GLBL247 Authors & Key Points

Kalyvas Ch. 5 "The Logic of Violence in Civil War"

Control can translate into political consensus. 'Rather be disliked but feared rather than liked but not feared when rival is feared,' weariness with war leads to resignation; those living in wartorn areas come to view accidents and victimization in the same way; spatial and temporal variation of control important; 8 mechanisms that "translate control into collaboration" 1) force to solve the collective action problem 2) support whoever can provide stability 3) mechanical ascription 4) credibility of rule (often includes diminishment of other side's credibility) 5) provision of benefits 6) monitoring 7) self-reinforcing byproducts - reputation 8) access; indiscriminate violence is highly ineffective; ""median-voter" view of civil war, namely that patterns of control during the course of the war reflect majoritarian preferences, especially as reflected in the prewar period" is NOT right; control can translate into political consensus; "the provision of benefits loses out gradually to the effective use of violence," 'rather be disliked but feared than liked but not feared when rival is feared.' lots of violence causes many people to resign themselves to current political order; emphasis on control/power of control well documented (opinion: fits well with 5-7% stat. from class); spatial variation of control important - is geography not ideal for rebels, may have to collaborate with government (ex. US seacoast more likely to support British in American revolution than less accessible New England or inland); temporal variation of control also important (ex North Carolina loyalists more open after US defeat at Camden in 1780); rejects notion of loyalty/legitimacy; "The same peasants who supported the insurgency back in their villages turned quiescent, even though they now had more reasons to complain about the appalling conditions of their new life;" six mechanisms that "translate control into collaboration" "coercion and survival maximization" - use force to solve collective action problem, shielding - support whoever can provide stability, ""mechanical ascription"" - natural next step for career/life, credibility of rule - "tiny groups tend to grow exponentially" insurgents get influx of members after indiscriminate violence and after success in battle, provision of benefits - ex. Vietcong lowered rents for peasants - meant to capture hearts and minds, monitoring - population control with established administration, self-reinforcing by-products - early reputation has a tendency to stick; chance = 'warring party's access to a segment of population,' "Proposition 1: The higher the level of control exercised by an actor, the higher the rate of collaboration with this actor - and, inversely, the lower the rate of defection." RENAMO operated where government jurisdictions met to exploit bureaucratic ineptitude; closer to major installations = more support for government; cities bad for resistance; occupied = less resistance; If an organization's support was weak before a war, it has little impact once the war has begun; Even the MI5 spent many times more what the NRA did; selective/discriminate violence far more effective than indiscriminate violence; "recruitment of insurgents goes up as risks of passivity and insurgency began to equalize," those living in wartime environments often view being victimized in the same way they view accidents;" "Proposition 2: Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive to civil war." selective violence most efficient way to deter defection; "control - regardless of the "true" preferences of the population - precludes options other than collaboration by creating credibly benefits for collaborators and, more importantly, sanctions for defectors."

Acemoglu "Why Nations Fail Today"

Politically extractive institutions beget economically extractive institutions which lead to economic and then state failure. Is possible to reverse this by becoming more inclusive. Zimbabwe - Mugabe rose in resistance to white oppressors but has kept their extractive institutions which he continues to use against the populace. Even wins the lottery. Colombia - AUC v FARC, AUC backed politicians make up 1/3 of Senate and House members in 2002, 4.5 million (10% of population) displaced, and up to 10% of rural alnd owned by paramilitaries. El Corralito in Argentina and 2009 incident in DPRK (100 old wons = 1 new won, 500,000 max. have one week to change). Mugabe wins lottery - almost complete control; extractive institutions - people don't save, invest, or allocate; Zimbabwe in shambles - apartheid from 1923 (Rhodes) - white elites declare, independence from UK in 1965, black rebels take over (Mugabe & Nkomo) by 1980, extractive institutions (EIs) established by whites then used by Mugabe, his ZANU-PF loosing its grip; similar pattern in many African nations since 1960s; Sierra Leone - no govt when RUF arrived in 1991, ideological underpinnings collapse caused heavy reliance on child soldiers; extractive institutions not new - evidence of Maya EIs; Who is the state? Colombia - violent, organized crime - as if in civil war - AUC (United Self Defense Forces of Colombia) powerful paramilitary to rival left wing guerillas (FARC); collaboration between AUC and politicians; 1/3 of elected to Senate and Congress in 2002 were back by paramilitary; 4.5 M displaced (10% of population); up to 10% of rural land was owned by paramilitaries; extractive because of lawlessness and insecure property rights; El Corralito in Argentina - used USDs to stabilize but more imports and nearly no exports, froze bank accounts - only 250-300 pesos (made 1 p = 1 USD) withdrawal, "government expropriated 3/4 of people's savings," extractive damage not seen b/c commodity price high, preexisting extractive institutions from Spanish encomienda system, increases likelihood of extreme perhaps because mainstream has betrayed, regime type attracts strongmen; new absolutism = communism; 1960-2002 France made 100 old francs = 1 new franc (42 years to exchange) - 2009 DPRK made 100 old wons = 1 new won (1 week to exchange and can't convert more than 500,000 old won) - took majority of wealth from citizens, weakened black market resistance; communism shielded building of EIs - Russia, China, DPRK, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia; King Cotton in Uzbekistan - 45% of exports are cotton, b/c combine harvests too expensive used school children to harvest - if children fail to perform (20 to 60 kg per day) then ostracized, children worked for 2 months, must find own lodgings and lunch, no free media, no NGOs, 750 demonstrators killed at once, no real elections, 1/3 live in poverty, $1,000/year avg income, books banned and internet censored; Karimov family had 67% of the tea market when they took over 30%; Egypt example - type later if time; Why nations fail: economically extractive institutions cause economic failure - begot by politically extractive institutions; similar worldwide but generally less extractive means less poor and more durable; better restraint on elites = more stability; extractive institutions often based on authoritarian regime - try to change to inclusive - nations have succeeded in doing this

