ES 144

POST In-re Ah Yup

(1878 F - naive citizen of China of Mongolian race applied for citizenship; first app. of Chinese decent I - Is a person of Mongolian race a White person within meaning of the 1875 statute of naturalization? Do these provisions exclude all but white people ; people of african descent R: Act of Congress Naturalization statute of 1875 A: The words white in the state intend to mean person of Caucasian race due to dictionary definitions mongolian race is not included within the white race; color is interpreted differently from race C: Petition for naturalization denied because mongolian race is not white within meaning of the statue

1940 Korematsu

(1942) Facts: "The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, 'a Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34... which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area." Issue: Is this a case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States? Is an Exclusion Order unconstitutional? Rule: Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34; Hirabayashi case; Analysis: "Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject the finding of military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on the same ground." Korematsu was excluded because the U.S. was at war with the Japanese Empire and because the U.S. government "decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily... and... Congress determined that they should have the power to do just this." Conclusion: While the Court acknowledged that "such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism," it still affirmed that Korematsu violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 by remaining in a Military area. Thus, the Civilian Exclusion Order was found constitutional.

brown v. board of education

(1945) F: black children from various states denied admittance to schools solely based on race. segregation deprives plaintiffs of equal protection (14th) legal because of "separate but equal" plaintiffs contended segregated schools were not and could not be made equal. this deprived of EP (14th) I: Is race based segregation of children omtp "seperate but equal" public schools constitutional? R: Plessy 1896, Sweat v. painter, Supel v. Oaklahoma, Commings v. board richmond county, lam v. rice, gaines v. canada, MacLaurin v. Oklahoma state regents A: Unlike Sweatt, schools were found to be equal, court analyzes the effects of segregation on public education; seperate but equal inescapable of being made fully equal since "those qualities are incapable of objective measurement" C: race-based segregation of children into "seperate but equal" public schools violates the EP of 14th and is unconstitutional -segregation creates inferiority as the status in the community and can effect their hearts and minds cause permanent damage Chief Justice Warran: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." death penalty rates 1995; 48% AA, 29% Hispanic 20% white

McCleskey v. Kemp

(1987) F: McClesky, a black man, convicted of killing Georgia Police officer and sentenced to death. writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argues that a statistical study (Baldes study) proved that race had an big role imposition of the death penalty. race of victim and accused. black defendants who kill white victims are most likely to receive death sentences; in this state black defendants who kill white victims have greatest likelihood of death penalty I: Does Georgia capital punishment law violate the equal protection clause (14th) R: 14th (EP) Gregg v. George (state death penalty found fair and neutral) A: defendents burden to show purposeful discrimination and how it affect him individually A: If they would have used study as sufficient protection then it would have to extend all capital punishment cases when defendant is black and victim is white; death penalty imposed by a proper constituted jury; jury cannot explain reasoning; prosecutor has wide descretion; require discretionary judgment by system; no discriminatory intent but there was effects; Defendants arguemtns are better addressed to legislature; if accepted all similar claim from other death penalty dealing with race Conclusion - not a violation of EP clause

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia

1832 FACTS -Worcester and several missionaries are convicted and sentenced to hard labor in prison for violating Georgia law forbidding white persons from residing on Cherokee lands without a license and oath. -Treaty between Cherokees and U.S. acknowledging it is sovereign nation to manage their own affairs and under the protection of U.S. and no other power. ISSUE -Is the Georgia law in question a violation of Constitution, treaties or U.S. law? RULES -Treaty between Cherokees and U.S. ANALYSIS -Treaty between Cherokees and U.S. acknowledging it is sovereign nation to manage their own affairs and under the protection of U.S. and no other power. -Georgia law is in contradiction of this Treaty. CONCLUSION -Georgia law, in contradiction of the Treaty, cannot be enforced.

