Exam 3

Regents v. Bake (1978)

-Facts: A white medical school applicant was twice rejected from the Univ. of California Medical School, though he had better scores than minority candidates who were accepted. -Legal Issue: Was the school's special admissions program constitutional? No. Can race be considered a factor in the admissions process? Yes. -Court Ruling: The U.S. Supreme Court held that the school's affirmative action program violated Equal Protection, but that race could be considered in admissions decisions under a better tailored program. The Court also affirmed the decision to admit the student to the school. -Reasoning behind Ruling: First, classifications based on race call for a strict scrutiny analysis. The goal of achieving a diverse student body is compelling enough to allow race to be considered as a factor in admissions decisions. However, the special admissions program was not necessary to achieve that goal, because it foreclosed consideration to applicants like Bakke. Accordingly, the special admission program violated the Equal Protection Clause. Second, the school should be ordered to accept Bakke as a student, thereby affirming that part of the California Supreme Court's opinion. The school could not meet its burden to show that Bakke would not have been admitted absent the special admissions program. Therefore, Bakke should be admitted to the school. -Legal Rule: Creating a diverse classroom environment is a compelling state interest under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, affirmative action programs can take race into account as a factor in the college admissions process. However, it is improper to set racial quotas as part of an affirmative action admissions program. Significance: Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke was the landmark affirmative action case of its time, and subsequent decisions have clarified the Court's position always with this case in mind. In finding for Bakke, the Court was able to minimize opposition to affirmative action programs. Moreover, the opinion allows for the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, which is a net gain for the cause of affirmative action.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

1. Facts: Pennsylvania had a law that regulated abortions based on the womans willingness to 1. wait 24-48 hours after first visit 2. get consent if a minor 3. spousal notification and 4. clinic to keep records of abortions 2. Legal Question: Can the state require these actions to be taken without violating their right to an abortion? 3. Decision: No. The court reaffrimed Roe v. Wade while keeping the Pennsylvania reqquirment for minors to get consent. 4. Importance: -strikes down spousal notification -reaffrims viability -"Undue burden" test adopted

Roe v. Wade (1973)

1. Facts: Roe became pregnant as a result of rape and could not get an abortion due to the Texas law banning abortions unless it's needed to save the mothers life. 2. Legal Question: Does the constitution protect a woman's right to abortions? 3. Decision: Yes. The constitution protects the woman's right to aboritions under the right of privacy in the 14th amendment. 4. Importance: -First trimester the woman has full privacy rights free from state regulations -Second trimester the state can regulate based on the mother's health -Third trimester state has the right to regulate to protect fetal life -Preservation of life after VIABILITY (able to live outside the womb)

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

1. Facts: Grisworld opened a clinic to challenge the Connecticut law banning the distribution of contraceptives (birth control) to married couples 2. Legal Question: Does the Connecticut law infringe on the couple's constitutional right to marital privacy? 3. Decision: Yes. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 9th, and 14th amendments together establish a right to marital privacy against state restrictions 4. Importance: -"Penumbras" -9th amendment is vague -Substantive due process= entitled to an outcome (clause of the 14th amendment)

Brown v. Board II (1955)

Facts of the case: After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems. Legal Question: What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Conclusion: The Brown I decision shall be implemented "with all deliberate speed." The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed." Signifcance:

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (1971)

Facts of the case: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. Question: Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation?: Conclusion: Unanimous for Swann. Yes. the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools. Legal Principle Applied: The federal courts have equitable powers that are flexible enough to find reasonable solutions to ending state-imposed segregation in school systems. Significance: the cases stand for the principle that federal courts can take common-sense, reasonable approaches to enforce the Court's landmark ruling, Brown v. Board of Education, in order to eradicate the evil of segregation in public schools. However, many people view these cases as "forced busing" cases in which the Court tried to micro-manage local school districts.

Romer v. Evans (19996)

Facts: - Amendment 2: Prevented the state from recognizing homosexuals and bisexuals as a protected class - Richard G. Evans sued Governor Roy Romer and Colorado on the basis that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment o Colorado Supreme Court struck down Amendment o Colorado appealed to SC Legal Question: - Does Amendment 2 violate the 14th Amendment? Ruling: - Yes - Affirmed Legal Rule: -Disadvantaged Group: o Homosexuals and Bisexuals -Legal Rule: -Government Interest: o Putting gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons o Rational Basis -Assessment of Government Interest:

Cruzan v. Director (1990)

