Supreme Court Justices

Potter Stewart (1958-81; Eisenhower)

A centrist and pragmatic member of a fiercely divided Court, Stewart was an influential swing vote who helped to tip the scales on many important decisions. This was Eisenhower's third recess appointment, and many Southern conservatives used the Senate debate over his confirmation to voice their frustration with what they saw as the Court's civil rights and "pro-Communist" rulings. Despite their criticism, Stewart was confirmed by the Senate in a 70-17 vote. Stewart believed in judicial restraint, and he saw the proper function of a judge as interpreting the law as it applies to a particular case, and not attempting to assert judicial influence over matters he saw best left to the legislature. This meant that at a time when the Court was fiercely divided ideologically, he occupied a spot in the center and was an influential swing vote on many cases. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), he joined the majority in striking down all death penalty laws that were then in use, only to later uphold the revised death penalty laws implemented by many states in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). He did stand out on a number of occasions. He was the lone dissenter in In re Gault (1967), which extended Miranda rights to minors, reflecting his concerns about overly broad interpretations of the Due Process clause. In one of his more well-known opinions in the obscenity case Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), Stewart famously said that while he could not readily define the term "hard-core" pornography, "I know it when I see it." Relatively young to step down from the Court, he said that his decision was influenced by his desire to spend more time with his grandchildren while he was still in good health.

William B. Woods (1881-87; Hayes)

A committed Democrat and resisted the growing Republican tide, he at first, opposed the Civil War but then acknowledged the necessity of a Northern victory. His appointment would be the first time from a Confederate state since 1853. His two most memorable opinions were in United States v. Harris, which struck down the Ku Klux Klan Act on grounds that the government had no right, under the 14th Amendment, to regulate the activities of individuals, and in Presser v. Illinois, which declared that the Bill of Rights limited the power of the federal, but not a state, government. Both positions were later reversed.

John Marshall Harlan II (1955-71; Eisenhower)

A conservative icon of the Court who practiced a unique form of jurisprudence combining judicial restraint and activism, he was the grandson of John Marshall Harlan, who sat on the Court from 1877 to 1911. Congressional leaders were worried about the potential of a runaway liberal justice being appointed to the Court following the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Therefore, Harlan appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee prior to his confirmation in order to respond to questions about his judicial philosophy. This had never been done before, but it set a precedent for every future Supreme Court nomination. 9 of the 11 senators who voted against his confirmation were southerners who were deeply concerned that Harlan would support desegregation and other civil rights initiatives. He adamantly opposed strict textualism but found that the original intent of the Constitution could be supplemented by measuring the social impact of judicial decisions. Ultimately, he believed in a limited federal judiciary and favored the political process as the best realm for addressing and remedying public issues. However, Harlan regularly voted to expand civil rights. He voted with the majority to compel public officials to desegregate Arkansas public schools not shortly after the integration of the "Little Rock Nine" (Cooper v. Aaron) and joined the unanimous decision to end the ban on interracial marriages (Loving v. Virginia). He also endorsed the idea of substantive due process that encompassed several fundamental Constitutional rights (dissenting from the dismissal of Poe v. Ullman, where he wrote that the due process clause protected freedoms and rights beyond the traditional norms and encompassed a right to privacy), and advocated for a separation of church and state (voting with the majority in Engel v. Vitale, which declared it unconstitutional for states to compel public schools to recite prayers). He frequently dissented from criminal cases during the 1960's that sought to limit the interrogation techniques of police officers. He dissented in Escobedo v. Illinois, which found that police officers had to honor a suspect's request to consult an attorney during an interrogation, and dissented in Miranda v. Arizona. Harlan often voted alongside his mentor Frankfurter, was the ideological opposite of his friend Black, and was considered a moderate member. By the late 1960's, Harlan's health started to deteriorate, beginning with his eyesight. He often compensated by having others read materials for him. He retired from the Court and died of spinal cancer that year.

Henry Brockholst Livingston (1807-23; Jefferson)

A distant forebear of presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, Henry Brockholst Livingston was a captain in the Continental Army and frequent follower of Chief Justice John Marshall during his tenure on the Supreme Court. He emerged as a notable anti-Federalist and helped Jefferson win over New York in 1800. Some expected Livingston to serve as the opposition to Chief Justice Marshall, but throughout his tenure, Livingston only produced thirty-eight majority opinions, eight dissents, and six concurrences in sixteen years. Livingston was seen as the unofficial expert on commercial law until the arrival of Justice Story. His time on the bench included two acts that violated judicial ethics. In the first instance, he informed John Quincy Adams of the court's decision in Fletcher v. Peck before the decision was announced. The second act, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, he was influenced by an extrajudicial communication with his former New York colleague, Chancellor James Kent. He survived an assassination attempt in 1785 and he killed a man in a duel in 1798. Despite this drama, he was an advocate for public schools, and served as treasurer and trustee of Columbia University.

John Catron (1837-65; Jackson)

A man firmly opposed to secession yet a supporter of slavery, was a paradox that sat on the bench of the Supreme Court during the tumultuous times before the Civil War period. President Jackson nominated Catron for the Supreme Court on March 3, 1837, on Jackson's last day in office. The Senate confirmed him on March 8, 1837, to a new seat authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1837, which expanded the number of seats in the Supreme Court from seven to nine. Catron was the only of Jackson's nominees to accept the position. Catron was a supporter of slavery throughout his career and sided with the majority in Dred Scott v. Sanford. In this case, he wrote a separate concurrence. He agreed Scott was a slave, but said that Congress did not have the power to interfere with slavery in western territories. He opposed secession, but stood on the states' rights side and wished for Tennessee to remain in the Union. When Tennessee seceded, Catron fled and temporarily lived in Louisville, Kentucky. Catron died in Nashville on May 30, 1865, concluding his service on the Supreme Court. Afterwards, the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 was enacted, reorganizing the United States Circuit Court and gradually eliminating several seats on the Supreme Court. This was used as a way to prevent President Johnson from appointing any justices and to reduce southern influence after the Civil War. With this act, Catron's seat on the Supreme Court was eliminated after this death.

Bushrod Washington (1799-1829; Adams)

A nephew of President George Washington, Bushrod Washington served as an associate justice in the United States Supreme Court for over thirty years. Washington supported issues related to increasing the powers of the federal government, protecting private property rights and encouraging economic development. He voted so consistently with the great Chief Justice that they were considered conjoined "as a single judge," and only voted against Marshall on three occasions. While on circuit-riding duty, Washington presided over United States v. Bright in 1798, an important treason case. The trial generated political tensions, but Washington was able to maintain order throughout the proceedings and upheld the power of the national government by sentencing Bright. Again sitting as a circuit judge, Washington handed down the opinion in Golden v. Prince in 1814. He ruled that the power to pass bankruptcy laws belonged exclusively to the federal government. Other notable cases include Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819, in which Washington issued a concurring opinion attempting to limit the implications of the majority opinion. The majority ruled that the legislature could not interfere in a contract between private parties and Washington argued that Dartmouth College should not be considered a private party. In Green v. Biddle in 1823, Washington delivered a decision declaring various Kentucky laws passed to protect settlers from absentee landlords unconstitutional. Considered George Washington's favorite nephew, Bushrod Washington inherited the famous Mount Vernon and became executor of his uncle's estate, including President Washington's public and private papers.

Joseph Story (1812-45; Madison)

A renowned writer and orator, Joseph Story's writings and opinions fundamentally influenced early American jurisprudence. Andrew Jackson once referred to Joseph Story as "the most dangerous man in America," due to Story's strong support of nationalism. Although Madison originally thought Story would contrast with Marshall and other Federalists on the Court, Story did the exact opposite; he sided with Marshall in almost all of Marshall's decisions. Perhaps Story's most famous opinion came in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee in 1816, a significant historical decision that established the appellate authority of the Supreme Court. His other important judicial opinions include Prig v. Pennsylvania (1842), where Story held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 precluded state statutes concerning the recapture of escaped slaves. In Swift v. Tyson (1842), Story also aided in creating a "federal common law" specifically for commercial cases. Finally, in 1841, the Supreme Court heard "the Amistad case," concerning the US Navy's taking of a Spanish ship that was carrying slaves from Cuba. Writing for the majority, Story declared that the African captives should be freed on the basis that they were free individuals with full rights. He also took an active interest in higher education, and in in 1829, he became Dane Professor of Law at Harvard, where he played a pivotal role in the foundation of Harvard Law School. In addition to his work in education, Story was also an accomplished writer. Arguably his most famous written works were his nine Commentaries on the law, which advocated economic liberty and expressed his support for a strong national government.

John Marshall Harlan (1877-1911; Hayes)

A slaveholder and a member of the southern aristocracy, but he remained loyal to the Union over the Confederacy. Harlan sat longer than most justices. In his long tenure, he earned the title of "great dissenter." He wrote 1,161 opinions (including 316 dissents) and was the Court's outstanding liberal justice during that time. He issued a famous dissent in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1895), in which the Court ruled the federal income tax to be unconstitutional, and in various cases arising under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, he insisted that Congress had intended to destroy monopolies entirely, not merely to keep them under control. Harlan dissented from the Supreme Court's ruling in the Civil Rights cases (1883) that Congress could not punish discrimination against blacks by private persons but only by those acting in an "official" or "state" capacity. Perhaps the most famous of Harlan's dissents was that in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the case in which the Supreme Court established the "separate but equal" principle of racial segregation. Asserting that "our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," he expressed the justified fear that the majority of the court was consigning black citizens of the United States to a permanent "condition of legal inferiority." Always within spitting distance of a spittoon, Harlan was perhaps the last of the tobacco-chewing justices.

James C. McReynolds (1914-41; Wilson)

A strong Wilson supporter in the 1912 election, in return, Wilson appointed him attorney general, where he distinguished for his vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, thus widely regarded as a liberal when Wilson appointed him. McReynolds had the gift of irritating those around him, and perhaps to rid his administration of his testy colleague, Wilson nominated McReynolds to the Court. There, he became increasingly conservative and was an outspoken member of the majority that prior to 1937 succeeded in striking down many of the social-reform programs of the New Deal, thus earning a designation as one of the "Four Horsemen." His manner affected his relationships on the Court. For example, he refused to converse with John Clarke (also appointed by Wilson) because Clarke was too liberal. McReynolds made no secret of his anti-Semitism by refusing to speak to fellow justices Louis Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo. McReynolds voted to strike down the Tennessee Valley Authority in Ashwander v. TVA, the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in United States v. Butler, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., and the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937). He was called "the most strident Court critic of Roosevelt's New Deal programs." Yet, he two early decisions using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect civil liberties: Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).

Stanley Matthews (1881-89; Hayes)

A wunderkind, he graduated at 16 and was admitted to the bar at 18. The senate accused Hayes of cronyism since he and Matthews were classmates at Kenyon College, practiced law in Cincinnati, and served as officers in the state infantry. Garfield re-nominated Matthews, and he eventually was confirmed, 24 to 23. Matthews joined with the bloc of justices that were bringing about an extension of federal powers by liberal interpretation of the Constitution, particularly in the areas of commerce and federal borrowing. His most important opinion, given for the court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), held that even a law fair and impartial on its face was unconstitutional if it was administered in such a way as to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws as required by the 14th Amendment. His opinion here is cited by judges to this day.

John McKinley (1838-52; Van Buren)

Although honest and hardworking, his time on the Supreme Court was unexceptional. McKinley favored the reform of federal land policies during his term in Congress. He believed in the transfer of public land from the federal government to the states for economic development; he was a supporter of state's rights; and he agreed with Jackson's attempts to demolish the Bank of the United States. At the end of Jackson's second term, Congress created two more seats on the Supreme Court. Because McKinley supported Jackson's successor, Martin Van Buren, Van Buren appointed McKinley to the Supreme Court to fill one of the new seats, and he was confirmed by a voice vote. The same year, he had been reelected to the Senate; however, the 57-year-old chose to serve on the Court instead. Assigned to the ninth circuit, McKinley oversaw Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. One of McKinley's most infamous decisions occurred in the circuit court in Alabama when he heard the Alabama Bank Cases. In his decision, McKinley ruled in support of Alabama's power to stop out-of-state banks from buying and selling bills of exchange. The Supreme Court heard the appeal of the case, later called Bank of Augusta v. Earle, in 1839. McKinley was the lone dissenter; however, in 1846, he wrote for the Court in Musson v. Lake. Here, he accepted Justice Roger Taney's opinion delineated in Bank of Augusta, which supported a balance between interstate commercial development and states' rights. In addition to his dissent in Bank of Augusta, McKinley also dissented in Lane v. Vick (1845), where he expressed his desire to keep the Court in its proper judicial bounds. His most significant contribution, however, was his opinion in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (1845), which gave a legal basis for opening America's land. On the Court, McKinley was a moderate supporter of states' rights, but he generally voted with the majority. During his time on the Court, he wrote only 19 majority opinions, 4 dissents, and 2 concurrences. McKinley's docket of circuit court cases was the largest, so Congress reduced part of his caseload in 1842 by dismissing him from duties in Mississippi and Arkansas. Congress, however, then added Kentucky to his list. Stress and poor health precluded him from actively participating on the Supreme Court in the second half of his 15 years on the Court. McKinley made very little impact on American constitutional law, but his contribution to Alabama's early development makes him an important figure in American history.

William Cushing (1790-1810; Washington)

American jurist who was the first appointee to the U.S. Supreme Court. He declined the chief justiceship in 1796 owing to ill health, but he remained an associate justice on the court until his death in 1810. He was also the last judge in the United States to wear a full wig. As the longest-serving justice appointed by George Washington, he was best known for his quiet demeanor and short opinions. His two most important decisions were Chisholm v. Georgia and Ware v. Hylton, which regarded intrastate suits and the supremacy of treaties.

