Criminal Procedure Quiz 1

Illinois v. McArthur, (2001),

"police officers who were already at McArthur's home, developed probable cause at the scene to believe that he had hidden marijuana in his trailer home. Two officers asked McArthur for permission to search the premises for marijuana, but he refused. As a consequence, one officer left to apply for a search warrant. The second officer informed McArthur, who by this time was standing on the porch, that he could not reenter his trailer unless accompanied by an officer. McArthur reentered his home two or three times, to make phone calls and get cigarettes, and each time the officer stood just inside the door to observe McArthur. The first officer returned two hours later with a search warrant, which was promptly executed. Justice Breyer: "We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful, in light of the following circumstance....the police had probable cause....the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, McAruthur would destroy the drugs....the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy....the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time...

Adams v. New York (1904)

- Criminal trials are concerned about the guilt and innocence of the suspect not how the evidence was obtained. - Citizens can sue the police officers civilly for trespass to remedy an illegal search

U.S. v White

-(5-4 decision) Defendant White was convicted of two narcotics offenses. Agents testified to conversations they overheard between the defendant and an informant. The conversations took place in the informant's residence, White's residence (defendant), a restaurant, and in the defendant's car. The agents' testimony about what they heard was allowed in. The agents used electronic devices to monitor the conversations. BYRON WHITE wrote the plurality decision (4 votes): If the person can testify to the statements made, then a recording of those statements is more accurate and also allowed. The person can also write down his testimony after the conversation which is little different from recording or transmitting them. -Begins the analysis that items exposed to a third party do not have an expectations of privacy and are not a search. Does the 4th Amendment bar from evidence the testimony of government agents relating certain conversations that occurred between a defendant and an undercover government informant, which the agents overheard while monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter concealed on the body of that informant? No. The testimony of government agents, relating conversations between a defendant and an undercover informant, overheard via electronic surveillance, is admissible, despite the informant's unavailability at trial. This case expanded the principle announced in Katz v. United States Douglas dissent: Electronic surveillance is not on the same level as eavesdropping. It violated privacy of the First, Fifth, and Fourth Amendments. Harlan dissent: A warrant is required because it violated the sense of security one has in dealing with each other in individual relationships.

Florence vs. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington (2011)

-A person who is arrested for a minor defense can be strip searched when taken to jail -Court said the strip search did not violate the 4th amendment

United States v Karo

-Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants. -Does the installation of a tracking device into a container, with the permission of the original owner, constitute a seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the tracking device? -No. The Court found that although the cans of ether may have contained an unknown and unwanted object, no meaningful interference with the defendants' interest in their possessions occurred, as the tracking device was installed before the defendants obtained the ether. This case was an expansion of the holding announced in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). (Abstract by Blaine Schmidt.)

United States v Katz

-February of 1965, Charles Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone. The police put a microphone taped to the outside of a phone booth and recorded his end of the telephone conversations. The phone company let the FBI know he was calling out of state -Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth. -Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violate of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. JUSTICE POTTER STEWART -The 4th Amendment protects people not places. He went into the phone booth so he would not be heard, so it is not a public place. A person would not expect to be heard in a phone booth when they shut the door. The trespass doctrine is no longer controlling. -It is not the location that is of concern, but the people and activity they protect that is important. You can expose activity in your home to the outside world and it is not protected just because it is in your home -But this effort to decide whether or not a given ''area,'' viewed in the abstract, is ''constitutionally protected'' deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. -The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. JUSTICE HUGO BLACK -dissent- The text of the Fourth Amendment refers to tangible objects. It is not the job of the Court to update the Constitution. The framers were familiar with eavesdropping which was using the ear to listen into a building. The framers did not make that unconstitutional, so this type of search is not either. Declaring this search unconstitutional makes the Court a functioning Constitutional Convention. -The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Duncan v. Louisiana (1968)

-Louisiana claimed it did not have to provide anyone charged with any crime a trial by jury -Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied. -In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision. -JUSTICE WHITE: -A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. -Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. -We need not, however, settle in this case the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes. It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that a crime punishable by two years in prison is, based on past and contemporary standards in this country, a serious crime and not a petty offense. Consequently, appellant was entitled to a jury trial and it was error to deny it... -JUSTICE FORTAS -The Due Process Clause commands us to apply its great standard to state court proceedings to assure basic fairness

Maryland vs. King (2013)

-Maryland DNA Collection Act allows officers to take DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary -Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant -DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting -Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Smith v Maryland (1979)

