Philosophy of Religion, War & Christin Theology Exam

3) Michael Walzer, Arguing about War

o "That is, in some cases the winning side has an obligation to help the loser rebuild itself, construct legitimate institutions and secure stability. Not every war requires it. Walzer argues that World War II required it and so does this war. An obligation to help the losing country could be more valid when unjust wars are concerned. The aggressor, one might argue, should enhance the well-being of those who suffered from its actions. Yet, the notion of postwar justice is more vexing than Walzer suggests. In the case of World War II, the winners had no legal or moral obligation to reconstruct Germany and Japan. Those nations were responsible for their actions and should accept the consequences. It was probably very wise to help rebuild them, but the ethical obligation was weak. The wars of Israel, with exception to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, would similarly have no obligation of postwar justice (another exception would be the obligation to return conquered lands, i.e., the Golan Heights, Sinai). The Iraq case is different mostly because it is an unjust war, and the losing nation could not be held responsible for the consequences of the war. This notion of postwar justice is important, yet it requires much far more detail than Walzer devotes to it." § Is it necessary to achieve postwar justice that US forces remain in Iraq? Would a quick withdrawal be more conductive to postwar justice? § To conclude, the book examines a wide variety of pertinent issues. It is especially helpful in covering the main moral arguments about how war can or cannot be justified, the "proper" conduct of warfare, and its aftermath. Walzer addresses the big ethical issues regarding the fight against terror.

1) Peri Roberts, "War and Peace in The Law of Peoples"

o "Where Rawls's The Law of Peoples addresses war and the use of force then his position has often been identified closely with Walzer's restatement of just war theory, as both positions appear to take nation-states, and the conflicts between them, to be the bedrock of the international system. On the other hand, Kant's notion of a peaceful federation of states presents us with the notion of a world without war and where the inter- national system is transformed. This article argues that Rawls's account of the use of force is better understood if we read it with an eye to its resonances with Kant rather than with Walzer. Doing so, rewards us with a clearer understanding of central aspects of Rawls's account of just war and vision of international politics." o Michael Walzer the contemporary authority on just war theory. § "Williams characterizes just war theory like Walzer's as Hegelian because it takes the nation-state as the bedrock of the international system and shares Hegel's skepticism about the possibility and functioning of a peaceful federation of free states (2012: 169). In doing so it accepts that war is a normal and ongoing part of international relations as an unavoidable instrument of foreign policy (Williams 2012: 143 and 165). Finally, it regards individual states themselves as solely positioned to judge just cause: when war is necessary in defense against aggression, in anticipation of aggression yet to happen and in some cases of aggressive intervention in another state. In some contemporary just war theory this has evolved into a power (or group of powers) making and imposing their judgements about rightful force on all other states (e.g., in the name of a 'duty to protect')" o Kant's account of war and the use of force is drawn very differently § Says that morally practical reasons pronounces in us its irresistible veto: there is to be no war. Some features: · 1) it depicts war as 'part of the pathology of human history' and 'not a normal human activity'; even if the occurrence of war is an unavoidable anthropological starting point for international law and politics it should not be accepted as unchangeable fact · 2) dismisses just war theory (and so can be interpreted as having no just war theory of his own) · 3) the highest political good is perpetual peace (Williams 2012:167 and even jus in bello restrictions on fighting wars can only make any sense in connection with the project of establishing this condition of perpetual peace. · 4) Kant argues that a prime feature of his preferred republican mode of government is that it promotes peace as a consequence of its reluctance to sanction the use of force because of the involvement (through their representatives) of their citizens in political decision-making · 5) Kant advances wholesale reform of inter- national politics as a federation of free republican states, transforming international law into a system of rights that upholds peace rather than maintains the possibility of war o Rawls, thought to align with Kant and not Walzer. This article disagrees · He has been generally regarded by cosmopolitan critics to be placing too much emphasis on the state as the basis of the international system. § Rawls approach is characterized by the Kantian idea that peace is the regulative principle of war...[and that] Rawls's just war doctrine represents principles of transitional justice, moving from the non-deal state of war to the ideal state of perpetual peace. § He believes: · War is a highly regrettable part of the practice of international politics as it is; we can and should move towards a stable peace and transitional principles of just war can be dispensed with in a future realistic utopia. o Agrees with Kant that war is a pathological feature of international politics as we have experienced it and that the long-term aim is to eradicate it. · "What makes the world we actually live in non-ideal is the existence of what Rawls calls the 'great evils of human history'; unjust war and oppression, religious persecution, and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder, and slavery." Says these evils follow from political injustice and that, once these gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear. o "I call a world in which these great evils have been eliminated and just (or at least decent) basic institutions established by both liberal and decent peoples who honor the Law of Peoples a 'realistic utopia' ... [This] shows us, in the tradition of ... Kant, the social conditions under which we can reasonably hope that all liberal and decent peoples may belong, as members of good standing, to a reasonable Society of Peoples."

1) J. Bryan Hehir, "Just War Theory In a Post-Cold War World"

o "danger may be understating how completely we need to rethink war, politics, and ethics today. Describing the contemporary challenge as "the end of the cold war" does not adequately capture the issues. A more complex framework is provided if the end of the cold war is understood as providing an impetus for forces already at work in world politics. The collapse of the cold war changes the structure of power in the world - always a major event. However, the deeper question is whether the changing structure of power will converge with the broader forces at work in the world to produce a shift in the substance of international politics as we have defined it, studied it, and practiced it since the sixteenth century" · "The past thirty years have been marked by an energetic renewal of traditional just war theory. Now changes in relations among nations and changes in military technology may require a recasting of the just war ethic comparable to its recasting by Vitoria and Suarez in the sixteenth century. After reviewing the way the way the just war tradition met the practical tests posed by Vietnam, nuclear deterrence, and the Gulf War I will argue that the erosion of the Westphalia legacy and the collapse of the cold war press two questions upon us: Can any modern war be defended as just? Are there resources in the just war tradition for assessing what constitutes morally defensible, even morally required, intervention by one state in the affairs of another?" § 20th century known as "The Century of Total War" · "we are at one of those rare points of leverage in history when familiar constraints have dropped away; what we do now could establish the framework within which events will play themselves out for decades to come." § 1989: The end of Europe's' division, the passing of bipolarity and of the conflict that arose from it, and the dramatic decline in the power and influence of the Soviet Union, are events that would normally be associated with the outcome of a great war § The transmission of the normative doctrine from Augustine to Aquinas had presupposed the framework of the Respublica Christiana, a political system which was profoundly altered by the rise of the lay state in the fourteenth century Class notes from IGA 220: · Childress Article o Provides not history of just war thought, he just synthesizes it § The history is over 1500 years old, begins in the Roman empire. Cicero had a version of Just war thought. Augustine of Hippo was the main guy though - he died in 430. In 410, there was an argument in Rome that the Christian were responsible for the empire falling apart with "the turn the other cheek" approach · Augustin responded by saying: he would not defend himself from attack as Christian. But, if someone else is under attack, he's going to defend that person. § How did war begin? Human nature? States - authoritarian states vs democratic states? The global theater is decentralized, and each state believes it had power to go after what they want · Augustine says it is due to sin! o Said need just cause, proper authority, and right intention § Expanded since then. · Augustine's view followed into the middle ages à no more empire, but a commonwealth. Just war had a penal enforcement. And the idea was that everyone should know what just war was, and if someone broke it, everyone would ganga around and reproach that person o Between 13 and 17 century à rise of sovereign state (much more in control than any medieval leader), the division of the Christian church (church no longer exercised moral authority), the people who worked on just war in medieval tradition but lived in modern era began to work on just war to make it more secular § Grotius was a main person in the latter effort. And two other figures: Swaref and Victoria. o Big talk about who could go to war § Then come to the 20th century there were two great wars: WW1 and WW2 à people thought after both that a moral doctrine of war needs to be rescued. Why? Because of the thing like both sides bombing civilians, for example. So just war now used in secular arenas all the time. Military trained in it. Public press raises questions about civilian casualties all the time. There is still a lack of moral conduct, however, people have the tools to raise concerns! § War was understood as an instrument of justice in Medieval times, it was a penal conception of war. in that framework, intervention was regarded as obligatory at times. St. Ambrose: he who knows evil is being done, and you do nothing about it, you are not different than the evil does. Great saint, scary potential prime minister § Reduce the reasons for force as much as you can, inside the political (religious, economic) community. In 20th-21st century, our community is not as integrate as medieval community, or as atomistic as the recognition of sovereignty would have us to believe. That is why you have intervention. During the Cold War, the legal argument was · Proxy wars vs humanitarian intervention o Proxy was ideological and not normative, it was self-interested, unlike humanitarian intervention. · In 1990s, go from bipolar world to multipolar war: and have 2 changes o 1) structure of power: debates about how the new multipolar order should be structured. § Sovereignty challenged normatively and morally. o 2) intervention undergoing a critique. Tested in the 1990s, because with danger of great power politics receding, at the same time, states began to explode from the inside! (Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, etc.) § Enormous human suffering, large scale human rights violations/loss of human rights. In that setting, people asked, what should be done - people starving, genocide, ancient conflicts reemerging? Less of a concern about the escalation of a great power's involvement, and more about should intervention happen or not!

2) Brian Orend, "Kant's Ethics of War and Peace"

o 1) Realism: Kant's attitude towards realism is complex, but in the end constitutes an on-the-whole rejection. o 2) Pacifism: There is a possibility of a just war for Kant, which means that Kant cannot be a pacifist because he does not categorically reject war o 3) Just war theory § Can credit Kant for being the first great thinker to stress, in a way the Just War Tradition had failed to do, the topic of justice after war, jus post bellum. · The principles of Kant's Just War Theory § Jus ad bellum o 1) just cause: the key principle here, in Kant's just cause, is the defense, protection and vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities and their citizens § Believes all states have moral rights (to political sovereignty and territorial integrity) and moral duties (not to violate other states' rights). o 2) right intention § a state may go to war only with the intention of upholding it's just cause o 3) proper authority and public declaration § stresses that the head of state does not have the right to declare war with impunity; rather, the people must be consulted in some unspecified sense, on each and every declaration of war. o 4) last resort § some serious attempt at a reasonable non-violent solution, perhaps through diplomatic negotiation, is to be made before resorting to war. o 5) comparative justice o 6) consistency with the ideal of perpetual § A) underlines the fact that a state may resort to warfare only for the purpose of vindicating and upholding its rights § B) force the state resorting to armed force to consider in advance whether it can do so while adhering to norms of jus in bello and even to those of jus post bellum. He seeks to run a normative thread through all three just war categories but to commit itself in advance to avoiding, as far as possible, any breach of the norms of jus in bello and jus post bellum as the war unfold. · Jus in bello o 7) Discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. Non-combatants are not to be made direct targets of armed force. o 8) no intrinsically heinous means § Jus post bellum · This is where we see the meaning of his earlier denunciation of the just war tradition as a band of 'sorry comforters'—they did not, in his eyes, work out a system of post-war justice which would render war increasingly irrelevant over time. Here are some of his thoughts: o Might does not equal right § the victor thus has no right, through the raw fact of military success, to punish the vanquished or to seek compensation. o claim that the spread of rights-respecting representative government around the world will increase peace, prosperity, and development for all. · Here are some of his preliminary articles (PA) and definitive articles (DA): § PA 1. 'No treaty of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war'. § PA 2. 'No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift'. § PA 3. 'Standing armies will gradually be abolished altogether'. § PA 4. 'No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state'. § PA 5. 'No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state'. § PA 6. 'No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts include the employment of assassins or poisoners, breach of · DA 1. 'The civil constitution of every state shall be republican'. · DA 2. 'The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states'. · DA 3. 'Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality'.

3) Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited

o 3) On immortal weapons, argues that cruel weapons designed to increase suffering with a view to inducing terror and despair are immoral because the military praxis is not a praxis of manipulation of psychological states; it is a praxis of denying the enemy the freedom to act in certain ways. o 4) argues the economic sanctions are actually an act of war, since they involve an exercise of power by a government beyond the normal sphere of it political authority—not direct force, but still designed to hurt with a view to communicating a discouraging act of judgement. o 5) final chapter focuses on the recent prospective debate about going to war against Iraq, O'Donovan makes some very telling, very refreshing crucial remarks about the quality of public discussion. § Notes that we could not have had 'perfect foreknowledge', so public discussion out to take the humbler form of common deliberation, 'marshaling reasons for decision as each new moment of decision arises and issuing in hypothetical recommendation. · Shows sensitivity to the complexity of what has to be evaluated in judging the justice of a particular war. provided that no single factor decides the case from the beginning—there are a variety of factors to be considered and questions to be answered: o Which among the multiplicity of motives are the driving ones that determine the moral character of the military action? o What are the risks of action? o What are the risks of inaction? o How serious is the intention to build peace? · Judgment can be built off of an evaluation of each of these answers o Some bad things about the book—doesn't mention Walzer of James Turner Johnson, it's confusing, bears much wisdom.

1) John Yoder, The War of the Lamb

o A collection of essay, lectures, and notes compiled into book format posthumously in the effort to clarify any misreading of his previous work and misunderstanding about pacifism—or, as Yoder prefers, non-violent direct action § Three sections · Part 1: "Nonviolence" o Begins by focusing on other theories of violence and argues that certain systems explain, regulate, channel, or manage violence. In contrast, the gospel is about overcoming violence. To support this argument, Yoder comprehensively refutes many of the traditional biblical arguments in support of war, and instead provides biblical and early Church examples in support of non-violent direct action. "Jesus: A Model of Radical Political Action" is perhaps the most illuminating argument of this section: § He contends that the lessons from the Sermon on the Mount "are not idealistic about human potential so much as they are realistic about divine power and about the substance of the divine intent. He essentially shifts the focus from a supposedly ideal opinion of humanity to a realistic view of the power and love of G_D.

2) Robert Williams, "Jus Post Bellum"

o A war is concluded justly: § "...that is, a just peace exists - when the human rights of those involved in the war - both winners and losers - are more secure than they were before the war. In other words, a successful war (and a just peace) is characterized first and foremost by the vindication of the rights for which the war was fought. While such a principle does not preclude punishment (indeed, punishment for the violation of human rights may be essential if those rights are to be vindicated), it does require that a state, having waged war and made peace to vindicate human rights, respect in the aftermath of war the rights even of those who were most responsible for the war. Victors may punish crimes, but they must neither abuse criminals nor punish those who are guilty of no crime." · A focus on the human rights function of just war theory suggests, too, that a just peace may well be impossible if the war is won by those who initiated it in violation of the human rights of others. When people's lives, liberty, property, and security are taken away through an act of aggression, only the defeat of the aggressor can vindicate those rights. To put it simply, an unjust war cannot produce a just peace. o Just or unjust: § The evaluation of jus in bello, however, is notso simple. When we ask whether a war is being fought justly or unjustly, we must evaluate many different aspects of the conduct of the war. One military operation may have been conducted with exemplary respect for the lives of noncombatants while another may have involved enormous "collateral damage." Justice (or injustice) in war is, depending on one's purpose in making the judgement, either a vast cumulative judgment about how the war was fought or a series of judgments about individual acts in the war. Either way, an all-or-nothing judgement must be considered a gross oversimplification. Jus post bellum is more complicated still... · Some actions taken after the war will be just and some will be unjust. Both the transcendent policies, planned and implemented by the state, and the individual acts of decency or depravity committed by soldiers and civilians in the occupied territory must be taken into account in assessments of just post bellum. Consequently, rather than being able to conclude that a particular postwar situation is just or unjust, we may have acknowledged that there are only degrees of justice and injustice in the aftermath of war. o "It should be obvious that winning a just war does not guarantee a just peace." § Examining the situation in Iraq roughly eight months after the US invasion in March 2003, argued for the possibility of a just settlement of an unjust war. If one accepts, as Walzer does, that the invasions was unjust, however, it would be more accurate to suggest that the settlement can only be more or less unjust. To claim that a just peace can come from an unjust war is, from a theoretical perspective, to conceded more to consequentialism than a rights-based just war theory ought to concede. From a practical perspective, it is almost certain to under-value the costs imposed by the side initiating the unjust war. o Jus post bellum principles: § 1) a just peace is one that vindicates the human rights of all parties to the conflict · Ex. The fact remains that public order is an essential foundation for the restoration of human rights. The widespread violence that has plagued Iraq since the end of US combat operations in May 2003 has jeopardized the ability of both the occupation forces and the Iraqi government to secure the human rights of Iraq's people. Postwar chaos consequently represents a significant US failure with respect to just post bellum. § 2) derived from the principle of the vindication of human rights is economic reconstruction. Without the rehabilitation in some small measure of war-torn economies, it may be difficult to secure the most basic of human rights, the right to basic subsistence § 3) derived from the jus post bellum principle mandating the vindication of human right sis the restoration of sovereignty, or self-determination. Surrender and occupation suspend sovereignty, but only temporarily if the surrender leads to a just peace § 4) Jus post bellum permits (and some would argue that it requires) the punishment of human rights violations related to war and its origins

2) Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited

o Also presents a coherent exposition instead of the usual 'bare list principles' for just war. § 1) legitimate authority: just war is the extension, in the name of natural law, of the power of a government beyond the limits of its normal sphere of authority. · Rebukes those who regard forma authorization by the security council as a necessary condition of justified war, when he makes the very salutary point that unauthorized, unilateral military action is not the only way in which the authority of the UN and international law can be damaged; for courts, too, may lose authority all together, whether by constant malfunction or by inability to enact their judgments. o In short: The duty of deferring to governmental authority is dependent on the availability of the authority and its capacity to act decisively in a crisis. § Still, if natural law can be held to give informal authorization for humanitarian intervention, it cannot be held to justify 'imperial' conquest. · Justified military intervention must be carried out by parties 'with demonstrable interest in the welfare of those they propose to rescue. Says there should not be self-interest. o If the nature of just war as a judicial act generate the principles of legitimate authority, it equally generates the principles of discrimination and proportionality. § Also argues the standard principle of right intention should not be distinguished from that of discrimination, since the only right intention in armed conflict is 'to distinguish innocence form guilt by overcoming direct co-operation in wrong. § As discrimination, so proportionality is the natural offspring of the judicial nature of war: for punishment should be proportioned both retrospectively to the originating offence and prospectively to the intended peace. · Two principles lie in prospective proportionality · 1) just war should be a last resort · 2) it should also have some prospect of success § These are both ways of proportioning war to its proper ends. § In relation to retrospective proportionality, argues along Grotian lines that the threat of any offence may warrant 'pre-emptive' war, provided that the threat is 'immediate.' o 2) On counter-insurgency war, claims that, in cases where the civil order cannot be effectively defended against insurgents but normal judicial processes, the insurgency should be treated as a war § Thirty-year long "trouble" in Northern Ireland

1) Albert Marrin, War & The Christian Conscience

o Anthology aims at utilizing historical source materials to make intelligible to the modern reader the various ways in which Christians have regarded war § For a thousand years, the church was the only tech in the west, there by assuring for Christianity an influence on through and action extending far beyond the confines of the Church itself. The foundations of international law, to take an outstanding instance, have rested upon religious bedrock.

1) Andrew Rigby, "Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum"

o Argues the following: · 1) A necessary feature of any just peace, particularly in post-civil war situations, is that it is a durable one. · 2) A particularly significant factor contributing to the durability of a peace settlement is that key publics, communities, and opinion leaders believe that the peace is sufficiently 'just' as to merit their commitment. · 3) A necessary element in facilitating the belief that a peace is 'just enough' is that the socio-cultural scars left by the war are addressed in a manner such that the pains of the past cease to dominate the present and open up the possibility of future co- existence between former enemies. · 4) The manner in which such 'memory' or 'forgiveness work' is carried out will vary from case to case, depending on a number of significant factors, including the balance of power during the post-peace settlement period. o Let's begin: § Core issue of just war: war is evil · "The victims of war are not sacrifices made as the means to an end in themselves" · "and was thus in perfect sympathy with the innermost principle of every war" § "Even if people on the basis of some moral calculus decide that the evil of going to war is less than that of leaving a particular situation unaddressed, there is still the terrible moral dilemma of attempting to judge how much and what type of 'necessary evil' is justified in the pursuance of a desirable goal" · "In war, however just the cause, no one emerges with clean hands." o Iraq: § "Having argued prior to the invasion that the war was just because the regime of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction that constituted a clear and present danger to the rest of the world, one of the subsequent arguments has been that whilst no weapons of mass destruction might have been found, the war was still just in so far as it liberated the Iraqi people from a terrible tyrant and his barbaric regime. In other words, the evil was justified by reference to the quality of the peace that was anticipated after the war - a new democratic Iraq where people might enjoy their basic human rights and live at peace with their domestic and international neighbors. This has been the type of argument that has been used to justify 'humanitarian wars' such as the bombing campaign against Serbian targets in Kosovo and Serbia proper in the spring of 1999: the evil of war is legitimated as a necessary means of bringing about a desirable and just peace" · The features of such a peace can be portrayed somewhat negatively in terms of the removal of a particularly evil regime and the neutralization of those guilty of carrying out crimes against humanity, or they can be delineated in more positive terms with regard to the strengthening of human rights, the establishment of a democratic regime and the socio- economic reconstruction necessary for people to live full and productive lives in harmony with their fellow citizens. Whatever the emphasis, the tradition of justifying the evil of war by reference to the just peace that can thereby be achieved remains as strong as ever. o Civil Wars: § One of the limitations of much of the literature relating to the principles underpinning theories of jus war is that most refer to either inter-state wars or cross-border interventions by third parties. Whilst the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should remind us that inter-state wars continue to represent a threat to peace in the world, it has to be acknowledged that over the last ten to fifteen years intra-state wars have been a more common occurrence. Particular features of these conflicts have included the phenomenon of war-lordism, with different armed factions (frequently sponsored by one or more 'third parties') targeting and preying off the civilian populations. This has reflected a weakened distinction between combatants and civilians and a disregard for the various Geneva Conventions ruling the conduct of war. This in tum has resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of civilian war-related deaths, burgeoning numbers of displaced and refugees, and the widespread destruction of social capital. · To the outside observers it can be very difficult to identify anything resembling a 'just cause' driving the violence in some of these cases. § "growing body of work that has identified 'greed' rather than 'grievance' as the main factor perpetuating many cases of armed conflict. What this means is that many of the key participants in the violence have a vested economic and material interest in its continuation; war for them is the pursuit of economic activity by other means" · The challenges facing peacemakers in such conflicts are awesome. As Roy Licklider has phrased it, "how do you make peace and agree to live in the same state with people who have killed your friends and family? How do you live with these people for the rest of your life? How do you trust them enough to work with them economically and socially to create a functioning political system? o Licklider's research suggest that negotiated settlements of civil wars are far more likely to collapse than those brought to an end by military victory. o Characteristics of an ideal-typical post-war society § Economic infrastructure destroyed, weak or collapsed state structures with serious law and order problems, social fragmentation, and absence of mutual trust within and between communities, and a widespread culture of violence and impunity.

