Philosophy Final

Intentionality

'Aboutness'; Directedness of a mental state toward its representational content. Representational content may be propositional, pictorial or other symbolic representation

Computationalism/Symbolicism

'Strong AI.' Mentality is simply information processing. Information processing is just computing symbolic representations according to syntatic rules. In other words, mentality involves during what a Turing Machine does

Problem of Overdetermination

(P1) Mental phenomena have effects in the physical world. (P2) The physical world is causally closed. That is, if any physical is caused, it has a sufficient physical cause (and a wholly physical explanation). (C) Mental Phenomena are physical phenomena

Too Intellectual (Objection to Conscoiusness)

1. Babies and animals can have state consciousness but they are not intelligent enough to have higher-order thoughts, because higher-order thoughts require concepts (including the concept of a mental state) that babies and animals don't (yet) have 2. HOT can't make sense of the non-conceptual content of our first-order thoughts. In order for this view to work, we must have as many concepts as we have qualia. But this seems very implausible. 3. For every conscious state there is an unconscious higher-order thought about it. But how does an unconscious state confer upon/explain the consciousness of another mental state? 4. It seems you can have HOTs about lower-order mental states without those mental states ever becoming conscious. For example, through therapy you may come to believe that you have a mental state of which you are never actually conscious. If this is possible, HOT is not sufficient for state consciousness, though it may be necessary

Arguments for PANIC

1. Conscious experiences are transparent in that we are never directly aware of them. Rather, we are conscious through them, only conscious of the thing those conscious states are aware of. This is a rejection of HOT theories of consciousness, which claim we must be aware of the conscious mental state in order for it to be conscious. 2. "Spot" argument: We can have conscious states without having a higher-order awareness of them, e.g. cases of change blindness. Having a conscious state does not require that one be conscious of their consciousness. The state is conscious just in case it has PANIC

Arguments for Propositional Attitudes Eliminative Materialism

1. Folk psychology is a stagnant research program. 2. Folk psychology is committed to the language of thought hypothesis, which is inconsistent with connectionism. 3. Folk psychology runs into the problems brought out in the exclusion argument.

Dennett's Qualia Eliminative Materialism

1. If qualia exists, then they are ineffable, intrinsic (non-relational), private, and directly known 2. Nothing is ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly known 3. Qualia don't exist

Argument from Illusion

1. Illusions and perceptions are subjectively/phenomenally similar 2. Illusions and perceptions both involve awareness of something 3. The best explanation for 1 and 2 is that the object of illusions and perceptions is the same, something subjective (mind-dependent) 4. The objects of perception are mind-dependent. Against Direct Realism

Objections to Consciousness

1. Introspectively Implausible 2. Too Intellectual

The Exclusion Argument

1. Mental event m is a cause of physical even p (Assumption for reductio) 2. If a physical event has a cause (occurring at) time t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t (Physical Causal Closure Principle) 3. Physical event p* is a cause of p (from 1 and 2) 4. m and p* are NOT identical (Assumption) 5. The causation of p is not a case of overdetermination (Assumption) 6. No event has two or more distinct sufficient causes, all occurring at the same time, unless it is a genuine case of overdetermination (Exclusion Principle) (--> <--) 7. M is not a cause of p (i.e. Premise 1 is false) and this holds for all m and p

Objections to Resemblance Theory

1. Not clear that this is consistent with a purely physicalist view of mind. Where are these pictorial representations? What are they made of? 2. Lots of thoughts have representational content without resembling the things they are thought about 3. Resemblance relation is symmetrical while representation relation is not

Arguments Against Propositional Attitudes Eliminative Materialism

1. Propositional attitudes Eliminative Materialism is self-defeating. In order to assert that beliefs don't exist, one needs to believe that beliefs don't exist 2. Folk psychology isn't a theory about the mind that can be replaced by another theory 3. We can't do without folk psychology and we won't reach a point where we can dispense with it 4. Introspection gives us excellent evidence of the existence of propositional attitudes in the same way that perceptions gives us excellent evidence of the existence of a material world

Objections to PANIC

1. Qualia isn't a type of representational content (conceptual or otherwise). While qualia may often (perhaps always?) involve or be accompanied by representational content, it's not clear that they are the same thing. Indeed, some qualiative experience seem to lack representational/intentional content (i.e. they aren't about anything) altogether, e.g. moods. 2. Two different experiences can have the same representational content (specifically embraced in the 'P' and 'A' parts of PANIC). But what makes them two different experiences rather than the same experience, if not that they differ in their qualia? But if they have the same content but differ in their qualia, the qualia must be different than the content. Additionally, qualia inversion is possible. In qualia, inversion, two people have the same representational content but opposite qualia.