Dred Scott v. Sandford

1856 FACTS •U.S. Supreme Court •Who is Chief Justice Taney? •Dred Scott was a slave. •Scott's owner, Dr Emerson, took him from Missouri to Illinois and then to Fort Snelling (part of Lousisiana Purchase where slavery was prohibited) •Emerson moved back to Missouri and sold Scott, his wife Harriet and daughters Eliza and Lizzie to John Sanford •Scott first attempted to purchase his and his family's freedom, when denied he sued Sanford for freedom for him and family in Missouri court (Scott v. Emerson) •Scott said he is citizen of Missouri, argued Illinois residency and Louisiana Compromise. •made him a free man •Said Sanford is a citizen of New York and sued again in federal court ISSUE •Can an African American (a "Negro") become a citizen and have rights of citizens, including right to sue in court? RULES •None. ANALYSIS •African Americans never intended to be included as "citizens" in our Constitution (drafted 1789). •African Americans were considered inferior, subordinate class. •Under Declaration of Independence, slaves or descendants, free or not, were considered part of the people. •Difficult to know public opinion in 1789, but public history of European nations makes it plan. •African Americans had no rights, were considered inferior, unfit to associate with white race, lawfully reduced to slavery for their benefit and for white man's profit. •Laws treat them as inferior, including laws prohibiting intermarriage. CONCLUSION/HOLDING •Blacks never intended to be citizens, so Dred Scott not a citizen (so no right to sue); court also invalidates Missouri Compromise. •Chief Justice Taney decided that black persons were not intended to be citizens under the •Constitution. This is a race case, but it is also prominently a case about citizenship and belonging to the decision-making polity.

Plessy v. Ferguson

1896 FACTS •1890 Louisiana law (Jim Crow law) mandating separate railway carriages for blacks and whites •Plessy charged with crime as African American sitting in white car. 7/8 black, 1/8 black—black race not discernable •Forcibly ejected by police, jailed ISSUE •Is the 1890 Louisiana law a violation of 13th RULES •13th Amendment - abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime. •14th Amendment - primarily concerned with details of reintegrating the southern states after the Civil War and defining some of the rights of recently freed slaves. •Roberts v. City of Boston (Massachusetts Supremes) upheld segregated schools ANALYSIS •A statute that implies a legal distinction has no tendency to destroy legal equality of races •14th Amendment enforces legal equality but not social equality, does not imply inferiority, best example is separate schools for colored children •Roberts v. City of Boston •Racial miscegenation laws are ok •The reputation of a white man is property •Says underlying fallacy of plaintiff's argument is assumption that enforced separation stamps the colored race with badge of inferiority, but only the colored race chooses to put that construction on it •Assumes prejudices can be overcome by legislation and equal rights cannot be secured except by commingling •Social equality must be done voluntarily •Constitution is color-blind, can't help people's prejudices and 14th Amendment? CONCLUSION/HOLDING •1890 law is constitutional (separate but equal is constitutional and legal) HARLAN'S DISSENT •Whites are the dominant race in prestige, achievements, education, wealth, power, for all time! But in eyes of the Constitution, the law, no superior or dominant race, it is color blind, respects civil rights of all, the humblest if peer to the most powerful. •Justice Harlan openly says the Louisiana law was based on white supremacy, and that •Constitution should be color blind. Sounds great but he had just signed off on the Chae Chan Ping decision upholding the exclusion of Chinese from the U.S. based on race! •However, there is a race so different they cannot even be citizens: the Chinaman! Under this law, the Chinaman can ride in whites' car!

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock

1903 FACTS -Dispute between three Indian tribes over ability of Congress to divide and allocate lands to Indians, contrary to 1867 Treaty establishing reservation lands already ISSUE -Was allotment statutes a violation of 1867 Treaty? RULE -Plenary power of Congress in regulating Indian affairs ANALYSIS -Since Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, Congress may abrogate U.S. Treaty (refers to Chinese Exclusion Case) CONCLUSION -The court upholds Congress' plenary power to abrogate prior Indian treaties and implement its policy of allotment.

In re Najour

1909 F: Petitioner arab from lebanon; has caucasian characteristics, hers of syrian descent I: is the petitioner from Syrian descent clasified as white? R: Naturalization statute of 1875 A: Syrians recognized to belong to white Caucasian race cites bio/race reference book; syrian is white, caucasian supposed to refer less to color/skin and more race C: Applicant is entittle to naturalization since he belngs to the meaning of inheritance within the statute

