econ 3050 final exam prep
A disagreement point is A. the outcome that occurs if there is no agreement in a bargain. B. the point in a negotiation where the players cannot reach an agreement. C. a way of keeping score in a negotiation. D. an item of contention between the two bargaining players.
A
A payoff matrix A. shows the payoffs to each firm for each possible outcome. B. is optional in game theory. C. details the actions each firm takes. D. shows the payoffs (i.e. bribes) required to government officials for firms undertaking specific actions.
A
A private auction is an auction in which A. individuals have their own valuation of the good but don't know everyone else's. B. only one good is auctioned off. C. individuals know their own value of the good and everyone else's valuation, too. D. many auctions are auctioned off at the same time.
A
A strategy in which a player uses probabilities to decide which strategy to use is called a A. mixed strategy. C. pure strategy. B. Pareto strategy. D. coin flip strategy.
A
Andre Agassi, a star tennis player, is playing the number one player in the world, Roger Federer. Before the match, Agassi decided that he would serve 20 percent of his serves to Federer's backhand, 30 percent of his serves to Federer's forehand, and 50 percent of his serves straight at Federer. In the language of game theory, this is known as: A. a mixed strategy. C. a maximin strategy. B. a dominant strategy. D. a pure strategy
A
Common knowledge in game theory A. is information known by all players. B. is required for static games. C. does not impact the outcome of the game, since everyone has the information. D. is information known by most people in a country.
A
If decision makers have limited ability to calculate profits from all possible combinations of options, they are said to have A. bounded rationality. C. Pareto inefficiency. B. a maximin problem. D. dementia.
A
If outcomes are ________, exactly one of the outcomes will occur and the probabilities add up to ________. A. exhaustive and mutually exclusive; 1 C. exhaustive; 1 B. probabilistic; between 0 and 1 D. mutually exclusive; between 0 and 1
A
In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the winner pays A. its own, highest bid. C. the amount bid by the runner-up. B. the common value. D. the average of the three highest bids.
A
In a two-player game in which each player has four options, how many outcomes can there be? A. 16 C. 8 B. 64 D. 4
A
Ming and Henri each run one of two dry cleaning facilities in the town of Scaraby. Both are considering offering free pickup and delivery services. Figure 13-2 below shows he payoff matrix containing the expected quarterly profits for each firm. Use this Figure to answer the following question(s). Figure 13-2 Does Henri have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it? A. No, he does not a dominant strategy - his best outcome depends on what Ming does. B. Yes, he has a dominant strategy and it is to offer free pickup and delivery. C. Yes, he has a dominant strategy and it is not to offer free pickup and delivery. D. No, he does not a dominant strategy - his strategies are all dominated by Ming's.
A
Wanting to invest in the computer games industry, you select Whizbo, Yowzo and Zowiebo as the three best firms. Over the past 10 years, the three firms have had good years and bad years. The following table shows their performance: Company Good Year Revenue Bad Year Revenue Number of Good Years Whizbo $8 million $6 million 8 Yowzo $10 million $4 million 4 Zowiebo $30 million $1 million 1 The expected revenue from all three companies combined is A. $17.9 million. C. $11 million B. $29.5 million. D. $48 million.
A
When firms select the solution that is better for all parties, the ________ is satisfied. A. Pareto Criterion C. Nash equilibrium condition B. pure strategy requirement D. coordination game requirement
A
When neither player has a dominant strategy A. at least one Nash equilibrium exists. B. the game cannot be analyzed. C. no Nash equilibrium exists. D. game theory will not provide information.
A
Which of the following is a simultaneous decision game? A. rock-paper-scissors (Roshambo) C. chess B. tic-tac-toe D. poker
A
Which of the following statements is TRUE about a non-cooperative game? A. When two players each have a dominant strategy, joint profits may not be maximized. B. When players use their best responses, joint profits are maximized. C. When two players each have a dominant strategy, joint profits are maximized. D. When two players each have a dominant strategy, joint profits may is never maximized.