Turing Test Objections

1. The test is too tough. Something could have mentality but fail the test. 2. The test is too narrow. It is designed to look for humanlike mentality, but not all things that have mentality have this kind of mentality. Response to both: passing the test provides a sufficient, even if not a necessary, condition for mentality.

Objections to Role Semantics

1. While some mental representations, like logical connectives, can be analyzed functionally, many mental representations. Concepts such as 'dog' have a specific intrinsic content not determined by the concept's function or relation to other mental representations (Searle's objection to functionalism applied to conceptual role semantics)

Turing Machine

A machine with a machine table that outlines what a given mechanism will do in relation to the following components: 1. A finite series of possible inputs, with "concrete physical embodiments," 2. A finite series of possible outputs, with "concrete physical embodiments," 3. A finite series of internal states. Each internal state will specify what to do when the mechanism encounters each of the inputs while in that internal state. These instructions will not only specify which output to produce but also which internal state to enter upon completing the task at hand. The machine table defines it and provides all the instructions for all of the internal states of that machine It's a computing machine. Can be deterministic mechanisms (internal states provide absolute instructions) or probabilistic automata (internal states provide probabilistic instructions, stating that certain outputs occur a certain percentage of the time)

Functional Kind

A natural kind whose defining feature (the feature that renders an individual thing a member of the kind) is a causal, role, i.e. a function members perform. This function is typically multiply realizable. E.g., mousetraps, mammals (all have babies, etc.)

Realizer of a Functional Property

A particular property is said to realize F (or be a realizer or realization of F) in system x if and only if that property performs F's causal role in system x

Folk Psychology

A psychological theory that is implicity held and which uses commonsense notions to explain mental phenomena. Folk psychology posits propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires to explain the cause of behavior. According to Eliminative Materialism, folk psychology will eventually be replaced by neuroscience as a general theory about the mind. In replacing it, the theoretical posits of folk psychology (mental states of a certain sort) will be eliminated.

Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness

A state is conscious when one has a higher-order thought about it, e.g. "I am in x state." This higher-order thought will have conceptual content. But it need not be itself a conscious thought (e.g. you can be unconsciously conscious of a mental state).

Strong AI

A suitably complex computer program has mentality. Strongly associated with functionalism

Turing Test

A test designed for a computer wherein the computer is asked a range of questions over all the area s of concern to humans. The computer passes the test if it can fool a human into thinking it is another human at a rate better than randomization. And if a computer passes, this shows that it has mentality

Mental Imagery vs. Thoughts

According to Empiricists, mental imagery is the basis for thoughts. That is, one cannot have thoughts without having mental images (And one cannot have mental images without first having perceptual experiences). These mental image can be called to mind and combined in any number of different ways

The Origination/Causal Chain Argument

Against compatibilism. Free will requires that actions ultimately originate with the agent. But if determinism is true, then all our actions are simply links in a long causal chain that originates a long time ago, before we were even born

Pseudo Objection to Problem of Overdetermination

All this rules out is non-physical causes, not non-physical effects. So really, this argument leaves open two options: mind-body identity theory or epiphenomenalism

Token-Physicalism

Anomalous Monism. Mental tokens are identical to physical tokens, though mental types need not be identical to physical types. Motivated by the seeming incompatibility between: Mental Causation, Nomic Subsumption, Anomalism of the Mental. According to this, mental types are not identical to physical types but mental tokens ARE identical to physical tokens.

Qualia

Argument against Functionalism. Philosophical Zombie, Cross-Wired Brain, Searle's Chinese Room Thought Experiment, Causal problems.

Swampman & Brain-in-vat

Arguments in favor of Internalism. Swampman: Dude comes out of a swamp and is exactly like you. Don't have the same experiences henceforth. Brain-in-vat: like the Matrix. Just a brain sitting somewhere and experiencing VR. Identical experience to how we are now

Problem of Mental Causation

Can mental events cause nonmental (physical) events?