-Michael Lee Smith robbed Patricia McDonough. After the robbery he began calling her and threatening her. He called her residence and asked her to step out. When she did she saw the 1975 Monte Carlo she had seen at the robbery drive by. The police got a pin registry (without a warrant) for his phone and saw that he called her phone. Using this evidence they searched his house (with warrant) and found that her name was marked in his phone book (page turned down). He was identified in the line-up. -court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement. -Did the use of a pen register without a warrant violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? -JUSTICE HARRY BLACKMUN delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are only relevant if the individual believes that the government has infringed on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to the numbers recorded by a pen register because those numbers are used in the regular conduct of the phone company's business, a fact of which individuals are aware. Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information that is voluntarily given to third parties, the telephone numbers that are regularly and voluntarily provided to telephone companies by their customers do not gain Fourth Amendment protections. -Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that a person who uses a telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of call. Because the telephone numbers dialed also contain information relating to the content of the call, that information is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority opinion's analysis depends on an individual's choice to voluntarily turn over information, but that choice is not valid if no practical alternative exists. He wrote that no citizen should be forced to accept government monitoring of the phone numbers he dials simply by registering a phone with a telephone company. Such government intrusion on telephone records could impede the exercise of free speech or political affiliation. Therefore phone records should be subject to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Justice Brennan also joined in the dissent.

Payton v New York

-NY law allowed police to enter home without a warrant for a felony arrest -The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. -Does New York statute authorizing warrantless arrests and searches violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures? -Yes. JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. JUSTICE WHITE DISSENT -The warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment was created to protect abuses of warrants not abuses of arrests without warrants. Under common law, officers could break down doors to effect a warrantless felony arrest and the Fourth Amendment was not intended to outlaw this type of police conduct. -There are four powerful checks on police home arrest: must be a felony, knock and announce, daytime, probable cause (about the crime and reason to believe suspect is present). -Hampers the police and increases the likelihood of that dangerous criminals will escape into the community.

Steagald v United States (1981)

-On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine. Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL -delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevents all warrantless searches of homes unless there are clearly exigent circumstances. Although the officers in this case did have a warrant to arrest Lyons, their warrant did not extend to the search of Steagald's home, and there was no judicial oversight to determine if there were grounds for such an extension. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment. -Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that, if the police possess a valid search warrant and believe the subject is in a third party's residence, they can reasonably execute a search to carry out the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant can serve as a search warrant because it functions to limit the scope of the search. He also argued that the state has a compelling interest in a search because of the inherent mobility of the subject. Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.

Florida v Jardines

-On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified ""crime stoppers"" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally smelled marijuana. On this basis the detective obtained a search warrant. JUSTICE SCALIA (majority) Trespass Doctine applies - "The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines ad immediately surrounding hs house in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protections as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicity or implicitly permitted by the homeowner. JUSTICE KAGEN concurrence This case violates both the Trespass Doctrine and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy test (Katz). Under the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, Kyllo controls the case because the drug dog is a device not in common use that was used to explore the details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion. JUSTICE ALITO (dissent) This is not a trespass because there is in implicit invitation for the public, including the police, to come to the door of a residence. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy, because odors that emanate from a residence to an area open to the public have no privacy interest (it is not one society is prepared to recognize).

United States v. Santana

-Police officers have probable cause to arrest Alice for a drug related offense. The officers drive to Alice's residence without a warrant. Upon arrival in their police van, they observe Alice standing directly in the doorway ("one step forward would have put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence"). The officers get out of the van, guns drawn, shouting "police." Alice retreats into her residence. The officers follow her inside through the open door and arrest her. Inside the police discover drugs in plain view. Should the evidence of drugs be excluded from her trial? -ruled that his was hot pursuit and allowed the entry into the home as an exigency. This is an example of an exigency that the police create. We will discuss police created exigencies in Kentucky v. King. Marshall and Brennan dissented in Santana because they said the police created the exigent circumstances

Mapp v Ohio (1961)

-The Cleveland Police suspected that Dollree Mapp was hiding a person in her residence who was wanted for questioning in relation to a bombing. Three police officers went to her residence and demanded entry, but she refused after calling her attorney. Three hours later, four more officers arrived and made forced entry to the residence. Mapp asked to see a warrant and an officer held a piece of paper. Mapp grabbed the paper and hid it in her bosom. The officers forcefully retrieved it and handcuffed Mapp. Mapp's attorney came to the scene, but the police would neither let him in the residence nor speak to Mapp. At the trial no search warrant was produced and there was considerable doubt if one ever existed. -JUSTICE TOM CLARK (Majority) The exclusionary rule should be enforced against the state in the same manner that is enforced against the federal government or it does not have value and meaning. • It is imperative for judicial integrity. "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws..." • Essential part of Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments -JUSTICE BLACK Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination creates a constitutional bases which requires the Exclusionary Rule. -JUSTICE HARLAN DISSENT The question is whether the exclusionary rule is mandated on the states or whether the states are free to choose their own sanction. Some states may desire to use other remedies to enforce the 4th amendment, some states may wish to use the exclusionary rule, and some states may wish to use the exclusionary rule and change back if they find better remedies or find that the cost is too high. -The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990)