Ladbury "Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan"

Religious motivation only contributing factor. Most radicalized into video-style Islam after joining. General public support for local Taliban. Taliban has little common cause and a broad coalition. Frustrated by lack of ISAF transparency. Wanted: T and HIL enfranchisment, ISAF transparency, withdrawal of foreign forces and replacement with civilians. Emphasize justice. Invest in women. "Build environment for work and jobs" with large projects. 'Nation as well as state building.' Results: "Religious motivation is only one of several reason for joining or supporting the Taliban or Hizb-i Islami. There was almost no support for government amongst those interviewed. Less than 6% of respondents (10 out of 192) attributed something positive to the government; all the rest were opposed. Most of those expressing support for the government (6 out of 10) were Hazara; their support was principally inspired by fears of resurgent Pashtun nationalism and the threat of Taliban rule. The majority of respondents expressed support for the Taliban - at least the 'good' Taliban - and/or Hizb-i Islami. young men join the Taliban or Hizb-i Islami for a number of personal reasons in addition to broader structural grievances regarding the government and foreign forces." (reasons include: money, status, religiosity, self protection, to solve a different armed conflict) "Most radicalisation appears to happen after young men join a Taliban group. The sort of Islam that Taliban combatants are radicalised into is not a scholarly, learned Islam; it reflects the populist messages of jihadi videos. Taliban and Hizb-i Islami combatants and sympathizers made little common cause with Islamist movements outside of Afghanistan. Respondents confirmed the nature of the Taliban presented in the literature, i.e. that it is a broad movement with groups with different agendas and varying degrees of allegiance to a central command. Respondents could not understand why the Coalition forces were in Afghanistan. All respondents had ideas about what should be done to bring security: The government should formally bring the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami into the democratic process and allow the leaders to stand for election. The military objectives of foreign forces should be made publically known. The government should then negotiate the withdrawal of foreign forces. Civilians and development aid must replace the military and military aid." Policy recommendations: "Prioritise justice and sub-national governance. In insurgency areas demands for justice and good governance outstrip demands for basic services (education, health, water, sanitation). Stay in the background on most things - particularly justice. Pay more attention to how services are provided. be realistic. Think about women in every single investment. Keep going with capacity and institution building. Think nation building as well as state building. Fund larger projects including in peaceful areas - using local contractors, a local workforce and Afghan security institutions, which also employ locals. Build the environment for work and jobs. Don't lump all the Taliban together and then demonise them. Monitor trends - but select the methodology carefully."

Cederman et al. "From Horizontal Inequality to Civil War via Grievances"

'Horizontal inequalities arise when there are differences in economic, social, or political standing between or among culturally distinct groups.' The creation of a state often exacerbates horizontal inequalities. not individual - group based, exploitation, by institutions; horizontal inequalities = ""inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups," making a state increases horizontal inequality; horizontal inequality as cause of conflict ///

Fast "Aid in Danger"

Absolute number of aid worker deaths increasing but rate seems to be constant. Should focus on morbidity and not just mortality (deaths). 60% of serious incidents in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan. Leading cause of death among aid workers is intentional violence. Motivations more often economic than political. Biafra's Uli airstrip and JCA's weapons movements. Biafra - example of blurred lines between humanitarian and military intervention - Uli airstrip example (kept open for use of JCA 1967-1970); absolute number of aid workers killed has increased, but rate seems roughly the same; 60% of serious incidents occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Sudan; tendency to sensationalize when accounts given obscures fact that many aid agencies don't know how many aid workers they have in any one place; national more likely to killed than international workers; leading cause of death among aid workers is intentional violence; sometimes most serious conflicts have fewest deaths because workers know to leave - more attention should be paid to lesser threats as well; morbidity - hospitalizations, evacuations; safety incidents - less lethal but might still be bigger security management issue, intensity of violence and activity of terror cells in an area not necessarily correlated to violence; violence more often economically motivated than politically motivated (political might be increasing tho), aggregate data too crude - must develop more nuanced understanding