1) Michael Walzer, Arguing about War

o Assembles eleven articles published over 25 years. Philosophical stances he devised and defended in Just and Unjust Wars are applied to the first Gulf War, Kosovo, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 9/11, the "war on terror" and the Iraq War. § Opening essay argues that ethics already is ingrained in military and political thinking insofar as politicians and military men try to justify their actions through moral argument. He suggest this is an important step, regardless of sincerity. · Moral justifications for war and terror are messy, deceptive, and easily exploited by business, and politicians and terrorist are prone to justify whatever actions they please. § In "Emergency Ethics," he examines the use of moral theory to judge what we should do when we face terror or extreme cruelty. He contends that when we are in grave danger we can dilute or suspend ordinary moral standards: "there are movements when the rules can be an perhaps have to be overridden. · When? He elects as such an edifying instant the bombing of residential areas in German cities during WWII o Thus, emergency ethics permits such actions because extreme circumstances, as the old saying goes, demand extreme action · Can one just argue that anything is an emergency? Is it ever wise to deny arbitrarily defined 'enemy combatants' access to the justice system? § In "After 9/11" he approves of the controversial Patriot Act because: "If we can't make the case, then we have to be ready to consider modifying the constraints. It isn't a betrayal of liberal or American values to do that; it is in fact the right thing to do, because the first obligation of the state it so protect the lives of its citizens (that's what states are for,) and American lives are not visibly and certainly at risk. · He goes on to commend the use of military courts in the war on terror. "Emergency ethics" is always intuitively appealing to some people (and almost all authorities) but on closer scrutiny the notion turns out or be very dubious o How to best conduct such a war? is all fair according to the eminent ethics professor, in love and war? § Walzer also suggest in his text that the US should not change it politics in the Middle East and elsewhere because of 9/11, for these changes would be a sign of weakness and so encourage rampant terrorism

1) Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War and Peace

o Book examines six perspectives, devoting one expository and one responsive chapter to each: § 1) The Catholic natural law tradition (John Finnis, Joseph Boyle) · Finnis and Boyle treat Cathlolic natural law as Catholic naural law treats problems of war and peace—that is to dsay, ahissotircally and hyperanalytically—in a way that nicely demonstrate a particular technical style of ethical analysis made possible when first principles are place beyond dispute. § 2) Realism (David R. Mapel, Jeff McMahan) · Realism, provide sharp contrast to Catholic natural law. Both authors present it as complex by not subtle, thematic but not coherent, unable to sustain the distinction it needs between "morality" and "prudence," and incapable of justifying the claim that the survival of the state has intrinsic and paramount value. § 3) Judaism (Michael Walzer, Aviezer Ravitzky) · Walzer argues that Judaism cannot answer most of the question posed because it is a tradition without an ethic of war and peace. § 4) Islam (Bassam Tibi, Sohail H. Hashmi) · Authors interpret Islam with the great learning and painstaking care typical of Qur'anic scholars interpreting the Word. They reach more or less diametrically opposite conclusions on a number of important issues—for example, whether Islam is essentially warlike or essentially peaceful § 5) Christian Pacifism (Theodore J. Koontz, Michael G. Cartwright) · Koontz, unable to say much about how and when force can be justified from the perspective of a tradition whose central commitment can be justified from the perspective of a tradition whose central commitment can be justified form the perspective of a tradition whose central commitment is that it cannot, instead devotees his energies to articulating the Christian pacifist perspective. This he does in a highly personal way—invoking a standpoint epistemology: to understand Christina pacifism he suggest, one must be a Christian pacifist. § 6) Feminism (Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sarah Tobias) · Jean Bethke Elshtain concludes that feminism cannot answer the questions posed because there is no single feminist perspective. Sarah Tobias goes son to make the case for privileging a particular strand of feminist thought (that which runs from Carol Gilligan through Joan Tronto, Nel Noddings and Sara Ruddick), arguing that a full-blown ethic of war and peace can emerge from a feminist ethic of care. Yet, Tobias suggest that if one adopts this perspective the questions the volume poses are the wrong ones to ask o Two chapters at the end, Terry Nardin and Richard B. Miller provide a comparative overview and analysis. The design of the book is intended to enhance "the comparative and dialogic exploration of ethical ideas" in order to "help readers acquire a better understanding of viewpoints that may be unfamiliar to them and a better sense of the assumptions and limitations of their own points of view

1) J. Bryan Hehir, Liberty and Power

o Bringing religion into international relations. The text is rooted in the idea that religious people—including people who share the same faith and live the same religious tradition—can see disgrace fundamentally on political questions not only because they see the facts differently, but also because they read and experience their traditions differently. § Faith-based foreign policy, Walzer claims, "doesn't always foster reasonable decision making." Furthermore, he says " I suggest that we need to worry about faith—for when it turns into dogma and certainty, as it frequently does, it tends to override morality. A faith-based foreign policy is a bad idea." o 1648 Treaty of Westphalia § "Under the Westphalian synthesis, political actors would stop using religious differences as reasons for interfering in the affairs of territories under the rule of others. "Sovereignty," Hehir writes, "meant a defined territory, an effective exercise of authority within the territory and—a decisive change—the refusal of the sovereign to recognize any superior authority, temporal or spiritual." A key moment in the birth of the idea of "separating church and state" was that treaty." · Walzer fear that "just war" theories might be displaced by a "faith-based" model. There is an alternative tradition, a medieval rival of just war, which has not been wholly supplanted: the crusade, the holy war, the jihad. All these words describe a faith-based struggle against the forces of darkness and evil, which are generally understood in explicitly religious terms: infidels, idolaters, the antichrist. In the West, especially after 9/11, we are a little leery about holy wars. o Volume 1Brings together in dialogue Mary Jo Bane and Lawrence M. Mead to consider poverty and welfare policy; Volume 2 Reflect on economics interacting with their moral commitments rooted in faith, providing a model in demonstrating that faith speaks to questions that are not easily pigeonholed as religious issues; Volume 3 Consider the broad question of the relationship between faith and American politics o Religion, Realism, and Just Intervention (Hehir) § Three steps · 1) an analysis of the general topic of religion and world politics, · 2) examples of how religion, morality and U.S. foreign policy have been related, · 3) and the use of an ethic rooted in a religious tradition to explore the question of war and intervention in the cur- rent international system. § Westphalian synthesis · Its content of that synthesis shaped the study and practice of world politics into the middle of the 20th century o Took two centuries to consolidate o 2 explicit propositions and a third implicit § 1) sovereignty § 2) non-intervention § 3) (implicitly) the determination to secularize world politics, again to remove religion as a casus belli. o "The correlative strategic proposition to sovereignty was the rule of nonintervention. Surely the experience of the religious wars, in which intervention was pursued consistently and destructively, led to the evolv- ing notion that the price of order and security for states was some under- standing that sovereign boundaries should be respected. The proposition was built on the basic distinction between the internal life of states and their external conduct. The nonintervention principle sought to remove the internal affairs of states from the possible reasons for war. The political, religious, and social order of states might vary greatly but should not constitute a casus belli. A contemporary advocate of the Westphalian syn- thesis, Henry Kissinger, describes the intent of this principle: "The Treaty of Westphalia reflected a general determination to put an end to carnage once and for all. Its basic purpose (in modern terms) was to stop the merging of domestic and foreign policy (in the language of the period) of faith and diplomacy." § Kissinger: "Probably the most dramatic transformation in the nature of contemporary international affairs has been the general acceptance of the proposition that certain universal principles are deemed enforceable either by the United Nations or, in extreme situations, by a group of states." He fears this transformation may usher in a new period of global interventionism with unforeseeable consequences · There is a growing consensus that a complete secularization of world politics, or an analytical effort to divorce religion from the political order, yields a distorted conception of contemporary world politics. § Niebuhr: o Christian realist! · probably the single most influential mind in the development of American attitude which combine moral purpose with a sense of political reality. Commanded attention in the church, the American academic, and the media · Provided an intellectual compass that served multiple functions: o "exorcise isolationism, and jus- tify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation of power, the techniques of intervention, and the methods of containment apparently required by the cold war; explain to a public of idealists why international politics does not leave much leeway for pure good will, and indeed besmirches purity; appease the frustrations of the bellicose by showing why unlimited force or extremism on behalf of liberty was no virtue; and reassure a nation eager for ultimate accommodation, about the possibility of both avoiding war and achieving its ideals. "Realism," however critical of specific policies, however (and thus self-contradictorily) diverse in its recommendations, precisely provided what was necessary" · Niebuhr crated a counterpoint to traditional Protestant pacifism with his moral defense of America's entry into the War. and in the post WWII setting, took advantage of the moment to become a national figure o His fundamental concern was an understanding of power. He criticized the church when it failed to understand power and its necessity to achieve justice, and he criticized the state when it used power without legitimate reasons. § John Courtney Murray, critiqued Niebuhr. He did not disagree with many of his policy conclusions, but her represented an entirely different styles of moral analysis, rooted in a different theological tradition. · "Whether conservative or liberal in their conclusions, evangelicals are biblical in their premises. Their contribution to policy discourse invokes and uses the scriptures in a fashion distinct from Niebuhr and demonstrably different from the philosophical style of Murray or Peace on Earth." o As William Martin notes, "the so-called Christian Right have put the United States, and indeed the rest of the world, on notice that religious conservatives will not limit their agenda to the water's edge. They are actively and increasingly involved in efforts to influence a wide range of U.S. policies, including support for Israel, arms control and defense and funding for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations" o These issues are certainly not unique to the Christian right. Other religious groups differ significantly in their conclusions but address a similar range of topics § "No tradition, nor any representative of a tradition, has the capacity to translate religious convictions or even moral principles directly into the policy process." o Military intervention § Covers a broad spectrum of actions. Its extreme case and the one that catalyzes the most debate politically and morally. It's a pervasive aspect of world politics. § Three phase evolution for military intervention · 1) the political-moral baseline for the argument is a well-known marker in the history of diplomacy, rooted in the 17th century (as a part of the Westphalian synthesis), it was securely in possession before the founding of the UN but has been held less securely since then. § "The opening paragraphs of the UN Charter constitute a clear, unequivocal endorsement of both the rights of sovereign states, and the requirement of all members, and the United Nations itself, to respect the domestic jurisdiction of states. Beyond the text of the charter, the United Nations produced two documents that embodied the challenge to the rule of nonintervention. The first, the Genocide Convention (1948), was as much a product of World War II as the charter itself. It sought to establish a clear limit to the restraint imposed by nonintervention; the existence of genocide called other states to take action. The second, a text of less legal significance than either the charter or a treaty, was the UN Declaration on Human Rights (1948). The essence of this document was precisely to establish standards against which the "internal order" of states was to be evaluated and the responsibility of states and international organizations for violations of human rights was affirmed. Neither of these documents had immediate impact on the inherited nonintervention rule, but together they contributed over time to the erosion of the absolute character of both sovereignty and nonintervention. The moral tradition of the just war ethic, however, cannot simply be identified with the political-legal rule of nonintervention. The moral tradition, especially in its Christian context but not exclusively so, is grounded in a conviction about the unity of the human family. This conviction is a pervasive dimension of Peace on Earth. It yields, in turn, a fabric of duties and responsibilities for states that runs well beyond the inherited assumptions of the nonintervention rule. These duties of states required intervention on moral grounds even if legal support for such action was lacking. This fact became evident in the debates of the 1990s" · Two elements to respond to challenge to policy assessing external military intervention: o A) a normative argument capable of winning broad support in the international community o B) a strategy that can be decisively implementd · 2) legitimation of intervention will, therefore, be restricted to a precise defined set of cases. They must pass a version of the "just cause" test of the traditional ethic · 3) The "just cause" standard produced some cases for which intervention war agreed on: genocide, ethnic cleansing, and failed states. o 4) A more controverted standard was the "proper authority" category of the just war ethic

3) Brian Orend, "Justice After War"

o But what about compensation, 'political rehabilitation;' and war crimes trials?'" § Compensation: · Since aggression is a crime that violates important rights and causes much damage ,it is reasonable to contend that, in a classical context of interstate war, the aggressor nation owes some duty of compensation to the victim nation. § "Walzer says that the deepest nature of the wrong an aggressor commits is to make people fight for their rights, that is, make them resort to violence to secure those things to which they have an elemental entitlement." o How much? Hard to say, because it may affect the civilian population of the aggressor state, failing to respect discrimination, lumping civilians into a "citizenship of common destiny" § Political rehabilitation: · This may require the aggressor regime to demilitarize, at least to the extent that it will not pose a serious threat to the victims—and other members of the international community—for the foreseeable future. o If the actions of the aggressor during the war were truly atrocious, or if the nature of the regime in Aggressor at the end of the war is still so heinous that its continued existence poses a serious threat to international justice and human rights, then—and only then—may such a regime be forcibly dismantled and a new, more defensible regime established in its stead. To note, such construction necessitates and additional commitment on the part of victim and any vindicators to assist the new regime in aggressor with this enormous task of political. § Additionally, this political therapy should be reserved only for the gravest cases of aggression, like Nazi Germany · Apologies are a nontrivial aspect of a complete peace treaty § War Crimes Trials: · "there can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women." Individuals who play a prominent role during wartime must be held accountable for their actions and what they bring about. o There are two types of war crimes § 1) those that violate jus ad bellum · "planning, preparing, initiating and waging" aggressive war. Responsibility of the commission of any such crime falls on the shoulders of the political leader(s) of the aggressor regime o Should political leaders on trial for jus ad bellum violations be found guilty, through a public and fair proceeding, then the court is at liberty to determine a reasonable punishment, which will obviously depend upon the details of the relevant case. § 2) those that violate jus in bello: · Such crimes include deliberately using indiscriminate or disproportionate force; failing to take due care to protect civilian populations from lethal violence; using weapons that are themselves intrinsically indiscriminate and/or disproportionate, such as those of mass destruction; employing intrinsically heinous means, like rape campaigns; and treating surrendered prisoners of war in an inhumane fashion, for example, torturing them. o "Primary responsibility for these war crimes must fall on the shoulders of those soldiers, officers, and military commanders who were most actively involved in their commission. Officers and commanders carry considerable moral burdens of their own during wartime. They are duty-bound not to issue orders that violate any aspect of the laws of war. Furthermore, they must plan military campaigns so that foreseeable civilian casualties are minimized, and must teach and train their soldiers not only about combat but also about the rules of just war theory and the laws of armed conflict.34 Something of note here is that, unlike jus ad bellum war crimes, jus in bello war crimes can be, and usually are, committed by all sides in the conflict." § Publicity: · War settlements often exert deep impact on people's lives. They are thus entitled to know the substance of peace settlements, and especially how such are predicted to affect them. o There needs to be an ethical exit strategy

3) Mark Evans, Just War Theory

o Chapter 3 considers the question of who or what has the right to wage war. o Traditional just war theory is highly state-centric: individual states are the sole relevant actors in this regard. It is clear, however, that this perspective - if ever it was justified - is too antiquated to be adequate in the modern world. But our institutions do not yet fully meet the requirements for authoritative direction here. I suggest a way, first of all, of thinking about this problem which I propose gives us some guidance. Controversially, perhaps, I also suggest that there is a democratic bias in just war theory which influences its accounts of legitimate political authority and 'just peace' § Next three chapter deal with the second traditional part of the theory: jus in bello, or 'justice in the conduct of war.' o Chapter 4 points out that the concept of proportionality has always been difficult to operationalize § "But there are certain aspects of recent conflicts which have exacerbated its indeterminacies and these are analyzed in order to assess the continued utility of a concept that is all-too-readily set aside in the heat of battle. Jus in bello critically depends upon an ability to draw morally meaningful distinctions between those who are rightly liable to die in war (which includes the just as well as the unjust combatants) and the 'innocent', those whose deaths should be minimized as far as possible." o Chapter 5 forcefully stresses that the extent of this difficulty continues to be underestimated by neglecting the peculiarities of 'the child' as a moral and political subject in war. § Through evocative examples and suggestive analyses her chapter proposes that some fundamental categories of just war theory may be significantly disrupted once we think properly about the role and status of children in war. o Chapter 6, Brian Orend discusses the 'supreme emergency exemption', which claims that the 'discrimination' criterion in jus in bello may be legitimately waived in certain extreme circumstances, for example when faced with attack from weapons of mass destruction. o Chapter 7 suggests that there is a human right to peace and analyses how this might sit in a theory of just war. o Chapter 8 discusses the concepts of forgiveness and reconciliation, and the various practices by which these may be pursued in societies recovering from conflict o Conclusion defends just war theory against some of the most important and familiar criticism it faces § "if we are to take the normative evaluation of war at all seriously, it is hard to think of how we might do so without ultimately adopting some version of the just war theory."

2) John Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution

o Chapter 3 through 8 § Delve into the origins of both the just war tradition and pacifism. · Argues that while pacifism remained consistent with the earliest Christians' response to killing, and a majority position in the early centuries, the understanding of justifiable war resulted from a blurring of the Church's ecclesial and political lines. After compiling a historical outline of just war criteria form Augustin to the post-World War II era, he offers a succinct analysis of just war theory. Concluding that there is a coherent theoretical logic to the just war ethical position, he questions whether the conditions of just war criteria, as historically defined, could ever be met. o Chapter 9 through 21 § Discusses nonviolence and pacifism form the medieval period through the present, including a brief consideration of pacifism in rabbinic Judaism. The discussion of 16th century Anabaptism contends that it offered a more viable peace witness than the earlier Waldensians or the Unitas Fratrum because Anabaptism produced Free Church institutions. In Yoder's presentation of Anabaptism, the emphasis falls on the separatist Schleitheim statement with its clear separation from the sword and resultant dualism and theology of martyrdom. · Seriously considers Niebuhr's realist critique of liberal Christian pacifism. Dismissing pacifism on the grounds of humanity's sinfulness and the political irrelevance of Jesus' ethic, Niebuhr argued for a degree of Christian responsibility that could affirm a pragmatic political ethic. Yoder uses chapter 19 and 20 as an engaged, relevant Mennonite pacifist response to Niebuhr's contention that Mennonites were ethically consistent only to the degree that they were withdrawn and socially irrelevant o Chapter 22 through 24 § Examines the moral challenges posed by war, nuclear weapons, revolution, and liberation movements. § Attempts to trace dialogues between proponents of just war theory and pacifism, specifically on the subject of nuclear war, and demonstrate the integrity of each tradition through his interlocutor's willingness to give and receive criticism within the context of moral discernment.

3) Larry May, Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law

o Chapter 5: Joanna Kyriakakis § Argues that a key feature of jus post bellum is holding those who are responsible for a conflict accountable; however, the guiding principles that undergird this idea on both just war and transitional justice approaches reflects liberal criminal law, which is often bling to or marginalizes the contributions of economic actors. She clarifies this point by providing, among other telling examples, and in-depth account of the role that economic actors played in heightening and prolonging the Liberian conflict. · Posits three reasons for thinking that, in some cases, a priority should be placed on accountability measures concentrated specifically on economic crimes: o 1) inasmuch as restitution and reparations are a goal of post-conflict resolution, As May indicates, and since economic actors often benefit from conflict, then holding economic actors accountable for the wrongdoing that they perpetrate is necessary o 2) given the role that richer nations frequently play in promoting conflict among poorer nations for their benefit, overlooking economic actors calls into question the legitimacy (and commitment to equality) of international institutions that act in the name of justice o 3) failure to address the wrongs of the economic actors invites a future repetition of the same unjust conflict, as Walker agrees. o Chapter 6: Mark Drumbl § Working within the transitional justice framework, challenges current best practices (as seen in the Paris Principles) and human rights politics that child soldiers should be consider faultless passive victims—children are shielded from any culpability related to the crimes that they may have committed during war. o Chapter 7: Tony Coady § Continues by examining community practices and accountability after war, Contends that since individual fighters are culpable for engaging in an unjust war, they should be treated differently upon a war's termination. This seems an intuitive point as it pertains to jus in bello. War criminals are typically strongly condemned, but not these who fail to object to fighting an unjust war. This asymmetry, as he declares, is a mistake · Notes an example of those who deem the war in Iraq an unjust war and yet still praise the troops. o Chapter 8: Robert B. Talisse § Responding to Coady's note, he attempts to answer in his contribution: cold democratization ever serves as a just cause for war, as it purportedly did for the invasion of Iraq? · In his view, under certain condition, the goal of establosuing democracy could serve as a just cause for war—a view that challenges the standard view that only defense against aggression acts can constitue a just cause for war. o Argues that democracies systematically improve the huma rights conditions of those living under them, hence, if , as others have argued, humanitarian duties can serve as a just cause for war, and if democracies help satisfy those humanitarian duties, then democracy should serve as a just cause for war. o Chapter 9: Seth Lazar § Investigates and rejects 3 prominent claims in the literature surrounding jus post bellum., and interpreted by just war theorists: · 1) the priority of compensation · 2) opposing Davidovic and Kyriakakis, that war criminals and political leaders responsible for unjust conflict be punished · 3) that intervening state are responsible for reconstruction o Lazar argues that the implausibility of each of these claims furthers a general notion of skepticism concerning corrective post-conflict justice. o Chapter 10: Robert Cryer Argues that jus post bellum should not be seen as a seamless byproduct of just war theory. Says, if viewed as a new normative concept, does jus post bellum provide a positive advance in our thinking and practices.

3) Larry May, Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice

o Chapter 5: Max Pensky § I context of post WWII Japan, investigates the more general question of whether domestic amnesties for serious violations of international criminal law by top political or military leaders in a justly defeated regime are in principle compatible with states' domestic and international leegal obligations. · While the concern to balance amnesties with prosecution feature in debates in both transitional justice and jus post bellum, Pensky argues that there is a significant difference between debates over amnesties in transitional justice and just post bellum o Chapter 6: Gabriella Blum and Natalie J. Lockwood § Consider recent proposal to expand the duty of reparations both vertically and horizontally. · Vertical expansion of the duty of reparations would require that there is a duty to compensate for all civilian war damage, and not only those victims of illegal forms of violence such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. · Horizontal expansion of the duty of reparations would require third parties to bear some of the burden of reparation, thus expanding the duty to repair to third parties who were not involved in the war. o Compare the justification for duties to compensate victims of war with hypothetical expansion of duties to compensate victims of natural disasters to see whether there is something unique about war that demands special consideration. § Argue "war-relatedness" of the injuries to victims is not a necessary component of any duty of repair. Also argue that the logic supporting the vertical can horizontal expansions of the duty of reparations generate duties to compensate victims of other catastrophes. o Chapter 7: Jovana Davidovic § Examines a different puzzle in the logic behind reparations and the ICC. · Noting praise for pairing of retributive and restorative justice in attaching Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) to the ICC. o Worries that the increased participation and influence of victims in criminal proceedings may undermine the procedural fairness of the ICC o Chapter 8: Cindy Holder § Argues that a conception of truth borrowed from feminist empiricism can show us why the pursuit of truth for its own sake is a valuable goal of transitional justice. Argues that conceiving of truth as adequate responsiveness to experience can help us see how truth can provide truth commission with epistemological standards appropriate to their pursuit of social knowledge. o Chapter 9: Margaret Urban Walker § Argues for truth as an independently valuable goal but focusses on the way truth commission can contribute to the prevention of future violations of human rights by serving as a pedogeological tool that promotes a culture of human rights. · Notes that while there is increasing convergence on debates about traditional justice and jus post bellum, the project of seeking truth is not usually part of seeking justice post-conflict. o Argues that a truth recovery process can importantly contribute the establishment and stability of long-term peace insofar as truth commission can help create societal conditions conducive to respecting human rights. Often truth commission's preventative power is seen as instrumentally valuable insofar as it uncovers and documents past abuses in order to make specific political and policy recommendation designed to spark societal change. But, truth commission lack the power to implement their recommendations. § Argues that truth commission are pedogeological tools promoting a culture of human rights in 4 ways · 1) teach and interpret the language of human rights by reinterpreting past actions and policies in the language of human rights abuses. · 2) truth commission reconstruct the epistemic environment by increasing awareness of gross violations of human rights against the tendency to disbelieve or ignore such abuses · 3) the increased prevalence of truth commission inhibits and deters future right-violating behavior by making people aware of what tis a violation of human rights · 4) truth commission also provide accounts of citizen mobilization and resistance to human rights abuses, these efforts can serve as models for resistance in other contexts. o Chapter 10: James Boham § Draws on the case of Northern Ireland as ana example of peace forged through Protestant and Catholic women's groups that formed a transitional society bridging the boundaries of conflict. Peace was not simply established through diplomatic negotiations but also through shared dialogues forging connections between citizens. · Aims to show that modern jus post bellum is a macro-deliberative, multilevel process of dialogues that established democratic legitimacy, occurring in a transitional normative and political order. o Chapter 11: Colleen Murphy and Linda Radzik § Argue for the need to draw on a broader set of normative ideals in defining jus post bellum than those that are traditionally the focus of just war theory. · Argue that the norms of political reconciliation offer important resources for achieving postwar reconstruction.

1) Paul Ramsey, The Just War

o Collection of 24 articles published in the 1960s, offering a scholarly presentation of the moral and ethical principles supporting Christian participation in the use of military force. § The moral question facing the church is whether force and violence can be justified in settling political disputes, or can international conflicts be resolved through the process of consultation and negotiation? If disputes cannot be settled peacefully, and the use of force is relinquished in this nuclear age, then, what kind of political action would break the impasse to maintain a relatively peaceful world? · The book deals with the above questions but is not confined to the political and legal aspects of "just war." · It provides a model for how Christian ethical analysis should be done. o Divided into five parts: § 1) political ethics dealing with the uses of power and conscientious objection § 2) morality of war, just war, and nuclear war § 3) morality of deterrence and advice of the Vatican Council · Note that it is trye that the tests of jus ad bellum (when is war right?) and jus in bello (what is right in war?) were first refined by men who have come to be identified as Roman Catholic moralist for the strange reason that they lived and wrote their treatises before the Protestant Reformation. Still the Augsburg Confession says, "Our churches teach that lawful civil ordinances are good works of G_D and that is tight for Christians to engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers;" the Westminster confession speaks of wars that are "just and necessary;" and left-wing Calvinism elaborated the just-war doctrine into a theory of justifiable revolution which underlay the struggles for human liberty and rights in the British civil wars and the American Revolution o This view of tmerpers and limited use of force in behalf of social change and revolutionary justice was productive asloof a spirit of mutla accommodation and compromise. IT demythologized the ends to be sought in any historical struggle or cause. It inculcated a sense of political community and habitual observance of social due process (not ever to be breached except in the last resort) which underlies the growth of democratic society ipon Puritan Protestant soil. § Therefore, must reject the myopic identification of the just war doctrine with Roman Catholicism. § 4) the pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council § 5) Vietnam § Each examines the Christian doctrine with its rich history and the technical specifics of modern warfare. Due to the time period in which the essays were written, focusing on the Vietnam War and larger context of international politics and military technology within which that war was fought.

1) Larry May, Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law

o Collection of essays bringing together leading legal, political, and moral theorist to discuss normative issues that arise when war concludes and when a society strives to regain peace. § Questions concern retribution, reparations, and rebuilding, along with questions about how reconciliation might possibly be affected in war-torn societies. o Introduction § Jus post bellum contested, but what is clear that there is a need for forthright discussions of conceptual and normative issues that arise in truth and reconciliation commissions as well as war crimes trials and reparations programs. · Transitional justice concerns the normative considerations that apply to a society that is moving from a repressive, non-democratic society to one that is non-repressive and democratic. Most of the repressive societies that are in this state of transition are also emerging from a period of mass atrocity or form a civil war. Jus post bellum concerns societies that are trying to regain peace after a period of war or armed conflict. In this sense there is considerable overlap between transitional justice and just post bellum. § Intro summarizes the main lines of argument of each of the essays of the anthology, beginning with a pair of essays on truth telling and reparations; then several essays on retribution, concerning what from retribution should take and where prosecutions should take place. Then there are essays that discuss hard cases. IT concludes with 2 pieces, one by a philosopher and one by a lawyer, that offer significant challenges to the very idea of jus post bellum as a discrete field of inquiry. o Chapter 1: Margaret Walker § Canvases the genesis of just post bellum, noting that it has developed out of two overlapping traditions -just war theory and transitional justice. Despite this overlap, she contends that there is a notable absence of discussion of public truth telling in the just war tradition, which is surprising given the prominence of truth commission in transitional justice theorizing. This divergence over truth telling in the extant literature prompts her to explore in more detail the relevance and implications of truth telling not only domestically bit internationally as a necessary feature of post-conflict justice. Her inquiry into public truth telling proceeds by examining the notion of a "right to the truth." · Walker asks: in the wake of atrocities, are individuals entitled to, as matter of justice, to an investigation into the events that transpired? To answer this question, she turns to the recently published "Study on the Right to the Truth" by the UN Commission on Human Rights, arguing that there are three reasons in favor of a right to the truth o 1) it acts as a kind of reparation affirming and restoring the dignity of victims o 2) it identifies those responsible, making it possible to hold them accountable o 3) it helps to prevent such atrocities from happening again by exposing how they arose. · She also notes that truth commission are the most familiar (but not the only) way to make good on this right, in order to see if truth telling should be a norm that extends beyond the domestic context (where it has typically been confined). o "insofar as the right to the truth is a matter of human rights, then conceptually, it seems equally applicable to the international domain, especially since human rights violations are often perpetrated or facilitated by foreign powers. Accordingly, since (minimally) truth commissions, properly executed, produce a credible account of events, and expose those responsible for them, she contends that these commissions should be extended beyond the domestic sphere. Without such commissions (or the like) victims have their dignity doubly violated, once during the atrocity, and after by having the truth hidden. Nevertheless, extending truth commission or the international sphere introduced various complexities, most notably, truth commission are often viewed as a process of self-assessment driven by a particular national narrative, thus that application of interstate conflict seems difficult. Walker, citing empirical studies, argues that this difference does not exclude the possibility of effective international truth commissions."

1) Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited

o Collection of essays in which author offers a "radically evangelical" account of just war theory. § This includes its roots in the conviction that G_D's peace is the original ontological truth of creation, that sheer antagonism is not basic to things, and that all will ultimately be united in G_D's rule. · Accordingly, war should not be glamorized as a crucible of heroic catharsis or shrugged off as an animal act of instinctive self-defense or self-aggrandizement or deplored as an icon of horror. Rather, it should be regarded as an act of love that, looking forward to the coming of G_D's rule, aims to make peace between enemies by doing justice that is solicitous for the right of both sides equally. § Claims that the doing of just in the face of wrongdoing crucially involves the meeting out of retributive punishment—surprising those who may thing that what is evangelical cannot be retributive. · Suggest that evangelical retribution aims at just and therefore lasting peace—not an equality of suffering—between victim and wrongdoer. o Suggest that the Christian counter-praxes are: § 1) the missiological form of an act of judgement, albeit one that looks forward to the dawning of G_D-s final peace § 2) pastoral form of mutual forgiveness · Both are sort of the same.

3) Paul Ramsey, The Just War

o Concerning the morality of deterrence, Ramsey says one thing: § The following: in concluding the no sort of force could be retained for deterrence's sake which it would be immoral ever to use, it should be noted in the findings of moral law that are necessary to show a possible deterrence posture and governing moral principles mesh together. o Some primary themes: § 1) It is war which must be saved, in other words, the possibility of test of armed strength between states rather than eternal peace, which would have to be established by the constant threat of the thermonuclear holocaust. · Concerning statesmen, do they wish to save war or save humanity from a certain war (thermos-nuclear war)? § 2) A theory of statecraft, of political authority, political community, and political responsibility. · The military doctrine—the just war theory—is an outgrowth, entailment, or expression of a conception of the relation between force and political responsibility. Whether one moves "from politics to war" or "from war to politics," it is statecraft that is crucial. § 3) concerned with the question, "how ought men to make political decision in the area of foreign policy and military affairs?—not what the decision should be in particular instances.

3) John Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution

o Final chapters § He reflects on ecumenical dialogue and the status of just war and pacifist positions in Roman Catholicism and in the World Council of Churches. Although just war has been one Catholic approach, "it is not the official one and not always operative" · States that wherever just war theory has been employed to criticize war, "the outcome has been a kind of pacifism. Because there has been "no profound dialogue" on the morality of war within the World Council of Churches, Yoder questions the council's ability to facilitate such discussions. He claims past dialogues have not allowed for different voices to be fairly represented at the table. Regarding the progress of ecumenical discussion on the subject, he concludes that in conversations asking, "whether or not we are to kill people, no breakthrough is possible." o Does not go on to offer a way forward for ecumenical dialogue

1) Immanuel Kant, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals

o First of his extensive writings on moral philosophy and attempts to establish a foundation for future works on moral theory. Kant believed that previous moral philosophers did not successfully define morality and argued that they based it too much on individual experiences. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals seeks to prove that there is a supreme, universally held principle of morality that applies equally to all rational human beings. He expanded on this idea in his 1797 book, The Metaphysics of Morals, which applies some of Groundwork's ideas in more specific contexts. Composed of a preface and 3 sections o Kant writes in the Enlightenment Era (from 1600s to the early 1800s). Enlightenment thinkers hoped to remove a metaphorical shroud of darkness they saw as clouding intellectual efforts. This darkness came from an over-reliance on religion and legend, which many thinkers saw as forces that drove the masses away from logic and reason. § In philosophy, its influence drove thinkers to consider reason as a fundamental human quality. As such, many thinkers from this period encourage secularization so humanity could focus more heavily on cultivating their logical faculties. Instead of purely relying on the church to determine how to act morally, humans should utilize their own rational cognition./ § Preface: · In the preface, Kant establishes his hopes for his writing. He acknowledges he will not be able to establish a complete metaphysics of morals at this time, but he believes he can prove the existence of a "supreme principle of morality" that governs all rational human beings. He asserts that all human beings can understand this principle intuitively, meaning it requires a priori cognition. o Lays foundation for future work on the subject and prove "the identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of morality" § Borrows from physics (laws of nature), ethics (principles of freedom), and logic (formal philosophy) § On Moral laws: · "Kant argues that we already view morals a priori, as we follow them for their own sake and commit to upholding moral obligations in our own lives. Moral laws justified by a priori cognition will leave no room for selfish interpretation, as it will be intuitively clear what they are and why they should be followed. He writes, "the ground of the obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being, or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason, and that any other prescription that is founded on principles of mere experience [...] can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law" (5, 4:389). Here, Kant expresses that while empirical thinking can justify the necessity of moral laws, it cannot be the groundwork of their formulation. We are used to applying morals to evaluate specific circumstances in our everyday lives. According to Kant's logic, we should fit our actions to our understanding of morality instead of warping morality to understand our actions. Establishing a framework for morality that needs no outside justification is the key to ensuring people can adequately judge their intentions before acting in a way that may prove to be harmful"

3) Albert Marrin, War & The Christian Conscience

o For categories: § 1) Early Christianity and war · Augustine: "On war even, if you must needs still be engaged in it, hold to the faith, seek after peace." § 2) The "just war" tradition and its variants § 3) Pacifism § 4) Christian thought about the modern modes of warfare.

3) Peri Roberts, "War and Peace in The Law of Peoples"

o Force is not sanctioned in order to bring about commitment to the Law of Peoples but only to sop terrible human rights violations (or in self-defense). Regime change cannot e be the justifying reason for intervention. § Having intervened we will be faced with legitimate post bellum obligations. This much might follow from a recognition that the present enemy must be seen as a future associate in a shared and just peace. o For Rawls, like Kant, commitment to the Law of Peoples should be freely chosen between equals. o A reasonably just well-ordered society, Rawls argues, meet five conditions: § 1) fair equality of opportunity § 2) A decent distribution of invoke and wealth § 3) society as employer of last resort § 4) basic health care assured for all § 5) public financing of elections · A key to perpetual peace then is the involvement of citizens in decision making o In summary § Kant and Rawls similarities: · 1) just as Kant regarded war as patholigcal so did Rawls · 2) Although Rawls does have have an explicit theory of just war where Kant may not have, as with Kant, Rawls's ad bellum and in bello restrictions on force in non-ideal situations are better understood when connected with the ideal of establishing a peaceful and regulated international order. · 3) despite war's pathological nature both argue that the existence of war should not be accepted as unchangeable fact and both envisage the possibility of an ideal peaceful world where there is no war · 4) both Rawls and Kant explicitly link the internal political organization of states to the possibility of peaceful external relations · 5) both also advocate the reform of international politics through the creation of a federation of peaceful and well-ordered states which transforms inter- national politics into a system of regulated order under law.

1) Reinhold Niebuhr, "Part III: Love and Justice in International Relations"

o His books provide the theological framework, and his articles and editorials show his response to contemporary events. This article considers an article of his and focuses on two questions: § 1) Are Niebuhr's guilt feelings about political participation really necessary?

3) Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace"

o How the transcendental concept of public law harmonizes morality with politics § Regarding the law of the state: is rebellion a legitimate means for a people to employ in throwing off the yoke of an alleged tyrant? · Since the rights of the people have been injured, when the tyrant is deposed this doesn't subject him to any injustice § Regarding international law: there can be no question of international law except in the context of a law governed state of affairs (without which no-one can be awarded any of his human rights) § Regarding the law of world citizenship, I shall say nothing. It's analogy with international law makes its maxims easy to state and evaluate

3) David Fidler, "Just and Unjust Wars, Uses of Force & Coercion"

o In short, states have developed interest and capabilities in using, and threatening to use, cyber as a means of force and coercion short-of-war. the examples above reveal a spectrum of harm that includes destructive, damaging, degrading, disruptive, and deterrent effects. This spectrum highlights the complications that cyber technologies introduce when attempting to distinguish force short-of-war from coercion short-of-force. The range of effects also creates the risk that cyber actions short-of-war might trigger escalation, which raised particular questions about automated response to cyber incidents. The spectrum, and its dangers, counsels thinking about just and unjust cyber coercion in addition to cyber force short-of-war. o For state actions that fall underneath the legal prohibition on the use of force associated with jus ad bellum, international law contains obligations, including to settle disputes peacefully, respect the sovereignty of other states, and refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other states. o Walzer § Argued that a theory of just uses of force short-of-war should reflect just war theory. We can extend this proposition to coercion short-of-force as well · 1) coercion and force-short-of-war must have a just cause · 2) should be limited in the same way that the conduct of war is limited, so as to shield civilians o In essence, jus in bello-type rules should apply § Should draw a line between force short-of-war and coercion short-of-force o How technologies support efforts to achieve peace—and advance jus ad pacem—is also important

1) John Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution

o Inspired but Roland Bainton's textbook Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace and provides an understating of Yoder's thought/the historical developments related to Christian pacifism and the just war tradition o Chapter 1 and 2 § Defines four typologies: · Pacifism · Justifiable war · The "blank check" o Decision about the legitimacy of war is made by the ruler, who is not accountable to anyone · Holy war o Warrant for war is found in revelation § He goes on to note an incompleteness in the development of just war doctrine, offering "no one single classic statement of all the criteria" for just war. His intent to address this deficit in some detail marks a departure from Bainton. By analyzing the historical "points at which fundamental difference of axioms, logic and context make for consistent differences in character, decision, and behavior," Yoder seeks to present a systematic outline of just war theory alongside various strains of pacifism. The blank check" and holy war streams receive relatively less attention

1) Carsten Stahn, "Jus Post Bellum and Just Peace"

o Introduces the concepts of jus post bellum and just peace o Let's begin: § Injustice = a "perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits § Peace agreements should avoid clauses that carry the seeds for the outbreak of further wars. Contemporary peacebuilding strategies seek to accommodate underlying causes of violence. However, the link between justice and peace is often overshadowed by more immediate concerns (e.g., security, stability), pragmatism or reliance on narrow or formal conceptions of justice § Aristotle says peace is the only legitimate war aim · Augustine and Aquinas go on to say that attaining peace must be a central aim of war § Morally, a war should not end with any type of peace, but rather a specific form of peace. Just peace theory relies on the premise that peace is not a natural or normal state, but something that needs to be constructed. Therefore: war should end in a "better state of peace," that is, peace that is more just and more stable than the situation that led to the war in the firs please § Unjust war can never result in just peace—Walzer may disagree concerning Iraq § Kant promoted the idea of a sustainable peace in his concept of justice after war · UN Declaration of the Right of Peace reaffirmed that 'peace is not only the absence of conflict but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, and socio-economic development is ensured." § Connection between justice and peace · The idea of just peace implies that peace is an overarching condition but must carry the promise of justice. Thought developed in peacebuilding approaches and transitional justice. o Ex. Latin American dictatorship have shown that some form of negative peace, without justice, is unsustainable. · Challenges o 1) interplay between them o 2) evolution of the nature of the conflict o 3) wide typology of violence § Today's conflicts are mostly non-international or mixed. They include classical civil wars, that is, internal armed conflicts between states and non-state actors, as well as conflicts between non-state actors. A just peace theory must accommodate the dynamics and particular difficulties of intra-state conflicts. § Four approaches to peace · 1) approaches grounded in the just war tradition o Does offer much guidance, but considers termination of hostilities, exit from war, constraints on conquest, parameters of peace settlements, limits of occupying powers, and justice after war § Brian Orend has established specific criteria for justice after war, including moderation in the termination of the war (e.g., exclusion of revenge), publicity of the terms of peace or proportionality of rights vindication. o Just war theory is meant to supplement, rather than replace just peace theory · 2) the peacebuilding tradition o Origins in the context of peacekeeping operations, UN enforcement action, and the dilemmas of humanitarian interventions, as well as peace ethics more broadly. o Treats armed violence as an undesirable social condition, that is, a tragedy or disaster that needs to be remedied o There's many others, including those by peacebuilding advocates—Christian ethicists included § Accommodates both short-term and long-term considerations of peace. IT is less normative and more pragmatic than just war theory · 3) transnational justice o Defined: the field introduces a strategy, that is, 'a way of thinking about justice after atrocity.' It relates to justice associated with periods of political change, including legal response to confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes. It's part of the UN peacebuilding structure. It encompasses: both judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms', including 'prosecution initiatives, facilitating initiatives in respect of the right to truth, delivering reparations, institutional reform and national consultations.' § It insist that restoring justice after conflict require a relinking of peace and justice after conflict. · There's a certain judicialization of peace § Six core elements of reconciliation that are essential to combine peace and justice in transitional processes: · 1) building socially just institutions and relations between states · 2) political acknowledgement of wrong · 3) reparations, including consideration of historical injustices · 4) judicial punishment · 5) apology · 6) forgiveness § Colleen murphy, who developed a political theory of reconciliation that views promotion of the rule of law, generation of reasonable political trust, and restoration of support for fundamental capabilities as essential elements of reciprocity and respect for agency. o She "argued that war damages social relationships and that just pursuit of transformation can only be affected through relational changes. Just peace is thus about repairing relationships. According to her, broken political relations and mistrust should be remedied through the promotion of adherence to the rule of law and respect for the moral agency of others. This type of change creates hope and acknowledgement." · 4) intersubjective approaches o Mutual recognition is necessary to order overcome impasse, break divides, or even come to accept conflicting narratives which are crucial for transformation o Four elements may be related to just peace: § the idea of 'order', which is a 'minimum condition of co-existence', and prerequisite for the quest for justice, retribution (i.e., accountability for wrongdoing), collective restoration (i.e. 'reparation and restoration of relationships'), and 'distribution' (i.e. 'resolving deep grievances of redistribution'). However, just peace relies essentially on 'negotiated and agreed inter-subjectivity' in order to be sustainable

1) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War

o Introduction: § "Note that in the first Gulf War of 1991, the United States and its allies fought in strict accordance with the classic just war paradigm: They stopped fighting once the invasion of Kuwait had been decisively defeated. They did not march on Baghdad; they did not aim at the overthrow and replacement of the Baathist regime; nor did they do anything to make it possible for the Iraqi people to turn Saddam Hussein out of office. ON the contrary, having called for rebellions against Saddam's rule, they failed to come to the aid or, much worse, to the rescue of the rebels. Though US officials compared Saddam to Hitler, the allies did not act on the comparison; it was propaganda and nothing more. They did seek constraints on the future behavior of the Baathist regime, and these constraints were predicated on a fairly grim view of the regime. Still, what we might think of as the constitutional character of the Iraqi state-whether it was autocratic or democratic, secular. or religious; whether it recognized or violated human rights; whether its bureaucrats acted arbitrarily or were legally con strained-all this was judged irrelevant to the decisions about war and peace made by the American-led coalition. By 2003 the position of the United States and its allies, a smaller number now, had changed dramatically. To be sure, the second Bush administration gave a variety of reasons for its decision to go to war: another day, another reason. But all the reasons suggested the need, this time, to march on Baghdad and replace the Baathist regime. The most important reason was the danger that Iraq possessed, or in the near future would be capable of producing, weapons of mass destruction." · So, Iraq was not similar to the German or Japanese or they hypothetical Rwandan case: The war was not a response to aggression or a humanitarian intervention. It's cause was not (as in 1991) an actual Iraqi attack on a neighboring state or even an imminent threat of attack; nor was the cause an actual, ongoing massacre. The cause was regime change, directly—which means the US government was arguing for a significant expansion of the doctrine of jus ad bellum: The existence of an aggressive and murderous regime, it claimed, was a legitimate occasion for war, even if the regime was not actually engaged in aggression or mass murder. In more familiar terms, this was an argument for preventive war, but the reason for the preventive attack wasn't the standard perception of a dangerous shift in the balance of power that would soon leave "us" helpless against "them." It was a radically new perception of an evil regime. · The harsh containment system imposed on Iraq after the first Gulf War was an experiment in responding differently to aggression. Containment had 3 elements: o 1) embargo intended to prevent the importation of arms (which also affected supplies of food and medicine through it should have been possible to design a "smarter" set of sanctions) o 2) inspection system organized by the UN to block the domestic development of weapons of mass destruction o 3) establishment of "no-fly" zones in the northern and southern parts of the country so that Iraqi's air power could not be used against its own people. § All this did not prevent the war

1) Mark Evans, Just War Theory

o Introduction: sketch jus war theory as a historical tradition in western thinking and discuss features of it as a moral theory § Just war theory is actually the product of experience, an extended effort to assert the claims of morality in the face of war's realities and against those who would regard such assertions as futile · "Following John Rawls, we can distinguish between ideal and non-ideal theory, and place just war theory firmly into the domain of the latter.15 In essence the distinction is a secularized version of Augustine's distinction between the city of God and the city of man, for it recognizes that morality might still specify how we should act even in circumstances where it is impossible to live up to all of its fully realized demands. Ideal theory specifies the terms of the 'ideal world', defined as that in which it is possible to be fully moral. It is the world in which what ought to be the case actually is the case. Non-ideal theory specifies moral requirements and guidelines for a world in which this fully realized ideal situation has not been, and perhaps cannot foreseeably be, achieved. Just war theory is non-ideal for the following reason: the goal of a just war is a just peace. In the ideal world there would be no war. Just war theory actually embraces pacifism at the ideal level but eschews the absolute pacifist's rejection of the moral possibility of war at the non- ideal level." § The theory laid out · 1. Jus ad bellum: to have the moral right to wage war, the following conditions must be respected: o (a) the cause is just; o (b) the justice of the cause is sufficiently great as to warrant warfare and does not negate countervailing values of equal or greater weight; (c) on the basis of available knowledge and reasonable assessment of the situation, one must be as confident as one reasonably can be of achieving one's just objective without yielding longer-term conse- quences that are worse than the status quo; o (d) warfare is genuinely a last resort: all peaceful alternatives which may also secure justice to a reasonable and sufficient degree have been exhausted; o (e) one's own moral standing is not decisively compromised with respect to the waging of war in this instance; o (f) even if the cause is just, the resort to war is actually motivated by that cause and not some other (hidden) reason; o (g) one is a legitimate, duly constituted authority with respect to the waging of war: one has the right to wage it; o (h) one must publicly declare war and publicly defend that declara- tion on the basis of (a) - (g), and subsequently be prepared to be politically accountable for the conduct and aftermath of the war, based on the criteria of jus in bello and jus post bellum.

2) Andrew Rigby, "Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum"

o It follows from this that any durable peace settlements should possess at least some of the following characteristics § 1) Inclusiveness: · "For settlements to be effective it is vital that they are supported by all the major players, particularly those with the resources to sabotage the process." § 2) Security: · "One of the most tangible features of any settlement must be the ending of large-scale violence and a corresponding increase in physical and psychological security. This can be facilitated in part by the provision of credible security guarantees to parties to the agreement, a role that can often be played effectively by third parties. It also entails the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants." § 3) Strengthening of the state: · "One of the major challenges facing post- war societies is the establishment of a working government that enjoys the legitimacy and the resources to begin to institutionalize non-violent ways of managing conflict whilst developing its capacity to provide security and other key services for its citizens." § 4) Economic reconstruction: · "To the extent that people experience tangible peace dividends, the likelihood of the settlement enduring is increased. Amongst the most important fruits of peace is the creation of employment and other economic opportunities." § 5) Socio-cultural repair work: § "War, particularly civil war, tears apart the social fabric of societies and leaves deep personal and collective wounds amongst victims and survivors. Unless the traumas caused by the horrors of war are addressed in a constructive manner, then the destructive memories from the past and associated cultures of violence and impunity will continue to be reproduced, with new generations determined to 'get even' and avenge the humiliation and the suffering, thereby undermining any efforts to repair relationships in the post-war society." · o Peace: § Durability of a peace process depends to a significant degree upon the implementation of certain structural and institutional changes in the post-war society. However, However, whilst such reforms are necessary dimensions of a durable peace, they are not sufficient in themselves to ensure the resilience of a post- settlement peace process. The crucial factor in this is the perception of significant publics, communities, opinion-leaders and other stake- holders that the unfolding peace process is sufficiently just for them to continue to lend it their commitment and resist whatever urge there might be to return to violence. A necessary element in facilitating the belief that a peace is 'just enough' is that the socio-cultural scars left by the war are addressed in a manner such that the pains of the past cease to dominate the present and open up the possibility of restoring some kind of constructive relationships between former enemies. Some insight into the nature of what might be called 'memory work', but which I prefer to characterize as 'forgiveness work', for reasons which should become clearer, can be obtained by exploring how people in general come to terms with painful memories of loss and suffering. o Dealing with the past: § How do people put the past behind them? How do they 'move on' in the sense of seeking to create a future which is not over-determined by particular traumatic experiences from their past? o Some people choose not to forget the pains of the past, but appear almost to embrace them—they remain 'pickled in their own past. o No single method of 'dealing with the past.' some people can forget, or exclude from the foreground of their consciousness, that which they do not want to remember § Difficult for people forget what they known—people don't want to forget what they know well. Their ability to forget what they do not want to know, to overlook what is before their eyes...it's challenging. · Some people are unable or unwilling to let go of the past. They can use the memory as a motivating force leading them to campaign for truth and justice. Ex. Gulf War veterans using experiences to push a message forward. · Others join with groups of fellow victims with whom one can share the memory of the suffering, hoping for some kind of solace through reexperiencing the pain and loss within a supportive group context. § The fact there is no single method of dealing with the past should sensitize us to the phenomenon that there is no singular 'past,' it is not some once-and-for -all set of events with an independent existence Out past is out historical memory or representation of our experiences. It is out re-membered past, and as such it is just one of a range of possible emphasized here is that the context of effort to achieve a peace that is 'just enough' to be durable, it is crucial that people construct and reproduce new memories shorn of the desires for revenge and retribution that can destroy a fragile peace. o Forgiveness and reconciliation § Vitale that people manage to deal with their sense of loss. Must become reconciled. · Reconciliation: in order to become reconciled to a loss as a way of dealing with the pasin of the past, it is necessary for them to reinterpret that past, look backwards through time with a lens that enable them to construct their memors in a manner that eases the intensity of feelings of hatred and bitterness, thereby opening ip the possibilitu ofor new relationship with those once deemed responsible of their suffering. o "Deep remembering:" a term by Geiko Muller-Fahrenholz uses to describe when people remain trapped within a memory of the pas that produces the old divisions and traumas. Such a situation has proves intractable when their vivid awareness of past attitudes and behaviors and the fear that these will be replicated in the future § Must redefine the past and create a new memory for the sake of the harmony of the community. Key feature of interpersonal forgiveness: the preparedness of the victim to distinguish between the perpetrator and the deed and thereby recognizing the humanity of the other. · "It is in this manner, through a reframing of the past—the creation of a new memory—that forgiveness can open up the possibility of a new relationship between those that have been divided. As Hannah Arendt phrased it, "Forgiveness serves to undo the deeds of the past." Agostino Giovanoli expressed a similar view when he wrote, 'Forgiveness is the state of a new memory, of a new kind of memory. o Conditions that facilitate interpersonal forgiveness § Central to acts of forgiveness, as mentioned above, is the preparedness to distinguish between the wrong committed and the person responsible for that wrong. Factors that make this redefinion of the perpetrator, and hence the construction of a new memory, more possible: · 1) acknowledgement and apology · 2) the promise not to repeat the wrong · 3) Offers to make amends—reparations o Requires time: § As Walter Benjamin observed: · "In order to struggle against retribution, forgiveness finds its powerful ally in time...time not only extinguishes the traces of all misdeeds but also - by virtue of its duration, beyond all remembering or forgetting - helps, in ways that are wholly mysterious, to complete the process of forgiveness"

1) Thomas Aquinas, "Second Part of the Second Part: Question 40, War"

o Italian Priest and Philosopher. Writes on questions of war in four parts: § 1) is some kind of war lawful? · All wars are unlawful, and war is contrary to peace and always sinful o Augustine says G_D does not forbid soldering o Aquinas reply: in order for a war to be just, three things are necessary § 1) the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. Private individuals cannot wage war § 2) a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because the deserve is on account of some fault. § 3) it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. · Though those who use the sword aren't always slain with the sword, they perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

2) Brian Orend, "Justice After War"

o Just and lawful war definition: according to just war theorists, one that was begun for the rights reasons, and that has been fought appropriately. The resort to war was just (just ad bellum), and only the right methods are used during the war (jus in bello). A war begun for the right reasons is a war fought in response to aggression, defined by Walzer as "any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another." It also requires that the war in question be launched as a last resort, be publicly declared by a proper authority, have some probability of success, be animated by the right intention of resisting aggression, and also be expected to produce at least a proportionality of benefits to costs—all of which have worked their way into various pieces of international law. § It must also be fought appropriately. For just war theorist this means obeying at least three things: · 1) discriminate between combatant (military)and noncombatant (civilian) targets and direct their armed force only at the former · 2) they may attack legitimate military targets only with proportionate force · 3) they are not to employ methods which, in Walzer's words, "shock the moral conscience of mankind. · The above are principle of jus in bello and jus and bellum which offer a coherent set of plausible values to draw on while developing an account of just war settlement. o The just goal of a just war must be a more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to war. To aim for the proverbial/assumed and literal restoration of the status quo ante bellum, is wrongheaded for two reasons: · 1) one ought not to aim of this restoration because the situation was precisely what led to war in the first place · 2) given the sheet destructiveness of war, any such literal restoration is empirically impossible. War simply changes too much. § We should instead aim for a more secure possession of our rights, both individual and collective: · "The general answer is a more secure possession of our rights, both individual and collective. The aim of a just and lawful war is the resistance of aggression and the vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities, ultimately on behalf of the human rights of their individual citizens. The overall aim is, in Walzer's words, "to reaffirm our own deepest values" with regard to justice, both domes- tic and international. It is not implausible to follow John Rawls in claiming that, in our era, no deeper, or more basic, political values exist than those human rights that justify a reasonable set of social institutions and ultimately enable a satisfying political existence." o "The principle of rights vindication forbids the continuation of the war after the relevant rights have, in fact, been vindicated." The very essence of justice of, in, and after war is about there being firm limits, and constraints, upon its aims and conduct." § Can't insist on unconditional surrender in most cases o A plausible list of propositions regarding what would be at least permissible with regard to a us settlement of a just war: § 1) the aggression needs, where possible and proportional, to be rolled back, which is to say that the unjust gains from aggression must be eliminated. § 2) The commission of aggression, as a serious international crime, requires punishment in two forms · A) compensation to the victim for at least some of the cost incurred during the fight for its right · B) war crimes trials for the initiators of aggression § 3) The aggressor state might also require some demilitarization and political rehabilitation, depending on the nature and severity of the aggression it committed and the threat it would continue to pose in the absence of such measures · Just war is something like radical surgery: an extreme yet necessary measure to be taken in defense of fundamental values, like huma rights, against serious, lethal threats to them, such as violent aggression o "Sufficient comment has already been offered on what the first proposition requires and why: aggression, as a crime that justifies war, needs to be rolled back and have its gains eliminated as far as is possible and proportional; and the victim of aggression needs to have the objects of its rights restored. This principle seems quite straightforward, one of justice as rectification...