Problem with Turing Machine Functionalism

Can't make sense of multiple simultaneous mental states

Interactionism (Mental Causation)

Cartesian Substance Dualism. The mind is nonphysical and does interact with the physical. Agrees with mental causation

Weak AI

Computer programs can explain and simulate mentality

Phenomenal Consciousness

Conscious states with a qualitative component. Technical sense of either subject consciousness (e.g. what it's like to be a bat) or state consciousness (e.g. what it's like to see red)

Property Dualism (Life After Death)

Could believe in life after death, could not.

Identity Theory (Life After Death)

Could recreate the identical physical structure of the brain

Hard Determinism

Determinism obtains so we are not free

Multiple Realization Argument

Every mental state (type) is multiply realizable, that is the mental state can supervene on any number of different physical or mechanical states. But identities require a one-to-one relation. M1 is not identitical to B1 if tokens of M1 can exist with B2, B3, .... instead of B1. The very same mental state may supervene on a number of different brain states in humans. But when we broaden our view and notice that mental states can be present in animals that have vastly different brains than we do, it seems very difficult to resist the idea that mental states can supervene on lots of different physical states and so cannot be identical with any one physical state.

Causal Closure of the Physical

Every physical event that has a cause, has a sufficient cause that is wholly physical. Problem for substance dualism. Seems to be confirmed by science: causation requires a transfer of energy but the physical world is a closed system in which energy is neither generated nor destroyed, only moved from one place to another (conservation of energy)

Modified Causal Closure of the Physical

Every physical event that has a cause, is caused wholly by physical properties, i.e. only physical properties are causally efficaious. Problem for property dualism -- left only with epiphenomenalism

Nomic Subsumption

For each individual case of causation, the specific cause and effect fall under a strict causal law according to which events of one type cause events of another type

Functional Property

For something x to have a functional property F (or to be an F) =def for x to have some property P such that there is a C(P) i.e. a specification of the causal work that P is supposed to do in x. There is no unique P associated with each F. All that must be present in some P that plays a particular causal role. F is a "second-order" property that quantifies over a class of "first-order" properties, namely P

Compatibilism

Free will and determinism are compatible

Incompatibilism

Free will and determinism are incompatible

An Example of a Compatibilist Conception of Free Will

Free will consists in having effective second order volitions. A second order volition is a second order desire that one of one's first order desires be efficacious. If that desire IS efficacious, then the action is free. Harry Frankfurt -- Hierarchy of Desire

Source Incompatibilism

Free will requires that our actions originate with us (i.e., that we are the ultimate source of our actions)

Leeway Incompatibilism

Free will requires the ability to do otherwise

Logical Determinism/Fatalism

Global Determinism. Facts about certain times are true at all times. It was true on January 1, 1900 that you would be reading this handout at this moment in 2016. Thus, you can't do otherwise now

Theological Determinism

Global Determinism. God has exhaustive foreknowledge. Given that God cannot hold false beliefs, what he believes must be true. Given the fact that God believed on January 1, 1900 that you would be reading this handout at this moment in 2016, you couldn't do anything but read this handout at this moment in 2016

Causal/Physical Determinism

Global Determinism. The past and the laws of nature together entail one future. Given the way the world was on January 1, 1900 and the fact that laws of nature are deterministic, it couldn't be otherwise than that you are reading this handout at this moment in 2016 (ex: Big Bang)

Qualia Epiphenomenalism seems to rule out self-knowledge

Imagine you have a "zimbo duplicate." If you pinch your hand, you might have the thought "I am now experiencing a painful quale." Since qualia are not causally efficacious, your throught can't be caused by your quale so there is no reason your zimbo duplicate can't have the same thought. But if you have the same thoughts, how do you know that YOU are not the zimbo?

Externalism

Identity IS a relation. Even assuming physicalism, if two people are physically, functionally, and behaviorally identical, their mental states may be different if those two people differ in their relational properties. That is, mental states and their content may supervene on extrinsic (relational) physical properties of the individual. Arguments in Favor: Twin Earth

Objections to Explanatory Argument

Identity cancels rather than explains correlation. Something can't correlate with itself. So as an explanation, it fails. Inference to the best explanation is typical in scientific theorizing. In that realm, however, once an explanation is offered, it is used to make predictions that are then tested. But the proposition, "mental state M is identical to brain state B" cannot be used to make predictions nor can it be tested. As such, it doesn't seem to be operating as an explanation.