Philip P. Barbour (1836-41; Jackson)

An advocate for states' rights and for rigid construction of the United States Constitution, he was nominated to succeed Justice Gabriel Duval. Democrats, who were eager to see a more limited Court, supported Barbour. Although Republicans and Whigs disagreed with his views, the Senate nonetheless confirmed him. During his time at the Court, Barbour authored only one major opinion. In City of New York v. Miln (1837), the Court upheld states' jurisdiction over certain commercial activities. Barbour was part of the post-John Marshall majority, which, led by Taney, shifted the Court away from nationalistic ideals and liberal construction. While Barbour was regarded as a brilliant scholar, he did not serve on the Court long enough to have much of an influence on its direction. After only four years as an associate justice, he died at the age of 57.

James Iredell (1790-99; Washington)

An ardent Federalist, he one of the early opponents of integrating "natural law" into the interpretation of the Constitution. Despite his ardent support for the Constitution, his allegiance to the Federalist Party, and his continuing advocacy for a strong union of states, Iredell's lasting impact as a jurist might lie in his two dissenting opinions that drew stark lines in the sand for where the powers of the judiciary end. In Chisholm v. Georgia, Iredell was the lone dissent, insisting that no provision of the Constitution allowed individuals to sue states in federal court where there was no federal concern. His view proved to be the precursor to the Eleventh Amendment. In another dissent, which resonates even to this day, Justice Iredell authored the first Supreme Court opinion rejecting the use of "natural law" in striking down a legislative act. His opportunity to further impact history was cut short, however, as the rigors of traveling the circuits proved too much for his health, and he died on October 20, 1799, at the age of 48.

Stanley F. Reed (1938-57; FDR):

An economic liberal and social conservative, Reed sided with the liberal majority on the court on most economic issues but otherwise sided with Justice Frankfurter as an advocate of judicial restraint. Convinced that controlling judicial precedents should be reversed only when necessary, Reed avoided the pull of the court's liberals who sought an expansive incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to the states, most notably in Adamson v. California (1947), in which Reed wrote for the majority that the reach of each of the amendments of the Bill of Rights did not automatically extend to the states (in this case the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination). He voted with the majority in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) and Irvine v. California (1954), both of which ruled that illegally obtained evidence may be admissible in state courts, and upheld the conviction of (and denial of speech rights to) American communists who were arrested for violating the prohibition against advocating the violent overthrow of the U.S. government according to the Smith Act in Dennis v. United States (1951). He was also the lone dissenter in McCollum v. Board of Education School District 71 (1948), in which the court ruled that religious instruction in public schools violated the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution, even if different religions were involved and even if the parents gave their consent to the teaching. On economic matters, a spate of early decisions demonstrated his commitment to the welfare state and the right and responsibility of government to regulate economic and commercial activity. In upholding the Agricultural Marketing Act in United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative (1939), which allowed milk regulation orders by the secretary of agriculture, and supporting increased federal control over inland waterways and power sources in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. (1940), Reed was instrumental in expanding the coverage of the commerce clause as well as federal regulatory authority. Reed's conservatism on social issues and liberalism on economic issues apparently clashed with regard to civil rights, and the result was a clearly centrist position that found Reed quietly supportive of the court's increasingly progressive attitude regarding racial discrimination. On several major civil rights cases—from Smith v. Allwright (1944), in which Reed wrote the majority opinion declaring whites-only primaries unconstitutional, to Morgan v. Virginia (1946), which upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission's prohibition on segregated seating on interstate buses, to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)—Reed joined the majority.

Samuel Blatchford (1882-93; Arthur)

An expert in admiralty and patent law, and well-versed in the construction of the nation's banking laws, he was the Court's workhorse, gaining a reputation as one of the most hardworking justices, with his 430 opinions in cases. Blatchford was uninterested in questions of moment; yet, he was supremely invested in the judicial function, dissenting less frequently than any justice since the era of Marshall. He authored few cases calling for constitutional interpretation. Blatchford's decisions on the status of design patents and his rulings regarding the infringement of design formed the basis for legislation passed by Congress in 1887 to provide remedies for patent infringement. His most noteworthy opinions, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, and Budd v. People of New York, were roundly criticized for their apparently contradictory conclusions about due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Byron R. White (1962-93; Kennedy)

An unmoving pragmatist, he lives in infamy for both his individualistic approach to law and his success as a professional athlete. As he is not easily categorized by ideology, scholars continue to debate his ideological posture because his demeanor during oral arguments, prose in written opinions, and voting record are each driven by the individual circumstances of the case. Rather than make sweeping legal conclusions about constitutional doctrine, he approached cases by examining their facts and implementing a pragmatic approach toward interpreting the law. White wrote a total of nearly one thousand opinions and is remembered for his stern interrogation of attorneys during arguments. What is known for certain is that he believed in a strong federal government, a U.S. Supreme Court deferential to the other branches, and government accountability. These ideas are perhaps best illustrated in his ardent support of expansion of governmental powers, writing several majority opinions to desegregate public schools, such as U.S. v. Fordice in 1992, and uphold affirmative action policies, as in Fullilove v. Klutznick in 1980. Nevertheless, his voting record fell more in line with the conservative bloc as the years passed. He wrote majority opinions to reduce the power of federal civil rights laws, to uphold state laws prohibiting homosexual sex between consenting adults, and opposed state and local affirmative action plans. He similarly dissented from the majority in Miranda v. Arizona and Roe v. Wade. A vocal critic of the substantive due process doctrine, White retired from the Court and was succeeded by Ginsburg.

Wiley B. Rutledge (1943-49; FDR)

As FDR's 8th and last appointment, Rutledge had spoken out in support of Roosevelt's court-packing plan while dean of the University of Iowa Law School. He proved to be a strong liberal on the Court. He did not see the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on the reach of the Bill of Rights. Due process had meaning that might go beyond specific Bill of Rights provisions. He wrote several noted and controversial opinions, including his dissent against the execution of the Japanese general Yamashita Tomoyuki (In re Yamashita, 1946) for war crimes. Rutledge objected to the use of hearsay evidence in the trial and won wide public approval for his defense of the right of even a defeated enemy to a fair trial.

James F. Byrnes (1941-42; FDR)

As a close associate of FDR, he recognized that he really was not cut out for the intellectual demands and resigned after only 16 months on the bench. He took an active role in the war effort, heading important agencies in the Roosevelt administration. After attending the Yalta (Big Three) Conference with FDR in 1945, Byrnes resigned but was recalled to active service by Truman as secretary of state and accompanied Truman to the Potsdam Conference in the same year. He resigned from the cabinet in 1947 in a disagreement with Truman. He was elected governor of South Carolina in 1951 on a campaign of states' rights and separate-but-equal education for blacks.

John Blair Jr. (1790-96; Washington)

As one of the first justices to set a precedent of judicial review, John Blair, Jr.'s legacy as both a Founding Father and inaugural Supreme Court Justice continues to affect the contemporary judicial system. Justice Blair participated in the Court's landmark case Chisholm v. Georgia, which limited states' sovereign immunity and ultimately led to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In his opinion, Justice Blair relied only on the wording of the Constitution and not the general principles as some of his colleagues did. After his six-year stint as an inaugural Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Blair resigned in 1796 for health reasons.

Louis Brandeis (1916-39; Wilson)

As the first Jew to sit on the Court, Brandeis came to the Court with extraordinary credentials as a lawyer and public figure. He proved to be an equally extraordinary justice by employing the skills that made him renowned as an attorney: he mastered procedural details, researched the facts and the law, and went to great lengths to fashion opinions that were clear and logical. For Brandeis, law was a device to shape social, economic, and political affairs. Law had to operate on the basis of two key assumptions: that the individual was the basic force in society and that the individual had limited capabilities. Brandeis did not seek to pamper the individual; rather, he sought to stretch individual potential to its limit. In his major judicial opinions, Brandeis expressed mistrust of both the unlimited exercise of governmental power in the name of the people and a conception of individual liberty resulting in the agreement of a few persons to monopolize an economic activity affecting everyone. He believed that, to preserve federalism, state legislatures had to be able to make laws suited to varied and changing needs, but he wished to restrict state laws when they interfered with the freedom to express ideas. In the case of (Charlotte) Anita Whitney (Whitney v. California, 1927), a communist who had been convicted under a state criminal-syndicalism statute, he delivered a concurring opinion urging that penalties on speech be applied only if they met the "clear and present danger" (of inciting to admittedly illegal acts) test formulated earlier by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Observing the procedural limits on the court, however, he voted to affirm the conviction because Whitney's lawyer had not properly raised the constitutional free-speech issue in the trial court. Previously, he had dissented when the Supreme Court upheld convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 for publishing criticisms of the U.S. entry into World War I. On most important issues Brandeis was aligned, often in the minority, with his colleague Oliver Wendell Holmes. During the period of the New Deal, however, many of the dissenting positions of Holmes and Brandeis came to be accepted by the court. While Brandeis supported the constitutional validity of most New Deal legislation, he did not do so indiscriminately; he joined, for example, in the court's decision holding the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 to be unconstitutional. He retired on Feb. 13, 1939. He was a Zionist.

Noah H. Swayne (1862-81; Lincoln)

As the first of Lincoln's five appointments, Swayne satisfied Lincoln's criteria for appointment: commitment to the Union, slavery opponent, geographically correct. When Justice McLean died, Swayne mustered support for the appointment to his friend's position. Swayne was an undistinguished justice. In the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)— a pivotal decision on the meaning of Section 1 of the relatively new Fourteenth Amendment —Swayne dissented with Justices Field and Bradley, which was important, and presaged later decisions broadening the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. He is most famous for his majority opinion in Springer v. United States (1881), which upheld the Federal income tax imposed under the Revenue Act of 1864. He stayed well beyond his time; he deteriorated mentally and physically while still on the bench. Though he lacked intellectual leadership, Swayne coveted the position of Chief Justice. He campaigned aggressively and unsuccessfully for the spot in 1864 and in 1873.

Alfred Moore (1800-04; Adams)

At only four feet five inches tall, he was the shortest justice to ever sit on the Supreme Court. Moore was a Federalist and supported the movement to create a stronger central government. While serving as an associate justice, Moore only left one recorded opinion. In Bas v. Tingy (1800), Moore upheld the view that during the undeclared naval war of 1798 and 1799, France was an "enemy" nation. He was on the Court at the time of Marbury v. Madison (1803), but did not participate in the decision due to poor health.

Thurgood Marshall (1967-91; Johnson)

Before becoming the first black member of the Court, he was the face of NAACP, and he successfully argued before the Court the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954). As a proponent of judicial activism, he believed that the nation had a moral imperative to move progressively forward. He staunchly supported upholding individual rights, expanding civil rights, and limiting the scope of criminal punishment. In Furman v. Georgia, he and Justice Brennan argued the death penalty was unconstitutional in all circumstances, and dissented from the subsequent overruling opinion, Gregg v. Georgia, a few years later. He also made separate contributions to labor law (Teamsters v. Terry), securities law (TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.), and tax law (Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue). He had strong views on affirmative action and contributed greatly to opinions on constitutional law. Marshall maintained a down-to-earth style and would often joke with Chief Justice Burger as they passed in the hallways by asking "What's shakin', Chief baby?" As the court made a shift toward conservatism, however, Marshall became frustrated and his influence weakened. Despite the change of currents, Marshall's voice remained strong until his retirement, when he was succeeded by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas.

John McLean (1830-61; Jackson)

Best characterized as a political opportunist, between 1836 and 1860, four parties considered him as a Presidential candidate. The senate confirmed him on the same day Jackson nominated him for Justice. McLean's most notable opinion was probably his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Writing in opposition of slavery, McLean argued that Congress should exclude slavery from the territories and liberate those living in "free" states. McLean also authored the majority opinion for the first significant copyright case to reach the Supreme Court, Wheaton v. Peters. After many solid opinions, McLean died of pneumonia.

Harry A. Blackmun (1970-94; Nixon)

Blackmun was quiet in the beginning as he established his voice, often voting in accordance with Burger. As he began to gain confidence, Blackmun gradually moved toward the liberal side and became more outspoken in his beliefs. As Blackmun became more independent, his friendship with Burger flagged. The two were once referred to as the Minnesota Twins, but eventually, Blackmun grew frustrated with Burger's style of managing the Court. As Blackmun gravitated toward the left, he focused on the pragmatic aspects of the case more than the theoretical. Blackmun would take extensive notes before and during the hearing, even noting the lawyers in their demeanor and appearance. Blackmun was most concerned with the person affected by the decision, urging the Court to stay grounded. Blackmun's growing determinant nature is illustrated in his opinion in Roe v. Wade. Blackmun led the Court in the decision to rule in favor of abortion, authoring an opinion that was both controversial and unexpected from the former conservative. Though he handled affirmative action, civil liberties, immigrants' rights, and commercial speech, his term was most noted for his decision regarding abortion. He continued to support the ruling, refusing to retire until the precedent was safe. Blackmun was also a staunch supporter of the First Amendment, of the strong separation of church and state, and of affirmative action. At the end of his legal career, Blackmun shifted his opinion on the constitutionality of the death penalty because of his growing belief that the death penalty was applied in an inherently random and arbitrary fashion.