A
"Cheap talk" is considered cheap because A. firms avoid the costs of hiring lawyers. B. a firm can say anything, but may actually do something different. C. communications via phone or email these days has a cost that is close to zero. D. the cost of talking is far outweighed by the gains to be made in coordinating efforts.
B
A "Credible Threat" A. always set a low price. B. is a strategy selection that is in your best interest. C. minimizes the return of your opponent. D. is also called a "titfortat" strategy
B
A Nash equilibrium occurs when A. the efficient allocation of resources is achieved by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. B. players choose their best strategy given the strategies chosen by others. C. a monopolist is forced to produce the efficient level of output. D. oligopolists cooperate with each other.
B
Assume that one of two possible outcomes will follow a decision. One outcome yields a $75 payoff and has a probability of 0.3; the other outcome has a $125 payoff and has a probability of 0.7. In this case the expected value is A. $60. C. $85. B. $110. D. $35.
B
Behavioral game theory assumes A. that people behave differently when playing games than when "playing for real." B. people have limited calculation capability or psychological biases that cause them to act irrationally. C. people act rationally. D. people overcome their psychological biases.
B
Deterring entry might require a firm to A. drop output almost to zero to show the consumers "who's boss." B. price their product closer to the competitive price than to the monopoly price. C. price their product closer to the monopoly price than to the competitive price. D. drop price almost to zero to get price below marginal cost.
B
From the expected value of a game, we A. can infer the subjective probabilities of each possible outcome. B. cannot determine the risk. C. can determine the risk. D. can determine exactly how much a player will receive
B
If a game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium then A. it does not have a mixed strategy equilibrium. B. it might also have a mixed strategy equilibrium. C. no player has a dominant strategy. D. at least one player has a dominant strategy.
B
Implicit collusion, where players do NOT have an explicit agreement A. results in cheating. B. are not strictly prohibited under antitrust laws. C. maximizes total surplus in the market. D. are strictly prohibited under antitrust laws.
B
In a Nash equilibrium, A. each player has a dominant strategy. B. players may or may not have dominant strategies. C. no players have a dominant strategy. D. the player with the dominant strategy will win. E. at least one player has a dominant strategy.
B
In a bargaining game, players A. are forced to negotiate, as in a mediation. B. voluntarily negotiate. C. are engaging in illegal activity. D. have to share the surplus equally.
B
In a second-price auction, the winner pays A. the average of the top two bids. C. the second-to-last bid he/she made. B. the amount bid by the runner-up. D. the winning bid minus 1 cent.
B
In an English auction A. the winning bidder pays the amount bid by the person with the second highest bid. B. the price increases until nobody else will raise the bid. C. bidders put their bids in a sealed envelope. D. the price decreases until someone bids.
B
In the beauty contest where players predict the outcome of players choosing a number between 0 and 100 , The submission closest to 1/3 of the average of all numbers submitted would win. A. your prediction should be based on what you think the winning number will be. B. the Nash equilibrium is 0. C. there is no Nash equilibrium because people are not rational. D. the Nash equilibrium is 33.
B
In the game in Scenario 3, equilibrium Scenario 3 Consider the following game: A. is for Moto to offer free maintenance and Zport to offer a sunroof. B. is for Moto to offer a CD changer and Zport to offer low-profile tires. C. is for Moto to offer free maintenance and Zport to offer low-profile tires. D. does not exist in pure strategies.
B
In the reality TV show Storage Wars, people bid on the contents of repossessed storage units without being able to evaluate the contents. This is an example of a ________ auction. A. private value C. second-price B. common value D. Dutch
B
One possible source of inefficiency in bargaining is A. that there are multiple Nash equilibria. B. that the bargaining process takes time. C. bounded irrationality. D. that the Nash product may be indeterminant.