Mercy Corps

Boko Haram recruits have no demographic profile, joined based on close peers and to get ahead in business, sought to dismantle government corruption, and can be reached through counternarratives (also helpful in preventing joining). Line between coercion and free will often blurred. To solve: reintegrate, legitimacy through service provision, connect youth with government, use counternarratives, and dialogue among close relationships, and provide opportunities for entrepeneurship. Those who join Boko Haram have no demographic profile, are most influenced to join by their peers (with priority put on closeness and not number), join to get ahead in business, were initially (and especially pre-2009) attempting to dismantle the corruption of the government, and are influenced by counter narratives from family members and community leaders. Worth noting that line between coercion and free will is blurred (ex. loans called back quickly). To solve problem: build trust in government by providing services, help former members reintegrate, use existing and successful counter narratives, connect youth with the government, help build strong and dialogue-filled social bonds, facilitate success for youth (especially in entrepreneurial pursuits). Worth noting: government defined youth as 18-35

Justino's "Nutrition, Governance and Violence: A Framework for the Analysis of Resilience and Vulnerability to Food Insecurity in Contexts of Violent Conflict"

Building resilience is key because effects last generations, refugees have loewr lifetime productivity, and food becomes expensive. Subsistence farming helps avoid attack and economic/nutritional shock. Informal economy (pays less). Violent conflict severly impacts growth (especially for girls), health, and education. Food security contingent on household resilience and quality of institutions. Policy recommendations: strengthen female participation and increase ease of transition from subsistence ag. to market exchange, end/reduce child labor, DDR. Recovery should focus on: ag., health, basic infrastructure; perception nearly as important as reality; some insurgent government. Resilience, Losses in "human capital" last generations, staple food more expensive during crisis, agricultural assets depreciate, those who leave "display lower productivity levels than those that stayed behind," farmers pivot to subsistence activities and might even destroy other assets to avoid attracting notice, some evidence for positive effects of this tactic with regard to child growth, often move to informal economy where earn significantly less, intra-household reallocation of labor, oddly - those affected more by violence in Tajikistan more likely to receive remittances, evidence for increased safety within insurgency than out of it, "soldiering ... may result in more significant individual political participation and leadership ... ex-fighters and those victimized by war," malnutrition good indicator of more permanent economic shock, violent conflict = substantial negative effects for child nutrition, more impact on girls, causal rel. between violence/refugee status and poor health & education outcomes (Zimbabwe - lost 3.4 cm in height and 14% in lifetime earnings). 'household resilience wrt food security hinges on: 1) vulnerability to poverty and violence 2) institutional factors control access to food markets and livelihood opportunities,' institutional control has enduring effect, policy recs: strengthen female labor participation, support mechanisms and institutions that allow transition from subsistence ag. to market exchange (subsistence ag. good mitigation), end/reduce child labor (b/c children removed from schools during conflict to labor), demobilization, disarmament, reintegration (DDR); post conflict focus should be on: recovery of ag., health, basic infrastructure, control of infectious diseases; perception nearly as important as reality for effective coping; insurgent government often better than no or even preexisting government

Berger

Countering violent extremism (CVE). High quantity (no need for high quality) messenging much more effective than suppression in disrupting extremist recruitment/radicalization. Not aiming for mainstream. Radicalization: curiosity, consideration, ID, self-critique, decision to act, movement. Recruitment discovery, create micro-community, isolate from mainstream, shift to private, ID, encourage most likely action; Disruption (non-kinetic): divide, disabuse, dillusion, directionless, discouraged. Family can have large impact either way. CVE - "focused exclusively on disrupting extremist recruitment and radicalization activities" Asserts that: promotion of virtues and development are effective in CVE, messaging does not need to be creative but it does need to be plentiful, messengers need not be "uniquely credible," suppression does work, Muslim radicalization is not unique, radicals aren't normally attempting to radicalize the mainstream, only disengagement (and not de-radicalization) is necessary Radicalization follows at curiosity, consideration, ID, self-critique, decision to act, movement critique cycle Recruitment follows discovery, create micro-community, isolate from mainstream, shift to private, ID and encourage most likely action Disruption (non-kinetic in CVE, of belief or will to take criminal act) makes militants divided, disabused, disillusioned, directionless, discouraged Family has large impact, can go either way