-The DEA conducted a search of the defendant's residence in Mexico while he was in jail in the United States. The Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not apply outside the United States. -The text of the Fourth Amendment concerns "the people," suggesting a concern with persons who are part of the national community, as contrasted with aliens without any substantial connection to the U.S. The search or seizure of property in a foreign country is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.

United States v Jones

-The police suspected Antoine Jones of being a high level drug dealer. The government (joint FBI-Metro DC task force) obtained a warrant allowing them to place a GPS device on Jones' wife vehicle within 10 days. The warrant expired without the GPS tracking device being placed on the vehicle. The agents then installed the GPS device on the vehicle while it was parked in a public parking space. The used it to track the suspect's location over a 28 day period. Jones was eventually convicted of distribution of 97 kilograms of cocaine and 1 kilogram of cocaine base. -Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights? JUSTICE SCALIA -Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property. JUSTICE Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. JUSTICE Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy. -The attachment of the GPS device was not a search or seizure. A seizure occurs when there is interference with the possessory interest in a person's property. The car functioned properly so no seizure. Not a search because placing the device did not yield information unless it functioned properly. The police could use other means to track and with no trespass violation their actions would yield the same information and be legal. This case should be looked at under Katz 4 Problems with Scalia's Opinion -Ignores the real problem which is the invasion of privacy and the information gathered not the attachment of the device to the car. -Makes brief surveillance illegal (when a GPS is used) and long-term non-GPS surveillance legal. -There is a standing issue if the person being surveilled does not have property interest in the vehicle. Since property interests vary from state to state this rule will vary greatly in the US. -Does not account for non-trespass monitoring such as using a built-in car GPS or cell phone GPS

Minnesota v Olson

-the police were searching for the accomplice in a robbery and murder. The gunman had been arrested and the murder weapon had been located. The day after the crime, the police learned that the second man was hiding in the upper unit of a duplex along with two women. In determining that no exigent circumstances existed, the Court noted that the suspect was the driver of the getaway car and not the shooter, the police had recovered the murder weapon, there was no suggestion of danger to the women, and the duplex was surrounded so there was no liklihood of escape. Police surround a house where an accomplice from a gas station robbery was hiding. The police entered without a warrant under exigent circumstances. The Court ruled against the police. Exigent circumstances exist when there is probable cause to believe the following exists: -Hot pursuit of a fleeing felon -Imminent destruction of evidence -The need to prevent a suspect's escape -Danger to the police or others

United States v. Dunn (1987) - It is resolved by looking at four factors:

-the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, -whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, -the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and -the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.''" -the government entered the defendant's 198 acre ranch that was ½ mile from a public road. The agents crossed a perimeter fence and an interior fence. The agents crossed two more barbed wire fences and a wooden fence. They shined a flashlight into the netting to view into a barn 1. Distance from fence to surrounding house: 50 yards. "Standing in isolation, this substantial distance supports no inference that the barn should be treated as an adjunct of the house." 2. "It is also significant that respondent's barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. * * * Viewing the physical layout of respondent's ranch in its entirety, it is plain that the fence surrounding the residence served to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house." 3. "It is especially significant that the law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home." Among the facts noted by the Court: the odor of phenylacetic acid. Also, when they came closer, they heard a motor running, like a pump motor. [Justice Scalia concurred, because he specifically wanted to disassociate himself from the Court's discussion of this factor. He did not consider it important that there were objective data: "What is significant is that the barn was not being so used [for intimate activities], whether or not the law enforcement officials knew it."] 4. "Respondent did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields."

New York v Belton (1981)

1 officer, 4 suspects uncuffed. Finds marijuana and arrests them then searches passanger compartment under incident of arrest. Supreme court wanted to make this an easy rule for police to follow. If they arrest someone, take them out of the car, the police can search containers within reach of the arrestee under incident of arrest

Chimel v California

3 officers let into home by wife. He returned home and was arrested. Asked to search house on basis of "lawful arrest." (Bc we are arresting you we can search your house). Searched house with wife. Was warrantless search of house constitutional under the 4th as "incident to arrest?" "despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a valid arrest." "searches incident to arrest are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect in order to prevent the grabbing of a weapon or the destruction of evidence" Limited the score of a search during an arrest Overturned Harris and Rabinowitz Delivered by JUSTICE STEWART (7-2 decision) "Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him" "for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand"

Arizona v Hicks (1987)

A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct. SCALIA No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.