Ex parte Shahid

1913 F: Of Syrian descent; did not read/write in English and spoke/understood broken English; wanted to bring family from Syria; darker complexion, "walnut" color I: Is Syrian descent entitled to be admitted citizenship? What's the definition of white person? Is Syrian white? R: Naturalization of 1875 A: White persons has to be interpreted aside definition when it was enacted in the 1790 act "free white persons" european descent in tan-complexion, statute includes races from which emancipated slaves descended. Excludes all who are not of European (mixed) of African descent C: applicant because of syrian descent (not european) cannot but denied due to personal disqualifications

tucker v. blease

1914 F: In north carolina kerby children of mixed (black and white) descent were dismissed from school; looked physically white but scared of having to admit others of "their kind" I: writ of certiori in order to determine what authorization does school have in dismissing kerby children; "propoer qualifications between those with negro blood and those with 1/8 negro blood R: plessy and intermarrige statute of South; 14th amendment equal protection Carolina A: school had no animosity, best interest of majority of school. offer of separate school was proper law prohibited integration of black and white races, regardless of mixed blood amount. courthas no force in changing since board of trustees acted rctional, acting in "greatest good of the largest number"

sweatt v. painter

1950 F: black applicant denied admitance into texas law solely on race, but then after TU built separate equal law school. state court dismissed claim since "separate but equal" has in accordance with the law I: Is rejection from white UT law school a violation of the 14th amendment R: Plessy, shelly , plessy A: No substantial equality between schools, seperate school no faculty or library. black school cannot be effective isolated from world of law, poor quality of education, resources, faculty and accredidation C: overrule of plessy in this case, the schools were not equal thus in violation of 14th -> petitioner allowed admittance

Milliken v. Bradley

1974 F: NAACP liked suit against Michigan state and detroit .. Milliken, enactment of policies to perpetuate racial segregation in schools; After Brown v. Board struggle in implementing esp in surrounding suburban towns I: may district courts redraw the boundaries of integrated school districts to achieve integration in a segregated district? R: Brown v. Board of Ed. (1954) A: School districts were not obligated to desegreate unless it could be prove that the lines were w/race intent; school not explicitly white, no no official evidence; pejure v. defacto segregation segregation existed bc of voluntary associations, was not under courts jurisdiction C: District courts cannot redraw the lines of integrated school systems to achieve react balance in a segregated school system absent an

Takoo Ozawa v. US

1992 -Berkeley high grad, UCB grad; children @American school Holding: white people are those that are white by popular belief; no more NaJour (scientific journals) -we should hold this way "in absence of reasons for more cogent on why he couldn't be a citizen"

Anthony Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities

1994 FACTS: Arthur Perkins (plaintiff) claims that he was subjected to racial discrimination within his workplace and based on his race, was also denied a promotion that was instead given to another white employee. Lake County Department of Utilities (defendant) filed two motions for summary judgment. The first seeks to prove that he was unqualified for the position he applied for and the second seeks to prove he is in fact not American Indian and therefore, not protected by Title VII. ISSUE: Is Arthur Perkins an American Indian for Title VII discrimination purposes? RULE: 1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2) U.S. v. State of Washington ANALYSIS: The court notes the "amorphous and subjective nature of racial classification." In addition, the defendant perceives the plaintiff as American Indian, as the plaintiff has the physical appearance of an American Indian and he himself believes himself to be such. In addition, the genealogy test found that the plaintiff is in fact 1/16th American Indian. CONCLUSION: Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied. The court did not concede that 1/16th Indian blood as insufficient to "establish membership in a protected class, based upon national origin, as an American Indian. In addition, the court states that "racial categorizations in the census have historically been dubious...A person is listed on the census according to how he labels himself." The court sided with the plaintiff and found that he is American Indian according to how he perceives himself and how he is perceived by others.

people exrel Joan R. Gallo v. Acuna

1997 San Jose F: city received preliminary injunction against indu... gang members of alleged gang

Grutter v. Bollinger

2003 F: White Michigan applicant applied to Michigan Law but denied admittance; she alleged school discriminated against her white race this violation of 14; acknoledgement of race in the admissions process was "predominat factor" giving minorities a higher chance of admittance while discriminating aginst distance races... I: Did UM use of racial preferences in the admissions process violate the EP or Title VII of Civil rights 1964 R: 14th EP; Title VI civil right 1964 Grutz v. Bollinger; Sweatt v. Painter; Regents v. Bolde; 1st amend. of education autonomy A: Race was just one factor of admittance process, they had a holistic review of each applicant; not a quota system; focus on enrolling a "critical mass" of diverse students education benefits of diversity; admissions process was declared; constitutional because it narrowly tailored to further compel state interes - "all pertinant elements of diversity" law school has "compelling interest on securing edu benefits of a diferse student body"; have logical endpoint C: race has to be one factor of admissions process and it contributes to education benefits which is in the best interest of the state; does not violate EP or violation of Civil Rights Act