Pierce Butler (1923-39; Harding)

Born on St. Patrick's Day, the luck of the Irish blessed him with an appointment to the Court. Butler was Taft's top choice for the number 6 position on the Taft team. Taft wanted to solidify the conservative portion of the bench. The Chief appealed to the symbolic value of a Butler appointment: Butler was a Catholic at a time when there were no other Catholic justices. Butler's confirmation raised the hackles of some liberal Senators and generated opposition from academic circles. But in the end, only 8 senators voted against him. Butler proved to be every bit the conservative on the Court. He generally preferred freedom to equality and opted for order rather than freedom in the cases that came before him. There were exceptions: He took a broad view of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, for example. As a strict constitutional constructionist, he was one of the conservative "Four Horsemen" during the New Deal. Together with, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, Butler opposed every piece of New Deal legislation that came before him: He opposed government control of business, consistently voted against the imposition of state and federal taxes, and joined with the court's majority in voting down two important New Deal programs, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery Administration. He wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Schwimmer, in which the Hungarian immigrant's application for citizenship was denied because of her candid refusal to take an oath to "take up arms" for her adopted country. In Palko v. Connecticut, Butler was the lone dissenter on the court; the rest of the justices believed that a state was not restrained from trying a man a second time for the same crime. Butler believed this violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He sided with the majority in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, holding unconstitutional an Oregon state law which prohibited parents from sending their children to private or religious schools.

David Davis (1862-77; Lincoln)

Both Lincoln and Stephen Douglas practiced before Judge Davis. Davis served as Lincoln's campaign manager in 1860, helping to secure the Republican presidential nomination. Lincoln nominated Davis to the Court, but Davis retained his appetite for partisan politics. Davis became famous in Ex Parte Milligan (1866), in which the Court held that since the civil courts were operative, the trial of a civilian by a military tribunal was unconstitutional. The opinion denounced arbitrary military power, effectively becoming one of the bulwarks of held notions of American civil liberty. Davis did not really enjoy his work on the Court. He found the appellate bench disagreeable for the hard study and labor it required. He served one term before retiring from public life.

David J. Brewer (1890-1910; Harrison)

Brewer lived up to the reputation that preceded him to the Supreme Court; he was an active contributor to the doctrine of substantive due process. This is the notion that there are certain activities outside the scope of legitimate government. The effect of this doctrine would be to free activities from any government control. The doctrine was confined to the economic and regulatory sphere when Brewer served on the Court, but the same doctrine has come to play a vital role in protecting individual liberty from government overreaching. Brewer may be best remembered for his dissenting opinions. However, he spoke for a unanimous Court in Muller v. Oregon (1908). Brewer generally joined conservatives in resisting the trend toward an increase in the power and responsibility of the federal government. At the same time, speaking for the majority in the principal injunction case of the period, In re Debs (1895), he upheld the government's use of the injunction against unlawful strikes. In a notable liberal departure, he wrote the majority opinion in Muller v. Oregon (1908), sustaining a state law that limited to 10 the daily working hours of women factory employees. From 1895 to 1897 he served as president of the commission appointed by Congress to investigate the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana.

Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (1932-38; Hoover)

Cardozo's appointment was something of a fluke in the view of some scholars. At the time, there was another Jew on the Court (Brandeis) and another New Yorker (Stone); and, Hoover was a Republican. But Cardozo had enthusiastic support from all quarters (the organized bar, the academic world, the media), and Hoover may have been motivated to make a nonpolitical appointment in the face of a tough reelection campaign in November. Cardozo's chief contribution came from his felicity of expression and skill at synthesis. His relatively short tenure minimized his influence, Nevertheless, his opinions have been grist for judges well beyond his years of service, placing Cardozo in the pantheon of eminent justices. A creative common-law judge and legal essayist, he influenced a trend in American appellate judging toward greater involvement with public policy and a consequent modernization of legal principles. Generally a liberal, he was less concerned with ideology than with the nature of the judicial process; largely for this reason, his importance—while universally conceded—is difficult to fix precisely. He wrote a majority opinion for Helvering v. Davis and other Social Security cases (1937), upholding the federal Social Security program on the basis of the general welfare provision of the United States Constitution (Article I, section 8). In Palko v. Connecticut (1937), a criminal case involving a claim of double jeopardy, he held that the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) to the Constitution imposed on the states only those provisions of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) that were "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."

John H. Clarke (1916-22; Wilson)

Clarke generally favored the extension of government regulatory powers over the economy, and his opinions were used later as precedents in some of the antitrust decisions backing FDR's New Deal policies. His position on civil liberties was ambivalent, however, and he relied on a very narrow construction of First Amendment rights in his decisions concerning the suppression of free speech during the Red Scare of 1919-20. His dissents on two cases, Hammer v. Dagenhart and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company supported Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause (in the Hammer case) and the Taxing and Spending Clause (in the Bailey case) to address what Progressives saw as a major social problem. He also demonstrated his opposition to monopoly in United States v. Reading Company, in a ruling that became a prominent part of anti-trust law. After the death of his two sisters, with whom he had lived in Youngstown, Clarke resigned from the court in 1922. Afterward, he headed a campaign favoring U. S. participation in the League of Nations. He then retired from public life, emerging briefly in a national radio address in 1937 to support Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan. Thus, Clarke's support for progressive causes never reached fruition on the Court because of his resignation.

Rufus Wheeler Peckham (1896-1909; Cleveland)

Cleveland's 4th and last appointment, Peckham will long be remembered for invoking the idea of "substantive due process" to invalidate a state statute regulating the hours of bakery employees. His opinion in that case aroused one of the most famous dissents in the history of the Court. Peckham took as his mission the separation of state powers from national powers and the separation of all government from individual rights. His was a daunting task, for as his colleague, Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, the major premise of Peckham's jurisprudence was "******** it." Peckham was basically a conservative justice who was noted for his careful and lucidly reasoned opinions. He is best known for the majority opinion he wrote in Lochner v. New York (1905), a case in which a baker had contracted with his employees for longer than a 10-hour working day in defiance of a state law setting 10 hours a day as the legal maximum. Peckham wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from curtailing a man's liberty to make his own economic arrangements with his employees. This decision drew a stinging rebuke from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in a memorable dissent. By the 1930's, Holmes's opinion had become the prevailing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and legislation such as maximum-hours laws was held to be constitutional. Peckham wrote frequently while he was on the bench, but modern students of constitutional law find his reasoning "unfathomable" and the results reached by that reasoning "insupportable."

Joseph McKenna (1898-1925; McKinley)

Considered a diligent but not otherwise notable justice. He served 4 terms in the House, and later, as circuit judge and (briefly) as attorney general. In all these roles, he was devoted to Republican principles. This loyalty was the basis for his nomination to the Court, for experience would confirm that it was not his ability that merited his elevation to the nation's highest tribunal. In fact, two federal trial judges took the unusual step of publicly expressing their view that McKenna was unfit for the office based on his performance as an appellate judge. He may have acknowledged his lack of preparation when, after his confirmation, he studied law at Columbia Law School to prepare for the burdens he would face as a justice. One of the most notable was his opinion in the case of United States v. U.S. Steel Corporation (1920), which held that antitrust cases would be decided on the "rule of reason" principle—only alleged monopolistic combinations that are in unreasonable restraint of trade—are illegal. In Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (1911), a unanimous Court upheld the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. While McKenna was generally quite favorable to federal power, he joined the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence and voted with the majority in 1905's Lochner v. New York, which struck down a state maximum-hours law for bakery workers.

Salmon P. Chase (1864-73; Lincoln)

Deeply involved in the antislavery movement, he would frequently defend runaway slaves in court when owners sought return of their slaves under fugitive slave laws. He returned to the Senate (Ohio) in 1861 but resigned two days after his election to take a position in Lincoln's cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury. Chase and Lincoln disagreed frequently, and Chase twice submitted his resignation. Lincoln reluctantly accepted it the second time in 1864, but he still held Chase in high esteem. Lincoln nominated him to fill the vacancy created by the death of Taney. Among his most prominent decisions while on the court were: Texas v. White (1869), in which he asserted that the Constitution provided for a permanent union, composed of indestructible states, while allowing some possibility of divisibility "through revolution, or through consent of the States"; Veazie Banks v. Fenno (1869), upholding banking legislation of the Civil War that imposed a 10% tax on state banknotes; and Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), which declared certain parts of the legal tender acts to be unconstitutional. He presided over the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson in the Senate. In 1868 and 1872, Chase made a private and ultimately unsuccessful bid to secure his presidential nomination.

Roger Brooke Taney (1836-64; Jackson)

Despite serving in the position for nine months, Taney became the first cabinet nominee ever to be rejected by the Senate. Jackson nominated Taney to replace Gabriel Duvall on the Supreme Court in 1835 but, afraid of his seemingly radical views, the senate rejected him again. Jackson successfully nominated him again 10 months later to succeed Chief Justice John Marshall. Taney, the first Roman Catholic to serve on the Court, was confirmed on March 15, 1836. While serving on the Court, Taney introduced new traditions that are still followed today. First, despite his refined upbringing, Taney began the custom of wearing ordinary pants under his judicial robes. He also started the practice of assigning opinions to associate justices. Besides these procedural changes, Roger Taney was best known for his policy. Adhering to the Jacksonian theory that the state and national government should share powers, Taney believed that the Supreme Court had the duty to decide which powers were shared and which powers were specifically assigned. He believed strongly in states' rights, and although his Court did transfer some power to the states, the Court did not completely dismantle his predecessor's federalist view. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, the Court asserted that private property had a social responsibility, and contracts made by the legislature should be construed in the public interest. Taney's most infamous decision was the Dred Scott v. Sanford opinion. Ironically, Taney freed the slaves that he had inherited; however, he believed that the federal government had no right to limit slavery. He mistakenly thought he could save the Union when he ruled that the Framers of the Constitution believed slaves were so inferior that they possessed no legal rights. He held the Missouri compromise unconstitutional, claiming that as property, slaves were protected under Article V. In addition to this unpopular opinion, Taney became even more disliked when he challenged President Lincoln's constitutional authority to apply certain emergency measures during the Civil War. Lincoln saw him as an enemy, and even defied one of Taney's judicial decisions. Despite his critics, Taney served until he died on October 12, 1864, at the age of 87, after being Chief Justice for 28 years.

William O. Douglas (1939-75; FDR)

Determined and competitive, he set the record for longest continuous service on the Court. Due to his loyalty to the New Deal and his friends on the inside, he became the second-youngest Court appointee in history. Douglas was well-known for his strict commitment to civil liberties and authored many opinions that expressed his views on individual rights, such as free speech. He supported the right to privacy, limits on government interference, and the rights of illegitimate children. While critics claimed his work showed haste and that he did not develop a coherent legal analysis, defenders admired the forceful and blunt manner by which he reached the core issue in each case. Douglas supported New Deal legislation, especially in the areas of labor law and control of markets. He believed in regulating business and helped change the antitrust analysis of price fixing. Douglas often wrote or voted in support of the theories developed by Justice Hugo L. Black, who also championed civil liberties. With Chief Justice Burger, however, Douglas was less than agreeable and often teased the Chief Justice. Douglas's advocacy of a broad reading of First Amendment rights was shown in his dissenting from the Court's decision in Dennis v. United States (1952), affirming the conviction of the leader of the U.S. Communist Party. Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), explaining that a constitutional right to privacy forbid state contraception bans.

William Johnson (1804-34; Jefferson)

During his twenty-nine years on the bench, he wrote 112 majority opinions, trailing only Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story in speaking for the Court. President Thomas Jefferson appointed him to the Supreme Court, and Senate confirmed him on May 7, 1804 as the first Supreme Court member who was not a Federalist. In Johnson's first major circuit court opinion, Johnson felt the executive branch's control of maritime trade in this case was an overextension of its constitutional powers. Widely known as a critic of Justice Marshall, Johnson's most noteworthy dissent was in Craig v. Missouri, in which Johnson argued that states should be able to issue temporary bills of credit or loans. Later, Johnson concurred in Gibbons v. Ogden, which held that the Commerce Clause gave to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. In Gibbons, Johnson revealed his nationalist position involving federal-state relations. He strongly believed that the federal government had the right to control interstate commerce, including the commerce of slavery. His position was so unpopular that he was forced to move to Pennsylvania. Johnson was an owner of slaves who opposed abolition while also opposing inhumane treatment of Africans. He put his reputation in jeopardy in his native South Carolina when he denounced anti-federal sentiment and state denial of due process to a slave rebel. Earlier, in 1823, Johnson invalidated a South Carolina Act that excluded free African-American traders from state ports in his circuit court decision in Elkison v. Deliesseline. Johnson remained on the Supreme Court until his death. In July of 1834, he traveled to New York for jaw surgery. After the procedure, he died from what was said to be "exhaustion." His death was unexpected but left a substantial legacy as a frequent dissenter and a Jeffersonian judge.

William J. Brennan, Jr. (1956-90; Eisenhower)

Eisenhower nominated Brennan as a recess appointment, partially as a political appeal to left-leaning voters in the upcoming 1956 presidential election. Despite initial fears from some Senators that he would allow his Catholic faith to guide his decision-making rather than legal analysis, Brennan was confirmed, with only Senator McCarthy voting against him. Brennan's ability to persuade his fellow Justices led him to author many landmark cases upholding individual freedoms, including Baker v. Carr (1962), which established the "one person, one vote" doctrine; and Texas v. Johnson (1989), holding that the burning of the American flag is political speech protected by the First Amendment. In Brennan's last vote as a Supreme Court Justice, he sided with the majority in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission (1990), upholding the constitutionality of two federal affirmative action programs aimed at increasing black ownership of radio and television stations. He is perhaps best remembered for his role in a series of obscenity cases, beginning with Roth v. United States (1957), many of which broadened the protection accorded to publishers but which also showed an attempt to balance individual freedoms with the interests of the community. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), Brennan created the "right to be wrong"—the speech and press rule stipulating that even false statements about public officials should be entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments unless "actual malice" could be demonstrated. Brennan was a strong believer in the importance of an independent judiciary and of the impact of procedure upon substantive rights. A skilled navigator of the Court's inner politics, he directly influenced most of the decisions in which he joined, and during his time on the Court wrote more than 1,200 opinions. He retired from the Court in 1990 due to his declining health. President Clinton awarded Brennan the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1993.