Fearon and Laitin

Definted civil war as: at least 1000 dead with at least 100 dead per year and at least 100 dead on each side. dead Civil war impacted by: poverty, political instability, rough terrain, large populations. Likelihood increased by: oil exporting. Not impacted by (R)ELF, Islam, democracy. General facts; 1.92 civil wars / 100 country years, 5 times more killed in intrastate than interstate wars between 1945-1999. Avg. war lasted 16 years - steady accrual since 1950s and 1960s. "current prevalence of civil wars is ... result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s" control for per capita income - "more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence in this period" factors that do matter: poverty, political instability, rough terrain, large populations 5 times more dead from civil war than interstate war between 1945-1999 civil war not linked to grievances assert that low per capita income = police/counter insurgent weakness (not sure this is entirely accurate) - "CW may require only a small # with intense grievances to get going" definition of civil war: agents/claimants to state fight organized but non state group(s) w/ at least 1000 deaths at rate of at least 100 per year w/ at least 100 killed on both side ("including civilians attacked by rebels"), count wars that occurred within colonial empires in most measures correlation between democracy and violence positive but not statistically significant Africa, Middle East, Asia - "$1,000 less in income corresponds to 34% greater annual odds of outbreak" ELF not significant, ethnic war much less likely at higher incomes inequality not powerful indicator for outbreak "odds of onset in a given year are estimated to increase by 67% if there was instability in governing arrangements in any of the previous three years" mountain increases risk half=13.2% not=6.5% population and risk grow together oil exports much higher chance of civil war Islam NOT strong predictor of violence young males' effect indeterminate "odds of civil war outbreak rose about 2% per year" "doubt that primary commodity exports are a good measure of financing potential for rebels" trade share of GDP does not seem to predict civil peace "Decolonization / gave birth to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak states." advocate '"neotrusteeship" under the UN, NATO, EU or other regional military or political organizations'

Lyall et al. Coethnic Bias and Wartime Informing

Guardians of Peace Program endorsement experiments with Tajik, Pashtun, and ISAF endorsers and Tajik and Pashtun respondents showed that coethnic bias exists in both groups but especially among Tajiks. Controlled for population size, elevation, ethnic composition, NSF grants in the past, ISAF and ANSF base proximity, number of ISAF and ANSF attacks. Found that bias not significantly diminished by distribution of territorial control, prior violence, or receipt of eocnomic assistance. ISAF victimization does make cooperation less likely. Questions: willing to call/stop by. Anonymity preserved. Retaliation. Median response: "not participate" or "unlikely to participate." 'coethnic bias - systemic tendency to favor cooperation with coethnics - shapes attitudes about informing and beliefs about retaliation, especially among Tajik respondents' 'persists after adjustment for distribution of territorial control, prior violence, and receipt of economic assistance' theory that indiscriminate violence means that "civilians are reactive, individualistic weather vanes, tacking with the prevailing winds and thus capable of shifting support toward either combatant seamlessly as conditions warrant," note: Kalyvas thinks follow curve drawn in close where reporting is highest where denunciation is safest and mixed control thus stifles denunciation, Asked: willing to call GP, believed would remain anonymous, stop by to report, likelihood of retaliation. Accounted for: elevation, pop size, ethnic composition, National Solidarity Program (NSF) grant in the past, number of ISAF and ANSF military bases within 2 km radius, number of ISAF and insurgent initiated attacks. Tajik have much greater coethnic bias than Pashtuns. Median response is "not participate" or "unlikely to participate." Slightly (not statistically significant) more likely to inform in Taliban controlled villages; both favored own ethnic group of ISAF; violence doesn't seem to change support for GP; victimization makes GP support less likely - especially ISAF victimization;

Lake "The Statebuilder's Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention"

Loyalty v legitimacy. Legitimacy better for long term stability. Succeed when can align with or obliterate existing interests. Need at least some civilian support even to coerce. State building often inimical to democracy. Legitimacy strengthened by liberal economic policies (LEPs), democracy (public deliberation, government responsiveness, procedural fairness); if can rule, can harm/abuse. state-building is essential and deeply threatening to the Westphalian system. want sovereignty and efficacy - legitimacy v want some control - loyalty; "In an authoritarian state, the ability to coerce citizens requires support from at least some significant fraction of the political community that is willing to pay taxes, serve in the coercive apparatus, work in the propaganda office, and fulfill other essential roles." legitimacy and loyalty are always in conflict; "state building is not - in principle - incompatible with democracy," "which posits that rulers with smaller minimum winning coalitions will provide private goods limited to their supporters at the expense of public goods that benefit society at large," "how the statebuilder weighs legitimacy versus loyalty at any given time or in any particular case; the strength of the statebuilder's interests in the failed state; and the distance between the policy preferences of the state builder and those of the target population," favoring loyalty makes a second intervention more likely; "On balance, a longer time horizon likely favors legitimacy except when the costs of the intervention are likely to be low in the future," "more emphasis is placed on the loyalty of the leader, the more displeased the statebuilder will be with the outcome," American racism exported; in Germany and Japan - "interests vested in the old order were either destroyed in the war or greatly depreciated." some social structures difficult for democracy; "democracy legitimates states by promoting deliberation by citizens in a public sphere," "democracy legitimates states by ensuring government responsiveness to citizen demands and desires," "democracy legitimates states because it is procedurally fair," "liberal economic policies of competitive markets, limited regulation, and openness to trade are understood both to maximize social welfare, and thereby legitimate the state," property rights so effective; modernization theory "continues to hold considerable sway in policy circles and the public imagination at least in the United States," "Implicitly, Americans have assumed that democratically elected leaders would support the United States and its interests around the globe." Winning hearts and minds COIN; "democratization - building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections; development - fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements." if can rule, can harm/abuse; "Indeed, if a single majority exists within a society, democracy may even lead to the abuse of vulnerable minorities, and less participatory and more consociational forms of government may be preferred." consociational = government by coalition and segmented autonomy; 'most of costs of Iraq War incurred during the statebuilding phase,' "Statebuilding is an enormously fraught undertaking. It is both essential to the maintenance of the Westphalian system and a threat to it." "The greater the distance in policy preferences, the more acute the trade-off between legitimacy and loyalty, the more statebuilders favor loyal leaders, and the less likely statebuilding is to succeed in creating legitimate states able to govern themselves effectively over the long run."