B
Refer to Figure 13-3. There are two mobile home manufacturers in Nevada, Sturdy Homes (S) and My Haven (M). Sturdy Homes has been in the market for a long time and must now compete with newcomer, My Haven. Suppose that Sturdy Homes believes that My Haven will match any price it sets. Use Figure 13-3 to answer the following question(s) and assume throughout that Sturdy Homes believes that My Haven will match any price it sets. Figure 13-3 What price will My Haven select after Sturdy Homes sets its price at $10,000 and what is My Haven's expected profit? A. price = $8,000; expected profit = $4 million B. price = $8,000; expected profit = $6 million C. price = $10,000; expected profit = $5 million D. price = $12,000; expected profit = $3 million
B
Refer to Figure 13-5. If Netflix lowers its price, will this deter Blockbuster from setting up an online DVD rental service? A. Yes, because Blockbuster will make a smaller profit than Netflix if it chooses to compete. B. Yes, because Blockbuster stands to lose $1 million if it competes with Netflix. C. No, because Blockbuster will make a profit if it competes with Netflix. D. No, because Blockbuster will make a larger profit than Netflix if it chooses to compete.
B
Refer to Scenario 15. If the firms price simultaneously, equilibrium would be A. a mixed strategy equilibrium. B. an $80 price for Simple and a $25 price for Boring. C. an $80 price for Simple and a $70 price for Boring. D. a $25 price for Simple and a $70 price for Boring.
B
Refer to Table 5.3. The information in the table below describes choices for a new doctor. The outcomes represent different macroeconomic environments, which the individual cannot predict. Table 5.3 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Job Choice Prob. Income Prob. Income Work for HMO 0.95 $100,000 0.05 $60,000 Own practice 0.2 $250,000 0.8 $30,000 Research 0.1 $500,000 0.9 $50,000 Rank the doctor's job options in expected income order, highest first. A. Do research, open own practice, work for HMO. B. Work for HMO, do research, open own practice. C. Open own practice, work for HMO, do research. D. Do research, work for HMO, open own practice.
B
The term prisoners' dilemma refers to a game in which A. the payoff from both players playing their dominant strategies is the same for each player. B. the payoff from both players playing their dominant strategies is not the highest payoff possible. C. there are no Nash equilibria. D. there are no dominant strategies.
B
When both firms have dominant strategies A. there is a prisoners' dilemma. B. the outcome is called a dominant strategy solution. C. there are multiple Nash equilibria. D. joint profits are maximized.
B
Which of the following sets of outcomes is exhaustive? A. employed full-time, employed part-time, unemployed B. win, lose, tie C. married, single, widowed D. All of the above.
B
A Nash bargaining solution A. is derived from a Nash equilibrium. B. gives a solution in both cooperative and non-cooperative games. C. is not the same as a Nash equilibrium. D. None of the above.
C
A an example of a game in which a leader moves first, and then the other rivals follow is a ________ game. A. finite move C. Stackelberg model B. tit-for-tat D. Cournot model
C
A dominant strategy can best be described as A. a strategy that leaves every player in a game better off. B. a strategy taken by a dominant firm. C. a strategy that is optimal for a player no matter what an opponent does. D. the strategy taken by a firm in order to dominate its rivals.
C
A maximin strategy A. involves a random choice between two strategies, one which maximizes potential gain and one which minimizes potential loss. B. maximizes the gain of one player, but minimizes the gain of the opponent. C. maximizes the minimum gain that can be earned. D. minimizes the maximum gain that can be earned.
C
A specific investment is A. an investment that cannot be physically moved, such as an oil refinery. B. reduces the possibility of a holdup occurring. C. one that can only be used in a transaction with a single firm. D. is more expensive than a general investment.
C
An incumbent firm uses limit pricing A. when it has no other advantages over a potential rival. B. to set one price for a quantity of a good below a certain limit, and a second price for purchases above the limit. C. to set price below a potential rival's marginal cost, thus making entry unprofitable. D. if it is limited in the quantity of inputs it can purchase to produce output.
C
Expected value represents A. the actual payment one expects to receive. B. the payment that is most likely to occur. C. the average of all payments one would receive if one undertook the risky event many times. D. the payment one receives if he or she makes the correct decision.