Earl Warren (1953-69; Eisenhower)

Eisenhower viewed Warren as a fellow moderate Republican and nominated him on the basis of affiliation with national politics. Since he was not attracted to national politics, however, his role as a "Republican" was not as predictive of his role on the Court as Ike had thought. Warren's position as Chief was one of courage and flexibility in carving new paths. Warren joined the Court in the midst of some of its most important issues - racial segregation in public schools and the expansion of civil liberties. The new Chief proved an effective leader as he brought the Court from division to unanimity in many cases. With this courage came a lack of humility, however. Warren viewed his rule as righteous; those who challenged him, he thought of as violating justice. Despite Warren's vanity, the air amongst the justices was overwhelmingly cordial. Growing liberal with age, much of Warren's decisions were still rooted in Progressive beliefs supported by the rule of common law. Warren viewed crime as mutually exclusive to poverty, education, social conditions, degradation, and standards of law enforcement. Warren gravitated away from the strict hand by which he formerly dealt with perpetrators. Instead, he believed crime could be ridden by improving the condition of cities and thus took into account the influential conditions violators lived within. After the reaction to Brown v. Board of Education, Warren thought of the Court as a protector of the public, the means to restore ethics and mind the conducts of legislators. The Warren Court did not view constitutional law as text alone; it was living. The Warren court handed down many significant cases affecting individual rights, including sexual freedom, rights of criminals, religion, and civil and political rights. Key cases include: Mapp v. Ohio (1961): Bill of Rights and the states; Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964): legislative reapportionment with the "one man, one vote" principle; Engel v. Vitale (1962): separation of religion from public schools; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963): right to counsel; New York Times v. Sullivan (1964): freedom of the press; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964): right to counsel; Miranda v. Arizona (1966): rights of the accused; Tinker v. Des Moines (1969): certain kinds of nonverbal communication can be protected under the first amendment.

Sherman Minton (1949-56; Truman)

Feeling that his record on the bench should be enough to prove he was qualified to serve on the highest court in the land, he deemed it unnecessary to testify at his Senate hearing, even though the Senate called for him. Despite this refusal, Minton was still confirmed by a vote of 48-16. Many predicted that due to Minton's record as a Senator, his voting record would be consistently liberal. While on the court, Minton actually championed a philosophy of deference to the legislative and executive branches of government, which often found him voting with the conservative side of the court. He rarely favored judicial interference if it could be avoided. In Adler v. Board of Education (1952), Minton wrote the majority opinion upholding a New York statute allowing schools to fire teachers who belonged to subversive groups—specifically groups that advocated overthrowing the government. Minton joined in the dissenting opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), a case that held unconstitutional President Truman utilizing executive authority to seize steel mills where the workers were striking. United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy (1950) was a case that centered around an American veteran with a German-born wife who was declared an undesirable alien. Minton authored the majority opinion upholding the Department of Justice's findings, stating nonresident aliens were not entitled to due process. Notably, in 1954 Minton did vote against the government in Brown v. Board of Education. Minton was fearful of keeping his position past his ability to adequately fulfill his obligations to the Court, and thus retired in 1956 due to poor health. He lived another 9 years before he died of pernicious anemia.

Arthur J. Goldberg (1962-65; Kennedy):

Goldberg's term on the court was short, but instrumental. His liberal perspective on jurisprudence helped shift the Court's focus toward broader constructions of constitutional rights at a time when the civil rights movement dominated the American legal system. His concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court ruled the Ninth Amendment protected a right to privacy, is one of his most prominent works from his tenure. Goldberg also strongly opposed the death penalty, going so far as to write an internal Supreme Court memorandum in 1963 that construed it as cruel and unusual punishment and a dissent from the Court's rejection of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama that expressed the same reasoning. This dissent inspired attorneys nationwide to challenge the constitutionality of capital punishment, which eventually led to a demonstrative end of death penalty for the rest of the 1960's and most of the 1970's. Goldberg's time on the bench came to an abrupt halt in 1965 when President Johnson asked him to step down in order to become the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and work toward mitigating the war in Vietnam. His was replaced by the President's close friend, Abe Fortas. Scholars believe Johnson wanted Fortas appointed in order to have early warning to any constitutional issues raised against his Great Society agenda. Subsequent events led to a fallout between Goldberg and President Johnson because Goldberg assumed that he would be appointed back to the Court when the war was over - and was disappointed when Johnson nominated Fortas to replace Chief Justice Earl Warren instead of him. Goldberg resigned and became a partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. The Nixon's election closed the door on Goldberg's aspirations to return to the Court.

Joseph P. Bradley (1870-92; Grant)

He advocated a broad nationalist view of the commerce clause and of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a justice, he emphasized the power of the federal government to regulate commerce. His decisions reflecting this view, rendered during the period of rapid industrialization that followed the Civil War, were significant in assuring a national market for manufactured goods. His refusal to allow constitutional protection for the civil rights of blacks assisted in the defeat of Reconstruction in the South. His most famous statement on matters of race came in the Civil Rights Cases (1883). He was among the 4 dissenters in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873). Bradley concurred with the court's decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, which held that the right to practice law was not constitutionally protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Electoral Commission of 1877, and his vote elected Rutherford B. Hayes President.

Henry B. Brown (1891-1906; Harrison)

He avoided service in the Civil War by hiring a substitute, an accepted practice in his day. Brown authored in excess of 450 majority opinions during his years on the Court. He gave preference to private property claims and defended free competition. Yet, Brown also took a broad view of the state's police powers including governmental restrictions on laissez faire. Brown will probably be forever marked by a single opinion he authored for a majority: Plessy v. Ferguson. Brown no doubt reflected the view of his day that whites were biologically separate from blacks, and that whites were superior to blacks as a group. Also, in his controversial opinion concurring in Downes v. Bidwell (one of the Insular Cases), he declared that peoples of annexed territories were not entitled to constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges.

Nathan Clifford (1858-81; Buchanan)

He delivered over 400 opinions as a Supreme Court Justice, although he only wrote on issues related to commercial and maritime law. Although many Republicans criticized Clifford because of his southern sympathies, the Senate narrowly confirmed Clifford. He held his seat as a Supreme Court Justice for 23 years without ever addressing a constitutional issue. However, Clifford is well known for his supporting role in Hepburn v. Griswold, which declared certain parts of the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional. The Legal Tender Act was passed during the Civil War for the purposes of funding the economy with U.S. notes; however, the act was overruled because the U.S. notes were deemed a depreciated medium of exchange that ultimately denied creditors due process of law. In 1877, Clifford chaired the electoral commission for the presidential election. Although he remained true to his political domain and supported the Democratic aspirant, the commission ultimately voted in favor of the Republican, Rutherford B. Hayes.

Edward T. Sanford (1923-30; Harding)

He elevated from his perch as a federal trial judge in Tennessee to the nation's highest court after the strenuous lobbying efforts of Chief Justice Taft. Sanford seemed to return that loyalty by joining with the Chief Justice regularly while they were on the Court. Sanford also participated in Taft's "inner club" of conservative justices who met at Taft's home on Sunday afternoons. Sanford contributed to the domain of civil liberties when he spoke for the Court upholding a state anarchy statute. Implicit in Sanford's reasoning was the notion that some provisions of the Bill of Rights apply with equal force to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This idea would have extraordinary consequences for the nationalization of the Bill of Rights during the era of the Warren Court. A number of his important opinions dealt with the Federal Bankruptcy Act and with the question of freedom of expression. He wrote the celebrated opinion in Liberty Warehousing v. Grannis, which declared that a federal court could not issue a declaratory judgment even if such a proceeding is authorized under state law. His most noted opinion was in the "Pocket Veto" case, in which he ended a 140-year-old dispute by ruling that the president has 10 calendar, rather than legislative, days to act on a bill before the adjournment of Congress. Sanford's career on the Court ended when he died unexpectedly on the same day as the death of his mentor, retired Chief Justice William Howard Taft.

John Jay (1789-95; Washington)

He established important judicial precedents as the first chief justice of the United States (1789-95) and negotiated the Jay Treaty of 1794, which settled major grievances with Great Britain and promoted commercial prosperity. In 1789, Washington appointed Jay the country's first chief justice, in which capacity he was instrumental in shaping Supreme Court procedures in its formative years. His most notable case was Chisholm v. Georgia, in which Jay and the court affirmed the subordination of the states to the federal government. Unfavorable reaction to the decision led to adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, denying federal courts authority in suits by citizens against a state.

Tom C. Clark (1949-67; Truman)

He faced a very difficult confirmation process: he was criticized for his lack of judicial experience, among other things. He declined to testify before the Judiciary Committee since he believed it would "[jeopardize] his future effectiveness on the Court." Nevertheless, he received Senate confirmation with only eight dissenting votes. Neither a staunch liberal or conservative justice, he voted with Vinson the majority of the time in his first years on the Court, which provided a somewhat predictable voting estimate. However, when Vinson died in 1953, and Warren succeeded him, Clark began issuing a balanced mix of liberal and conservative opinions. This approach was reflected in his equal use of judicial restraint and expansive constitutional interpretation. He generally supported government laws intended to protect or promote racial equality. He joined opinions of cases that utilized the Equal Protection Clause against racial discrimination in education (e.g., Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents), which created the groundwork for the Brown v. Board of Education decision. He also faced challenges to Cold War-era laws that he initiated or created. While he usually recused himself from such cases, he deferred to the government in the cases he did participate in (e.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, a decision he authored that upheld a city's right to require public employees to submit affidavits that they were never members of the Community Party). His career history as an assistant district attorney and attorney general influenced his opinions on criminal procedure and the rights of criminal defendants. He usually backed government prosecutorial efforts in his early years; however, as the makeup of the Court began to shift, he allied with the liberal justices on several key decisions (e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, Mapp v. Ohio, and Berger v. New York). Clark penned the opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, a First Amendment Establishment Clause case that ruled Bible-reading exercises and mandated prayer in public schools were unconstitutional. In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Clark wrote the majority opinion that evidence obtained by illegal seizure could not be used in state courts, thereby greatly broadening the constitutional protection available to defendants. Clark retired in order to avoid a conflict of interest when his son, Ramsey, was named Attorney General. He was succeeded by Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American Supreme Court justice.

Morrison Remick Waite (1874-88; Grant)

He gained a measure of national attention when he represented the U.S. delegation to an international arbitration aimed at settling a dispute between the United States and Great Britain concerning the outfitting of Confederate vessels in British ports. The United States was awarded $15.5 million and brought Waite praise and attention. Waite was a surprise choice for the chief justice position. Grant had offered the position to another candidate who turned him down. Grant approached three others, but they withdrew when the Senate threatened rejection. Waite was Grant's 5th and final choice for the job. His surprise appointment also generated resentment among several of his colleagues on the Court who aspired to the center chair but did not obtain it. Waite's legacy to constitutional law falls into three domains. His opinions were the first interpreting the Civil War Amendments. Second, his opinions guided state governments, as they sought to address economic changes resulting from the industrial revolution. Finally, Waite's view of the judicial function guided thinking about judicial review well into the 20th century. Waite sympathized with the court's general tendency to interpret the Civil Rights Amendments narrowly. In United States v. Cruikshank, the court struck down the Enforcement Act, ruling that the states had to be relied on to protect citizens from attack by other private citizens. In Minor v. Happersett (1875), using the restricted definition of national citizenship and the 14th Amendment as set forth in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), Waite upheld the states' right to deny women the franchise. Nonetheless, Waite sympathized with the women's rights movement and supported the admission of women to the Supreme Court bar.

John Archibald Campbell (1853-61; Pierce)

He had a brilliant legal career, but his career as a Supreme Court justice will be remembered as the career the Civil War cut short. After the Senate had rejected Pierce's candidate for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Taney, along with every other justice, unanimously requested that Campbell be chosen to fill the empty spot. Campbell's ability to strike a pro-slavery slanted middle ground was what allowed him to do what the other candidate could not: receive a unanimous confirmation from the Senate. His largest struggle during his time on the bench was attempting to stop the secessionist fever from spreading. He never believed that seceding was the correct path, and even freed his own slaves before he took the bench to prove it. When cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford came up, he wished to give a ruling as narrow as possible, so as to avoid issues that perpetuated tensions between the North and South. When the Confederacy was first created in 1860, many officials from the North refused to validate the new state by meeting with its officials. Campbell tried to act as a mediator, to no avail. He resigned from the Court in 1861 and moved back to his Mobile, Alabama home. Southerners viewed his attempts to mediate as a betrayal and threatened to lynch him, so he moved to New Orleans to set up a law practice there. In 1865, the president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, granted Campbell permission to meet with President Lincoln and arrange the terms of the South's surrender. Shortly after they struck an agreement, Lincoln was assassinated, and Campbell found himself imprisoned. The North was so angered by the assassination that they accused Campbell of misrepresenting what Lincoln stated his views were toward surrender during the meeting. The charges were dropped four months later through the efforts of his old colleagues, Benjamin Curtis and Samuel Nelson. Eventually, the Supreme Court decided in Ex parte Garland that an act barring attorneys from practicing in federal courts unless they swore under oath that they never aided the Confederacy was unconstitutional. That decision allowed Campbell to argue in front of the Supreme Court again. He argued about six cases a year in front of the Supreme Court, his most famous being the Slaughterhouse Cases, which revolved around a monopoly in the slaughterhouse business granted by a Louisiana statute. Campbell argued that it was unconstitutional and, while the argument failed in that case, it was later adopted and used successfully in protecting black businessmen in civil rights cases. Campbell slowly decreased his caseload, but never fully retired from the practice of law until he died of natural causes in 1889. Though Campbell had an untimely exit from his position as a Supreme Court justice, he will be remembered as a legal prodigy who attempted to navigate through the Civil War preaching peace and compromise.