World Bank MENA report

MENA & world economies not doing well. MENA b/c 1) too dependent on oil and prices are low right now 2) violent extremism/radicalization on the rise. Lack of inclusion, not poverty, driver of radicalization into joining groups like ISIS. In fact, ISIS recruits generally from wealthier countries and usually better education or as educated as the norm. World isn't doing so hot, MENA especially because conflict and low oil prices, nations too dependent on price of foreign oil - deficit for foreseeable future, "disappointing performance of MENA economies, and possibly global, partly due to rise of terrorist attacks and spread of violent extremism" Most members of ISIL are better educated than the norm if not from Europe and as educated as the norm if from Europe and not likely to have been unemployed, "older regions do not produce older Daesh recruits," "poverty not driver of radicalization into violent extremism" people from wealthier countries more likely to become ISIL recruits lack of inclusion might fuel terrorist behavior

World Bank: World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development

Most common form of violence prevention is elite pact. Security, economic, or justice horizontal inequality all increase risk of violence. Countries with formal constitutions are 64% less likely to relapse into civil war. Economic costs of being bystanders often as high as those associated with being a rebel. Motivations for joining a gang or insurgency: 1) unemployment/idleness 2) feel more secure/powerful 3) belief in the cause/revenge/injustice. elite pact or agreement between leaders is most common type of inter-group violence prevention; stress on security, economy, or justice all increase risk of violence; inequality alone is not enough to trigger violence - must be horizontal; may merely be desire for self-determination; impunity for organized crime begets violence; crime syndicates in Africa sometimes move from region to region opportunistically; Mara gangs from LA repatriated to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador - heightened violence in those countries; economic sometimes cost of staying peaceful is greater than cost of being violent; unemployment or employment in undesired sectors (ag. labor in some cases)may lead to violence; motivation to join gangs and rebel groups is highly similar 1) unemployment/idleness 2) feel more secure/powerful 3) belief in the cause/revenge/injustice; most cultures favor fairness above personal material gain; human rights abuses make civil war more likely; ideological militant movements - plurality of members joined for ideology; legitimacy - political and inclusion (accountability) - transparent processes that take public will into account; performance (capacity) government provides "security, economic oversight and services, and justice," formal constitution - civil war recurrence 64% less likely, governance better than other countries with same GDP per capita = lower chance of civil war; 2007-8 food protests - weak developing governments 4 times as likely to have violent food protests as strong developing

Kalyvas and Kocher "How "Free" is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem."

Often more dangerous to be a civilian than an insurgent. Insurgents often have access to information and other resources for survival and innocence is sparse protection against victimization. Being a rebel gives mean to defend against malicious denunciation. Phoenix Program in Afghanistan. German occupation of the Argolid. Collective action problem exists only if insurgent participation is relatively risky. First joiners are rare "political entrepeneurs with strong motivators, willing to assume high risks." Some rebel groups might encourage indiscriminate violence to help with recruiting. Persecuted groups often flock to persecuting army. rebels have some effective mechanism of resolving the collective action problem; insurgencies must encourage some free-riding because they provide public good and the risks of individual participation in insurgent collective action are high; "We argue, instead, that the collective action problem applies only if insurgent collective action is risky relative to non participation." just existing might be dangerous too - or be perceived to be dangerous; if free riding costly - collective action problem likely eliminated; historical records including the empirical Phoenix Program in Vietnam support this; (opinion: drone strikes might actually be highly effective in helping to remedy this); risks of non participation are "routinely underestimated;" "Rebel groups typically claim public goods are their goals," "Even putting aside the question of how authentic and widely shared these aims are, they are subject to high levels of uncertainty and very long time horizons," first joiners "are political entrepreneurs with strong motivations, willing to assume high risks;" sometimes (remote areas, extremely weak government control, for example) being a rebel isn't that risky; malicious denunciation - being innocent doesn't protect but having the ability to retaliate does; innocents "victimized disproportionately" because "rebel combatants have access to skills, resources, and networks that should promote their survival relative to noncombatants." Rebels can provide warning, shelter, methods of escape and survival, training, and necessary resources for survival. "insurgent participation is much less dangerous relative to non participation than is posited by the collective action paradigm and than is generally thought." in Salvadoran civil war many women became insurgents to survive; 1) rebels sometimes favor indiscriminate counter insurgent violence because it helps them cement pro-rebellion sentiment/recruit 2) "indiscriminate state violence may give rise to club goods for the rebels" 3) weak rebellion's inability to protect its civilians will cause them to defect to the government; if rebels can offer selective violence, can attract civilians; less motivated to rebel often those killed - El Mozote massacre in El Salvador took mainly undecided civilians as its victims; in German occupation of Greece - Germans would kill all the men they found at home during raids - all the men who were not part of the rebellion and thus were not warned; "In such contexts, the belief in one's own innocence can be fatal, unlike the awareness of one's own guilt." US selected 73,697 people as members of the Vietcong - killed 21% or 15,438 by the end of the war, "actual guilt was, at best, weakly correlated with selection," those killed were the least likely to be guilty; to be one the list denounced by 3 distinct people or one ""irrefutable source"" (don't know what makes ""irrefutable""), only 11% on list had had been identified in this way (opinion: one wonders who they found themselves on this list then); "those under low suspicion were almost five times more likely to be killed than those under high suspicion," ~97% of killed were unconfirmed; higher rank meant higher physical security - likely meant higher ID security too; confirmation could be a long process only completed by those who survive; US might have more effective out of Phoenix program than in it; 70-90% of Abu Ghraib not insurgent connected in 2004; members of Phoenix effort recognized that people using denunciation as method of revenge; "A US commander in Iraq remarked about Iraqi counterinsurgents that "if they shoot somebody, I don't think they would have remorse, even if they killed someone who was innocent." occupation of the Argolid - homicides by army were 68.5% indiscriminate violence whereas homicides by rebels were 31.4% indiscriminate violence;" "civilian collaborators of the rebels did not face a graver danger than non collaborators;" b/c rebels have limited resources they have fewer members but use the civilian population as a source of broad support - explains relatively small size of active fighting forces despite fewer deterrents than expected; in fact, persecuted groups might flock to persecuting armies ("Chechens in pro-Russian militias, Kurds in the Turkish Army");