C
How many Nash equilibria are there in this payoff matrix? A. 1 C. 2 B. 4 D. 3
C
If a Cournot duopolist announced that it will double its output, the other firm does not view the announcement as credible because A. the other firm's profits will fall if the announcing firm carries out the threat. B. the other firm will double output also. C. the announcing firm's profits will fall if it carries out the threat. D. the other firm's profits will rise if the announcing firm carries out the threat.
C
If a monopolist faces entry by a potential rival, investing to lower its marginal cost A. is credible but will not deter entry. B. will not occur, even when there are no barriers to entry. C. is a credible way to deter entry. D. is not a credible threat.
C
If player 1 has a dominant strategy, then player 2 A. must also have a dominant strategy. B. will not be able to reach an optimal solution to the game. C. may or may not have a dominant strategy. D. will block this dominant strategy and force player 1 to another strategy.
C
If you take a maximin strategy A. then both players are doing the best they can given the payoffs in the game. B. you are irrational according to economic definition. C. you are getting the best possible outcome given that the other player does the thing that's worst for you. D. you are ensuring that the other player gets the worst possible outcome.
C
In a tit-for-tat strategy, a player A. maximizes the joint profit in the game. B. randomly punishes its rival. C. copies the action of its rival's prior move in the subsequent rounds. D. ensures that the joint profit is maximized in each round.
C
In an indefinitely repeated Cournot Duopoly/prisoners' dilemma game, a firm might use a ________ to ________ a rival that defects from a cooperative strategy. A. legal maneuver; sue C. trigger strategy; punish B. tacit threat; dissuade D. trigger strategy; threaten
C
In an ultimatum game A. players act in an economically rational way. B. players move simultaneously. C. non-profit-maximizing behavior often occurs. D. one player receives nothing.
C
In the above table, if the players do not have complete information on their rival's payoffs and use a maximin strategy A. firm A produces a High Quality product and firm B produces a Low Quality product. B. the equilibrium choice is the same as using a regular, best response strategy. C. firm A produces a Low Quality product and firm B produces a High Quality product. D. both firms produce a High Quality product.
C
In the game in Scenario 6, what is the Nash equilibrium? Scenario 6 Consider the following game: Payoffs are in millions of dollars. A. The strategy pair associated with -$.5, -$.5. B. The strategy pair associated with $1, -$1. C. The strategy pair associated with $2, -$.5. D. The strategy pair associated with -$100, -$1.
C
In the ultimatum game, one reason players don't choose the rational offer is A. that there are too many possible outcomes to reasonably consider. B. that it is not a Nash equilibrium. C. most people believe in reciprocity, and will therefore get even if the prosper treats them badly. D. they are worse off by taking the offer.
C
Refer to Table 5.4. Table 5.4 Job Outcome 1 Deviation Outcome 2 Deviation A $40 W $60 X B $20 Y $50 Z If at Job B the $20 outcome occurs with probability .2, and the $50 outcome occurs with probability .8, then the standard deviation of payoffs at Job B is nearest which value? A. $35. C. $12. B. $44. D. $20.
C
Regarding fixed costs of entry A. neither incumbents nor potential entrants consider them. B. both incumbents and potential entrants are affected by them. C. potential entrants are affected by them while incumbents are not. D. incumbent's decisions are affected by them, while the potential entrant ignores them.
C
The above figure shows the payoff to two airlines, A and B, of serving a particular route. If the two airlines must decide simultaneously, what happens if the government imposes a $20 per firm tax on firms that service this route? A. Neither firm entering is a Nash equilibrium. B. Only firm A will enter. C. Neither firm has a dominant strategy. D. Not entering is a dominant strategy for both firms.