Thornton v U.S. (2004)

A guy gets out of his vehicle and walks away then is arrested and they search the car. As long as a person is a recent occupant of the vehicle, it can be searched.B

United States v Robinson

A police officer pulled over and arresting Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket. The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.

Spinelli v. United States (1968)

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to "local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker." The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they "had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136." Did the affidavit included in the warrant application afford probable cause sufficient to issue the search warrant? MAJORITY by HARLAN No. The informant's tip, even when corroborated with the FBI's observations from their surveillance, was not sufficient to provide a basis for a finding probable cause when using the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.) Search Warrant must have information -Revealing the informant's basis of knowledge -Provide sufficient facts to establish either the informant's veracity or the reliability of the informant's report

Kyllo v United States

An officer suspected a Kyllo was selling marijuana. He used a thermal imager from the street sitting in his vehicle to determine that Kyllo's residence was emitting more heat than his neighbors and that heat was emitting from a specific part of the house. JUSTICE SCALIA -"...obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general use." The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house and that line must be firm. A long view must be taken of how this will affect future searches. -Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment? -Scalia says yes it violates search under 4th amendment JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (Dissent) -Any member of the public could observe this. The intrusion is minimal. -The police do not have to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal behavior. Analogous to smells and aromas. It did not reveal any details regarding the interior of the home. -The Court should let legislatures grapple with these issues.

Maryland V. Garrison (1978)

Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of one McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment" for controlled substances and related paraphernalia. The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the described premises, but in fact the third floor was divided into two apartment, one occupied by McWebb and one by respondent. Before the officers became aware that they were in respondent's apartment, they discovered the contraband that provided the basis for respondent's conviction for violating Maryland's Controlled Substances Act. Since the officers did not know and it was reasonable for them not to know there were two apartments on that floor, the search was upheld. "The court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants."

California v Acevedo

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition. Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence? Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented. overruled chadwick and used caroll doctrine: police can search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probably cause to believe it has contraband

Draper v. U.S. (1959)

Does knowledge provided by an informant give the police probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to arrest and search a suspect? John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag. Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed. JUSTICE CHARLES E WHITTAKER Yes. Justice Charles E. Whittaker delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence required to show probable cause is not held to the same standard as evidence required to prove guilt in trial. Despite the fact that information Marsh gained from Hereford would be inadmissible at trial as hearsay, it may still be relied on as probable cause for a search and arrest. The Court also held that, because Marsh was able to personally verify the description Hereford had given, he had "reasonable grounds" to believe that the information regarding the heroin was also correct. DISSENT WILLIAM JUSTICE In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that an arrest made on the word of an informant violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because it allows the police latitude to arrest innocent people without sufficient proof. He argued that an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to allow arrests based on suspicion goes against the entire history of American jurisprudence and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.

Warden v. Hayden (1967)

Following a hold-up, cab drivers followed the robber to a nearby house. The police arrived at the house minutes later, knocked, and announced their presence. The woman who answered the door did not object to allowing the police to search. On entering the house, the police found Hayden in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep, a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank in a bathroom (where water was heard to be running), a jacket and trousers (matching the description of those worn by the robber) in a washing machine in the basement, and ammunition under the mattress of Hayden's bed. The Court upheld the search on the theory that the police were in ''hot pursuit'' of the robber: JUSTICE BRENNAN ''[T]he exigencies of the situation made [a warrantless entry and search] imperative.'' The police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the suspect had entered [the house] less than five minutes before they reached it... The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape."

California v Greenwood

If the police search the plastic garbage bins on the curb in front of a house, is this a search under the Fourth Amendment? It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. * * * Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence, ''[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.'' Katz v. United States JUSTICE WHITE (decision) Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."

Wolf v. Colorado, 1949

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient. -Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court. -Were the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? -JUSTICE FRANKFURTER -The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the application of the Bill of Rights to the states. What is required is "all that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" The process of where this line is to be drawn is not drawn at one time, but it is a gradual process of inclusion and exclusions. The protection of the Fourth Amendment is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and as such is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause Exclusionary rule not required under the 14th. This case applies the 4th under the 14th to the states.

Is there is a "No Trespassing" sign and a fence around a field, is it an open field or is it protected by the Fourth Amendment? Oliver v. United States

It is not a "person, house, paper or effect." Effect does not include property not associated with the home. There is no societal interest in protecting open fields and at common law this was the understanding. The police could have surveilled the land from the air so it is not an expectation that society is prepared to recognize. It is a not a privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.