Samuel Freeman Miller (1862-90; Lincoln)

He held to the view that slavery should be abolished, although gradually. Miller set the record for his time for the most constitutional decisions authored by a single justice (100). His narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment—he wrote the opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases—limited the effectiveness of the amendment. Miller wrote the majority opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, which held that the right to practice law was not constitutionally protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller held that the federal government had broad authority to act to protect black voters from violence by the Ku Klux Klan and other private groups. Miller also supported the use of broad federal power under the Commerce Clause to override state regulations, as in Wabash v. Illinois.

Harold H. Burton (1945-58; Truman)

He holds the unusual distinction of being the only Republican appointed to the Court from 1933 to 1953, a period of virtually complete Democratic control. He proved to be the most liberal of Truman's four appointments. He possessed extraordinary personal charm. His liberal views did not always protect individual rights, as his opinion for the Court in the Bute case makes plain. Burton earned a reputation as a diligent but quiet justice, often working more than 80 hours per week and rarely leaving his office for social occasions. Burton honored the more traditional approach of circulating drafts of opinions and was not an opinion leader. He was essentially an ideologically stable, strict constructionist. Throughout his tenure on the court, the ideological balance shifted; during the first third of his career on the bench, he formed part of a loose conservative majority, and in the next third he became part of a solid centrist bloc. With the appointments of Warren (1953) and William Brennan (1956), the final years of Burton's tenure found him increasingly in the minority, though he was one of the early supporters of the unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education; he also voted to invalidate restrictive housing covenants, which forbade some homeowners from selling their property to racial minorities. Burton generally opposed union power and antitrust legislation; he also supported greater governmental intervention on social matters (e.g., he rejected claims of free speech rights made by communists) and less governmental intervention on economic ones. Burton began to suffer from Parkinson disease, so he resigned from the Court.

Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57; Fillmore)

He is best known for his service during what was arguably the Supreme Court's darkest time, and for his abrupt and dramatic exit from the Court. Curtis was chosen as Justice Levi Woodbury's replacement to create a balance between the Whig and Democratic parties. He started his term on the Court with one of his most notable opinions, Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (1852). This case was surrounding a Commerce Clause issue— mainly, whether states were allowed to impose regulations in areas of commerce where the federal government had already imposed regulations. Curtis argued that the state was not allowed to regulate areas of commerce unless the federal government was silent on restriction in that area. While Curtis knew he needed to create this bright-line rule, he wished to leave room for future interpretation given that the nature of commerce was bound to change with time. Curtis became particularly disenchanted with the court around 1855. His missed his family and home he left behind in Boston, and he struggled to financially support himself and his family on his annual salary. Furthermore, he decided to consistently uphold the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, legislation that allowed runaway slaves to be captured and returned to their owners and imposed hefty penalties on individuals who interfered with their capture, even though he found the act itself abhorrent. This made him very unpopular among the Northern population. The Court faced this issue again in 1857 during the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. This decision left a major blemish on the Court's record, but it was particularly disastrous for Curtis, who dissented from the majority opinion. Curtis based his opinion on the premise that Roger B. Taney, the author of the majority opinion, stated that black people were not and could not be citizens. However, Curtis pointed out, five states had granted them citizenship, and that living on free soil granted slaves freedom. His dissenting opinion was published without his knowledge in a Boston newspaper before the majority decision was published. Taney saw this as an affront to the Court, and this incited a feud between himself and Curtis. Scathing letters were send back and forth between the two until Curtis resigned in 1857. Even though Curtis started his career by defending Congress's right to pass slave laws, he is remembered for ending his career as a justice on the right side of history.

Gabriel Duvall (1811-35; Madison)

He is called "the most insignificant" Justice in the Court's history. Duvall found that his views largely aligned with Marshall's views, leading to Duvall rarely writing opinions. Even during the few times he disagreed with Marshall, Duvall tended not to write a dissenting opinion. The one time when Duvall dissented was in the case of Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn (1813), where he was the sole dissenting justice in a case that ruled whether the daughter of an ex-slave could provide hearsay evidence that her mother was free at the time of her birth. Duvall wrote that the evidence should be allowed, and "people of color from their helpless condition under the uncontrolled authority of a master, are entitled to all reasonable protection."As Duvall aged, his hearing declined to the point of near deafness. Duvall only stepped down from his seat on the court when Jackson assured him that he would be replaced by an individual who was not too political.

Thomas Johnson (1792-93; Washington)

He is remembered as the justice with the record for shortest tenure. His historical significance does not stem from his time on the Court, but his involvement in the revolutionary cause. He headed the resistance to the 1765 Stamp Act. In 1791, Washington offered Johnson a position on the Court, a role that Johnson did not immediately accept. Johnson was worried that the responsibilities of the Court would prove too much for his health. Washington insisted Johnson accept the position and told Johnson they would sort everything out if he accepted. Johnson agreed, but his every concern came to fruition not long after he started work. After fourteen months of working intermittently as a justice, Johnson retired. He returned home and refused to take any other political office, though many were offered. He was the author of the Court's first written opinion, Georgia v. Brailsford, in 1792.

Robert C. Grier (1846-70; Polk)

He left an impressive impact during an eventful era of the Court by authoring opinions discussing slavery and the Civil War. Grier earned a spotless attendance record for the first 21 years of his tenure. It was not until 1867 that he missed a session, due to an illness that left him partially paralyzed. Grier's ideology most closely aligned with Justice John Marshall and the Federalists, but he was known to forge his own path when his opinion demanded it. Grier authored numerous opinions, concurrences, and dissents, but is most well-known for his opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford and the Prize Cases. The former was such a landmark case that each justice provided their own individual opinion. Grier originally wished to disregard the complex and politically charged constitutional questions, but President Buchanan sought him out and persuaded him to address whether or not slaves were citizens. Currently, a discussion of that nature would violate the standard of ethics surrounding the Supreme Court, but restrictions on confidentiality between presidents and justices were comparatively more lenient at the time. Grier, who was neither known for being sympathetic to abolitionists nor staunchly proslavery, decided that slaves were property, not citizens, and could not sue in federal court. In the Prize Cases, the Court discussed President Lincoln's use of blockades in the South before Congress had officially declared war on the Confederacy. In writing the majority opinion, Grier decided that President Lincoln had acted legally in responding to the rebellion in the South. Grier stayed true to his northern roots and was vocal in his opposition to the South's secession. A year after this decision, Grier's health deteriorated, and less than a year later, Grier died in his Pennsylvania home.

William H. Moody (1906-10; T. Roosevelt)

He rose to prominence when he prosecuted the alleged ax-murderer, Lizzie Borden. Although she was acquitted, his prosecutorial skill was noted by leading Republicans of the day. He was close to New York police commissioner Theodore Roosevelt. As Attorney General, Moody moved to break up the giant monopolies, notably in the meat-packing industry, through vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. His most noted opinion was in the minority in Employers Liability Cases (1908), where he held that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce included the ability to legislate management's relationship with employees. While he generally supported enhanced federal powers, opinions as Twining v. New Jersey (1908), where he held that the Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination did not apply to cases presented in state courts, made him hard to pigeonhole. He also wrote for a unanimous court in the famous case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, which limited federal question jurisdiction to cases in which the plaintiff's cause of action was based on federal law. His career was cut short by a form of crippling rheumatism that forced his early retirement from the bench.

Levi Woodbury (1845-51; Polk)

He served as a Senator until Polk took office and appointed him a Supreme Court justice. In his short tenure, Woodbury was not connected to any major case, but was seen as a valuable member to the bench for his reasoning skills and his work ethic. Woodbury kept his views indeterminable in debate until he absolutely had to pick a side. This led to many misconceptions as to what his actual stance on a subject was. For example, in Jones v. Van Zandt, Woodbury voted to uphold certain fugitive slave laws. Many thought this indicated a pro-slavery stance, but really his vote was motivated by an appreciation for states' rights and a fear that the constitution was being interpreted too liberally. This opinion made Woodbury popular in the south. Mixed with his background as a northerner, he was a popular choice for the 1848 presidential campaign. He lost the Democratic nomination to Lewis Cass, but was determined to take the 1852 slot; yet, he died suddenly in 1851, cutting short his presidential dream.

Willis Van Devanter (1911-37; Taft):

He specialized in the fields in which he had worked in the West: public land, water rights, Indian questions, and admiralty and corporation law. Highly conservative on economic issues, he stayed on after his intended retirement date to become the backbone of the anti-New Deal bloc. He voted against the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (United States v. Butler), the National Recovery Administration (Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States), federal regulation of labor relations (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.), the Railway Pension Act (Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad), unemployment insurance (Steward Machine Co. v. Davis), and the minimum wage (West Coast Hotel v. Parrish). He was anti-Semitic but less openly so than McReynolds. His opinion in United States v. Sandoval (1913) held that because the New Mexico Pueblos were "intellectually and morally inferior" and "easy victims to the evils and debasing influence of intoxicants," they were subject to restrictions on alcohol sales in Indian Country. The decision has since been the basis for Pueblo self-government and protection of tribal lands. Afflicted with "pen paralysis," he rarely wrote or spoke for the Court in constitutional cases.

Charles E. Whittaker (1957-62; Eisenhower):

He struggled to find a distinct judicial philosophy and tended to side with majority opinion, casting the deciding vote with the conservative bloc in a number of decisions, many of which were reversed during or immediately after his tenure. Many of Whittaker's more influential opinions were in obscure procedural cases, and as such, did not leave a lasting impression. Whittaker found the pressures of the job to be overwhelming, and in 1962 he suffered a nervous breakdown and retired, citing "physical exhaustion."

Mahlon Pitney (1912-22; Taft)

He was a classmate of Woodrow Wilson at Princeton and was the last of Taft's appointments. Taft himself was later appointed chief justice of the Court on which Pitney still served and criticized him as a weak member. Pitney's opinions were characterized by his conservative interpretations and meticulous care. He made his most important contributions in the area of labor law. His opinions in Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917) and Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921), which limited the rights of workers to collective bargaining, were elaborations of his earlier opinion in Coppage v. Kansas, in which the court struck down a Kansas statute prohibiting an employer from preventing union membership among his employees by force or coercion. Pitney resigned from the court on December 31, 1922.

Henry Baldwin (1830-44; Jackson)

He was almost always at odds with the rest of his justices. He viewed the extension of the court's power as inexcusable and sought to reestablish a literal interpretation of the constitution, an interpretation driven by the intention of the Framers. He was so vehemently disappointed in these extensions that he considered resigning, but never did. He did, however, behave so aggressively in his dissents while on the court that it was rumored he had gone mad. Both his behaviors and his views were so unorthodox that he became isolated from the other justices and was unable to accomplish his appointed mission, taming the new reaches of judiciary power that the court had given itself. Baldwin was aware his opinion was contrary to the other justices, so he decided to publish them in a pamphlet called A General View of the Origin and Nature of the Constitution and Government of the United States. One of his most influential majority opinions was United States v. Arredondo (1832), in which the Court held that public policy prevented the government from violating federal land treaties. With respect to the issue of slavery, however, Baldwin's views were considered to be much more radical than those held by other members of the Court. In Groves v. Slaughter (1841), the Court considered the constitutionality of a Mississippi provision that prevented the importation of slaves into the state. The Court ultimately struck down the statute on technical reasons, but Baldwin, in a separate opinion, argued that slaves were property as well as persons and viewed the prohibition as an obstruction of interstate commerce. He was the sole dissenter in United States v. The Schooner Armistead (1841), in which the Court held that slaves who had mutinied and taken over the slave ship transporting them from Africa should be set free. His most important opinion was in the Florida Land Case, United States v. Arredondo (1832), which made strict adherence to treaties a basic element of public land policy.

William R. Day (1903-22; T. Roosevelt)

He was probably born to be a judge: His maternal great-grandfather was chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court; his maternal grandfather served on the Ohio Supreme Court; and his father was chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Day generally voted with liberals in dissolving trusts and upholding the right of states to pass laws promoting health and safety but sided with conservatives in barring the federal government from imposing such reforms on the states. He is recorded as asking his clerk for "regular updates" during the bench hearing of Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States about the final game of the 1912 World Series. His important case decisions: Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (1908) helped establish "first-sale doctrine" in United States copyright law; Muskrat v. United States (1911) held that there must be an actual controversy between parties for the Federal courts to have jurisdiction; Weeks v. United States (1914) held that exclusionary rule is applicable to the federal government for violations of the Fourth Amendment; Buchanan v. Warley (1917) held that municipal ordinances segregating neighborhoods were unconstitutional; and Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) held that laws regulating child labor are beyond the scope of Congress's constitutional power under the commerce clause.

Abe Fortas (1965-69; Johnson)

He was raised as an Orthodox Jew in a comfortable home. In 1939, while the Undersecretary of the Interior, he became friends with Lyndon Johnson. He fit well within the Warren Court's liberal commitment, as he promoted civil liberties. He authored important opinions that extended due process protections to juvenile offenders and supported students' right to protest. Fortas also upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, invalidated the poll tax, and supported the Court's stance on Miranda v. Arizona. Though supportive of civil liberties, Fortas was against the right to privacy and despised the press. He was more concerned with social policy than legal precedent. In 1968, after Warren's resignation, Johnson nominated Fortas for his position. Critics claimed that Fortas' closeness to Johnson violated the separation of powers. The nomination ultimately failed when it was brought to light that Fortas had accepted money from friends and clients for teaching a summer course. A year later, another damaging financial aspect was introduced when Life magazine revealed that Fortas had accepted and then returned a fee of $20,000 from a charitable foundation controlled by the family of an indicted stock manipulator. Fortas resigned from the bench in 1969 but denied any wrongdoing.