Arguments Against Hard Determinism

If free will is required for moral responsibility, then denying the existence of free will entails that moral responsibility is illusory. It is not clear that we can conceive of ourselves as agents without believing ourselves to be free

Modal Argument: Zombies

If identity theory is true, then it would be impossible to have a particular brain state associated with a quale (in most people) but yet fail to have the same quale. It is possible (because conceivable) to have a particular brain state associated with a quale (in most people) but yet fail to have the quale. Therefore, identity theory is false

Cross-Wired Brain

If we were to cross-wire the brain such that mental states had their qualia and functions crossed, it's not clear that the mental state would 'go with' the function rather than the qualia. According to the functionalist, if a state mediates between pain inputs and outputs, and is related to other mental states in a certain sort of way, it is pain. But in this scenario, one in which pain and itch mechanisms are crossed, many of us might claim that in spite of the fact that an itch mechanism is performing the role of a pain mechanism, by mediating pain inputs and outputs, it is NOT the case that the subject is in pain, but is rather experiencing an itch.

Mental Imagery vs. Percept

In general, highly similar, small differences. 1. Percepts need to be caused by something physically close but mental images do not 2. Percepts cannot be called to mind at will but mental images can 3. Percepts are typically clearer and more vivid than are mental images

Max Black's 'Distinct' Identity Argument

In order for an identity to be a posteriori identity, the two referring expressions must pick out different properties. For instance, to say that Clark Kent is identical to Superman, and that this identity claim is something that we can discover through empirical investigation, it must be that "Clark Kent" and "Superman" pick out different sets of properties. That is, while they refer to the same person, both titles pick out something different about the person. This is what makes the identity claim non-vacuous.

Causal problems associated with dualism (Functionalism)

In what do the causal powers of a mental property consist? Are they over and above the causal powers of its realizers? And if so, what is the relationship between the two? How does the mental property cause anything? And why are its causal powers necessary if the causal powers of the realizer do all the work (problem of overdetermination)?

Internalism

Intentionality is NOT a relation. For a physicalist, if two people are physically, functionally, and behaviorally identical, all of their mental states (including the content of those mental states) will be identical. That is, mental states and their content supervene on intrinsic physical properties of the individual

Causal/Information Theory

Intentionality is a kind of causal relationship (grounded in perception) such that the mental state (the effect) is taken to have natural meaning. A state of affairs has natural meaning when it carries information about its cause.

Inconsistent Triad

Intentionality seems to be relational. But this forms the basis of a puzzle/problem for intetionality. More specificifically, this conception of intentionalily when combined with two other incredibly plausible propositions forms an inconsistent set: 1. We can think about things that do not exist 2. Thinking about something is a relation between the thinker and the thing thought about 3. There can only be a relation between two things if both of the things exist

Intentionality Resists Reduction

Intentionality seems to resist reduction to physical or function states. Intentionality, like qualia, seems deeply puzzling on a purely physicalist account of the mind. Several attempts have been made to give a purely naturalistic/physicalist explanation of intentionality, mainly by trying to give a naturalistic reading of representational content

How do emotions differ from one another?

Intentionality, Intensity, Valence

Challenge to Language of Thought Hypothesis

Is this way of understanding cognition compatible with connectionism about the brain, e.g. the view that cognition is distributed throughout the brain rather than certain types of cognition being localized to one area?

Ethical Determinism

Local Determinism. When we choose to do X, we do so because we have determined that x is the best course of action, i.e. it is the right thing to do. So our actions are determined by what we think we should do.

Psychological Determinism

Local Determinism. When we choose to do X, we do so because we want to do X more than all other options. So our actions are determined by what we desire

Philosophical Zombie

It is conceivable that two things have all the same functional properties but only one has qualia. But this should be impossible if all mental states are functional properties. Particularly devastating for Analytic Functionalism because it defines mental states by our concepts of them. If two concepts come apart, as mere conceivability demonstrates, then those two concepts cannot be identical.

Arguments Against Leeway Incompatibilsm

It seems that we can come up with counterexamples (referred to as Frankfurt-style counterexamples) to this claim. These counterexamples will involve an agent who, unbeknownst to her, could not do otherwise but is still free and morally responsible because she is never caused to perform the action. In these cases, the mechanism that removes alternatives does not actually cause the action in question.

Systematicity

Language of Thought Hypothesis. Certain thoughts bear systemic relations to one another, e.g. transitivity symmetry.