Emal Habib for Afghanistan Analysts Network

Outside world saw as revolution for girl's education. In fact, discontented Taliban/former Hezb-i Islami revolted against new Taliban commander with support of influential official Khaled. Over 100 killed and region did not return to government control. No aid had been administered. Andar uprising, Taliban didn't let girls go to school (despite special exception in the region) when government banned motorbikes, population revolted in what was widely held as revolt in favor of education In fact, just discontented Taliban encouraged by government and originally lead by Rahmatullah Return to Hezb-i Islami times Andar already known to be fractious tribe Devolved into many armed groups of youth Khaled - influential capital dweller supporting uprising Underestimates of deaths but still place at 102 on all sides as of 2012 Taliban control not effectively broken

Justino, Bruck, Verwimp - "Micro-level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development"

RCTs key. Confounders: attrition non-random, diffusion or contamination, resentment, external validity, "bargaining model approach" - aid weakens the government or insurgents and thus worsens conflict; less visible = safer, more visible = more legitmacy; must: evaluate regularly, compare secondary data acroos sources, consider some qualitative measures, need neutral monitors; RCTs good at establishing causal relationships. RCTs should be used to evaluate development, effective randomization key, counterfactual - what has not happened, E=mathematical expectation operator, ex ante=based on forecasts, threats and potential biases: attrition non-random, diffusion or contamination, resentment from control or treated, external validity - do the results make sense elsewhere, "bargaining-model approach" = aid weakens government or insurgents and thus worsens conflict, less visible programs tend to be more protected and less likely to incite violence, but bigger projects might be better at building legitimacy, CCT downsides: weak banking makes hard to pay, states can't implement well, potential to cause inflation, corruption/diversion of money, high migration; Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); regular evaluation essential, compare secondary data across sources, take some qualitative into effect, need neutral partners to monitor; RCTs could at explaining failure and causal relationships; always account for conflict

Weinstein on insurgent governance

Rebels groups depend on civilians, they maintain good relationships through inclusiveness/transparency, protecting property rights, using existing power structures, and following through. Heavily dependent on conditions at inception. Can use control to "maintain semblance of stability and prevent defection." Rebel groups depend on civilians, must take into account: "desire for security, their need for food and shelter, and their incentives to choose one side over the other," rebel groups - inclusiveness, power sharing; property ownership and follow through are key, build symbiotic relationship; rebel groups strategies "shaped by the conditions present at the organization's inception ... types of members who are attracted to participate;" sometimes use military control "maintain semblance of stability and prevent defection," "extent of civilian labor required" is key, transparency with civilians good tactic, NRA used committees to share power and make civilians feel enfranchised - also helped for better cohesion and provision of resources, NRA "Importantly, in the provision of health care, no distinction was made between civilians and soldiers," use existing power structures - Renamo used Régulos from Portuguese colonial times but also had a stated goal of democratization, Shining Path allowed full participation of civilians in rebel affairs - ran popular schools - fighters not given (openly) better treatment than others - Shining Path in Huallaga was different - used civilians almost exclusively as a source of coca leaves