Lucius Q.C. Lamar (1888-93; Cleveland)

He was the first ex-Confederate to serve on the nation's highest tribunal. His most important opinion was a dissent in In re Neagle (1890), which expressed his conviction that the authority of the federal executive is limited to the powers specifically granted by the Constitution and statutes.

Joseph R. Lamar (1911-16; Taft)

His nomination was something of a surprise, as Lamar had only brief contact with Taft as a result of Taft's occasional vacations in Lamar's community of Augusta, Georgia. Lamar was little known outside the South, which cast potential doubt on his confirmation by a Republican Senate. Those doubts proved unfounded, and Lamar was confirmed five days after his nomination. Lamar proved to be a dull justice, lacking imagination and creativity. He authored the Supreme Court's opinion on two important cases: Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company (1911), which upheld the power of the courts to punish violations of injunctions but set aside the convictions of Samuel Gompers and other labor leaders on procedural grounds; and United States v. Midwest Oil Company (1914), which upheld the president's right to withhold public oil lands from private entry. Lamar also represented Wilson at a conference called to settle differences between Mexico and the United States arising out of Wilson's refusal to recognize the administration of Mexican President Victoriano Huerta.

Horace Gray (1882-1902; Arthur)

Holding to the view that law and politics were completely separate domains, his opinions were steeped in legal history and lacked any appeal to public policy. In his most notable opinion, Juilliard v. Greenman (1884), Gray upheld the right of the federal government to make paper money legal tender for the payment of private debt even in times of peace, a procedure previously considered constitutional only as an emergency war measure. Gray will best be remembered as the justice who changed his vote on the validity of the income tax.

James Wilson (1789-98; Washington)

In 1790, he engineered the drafting of Pennsylvania's new constitution and delivered a series of lectures that are landmarks in the evolution of American jurisprudence. He was appointed an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, where his most notable decision was that on Chisholm v. Georgia (1793). In the winter of 1796-97 financial ruin brought on by unwise land speculation shattered his health and ended his career.

Thomas Todd (1807-26; Jefferson)

In 1807, Congress voted to add a 7th federal judicial district and a 7th seat to the Court. Jefferson broke with tradition in the appointment process. Instead of appointing an individual he knew, he deferred to the advice of the congressmen from the new district, nearly all of whom suggested Todd. Todd's first reported opinion was a dissent to the opinion of Marshall in Finley v. Lynn. He concurred in all other opinions written by the Chief Justice. One of the more interesting of these cases was Preston v. Browder, where Todd upheld the right of North Carolina to make land claim restrictions on filings that were made in Indian territory and violated the Treaty of the Long Island of Holston made by the state on July 20, 1777. His opinion in Watts v. Lindsey's Heirs et al., explained confusing and complicated land title problems which plagued early settlers of Kentucky. Todd's only Court opinion that did not involve land law was his last. In Riggs v. Taylor, he made the important procedural ruling, now taken for granted, that if a party intends to use an original document as evidence, then the original must be produced. But if the original is in the possession of the other party to the suit, who refuses to produce it, or if the original is lost or destroyed, then secondary evidence will be admitted. Many historians regard Todd as lacking in notability; however, Todd's colleagues considered him an asset to the bench. Todd acted more as a behind-the-scenes political advisor, lending his specialized knowledge of politics in the western governments, rather than as a figurehead of the Court. In February of 1826, Todd died while the Supreme Court was in session.

Howell E. Jackson (1893-95; Harrison)

Jackson was struck with tuberculosis after a year on the bench. He left the Court but did not resign, hoping to recover from his illness. He returned to Washington to participate in the re-argument of the Income Tax Case (the remaining 8 active justices were equally divided). Jackson voted to uphold the constitutionality of the tax, but he was outvoted. Since Jackson voted in favor of the tax, then one of the original proponents of the tax switched positions Jackson characterized the majority position in strong terms: Voiding the income tax was "the most disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of Congress." He died of tuberculosis three months later.

Warren E. Burger (1969-86; Nixon)

Nixon appointed Burger in the hope that his deference to "law and order" would reign in what many conservatives saw as liberal judicial activism. Although Burger was a lifelong Republican, many of the landmark decisions issued during his tenure represented clear liberal victories. For example, In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education (1971), the Court issued a unanimous ruling supporting busing as a pragmatic approach to reduce de facto racial segregation in schools. However, Burger's conservatism can be seen in opinions such as his concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which upheld a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy. When Burger retired in September of 1986, he was the longest serving Chief Justice of the 20th century. He was also a fundamental proponent of Alternative Dispute Resolution, citing its ability to alleviate an overburdened judicial system. Burger had been awarded the James Madison Award for Distinguished Public Service by the American Whig-Cliosophic Society of Princeton, the United States Military Academy's Sylvanus Thayer Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Some key cases: Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): Establishes Lemon Test regarding state funding of parochial schools; New York Times Co. v. United States (1971): Prevented federal government from prohibiting publication of the Pentagon Papers; Roe v. Wade (1973): Legalized abortions; Miller v. California (1973): Established the Obscenity Test; United States v. Nixon (1974): Ruled executive privilege is not absolute; Buckley v. Valeo (1976): Upheld federal limits on campaign finance and upheld campaign financial contributions to influence elections as free speech: Gregg v. Georgia (1976): Ruled constitutionality of the death penalty; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): Upheld affirmative action.

William H. Rehnquist (1972- 1986; Nixon; 1986- 2005; Reagan)

Nixon wished to use the appointment as a way of curtailing the perceived influence of liberal jurisprudence on social policy. Rehnquist flourished as Chief Justice and showed an acumen for pragmatism and leadership. Rehnquist's reputation as a justice was based on his encyclopedic knowledge of constitutional law, his conservative voting record, and his leadership of the court as it moved from generally liberal to mostly conservative. During the 1970s and into the '80s, the vigorous and articulate Rehnquist formed the anchor of the court's conservative minority bloc. In much the same way that he appealed to Nixon's desire for a "cleaner and safer" America, Rehnquist suited Reagan's positions on abortion rights and religious liberty, among other issues. An opponent of legalized abortion and an establishment-clause accommodationist (i.e., he favoured extending religion farther into the public sphere), Rehnquist—like other Reagan appointees—shared the president's vision that the court's interpretation of the Constitution and individual laws should be limited to reflect the original intent of the framers and the letter of legislative statutes, respectively. Even the liberal justices recognized his fairness toward his liberal opponents. Most impactful was his rigid organization style with a heavy emphasis on punctuality from clerks and justices alike. Rehnquist's approach to conservatism differed from his colleagues. He looked beyond pure originalist ideals to allow future consequences to factor into his decisions. In 2003, Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, which allowed employees to bring suit against states and state government employers under the Family and Medical Leave Act. This decision aggravated Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who argued that this decision impeded upon states' rights. His court curbed the ability of Congress to expand federal authority and curtailed affirmative action. Federal laws regulating conduct as disparate as religious expression (under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), intrastate commerce, and criminal procedure were invalidated in deference to states' rights. Although many conservatives had hoped that Rehnquist would lead the court in a reversal of Roe v. Wade (1973), the ruling that established the legal right to abortion, the decision of three Republican appointees in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) permitted greater legal restrictions on abortion but also reaffirmed the right found in Roe. Rehnquist fell ill in 2005 but refused to retire even after his diagnosis of thyroid cancer and remained Chief Justice until his death.

Ward Hunt (1873-82; Grant)

No appointment that Grant has made has been based upon stronger recommendations than that of Hunt's. His political mentor was Roscoe Conkling, who also was the Republican Party boss and a confidant of President Grant, and, with Conkling's influence, Grant nominated Hunt. He was given little to do and did just about that, at least with respect to constitutional adjudication. His most notable contribution was when he presided over The United States v. Susan B. Anthony. Citing the 14th Amendment, Anthony argued that she was constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote and had not broken the law when she voted in the 1872 election. Justice Hunt refused to allow Anthony to testify on her own behalf, allowed statements given by her at the time of her arrest to be allowed as "testimony," explicitly ordered the jury to return a guilty verdict, refused to poll the jury afterward, and read an opinion he had written before the trial even started. Hunt found that Anthony had indeed broken the law and fined Anthony $100 (which she refused to pay). After six years of service, Hunt suffered a severe stroke that prevented his participation in the Court's work. Nevertheless, Hunt remained on the Court for three more years. He stayed on because retirement with full pension required a minimum of 10 years of service and a minimum age of 70. To encourage him to step down, Congress passed an exception to the retirement requirements if he would retire within 30 days. Hunt stepped down at the first available opportunity after passage of the act.

Stephen Johnson Field (1863-97; Lincoln)

Nominated to fill a newly created 10th seat on the Court, his appointment as a Democrat was based on his staunch support of the Union cause. Field wanted to be chief justice, but that was not to be. He became the prime advocate of the theory of "substantive due process," which favored private property rights over attempts by state and federal government to regulate the economy. Field's vocal advocacy of substantive due process was illustrated in his dissents to the Slaughterhouse Cases and Munn v. Illinois. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, Field's dissent focused on the Privileges or Immunities clause, not the Due Process clause. In both Munn v. Illinois and Mugler v. Kansas, Field based his dissent on the protection of property interests by the Due Process clause. One of Field's most notable opinions was his majority opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff, which set the standard on personal jurisdiction for the next 100 years. His views on due process were eventually adopted by the court's majority after he left the Supreme Court. In other cases, he helped end the income tax (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company), limited antitrust law (United States v. E.C. Knight Company), and limited the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. On racial issues, Field is regarded to have had a generally poor record. He dissented in the landmark case Strauder v. West Virginia, where the majority opinion held that the exclusion of African-Americans from juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. He also joined the infamous case Plessy v. Ferguson. He remained on the Court well after his abilities started to wane, and he became the 2nd longest serving justice of the Court.

Frank Murphy (1940-49; FDR)

Noted for his militant defense of individual liberties and civil rights, for his insistence on doing substantial justice irrespective of legal technicalities, and for being a strong liberal who had the most impact through his concurring and dissenting opinions. Perhaps Murphy's most notable judicial opinion was his dissent in Korematsu v. United States (1944), in which he denounced as "legalization of racism" the government's wartime internment of Japanese-American residents of the West Coast. His dissent in Wolf v. Colorado (1949), in which the court held that illegally seized criminal evidence was admissible in state (though not in federal) courts, was vindicated when a later court overruled the Wolf decision (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961).

Hugo L. Black (1937-71; FDR)

On September 11, 1923, Black joined the KKK after weighing the decision for over a year. Though he had never engaged in racial discrimination and often ruled in favor of African-Americans, he believed the membership would gain him political advancement. Black's persistence of the issues he thought important often frustrated his colleagues. Though Black was a controversial member, he was also one of its most intelligent leaders. He relied greatly on historical intent, which was evident from his opinions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment that limited judicial discretion. He came to the bench with positivist jurisprudence and a literalist interpretation of the First Amendment. However, he did not believe this extended to symbolic speech and recognized the government's power to deny people the freedom to express ideas. Aside from his strict interpretation of the Constitution, he was generally an activist and a liberal. Over the last 10 years of his term though, he gradually became more conservative, dissenting often with Warren's liberal court. Upon reflection of his term, he stated that his dissent in Adamson v. California (1947), about whether the Fifth Amendment is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, was his most important contribution; though, he also spoke highly of earlier opinion in Chambers v. Florida (1940), another Fourteenth Amendment case. He supported the right of The New York Times to publish the so-called Pentagon Papers in 1971 in the face of government attempts to restrict their publication. True to the literal foundation of his liberal jurisprudence, he dissented from the majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which established a constitutional right to privacy. Black's legacy derives from his support of the doctrine of total incorporation, according to which the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States makes the Bill of Rights—originally adopted to limit the power of the national government—equally restrictive on the power of the states to curtail individual freedom.

Fred M. Vinson (1946-53; Truman)

One of the few people to have occupied positions in all three branches of the federal government. The major issues during Vinson's tenure were the rights of communists, labor unions, and the validity of racial segregation. His belief in the necessity of a strong central government likely motivated his most passionate dissent when the majority voided President Truman's seizure of the steel industry during a strike in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). Perhaps his best-known opinions are those upholding the rights of members of racial minorities under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He recognized the failure of the "separate but equal" doctrine to provide truly equal facilities for all races, and the Court's decision in Sweatt v. Painter (1950) helped lay the foundation for the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Although Vinson was Chief Justice when Brown was granted at the Court, he did not vote on the final decision due to his sudden death from a heart attack in 1953.

John Marshall (1801-35; Adams)

One of the most influential justices to have served on the Supreme Court of the United States, if not the most influential. Marshall's tenure on the Court can be divided into four phases. The first phase began in 1801 and included Marbury v. Madison, a case that established the Court's power to review the constitutionality of congressional acts. Marbury placed the judiciary in a position of primary authority on constitutional law and established judicial review as a fundamental principle and powerful responsibility of the Court. Marshall wrote the opinion for this case, giving him the power to frame this issue and influence its future implementation. The second phase began in 1813. The Court in this phase adjusted to include Jeffersonian inclined appointees, leading to dissonance on the Court. Few decisions of long-term impact occurred during this phase. The third phase began in 1819, otherwise known as Marshall's "golden period." Most of Marshall's famous decisions occurred during this period, wherein he defined the boundaries of the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, advocated for a strong federal government by alleviating burdens of federal taxation, and worked to realize a healthy and diverse economy by concluding that monopolies were unconstitutional. By 1822, Marshall's power began to decline, marking the beginning of the final phase. There were enough Jeffersonian thinkers who favored states' rights on the Court that their consensus left Marshall and his values on a strong federal government in the minority. Marshall spent his last years working diligently in the Supreme Court, remaining as long as his health permitted until February 1835.