1980 Yasui

Facts This is a companion case to Hirbayashi v. United States. Yasui, an American-born person of Japanese ancestry, was convicted for violating the curfew order made to Portland, Oregon, by Public Proclamation No. 3.The validity of the curfew was considered in the Hirabayashi case, and this case presents the same issues. Yasui was a member of the bar of Oregon, and a second lieutenant in the Army of the United States, Infantry Reserve; he had been employed by the Japanese Consulate in Chicago, but had resigned on December 8, 1941, and immediately offered his services to the military authorities; that he had discussed with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the advisability of testing the constitutionality of the curfew; and that when he violated the curfew order he requested that he be arrested so that he could test its constitutionality. Issue Is Appellant's citizenship relevant in his conviction for violating a curfew order applicable to all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in military areas, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942? Rule Civilian exclusion order no. 34 Analysis Since in the Hirabayashi case, that the curfew order was valid as applied to citizens, it follows that Yasui's citizenship was not relevant to the issue tendered by the Government and the conviction must be sustained for the reasons stated in the Hirabayashi case. However, as the sentence of one year's imprisonment - the maximum permitted by the statute - was imposed after the finding that appellant was not a citizen, and as the Government states that it has not and does not now controvert his citizenship, the case is an appropriate one for resentence in the light of these circumstances. Conclusion The district court ruled that the Act of March 21, 1942, was unconstitutional as applied to American citizens, but held that appellant, by reason of his course of conduct, must be deemed to have renounced his American citizenship. The US Supreme Court sustained the conviction, vacated the judgment and remanded the case "to the district court for resentence of appellant, and to afford that court opportunity to strike its findings as to appellant's loss of United States citizenship."

Botiller v. Dominguez (1889)

Facts: -Dominguez trying to eject Botiller from "Rancho Las Virgenes." -She has valid title papers saying it was a land grant by Mexico to her. But she had not presented previously to board of land commissioners. -Cal Supremes found federal statute creating California Land Claims Commission invalid. Issue: -Is the statute creating the California Land Claims Commission valid? Two arguments: 1) Statute is in conflict with Treaty (which guaranteed Mexican land grants respected). U.S. and Mexico can re-negotiate a new Treaty, but courts will uphold statute. This court cannot enforce the Treaty. 2) Statute in conflict with property rights under U.S. law and Constitution. Nothing unjust here. All people have a right to go to court to determine issues. Holding: -Supreme Court upholds California Land Claims Commission and by extension, rejects Dominguez' claim to land. Even if this violates Treaty, court would enforce statute.

Hernandez v. Texas (1954)

Facts: Hernandez convicted of murder. Mexican Americans excluded from jury service, though 14% of population was Hispanic. 11% of males over 21 had Hispanic names and 6-7% of land owners were Mexican. In the last 25 years, 6000 jurors: No Mexican Americans served on juries. There were eligible Mexican Americans (over 21, landowners, males, meet other requirements). 5 jury commissioners said no discrimination, that they only picked qualified jurors. Issue: -Did systematic exclusion of Mexican Americans violate 14th clause? Rules: -14th Amendment Holding: -Results shows discrimination and 14th or not it was conscious decision to discriminate Landmark case: First Supreme decision to protect Mexican Americans under 14 amendment EP clause. Q: What is black/white binary paradigm? - Blauner says academic colonialism

1980 Korematsu

Facts: "On September 8, 1942 Fred Korematsu was convicted of being in a place from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded pursuant to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34." His conviction was affirmed. Korematsu now brings a "petition for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his conviction on the grounds of governmental misconduct... It was uncontroverted at the time of conviction that Korematsu was loyal to the United States and had no dual allegiance to Japan." Issue: "In his papers petitioner maintains that evidence was suppressed or destroyed in the proceedings that led to his conviction and its affirmance. He also makes substantial allegations of suppression and distortion of evidence which informed Executive Order No. 9066 and the Public Proclamations issued under it." Rule: Korematsu v. United States (1942); DeWitt report Analysis: "The Commission found that military necessity did not warrant the exclusion and detention of ethnic Japanese." It also found that the exclusion, removal, and detainment of those of Japanese descent by the United States during WWII was "a grave injustice." "At common law, the writ of coram nobis was used to correct errors of fact. It was not used to correct legal errors" and the "court has no power, nor does it attempt, to correct any such errors." Conclusion: "In accordance with the foregoing, the petition for a writ of coram nobis is granted and the counter-motion of the respondent is denied."