Weinstein on insurgent recruitment

Rebels resolve the collective action dilemma by being selective, using strong, pre-existing social ties, being process-oriented thus allowing members to feel more personal efficacy. Low commitment = consumer whereas high commitment = investor. Address their own ID problem with background checks, vouching, make joining labor intensive. Economic motivation makes groups more heterogenous while postponed rewards attract the ideologically committed. NRA used large social endowmnet, pre-existing Baganda-Banyankole social structures, indoctrination, and ethnic ties. 'Rebellion when people run mortal risks by challenging the government,' "rebellion offers potential recruits a pathway to a different, and perhaps better, future," somehow many rebel groups find some way to eliminate free riders and thus solve the collective action problem; material rewards are well documented; collective & selective; "shared identities and social ties help to resolve the dilemma of collective action by providing for reciprocity," strong communities = more cohesive rebels when drawn from those communities; process-oriented - allow rebels to feel personal efficacy; economic and social endowments; low commitment = consumer, high commitment = investor; selective admissions to insurgencies; address info. problem: background checks, have members vouch, make it difficult to join (ex. must learn tenets before can join); use economic motivation more = more heterogeneous group; willing to postpone reward - shows commitment; NRA - "ethnic appeals and community ties," large social endowment, relied on aid of Baganda people, respected village elders; emphasized historical Baganda-Banyankole link; Renamo - had to switch from allowing people to join to conscription - uneducated, diverse, otherwise not connected troops - economic and process orientation and force; Shining Path - had to go to school, learn to read and write and history of Peru, "belief that one could be objectively guilty while subjectively believing that one was acting correctly," young and educated group, pleasure in agency, established popular schools - of course, more coercive Huallaga branch; "Some people are embedded in communities that place a higher value on investment; others come from environments in which consumption is prioritized"

Kalyvas Ch. 4 "The Logic of Violence in Civil War"

Sovereignty can be fragmented or segmented. Irregular war - ID problem. Violence plays an underestimated role in amassing support. Much more going on than grievances. 7% supporting an insurgency is considered strong. Build small core of support and hope for passive, exclusive collaboration from the rest of the population. Defection - nonconforming, informing, switching sides. Institutional collaboration: militias are more commonly used by occupiers, easier to recruit, often highly violent, and political and committees. Sovereignty: Fragmented - two or more exercise partial control Segmented - two or more exercise full control Irregular war - Can't identify enemy combatants, CIA - small scale operations in Vietnam between 1966 and 1968 definitively encountered insurgents less than 1% of the time. MI5 used 45% percent of budget (hundreds of millions of pounds) to fight IRA in year in which IRA had 5 M pounds at most, Insurgents often afraid of betrayal by the town's people Support - "Like the man who has to hit his opponent through the body of the referee," Too much focus on grievances - must be grievances or dismay + strong political organization, Observed support not good indicator b/c very little to keep people from acting however they please at the moment, also pressure to act one way or another, Violence plays an underestimated role in amassing political support, But - whole range of complex factors at play many of which have nothing to do with ideology (ex.- elevated status), Militias often comprised of turncoats or vengeful people , Often become wider movements Focus on behavior rather than attitudes? Data difficult to collect, Spectrum of support , Initial, sustaining, combat motivations may be unique, 7% of population supporting an insurgency is considered strong support, Likely that ethnic and non ethnic conflicts have similar support levels Forms of Collaboration and Defection - Leaders look for small group of loyalists and hope for the rest of the populations exclusive, gentle collaboration Defection - Nonconforming, Informing, Switching sides Institutional setting of collaboration - Militias - may be violent at will - more likely to be used by occupiers, Committees - must get permission to be violent - more likely to be used by rebels Militias -Usually highly political and local, Violent, Usually very easy to recruit (1 million militia people in Guatemala in 1985, Not uncommon to have more than needed by occupying force), Used to build public support for government - after fighting guerillas, feel less ambivalent Committees - Come to represent local extension of rebel government, Give information to higher levels of government, make determinations about executions, Sometimes can "veto violence" in their own communities

Leites "Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflict" (1970)

Theory: HAM, COIN as "political, social, and economic" struggle, insurgents as ""fish in the sea"" Mao Tse-Tung, P1: need some popular support. Vietcong (1964) and Malay (1951) as low as 1%. Perception of A's indomitability highly valualbe. P2: 'R gets power from poverty and economic inequality.' Rebels often richer than general population. Aid facilitates action based on existing opinions. P3: R's internals more important than externals. theory could be divided into: "hearts and minds," counterinsurgency as "political, social, and economic" (as opposed to military) struggle, insurgents as ""fish in the sea (Mao Tse-Tung)" "with the populace comprising the environment that incubates, nourishes, and sustains rebellion," "Proposition 1: R requires popular support to get started and gain momentum, and guerilla forces require popular support to conduct successful military operations. (Conversely, acquiring popular support by A is essential if operations against R are to be successful.)" some estimates put active Vietcong (1964) and Malayan rebel (1951) supporters as low as 1%; damage limited and profit-maximizing behavior; "assisted preferences: once fear, advantage, and forecasts counsel a certain conduct, it may come to seem intrinsically worthwhile," "damage-limiting, profit-maximizing, and inevitability considerations rather than sympathy," existing authority may easily manage beloved rebellion if "A's own resolve and resources seem beyond doubt;" if no genuine support, just coerce; "Proposition 2: R derives its strength from poverty and inequality of income and wealth. (Conversely, if R is to be neutralized and A's strength enhanced or restored, poverty and inequality must be relieved.)" rebels often richer than general population; although aid can change opinion, it is more likely to allow people to act on existing opinions; A's aid can help R's public perception; "Proposition 3: In the growth of R and in its prospects for success, factors and influences that are fundamentally internal (endogeny) predominate over factors and influences that are external (exogeny). (Conversely, for A to prevent or defeat R, its efforts and counter pressures must place primary emphasis on endogenous rather than exogenous targets);" endogeny over exogeny; "R may win without external support; A is unlikely to wing if R continues to receive it."