3) Carsten Stahn, "Jus Post Bellum and Just Peace"

o Just post bellum § Origins in just war through · Minimalist: constrain just post bellum to the more immediate goal of ending conflict. According to this understanding, the process of building and consolidating peace should be assessed by different parameters. · Maximalist: argue that the right ending of conflict requires not only moderation, but positive measure towards a just, or even sustainable peace § Definition: · Just post bellum requires that: o "war crimes trials be held to punish those guilty of war crimes (formalizing the quasi- judicial function of war), that the victors take responsibility for governing the vanquished in cases where the latter's government collapses as a result of war . . . and that they take active measures to avoid sowing the seeds of future war by, for instance, assisting in the long- term economic reconstruction of the vanquished." · It is not simply a third element of Just War thinking, but a partly autonomous concept. This means that the justice of the peace should be evaluated independently of the justice of the war. For instance, even an unjust conflict may be settled by a just peace. · Peace for jus post bellum involves affective dimensions, namely that: o "the socio-cultural scars left by the war are addressed in a manner such that the pains of the past cease to dominate the present and open up the possibility of future co-existence be- tween former enemies" · Colleen Murphy says its (intersubjective) main goal is to contribute to the repair of the relationships damaged prior to and during the course of war such that political interaction is base dot a minimally acceptable threshold level on reciprocal agency. § Larry May's work identifies six post bellum principles: · 1) rebuilding · 2) retribution · 3) restitution · 4) reparation · 5) reconciliation · 6) proportionality · "Prevention is the common bond between just war theory, transitional justice, and peacebuilding. It treats peace as a continuum. It cuts across all three areas: ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum. It turns just peace into sustainable peace."

2) Lisa Cahill, "Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom of Christian Tradition"

o Luther: warrants war but, like Augustine, doubts the legitimacy of individual self-defense. § Also references Augustine. In regards to just war, cites TO and NT texts approving the sword or accepting the soldier's profession and, following Augustine, stresses civil order and peace, legitimate authority to declare war, the motive of love in seeking to restore peach and justice, and the nearly absolute obligation of the soldier to obey. · Rejects war spurred on by the church for religious causes. o Menno Simon and the Quakers: absolute pacifists § Menno is a Dutch priest § Quackers claim alongside Reformation pacifists, that the Kingdom makes possible a life in the gospel in which violence has not part. · It calls for a withdrawal from politics o Calvin: not only justifies war but also the defense of religion by civil authority · Far from considering that Christianity calls for withdrawal from politics, enlists civil authority in support of religion § "Calvin claims the warrant of Scripture to defend 'resort to arms' if the civil polity is 'hostilely assailed.' Like Augustine, he insists not only that war aim at a restoration of peace, but also that it be a last resort, and that it not be conducted with attitudes of hatred." o Puritans: some of whom carry this last point to the extreme of holy war § Like Calvin, thy understand Christianity to assimilate worldly institutions, which can give religion social and political stability. · "holy war" mentality submits that "just war" is also a religious cause under G_D's leadership. Puritans' passionate use of biblical warrants to exhort to almost unrestrained violence gives evidence of a mentality no unlike that of the twelfth and thirteenth century crusades against the Moslems in the Holy Land. o Grotius: secular jurist who tries to define the right of nations to war in a way that makes sense of the Christians; special obligations. § James Johnson notes that in mid-17th century the character of war changed. The relatively unified Christian society of the Middle Ages began to break down, Europeans made contact with non-Cristian people, the constitution of armies began to encompass the lower as well as the knightly classes, weaponry was improved, and hostilities increasingly existed between nations without any formal declaration of war. all of this required the adaptation of medieval just war theory § Grotius related gospel injunction and the law of nature coherently and convincingly, and "observes that if all persons were Christians, there would be no wars; and that wars are just only as responses to violence, which should not exist in the first place. Just wars and capital punishment both originate in "the love of innocent men" and are understood as responses to conflicts among the duties of love, specific justifications of and restraints in war derive from the common law of nations and the law of nature."

3) John Carlson, "Is There a Christian Realist Theory of War and Peace?"

o Much as Niebuhr facilitated the recovery of just war thinking, he also proleptically perceived the potential limits of the tradition, particularly a too rigorous, elaborate, and rigid application of just war principles · Christian realism is what Niebuhr inspires. It is primarily an interpretative theory that helps us to morally evaluate the deliberative processes we use and the limitations and errors of out moral deliberations. Its approach to war and peace differs from just war presumptions in that it does not assume that applying just war criteria more stringently necessarily yields more ethical decision-making processes or outcomes. Yet unlike just war classicism, a Christian realist ethic applies added pressure to that state to be more self-critical in its use of force and encourages citizens to reject political standards of justice established by the state as finally normative. Christian realism can help us interpret and reform these just war positions. § An accompanying principle: "Given the reality of evil that may require force to confront it, and given the reality of sin that limits the ability to conform human action to transcendent aspirations—resulting from finite human knowledge, the capacity for self-delusion, and the human propensity to overestimate that is in our control—do we make amends for, and do our actions preserve latitude to make amends for, errors we know we inevitably will commit in the political and military use of force?"

3) Walter Clarke, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention"

o Much of what went wrong in the Somalia operation can be traced to the schizophrenia of the Bush & Clinton administration when confronted with the fact that any intervention would deeply involve the United States in Somali politics. The international community should discard the illusion that one can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence without affecting domestic politics and without including a nation-building component. § In Somalia, there was no clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed. o Future of Intervention § Three lessons can be drawn from the Somalia experience · 1) Future intervenors must understand that there is no such thing as a humanitarian surgical strike. To be successful, the United State will have to discard the fiction that a large military force can or should be apolitical when it is supporting internationally agreed-upon political goals. · 2) defining a failed state. A new term is needed to express the idea that a state's fundamental institutions have so deteriorated that it needs long-term external help, not to institutionalize foreign control but to create stronger domestic institutions capable of self-government. · 3) the proper intervention forces must be developed

2) G.A. Harrer, "Cicero on Peace and War"

o No war is just, according to him, except one which is wages after demands for reparation have been made, or the war has been officially declared and proclaimed. § "Justice teaches you to spare all, to plan for mankind, to grant eve own, not to touch sacred or public or another man's possessions" § Treaties are inviolable

2) David Fidler, "Just and Unjust Wars, Uses of Force & Coercion"

o Of note, Stuxnet is the only existing example of cyber incident that approaches jus ad bellum, but states and terrorists could try to use cyber weapons to kill and destroy on a massive scale. § How do we evaluate acts of force or coercion short-of-an-attack during war? When we evaluate such acts, will we not look favorably on them compared to violent, kinetic attacks? Aren't we going to want, ethically, weapons that do not produce the death, injury, destruction, and damage that belligerents can legally inflict during war? · Even still, analyzing cyber warfare has a surreal quality at the moment because there has been no cyber warfare, at least not as just war theory describes war. o There are the Islamic State that integrates kinetic operation with cyber activities in its war-fighting, using social media to spread propaganda and recruit adherents. Its use of social media to wage war is unprecedented, and it has produced not only US cyber-attacks against the Islamic State's social media operations, but also US kinetic attacks against members of the cyber caliphate · In 2011, the UN security council authorized the use of force under the responsibility to protect (R2P) principles to protect Libyan civilians. o It includes the "responsibility to rebuild" after military intervention, which links with jus post bellum. Libya supports those seeking more attention on the transition from war to peace. NATO forces complied with jus as bellum and jus in bello, but the post-conflict phase tainted the notion that the intervention was a just war. Even so, how more emphasis on jus post bellum would have affected the decision to use military force or choices NATO made in waging war is hard to see. o The following exampled illustrate that forceful and coercive cyber actions and threat of such actions have become frequent § 1) Cyber Sabotage § 2) Cyber vandalism § 3) Cyber reprisal § 4) Cyber attrition § 5) Cyber espionage § 6) Cyber deterrence

1) Daniel R. Brunstetter, Just War Thinkers

o Offers introduction to the seminal figures in the historical development of the just war tradition. In doing so, provides a big picture look at the development of thinking about the ethics of war by means of a series of smaller pictures—contextualized "snapshots," as the editors term them—of individuals whose work has contributed to the development of the just war tradition in some way § 19 thinkers who have made come contributions · 1) Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BCE-4 BCE) o Cited by later authors as first just war thinker, though it can be argues that a recognizable just war theory did not emerge unit Aquinas in the 13th century o Many contributions to just war, especially in relation to his theory of natural law § Defines natural law: · True law is right reason, consonant with nature, spread through all peoples. It is consonant and eternal; it summons to duty by its orders; it deters from crimes by its prohibitions...There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another later, but all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law, and the god will be the one common master and general (so to speak) of all people. Hs is the author expounder and mover of this law. · Common divisions of the law, those things which are written and those which without writing are upheld by the law of nations or the customs of our ancestors...those law which are unwritten owe their force either to custom or to the agreements and at it were, common consent of men. o Discusses jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum § There are two types of conflict, the one proceeds by debate, the other by force. Since ethe former is the proper concern of man, but the latter of beast, one should only resort to the latter if one may not employ the former. Wars, then, ought to be undertaken of this purpose, that we may live in peace, without injustice; and once victory has been secured, those who were not cruel or savage in warfare should be spared. · Also, considered an inevitable part of life—a vehicle to rise in stature in society, a means to spread Rome's influence in the Mediterranean world, and a way to preserve her values and traditions from rivals and enemies.

2) Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum

o Part 1 · Deals with the nature of jus post bellum as a concept in different disciplines. § First subsection: · 1) Larry May connects current debates to the concepts of 16th-17th century theorists, developing a concept of justice in jus post bellum that is rooted in traditional humility and modern skepticism towards humanitarian wars and their aftermath—synthesizing practicality and the virtue of compassion. · 2) Mark Evans presents typology of jus post bellum conceptions ranging from the restricted to the extended, considering two pressing challenges: differentiating justice before and after the end of war and the tension between backward-looking and forward-looking goals after conflict. · 3) Dieter Fleck: emphasizes the differences in contents, purpose, and regulation between jus post bellum and other branches of international law—as a partly independent legal framework · 4) James Gallen looks at concept of jus post bellum as an interpretive framework—the extent such an understanding might avoid fragmentation between related fields in the transition out of armed conflict. § Second subsection: · 1) Jen Iverson contrasts Transitional Justice and jus post bellum in order to create a clearer definition and understanding of each, with a highly particular and concrete emphasis on the differentiated substantive focus, temporal aspects, geographical scope, legal or political nature, historical foundations, and current usage o Transitional justice can be helpful to study jus post bellum, but the transitional justice field needs to be refocused · 2) Stahn: challenges the assumption that just post bellum and the R2P are without tension, highlighting both reinforcing and contradicting tendencies. He posits that only with a polycentric vision of the international order can the relationship between the 2 concepts be properly understood. § Third subsection: · Eric de Vrabandere attacks just post bellum , asserting that tit tis limited both in usefulness and accuracy—considering post-conflict reconstruction as a result of the jus post bellum concept. · Roxana Vatanparast: warns of manipulation and instrumentalization of the legal framework by international actors, as well as the embedding and legitimation of neo-colonial projects through law. · Fionnuala Ní Aloáin and Dina Haynes give gender perspective on post-conflict frameworks, cautioning against an emphasis on a "universal" citizens and inquiring hoe jus post bellum might address the needs and challenges of women in conflict and post conflict settings.

3) Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum

o Part 2 § Interplay between jus post bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and peace. It rethinks the concept of "bellum," in particular its relevance to internal armed conflicts. · Christine Bell asks whether a new jus post bellum regime operating across different types of conflict is possible and desirable—in light of accrual peace negotiations and agreements to understand the importance of the chose goals of international law in the contemporary globalized context. Argues that while the discussion of the concept provides a useful way to explore gaps in how international law deals with peace settlements and the implementation issues they raise, it is neither possible nor desirable to develop emerging legal innovations into a fully-fledged legal regime. · Inger Österdahl argues that just post bellum is necessary in order to cope constructive with the consequences of armed conflict, and that the introduction of a systematic and comprehensive jus post bellum will challenge the traditional conceptual categories relating to the law on the use of force. Says it will create a more human-centered law of armed conflict. · Gregory Fox illustrates how jus post bellum could either be limited by a traditional state-centric focus or could pose a controversial constraint on both sub-state and inter- national organizations, including the United Nations Security Council · Kristen Boon suggests that in the context of non-international armed conflicts, jus post bellum should incorporate the idea of "bounded discretion" and should show deference to local authorities in certain areas · Astri Suhrke provides an incisive political science perspective that should fundamentally change the way scholars and practitioners approach jus post bellum o Part 3 § Deals with different dimensions of the conception and management of the "post" in existing scholarship and practice—three crucial aspects: · 1) the validity of the "conflict"/"post-conflict" distinction · 2) its role in defining the temporal scope of application of jus post bellum · 3) techniques and strategies used to deal with the uncertainties of the "post" in transitions o Part 4 § Examines the meaning of "just" in jus post bellum. It treats different notions of the "jus," including goals, "functional" meaning, and its relationship to norms and principles. Clarifies how the concept of jus post bellum influences the treatment of core principles of international law and international relations in situation of transition: for example, sovereignty, constitutionalism, gender, consent, democracy, environmental protection, and accountability o Conclusion § The creation/review of the "spectrum" of jus post bellum, featuring maximalist and minimalist conceptions. Hope that the concept will serve as an instrument to overcome some of the existing normative and disciplinary biases in the international order.

3) Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American Difference

o Part 3: § Attempt to develop an account of church as an alternative to war. In this section: "Catholic" names a people whose worship of G_D means they must recognize others who ma y well worship G_D in strikingly different ways. · Chapter 8 o Jesus: the justice of G_D · Some believe that "justice is justification"—recognizing the importance of social justice, but make the achievement of social justice secondary to individual entering into a saving relation with Jesus Christ. Such a view often presupposes satisfaction theories of the atonement in which Christs' death is through to render due the debt incurred by out sin. Yet this understanding of justice is individualistic, which makes it congruent with the politics of modernity. This understanding of justice displaced Jesus as G_D's justice because Jesus must be the victim of divine justice o The justice G_D must enforce turns our to be through secular and, in particular, retributive, in a manner that reinforces modern statist forms of politics. § In contrast, Paul argues that Jesus is no the victim of G_D's justice, but the very embodiment of G_D's justice through his faithfulness and obedience in manifesting G_D's unrelenting desire for reconciliation. o All who bear G_D's image possess an inherent right not to be murdered. · Chapter 9: Pentecost o Greatest single antidote to violence is conversation, speak out fears, listening to the fear of others, and in that sharing of vulnerabilities discovering a genesis of hope. · "many who assume the responsibility to create a better world in the name of eliminating suffering find that they themselves suffer from either doing too much or too little § It is in Christ we see out common humanity—a humanity that cannot avoid suffering if we are to be of service to one another. · Chapter 10: worldly church · Chapter 11: future of parish ministry · Chapter 12: The church is mission—beyond the boundaries

1) Carsten Stahn, Just Peace After Conflict

o Preface: § Book seeks to clarify the meaning and contours of just peace, its nexus of jus post bellum, and some of the ways in which it is produced—building on macro-principles identified by Larry May and analyses contemporary practice in the field. It argues the widest sense that just peace requires not only negotiation, agreement, and compromise (moderation), but understanding of law, multiple dimensions of justice, and strategies of prevention. o Introduction § Injustice = a perceived discrepancy between entitlement and benefits · Morally war should not end with any type of peace, but rather a specific form of peace—"better state of peace" or peace that is more just and more stable than the situation that led to the war in the first place o "just peace;" unjust war can never result in a just peace (what about Iraq?) o Kant promoted sustainable peace § Peace requires both ending of hostilities and guarantees of justice. § Peace and justice share ancient roots. It was developed in peacebuilding approaches and transitional justice, however, historically the two concepts have been in tension. Some challenges: · 1) seeking justice may prolong armed conflict or impede peace efforts · 2) evolution of the nature of the conflict. o Today's conflicts are mostly non-international or mixed, they included classical civil wars, that is, internal armed conflict between states and non-state actors, as well as conflicts between no-state actors. A just peace theory must accommodate the dynamics and particular difficulties of intra-state conflicts · 3) typology of violence § 4 approaches to just peace · 1) Approaches grounded in the just war tradition · Criteria have focused on termination of hostilities, exit from war, constraints on conquest, parameters of peace settlements, limits of occupying powers and justice after war. Brian Orend has established specific criteria for justice after war, including moderation in the termination of war (e.g., , exclusion of revenge), publicity of the terms of peace or proportionality of rights vindication. § Just war theory meant to supplement, rather than replace, just peace theory · 2) the peacebuilding tradition o Short and long term considerations of peace, UN

1) Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace"

o Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace among states: § 1) No peace treaty is valid if it was made with mental reservation that could lead to a future war § 2) No independent states, large or small, are to come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift. § 3) standing armies are eventually to be abolished · Makes peace more of a burden than a short war. § 4) National debts are not to be incurred as an aid to the conduct of foreign policy · Dangerous kind of money power § 5) No state is to interfere by force with the constitution or government of another state. § 6) No state during a war is to permit acts of hostility that at would make mutual confidence impossible after the war is over—e.g., the use of assassins and prisoners, breach of capitulation, incitement to treason in the opposing state. · The use of spies, for instance—though o Definitive articles for perpetual peace among states o The natural state of men is not peaceful co-existence by war—not always open hostilities but at least an unceasing threat of war. So, a state in which there is no danger of hostilities needs to be established, and this will have to involve more than merely the absence of hostilities. Real security against outbreaks of war is something that has to be pledged to each person by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state); without that pledge, each person may treat his neighbor as an enemy. o Thus, all men who can affect each other must stand under some civil constitution. There are three types: § 1) Constitutions that embody the civil law governing inter-relations amongst men in a nation-state § The constitution that embodies international law governing the inter-relations amongst the nation-state of the world § The constitution that embodies the law of world citizenship considered as citizens of a universal state of mankind.

2) Thomas Schelling, "An Astonishing Sixty Years"

o Presently: why couldn't a nuclear bomb no larger than the largest blockbuster of WWII be considered conventional, or a nuclear depth charge of modest explosive power for use against submarines far at sea, or nuclear land mines to halt advancing tanks or to cause landslide in maintain passes? § The analogy to "one little drink" of a recovering alcoholic was sometimes heard." · Conclusion: nuclear weapons, once introduced into combat, could not, or probably would not be contained, confined, or limited. § PNE's: peaceful nuclear explosions: the decisive argument against PNEs was that they would accustom the world to nuclear explosions, undermining the belief that nuclear explosions were inherently evil and reducing the inhibitions on nuclear weapons. § Important not to think that nuclear weapons alone have this character of being generically different, independent of quantity or size. Gases were not used in WWII. § Notion that to provide equipment much less participatory than to provide military manpower; we arm the Israeli military and provide ammunition even in war time, but so much as a company of American Infantry would be perceived as a greater act of participation in the war then $5 billion worth of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts. § The aversion to nuclear weapons—one might even say the abhorrence of them—can grow in strength and become locked into military doctrine even without being fully appreciated, or even acknowledged. § "Arms control is so often identified with limitations on the possession or deployment of weapons that it is often overlooked that this reciprocated investment in nonnuclear capability was a remarkable instance of unacknowledged but reciprocated arms control." o We were spared from temptation in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Iraq was known to possess, and to have been willing to use, "unconventional" weapons—chemicals...the military profession traditionally despise poison.

1) Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays

o Proposal on the means by which world peace can be achieved and maintained indefinitely. He believes in human progress and in world peace as destiny § In a nutshell, such a peace program involves the establishment of a federation of free republican nations that abide by the same international laws and agreement out of self-interest and ultimately out of duty. At that point, Kant argues, practical politics and morality will harmonize. Kant has faith the perpetual peace will be achieved, despite the tempestuous journey through which nature pushes humankind. He ultimately argues that humans are naturally aggressive and self-centered, but that reason can save and elevate us out of this brutal state into a moral one. o Summary: § Introduction · Kant is convinced that pereptual global peace can be achieve with the help of political theorists. In order to do so, the practical politician and the academic theorist must set aside their differences and work together. From here on, Kant's essay is thoughtfully structured into two main sections, the firs negative, the second positive. This is followed but two supplements and finally two appendixes.

2) Paul Ramsey, The Just War

o Ramsey argues that war can only be justified in defense against an overt act of aggression. It is the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from tyranny and oppression of the aggressor national § Only along these lines, war can, on occasion, be justified to the Christian conscience. In supporting the rights of the people to protect themselves against an unjust aggressor the author vindicates the principle of the rights of man: · As Pope JP II observes: "Peoples have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor...Deterrence based on balance, certainly not an end in itself but as a step on the way to progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." § Ramsey notes that "until there is a world community, there will be no actual world agreement as to justice." A world government is not possible under the modern nation-state system. In this multinational world, nations cannot get along with each other, although nuclear capabilities of the major powers necessitate cooperation. Our multinational world is characterized by the absence of guarantees of human rights, absence of judicial methods for the resolution of conflicts, and absence of moral distinctions between just and unjust use of force—the norms readily applicable and practiced in the governing of nation-states and the settlement of difference between its citizens. The responsibilities and powers of the state for maintaining the good of the citizen are not applicable for the good of the world community. · Ramsey thus recommends that the Western nations should increase forces in subconventional and conventional warfare, announce as a matter of policy that the West will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and maintain nuclear capability to stop unjust wars. o The indifference in the formulation of adequate laws at the international level, Ramsey attributes to the "grievously faulty" United Nations mechanism for the maintenance of peace and protection of human rights. § These observations are as naïve as the imperative that resort to force be forever banished!! For, it should be noted, the United Nations is not the agency to solve complex problems of general warfare and nuclear competition among major powers. And not the major powers alone, but practically all members of the UN organization are reluctant to take their case to the ICJ. To reconstruct an authoritative international order, one shall have to disband the nation-state system, which is almost an impossibility today. § To Ramsey, political action is always an exercise of power and purpose. The use of power and armed force is the "essence of politics." o Some more notes: § Because Ramsey believe "that one does social or political ethics by clarifying the doctrine, and because he believes that the Christian doctrine is the just war, these essay are an explanation and exposition of the just war doctrine. This leads to analyses of such issues as nuclear war, selective conscientious objection, intervention, and deterrence, counter-insurgency warfare, biochemical weapons, the role of the church in politics, and procedures for ethical analysis. Interspersed throughout are debates with numerous ethicists and pronouncements from various church groups. · He is speaking primarily to churchmen and not statemen: o He wants most of all for the church to be faithful to its mission and accurate in its articulation of Christian values. His warning is that the church is in danger of being captured by American culture. To avoid this "will require a Just-war theory of statecraft to take the pace of the policy of more and more war and the policy of more and more peace which are joined together like Siamese twins in the American ethos. § In providing an exposition of the ethical sanctions for war and yet how its destructiveness must be limited, Ramsey argues that both the use of nuclear weapons and the execution of counter-insurgency warfare can be justified. Wit primary attention on the traditional just-war standards of proportionality in the use of violence and avoidance of noncombatants, Ramsey persistently argues that US involvement in Vietnam qualified as a just war. The only exception was Ramsey's admission that an American bombing mission against a steel complex outside of Hanoi on 10 March 1967 was an unjust counter-society strike and not a justifiable counter-insurgency strike. Ramsey's arguments are well-informed and often very perceptive. However, his failure to see any significant discrepancy between the doctrine of the just war and the massive assault against both the land and the people of Vietnam is a puzzle to me, the E! To be sure, it is hard to comprehend how any reasonable interpretation of proportionality could condone the gigantic technological assault which the US unleashed upon the peasant villages and agrarian environment of Vietnam. The failure of such capable interpreters as Ramsey to apply the doctrine of the just war more prophetically has led many to unfortunate conclusion that this doctrine is either bankrupt or inapplicable to today's world.