Hirabayashi v. United States 1940

Hirabayashi v. United States (1942) Facts: Appellant, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was out past curfew during WWII backlash. He was convicted of violating the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942 (an Executive Order of the President), as he disregarded restrictions made by a military commander to persons in a military area. Issue: The question is whether the restriction the appellant violated (that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in such an area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of 8pm and 6am) was unconstitutional, in that it "was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power." The second question is "whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Rule: Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; Executive Order No. 9066; Public Proclamation No. 3; Act of Congress of March 21, 1942; Analysis: Appellant agrees that, given the wartime political climate, a curfew was an "appropriate measure against sabotage." However, "the exercise of the power is inappropriate and unconstitutional because it discriminates against citizens of Japanese ancestry, in violation of the Fifth Amendment." The government, on the other hand, opposes this view, as any American citizen of Japanese ancestry is seen as a potential danger to the United States. "Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction would not be regarded as in accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment... It is true that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no guarantee of equal protection of the laws." Therefore, the Supreme Court considered the curfew "within the boundaries of the war power." Conclusion: The Court was "unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress" to exclude American citizens of Japanese ancestry by appointing curfews. The Court found that an exclusionary curfew, only meant for American citizens of Japanese descent, was constitutional. Thus, the Court affirmed that the appellant violated the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, as he disregarded the curfew.

Hirabayashi v. United States 1980

Hirabayashi v. United States (1987) Facts: In 1942, Gordon Hirabayashi was living in Seattle and "was therefore subject to wartime orders requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizens or not, to remain within their residences between 8pm and 6am." He violated the curfew because he felt that the military orders were based upon racial prejudice and were unconstitutional. His conviction for violating the curfew order was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Issue: In his coram nobis petition, Hirabayashi provided proof, unavailable at the time of his conviction, "that the curfew and exclusion orders were in fact based upon racial prejudice rather than military exigency." He further alleged that had the concealed documents surfaced, the Supreme Court decision in the case would probably have been different. Rule: Hirabayashi v. United States (1942); DeWitt report Analysis: The Government agreed "with the petitioner and the district court that General DeWitt acted on the basis of his own racist views and not on the basis of any military judgment that time was of the essence." The government could not "hold that the district court erred in deciding that the reasoning of the Supreme Court would probably have been profoundly and materially affected if the Justice Department had advised if of the suppression of evidence which established the truthfulness of the allegations made by Hirabayashi and Korematsu concerning the real reason for the exclusion order." Conclusion: "The judgment of the district court as to the exclusion conviction is affirmed. The judgment as to the curfew conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded with instruction to grant Hirabayashi's petition to vacate both convictions."

Machado v. Goodman Manuf. Co

Machado v. Goodman Manuf. Co FACTS: -Machado felt discriminated against (Most of opinions is factual) ISSUE: -Should the court grant summary judgment/dismissal motion (like Arthur Perkins case) on claim of harassment because of national origin, and on constructive discharge claim. RULES: -Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 ANALYSIS: -Enough evidence to deny motion on harassment claim but not on constructive discharge/firing claim HOLDING: -The court denied summary judgment/dismissal motion on claim of harassment because of national origin, but granted it on constructive discharge claim.

Gratz v. Bollinger

We will apply the reasoning used in Gratz v. Bollinger: Petitioners argue that "diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means". The Court, however, rejected those arguments. Petitioners alternatively argue that even if the diversity could be considered a "compelling state interest", the District Court erred in concluding that the University's use of race during the admissions policy was "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest. Respondent argue that in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, Justice Powell expressed "the view that the consideration of race as a factor in admissions might in some cases serve a compelling government interest". But Petitioners respond that this case doesn't even "remotely resemble the kind of consideration of race and ethnicity that Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke". Respondents say that the program is "narrowly tailored and avoid[ed] the problems of the Medical School of the University of California at Davis Program rejected by Justice Powell. They say that the program "hews closely" to the admissions program described by Justice Powell as well as the Harvard College admissions program". Respondent argues that the "LSA's policy provides the individualized consideration that "Justice Powell considered a hallmark of a constitutionally appropriate admissions program". Strict scrutiny test was applied and didn't pass. The University of Michigan failed to show how attributing 20 points for race advanced the interest of promoting diversity without compromising equality for other applicants. In our case, the same story repeats except now applicants receive 10 points for being of a certain race/ethnic origin.