Productivity

Language of Thought Hypothesis. The number of thoughts we can have and the number of things we can understand is indefinitely large.

Causal Argument

Mental states are causes of behavior. They can't make sense of this is firm reason to abandon behaviorism and property dualism (and possibly substance dualism because of the interaction problem). Functionalism defines mental properties as causal properties and therefore can make sense of this critical component of the mental

Main Claims of Functionalism

Mental states are defined by their causal role, standing as intermediaries between various inputs and outputs. Mental states are NOT defined by the physical substances that realize them (rejection of mind-brain identity theory) Mental states are NOT defined by publicly accessible behaviors. Behavior is relevant but mental states cannot not be reduced to behavior (rejection of behaviorism). They are instead the cause of behavior.

Multiple Realizability

Mental states can or could be realized in any number of different physical states (including, but not limited to, brain states). Mind-brain identity can't make sense of this but in positing second-order functional properties, the functionalist can

Substance Dualism (Life After Death)

Mental substances can exist without bodies and/or can be attached to new bodies

Functionalism (Life After Death)

Mind uploading into different hardware

Reductionism (Mental Causation)

Mind-Body Identity Theory. The mind and the brain are the same so all mental causation is really physical causation. Agrees with mental causation

Explanatory Arguments (Inference to the Best Explanation)

Mind-body identity is the best explanation for individual psychoneural correlations and the pervasiveness of these correlations.

Type-Physicalism

Mind-brain Identity Theory. Mental types are identical to physical types. This means that mental states will be identical to physical states.

Searle's Chinese Room Thought Experiment

Objection to Computationalism. Clear that there's no understanding

Parallelism (Mental Causation)

Occasionalism and Pre-established Harmony. The mind is nonphysical and does not interact with the physical. Against mental causation.

Anomalism of the Mental

Only physical descriptions of events fall under strict laws, i.e. strict laws only occur in physics. Psychological descriptions (e.g. that x desires y) do not fall under strict causal laws, for the reasons raised by the Geach-Chisholm objection to behaviorism.

Problem with Analytic Functionalism

Parts of folk psychology have been proven false by work done in psychology and cognitive science. There is no reason to believe that more won't be proven false as science progresses

Perdurantism/Four-Dimensionalism

Persons are four-dimensional time-space worms. X doesn't persist through change. Rather, X is extended through time. Objection: May rule out free will

PANIC Theory of Consciousness

Poised Abstract Nonconceptual Intentional Content. Phenomenal character (qualia) of first-order mental states is a type of representational content. A conscious state is a mental state that has PANIC. Transitive consciousness is explained by state consciousness. A state with PANIC is the type of mental state in virtue of which transitive consciousness is possible. That is, when we are conscious of something, it is in virtue of having a mental state that is conscious.

Arguments Against Libertarianism

Problem of Luck. if free will is incompatible with determinism, it must be compatible with (indeed require) indeterminism. But if our actions are indeterministic then they must be a matter of luck. But free will requires control, so luck undermines it

Interpretational Semantics

The content of a mental state is determined by the interpretation. Mental states get their content in much the same way that strings of letters get their content, i.e., through the interpreter

Functionalism: Searle's Chinese Room Thought Experiment

Problematic for Turing Machine Functionalism and Analytic Functionalism because the functional role of understanding is being fulfilled and the system is a sufficiently complex Turing machine, yet there is no actual understanding. Less problematic for Empirical Functionalism because what we can conceive does not tell us what mental states actually are (which is discovering through science).

Problem with Empirical Functionalism

Psychology and cognitive science are relatively new fields and have not established any bedrock truths. Furthermore, much of our work in psychology and cognitive science must work within the confines set by our prior judgements about mental states, e.g., our understanding of what pain is

Silicon Chip Replacement Thought Experiment

Response to Searle's Chinese Room. Similar behavior, continuity of memory, capacities (including capacity to learn and notice changes) will all remain constant. Being slowly replaced by silicon

Introspectively Implausible (Objection to Consciousness)

Response: That's because we rarely have conscious second-order thoughts (which would require third-order thoughts)

How are emotions different from other mental states?