Hester v. United States (1924)

It is not a search if the government goes onto an open field outside the curtilage of the home.

Weeks v. United States (1914)

JUSTICE DAY -The suspect was arrested for transporting coupons or tickets representation chances in a lottery or gift enterprise. After the arrest, his house was searched by both the local police and the United States Marshall. -The Fourth Amendment was created in response to writs of assistance and general warrants. General warrants were authorized by a King and allowed a person to search anything and anyplace he wanted while the king was in power. A writ of assistance allowed a person under a general warrant to get assistance from anyone he needed. The searches were primarily for seditious libels (criticisms of the government) and tax collection -Because the Court in Weeks only applied the exclusionary rule to evidence seized under ''federal authority,'' this seemingly left local police free to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures and then deliver the evidence to federal prosecutors ''on a silver platter,'' to be used in federal prosecutions -2 searches without warrant - one by local police and one by marshall -material seized by marshall is thrown out but material seized by police is not -exclusionary rule only applies to federal government and not the states -In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule."

Wilson v. Arkansas, 1995

Knock and Announce means that officers must knock on the door and announce their presence before entering. It allows the homeowner to get dressed to prevent modisty, it prevents the needless destruction of evidence by allowing the homeowner to open the door, and decrease violence. Police in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a "no-knock" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richard's' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richard's' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. (from Oyez.com) JUSTICE STEVENS the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. In so doing, it reaffirmed a pre-Wilson holding and concluded that Wilson did not preclude this per se rule. We disagree with the court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity. But because the evidence presented to support the officers' actions in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin court.

United States v Knotts

Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The beeper surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on public streets and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. While respondent had the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as his cabin was concerned, such expectation of privacy would not have extended to the visual observation from public places of the automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, or to movements of objects such as the chloroform container outside the cabin. The fact that the officers relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting their sensory faculties with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case. There is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the chloroform container within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin No does not violate 4th. JUSTICE William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the use of the radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radio transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knotts' right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier.

Arizona v Gant (2009)

Officers acted on an anonymous tip that a residence was being used to sell drugs. The officers went to the residence, asked for the owner, and Gant revealed himself. They left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. After they arrested him, they put him in their car, and went to to search his vehicle. They found a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine in a jacket pocket. Is a search conducted by police after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? Majority: John Paul Stevens Yes - this is a violation. Police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that he might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. "Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" with narrow exceptions - none that are in this case. "Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable." they arrested him and searched car but there is no evidence of driving without a license in a car; he's in the back of a cop car locked up and can not use weapons to hurt police. unreasonable search

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006)

Officers respond to a loud party call. They see two juveniles drinking alcohol in the backyard. They see a fight inside the residence and enter the residence. "Law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." This is known as the community caretaking function of the police

Bailey v. United States (2013)

On July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named "Polo." Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by a heavy set black male with short hair, known as "Polo." That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton-exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment. The officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey's front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not live in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver's license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant's description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment. Did Suffolk County police officers lawfully detain Bailey incident to the execution of a search warrant when officers saw Bailey leaving the immediate vicinity of his apartment before they executed the warrant? No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Michigan v. Summers did not apply because Bailey was not in or immediately outside the residence being searched when he was detained. Also, none of the law enforcement interests mentioned in Summers were served by detaining Bailey. Arrests incident to the execution of a search warrant are lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but once an individual leaves the premises being searched, any detention must be justified by another means. On remand, the Second Circuit should consider whether stopping Bailey was proper under Terry v. Ohio. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, emphasizing that Summers provides a bright line rule for law enforcement to follow. The Second Circuit's balancing test was an improper and would make it harder for officers to decide whether a seizure is constitutionally permissible before carrying it out. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority applied an arbitrary geographical line instead of weighing actual Fourth Amendment concerns. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.

Lo-Ji Sales, Inc v. New York, 1979

On June 20, 1976 an investigator for the New York State Police purchased two reels of film from the petitioner's adult bookstore. He took the film to the Town Justice who watched the films and determined they were obscene. The officer wrote a warrant for the adult bookstore with the list of items to be seized left blank. The officers and 11 other law enforcement agents conducted a search of the adult bookstore along with the Town Justice. The Town Justice viewed the movie reels, magazines and other items at the store determining which items were obscene and could be seized. After the items were seized and after the search warrant was served, the police listed the items to be seized on the search warrant. Yes as to the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not permit a search with an open-ended warrant that left the determination of what was obscene fully in the discretion of the officials conducting the search. The Court also held that the search was not justified under the theory that the store owner had no legitimate expectation of privacy because the items were displayed at a store open to the general public. Merely inviting the public to enter does not give consent to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to the Fourth Amendment.