2) Michael Walzer, Arguing about War

o Reflections on the war in Iraq are five pieces written between Sept. 2002 and November 2003. § He regards the war in Iraq as unjust because there were numerous other courses of action to achieve the goal of disarming Iraq (assuming there were WMDs). Moreover, the Bush administration never offered sufficient evidence to prove the Iraq was a threat or would become one. It is not enough to assert that someone is developing weapons, indeed most countries develop weapons, to justify a preemptive or a preventive war, we must show that such development would highly likely endanger "us." · He then goes on to argue that the war in Iraq cannot be justified on the ground that the Bush administration proposed. Since then, the justification that officials invoke is liberating the Iraqi people or else crushing Saddam's ability to produce dangerous weapons. This shift in justification, he notes, is an illegitimate one. o Citizens through their representatives approved the invasion on specific grounds and if these grounds were wrong then in order to restore legitimacy the administration must either withdraw the military forces or ask for another authorization based on this new argument. This point is worth stressing. Legitimacy of government actions is of utmost importance. The funds that Congress authorizes should fulfill the aims for which they were intended. § Nevertheless, Walzer argues that the US should do everything to win the war and that the victors are obliged to reconstruct Iraq (pg. 164). To justify this view, Walzer introduces a new turn in his ethical theory of war, namely postwar justice (pg. 18-22, pg. 162-128).

2) Garth Evans, "The Solution: From 'The Right to Intervene' to 'The Responsibility to Protect'"

o Responsibility to Protect § International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty launched in Sept. 2000 and wrote a research essay called The Responsibility to Protect. · Political effort to catalyze a debate, not just an academic exercise § The report · " Basic principles o A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. o B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. · Foundations o The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in: § A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; § B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; § C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law, and national law; § D. the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself. · Elements o The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: § A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. § B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. § C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. · Priorities o A. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it. o B. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

1) George Sabine, A History of Political Theory

o Reviews political ideas for a period of some 2,500 years; it begins with the Greeks before Plato and ends with Nazi Communist and Fascists of the 1930s. In the preface, he announces his general adherence to Hume's discrimination between allegations (or estimates) of fact, demonstrations of logical compatibility, and statements of valuation and predilection. Accordingly, he criticizes the natural-law theorist and other writers, such as Hegel and Marx, who attempted to fuse fact, logic, and value into single, coherent theoretical systems. § What he calls his "social relativism" is clearly formulated by him in the Preface: "It is impossible by any logical operation to excogitate the truth of any allegation of fact, and neither logic not fact implies a value. Consequently, he believes that the attempt to fuse these three operations, whether in Hegelian idealism or in its Marxian variant, merely perpetuated an intellectual confusion inherent in the system of natural law. The substitution of the belief that there is a determinate order of evolution or historical progress for the belief in rational self-evidence displaced an unverifiable idea with one still less verifiable. So far as there is any such thing as historical 'necessity,' it seems to belong to the calculation of probabilities, and in application this calculation is usually impossible and always highly uncertain. As of values, they appear to the author to be always the reaction of human preference to some state of social and physical fact; in the concrete they are too complicated to be generally described even with so loose a word as utility. Nevertheless, the idea of economic causation was probably the most fertile suggestion added to social studies in the 19th century.

3) Carsten Stahn, Just Peace After Conflict

o Roots and Branches § Aristotle for just war theory, Kant for jus post bellum o Just and lasting peace after war § "Wars are waged for the sake of peace. It is generally assumed that war has a teleological character; it not valued in itself but seen as an instrument to achieve a certain end.1 This instrumental conception of war is not only firmly entrenched in history but is also one of the pillars of just war theory. Just war theory is premised upon the idea that war, given the scale of overall destruction and death it causes, is a great evil. In an ideal world, there would never be war. However, just war theory is pre-eminently a non-ideal theory which recognizes that in the real world, war might be necessary and justified in exceptional circumstances. And although some essential moral principles are set aside in times of war, morality does apply. This way, just war theory occupies the middle ground between political realism and moral idealism and is a balance between the desiderata of feasibility and desirability. It sets a moral standard for war, in order to limit its negative consequences as much as possible. More specifically, jus ad bellum restricts the number of wars; jus in bello restricts the sort and scale of the violence, and jus post bellum is the relatively new branch that regulates the transition from war back to peace. The axiomatic goal of just war theory is a 'just and lasting peace'" o Just Post Bellum and proportionality § Proportionality simultaneously empowers war-fighters and imposes concrete restrains over the conduct of armed conflicts when properly applied. Jus post bellum considerations play an undeniable role in linking otherwise disparate invocations of the proportionality principle. Concepts of proportionality are amongst the most controversial imperatives in waging modern conflicts from the legal, moral, and political perspectives. o Reconciliation and just peace · Reparations = a remedy for a legal injury, owed when a state has breached an obligation under a treaty or customary international law § Argues that assessing how just post bellum contributed to reconciliation a necessary component of any emergent jus post bellum framework o Just Post bellum and the evolution of reparations § The obligation to provide reparations in relation to armed conflict at the present time is intended to implement principles of jus post bellum and to provide practical aid to assist the transition of war-torn societies to peace. § The evolution in reparations has occurred in parallel with the emergence of just post bellum as an increasingly coherent body of norms and practices. · Shift to the concept of peacebuilding, replacing score-settling between former adversaries: attention was refocused on using reparations to restore individuals and the environment so that society could rebuild, recognizing that environmental infrastructure—including hydrology, biodiversity, and soil—are important to the economy, culture, and the future.

2) Peri Roberts, "War and Peace in The Law of Peoples"

o So, Rawls is outlining an ideal for international politics of a Society of Peoples in a lawful condition governing themselves under a Law of Peoples and as part of a peaceful Confederation of Peoples (1999: 93). In this ordered international politics there is no space for war as a decision procedure, nor for war as punishment, extermination of enemies or as a teaching tool (TTP, 8: 346-7 and 356-7). Rawls also claims that such an ideal is at least possible given an assessment of the best available evidence when he places such store by the Democratic Peace Thesis that properly organized democratic states do actually find cooperative alternatives to war when they fall into dispute § To further the law of peoples: · 1) Assist societies whose institutions do not enable them to efficiently combat starvation and extreme poverty (Rawls 1999: 106). · 2) Respond with force in self-defence (or the defence of others) when subject to aggressive attack (unjust war) (Rawls 1999: 91). · 3) Potentially forcefully intervene in outlaw states to prevent mass murder and genocide (Rawls 1999: 93-4 n. 6). § Rawls finds war justifiable only in this transition from the non- ideal to the ideal (Williams n.d.: 1). The overarching hope of Rawls's non-ideal theory is to bring about a world in which there are no outlaw states, nor any societies burdened · Says that the aim of the Law of Peoples would be fully achieved when all societies have been able to establish either a liberal or a decent regime, however unlikely that may be. § So, Rawls' law of peoples can plausibly be understood in terms of its resonances with the five features of Kant's account § 1) like Kant, Rawls is treating war as a pathological condition to be eliminated, not as an unchanging fact of international politics § 2) although he does have a theory of just war it is clearly limited, and the use of force can be justifiable only in service of the transition towards the ideal § 3) this ideal, broadly shared by Rawls and Kant, is of a world characterized by a truly peaceful Society of Peoples. § 4) also, like Kant, achieving such a peaceful world is dependent on the existence of peoples whose internal politics is appropriately organized. § 5) the reform of international politics involved in bringing about the transition to a peaceful world requires the creation of a Con- federation of Peoples under a Law of Peoples that governs their interactions in an ordered and lawful manner o Rawls on International use of force/self-defense § "Decent but non-liberal peoples also have this right to self-defense on the basis that they 'also have something worth defending', a society that respects and honors the human rights of its members coupled with decent political arrangements motivated by a common good sense of justice (Rawls 1999: 92). The right to self-defense in both cases recognizes that unjust aggressive attack for gain, punishment or glory is an attack on the idea of a peaceful world regulated in an ordered and lawful manner. It is also an attack on the examples of well-ordered lawful regimes already existing in the world. For these reasons such attack can rightly be resisted." § Two situations in which, if subject to force, they may not rightly respond with force of their own. · 1) they might be subject to a war of self-defense by one or more well-ordered societies responding to that outlaw state's own aggressive attack on them · 2) there are circumstances in which they might be subject to intervention by well-ordered societies on the basis of their egregious and severe violations of human rights that persist in the face of actions short of forceful intervention, such as sanctions. § Supreme emergency · Conditions where constraint on waging war concerning respecting the rights of enemy combatants, limiting deliberate targeting of civilians for example, can be relaxed and civilian populations can be deliberately targeted. o Must satisfy two criteria: § 1) the imminence of danger: the threat to the community must be close and pressing § 2) the nature of the danger must be of an unusual and horrible kind, threatening the existence of the political community itself · When both of these criteria are met, political leaders are placed in a position where they will do what they must to save their own people and they may override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political community. o Perhaps it's not a threat to a particular community, and more likely a threat to civilized life, to the nature and history of constitutional democracy and on behalf of the world order.

1) Garth Evans, "The Solution: From 'The Right to Intervene' to 'The Responsibility to Protect'"

o Some of his thoughts: o 1990s set international thinking on new path. Breakthrough in 2001, when the international commission on intervention and state sovereignty (ICISS) introduced into the debate the concept of "responsibility to protect" § By 2005, UN General Assembly meeting unanimously and formally embraced it. o Concept of "human security" and "individual sovereignty" o Bernard Kouchner—popularized expression of "Le droit d'ingérence" or "humanitarian intervention" § "As the 1990s wore on, however, it became more and more apparent that while "the right to intervene" was a noble and effective rallying cry with a particular resonance in the global North, around the rest of the world, it enraged as many as it inspired. The problem was essentially that the concept remained so inherently one-sided, not in any way acknowledging the anxieties of those in the global South who had all too often been the beneficiaries of missions civilisatrices in the past. That concern was com- pounded, in the French-speaking world, by the fact that ingérence conveyed the sense not just of 'intervention' but 'interference.'" · Blair said: the most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstance in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts," and to do so ny bringing together a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish o This is why he said the Kosovo conflict was a just war, not based on any territorial ambition but on values o Human Security § UN Development Program's Human Development Report 1994 was an attempt to bridge the gap between North and South views of the world. Considered the preoccupations of developed countries with national boundaries and institutions, and military threats and responses, and of developing countries with feeding, clothing, sheltering, healing, and educating their populations. · Concept of human security arose, as a summation of seven different dimensions of security: o 1) economic o 2) food o 3) health o 4) environmental o 5) personal o 6) community o 7) political o Sovereignty as Responsibility § Belief in being respectful of a country's sovereignty, but the essence of being a sovereign country these days is not just protection form outside interference—rather it's a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their own citizens' welfare, and to assist each other. § Kofi Annan says: · "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent inter- national treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of human rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them" o From this came the birth of "The Responsibility to Protect"

1) Saint Augustine, City of G_D

o Started in 413 CE, a few years after the Sack of Rome, the text is Augustine's rejoinder to pagan conceptions of Christianity. In the aftermath of a disastrous and unprecedented attack on Rome by Vandals, many Roman citizens blamed Christians, saying that the pagan gods demanded sacrifice accusations not only by pointing out their inconsistency, but by mounting an attack on pagan religion—and providing a contrasting account of the consolations and truthfulness of Christianity o Book 1-10 § Examines the pagan system and finds it both ludicrous and self-evidently unhelpful. · Drawing on extensive study, he provides a thorough examination of the pre-Christian history of Rome, which was just as full of disasters, tragedies, plagues, murders, and calamities as post-Christian Rome, and wonders why pagans don't accuse their own gods of neglect. He also pours scorn on pagan religious ritual, in which pagans placate the gods with theatrical performances that Augustine sees as lascivious and immoral. Roman religious hypocrisy, he observes, is made clear in the fact that Romans see acting in these performances as a lowly thing to do. Why should the gods demand spectacles that even humans can see are somehow shameful? § In contrast to the Roman pantheon, which is full of scandalous behavior and provides no moral instruction, Christianity presents believers not only with clear ethical boundaries but with the promise of a better life to come. As Augustine explains it, the truth of Christianity is in the way it effects the hopes and behavior of believers. Christians have the capacity to go through horrific sufferings like the Sack of Rome (during which many were tortured and raped) with patience, and even allow pain to strengthen them. · Augustine finds a closer approach to truth in the Platonic philosophers, who see God as the Summum Bonum, the ultimate good and the ultimate reality. While Platonists get closer to the truth than most, discerning a monotheistic God, they flinch at the final step: the incarnation of Christ. Augustine provides a step-by-step examination of Platonism's successes and failures as a philosophy, landing at last on this central issue of embodiment. Platonists and Christians share a sense that the body and its worldly pleasures mustn't be put at the center of one's philosophy or morality, but the Platonists have a distaste for the body full stop. Christians, on the other hand, have the example of Christ: By synthesizing divine and human, mortal and immortal, Christ redeems what the Platonists can only reject o Augustine's central metaphor is of the City of God: that is, the heavenly city. The city has a dual nature. It's here on earth right now as the community of Christian believers, whose duty it is to renounce their pride, submit to the will of God, and transmit divine compassion on earth. But it's also in the life to come. No pagan god, demon, or spirit can take you there, Augustine argues: The only truth is the truth of Christ. § Book 1-3 · Lays out his book's premises, addressing his follower Marcellinus: o Intends to defend "the glorious City of God against those who prefer their own gods to the Founder of that City"—that is, pagan Romans (5). Many such Romans, Augustine writes, survived during the Sack of Rome by Christ's mercy, hiding in Christian places of worship that "barbarian" attackers did not enter. Some of these very people now wish to lay the blame for the Sack of Rome at the feet of Christianity, when in fact they should see their trials as God's way of improving their moral lives. § Notes concerning the despoilment of Minerva's temples for support. The men killed in those temples received no protection from Minerva: "The image did not preserve the men; the men were preserving the image" · Why adhere to gods that need human protection? o Notes that Virgil records pagan temples used, not as sanctuaries, but as prisons and treasure hoards, or sacked and despoiled during invasions. Meanwhile, Christian apostles' shrines were places to redistribute resources to those who needed them. The historical record makes it clear that pre-Christian temples were never special or off-limits during times of war. § Christian sanctuary

1) James Childress, "Just War Theories"

o Starting from out "historical deposit" of just-war criteria, now accessible in a number of fine historical studies, the text tries to determine what questions we need to answer in order to develop a coherent just-war theory and, indeed, to have usable criteria for policy-makers. § Two useful approaches to an ethical critique of just wars · 1) start from basic ethical principles and to ask what criteria of just wars can derived from them. o John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which treats just-war criteria within the context of a systematic theory of justice as fairness. Unfortunately, his treatment is very sketchy and mainly reaffirms the traditional criteria without establishing the links between them and his theory of justice. · 2) start from the just-war criteria that we have inherited and to criticize them in terms of consistency, coherence, and fidelity to fundamental ethical principles and values. § Just war criteria: · "following criteria frequently appear in comprehensive just-war theories: legitimate or competent authority, just cause, right intention, announcement of intention, last resort, reasonable hope of success, proportionality, and just conduct. All these criteria taken together, with the exception of the last one, establish the jus ad bellum, the right to go to war, while the last criterion focuses on the jus in bello, right conduct within war, and includes both intention and proportionality, which are also part of the jus ad bellum" o Some exceptions, for example, for tyrannicide § Bonhoeffer, a theologian put to death for involvement in 7/20/1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler, justified tyrannicide by some of the criteria of traditional just-war and just revolution theories despite his theological-ethical methodology that appeared to exclude rules and principles: · "His "operative guidelines," for which his theological-ethical methodology made no provision, included: clear evidence of serious misrule; respect for the scale of political responsibility and authority (those lower in or outside the political hierarchy should act only after others have failed); reasonable assurances of successful execution; tyrannicide as a last resort; minimal necessary force" · "In this sort of dilemma we justify sacrificing one prima-facie obligation to fulfil another only when we can answer certain questions: we need to know whether we have a just cause, proper intentions, a reasonable hope of achieving the end, a reasonable balance between probable good and evil, no other courses of action that would enable us to avoid sacrificing the obligation, etc. Thus the criteria for assessing wars and several other actions are similar because war and these other actions sacrifice some prima-facie obligation(s)—a sacrifice that must be justified along certain lines suggested by the criteria. While the fact that force is used is important, it is only one of numerous human actions that stand in need of justification because they sacrifice prima-facie obligations. Just-war criteria can be illuminated by the language of prima-facie obligations and the content of the particular obligations (not to injure or kill others) that the justification of war must override." o To hold that an obligation of duty is prima-facie is to claim that it always has a strong moral reason for its performance, although this reason may not always be decisive or triumph over all other reason. If an obligation is viewed as absolute, it cannot be overridden under any circumstances; it has priority over all other obligations with which it might come into conflict. If it is viewed as relative, the rule stating it is no more than a maxim or rule of thumb that illuminate but does not prescribe what we ought to do. If it is viewed as prima-facie, it is intrinsically binding, but does not necessarily determine one's actual obligation.

2) John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"

o Summary of The Laws of Peoples § A "law of peoples" developed out of "liberal ideas of justice." It also determines the attitude of political liberalism to non-liberal societies once a law of people has been developed form liberal principles. · This is to say liberal societies will respect non-liberal societies provided they adhere to the law of peoples. More specifically stated, liberal societies will tolerate a specific type of non-liberal societies: "well-ordered hierarchical societies. § Consider first that the conceptualization of liberal conception of justice begins with hypothetical closed and self-sufficient liberal democratic society and covers only political values and not all of life. · How can such a conception be extended to non-liberal societies? How can it be extended to future generations? How can it be extended to non-cooperative individuals? How can it be extended to animals and the rest of nature? In short, how can such a conception be universalized? o In most philosophical positions, the universalizing facto is often a source of authority: G_D. o However, the libera conception of "justice as fairness" is "constructed" through a "reasonable procedure" by working with relevant subjects" at different levels. This constructivist doctrine becomes universal when it produces the law of peoples that applies to the most comprehensive subject, "the political society of peoples" § Two parts to liberal conception of justice · 1) Domestic realm of liberal societies · 2) General realm of the political society of peoples § Both principles are derived from the "original position" § The law of peoples provides the conceptual tools with reference to which the law of nations (or international law) can be judged. This is the distinction between the law of peoples and the law of nations. · Extension of the liberal conception to the law of peoples proceeds in 2 stages: ideal theory and then, non-ideal theory o Ideal is strict compliance to the princoplees of the law of peoples, listed below: o The principles of justice between free and democratic people will include "certain familiar principles...among them the following: § 1) Peoples (as organized by their governments) are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. § 2) Peoples are equal and parties to their own agreements. § 3) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to war. § 4) Peoples are to observe a duty of nonintervention. § 5) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. § 6) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of war (assumed to be in self-defense). § 7) Peoples are to honor human rights." o Well-ordered hierarchical societies fulfil 3 conditions § 1) it is peaceful and gains its legitimate aims through "ways of peace" § 2) it imposes moral duties and obligations upon it members. § 3) it recognizes basic human rights · Fulfilling the conditions, even hierarchical societies can agree to a law of people that recognizes human rights. o Human rights § Based on consideration of huma rights, the war-making and population exterminating rights of the state has severely been limited. War is no longer an admissible state policy § They are not derived from comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines. They only express a minimum standard of well-ordered societies available to all members. · An imposition of moral duties and obligations makes the existence and acceptance of human rights possible. o One role of human rights is to circumscribe state sovereignty. § Human rights do the following · 1) legitimize regimes · 2) prevent forceful (even if justified) intervention by other people · 3) "set a moral limit to pluralism" among peoples o Now, consider non-compliant societies, or nonideal theory · Presupposes ideal theory and seeks to work towards it in gradual steps. 2 kind of nonideal theory o 1) outlaw regimes which refuse to comply with the law of peoples § Terror and coercion o 2) burdened societies or societies with unfavorable conditions that make their achieving well-orderedness difficult if not impossible § Lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and the resources, material, and technological, that make well-ordered societies possible. § With nonideal theory, must consider just war doctrine and the right to war o Fifth initial principle of equality of the Law of Peoples gives well-ordered peoples a right to war in self-defense but not, as in the traditional ac- count of sovereignty, a right to war in the rational pursuit of a state's rational interests; these alone are not a sufficient reason. Well-ordered peoples, both liberal and decent, do not initiate war against one an- other; they go to war only when they sincerely and reasonably believe that their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states § Below is a discussion of the content of the principles of the Law of Peoples for the conduct of war. § Well-ordered Peoples' Right to War: · No state has a right to war in the pursuit of rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests. The Law of Peoples does, however, assign to all well-ordered peoples (both liberal and decent), and indeed to any society that follows and honors a reasonably just Law of Peoples, the right to war in self-defense · Law of peoples as guide to foreign policy o A reasonable law of peoples guides well-ordered societies in facing outlaw regimes by specifying the aim they are to have in mind and indicating the means they may use or must avoid using. § To achieve long-run aim, they should establish new institutions and practices to serv as a king of confederative center and public forum for this common opinion and policy toward non-well-ordered regimes.

2) Samantha Power, "Bystanders of Genocide"

o Talking points: § Germany first, and Belgium (took over in 1919). § Hutu, Tutsi 14% § Economy 90% agricultural § Tutsi's were minority, but Belgians favored them. Hutu government in power, until 1994, Tutsi group that had been in exile invaded the country and tried to take a share of governance. § Arusha accords happened to govern relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. In 1994, HUTU president died in plane crash, and it was clear that Tutsi's had plans to eliminate adversaries. So, Hutus went on rampage, and genocide that is now known as Rwandan genocide. § No other outside support. Mayor said 5,000 more people may have really helped to prevent the genocide

1) Robin Lovin, Reinhold Neibuhr and Christian Realism

o The text is largely an American study—concerned with America social ethics. It has, after its introduction, five chapters § "As a Christian Realist, Niebuhr strongly affirmed America's moral responsibility to defend not just its own interests but also democracy and moral order in the world." · This includes political, theological, and moral realism o "We understand what Christian Realism is largely by identifying the many less adequate views that it is not. § The moral vision of the New Testament is rerated as a 'simple possibility.' It becomes a key point of Christian Realism that the ethics of Jesus cannot provide a social ethics. o The formulation of political realism suggests that we should not rely on moral argument alone to decide on political action nor should we overestimate the power of moral suasion to determine the course of events. § Introduction · Sets out what is means by Christian Realism. Lovin Illustrated by using Niebuhr's dialectic method of identifying Christian realism by reference to what it is not. Niebuhr's debates with Marxism, the social gospel, liberalism, natural law, and pragmatism are set in their historical context. Christian realism is shown to be not the same as political, moral, or theological realism because it is concerned to attend to all the forces at work in any given situation, including the limitations imposed by human nature and the possibilities open up by love. o Being realistic means taking all realities into account which includes the capacity of self-deception as well as living in hope of God's power. Christian realism therefore involves self-criticism and critical reflection in the attempt to discern what is going on. Here we meet the Niebuhrian themes of suspicion, self-interest and anxiety and the familiar criticism of all attempts to move from the ethics of Jesus to contemporary social ethics. Yet the relevance of the impossible ethical ideal of love abides. The Christian Realist tempers any pessimism with the hope that comes from faith in God. Hope in God is different from wishful thinking. 'Christian Realism teaches us how to do Christian theology in a modern intellectual world where critical consciousness makes us most suspicious of precisely those things we most strongly believe'

1) Brian Orend, "Justice After War"

o This article considers what participants should do as they move to wrap up a war. It will do so while drawing on the resources contained within the just war tradition, particularly its reworking offered by Michael Walzer's Since just war theory has played a constructive role thus far in its influence on political and legal discourse concerning launching and carrying out war, there is reason to believe it has light to shed on war termination. My goal is to construct a general set of plausible principles to guide communities seeking to resolve their armed conflicts fairly. § Few restrains on endings of wars. There has never been an international treaty to regulate war's final phase, and there are sharp disagreements regarding the nature of a just peace treaty. There are, by contrast, restraints aplenty on starting wars, and on conduct during war. These restraints include political pressure from allies and enemies; the logistics of raising and deploying force; the United Nations, its Charter, and Security Council; and international laws like the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Indeed, in just war theory-which frames moral principles to regulate wartime actions--there is a robust set of rules for resorting to war (jus and bellum) and for conduct during war (jus in bello) but not for the termination phase of war. Recent events in Afghanistan, and the "war against terrorism," vividly underline the relevance of reflecting on this omission and the complex issues related to it. The international community should remedy this glaring gap in our ongoing struggle to restrain warfare. The following facts bear this out: · 1) Recent armed conflicts—in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo—demonstrate the difficulty, and illustrate the importance of ending wars in a full and fair fashion. We know that when wars are wrapped up badly, they sow the seeds for future bloodshed. · 2) To allow unconstrained war termination is to allow the winner to enjoy the spoils of war. This is dangerously permissive, as winners have been known to exact peace terms that are draconian and vengeful · 3) Failure to regulate war termination may prolong fighting on the ground · 4) allowing war termination to be determined without normative restraints leads to inconsistency and confusion. o A) how can we try to regulate the first two phases of war—the beginning and middle—yet not the end? o B) the lack of established norms to guide the construction of peace treaties leads to patchwork "solutions," mere and hoc arrangements that may not meet well considered standards of prudence and justice. § "Peace treaties should still, of course, remain tightly tailored to the historical realities of the particular conflict in question. But admitting this is not to concede that the search for general guidelines, or universal standards, is futile or naïve." o The article: § First step is to answer the question: What may a participant rightly aim for with regard to a just war? What are the goals to be achieved by the settlement of the conflict? § "Concerning the assumption of "victor's justice:" The raw fact of military victory in war does not of itself confer moral rights upon the victor, nor duties upon the vanquished. In my judgment, it is only when the victorious regime has fought a just and lawful war, as defined by international law and just war theory, that we can speak meaningfully of rights and duties, of both victor and vanquished, at the conclusion of armed conflict." o Just and lawful war definition: according to just war theorists, one that was begun for the rights reasons, and that has been fought appropriately. The resort to war was just (just ad bellum), and only the right methods are used during the war (jus in bello). A war begun for the right reasons is a war fought in response to aggression, defined by Walzer as "any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another." It also requires that the war in question be launched as a last resort, be publicly declared by a proper authority, have some probability of success, be animated by the right intention of resisting aggression, and also be expected to produce at least a proportionality of benefits to costs—all of which have worked their way into various pieces of international law. § It must also be fought appropriately. For just war theorist this means obeying at least three things: · 1) discriminate between combatant (military)and noncombatant (civilian) targets and direct their armed force only at the former · 2) they may attack legitimate military targets only with proportionate force · 3) they are not to employ methods which, in Walzer's words, "shock the moral conscience of mankind. · The above are principle of jus in bello and jus and bellum which offer a coherent set of plausible values to draw on while developing an account of just war settlement.