Facts: Nancy Cruzan was in a car accident that resulted in her being in a constant vegetative state, needing artificial means to remain alive. The hospital refused to remove Cruzan's life support at the request of Cruzan's family without a court order. Legal Issue: Does a State law that requires a patient's family to prove the patient's wishes to remove artificial means to sustain life by clear and convincing evidence violate the Constitution? No. Ruling: The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, holding that the State's interest in preserving life must be balanced against an incompetent patient's wishes, and that a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard does not violate the Constitution. Reasoning behind Ruling: The issue here is whether the Constitution prohibits Missouri from having a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard before removing life support for an incompetent patient. The due process right of refusal of treatment is different for incompetent patients, because it is unclear what an incompetent patient wants. Therefore, the State's interest in maintaining the life of the patient is a proper State interest justifying a procedural safeguard like a heightened standard of proof. Thus, the State Supreme Court did not violate the Constitution by finding that clear and convincing evidence did not exist here. Indeed, the judgment of close family members does not become a constitutional requirement. Legal Rule: A State may constitutionally require evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes by clear and convincing evidence before removing life support. Significance: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health is a landmark case because it gave strong deference to a State's interest in the preservation of life when balancing that interest against the wishes of an incompetent patient to remove life support.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Facts: The University of Michigan Law School denied Barbara Grutter's application to the School. Grutter, a white Michigan resident, then sued the Law School. Grutter claimed that the Law School's use of affirmative action in its admissions policy violated her Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal Issue: Is a public university's goal of "student diversity" sufficiently compelling to justify a narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions? Yes. Court Ruling: The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the Law School's affirmative action policy was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Law School's goal of student diversity was a compelling interest. Also, the Court found that the Law School's individual review of each applicant (where race was only one of many factors) was narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. Reasoning behind Ruling: The Law School's admissions policy is constitutional because the manner in which it achieves a diverse student body passes strict scrutiny. All classifications based on race must be given strict scrutiny. That is, a racial classification is only constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Here, the Law School's goal of diversity passes strict scrutiny. The Law School's admissions policy, therefore, is constitutional. First, the Court found that the Law School has a compelling interest in enrolling a diverse student body. The Court pointed to the fact that attaining a diverse student body leads to cross-racial understanding and prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce. Second, the Court found that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored. The Court noted that the Law School's policy does not amount to a racial quota. Rather, the Law School engages in an individualized, holistic review of each applicant. Race is one of many factors the Law School considers. In fact, the Law School gives weight to diversity factors other than race. Accordingly, the Law School's race-conscious admissions policy did not violate Grutter's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal Rule: Student diversity is an interest that is sufficiently compelling to justify the narrowly tailored use of race when a public university makes admissions decisions. Significance: Grutter v. Bollinger is an important milestone in the debate on affirmative action. The Court found the use of affirmative action in school admissions can be constitutional provided that (i) race is only one of many factors considered; (ii) the purpose is a diverse student body; and (iii) an applicant's race does not replace an individualized, holistic review of each applicant.

U.S v. Virginia (1996)

Facts: - United States sued the Virginia Military Institute on the basis that their men-only admissions policy violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment o District court ruled in favor of VMI o Court of appeals reversed it - Virginia made Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership as a response Legal Question: - Is the creation of a women's-only academy satisfy the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Ruling: - No - Reversed and Remanded Legal Rule: - Proper consideration of gender discrimination: - 2 asserted gov't interests: - Relationship of single-sex VMI to Interest 1: - Relationship of single-sex VMI to Interest 2: - Validity of VMIL as a remedy: Significance: - Struck down any law that denies equal opportunities to women

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Facts: Petitioners, a number of same-sex couples, sued four states that denied marriage licenses to those couples because those states defined marriage as being a union between one man and one woman. Legal Issue: Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? Yes. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in another state that allows same-sex marriage? Yes. Ruling: Reasoning behind Ruling: Legal Rule: Significance:

PICS v. Seattle School District (2007)

Facts: The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. Question: 1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger apply to public high school students? 2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? 3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance? Conclusion: No, no, and yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Legal Principle Applied: Significance:

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Facts: Lawrence and Garner were engaging in sexual activity when an officer entered the home of Lawrence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. The officer arrested both Lawrence and Garner and held each in overnight custody. The two men were later charged in Texas by a Justice of the Peace. Rule: The right of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct in the privacy of their homes is protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment's liberty interest. This right encompasses homosexual activities. Significance: Lawrence v. Texas was the landmark case that decriminalized homosexual conduct and "keeps the government out of our bedrooms" so to speak. The right of consenting adults both homo and heterosexual to engage in sexual conduct was recognized as a constitutional right protected under the right to privacy.

Brown v. Board I (1954)

Facts: Oliver Brown and other plaintiffs were denied admission into a public school attended by white children. This was permitted under laws which allowed segregation based on race. Brown claimed that the segregation deprived minority children of equal protection under the 14th Amendment. Brown filed a class action, consolidating cases from Virginia, South Carolina, Delaware and Kansas against the Board of Education in a federal district court in Kansas. Rule: Separating educational facilities based on racial classifications is unequal in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Reed v. Reed (1971)

Facts: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. Decision: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

Sweat v. Painter (1950)

Facts: The petitioner, an African-American applicant to the University of Texas Law School was denied admission to the school because of his race. Following an initial court proceeding, the university offered petitioner enrollment in a new law school specifically for African-American law students. Petitioner refused that offer. Rule: The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause limits the power of a State to discriminate based on race in professional and graduate educational institutions. Significance: Sweatt v. Painter is a landmark decision that began a robust use of the Equal Protection Clause to stop State governments from disadvantaging people based on race. While the Court did not expressly overrule the separate-but-equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, this case marked a start down that road towards eliminating that discriminatory doctrine.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy - who was seven-eighths Caucasian - agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he was refused and arrested. At trial, Plessy's lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted. Does the Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?