California v Ciraolo

On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in respondent's backyard. Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent's yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard. Later that day, Officer Shutz, who was assigned to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15-by 25- foot plot in respondent's yard; they photographed the area with a standard 35mm camera -Was viewing the plants from the air a search? No. The police were in legal air space where any private citizen could have been. Florida v. Riley -The government used a helicopter to fly 400 feet above the defendant's home. The officer was able to see marijuana growing in a greenhouse and use that information to get a warrant. The Court (5-4) ruled that Ciraolo controlled this case.

United States v Chadwick

One and a half hours after arresting the Respondents, Chadwick, Machado, and Leary (Respondents), federal narcotics agents opened a footlocker confiscated during the arrest. The agents had not obtained a warrant to open the footlocker. The Respondents were arrested by federal narcotics agents as they were lifting a footlocker into the trunk of a car. The agents confiscated the footlocker and moved the Respondents, footlocker, and car to the Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrest, the agents unlocked the footlocker without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Large amounts of marijuana were found in the footlocker. In United States v. Chadwick, the police had probable cause that a person was transporting drugs in a locked footlocker. The footlocker was placed in a vehicle after being transported on a train. The Court ruled that a search warrant was needed because there was probable cause for the footlocker and not the car. The Court ruled that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker. The Court ruled that once the footlocker was seized from the vehicle and taken into custody by the feds, there was no exigency that prevented them from getting a search warrant. The car is larger and harder to store compared to a footlocker The search of the footlocker was a greater intrusion than the seizure. The seizure does not diminish the expectation of privacy in the footlocker The greatly reduced expectation of privacy in the automobile, coupled with the transportation function means the seizure of the car can be a greater interference with the rights of the owner compared to the footlocker. Lack of exigency means warrant was required. Personal effects that have been confiscated by the police incident to an arrest cannot be searched without a warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist.

Oliver v. United States (1984)

Open fields may include any unoccupied or underdeveloped area outside the curtilage of the home. An open field need be neither open nor a field as those terms are used in common speech.

Chambers v Maroney

Petitioner was one of four men arrested after the auto in which they were riding was stopped by police shortly after an armed robbery of a service station. The arrests resulted from information supplied by the service station attendant and bystanders. The car was driven to a police station, where a search disclosed two revolvers, one loaded with dumdum bullets, and cards bearing the name of an attendant at another service station who had been robbed at gunpoint a week earlier. In a warrant-authorized search of petitioner's home the next day, police found and seized ammunition, including dumdum bullets similar to those found in one of the guns in the car. The materials taken from the car and the bullets seized from petitioner's home were introduced in evidence, and petitioner was convicted of robbery of both service stations. The warrantless search of the automobile was valid, and the materials seized therefrom were properly introduced in evidence. Just as there was probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car, there was probable cause to search the car for guns and stolen money. If there is probable cause, an automobile, because of its mobility, may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify a warrantless search of a house or office.

Kentucky v. King (2011)

Police chase after drug dealer from an undercover operation, but are not sure what apartment the dealer entered. The officers knock on the wrong door, hear movement, and enter to prevent the destruction of evidence. Does the exclusionary rule apply when the police created exigency situations? JUSTICE ALITO Fourth Amendment cases emphasize objective factors and not subjective intent Reasonable foreseeability hard to determine how predictable is too predictable Police have valid reasons for getting a warrant or determining the strategy of their investigation (reveal sources, easier to get consent, want more PC before getting warrant) -overturned the lower court decision that the police created exigency and therefore created unlawful warrantless search -alito decided that the entry in order to not allow partitioners destroy evidence was completely lawful

Richards v Wisconsin

Police in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a "no-knock" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. JUSTICE STEVENS No. After noting the general importance of following conventional "knock-and-announce" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.

Michigan v. Fisher (2009)

Police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance where upon their arrival Mr. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and bleeding. After the officers inquired whether Mr. Fisher was okay, he ignored them and told them to get a search warrant. One of the officers then pushed the door open and entered the house and found Mr. Fisher pointing a gun at him. The trial court granted Mr. Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence, which was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Court held that Mr. Fisher's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Court recognized that "searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable," but that presumption may be overcome. Here, the "exigencies of the situation," Mr. Fisher's injury, made the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search was reasonable.