C
The figure below shows the payoff to two airlines, A and B, of serving a particular route. If the two airlines must decide simultaneously, which one of the following statements is TRUE? A. Neither firm entering is a Nash equilibrium. B. Since firm B's decision is unpredictable, firm A's decision is unpredictable. C. Firm B will not enter because it knows firm A will. D. Since firm B has no dominant strategy, its decision is unpredictable
C
The figure below shows the payoff to two gasoline stations, A and B, deciding to operate in an isolated town. Suppose a $30 fee is required to enter the market. If firm A chooses its strategy first, then A. firm A will not enter. C. both firms will enter. B. firm A will enter and firm B will not. D. neither firm will enter.
C
The trench warfare case during World War I is an example of a(n) A. non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. C. tit-for-tat strategy. B. explicit agreement. D. trigger strategy.
C
Variance is a measure of ________ and the lower the variance, ________. A. expected profit; the lower the profit B. standard deviation; lower the standard deviation C. risk; the lower the risk D. risk; the greater the risk
C
Which of the following is true for the game in Scenario 3? Scenario 3 Consider the following game: A. Neither company has a dominant strategy. B. Zport's dominant strategy is the sun roof. C. Zport's dominant strategy is the low-profile tires. D. Moto's dominant strategy is the free maintenance.
C
Your economics professor has decided that your class will not be graded on a curve but on an absolute scale. Therefore, it is possible for every student in the class to get an "A." Your grade will not depend in any way on your classmates' performance. Based on this information, you decide that you should study economics three hours each day, regardless of what your classmates do. In the language of game theory, your decision to study three hours each day is: A. a minimax strategy. C. a dominant strategy. B. a maximin strategy. D. a Prisoner's dilemma.
C
A dominated strategy A. exists when one firm is weaker than another. B. is a characteristic of games with multiple Nash equilibria. C. only occurs in a mixed strategy scenario. D. is one that is never used by a rational actor.
D
A dynamic game is a game A. that has actions instead of strategies. B. in which the players are highly animated. C. where the payoffs change frequently. D. that is sequential or repeated.
D
A maximin strategy A. maximizes the minimum joint profits of the players. B. minimizes the maximum payoff. C. maximizes the payoff of one player, but minimizes the payoff of the other. D. maximizes the minimum payoff.
D
A mixed strategy may A. lead identical firms to choose different actions. B. be part of a Nash equilibrium. C. be a set of probabilities of selecting each possible action. D. All of the above.
D
A player that starts at the end of the game and progresses to the first move to determine best responses A. doesn't understand how to play a game. C. is using the Stackelberg Strategy. B. is acting irrationally. D. is using backward induction.
D
Although he is very poor, Al plays the million-dollar lottery everyday because he is certain that one day he will win. Al makes this calculation based upon A. knowledge of all possible outcomes. C. the frequency of past outcomes. B. tossing a coin. D. subjective probability.
D
An exclusion contract A. gives a firm the right to be the exclusive provider of a good in a particular market. B. may not always be profitable for the incumbent. C. is a form of entry deferral. D. All of the above.
D
Best guesses of an event occurring in the future are based on A. estimates derived from the frequency of the event occurring in the past. B. coin flips. C. the wisdom of crowds. D. subjective probability
D
By vertically integrating, two firms can A. limit the problems inherent in moving too quickly. B. increase market share. C. avoid antitrust issues. D. avoid holdup problems.
D
Communication between players prior to the start of a game that does NOT affect the payoffs is called A. a binding verbal contract. C. pareto efficient. B. ineffective bargaining. D. cheap talk.
D
If Boring were able to move first in a sequential version of the game in Scenario 15, the equilibrium would be (Draw the complete game tree and write down the strategy set for each player. (Remember that especially for the second-mover, a strategy is a complete contingent plan.) Find the Nash Equilibirum in the dynamic game by backward induction.) A. a $35 price for Simple and a $25 price for Boring. B. a mixed strategy equilibrium. C. an $80 price for Simple and a $70 price for Boring. D. an $80 price for Simple and a $25 price for Boring.