Peter V. Daniel (1842-60; Van Buren)

Politically, Daniel believed strongly in state's rights, and he supported the idea that the federal government should be limited to the exact powers listed in the Constitution. Only a week before the end of his term, Van Buren appointed Daniel to the Supreme Court. Daniel was assigned to serve as a trial judge for the regions of Arkansas and Mississippi, trips that were difficult to make from Washington, D.C. His life in Washington, however, was much more comfortable. He was a friend of the chief justice, Roger Taney, who shared similar beliefs. While on the Court, Daniel advocated for a strongly agrarian-centered society and did not believe in the modern capitalist system. For example, he did not believe corporations should be recognized in the legal system at all. Daniel's views were a deviation from the common economic and constitutional views of the period, so not much of his work has withstood the test of time. One exception was his opinion in West River Bridge Company v. Dix (1848), which helped establish the principles of eminent domain. Daniel also was a strong supporter of slavery, and he was very much in favor of the Dred Scott v. Sanford opinion, in which he wrote a concurring opinion. Leading up to the Civil War, Daniel became one of the earliest and most extreme secessionists. In fact, his friendship with Van Buren ended when Van Buren became a Free Soiler, part of a group that opposed slavery. Daniel vowed never to travel north of Maryland again. He believed slaves were strictly property, and a freed slave had no right to citizenship. Daniel, the last old Jeffersonian on the Supreme Court, supported somewhat archaic principles, but his strong beliefs on land preservation, the jury system, and fairness in criminal law will continue to endure.

Samuel Chase (1796-1811; Washington)

Remembered largely as the only Supreme Court justice to ever have faced impeachment proceedings. Chase's most notable decision was in Calder v. Bull (1798), a case defining four important points of constitutional law. Chase discussed natural law, which guaranteed rights and liberties not expressly found outside the Due Process Clause. This later developed into what is referred to as "substantive due process." When President Jefferson was elected, he was alarmed at the seizure of power by the judiciary through the claim of exclusive judicial review and led his party's efforts to remove the Federalists from the bench. Jefferson and his followers sought to silence Chase by working to impeach him. Adams' Federalists, of which Chase was a part, enlisted in Chase's defense. The impeachment charges were shown to be little more than a politically motivated defamation, and Chase's opponents failed to muster the two-thirds majority needed to convict him. He was therefore acquitted. The Senate's failure to remove Chase from the bench was seen as a victory for judicial independence and established the precedent that a judge could not be removed as a result of stating political views from the bench. This attempted impeachment proved that judges should remain non-partisan by demonstrating the dangers of a judge articulating political philosophy.

Owen Roberts (1930-45; Hoover)

Roberts was a replacement nominee to the Supreme Court. His name was sent to the Senate after the defeat of John J. Parker's nomination in May 1930. Roberts, a social liberal, made some of his most important contributions to the court in the area of civil liberties. A supporter of the doctrine of selective incorporation, Roberts voted to extend the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, through its due process clause, to the states in order to protect individual rights from being infringed by both the federal and state governments. This tendency was most apparent in Stromberg v. California and Near v. Minnesota (both 1931), in which the court invalidated state-led attempts to restrict the First Amendment rights of speech and the press. In perhaps the most famous decision that he wrote, Herndon v. Lowry (1937), Roberts set aside the conviction of an African American communist organizer convicted under a law that provided no clear standard of guilt. In the area of economic and commerce law, Roberts's opinion in Nebbia v. New York (1934) upheld the price-setting activities of the New York State Milk Control Board and provided a legal foundation for government regulation of business "affected with a public interest." This liberal orientation was also apparent in Roberts's decisions to uphold the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (commonly known as the Wagner Act), the Social Security Act of 1935, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. However, in a series of cases involving prized elements of the New Deal, Roberts sided with the economic conservatives in declaring unconstitutional the Railroad Retirement Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. Despite his role in the New Deal cases, however, Roberts is best remembered for his role as the famous "switch in time that saved nine." In a move assumed to have been politically motivated, Chief Justice Hughes is widely believed to have persuaded Roberts to change his vote in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), in which the court upheld Washington state's minimum wage law. The ruling also signaled that the remainder of the New Deal legislation would be declared constitutional and helped to undermine the momentum behind Roosevelt's court-reorganization ("court-packing") plan. Roberts's tenure on the court also included a stint overseeing commissions that investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the theft of art objects by the Germans during World War II. Roberts returned to the University of Pennsylvania following his retirement from the Court. Roberts taught and served as dean.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1902-32; T. Roosevelt)

Roosevelt thought Holmes's views compatible with his own, so he nominated him, with no Senate objections. Holmes was a key player on four major courts: Fuller, White, Taft, and Hughes. In 25 of his 29 years, Holmes never missed a session of the Court. He walked from his home to the Court daily, a distance of some 2 1/2 miles. By character, Holmes asserted a pragmatic view of the law. He balanced his deep skepticism in human nature against the stabilizing rule of law. Yet he treasured liberty and put his trust in the law. His opinions will endure largely because he kept them short and studded many with vivid phrases. This left little work for his law clerks. Often, he has been called "The Great Dissenter" because of the brilliance of his dissenting opinions. Holmes believed that the making of laws is the business of legislative bodies, not of courts, and that within constitutional bounds the people have a right to whatever laws they choose to make, good or bad, through their elected representatives. In Schenck v. United States (1919), Holmes, ruling for the majority, established his "clear and present danger" concept, which further established the pattern of how the assurance of freedom of speech and press are limited by the interests and safety of the citizenries, and he asserted this concept as the only basis for curtailing the right of freedom of speech, illustrating it with the homely example: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." In the 1920 case, Horning v. District of Columbia, Holmes underscored the importance of jury nullification with regard to American jurisprudence: "The judge cannot direct a verdict, it is true, and the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." The newly inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt called upon the retired justice and found him reading Plato. "Why do you read Plato, Mr. Justice?" "To improve my mind, Mr. President," replied the 92-year-old man.

Charles Evans Hughes (1910-16; Taft; 1930-41; Hoover)

Scoring an amazing 99 1/2 on his bar exam at the age of 22, he was remarkable intellectual and had social gifts that made him a superb leader and administrator, such having a photographic memory that few, if any, of his colleagues could match. Yet he was generous, kind, and patient in an institution where egos generally were large. He earned national recognition for his investigation into illegal rate-making and fraud in the insurance industry. Hughes authored twice as many constitutional opinions as any other member of his Court. His opinions, in the view of one commentator, were concise and admirable, placing Hughes in the pantheon of great justices. Hughes's first period of service on the Supreme Court was relatively unremarkable: Ideologically moderate, he supported federal governmental responsibility in regulating commerce and favored First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In the absence of controversy on the bench—and insulated from the split in the Republican Party (i.e., the Bull Moose revolt of 1912)—Hughes emerged as a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1916. After receiving the Republican nomination, he resigned from the Supreme Court. Hughes was narrowly defeated (277 electoral votes to 254), however, by Wilson, and he then returned to the private practice of law. Hughes's nomination to be chief justice met with opposition from Democrats, who viewed Hughes as too closely aligned with corporate America; their opposition was insufficient, however. As chief justice, he led the Supreme Court through the great controversy arising over the New Deal legislation of FDR. As the 1930's marked a period of jurisprudential transition—a movement away from economic questions and toward issues of individual rights—Hughes found himself and the court supporting the doctrine of selective incorporation, under which some elements of the Bill of Rights (e.g., freedom of speech, the press, and religion) were made applicable to the states under the rubric of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes played a leading role in defeating FDR's "packing" plan. Hughes successfully persuaded Justice Owen Roberts to switch his vote in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), which upheld Washington state's minimum wage law and also implied that the remainder of New Deal legislation would be considered constitutional, and in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Hughes attacked Roosevelt's plan to reorganize the judiciary. Hughes delivered the opinion in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937), which sustained the right of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act), and a few weeks later the court upheld various provisions of the Social Security Act. It was widely believed that these pro-New Deal decisions dampened the political pressure to alter the composition of the judiciary and thus contributed to the defeat of the court-packing plan.

George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903; Harrison)

Shiras's decade on the Court revealed an "unadorned and cool style," and his interpretive approach relied heavily on precedent and conventional rules. The major issues confronting the Court included freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment, the reach of national authority under the commerce power, and the constraints on individual liberty and property arising from legitimate enlargement of national power. Shiras was a participant in all these areas but was not a leader in any one. Shiras came to the defense of individuals who challenged government power, but he did not articulate a compelling jurisprudence for others to follow. An able justice, he gave the opinion of the court on a number of cases involving corporation and commercial law, including Brass v. North Dakota (1894), which upheld the regulatory power of states over grain elevators. He is chiefly remembered for an incident involving the 1895 income tax case Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. On the first hearing, the court, with one member ill, was evenly divided on aspects of the tax; on rehearing, one of the initial supporters of the tax changed his vote, and the tax was ruled unconstitutional. Widespread belief identified Shiras as the changed vote, and he became temporarily the object of an outpouring of sentiment from both supporters and opponents of the measure. Neither he nor his colleagues ever revealed who had changed his vote, although in 1928 Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes suggested that it had been another justice.

William Paterson (1793-1806; Washington)

Signed the Constitution, served as a governor of New Jersey, and served on the Supreme Court. Paterson was an advocate for a more energetic national government during the Constitutional Convention, opposing the proposal that both houses in Congress be apportioned according to population. Since he was from a smaller state, Paterson feared it would give too much power to states with more inhabitants. Constantly arguing for the federal government to exercise power over the states, Paterson's decision in Penhallow v. Doane's Administration (interpreting the origins and nature of the United States with a national focus) and Ware v. Hylton (invalidating a Virginia statute) reflected these ideas. In Hylton v. United States and Calder v. Bull, Paterson's opinions were especially crucial, as he was able to speak truthfully and completely to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution because he was a direct contributor to its creation. After the Jeffersonian victory in the election of 1800 and the subsequent appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall, Paterson became more cautious about his strong views on an independent judiciary. The Judiciary Act, which Paterson helped author, was repealed in 1802. In Stuart v. Laird in 1803, Paterson's more moderate attitude was proven when he spoke for a unanimous court declaring this revocation constitutional.

Harlan Fiske Stone (1925-41; Coolidge; 41-46; FDR):

Stone's experience in academic work was good preparation for his tenure on the High Court, where he articulated a central tenet of his judicial philosophy: the concept of judicial self-restraint. In his early experience on the bench, Stone was often at odds with many of his colleagues who sought to impose their policy preferences in the name of the Constitution. Stone continued to battle against the imposition of personal policy preference while chief justice, though the impetus for change came this time from his liberal colleagues. Stone's ideas about the role of the judiciary were forcefully expressed in several important dissenting opinions during the heyday of the New Deal, when the Court majority continually struck down national legislation. By 1937, the Court seemed to engage in a virtual withdrawal from the act of governing, when it reversed course and approved subsequent exercises of national authority under the commerce clause. But the withdrawal did not signal a rout, merely a reallocation of judicial resources. Stone gave life to the doctrine of preferred freedoms and that the judiciary maintained special oversight of individual liberties while it withdrew from the realm of economic legislation. During Roosevelt's presidency (1933-45), Stone generally affirmed the legislative reforms of the New Deal, upholding, for instance, the Social Security Act of 1935 and the enactment of a national minimum-wage law in 1938. In a leading case involving federal New Deal legislation, United States v. Butler (1936), he opposed the court majority's invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Besides advocating a new tolerance for state regulation of economic activity, Stone was instrumental in asserting the court's concern for protecting individual civil liberties from governmental coercion. He was the lone dissenter when, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), the court upheld a state ruling that children who were Jehovah's Witnesses must join in saluting the American flag in public schools. This decision was overruled (1943) while Stone was chief justice. In Girouard v. United States (1946), the court followed Stone's dissent in a similar case, United States v. Macintosh (1931), in which he had argued that religious pacifists who refused to take the statutory oath to bear arms could nonetheless be naturalized as citizens. Stone was renowned for the judicial impartiality and objectivity that he displayed in his more than 600 opinions, many of which on important constitutional questions. He was often less successful, however, in building a consensus among his associate justices, with the result that the Supreme Court during his chief justiceship was often a bitterly divided body. Stone died suddenly in April 1946, leaving a Court deeply divided under his leadership.

John Rutledge (1789-91; 1795; Washington

Strongly supported the protection of slavery and the concept of a strong central government, a position then possible, but paradoxical in later times when slavery's defenders sheltered behind the bastion of states' rights. Two cases were decided while Rutledge presided over the Court: In United States v. Peters, the Court ruled that federal district courts had no jurisdiction over crimes committed against Americans in international waters; and in Talbot v. Janson, the Court held that a citizen of the United States did not waive all claims to U.S. citizenship by either renouncing citizenship of an individual state, or by becoming a citizen of another country. The Rutledge Court thus established an important precedent for multiple citizenship in the United States. Nominated Chief Justice in 1795, he failed to win Senate confirmation because of his outspoken opposition to the Jay Treaty of the previous year. This was the first time that the Senate had rejected a Court nomination. To date, it is the only Court recess appointment not to be subsequently confirmed, and Rutledge remains the only justice unseated involuntarily by the Senate.