California v. Carney (1984)

Police warrantlessly searched mobile home that wasn't where usual residence are, for marijuana being sold for sexual favors. Home stayed under surveillance of the state. It was considered to be a vehicle bc it was at a parking lot (it has mobility). It is regulated by being under surveillance of the state There are decreased expectations of privacy bc more windows etc than a house and bc of regulation by the state. Search was okay under the 4th bc different expectations for house and vehicle. "No.... The 4th Amendment applied a lesser degree of protection to motor homes based on the ability to easily and quickly move before a warrant can be obtained. Also, the regulation surrounding automobiles affords them a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore less protection under the Fourth Amendment." The case is significant because it expands upon the ability of the police to act in exigent circumstances. In this particular case, the exigent circumstance is the ability to quickly move the vehicle. "The majority is drawing a brighter line between fixed structures and vehicles."

Rochin v. California, 1952

Rochin swallowed drug capsules to dispose of evidence. The police pummeled him and jumped on his stomach in a vain effort to make him throw up. They took him to a hospital where a doctor was instructed by the police officers to administer an emetic by forceably passing a tube into Rochin's stomach. He vomited the capules and was convicted on the basis of the evidence produced from his vomit. -Did the police procedure forcing Rochin to vomit violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? -The Court reversed the conviction. The police violated Rochin's right to due process of law. Due process was an admittedly vague concept, but it prohibited "conduct that shocks the conscience." This nebulous approach was mocked in a concurring opinion by JUSTICE BLACK. -[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents—this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.

Rabinowitz

Seized stamps while executing an arrest warrant. Stamps admitted into evidence Courts rejected that the "warrantless search had been unlawful" "Not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable" Reason California upheld that the search was legal police had arrest warrant for someone in one room and they arrested him but also searched under incident of lawful arrest

Illinois v. Gates (1983)

The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous letter that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons. Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case. two prong test overruled DISSENT WILLIAM BRENNAN Information provided by informants must be shown to be reliable through their basis of knowledge and in enough detail to be shown to be accurate. The requirements in Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate's role as a neutral and independent arbiter of probable cause. It creates a structure for magistrates to use in evaluating information from informants to ensure that probable cause exists. Information for anonymous informants should be highly suspect. JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS "...the fact that the anonymous letter contained a material mistake undermines the reasonableness of relying on it as a basis for making a forcible entry into a private home."

Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas (1989)

The Court ruled that Blanton did not have the right to a jury trial because the crime he was charged with was "petty". The Court went on to elaborate: "offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months, or less, are presumptively petty...a defendant can overcome this, and become entitled to a jury trial,..by showing that additional penalties [such as monetary fines]...are...so severe [as to indicate] that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a serious one."[1]

Michigan v. Summers (1981)

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers' motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers' detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Did the officers have the authority under the Fourth Amendment to detain Summers while they executed a warrant to search his house for heroin and other contraband? JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS Yes. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a warrant to search for contraband grants police officers the limited authority to detain occupants of a house during the search of the premises. This authority is an exception to the probable cause standard to determine the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures. The law enforcement interests in preventing the flight of occupants of the property named in the search warrant, reducing the risk of harm to officers, and otherwise facilitating the search convinced the Court that the detention of people on the property in question was reasonable. Similarly, the Court held that the exception to the probable cause standard applied to Summers' detention because it was less intrusive than an arrest and unlikely to be abused by police officers. Finally, the connection between an occupant and the home named in the search warrant gave the officers an easily identifiable and certain basis on which to detain Summers. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the Court for expanding the scope of the exception to the probable cause standard for Fourth Amendment seizures. Justice Stewart argued that the State failed to offer a justification for the detention that was unrelated to its interest in investigating crimes and apprehending suspects. He further expressed concern that the Court's holding could be exploited by police officers eager to detain occupants and make them available for arrest in case the search of the property revealed evidence of criminal activity. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Hudson v. Michigan, 2005

The knock and Announce rule is still valid The exclusionary rule is still valid Violation of the knock and announce rule does not require suppression of evidence because the knock and announce rule was not meant to prevent the police from entering the home. The knock and announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property damage, and impositions on privacy - not to prevent the police from conducting a search.

Horton v. California

The police had a search warrant to search an apartment for jewelry stolen in an armed robbery. The detective (affiant) knew weapons were used in the robbery and suspected they might be in the home during the search, but weapons were not listed as the object of the search on the search warrant. It doesn't matter if the officer suspected that he might find the weapons during the search as long as the officer meets the requirements for plain view. If the officer is searching for a murder weapon and finds a photo of the victim inadvertently then he can seize that photo. If the officer then suspects more photos may be found, under the inadvertent theory he cannot seize additional photos. Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight if the discovery of such evidence was not inadvertent? No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to prohibit. Once an officer has a warrant to search a suspect's house, that officer may seize any obviously incriminating evidence that the officer finds in plain view. The Court also held that the "inadvertent" limitation does not limit the scope of the search further than the warrant itself does. In this case, since the warrant was specifically for the stolen property, the officer had to limit his search to the likely places where the property might be kept. Since the officer also had probable cause to believe that certain types of weapons were used in the commission of the crime, he could legally seize the weapons if they were found in the course of that search.