D
If Gooi can move first, and Ici threatens to buy yogurt machines, no matter what Gooi does, what is the Nash equilibrium in the dynamic game? Hint: Draw the complete game tree and write down the strategy set for each player. (Remember that especially for the second-mover, a strategy is a complete contingent plan. Find the Nash equilibrium in the dynamic game by backward induction. A. Gooi will threaten to buy yogurt machines, no matter what Ici does, to see whether that will get the people at Ici to change their minds. B. Gooi will buy yogurt machines, which it otherwise wouldn't have, in order to retaliate. C. the equilibrium payoff of ($50,$50) will be enforced. D. Gooi will not change its behavior, because Ici's threat is not credible.
D
If Gooi can move first, and Ici wants to realize the ($150, $300) payoff, (Draw the complete game tree with Ici moves first (not Gooi) to rearrange its physical plant (at no cost) and assuming that after the rearrangement, if Ici installs Galeto machines will cost Ici an extra of $120 to do so but the payoff on installing Yogurt machine won't be affected. Write down the strategy set for each player. (Remember that especially for the second-mover, a strategy is a complete contingent plan.) Find the Nash equilibrium in the dynamic game by backward induction.) A. it could make its threat credible by rearranging its physical plant so that the installation of gelato machines would bring in profit less than $150. B. it could make its threat credible by rearranging its physical plant so that the installation of gelato machines would bring in profit less than $300. C. it has to move before Gooi; there is no other way. D. it could make its threat credible by rearranging its physical plant so that the installation of gelato machines would bring in profit less than $50
D
If Simple were able to move first in a sequential version of the game in Scenario 15, the equilibrium would be (Draw the complete game tree and write down the strategy set for each player. (Remember that especially for the second-mover, a strategy is a complete contingent plan.) Find the Nash Equilibirum in the dynamic game by backward induction.) A. a $25 price for Simple and a $25 price for Boring. B. a mixed strategy equilibrium. C. a $25 price for Simple and a $70 price for Boring. D. an $80 price for Simple and a $25 price for Boring.
D
If a game contains private information, then A. players will decide not to play the game. B. firms will engage in cheap talk to coordinate their actions. C. third-party negotiations are necessary to resolve the information gap. D. the game's outcome is affected.
D
In a Stackelberg oligopoly A. there is no Nash equilibrium. B. both firms act simultaneously, but one chooses price and the other output level. C. the leader moves first, and the follower chooses its price in the second stage of the game. D. the leader moves first, and the follower chooses its output in the second stage of the game.
D
In a beauty contest game such as predicting the average of respondents choosing a number between 0 and 100 A. the winner usually exhibits level-3 reasoning. B. the outcome is not normally the Nash equilibrium for the game. C. the winner must understand the non-rationality of the players. D. All of the above.
D
In a dynamic game, rational players A. use backward induction to determine best responses. B. have strategies that select a Nash equilibrium in the game as a whole. C. will reject outcomes that are not subgame perfect. D. All of the above.
D
In a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game A. firms cooperate and achieve the collusive Nash equilibrium for all rounds. B. firms will only cooperate if they each adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. C. firms cooperate for most of the rounds, but switch to the non-cooperative outcome in the final couple of rounds. D. firms do not cooperate and the static game Nash equilibrium is the outcome for each round.
D
In an ultimatum game where the payoff totals $100 and is split in $1 increments, the rational amount for the proposer to offer and the responder to take is A. $100. C. $0. B. $50. D. $1.
D
In the example of coordination problems between Google and Motorola Mobility, one method to solve the problems was A. to undertake a merger or acquisition. B. form a joint venture. C. for one firm to subcontract with the other. D. All of the above.
D
Not all games with two or more Nash equilibria can be solved with pre-play communication because A. cheap talk may be illegal under anti-trust laws. B. if there's an incentive for one or more players to lie, then cheap talk lacks credibility. C. pareto criterion might not be defined. D. Both A and B
D
Refer to Figure 13-4. Which of the following is true? Two rival oligopolists in the athletic supplements industry, the Power Fuel Company and the Brawny Juice Company, have to decide on their pricing strategy. Each can choose either a high price or a low price. Figure13-4 shows he payoff matrix which reports the profits that each firm can expect to earn, depending on the pricing strategy that each adopts. Use the Figure to answer the following question(s). Figure 13-4 A. Power Fuel does not have a dominant strategy. B. Brawny Juice does not have a dominant strategy. C. Brawny Juice's dominant strategy is to select a high price. D. Power Fuel's dominant strategy is to select a low price.