James M. Wayne (1835-67; Jackson)

The first Georgian to serve on the Court, Wayne was just short of 45 when he became a justice. He was a strong nationalist, which was unusual for a southerner at the time. In the Passenger Cases, he opposed the exercise of state power, and in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia he wrote a nationalist dissent dealing with sovereignty and commerce. He supported the rights of corporations and opposed state attempts to remove their tax exemptions. Surprisingly, Wayne, a slave owner, was rather unsupportive of slavery. In his first assigned case, he ruled that if a slave owner gave a slave freedom in his will, that right to freedom was superior to a claim of a creditor if there were other property assets to meet the owner's debts. Despite this decision, he did support the opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford. Wayne played an influential role in this decision by refusing to let the Court issue a narrow holding. He advocated a broader approach, hoping to resolve the slavery question. The Civil War began a few years after this controversial decision. During the war, Wayne refused to resign and remained an avid supporter of the Union. He believed that the Court needed a judicial voice on behalf of the south. In 1862, a Georgia court repealed his citizenship, branded him an enemy alien, and seized his property. After the war, he obtained a pardon for the judge who issued this ruling, and he became a voice for the south and opposed any measures that he thought sought to punish it. In 1867, Wayne contracted and died from typhoid fever. His southern support of nationalism during the Civil War make him an important justice in American history.

Edward Douglass White (1894- 1910; Cleveland; 1910- 1921; Taft)

The first associate justice to become chief justice of the court. White's appointment to the Supreme Court was a surprise. President Cleveland had twice sought to appoint New Yorkers to replace Blatchford, who had died, but the New York senators were Cleveland's foes, and they exercised senatorial courtesy to scotch the appointments. Cleveland found a lead-pipe cinch in White, since senators would never disapprove of one of their own. As an associate justice, he formulated the concept of the "incorporation" of territories that the United States had acquired in 1898 by the Spanish-American War. In a concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), one of a group called the Insular cases, White argued that "incorporation" into the United States, by treaty or statute, determined the availability of constitutional safeguards to residents of a new U.S. possession. This vague criterion was adopted by a majority of the court in 1905 and was invoked to deny constitutional protection in Hawaii and the territories won from Spain, which were held to be "unincorporated." Promoted to the chief justiceship by Taft in 1910, White assumed office early the next year. In Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco Company (both 1911), he promulgated the idea that a restraint of trade by a monopolistic business must be "unreasonable" to be illegal under the Sherman Act. His failure to define a "reasonable" restraint, coupled with the imprecise brevity of the Sherman Act, made subsequent antitrust decisions very difficult to predict. During World War I, White wrote two important decisions in favor of federal emergency powers: Wilson v. New (1917) sustained the Adamson Act of 1916, fixing minimum wages and maximum hours for railroad workers; and military conscription was upheld in the Selective Draft Law Case (Arver v. United States, 1917).

Felix Frankfurter (1939-62; FDR)

The most controversial justice of his time, who was in his time the high court's leading exponent of the doctrine of judicial self-restraint. Much like his reputation at Harvard, Frankfurter was known as a brilliant and confident justice able to dominate anyone of weaker intellect. Frankfurter used his intelligence to influence other justices, either through their clerks or by using flattery and false praise. He was the Court's master manipulator. He was often critical of the other justices who, in his opinion, occasionally wrote their personal preferences into the law. He thought of the Court as a tutor to lower courts, harkening back to his days as a teacher, and brought a sense of history and comparison to his legal approach. His opinions could often be read as part of a continuing dialogue. Frankfurter was not a formalist but viewed the Constitution within a broader framework of evolving notions. Frankfurter's belief that decent government depends in part on procedural safeguards for criminal suspects occasionally conflicted with his policy that the Court should defer to other branches of the federal government and to the states. In the criminal case of Wolf v. Colorado (1949), he spoke for the court in condemning illegal seizure of evidence by state officials, but he ruled that the "due process of law" clause of the 14th Amendment (1868) to the U.S. Constitution did not require a state court to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained. (The Supreme Court repudiated this theory in 1961.) In his last major opinion, a 64-page dissent in Baker v. Carr he unsuccessfully asserted that inequitable representation in legislatures is a "political controversy" not subject to the federal judicial power. In July 1963 President Kennedy awarded him the Medal of Freedom.

Oliver Ellsworth (1796-1800; Washington)

The third Chief Justice of the Court, Ellsworth was revolutionary against British rule and a drafter of the Constitution. He held Chief Justice for only just over three years and was unable to make much of an impact on the Court's development. Ellsworth favored expanding the authority of the federal courts and, as chief justice, tried to initiate the policy of the Supreme Court's handing down per curiam opinions for the entire Court, instead of separate opinions by each individual justice. Four cases the Ellsworth Court decided were of lasting importance in American jurisprudence: Hylton v. United States (1796) implicitly addressed the Court's power of judicial review in upholding a federal carriage tax (although it would not be until Marshall succeeded Ellsworth that the court addressed this issue head on); Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798) affirmed that the President had no official role in amending the Constitution, and that a Presidential signature was therefore unnecessary for ratification of an amendment; Calder v. Bull (1798) held that the Constitution's Ex post facto clause applied only to criminal, not civil, cases; and New York v. Connecticut was the first exercise by the court of its original jurisdiction in cases between two states.

Melville Weston Fuller (1888-1910; Cleveland)

There were objections about Fuller's sympathies for big corporations and Northern Republicans questioned his loyalty to the Union. In the end, however, Fuller was approved. Fuller presided over a Court that was barraged by constant criticism. In fact, only the Warren Court was the subject of more abuse. Both Courts actively injected their value preferences into the legislative arena. Fuller was a friendly leader who inaugurated the custom that each justice greets and shake hands with every other justice prior to the conference, a custom that continues to this day. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Samuel F. Miller, two outstanding members of the Fuller court, called him the best presiding judge they had ever known. He wrote two important opinions, both in 1895: U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., in which he construed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 so narrowly as to prevent its application to almost any business except transportation; and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., in which he declared the federal income tax law of 1894 unconstitutional. While serving as chief justice, Fuller also was an arbitrator of the Venezuelan boundary dispute between that nation and Great Britain (1897-99) and a member of the Hague Court of International Arbitration (1900-10).

Smith Thompson (1823-43; Monroe)

Thompson was very active on the bench throughout his twenty years as a Supreme Court justice, although his anti-federalist views often made him a dissenter. Moreover, Thompson was marked as a transitional character between two well-recognized Chief Justice eras - John Marshall's and Roger Taney's. Thompson's most notable decision as a Supreme Court justice involved interpreting the Commerce Clause. Thompson believed that states were allowed to regulate commerce unless the regulations directly conflicted with congressional laws. For example, in New York v. Miln (1837), Thompson argued that taxation on immigrants was not distinguishable from a valid exercise of police powers. Arguably, Thompson's finest dissenting opinion was set forth in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), in which he argued that Indian tribes are independent sovereigns from the State. Smith Thompson served as a Supreme Court Associate Justice until he died at the age of seventy-five. The USS Smith Thompson, a Clemson-class destroyer in the United States Navy, was named after him in 1919.

Robert Trimble (1826-28; Quincy Adams)

Though Trimble served during Chief Justice John Marshall's reign, Trimble was still able to write an unexpectedly large share of opinions. This is surprising, considering his position as one of the newest justices. Trimble's first and farthest-reaching opinion, Montgomery v. Hernandez, set out certain court procedures that are still followed today. During his short tenure on the court, Trimble made a small but lasting impact and is remembered as a justice with great potential.

William Howard Taft (1921-30; Harding)

Though he won the presidency in 1908, it was not the office he sought: Above all, he aspired to be chief justice. Taft's long-held wish came true in 1921 when Harding selected Taft to replace Edward D. White as chief justice. He promptly took steps to improve the efficiency of the Court, which had fallen far behind in its work. His influence was decisive in securing passage of the Judge's Act of 1925, which gave the Court greater discretion in choosing its cases, so that it could focus more attention on constitutional questions and other issues of national importance. Although generally conservative in his judicial philosophy, Taft was no rigid ideologue. His approval of court injunctions, for example, was limited by his insistence that injunctions could not be employed to interfere with the rights of workers to organize and strike. His most important contribution to constitutional law was his opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) upholding the authority of the president to remove federal officials, a much-belated endorsement of the position taken by Andrew Johnson with respect to the Tenure of Office Act in his impeachment trial in 1868. Suffering from heart disease, Taft resigned as chief justice and died a little more than a month later.

Robert H. Jackson (1941-54; FDR)

Upon news of the death of Chief Justice Stone, two of Jackson's colleagues threatened to resign if Jackson were selected as Stone's replacement. Jackson was a fine craftsman: His opinions displayed an elegant prose style. He was witty and combative as he advanced his brand of judicial restraint. His early opinions reflect his liberal and nationalistic views. In Edwards v. California (1941), which declared unconstitutional California's "Okie" law barring indigent migrants from entering the state, Jackson held that freedom of movement within the United States was guaranteed by citizenship. He also strongly defended the separation of church and state. His defense of First Amendment guarantees was, however, balanced by concern for maintaining public order and security, which led to his concurring with court findings against the Communist Party and in favor of the relocation of Japanese persons during World War II. Jackson took a leave from the bench to serve as chief U.S. prosecutor in the Nurnberg trials after WWII, and he returned to a deeply divided Court.

William Strong (1870-80; Grant)

When Justice Grier retired from the Court, Strong was suggested as a possible replacement. However, Grant was heavily lobbied to nominate former Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Stanton was nominated, and confirmed by the United States Senate, but he died just 4 days later without having served on the Court. Grant then nominated Strong, who was confirmed without a recorded vote. Justice Strong wrote the opinion for an early equal protection case in Strauder v. West Virginia (1879). Strong was one of five Supreme Court Justices who sat on the Electoral Commission that was convened to resolve the disputed electoral votes in the U.S. presidential election of 1876. Strong voted along with his fellow Republicans, who held the majority on the Commission, to award every disputed vote to Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican candidate, thus ensuring his presidency. Though he was regarded as able and hard-working, Strong never devoted much intellectual capital to constitutional matters. He left the bench while in good health, in part to serve as an example to several infirm justices who refused to give up their seats. Strong took up religious causes in his remaining years.

Horace H. Lurton (1910-14; Taft)

While fighting for the Confederacy, he was captured but then escaped and then captured again. Sick with tuberculosis, Lurton's mother successfully petitioned Lincoln to release her son to her care; he was paroled. He was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals by Cleveland, where he was a colleague of Taft. When elected president, Taft made Lurton his first appointment. The appointment by a Republican of a Southern Democrat caused considerable surprise, as did the fact that Lurton was 66 years old at the time, the oldest justice ever to be appointed. Lurton wrote infrequently during his brief tenure, and he confined his talent to procedural issues or employer liability cases. Lurton was a constitutional conservative and opposed the concept that social changes be brought about through judicial interpretation. His most notable opinion he authored was probably in Coyle v. Smith (1911), which held that the federal government could not tell a state where to locate its capital, as that all states must be on "equal footing."

George Sutherland (1922-38; Harding)

While in private practice, Sutherland articulated a fundamentally conservative position on the role of government. His vision did not change on the Court. He offered his vote and voice in support of substantive due process and other judicial barriers to state government regulation and control. Much of this approach was rejected by subsequent Courts. He left his mark on other domains including the law of "standing" and the constitutional constraints governing foreign relations. Sutherland also forged an important link in the nationalization of the Bill of Rights by articulating the steps states must take to assure the right to counsel in capital cases. Sutherland's opinions in the 1920's reflected a commitment to the balance of power between state and federal authority and a firm belief in the limitation of political authority. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), he relied on the virtually discarded precedent of Lochner v. New York to outlaw the minimum wage. However, in another memorable ruling, Powell v. Alabama (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time applied the 6th Amendment guarantee of legal counsel to defendants in state courts. During the 1930's, he was a staunch opponent of New Deal legislation and gave the court's opinion in a number of decisions restricting the power of federal agencies.

Samuel Nelson (1845-72; Tyler)

While on the Court, Nelson kept a low profile and usually went along with the majority. While his specialty on the Court was admiralty law, Nelson contributed little to constitutional law. During the Dred Scott decision, Nelson agreed with the majority; however, he believed the issue was only a question of Missouri law. Nelson suggested a re-argument of the case. He wanted to narrow the issues to whether or not Scott was a citizen of Missouri, and if Missouri had proper jurisdiction over the case. Nelson prepared an opinion upholding the lower court's ruling on the narrower issues, but the majority chose a broad view. After the start of the Civil War, Nelson always refused to accept the war's necessity, and in his dissent in the Prize Cases, he stated that until Congress officially declared war, President Lincoln's blockade of southern ports was illegal. Additionally, in Ex Parte Milligan, Nelson voted to overturn the conviction of a man who had been charged with assisting the Confederacy. Moreover, Nelson opposed expanding federal power, and he supported reunion with the Confederacy. These were unpopular opinions at the time. He was also considered as a presidential nominee at the Democratic convention in 1860.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1972-87; Nixon)

With a Court in balance ideologically, Powell was cast in the middle of several important issues during his tenure as a moderate. Powell was one of the more conservative members of the court during the 1970's and early '80s, but he came to occupy a key centrist position as Reagan's appointments shifted the court's composition in a conservative direction. His vote decided the Court's first confrontations with abortion and affirmative action, and his stance in the Court's center made him the decisive voice in many cases. Powell was on the winning side of about thirty major decisions— more than any other justice. His stance on abortion cases prevailed in all 18 of the cases he heard. Powell got along well with the other justices. Among his most well-known decisions was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), in which Powell led the court in ruling that affirmative action was constitutional as a mechanism to achieve diversity, though the court rejected the use of strict numerical quotas as a means to that end. Powell was well respected, and upon retiring, several of his colleagues expressed their great sadness at losing one of the "few great justices."