Seems to be intimately tied to certain bodily states can translate into different emotions depending on cognitive content, so it can't be that emotions simply are (awareness of) bodily states

Intensity

Some emotions are more this than others

Valence

Some emotions are positive while others are negative

Intentionality (Emotion)

Some emotions may require this whereas others may not

Objections to Causal/Information Theory

Some mental states have representational content about future events or nonexistent things. A causal relationship with these events/things is impossible and the representational content cannot serve as a sign of something not existent/not present

Agent Causation

Sometimes events (actions) are caused by substances (agents) rather than events involving those substances. Agents are uncaused causes; they are not determined by prior events but instead initiate new series of events. Argument against: seems incoherent

Do mental images represent by resemblance?

The commonsense answer is 'yes,' but it has problems. Negative concepts, abstract concepts, being able to understand subtle differences that are not represented in a picture, mental images are often cognitively penetrable (i.e. verbal descriptions can impact how people are able to handle images

Empirical Functionalism

The kind of role descriptions that define mental states are those that can be known as posteriori. Scientific psychology -- uses the generalization that we have discovered through the use of psychology and cognitive science, based on empirical data.

Analytic Functionalism

The kind of role descriptions that define mental states are those that can be known as priori. Commonsense psychology ('folk psychology'). Based on intuition

Turing Machine Functionalism

The kind of role descriptions that define mental states are those that could be spelled out in a machine table

Epiphenomenalism/Property Dualism (Mental Causation)

The mental is simply a byproduct of the physical but is not causally efficacious. Contrary to commonsense (must deny mental causation). The mental must be a non-causal effect of the physical processes so as to remain consistent with the conservation of energy.

Mind-Brain Identity Theory

The mind is the brain. Mental states are brain states, in much the same way that water is H20 and lightening is electrical charges. A posteriori identity claims, i.e. these identities are discovered through empirical investigation. Monist view, Reductionist view (like behaviorism). Considers the mind to be internal rather than external, and a cause of behavior (like property dualism and substance dualism). In support: Argument from Simplicity (Ockham's Razer), Explanatory Arguments

Direct Realism

The objects of perception are mind-independent things that are perceived directly.

Transitive Consciousness

The relation or state of being conscious or aware of something

Resemblance Theory

The representation relation in question is one of resemblance

Conceptual Role Semantics

The representational content of a mental state is determined by the relations that mental state holds to other mental states (of the same mind). That is, the representational content is to be analyzed much like functional states are

Teleological Evolutionary Theory

The representational content of a mental state is determined by what the mental state has been naturally selected for.

Eliminative Materialism

The view according to which we should eliminate talk of all of a specific set of mental states from our explanations about the world because those mental states do not exist. Most versions argue that we should eliminate propositional attitudes. Some versions seek to eliminate qualia. More extreme version of Mind-Brain Identity Theory.

No-self View/Personal Nihilism

There is no X. Problem-of-the-many argument against physicalist and perdurantist views of the self. Objection: Contrary to common sense

Language of Thought Hypothesis

Thinking involves symbol manipulation according to various laws. The symbols are mental representations and the laws govern the roles these mental representations can play. That is, thinking involves symbol manipulation in the same way that language does.

Objections to Interpretational Semantics

This view of intentionality is either viciously circular or leads to an infinite regress because interpretation is, itself, a representation. That is, you need the representational content of the interpreter's mental states to determine the content of other mental states

Anomalous Monism

Type-physicalism and Token-physicalism.

Libertarianism

We are free so determinism does not obtain

Perception

We need a theory of perception that sets it apart from mere thinking. This theory of perception should take into account the seemingly causal relationship involved in perception, the veridical nature of perception, and the fact that perception, and the fact that perception is not beholden to the will

Akrasia

Weakness of the will

Problem of Perception

What are the objects of perception, i.e., what is it that we perceive?

State Consciousness

When a mental state is such that the person is conscious, or aware of it

Creature/Subject Consciousness

When a person or creature is awake or alert

Psychological Approach to Personal Identity

X stays the same person so long as X has a continuous string of consciousness held together by memory (ex: Freaky Friday movie). Transfer of mental properties/the soul; brain transplant. Objection: Bodily or mental fission cases that violate the transitivity of identity

Somantic/Bodily Approach to Personal Identity

X stays the same person so long as X remains the same organism. Objection: Fission cases involving matter teletransportation thought experiment

The Consequence Argument

You have no choice concerning the nature of past events, including the first events (e.g. the Big Bang). And you have no choice about the laws of nature. And you have no choice about what follows from the combination of the past and the laws of nature. But if the past and laws of nature entail all of your actions, including the action of reading this handout, then you have no choice (aka you are not free concerning) all of these actions