D
Refer to Figure 13-5. A few years ago Netflix (N) pioneered an online DVD rental service. Blockbuster (B), a brick and mortar DVD/video rental company, waited until Netflix had been in business for over a year before considering whether or not to establish a competitive online rental service. At this point, Netflix had to decide whether or not to lower its subscription price in order to resist Blockbuster's intrusion into its market. Figure 13-5 shows the decision tree for the Netflix-Blockbuster entry game. Use the Figure to answer the following question(s). Figure 13-5 Does it make sense for Netflix to lower its price in order to deter Blockbuster's entry into the online DVD rental market? A. No, because Blockbuster will enter the market regardless of Netflix's decision about its subscription price. B. Yes, because Netflix stands to make a profit of $7 million by lowering its price and keeping Blockbuster out of its market. C. Yes, because it is always profitable to maintain a monopoly in a market. D. No, because Netflix will make a higher profit by keeping its subscription price unchanged, irrespective of whether Blockbuster enters its market or not.
D
The Cournot and Stackelberg models are similar, EXCEPT Cournot ________ and Stackelberg ________. A. sets price; sets output C. sets output; sets price B. is dynamic; is static D. is static; is dynamic
D
The figure below shows a payoff matrix for two firms, A and B, that must choose between selling basic computers or advanced computers. Firm B's dominant strategy A. is to make basic computers. C. is to make advanced computers. B. is to adopt firm A's strategy. D. does not exist in this game.
D
The individual with the highest valuation of the good will win in which of the following auctions? A. Sealed Bid Auction C. Dutch Auction B. English Auction D. All of the above.
D
Wanting to invest in the computer games industry, you select Whizbo, Yowzo and Zowiebo as the three best firms. Over the past 10 years, the three firms have had good years and bad years. The following table shows their performance: Company Good Year Revenue Bad Year Revenue Number of Good Years Whizbo $8 million $6 million 8 Yowzo $10 million $4 million 4 Zowiebo $30 million $1 million 1 Based on the 10 years' past performance, rank the companies' expected revenue, highest to lowest: A. Zowiebo, Yowzo, Whizbo C. Whizbo, Zowiebo, Yowzo B. Zowiebo, Whizbo, Yowzo D. Whizbo, Yowzo, Zowiebo
D
Wanting to invest in the computer games industry, you select Whizbo, Yowzo and Zowiebo as the three best firms. Over the past 10 years, the three firms have had good years and bad years. The following table shows their performance: Company Good Year Revenue Bad Year Revenue Number of Good Years Whizbo $8 million $6 million 8 Yowzo $10 million $4 million 4 Zowiebo $30 million $1 million 1 Based on the 10 years' past performance, what is the probability of a good year for Zowiebo? $27 million A. 0.9 C. $3 million B. $1 million D. 0.1
D
What is true about threats in the game in Scenario 15? A. Boring can change the equilibrium by means of a credible threat only if it can move before Simple. B. Simple can change the equilibrium by means of a credible threat only if it can move before Boring. C. Simple can change the equilibrium by means of a credible threat; Boring cannot. D. Neither firm has a credible threat with which to change this equilibrium.
D
Which of the following sets of outcomes is mutually exclusive? A. win, lose, tie B. married, single, widowed C. employed full-time, employed part-time, unemployed D. All of the above.
D
Which one of the followings is NOT a way to avoid holdups? A. use multiple sources. C. use contracts. B. vertically integrate. D. horizontal integration
D
Which one of the followings is not a disadvantage of moving too quickly is that A. costs of entry are higher. B. followers gain an advantage by learning from the first-mover. C. the likelihood of misunderstanding the demand is greater. D. establish a loyal customer base.
D