2) George Sabine, A History of Political Theory

o Three parts § 1) The City-State · Context of political theory o Political theory and the evolution of man; political theory and political institutions; political theory as an attribute of Western Cultural Tradition; the development of civilization before the Greeks; the invention of political philosophy · The city-state o Social classes, political institutions, political ideals · Political Through Before Plato o Popular political discussion; order in nature and society; nature and convention; Socrates · Plato, the Republic o The need for political science; virtue is knowledge; the incompetence of opinion; the state as a type; reciprocal; needs and division of labor; classes and souls; justice; property and the family; education; the omission of law · Plato, the Statesman and the Laws · Aristotle, Political Ideals · Aristotle: political Actualities · The Twilight of the City-State

3) J. Bryan Hehir, "Just War Theory In a Post-Cold War World"

o War and politics are 2 principles which the just war ethic seeks to relate and direct o In the coming decade, two themes surfacing: another review of the ethical premise of the just war theory and a renewed emphasis on the political nature of the theory. § In Christian context, the review of idea that the just war ethic must continually be ready to review the premise of the theory—the conviction that lethal force merits moral support—is important because Christianity doesn't immediately do away with war. o Tension between Christin just war position: § "position: "The effort of moral reason to fit the use of military force into the objective order of justice is paradoxical enough; but the paradox is heightened when this effort takes place at the interior of the Christian religion of love" o "violence destroys what it claims to defend: The dignity, the life, the freedom of human beings (John Paul II 1979, 274)" § The pope goes on to say that "in the name of an elementary requirement of justice, peoples have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor. o Consider the following Catholic thought resource § "Entitled "Christian Conscience and Modern Warfare," the article has two purposes. It is a severe commentary against the Gulf War, and it uses this war as an example of why modern warfare will always violate traditional ethical restraints" To Johnson's question, "Can Modern War Be Just?" Civilta Cattolica answers in the negative o There are still enough revieing and revising abroad in both the empirical and ethical literature that a return to the premise of just war theory is likely in several quarters: § The decentralized, anarchic nature of international politics still stands for me as the reason why the just war argument must be retained. Still, it will not be retained in the 1990s without a new defense of its premise and a reassertion of the contention of Johnson and Murray that ethics and politics can limit modern technology. · It is perhaps the political character of the just war ethic which should be emphasized rather than its strategic dimensions o two examples: § 1) the ethics of deterrence § 2) targeting and intentionality o "In the legal paradigm, embodied in the legacy of Westphalia, the implicit ethic gave primacy to order and peace over justice and human rights. The status of sovereignty was protected, and the logic of the ethic held that in a world of sovereign states, one risked both chaos and war if the barriers against intervention were lowered. The moral case was utilitarian in character and politically conservative in its conclusions. The status quo was to be protected by law and policy. The wisdom of Westphalia should not be too quickly dismissed. It not only preserved sovereignty, but it also served as a protection for small states in a world of big powers. The protection of the small was never total, but since World War II, the new states have seen in the nonintervention principle a restraint they do not want weakened or removed. At the same time, the logic of Westphalia has left the U.N. human rights regime seriously impaired. It has allowed the international community to turn discreetly away from genocide in Cambodia and from Amin in Uganda." · Question at stake is whether recasting the ethic of intervention in a more activist mode could enhance human rights, prevent prolongation, and provide better criteria for humanitarian and development policies without simply increasing the control of the strong and wealthy over the small and poor states.

1) Walter Clarke, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention"

o While Somalia (Dec 1992-1994) should be important precedent for international intervention in the post-Cold War world, it is not clear the right lessons have been learned. This essay thus reevaluates the mission in the harsh light of the facts, separates and acknowledges the errors unique to the Somalia mission, and distills some guiding principles for other would-be intervenors. · "no massive intervention in a failed state-even one for humanitarian purposes-can be assuredly short by plan, politically neutral in execution, or wisely parsimonious in providing "nation-building" development aid." o "Nations do not descend into anarchy overnight, so intervenors should expect neither the reconciliation of combatants nor the reconstruction of civil societies and national economies to be swift. There is an inescapable reciprocity between civil and military goals. Military commanders can- not expect a failed state to become inherently peaceful and stable and their efforts to be worthwhile in the long run without the work of developmental and civil affairs experts. Likewise, humanitarian workers must recognize that the relief goods they handle in failed states can become the currency of warlords" § The most common charge about the Somalia intervention is—"the mission changed" o Perhaps a reaction of when the US attempted to distance themselves from the tragedy by blaming the UN § UN gained control of the mission in May 4, 1993—but still steered by US. Only after the October 1993 firefight did the US try to wash its hands of an operation that is had started and almost entirely directed. As one international civil servant said, the UN was "seduced and then abandoned" by the United States.

1) G.A. Harrer, "Cicero on Peace and War"

o Written during the first World War. essay presents the views of one man at one period—Cicero in the first century before Christ—and his throughs on peace and war. § "Rashly to engage in line of battle and hand to hand to fight with an enemy is somehow monstrous, and like the actions of wild beast" o What are the proper reasons for war, in Cicero's view? · ""Now since there are two ways of contesting for a decision, one by discussion, the other by force, and since the former is proper for man, the latter for beasts, one should have recourse to the latter only if it is impossible to use the former. Wars then are indeed to be waged for this reason, that without wrong life may be lived in peace [ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur]."2 In the De republica he states, "Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without cause. Now without a purpose to punish wrong [ulciscendi] or to beat back an attacking enemy, no just war can be wage.

2) Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War and Peace

o is concerned with the reasons for making war, for fighting with restraint, or for repudiating war as an instrument of policy, as these issues are understood within six distinct and important ethical perspectives. Its premise is that there is more than one way of looking at the ethics of war and peace, and that to understand the topic is, in part, to understand these alternative views. A few words about how we have approached our task may help the reader to understand the substantive chapters that follow this introduction. · Book is focused more narrowly on the ethical aspects of war and peace. It contributes to the newer tradition of scholarship by taking an explicitly comparative approach to the study of religion of international ethics. o It explores the reasons for waging war and for fighting with restraint as fomulated in a variety of ethical traditions, religious and secular; beginning with the classic debated between political realism and natural law, it seeks to bring int the voice sof Jusdaims, Islam, Christina pacisfms and contemporary feminism. Both authors address the same set of questions: What does "war" mean? § First order discourse that goes on inside a moral tradition seek primarily to elicit the implications for conduct of a particular system of values. In contrast, the dialogue in the book constitutes a second-order discourse, designed to clarify how recurrent questions of war/peace ethics are handled in different ethical systems. · Questions for conceptions of peace and war, as these are understood withing each perspective: What types of peace and war can be distinguished? How are they related? What attitudes toward peace and war are reflected in these conceptions? Is there a presumption against war, and if so, on what is it based? To what extent is it morally proper to adopt nonviolent, pacifist, or abolitionist attitudes? · Questions for reasons for waging war: What grounds for war, if any, are recognized within each perspective? What criteria distinguish justifiable from unjustifiable wars? Do intentions matter? How important is one's internal motive or the spirit in which one acts? Are acts of war rendered unjust if done for the wrong motives? And because wars can occur within as well as between communities, how should we think about the ethics of civil war? Which situations, if any, warrant armed resistance or conscientious objection? · Questions for the conduct of war, once the fighting has begun: What constraints apply to military conduct? Are these merely prudential constraints, or do they have moral force? How can respect for moral principles be reconciled with a concern for consequences? Can one ever be excused from observing constraints on the conduct of war? In particular, can these constraints be overridden in emergencies that threaten to destroy a community? What does a commitment to peace re- quire of those who must decide when and how to fight?

3) Thomas Schelling, "An Astonishing Sixty Years"

§ "Are we witnessing a gradual sanctification of Hiroshima (but not Nagasaki) was fortunate. "are we witnessing a gradual sanctification of Hiroshima—that is, the elevation of the Hiroshima event to the status of a profoundly mystical event, an event ultimately of the same religious force as biblical events? I cannot prove it, but I am convinced that the 40th Anniversary of Hiroshima, with its vast outpouring of concern, its huge demonstrations, it wide media coverage bears resemblance to the observance of major religious holidays. This sanctification of Hiroshima is one of the most hopeful developments of the nuclear age." o The next possessors of nuclear weapons may be Iran, North Korea, or possibly some terrorist bodies. Is there any hope that they will have absorbed the nearly universal inhibition against the use of nuclear weapons will at least be inhibited by the recognition that the taboo enjoys widespread acclaim. § Terrorists will conclude—I hope they will conclude—over weeks of arguing, that the most effective use of the bomb, from a terrorist perspective, will be for influence. Possessing a workable nuclear weapon, if they can demonstrate possession—and I expect they will be able to without actually detonating it—will give them something of the status of a nation.

2) Walter Clarke, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention"

§ "The distinction The distinction between humanitarian intervention and nation- building that is central to so many critiques of the Somalia operation and intervention is problematic." · The implication of those who support only humanitarian intervention is that Somalis were starving because of an act of nature. But the famine that gripped Somalia in 1992 resulted from the degeneration of the country's political system and economy. · A Summary of the crisis: Imported food was being stolen by gangs and merchants and when the US troops intervened in December 1992 to stop the theft of food, they disrupted the political economy and stepped deep into the much of Somali politics. By reestablishing some order, the U.S. operation inevitably affected the direction of Somali politics and became nation-building because the most basic component of nation-building is an end to anarchy. The current conventional wisdom that draws distinctions between different types of intervention and stresses the desire to avoid nation-building may be analytically attractive, but it is not particularly helpful. How could anyone believe that landing 30,000 troops in a country was anything but a gross interference in its politics? The Mogadishu line was crossed as soon as troops were sent in.

3) Lisa Cahill, "Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom of Christian Tradition"

§ "They differ in the way in which this insistence is articulated. Augustine most stringently prohibits self-defense; Luther prohibits it also if it is genuinely self-defense, but he allows that there is an area in which one's own interests may be bound up with those of others and in which resistance to evil may therefore be justified. Grotius puts the civil order in a more positive light than either Augustine or Luther and mentions the establishing of the Kingdom in history through the Spirit (though this is not a major theme). He suggests that Christianity ought to transform both public and private actions, of community and of individual. For both agents, Christianity puts definite limits on the fundamental natural right to self-defense, without excluding it completely. Thomas Aquinas differs from all of the above by presupposing that the Christian has no substantive moral obligations which differ from those of the citizen as such. The exhortations of Christ regarding nonresistance and nonviolence become supererogatory ideals, and justice is the fundamental norm of social action. Violent aggression may require a violent response, though not a disproportionate one." · "Justification of war in Christian tradition has been primarily based upon either an appeal to the natural moral law, love of the innocent neighbor, or a combination of both. The New Testament is used to show that participation in political institutions is at least not condemned, with the "hard sayings" being transferred to some level of limited applicability. For both pacifists and just war theorists, the Old Testament is seen as a merely secondary source. The incidence of violence in it is either virtually equated with that necessitated by the natural moral law; or, more frequently, its religious context and significance is recognized, but it is interpreted with the use of some hermeneutical principle (such as allegory or the three senses of Scripture) which permits the interpreter to lift out from descriptions of divinely approved violence some "essential" meaning such as God's grace and protection of his covenant people. To a somewhat lesser extent, the New Testament is understood by means of similar principles. For instance, the pacifist will argue that the "sword" which Jesus brings is a spiritual one, while the just war theorist will argue that "turn the other cheek" represents an attitude of forbearance. Perhaps such efforts to bring unity out of diversity are not all that dissimilar to our own. For all, the tension between Kingdom present and Kingdom future (to use modern terminology) pervades appeals to biblical authority. The dividing question is whether the Kingdom's peace can characterize history, or whether peace waits upon establishment of justice, even if by coercion and even if by violence"

1) Brian Orend, "Kant's Ethics of War and Peace"

§ "This essay explores Kant's writings on war and peace, and concentrates on the thesis that Kant has a just war theory. It strives to explain what the substance of that theory is, and finds that it differs in several respects from that offered by the just war tradition. Many scholars suspect that Kant has no just war theory. Effort is made to overturn this conventional understanding: first by showing, negatively, that Kant does not subscribe to the two main rival doctrines on the issue, namely, realism and pacifism; and second by demonstrating, positively, how the core propositions of just war theory are consistent with Kant's basic moral and political principles. Interpretive reconstruction then reveals the full substance of Kant's just war theory, which is divided into accounts of jus ad bellum , jus in bello and jus post bellum . Kant's jus post bellum reflections remain his most deep, original and relevant in this regard." o The focus of this thesis is that Kant does have a just war theory, despite traditional understandings. Let's begin · One prominent anti-just war quote occurs in Perpetual Peace, when Kant reflects on the contributions of traditional just war theorists and famously arrives at the following judgment: 'It is therefore to be wondered at that the word right [or justice] has not been completely banished from military politics as superfluous pedantry, and that no state has been bold enough to declare itself publicly in favor of doing so. · Kant also says that international right becomes meaningless if interpreted as a right to go to war. o These statements alongside his insistence on the destructiveness of war in general, and his core notion that the international state of nature is unjust and thus must be exited, both add credence to the anti-just war interpretation of Kant. § This paper is going to prove that the above quotes can be reconciled with the claim that Kant has a just war theory, albeit his own rather unique kind. · Despite the presence of Perpetual Peace, Kant is not an extreme passivist. o There are three approaches to war: Pacificism, Realism, and Just War Theory Class notes from IGA 220: · 3 Broad Moral Traditions o Pacifism and nonviolence: denial of moral legitimacy of use of force. Different from non-violence. Says war and morality are contradictory terms § War outside moral universe: expelling war from moral consideration o Classical realism: no room in evaluation of war fare for a moral/ethical perspective, understanding position of adversary, no room for arguments about restraint. § War outside universe: denying the significance of moral reflection when thinking about war and peace. o Just War Ethic: Childress § Jus ad bellum (right to go to war)/Jus in bello (how to fight in war) · Develop over time to include just post bellum § Presumption/exception mode of argument: · War as a rule governed exception, locating war in moral order o 1) presumption exception model à Childress prima facia rule, which binds you in certain case, but admits exceptions. o 2) defining rationally/morally defensible exception § 3 questions: why, when, what, how (jus in bello) o 3) like 16ish § Absolute principle, the direct intentional taking of human life is always wrong · Ford: read as extension about how Just in bello, how question · Just war may have been applicable before nuclear world o Add a subset: nuclear passivist

1) Thomas Schelling, "An Astonishing Sixty Years"

§ "conflict and cooperation" o Studies bargaining theory and looks at nuclear strategy as his subject. Notes in this text that the most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed 60 years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger. § "The weapons remain under a curse, a now much heavier curse than the one that bothers Dulles in the early 1950s. These weapons are unique and a large part of their uniqueness derives from their being perceived as unique. We call most other weapons "conventional," and that word has two distinct senses. One is "ordinary, familiar, traditional," words that can be applied to food, clothing, or housing. The more interesting sense of "conventional" is something that arise as if by compact, by agreement, by convention. It is simply an established convention that nuclear weapons are different. · "This attitude, or convention, or tradition that took root and grew over these past five decades is an asset to be treasured. It is not guaranteed to survive; and some possessors or potential possessors of nuclear weapons may not share the convention. How to preserve this inhibition, what kinds of policies or activities may threaten it, how the inhibition may be broken or dissolved, and what institutional arrangements may support or weaken it, deserve serios attention. How the inhibition arose, whether it was inevitable, whether it was the result of careful design, whether luck was involved, and whether we should assess it as robust or vulnerable in the coming decades, is worth examining. Preserving this tradition, and if possible, helping to extend it to other countries that may yet acquire nuclear weapons, isas important as extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." § First occasion when they would have been used again was early in the Korean War. Americans and South Koreans had retreated to a perimeter around the southern coastal city of Pusan and appeared in danger of being unable to hold our or to evacuate safely § In 1953, National Security council document states "in the event of hostiles, the US will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions · The antinuclear movement in the Kennedy Administration, led by the Pentagon, and in 1962 McNamara began his campaign to reduce reliance on nuclear defense in Europe by building expensive conventional forces in NATO

2) Robin Lovin, Reinhold Neibuhr and Christian Realism

§ 1) G_D—further explores Niebuhr's theological realism and its relationship to distinctive currents in American Protestant through · Takes the question of whether the idea of G_D makes any practical difference to out account of human experience. Niebuhr knew the difficulty in arguing publicly for moral choices based on a distinctive view of G_D by he sought to show the difference it makes to affirm that G_D is the center of meaning in a morally coherent universe. Christian Realism holds to belief in G_D as the transcendent center of value. This implies that any confidence we may have cannot ultimately be based in our theology or our moral assessments and decisions. There is a necessary modesty that belongs with the theologian who, believing in God, trusts that this is a morally coherent universe. It is not possible to prove this claim, but it makes it possible to disturb any who seek to impose their own interests in the name of religion or morality claiming them to be the final goal of life and meaning. o Niebuhr was always aware that his century saw two world wars, totalitarian states, and the wielding of fearful economic power by and in the 'free world'. Coherence is a key term as Niebuhr developed his arguments for Christian pragmatism, but he insisted on the limits of perceived coherence. The moral life is only possible in a moral universe so the resolution of conflict is possible but, before overconfidence leads us astray, we must acknowledge that paradoxically the most coherent theological statement will be the one that includes an element of incoherence. So, although the reality of God means that love and not prudence is the law of life, and since we do not have God's own eye view, there is a proper modesty that belongs to our affirmations, a modesty in keeping with biblical faith in God. § Thus, the first task of the theologian is not to announce from the blue the divine command so much as to make sense of what is going on. As such, an adequate Christian ethic must appeal to all thoughtful people and include their insights. Faith in G_D is a resource for the deeper and wider systems of coherence that makes possible the kind of moral insights for which Niebuhr was justly famed. The Christian Realist therefore is an apologist not simply in the sense of answering questions but, as importantly, in questioning the questioners to unmask the interests that lie behind their questions. And that includes the questions that religious believers put to others. Lovin's ability in showing how Niebuhr used Christian symbols to explore and illuminate the human condition is among the most impressive aspects of the book.

2) Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace"

§ 1) The civil constitution of every state is to be republican · Its established by principles of the freedom of the members of society (as human beings); and by principles of everyone's dependence on a single common system of law (as subjects); and thirdly by the law of their equality (as citizens). § 2) the law of nations is to be founded on a federation of free states · Bearing peaceful, rational freedom that they can have If the submit to a lawful constraint under laws established by themselves § 3) The law of world citizenship is to be united to conditions of universal hospitality o Two additions § 1) nature as a guarantor of perpetual peace · Some notes o 1) Even if a people weren't forced by internal discord to submit to constraint by public laws, war would compel them to do so, in the way I have described: nature places each people near some other that presses on it, and it must form itself into a ·law-governed· state in order to defend itself against this neighbor. o 2) The idea of international law presupposes the separateness of many independent by neighboring states o 3) Jus as nature wisely separates nations that the will of every state would gladly unite by subtlety or by force, under the cover of international law, so also it unites, by harnessing everyone's self-interest, nations that couldn't have secures themselves again violence and war by means of any appeal to a law of world citizenship § 2) the secret article o Two appendices: § 1) the friction between morality and politics regarding perpetual peace · Morality is practical: it is the totality of unconditionally commanding laws that we ought to obey · Some maxims of Kant o 1) act first, then justify o 2) if you did it, deny that you did o 3) divide and conquer

3) James Childress, "Just War Theories"

§ 2 & 3) The requirements of reasonable hope of success and proportionality are closely related. If war has no reasonable chance of success, it is clearly imprudent. But more than a dictate of prudence is involved in the demand for a reasonable hope of success. If none of the just and serious ends, none of the other prima-facie obligations, could be realized or fulfilled through the war, a national should reconsider its policy, which, after all, involves overriding stringent prima-facie obligations. § 4) Regarding proportionality: it can never be right to resort to war, no matter how just the cause, unless a proportionality can be established between military/political objective and their price, or unless one has reason to believe that in the end more good will be done than undone or a greater measure of evil prevented. § 5) the las major criterion of jus and bellum is right or just intention (which along with proportionality is very important in particular battles, engagements, and acts within war and not merely for the war as a whole). For the war as a whole, right intention is shaped by the pursuit of a just cause. But it also encompasses motives. · Another interpretation of right intention focuses on peace as the object or end of war. It too bridges the jus and bellum and jus in bello. Peace does not require mutual goodwill; it at least requires some trust and confidence. Thus perfidy, bad faith, and treachery are ruled out in part because they are destructive of the ultimate object of peace o There's also a prima-facie obligation not to injure or kill others. Since its not cancelled event when it is overruled, its impact can be seen in various restriction of the jus in bello. · 1) the immediate object is not to kill or even to injure any particular person but to incapacitate or retrain him/her. · 2) directly to attack noncombatants is not legitimate · The original prima-facie obligation not to injure others also excludes inflicting unnecessary suffering. · 3) even the indirect, incidental, or obliquely intentional effects on civilians must be justified by the principle of proportion. o So, how can one recognize an unjust and/or unjustified war? § 1) Some argue that meeting each criterion is necessary for a just war; each is necessary, and all are collectively sufficient. Thus, the inability to meet any single criterion, such as last resort, renders a war unjust § 2) another approach would be to hold that a just war must "more or less" meet or approximate the criteria. No particular criterion is absolutely necessary, but at least several must be met for a war to be just and justified § 3) another approach would offer a serial or lexical ordering of the criteria so that some must be met before others can even be considered. § 4) approach could consider all or some of the criteria as stablishing prima-facie duties, which would then follow the logic already sketched in this essay. § 5) approach could consider the criteria as "rules of thumb" or "maxims" that identify some morally relevant considerations. o Paul Ramsey prefers to translate justum bellim as "justified war" rather than "just war," in part because he does not think that a substantive theory of justice in relation to ends can be developed or that one side can legitimately claim justice while denying it to the other.

3) Robin Lovin, Reinhold Neibuhr and Christian Realism

§ 2) Ethics & 3) Freedom—discuss Christian realism's moral realism, relating it more clearly to other versions of ethical naturalism and to natural law thought, and contrasting it to the dominant versions of moral rationalism and moral relativism in religious ethics today § 4) Politics & 5) Justice—return to the testing of theological and moral insights against the multiple demands of politics and lead us toward a more synthetic statement about justice and love with the which, chapters are brought to an end. o The book is important for several reasons, including the way in which Lovin comments on the argument of Niebuhr's critics leads to new appreciations of both the force of the criticism and the position of Niebuhr too. · Example: Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas press the question of why Christians should take political concerns seriously, anyway, charging Niebuhr with an inadequate doctrine of the Church and its calling. They stress the need for Christian community and its retelling of the crucial story which is absolutely necessary for the formation of Christian character. o Niebuhr was more alert than some contemporary Christians to the need for careful analysis of the forces shaping out common life. His conviction was that the prophetic religious symbols gave a true account of the human situation, full of grief and glory. These religious symbols indicated and expressed the 'deeper dimensions of history.' § Lovin make the point the Niebuhr's contribution would not have been so valued had it been simply an expression of secular opinion in religious dress. He brought distinctive religious ideas to bear on public moral issues but not from some distant realm.

3) Reinhold Niebuhr, "Part III: Love and Justice in International Relations"

§ 2) Is it not time to move into a post-Niebuhrian period on the issues of war and peace? · He's made obsolete a pacifism based on a too sentimental theology, has not history made obsolete a non-pacifism based on neat calculations of justice?

2) Thomas Aquinas, "Second Part of the Second Part: Question 40, War"

§ 2) is it lawful for clerics to fight? · Warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for 2 reasons o 1) warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of G_D, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric o 2) all clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the passion of Christ is represented sacramentally § So, it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.