Ybarra v. Illinois (1979)

The police obtained a valid warrant to search a tavern and ''Greg,'' the bartender, for ''evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.'' Seven or eight officers proceeded to the tavern in the late afternoon. While most of the officers searched the premises and bartender Greg, one officer conducted cursory searches of a dozen or so customers present and, in the case of Ventura Ybarra, conducted a more extensive search. The latter search turned up a cigarette pack, inside which were six tinfoil packets containing a brown powdery substance that later turned out to be heroin. The Court held that the warrant did not authorize the Ybarra search Does the Illinois state statute that allows authorities to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? JUSTICE POTTER STEWART delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no probable cause to suspect any of the patrons of committing a crime simply because they are on the premises during a search. Without any particular indication that a person is connected to the premises for the reasons the search is being conducted, a police search of the person violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that even an initial pat-down search is unconstitutional without a reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous.

According to United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, is the sniff of a trained government dog a search

The sniff only reveals the presence or absence of contraband so it is not a search because it does not reveal other items. It has limited capabilities similar to a pen registry. The court said a canine sniff is sui generis meaning it is unique or one of a kind as the search is very limited and only reveals contraband.

Atwater v. Lago Vista

There is no violation of the 4th amendment if police arrest a person for a minor traffic violation

Welsh v Wisconsin (1984)

Warrantless entry to get blood from a suspected DUI driver does not fall under exigent circumstances.

Stanton v. Simms (2013)

Warrantless hot pursuit into a home could be constitutional even if the crime was minor. The Court distinguished Welsh because Welsh did not involve hot pursuit.

Birchfield v North Dakota (2016)

Warrantless test for breath is admissible but blood tests are not allowed search incident to arrest because the piercing of the skin is more invasive

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 1993

We think that [the plain-view] doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search. * * * If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing [for weapons] and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, "there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context."

Franks v. Delaware (1978)

What if the defense thinks the police officer lied in the search warrant affidavit? In a Franks hearing, there must be some showing by the defense that the statements are false to authorize a hearing. The defense must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the warrant contained deliberate falsehood or contain a reckless disregard for the truth. If the defense wins, then the warrant is reevaluated excluding the false information. A police officer obtains a search warrant for several residents after a shooting. The shooting was gang related and the targets of the search warrants are in a gang. One of the targets is serving a six months sentence at the time of the shooting. Is the omission of the fact that the target of the warrant is in jail "reckless disregard for the truth?" Does it matter if the police officer did not know he was in prison? The omission of the information that the target was in jail was reckless. Reviewing the warrant with the omitted material included shows the warrant now lacks probable cause. Suspect is arrested for selling crack cocaine to the police and flips. He says he purchased cocaine from a person and the police serve a warrant on that person. In the warrant they say, the suspect sold 50 grams of crack cocaine to the defendant. During the Franks hearing, the suspect corrects that it was 50 grams of powder cocaine, not 50 grams of crack cocaine. Is this enough to suppress the warrant? The court says alleging the suspect lied to the police is not enough to create a problem under Franks. Also, if the information is corrected in the warrant, there is still probable cause.

Whren v United States

Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. SCALIA Not unreasonable. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Maryland v Buie

allows police to make arrest while in the residence under incident of arrest

Riley v California (2014)

arrested for firearm violation. Searched his phone incident to arrest and found out he is into gang related activity. roberts says it's a computer, youre gonna search something with online storage that can lead to so much more below the surface. Therefore it violates reasonable clause of the 4th. Need of gov to search v privacy of individual. You can search a phone to make sure there's not a razor blade but you're searching a computer or much further than what's been allowed before. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.

Powell v. Alabama (1932)

the Court ruled that they were denied due process of law because they did not have access to a qualified attorney. This applied the 14th amendment to the states.

Burden v. McDowell, 1921

the Fourth Amendment only limits government action. • The Fourth Amendment does not apply to landlords, roommates, private detectives, airline employees, etc.

Olmstead v. United States, 1928

the court concluded that there was no trespass when federal agents placed wiretaps on telephone wires outside defendants' homes and offices since there was no "actual physical invasion" of a constitutionally protected area." Justice Brandeis famously dissented saying that the Fourth Amendment protects "the right to be let alone." -Under the Trespass Doctrine, the government action was not a search unless it was a trespass