Staniland - "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders"

Typology of warfare control divided into segmented and fragmented with state-insurgent cooperation divided into active, passive, and nonexistent. Staniland advocates this system to resolve the vast number of "indeterminate" classifications. Shouldn't fixate on "monopoly of violence" definition of the state. States are not Leviathans. Politics and violence should be considered together. States and insurgents optimize control rather than maximize utility. Civil conflict can be viewed as "competitive state-building." fixation on "monopoly of violence" has lead to some inaccuracy in political science terms; "States and insurgents are not simple-minded utility maximizers of monopoly but instead are optimizers of authority in complex, often counter intuitive, interaction with other armed actors." "Rather than a category unto itself, civil war should be situated within a broader set of processes that combine politics and violence." existing system leaves too many conflicts labeled some variation of indeterminate; states not Leviathans; no good measure for political control in civil war; "civil conflict as competitive state-building," wartime = contending armed forces with monopoly of state violence broken; segmented = each side controls some territory, fragmented = each side controls overlapping territory; Typology of six wartime political orders: active state-insurgent cooperation: segmented distribution of control = shared sovereignty fragmented distribution of control= collusion passive state-insurgent cooperation segmented distribution of control = spheres of influence fragmented distribution of control = tacit coexistence nonexistent state-insurgent cooperation segmented distribution of control = clashing monopolies fragmented distribution of control = guerilla disorder ("situations of no cooperation lead to unrestrained violence that most closely approximates intuitive understandings of civil war") using wartime political orders (WPOs) helps deal with the unhelpful overabundance of indeterminate categorizations; "politics do not end when the first bullet is fired," "powerfully shown that military efforts to "do politics" - through security and service provision - frequently misdiagnose the core political stakes of conflicts," "The threat from weak and failed states has been dramatically exaggerated, and there is little need for expansive "global counterinsurgency."" advocates "flexibility, creativity, and imagination"

FM 3-24

aid and force/legitimacy and control simultaneously; shape (prepare environment, share information), clear, hold, build (increase security capacity), transition back to local leaders; micro-level and (ostensibly) assessments based; use local, inclusive, transparent leadership and engage the youth; ID separate, isolate, influence (erode desire to resist with "generous" escape deals), reintegrate; money usage should be host nation owned, build capacity, be sustainable, be selectively given, use strong partnerships, be flexible, and be held to high standards of accountability. SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION FRAMEWORK; Shape - change environment, notify population of increasing military presence, Clear - remove overt insurgent presence, Hold - provide security to keep out insurgents, Build - increase security capacity, Transition back to local leaders; Nonlinear and highly assessments based, Assessments should be region by region and small scale, Multiple variables should be taken into account simultaneously; Nation assistance - mutually agreed upon foreign aid aimed fostering long term growth; Security cooperation - DOD to foreign governments;5 rules govern:Local actors, Independent and variegated funding sources, Diverse leaders (not just intellectual elite), use growth indicators other than enrollment - number of offices, personnel, outcomes, Should link population and government; Youth programs demonstrably beneficial; Give information on avoiding angering the population IDENTIFY, SEPARATE (physically, socially, and psychologically), ISOLATE (Destroy connections among insurgents - must understand well first, Treat prisoners well to undermine ideological footing, Careful to practice economic isolation responsibly so as not to harm local people), INFLUENCE (Erode desire to struggle and decision making capabilities, but allow a way out, Deals which seem generous, such as amnesty and reintegration, lure insurgents away and causes rifts in remaining insurgents, Incentivize and treat fairly to extract more and more accurate information), AND REINTEGRATE (Must restore society, economy, government and take into account all needs of former insurgents to remake them into productive members of society Demobilization - get people out of insurgencies, must be able to reclaim citizenship); Discover identity of insurgents and isolate from population; Integrated monetary shaping operations, Control insurgents monetary supply and influence using aid and measures to prevent international funding or use of international monetary institutions; Money Usage Principles in Counterinsurgency: Host-nation ownership. Capacity building. Sustainability. Selectivity. Partnership. Flexibility. Accountability.