3) Thomas Aquinas, "Second Part of the Second Part: Question 40, War"

§ 3) is it lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? · The object of laying ambushed is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in 2 ways o 1) through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful o 2) because we do not declare out purpose or meaning to him. We are not always bound to do this § Thus, among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war. § 4) is it lawful to fight on holy days? · The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. However, as soon as the deed ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day.

3) Brian Orend, The Morality of War

§ 6) Jus post Bellum #1: Justice after War · The riles o Proportionality and Publicity: The peace settlement should be both measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. To make a settlement serve as an instrument of revenge is to make a volatile bed one may be forced to sleep in later. In general, this rules out insistence on unconditional surrender. o Rights Vindication: The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty. This is the main substantive goal of any decent settle- ment, ensuring that the war will actually have an improving affect. Respect for rights, after all, is a foundation of civilization, whether national or international. Vindicating rights, not vindictive revenge, is the order of the day. o Discrimination: Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post- war measures. This rules out sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment. o Punishment #1: When the defeated country has been a blatant, rights- violating aggressor, proportionate punishment must be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular, should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. o Punishment #2: Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers, from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation and possible trial. o Compensation: Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. A post-war poll tax on civilians is generally impermissible, and there needs to be enough resources left so that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction. To "beggar thy neighbor" is to pick future fights. o Rehabilitation: The post-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible—as I'll argue next chapter—but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime. They may involve: demilitarization and disarmament; police and judicial re-training; human rights education; and even deep structural transformation towards a minimally just society governed by a legitimate regime. § "In short, there needs to be an ethical "exit strategy" from war, and it deserves at least as much thought and effort as the purely military exit strategy so much on the minds of policy planners and commanding officers. The terms of a just peace should satisfy all these requirements." § 7) Jus post Bellum #2: Coercive Regime Change · Recipe for transforming defeated, right-violating aggressor regimes into stable, peaceful, pro-rights societies is: o 1) adhere diligently to the law of war during the regime take-down and occupation o 2) purge much of the old regime, and prosecute its war criminals o 3) Disarm and demilitarize the society o 4) Provide effective military and police security for the whole country o 5) Work with a cross-section of locals on a new, rights-respecting constitution which features checks and balances o 6) Allow other, non-state associations, or 'civil society,' to flourish o 7) Forego compensation and sanctions in favor of investing in and rebuilding the economy o 8) If necessary, revamp educational curricula to purge past propaganda and cement new values o 9) Ensure that the benefits of the new order will be concrete and widely, not narrowly, distributed. o 10) follow an orderly, not-too-hasty exit strategy when the new regime can stand on its own two feet. · "The war winner occupies a position of enormous power and there- fore trust, and is duty bound to follow the recipe and to work with and nurture local leadership. The locals, for their part, must commit themselves to peace, to good faith interaction with each other and, above all, to the development of a minimally just regime. Some resistance should be expected, and the huge difficulties acknowledged—perhaps only partial realization of the ideal is possible. That is still better than nothing—or worse, not even trying—and in fact might be a reasonable definition of progress in such difficult circumstances" § 8) Evaluating the Realist Alternative · Best thought of as a healthy and needed antidote to those who-whether out of a secure upbringing, little contact with distant strangers or blinkered ideology—simply expect too much of flawed people behaving in an insecure environment. o Taken from its wisdom, just war theory gets just ad bellum and its principles of "last resort; probability of success; and proportionality. § 9) Evaluating the Pacifist Alternative · Can be incorporated into just war theory, just as parts of realism were. Pacifism and just post bellum can find many common causes and support for reform, and pacifism reminds us of ultimate ideals most reasonable people would like to see realized. Thus, it provides rich source material for the last resort rule in jus ad bellum.

2) J. Bryan Hehir, Liberty and Power

§ Beyond these key tests even more pluralism could be found on judgments of "last resort" and proportionality · They're dependent on assessments of empirical data, and they were particularly difficult to invoke because the speed and fury of some of the internal conflicts (Rwanda uniquely) meant that hesitation could defeat the entire enterprise of rescue · 5) all interventions are tested by the "just means" principles, both during the military operation and retrospectively, because a learning curve has developed over time about the ways to use limited force in these engagements, which always involve civilians in the midst of combat. · Iraq: o "The more complex and controverted issues arose when the response to terror extended beyond Afghanistan to other countries (Yemen, Philip- pines, Indonesia) and, most important, to Iraq. The debate about Iraq clearly went beyond the arguments of the 1990s, and it raised some of the older questions about Great Power intervention. Iraq was clearly not about humanitarianism (even though Hussein's human rights record was reprehensible in scope and savagery); it was also not a linear case about terrorism, since the links existing with al Qaeda were a matter of much dispute. The U.S. case for war was a mix of several reasons: that Iraq possessed some and sought to produce other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that UN authorization existed to enforce resolutions from the early 1990s, that regime change was necessary to solve the first two problems, that the Iraqi people deserved to be rescued from the grip of a malicious regime. Unlike 1991, however, there was not a clear case of international aggression that could galvanize an international response, particularly in the Security Council. The proposed action against Iraq was, therefore, unauthorized military intervention. In addition, the appearance in September 2002 of an official policy paper of the U.S. government, The National Security Strategy of the United States, made it clear that the reasoning being used to support intervention in Iraq could be extended to other countries. Hence the Iraq debate was two dimensional: Was intervention justified, and would it set a precedent for other military actions? The U.S. case was pressed on the basis that the world faced a new and different kind of threat, certainly not the kind posed by humanitarian crises but also not the kind envisioned by those who had shaped the traditional nonintervention rule." o Can There be a Moral Foreign Policy? (Walzer) o Claims political arguments are often a façade for moral commitments, even within the academy the role of religion in politics has long been largely ignored. § One can be critically engage through the medium of different moral and religious traditions with concerns of war and conflict. § Faith, morals, and foreign policy—but focusing mostly on morals. Notes that religion has had a big influence on morals: · "For rea- sons that I describe below, these ideas about morality don't come glued to any particular religion; nor are they a function of actual belief, faith in the literal sense. In the contemporary world, I suggest that we need to worry about faith—for when it turns into dogma and certainty, as it frequently does, it tends to override morality. A faith-based foreign policy would be a very bad idea." o But does morality, even when it's not overridden, have anything to all to do with foreign policy? § "But does morality, even when it's not overridden, have anything at all to do with foreign policy? The claim of the people who call themselves "realists," who preen themselves as Machiavellian princes or as Machiavellian advisers to princes, is that morality never has to be overridden; from the beginning it is nothing more than a façade behind which states pursue their strategic interests. Political leaders seize the available opportunities, or they are driven by military necessity. When they are hard-pressed, they do what they have to do; in a position of strength, they do whatever they can. No doubt, that is often true—or it is true often enough so that "real- ism" isn't a crazy position. But I don't think that it is always true, and I want to suggest—provocatively, I hope, but also realistically—that some- times the opposite is true: strategic arguments about what is possible or necessary are a façade behind which political and military leaders act out their deepest moral and political convictions." · Consider the bombing policy of Britain in the early years of WWII § Four propositions · 1) obligation 1 of the state, any state, is its Hobbesian obligation to protect the lives of its citizens. · 2) obligation 2 is not to inflict harm on the citizens of other states · 3) obligation 3 is to help citizens of other states, when it is possible to do so, to avoid or escape the crimes and disasters of collective life: genocide, tyranny, conquest, ethnic cleansing, famine, and pandemic disease · 4) obligation 4 is to help the citizens of other states, when they want to be helped, to build decent and nonrepressive political systems. § Each can be expressed and understood in different cultural idioms and traditions, including religions · Catholic moral philosophy is an expression of what are called "natural laws" because they are knowable to all of us; they follow from certain facts about out common human nature. Judaism—"these are the rational law" says Judah Halevi in The Kuzari, "being the basis and preamble of divine law, preceding it in character and time, and being indispensable in the administration of human society. § Just war theory · An expression of the laws of nature, a construction of reason, or even, perhaps, a modus vivendi for robber gangs. It regulates state behavior in regard to the firs and third of my opening propositions, whenever these two require states to go to war, in self-defense or in defense of others. o "As a systematic theory, just war has its origin in Catholic moral philosophy.5 But as a set of propositions about aggression, self-defense, humanitarian intervention, noncombatant immunity, the treatment of prisoners of war, and much else, it has a more complicated and diverse history. We might even say that it originates in many different places—in all the places, in fact, where wars have been fought. In any case, Catholic just war theory was incorporated into and adapted to the uses of international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it was rediscovered by secular moral philosophers and political theorists in the twentieth century. It is, I believe, triumphant today, having supplanted many alternative ways of talking about war" · "The just war arguments in which Americans are currently engaged— about self-defense and humanitarian intervention, about preemption and terrorism—are definitely focused on "harms inflicted" (or, in the case of preemption, on harms that are supposedly about to be inflicted). These arguments can be worked out in the language of Catholic natural law, or in the language of the international lawyers, or in the language of con- temporary analytic philosophy. Each of these is probably translatable without much loss into the other, and so, again, it doesn't matter which one we choose to speak. There are differences, though, and so I should acknowledge that I speak here as a philosopher. But not an academic philosopher: the harms that we are talking about today, in the new age of mass murder and terrorism, require a political or military response, and so the moral arguments we make should be aimed at shaping the policies of our government"

3) G.A. Harrer, "Cicero on Peace and War"

§ Cicero approved war. To the senate he says, "The name of peace is sweet, and that condition itself is salutary; but between peace and slavery there is a very great difference." In another letter, "And I am not opposed to peace, but I fear war rolling upon us under the name of peace. So then, if we would enjoy peace, we must wage war; if we give up the war, we shall never enjoy peace." Again, "Peace made with them will not be peace, but an agreement for our own slavery."

3) Andrew Rigby, "Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum"

§ Conditions that facilitate successful collective forgiveness work · 1) Truth · 2) Peace/security · 3) Justice: o People should not be allowed to act with impunity, they should be required to pay at least some price for the wrongs committed; whilst victims/survivors should receive some kind of compensation or reparation for suffering endured · 4) Time o The length of time necessary for new memories to be formed that allow for new relationships between those that were divided will vary from person to person and community to community according to the particular circumstances and culture. o Forgiveness and Reconciliation § Relationship between past-oriented forgiveness work and future-oriented reconciliation work in the context of achieving a sustainable and just peace o "war is such an evil that one of the key characteristics of any 'just peace' should be its resilience. For a peace to be durable in the context of a post-civil war society it is important that key actors believe it to be sufficiently just as to deserve their commitment. The likelihood of this happening is increased to the extent that certain institutional changes take place, but alongside these there needs to be a process akin to forgiveness - the formation of new interpretations of the past, new memories that allow for the creation of constructive relationships with former enemies. It is this process of relationship-building that we can refer to as reconciliation work. An analytical distinction can be made between forgiveness and reconciliation work, in so far as the former is oriented towards the reframing of the past, whilst reconciliation work is oriented towards the future and the fostering of co-existence between those that have been divided. However, at the empirical level of the lived world it can be very difficult to distinguish between initiatives that are exclusively past or future-oriented." · 1) Forgiveness is necessary but not sufficient for future reconciliation in the full sense of the restoration of harmonious relationship between those that were divided · Be sensitized to the fact that the levels of forgiveness and reconciliation achieved over time are matter so degree · 3) forgiveness, and hence reconciliation, are not once-and-for-all irreversible processes. Whatever new memories and interpretations of the past are crated in the process of forgiveness, they are formed on the basis of the old. o Tensions between the constitutive dimensions of a just peace: o The resurfacing of deep memories invariably reflects a growing belief amongst key actors that the peace process is not 'just enough' to deserve their continuing commitment. Frequently the critique of the peace focuses on the lack of progress made in relation to one or more of the constitutive processes of peace/security, truth, and justice § Elements conductive to forgiving the past as the basis for future reconciliation do not rest easily together. Too active a pursuit of justice in societies emerging our of division can result in a return to repression and bloodshed. Too great of a concern with avoiding a resumption of violence for the sake of peace and security can mean that truth and justice are forfeited through individual and collective amnesia. · If the value of truth is sough above all else, then this can come at the cost of justice—after all, they should perpetrators confess to their war crimes if, in consequence, they will face punishment? o Below: see how choices made regarding the relative value place d on the different constitutive element of peace/security, truth and justice reflect to a significant degree the balance of people between the different parties to the peace settlement and the subsequent post-settlement peace-building process. · When the outcome of a violent conflict is the comprehensive defeat of one of the parties, then it is highly likely that the victors will prioritize some form of retributive justice as the main means of dealing with the past. o Problem: for creating a just peace is that it can leave the vanquished nursing grievance s about what they might considered a perverted form of victor's justice, thereby undermining any efforts at longer-term reconciliation between those divided by war and violence. § Collective Amnesia · Where the peace settlement has been arrived at by negotiation rather than military victory, 'leaving the past behind' by means of some kind of process of personal and collective amnesia can seem the most desirable option. This can appear as the only "realistic" option if there are well-grounded fears that any attempts to bring to account those responsible of the worst abuses might provoke a renewal of the conflict with all the accompanying bloodshed and pain. o Just because one generation might want to forget the past, it does not mean that subsequent generations will remain satisfied with leaving it covered up. § Prioritizing truth when people cannot forget · Truth commissions: South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission elevated as model. Typically, they focus on acknowledgment of the wrongs inflicted upon the victims of abuse and violence o The hope is that through such a process of unveiling the past and receiving reparations former victims might be enabled to come to terms with their anger and bitterness and define the post-settlement peace as 'just enough' to merit their commitment. o Criticism: the charge that justice is sacrificed in the proclaimed quest for truth, and that the alleged reconciliation is false. At its crudes it is alleged that the criminals provide a version of the truth in return for amnesty, and the victims are then left to become reconciled to their loss. Sadly, this may be the prices that has to be paid for the sake of peace and the restoration of human rights, at least in the short term. § Permitting amnesty: the understanding that we are all part of one community, and that by enabling perpetrators to take their place once again within this community they can be helped to regain something of their lost humanity, and thereby enrich us all through the restoration of social harmony and wholeness. Ubuntu-form of restorative justice § Changing definitions of "just peace" · Example: in the immediate aftermath of a civil war people might be prepared to accept, however reluctantly, that war criminals should be allowed to go free and that their own loss and pain should remain unacknowledged. This might be the necessary price to pay for a surface peace achieved with the end of organized killing and repression. However, people's perception of peace/security, truth and justice, the commitment to a just peace must be founded upon their experience of 'things moving in the right direction.' This requires institutional change. o "It is unrealistic to expect any sustainable progress towards co-existence so long as the members of once-divided communities live their everyday lives within the same institutional frameworks that remind them of the 'deep memories' which fueled the violence that split them apart. Only with appropriate changes in the conditions of everyday life will the seeds of a durable culture of reconciliation flourish, one which embodies those values that facilitate inter-personal and collective forgiveness, thereby opening up the possibility of erasing those deep memories that can call into question the justness of any post-war peace process." o Necessary conditions for sustainable peace: § 1) The preparedness of survivors to forgive the past, in the sense of reframing their personal and collective narratives in a manner which allows them to acknowledge the humanity of former enemies and allows for the possibility of future co-existence. § 2) The perception of key publics and opinion-leaders that the peace remains 'just enough' to merit their continued commitment over time. § 3) The development amongst key sectors of all communities of a degree of trust necessary for them to anticipate a shared future.

2) Immanuel Kant, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals

§ First Section: · Transition from common to philosophical moral rational cognition, Kant argues that humans are uniquely fit to understand the principles of morality because of our capacity for reason. Kant establishes the importance of a "good will." Anyone can have certain talents, but they will only benefit the world if the person gifted with them intends to use them for good. We can evaluate a person's intentions by focusing on their desired outcome, or end. Furthermore, we can pursue good will by following duty. Kant offers three propositions about duty: o 1) the first tells us to identify an individual's reason for following duty, o 2) the second asks that we evaluate their motivations (their maxim) o 3) the third states that a truly good maxim can be applied as a universal law. This good maxim stems from an understanding of our obligation to obey universal moral laws. · Begins the section with characterization of a good will—it can inspire an unlimited amount of goodness in an individual and a community. The will ought to be "good in itself" and not good for accomplishing something else. · On happiness: o "Kant then pivots to the specific composition of humanity and explains why humans are specifically cut out to understand morality. Every living creature's natural composition makes them attuned for a specific purpose. Human beings are meant to pursue "preservation" and "happiness" (11, 4:395). However, our capacity for reason can make this difficult. Kant envisions all humans as fighting an intellectual battle between happiness and reason. Reason dictates we pursue ends that are good in themselves, but our desires for happiness may incentivize us to behave selfishly." · On Duty o duty encompasses all actions a person ought to complete in pursuit of a good will. He presents three overarching propositions about duty. § 1) The first proposition states it is essential to distinguish an individual's reasons for following duty § 2) second proposition revolves around an individual's maxim. A maxim is a person's motivation for acting in a particular way. Kant introduces the concept of the maxim to hark back to a priori cognition. Returning to the examples from his first proposition, a person who acts solely based on duty understands the importance of pursuing a good will a priori. However, someone like our shopkeeper, who adheres to duty for personal reasons, is not driven by a pure desire for good will. § 3) Kant's final proposition states that people ought to pursue duty out of "respect for the law" (16, 4:400). Respect is an effect of intentionally and carefully following duty. While our actions may unintentionally yield positive outcomes, a truly good will comes from an understanding of why adhering to moral laws is a supreme obligation of all beings capable of reason. As we have already established that our understanding of morality is a priori and therefore ought to be universal, Kant proposes the following law of morality: "I ought never to proceed except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (17, 4:402). In presenting this law, Kant encourages the reader to consider their duty to others by placing themselves in someone else's shoes. This offers an empathetic take on morality. To put Kant's ideas into a more familiar context, readers may recognize this theory as the Golden Rule: treat others as you would want to be treated. § Second Section · Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals, Kant argues that morality is governed by laws. These laws are called imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives tell us how to act in pursuit of a specific outcome, whereas categorical imperatives are ends in themselves. Categorical imperatives govern morality. Kant uses the categorical imperative to expand his previous assertion about evaluating maxims, writing that the only categorical imperative is to act as though your maxim is a universal moral law. These universal laws cannot contradict themselves—for example, we can never legitimize suicide because taking life contradicts the fundamental principle of nature. As such, the categorical imperative acts as a foundation for all imperatives related to duty. In an ideal world, where all humans adhere to the categorical imperative, we enter the kingdom of ends. The kingdom of ends is a complete moral community that is composed of rational beings with self-legislating wills who treat each other as ends in themselves. If a will is self-legislating, it is autonomous. o Restates his argument that some people follow duty because they feel obligated to, not because they genuinely want to. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that "no reliable example can be cited of the disposition to act from pure duty [...]" (21, 4:406) · Since morality exists in nature, it must be governed by laws. Kant asserts that morals are ruled by imperatives, writing that "the representation of an objective principle in so far as it is necessitating for a will is called a command, and the formula of the command is called imperative" (27, 4:413). An imperative goes beyond telling us to do something—it also encompasses the logical steps necessary to complete this task. Imperatives are a crucial step in establishing a metaphysics of morals because they explain why a particular task is important to establishing a certain goal and how we can go about accomplishing it. Imperatives help us use reason to reach a desired outcome. o Key disctionc between 2 types of imperatives is how frequently they are used § 1) categorical imperatives: order us to pursue an outcome that is universally justified as bot unequivocally necessary and unequivocally moral. They are used less frequently. There are very few, if any, everyday examples of humans following categorical imperatives—save form morality. The only categorical imperative that humans frequently encounter is on based around morality. · "There is therefore only a single categorical imperative, and it is this: act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" · Examples of how we can connect duty to the categorical imperative o 1) someone may attempt to justify suicide by arguing a maxim of self-love—they take their life, they will no long er be in pain o 2) idea of a false promise and posits someone borrowing money they know they cannot repay o 3) visualizes a person who has a skill that could improve society but chooses not to pursue it. o 4) a person who is well off but refuses to help others § 2) hypothetical imperatives: provide us with the means to reach a specific desired outcome. They are used often and for a variety of purposes

2) J. Bryan Hehir, "Just War Theory In a Post-Cold War World"

§ Grotius age in Middle Ages, involved in the effort to salvage the substance of the natural law ethic, and specifically the just war teaching, in a new setting where princes no longer acknowledged a higher authority in the world of politics or religion. Today, given the changing role of both the state and war I the contemporary international system, the task facing just war theorists may be that of once again reshaping the ethic to meet the needs of a world which is neither as coherently integrated as the Respublica assumed nor as decisively divided as the classical view of world politics would lead one to believe o The recovery of a tradition: Just war theory § Began around the late 1950, jointly catalyzed by John Courtney Murray and Paul Ramsey in Catholic circles to meet the politics of the Cold War. · Murray stated case, and Ramsey wrote the books from a strictly Catholic/Just War perspective, jus in bello § Protestant scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s § Catholic wave of writing followed in the 1980s, generate in part by a pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace. o Three practical tests: all of which challenges citizens, scholars, and policy makers espousing the just war ethic § 1) Vietnam War & 2) the nuclear debate · Both reflected the patter of conflict which dominated most of the Cold War. The result of a bipolar nuclear statement, structed by the strategy of deterrence, both forestalled superpower confrontation and pushed their intense rivalry downward into remote regional conflicts. Both the strategy of deterrence and the shape of the Vietnam conflict forced the just war ethic onto unexplored terrain. o Vietnam illustrated the wisdom of Johnson's advice that we attend to the jus ad bellum; failure to adjudicate the just cause and proper authority issues leave the just war ethic without mooring in a revolutionary or insurgency situation o The nuclear stand-off was principally about an ethic of means—the need to assess not only the means of making war, but the means of keeping the peace § Where previously intentionality had been a subset of jus ad bellum, the character of deterrence theory placed intentionality at the center of the discussion of jus in bello considerations. · Vietnam o Moral case became one piece of the wider public judgement that the war was causing disproportionate damage in Vietnam and here, after the war was already underway § 1) Walzer's tribute to he way in which the language and logic of the traditional ethic provided citizens with the means to validate their instinctive sense that the war exceeded all rational purpose § 2) in The Pentagon Papers an intricate argument about bombing policy is woven through the policy debate. · Nuclear: two stages in the 1960s and 1980s o 1960s: questions of use, deterrence, and the intention-cum-threat which tied them together o 1980s: more extensive use of the ethical assessments in the standard strategic literature, a normative influence which resembles the field of bioethics and public policy § Both set foundation for Gulf War deabtes § 3) Gulf War · Return to the standard case. o "Comparatively speaking, in the Gulf War terms like "aggression" and "defense" took on greater clarity; civilians and combatants were not neatly divided in medieval fashion, but they at least resembled the patterns of the past. The standard case also brought the full scope of the just war ethic into play. The public debate unfolded through a discussion of just cause from August to October, then an intense focus on last resort and proportionality from November into January, and a less adequate assessment of means during the six weeks of actual combat." · Three arguments of note o 1) the way in which the just case issues were tested and pressed by consideration of last resort and proportionality in the period from November 1990 through January 16, 1991. o 2) the attention paid to noncombatant immunity in official policy statements testified to the need felt within the government to be seen as sensitive to this critique o 3) presuming both good faith and vigorous efforts to protect the principle of discrimination, the amount of destruction—combatant, civilian, material—caused by the air war was still appalling o Changes occurring in the post-cold war international system which bear directly on the future role of the just war ethic § 1) the shifting status of sovereignty · Four challenges to state sovereignty today: its not that the sovereign state will collapse or that a central governing authority is likely to arise in world politics; rather, what is occurring is a persistent erosion of sovereignty at times forced upon states, at other times conceded by them—a consequence of some of the deeper forces in world politics, four of them o A) a normative challenge embodied in human rights regimes § Oldest of the four. Rooted in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and subsequent covenants which developed from it. o B) a strategic challenge posed by the nuclear age § Challenges the states capacity to defend its borders, its people, and its territory o C) an economic challenge shaped by interdependence § The economic ties which facilitate growth are also ties which can limit sovereign decision making. States forfeit some of the scope of independent action normally associated with sovereignty because economic interdependence requires structures and institutions capable of coordinating transnational relations. o D) a political challenge created by events since the Gulf War · Question: this process of erosion posed for the just war ethic whether changing patterns of sovereignty in other area affect the basic principle of the ethic: that sovereign states possess a real if limited right to resort to force. A response balances several elements o 1) the erosion of sovereignty has not produced any comparable institution of central governance which could supplant the security role of states o 2) a possible step which could be taken is to increase the collective security function of the UN. o 3) both the erosion of sovereignty and the possible increase of a UN security role will likely put a new pressure on the old rule of non-intervention. § 2) the changing face of war o Description of the present moment as a time of profound political change characterized by the declining utility of force. o Dominant security threat which has absorbed Western defense establishments for four decades is virtually gone. · "The likely just war debates, in my view, will resemble the Gulf War case. That is to say, if force is to be used, the war will have the following characteristics: o 1) it will have a North-South character o 2) it will involve high-tech warfare pitted against societies of modest eco- nomic capability which may still possess ballistic missiles with conventional, chemical, and in a few instances, nuclear warheads o 3) the U.S. action will be some form of intervention - either to change a pattern of behavior within a state (for example, Libya) or to intervene as a third party in an on-going conflict." · If the gulf war case is at all proto-typical, we need to follow Johnson's lead in giving renewed attention to jus ad bellum issues because neither the North-South character of a war not its interventionary character can be assessed apart from them. o Jus in bello also face new issues: high-tech weaponry combines 2 characteristics: dramatic increase in precision and a corresponding increase in destructive capability. These create the problem of evaluation faced with respect to the Gulf War. § There's still an unfinished debate about the proportionality of the Gulf War—unfinished because data about civilian casualties and suffering is still being uncovered-has critical long-term significance.

3) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War

§ He aims to strengthen the war convention, which morally governs the rules of war or jus in bello. He is critical of a purely utilitarian approach, which justifies the killing of civilians if it is militarily necessary. Walzer distinguishes between combatants and noncombatants and provides the latter with immunity. He proposes a revision of the standard of double effect, which allows civilians to be killed in a legitimate act of war if the direct effect is morally acceptable—such as bombing a military installation—the actor's intentions are good, and the good effect is proportional or sufficient to compensate for the evil done. Instead, Walzer calls for a double intention whereby the actor must not only intend good but act to reduce the evil as much as possible even at risk to self. Consistent with his goal of protecting the rights of noncombatants, Walzer condemns siege warfare, unless civilians are provided safe passage, and terrorism for targeting innocent people. He also deems reprisals that target civilians unjust. Guerrilla warfare challenges Walzer's distinction between combatants and noncombatants, as the guerrillas mix with the general population and do not wear uniforms. Walzer labels guerrillas who do not have popular support criminals but allows the rights of guerrillas to grow as popular support does. With sufficient popular support, they become one with the populace and it is then wrong to wage war against them. He argues that this was the case in Vietnam. · Acknowledging the possibility of a conflict between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, Walzer allows for the rules of war to be broken in the case of a supreme emergency. Ordinarily, those fighting on the side of justice do not have more leeway to break the rules than the aggressors. He limits supreme emergencies to times of both an imminent danger and catastrophic threat. For example, the Nazis posed a catastrophic threat to the democratic world, but the rules of war had to be followed in all cases unless doing so would have allowed for their imminent victory. Indeed, he criticizes England for breaking the rules of war with its bombing of German population centers late in the World War II. Similarly, Walzer demands that belligerents in a war respect the rights of neutral countries unless national or civilizational survival is at stake. Walzer condemns nuclear war and the threat of nuclear war, on which deterrence theory depends. Since he does not provide an alternative means to maintain peace in a world with nuclear weapons, he allows deterrence as a form of permanent emergency. o Walzer holds political leaders and supporters accountable for starting unjust wars. He believes it is possible and appropriate to assess collective responsibility, especially in a democracy. However, he acknowledges the complexity of so doing, given the imperfect nature of democracies. Both soldiers and officers must be held accountable for crimes in war, though officers have a higher level of responsibility. There are instances when soldiers are coerced to commit crimes, such as when they are in fear of their life. In such cases, they are not morally accountable. However, they are responsible in the absence of such a direct threat. Walzer closes with consideration of non-violent resistance to an aggressor. Such a form of resistance transforms the struggle from a military to political one. The success of such resistance is entirely dependent upon the aggressors obeying the war convention and therefore not killing peaceful resisters. He reiterates the essential need for all soldiers to heed the war convention in his postscript. Without it, there is no possibility of a transformation to non-violent conflict and no limitations in war. Both sides will claim the mantle of justice.

2) John Carlson, "Is There a Christian Realist Theory of War and Peace?"

§ He insists that there is no "fool-proof yardsticks" to ascertain the justice of any given war, the individual conscience must be the ultimate arbiter of a just war: "Each must decide whether, on balance, there is enough preponderance of moral value on one side of a conflict to justify conscientious participation." § Also, critiques Catholic just war, condemning the rigidity of permitting one just war principle (proportionate means) that has become outmoded in an atomic age to eclipsed broader, more pressing claims of justice! · "In the end, just war language is most attractive to Niebuhr—meaning it sup ports the general deliberation about justice, morality, and war—when it is least like just war theory and when it offers imprecise guidance about the use of force. Yet the more explicitly Niebuhr embraces just war language, the more he compromises his earlier Christian realist critiques. Interestingly, his critical engagement with just war ideas—even their limitations—has the effect of rein forcing them, to the point of protecting just war theory from obscurity and from its own limitations-" · "evidence that he understood a clear distinction between the general idea that war could be just or morally justifiable—a necessary p instrument of justice—and the more particular moral principles constituting the just war tradition... The fact that we are scrutinizing footnotes and rooting through scattered opinion pieces and audio lectures to glean Niebuhr's take on just war doctrine confirms for me that it was not a particularly operative concept in his thought. Yes, he believed that war could be an instrument of justice and that the use or threat of force could be morally justifiable. But his nonpacifist reasoning differs starkly from the approaches of the classical just war tradition. Finally—and I say this as an admirer of Niebuhr—I find him wanting in his imaginative ability to ex plicate the Protestant sources of a moral theory or at least a framework for de liberating on war and peace: if not a Protestant component of or counterpart to just war theory, then at least intimations of a Protestant alternative"

3) J. Bryan Hehir, Liberty and Power

§ Humanitarian intervention · There are no differences among the different moral traditions or among the different versions of just war theory with regard to the wrongness of massacre and ethic cleansing. · Some throughts o 1) in a system of sovering states, multilateral cation is preferable to the action of single states, since its protects those acted on from imperial ambition and state aggrandizement o 2) the inability to act in one case doesn't require a state, for the sake of moral consistence, to refuse to act in other cases. o 3) the likelihood, even the certainty, of civilian deaths is not a bar to military action that is necessary to stop massacre or ethnic cleansing—as long as positive steps are taken to minimize the number of civilians killed, and as long as the number is not disproportionate to the disaster that is averted. o 4) the notion that force is that last resort is nay moral or political crisis is not plausible guide to foreign policy decision making. Military resistance may rightly be the first resort of a state or national facing armed aggression. § Global inequality: 4 questions · 1) to what extent have the prevalent inequalities been created by willful human action? · 2) what sacrifices are we obligated to make in order to reduce the suffering of the world's poorest people? · 3) how is the responsibility to act distributed among individuals and states? · 4) how should we in the wealthiest nations respond to the self-destructive politics, the corruption and violence, of may of the poorest countries? § Moral realism and Iraq: · "Unnecessary wars are almost always unjust wars" o "Unnecessary wars are almost always unjust wars. Still, the most attractive defense of this war was the description of it as a "war of choice," fought for the sake of democracy—in fulfillment, one might say, of the fourth of my posited obligations. The war against Iraq was chosen (out of all the imaginable wars for democracy) because it was possible: here was a vulnerable regime, whose brutality was widely known, whose overthrow would be welcomed by most of its subjects, and whose democratic re- placement would be a beacon of light in one of the darker parts of the world" · Absolute power corrupts: Lord Acton's famous maxim isn't a cliché because it has been repeated so often but rather because it has proved true so often o "Multilateralism is a good creed for moral realists: it is just and prudent. After the Iraq war, America's military superiority is indisputable. We possess something close to absolute power, at least in the military sphere. But power of this sort is dangerous, not only for other countries but also for the country that possesses it" · The war was not: o A war designed to redistribute resources, either for the benefit of Iraqi people or American companies o An example of humanitarian intervention ('91) · Could have done a policy of containment—it was working to maintain regional peace this way vias 1) embargo of military supplies, 2) the no-fly zones, 3) and the UN inspections; this containment regime was established after the first gulf war and, except for the inspectors, had been in place ever since, the inspectors withdrew in 1999. But an argument against was the new destructive technologized in WMDs o Fighting Against Terrorism and for Justice o Old Chinese adage "kill 1, frighten 10,000" § Considering terrorism and counterterrorism · Role of religion—religious terrorist movements have also been transnational. o Religion plays three different functions in terrorist groups: § 1) it helps one to define oneself and identify one's enemy, but groups are not fighting about doctrinal differences—religion is simply the badge of ethnic identity § 2) by far the most common role religion plays in terrorist groups is a tool for recruitment, a mask for political motives, and a means of acquiring or claiming legitimacy § 3) alternative claim to legitimacy and sovereignty, an ideology or theory, or a guide to action. · Iraq: Walzer applies what he calls "moral realism" to war in Iraq. He maintains that there were alternative to the war and concludes that there was not just cause for fighting it. o Louise believes that a campaign against terrorist is the most efficacious and most ethical response, though it cannot be won by military means. The history of antiterrorist campaigns is fairly unequivocal on this point. We must do it by demonstrating in our response to the ghastly atrocity visited upon us that we mean what we say when we say that we believe in the rule of law and the value of democratic principles—though acting ethically is not necessarily enough to win the conflict. o Between Faith and Ethics § In this chapter, address four related issues: · 1) the role of religion in world politics and in American foreign policy o Often a lack of differentiation between the role of religious ideas and the role of religious organization. § The level of religious organization has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of a community's political organization. · 2) the source of political power of religious groups and organizations o Argue that the increasing role of religion in politics is more truly a function of organization and political space than of faith is not to say that faith is not a factor! o Passionate faith is powerful. Is it the driving force of political activism or merely an instrument in the hands of aspiring politicians? · 3) the relations between religious and ethical beliefs and foreign policy o Two issues of primary importance to the moral claims invoked in the name of religion, one pertaining to the internal perspective of the individual and the community of believes and the other to the external perspective of society at large § Is that which is religious also ethical? § How does one differentiate the 2? · Soren Kierkegaard considers these questions in the latter stage of his writings. o Says the difference between he purely ethical behavior and the religiously ethical behavior is the source of the internal drive: the natural passion of faith, on the one hand, and the habitual ethical behavior or that which is based on the fear of consequence, on the other hand. To be religious is to posit the self in terms that make ethical behavior a fulfillment of the self. The added value is internal, by the behavior is readily measurable by external ethical standards. § That which is ethical should be recognizable by the external standard of society, not only by the subjective standards of believers. · 4) the relationship between the ethical and religious. o Even in a world where international norms are less uniform and clear, and where power often trumps norms, ethical behavior cannot be defined solely according to the internal judgements of state. o We often have an internal motivation of external ethical behavior § Primary instruments of foreign policy include material power—economic and military. · In the end, even the most powerful nation on earth is not powerful enough to always go it alone. The dilemma of power is that it is most useful when it is least used; the more one uses it, the less one has left to use, the weaker one's deterrence. o "An international system of state and nonstate actors without an effective central authority means that there are limits on states' ability to behave ethically. Despite that, nothing prevents the application of ethical standards in foreign policy—especially for powerful states—even as an end in itself. Moreover, there is much to suggest that the pursuit of primary interests cannot be optimally effective without ethical restrictions. Ethical standards must in the end be subject to measures beyond one's subjective interpretation of what is ethical. In the American democracy, where passionate interest groups significantly affect policy, there is no reason why the moral issues of religious groups should not be driving forces in policy debates. Religious groups must be seen as legitimate interest groups in American politics, whose passionate commitment could ultimately affect the formation of domes- tic and foreign policy. But as in the case of other interest groups, which are always driven by their sense of what is important and good, the standards of societal and international ethics must be checked externally, for no group commands the moral high ground by virtue of its subjective beliefs." o When unilateralism is right and just § Chapter disagrees with Hehir that the foundation of order is multilateral action in international law. Thinks that is fiction—it does not exists. The foundation of the current order in the world, the guarantor of peace in just about every region, is power and most specifically, American power. § Says the idea that there is some multilateral structure, or some international law or agreement, keeping the peace is absurd. Do a thought experiment. Imagine the removal of the United States by some act of God from the world today and imagine how long international law and multilateralism would keep the peace in the Pacific, the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, or anywhere else in the world. § Agrees with Walzer claims that the opponents of American unilateralism and opponents of the war in Iraq would be strengthened in their arguments if they would urge other actors in the world to bear the burdens in the advance of peace and security and humanitarianism/ o Morality is Hard § Says, in response to Hehir claim of the salience of religion in American politics and the gradual dissolution of state sovereignty that: § "I do appreciate the tendency of Americans to cast their pol- icy preferences in moral terms. That tendency, however, can squelch debate. When people become certain of their moral rectitude, they can easily drift into sanctimony, so anybody who disagrees with them must by definition not be really interested in moral issues. That attitude tends to poison the debate rather than advance it"

2) Carsten Stahn, "Jus Post Bellum and Just Peace"

§ Justice: · Just peace theory suggest that social order is only peaceful if it is just. Justice has a strongly forward-looking dimension in this context: it is deemed to enable a social, non-violent context in which peace can emerge. It is concerned with ending of conflict or prevention. § "Just peace encompasses not one, but a spectrum of different forms of justice: retributive, procedural, restorative, or even distributive justice. Emphases vary among protagonists and just peace traditions. For in- stance, just war traditions and transitional justice approaches tend to define aspirations for retributive or restorative approaches based on objective moral or legal norms, while inter- subjective approaches devote greater attention to procedural elements." o Definition of justice: § "A useful general framework has been identified by Herbert Kelman. He has argued that the definition of justice in peace processes requires a common basis for peace that has to be negotiated by the parties. Such negotiations might involve 'different kinds of justice', namely (i) 'substantive justice, achieved through an agreement that meets the fundamental needs of both sides', (ii) 'procedural justice, achieved through a fair and reciprocal process of negotiating the agreement', (iii) 'future justice, achieved through the establishment of just institutions, arrangements' and 'emotional justice, achieved through the sense that the negotiations have seriously sought and to a significant degree shaped a just outcome'.100 Existing justice conceptions found in classical peacetime or domestic law might have to be adjusted to context." · 1) Retribution o Demands for retribution (e.g., , payback for wrong) need to be balance against conflicting aims and the realities of transitional process. Punitive ideas require moderation · 2) Procedural justice o Procedural elements play a stronger role than in classical peacetime situation § Procedural justice is key to the relational dimension of justice · 3) Restorative Justice o Restorative elements of justice are an important element of just peace theory. Justice can only promote relational change if it repairs social harm created through conflict. § Ex. Human rights and feminist movements. They view war, violence, or crimes as indicators of broken social relationships. They argue that justice may contribute to societal healing. o John Braithwaite says that restorative justice and shame management is important for crime prevention and war prevention. He says restorative justice deserves a prominent space in diplomacy and peace ethics, because 'late modern war is a criminal matter much more than modern and early modern war was." § "peace is unlikely unless the people can come to terms with their anger and hatred over those crimes. Rituals are needed to heal the damaged souls of the people, to help them find ways to transform hatred into sorrow or forgiveness, to be able to move forward with hope rather than wallow in the evil of the past." o Restorative justice thus says it may help to counter domination crated by crimes and violence through means of dialogue, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, recognition, and repair of harm. § Punishment thus is not inflicted to educate the perpetrator or deter future crimes, but to repair social relationships, remedy harm cause to victims, build trust in institutions, or contribute to societal prevention § Reparation · 4) Distributive justice o One of the most delicate and neglected dimensions of peace process, which correction of historical injustices or structural inequalities, such as distributions of goods and resources (e.g. equitable land distribution) and access to political power or opportunities in society (e.g. discrimination in employment, access to education). § Usually an element of sustainable peace, rather than just peace § In peace theory, just peace has a hybrid status. It is a bridge between pacifism and the just war tradition.

3) Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War and Peace

§ Part 1 · Natural law and illustrations of different ways of approaching the topic. § Part 2 · Expands the dialogues by bringing in the voices of Jewish and Islamic ethical thought. How does the classic debate look from the standpoint of perspectives somewhat removed from this debate, yet clearly related to it? The dialogue becomes more difficult here, for Jewish and Islamic perspectives on war and peace are shaped by ideas, methods, and sources peculiar to these traditions. It is, for the scholar com- ing from a concern with Christian, Western, or secular ideas and issues, also inherently risky—if one attempts it at all, one may be chided for lack- ing expertise, reproached for not doing more, or accused of orientalism. These are risks we choose to run, trusting that others will correct our mistake § Part 3 · Adds two critical voices, those of feminism and Christian pacifism, that have for the most part been outside the mainstream Western debate on war and peace but whose moral significance is undeniable. Like Judaism and Islam, these perspectives have proven hard to incorporate into the debate between realism and natural law, for they, too, seem to challenge the assumptions of that debate. Our effort to come to terms with this challenge has been illuminating for all sides, and we hope it will prove illuminating for the reader. § "The final section of the book contains two especially valuable chapters. One is an essay by the editor comparing and contrasting the perspectives presented without seeking to adjudicate their differences. It is a nice summary of the "findings" of the project. The other chapter in the final section is written by Richard B. Miller, who articulates the only serious criticism one could level at this book- that it is not really possible to represent, explain, compare, and contrast religious traditions even on such focused questions as those posed by the editor at the outset of this project. Miller refers to this argument as his "hermeneutical observations about the problem of representing a tradition" (265). He notes that each chapter in the volume results from quite distinct decisions about what constitutes a tradition. These diverse decisions, in turn, bear directly upon what the authors considered to be representative or authoritative material in the traditions they sought to describe. Yet, in their representations of their respective traditions, what they included or excluded was not always obvious. He argues that many of the traditions included in the book are not really able to speak with one voice about such questions as the grounds for war. Thus, he warns that comparison among traditions based on the essays included in the book would be incomplete and sometimes deceptive"

2) James Childress, "Just War Theories"

§ Protestant vs. Catholic · Differs in relation to the appropriate attitude toward a just war that overrides the prim-facie duty not to injure or kill others. o Catholics: the act of self-defense or an act of vindictive justice, although imposed by circumstance which are regrettable, is morally good. For them, "war is not the lesser of two evils, but the lesser of two goods (one of which [i.e., peace] appears, at the moment of choice, unattainable)." § Some implications of the prim-facie duty not to injure or kill others, which are presuppositions of many just-war theories that include both jus and bellum and jus in bello: · 1) because it is prima-facie wrong to injure or kill others, such acts demand justification · 2) because not all duties can be fulfilled in every situation without some sacrifices (this inability may be understood as natural or as the result of sin), it is necessary and legitimate to override some prima-facie duties. · 3) The overridden prima-facie duties should affect the actor's attitudes and what they do in waging wars § Two points: on the one hand, war must be justified because it violates some of our prima-facie obligations, not because it is totally immoral or amoral or utterly discontinuous with politics; on the other hand, it can be more or less humane insofar as it is conducted in accord with some standards that derive from the overridden prima-facie obligations and other obligations that endure even in war. · A model of war as a rule-governed activity stands in sharp contrast to a model of war as hell, which is accepted by most pacifists and by many "realists" who recognize no restraints other than proportionality. o "According to one view, war is hell, murder, and there is thus only the crime of war, within which anything goes, for "all's fair " According to another view, war is a game-like (not in a frivolous sense) or a rule- governed conflict, within which one may legitimately injure, kill, and destroy, but not commit war crimes such as injuring or killing defenseless 17 persons who are noncombatants or ex-combatants" o Most of the criteria traditionally associated with just-war theories emerge because war involves a conflict between prima-facie obligations(when it is just and justified) and because the overridden prima-facie obligations forbid us to injure and kill others § 1) the first criterion of a just war is right or legitimate authority, which is really a presupposition for the rest of the criteria. In fact, it determines who is primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met. The principles of just war become operative only after the classic political question is answered: who should do the judging? Answering the judging question is a precondition for answering the others. · After the proper authority has determined that a war is just and justified and thus overrides the prima-facie obligation not to injure and kill others, citizens, influencing subject-soldiers, face a different presupposition o War is the ultima ratio, the last resort

3) Samantha Power, "Bystanders of Genocide"

§ Question of role of memory in war. In Rwandan case, clash of 2 memories: a historically established memory of never again (after World War 2 and Holocaust). This was also joined by memory of Somalia, which President Clinton was so taken by, so that he never grasped the never again heritage and could not connect the two memories. The memory of not having acted in Rwanda was one of the inspiring reasons to lead the bombing campaign in Kosovo. § Very strong recovery after genocide - economic and within the country itself!

2) Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays

§ Section 1 · The first section is negative in that it contains six prohibitions deemed necessary to ensure world peace. The prohibitions, in the form of "articles," are as follows: o 1) all treaties written for peace should never contain ambiguous passages that could potentially be used int the future to engage in war. o 2) no nation can be acquired as a possession by another nation o 3) professional armies must be abolished o 4) a nation's foreign affairs department should never acquire a financial debt o 5) no national should interfere with the constitution and government of another nation o 6) no devious acts such as assassination can be performed during a war lest trust among the nations be broken § Section 2 · The second section is positive in that if proposes the establishment of three political ideas o 1) each nation should have a republican constitution. In other words, the constitution should not provide for a monarchy but must allow regular voting and separate government from legislature o 2) a federation of these free republics should be established for the mutual benefit of all. This federation is one of free nations working together. A federation is not the same thing as a world nation that rules over all—each nation is still independent and retains its freedom. o 3) cosmopolitan constitutions should be set up in each nation (for example, offering hospitality to all foreigners). Kant says that such a cosmopolitan world will catalyze commerce and foster peaceful, friendly relations among all peoples.

1) David Fidler, "Just and Unjust Wars, Uses of Force & Coercion"

§ Summary: The emergence of cyber means and methods of war, force, and coercion raises ethical questions under just war theory different from those historically generated by the development of ever more destructive instruments of war. Whether in armed conflict or contexts not considered war, cyber technologies create political and ethical incentives for their use. However, this attractiveness poses potential risks and dangers that, at present, are largely speculative but invite more ethical deliberation. Unfortunately, the con vergence of political and ethical incentives on cyber in a context of increasing geopolitical competition and conflict make the prospects for ethical consensus on just and unjust cyber coercion, force, and war unlikely o Cyber weapons: does not endanger ethical objectives as directly in the just war tradition. Cyber weapons take a different trajectory within just war theory: away form extremes that threaten to obliterate ethics and toward scenarios in which the ethical compass functions by struggles to find true north. § Highlights the difference between war and force · Recalls Walzer's argument for a theory of just and unjust uses of force. Cyber creates possibilities for force "short-of-war" and coercion short-of-force and thus raises questions about the relationship among force, coercion, and ethical objectives of the just war tradition, such as protecting civilians o In 2013, GGE reached a consensus that international law applied to cyberspace. Also concerned with internet freedom/sovereignty o Stuxnet—a weapon designed to damaged property in another country § Its use inspired debates about "force" vs "armed attack," and about whether it was an illegal use of force or an armed attack—all of which produced disagreement about whether the damaged constituted force or an armed attack in international law. § Two readings · 1) read Stuxnet as not amounting to war or aggression because of the limited damage it caused, particularly the absence of injuries/deaths · 2) perhaps the perpetrators were justified in attacking, in which case Stuxnet was not an act of war or aggression. o Both use evaluations form jus ad bellum § In just war theory, having a just cause to go to war requires identifying the state that committed the initial wrong triggering the right to use force. · Walzer: says "preventative use of force-short-of-war" outside of jus ad bellum, thus highlighting the need to extend just war thinking to force short-of-war.

3) Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays

§ Supplements · 1) The first supplement asserts that perpetual peace is guaranteed because it is humanity's destiny. The meaning of humanity, Kant argues is moral progress. Such moral progress will ultimately result in perpetual peace. · 2) The second supplement suggests that a secret article should be placed in nations' constitutions stating that philosophers should be consulted on matters of war and peace. § Appendixes · 1) distinguishes "moral politicians" from "political moralists." The former are concerned with imbuing politics with a genuine morality. The latter may not believe in a true mortality and so see politics as a game of power. In order to advocate the moral politician above the political moralist, Kant briefly delves into his famous "deontological" (duty-based) ethical theory to show that there is a genuine morality, one that is true for all people. · 2) The second appendix introduces another means by which a political act can be considered genuinely moral—namely if the act can still be implemented if it is made public. Private acts, hidden form the public, tend toward immorality. Therefore, honesty is the best policy.

3) George Sabine, A History of Political Theory

§ The Universal Community · The Law of Nature · Cicero and the Roman Lawyers · Seneca and the Fathers of the Church · The Folk and its Law · The investiture Controversy · Universitas Hominum · Philip and Faire and Boniface VIII · Marsilio of Padua and William of Occam · The Conciliar Theory of Church Government § 3) The National State · Machiavelli · The Early protestant Reformers · Royalist and Anti-Royalist Theories · Jean Bodin · The Modernized Theory of Natural Law · England: Preparation for Civil War. · Thomas Hobbes · Radicals and Communists · The Republicans: Harrington, Milton, and Sidney · Halifax and Locke · France: The Decadence of Natural Law · The Rediscovery of the Community: Rousseau · Convention and Tradition: Hume and Burke · Hegel: Dialectic and Nationalism · Liberalism: Philosophical Radicalism · Liberalism Modernized · Marx and Dialectical Materialism · Communism · Fascism and National Socialism

2) John Murray, "Remarks on the Moral Problem of War"

§ Three theological questions that must be considered: · 1) concerns the exact nature of the conflict that is the very definition of international life today · 2) concerns the means that are available for ensuring the defense of the values that are at stake in the international conflict · 3) concerns the ultima ratio (the final argument/last resort) itself, the arbitrament of arms as the last resort

2) Larry May, Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice

§ Transitional justice · Principles not nearly as worked out as are those in jus post bellum literature o 1) Rule of law § The reestablishment, or establishment, of the rule of law involves the movement away from a regime where there was widespread abuse of civil rights and political corruption in oppressive regimes. Prioritizes guaranteeing formal legal rights in a society o 2) Democracy § Calls for the transition from repressive regimes to less repressive, democratic governments · Sometimes leads people to advocate highly violent means to achieve the more democratic order even if it is not what the people want. o 3) Truth § Major subject of transitional justice. headway toward ending oppression can be made simply by exposing the old regime's acts of oppression to the first and one of the most important steps to overcoming and changing the repressive regime o 4) Forgiveness § In order to be able to move to a less repressive regime, it often happens that the current political leaders need to be removed. These leaders may attempt to cling to power if they think they may face criminal prosecution after a new more democratic regime is in place. · It concerns amnesty for the main perpetrators of oppression and atrocities when the successor regime are established—forgiving the leader who were responsible for oppression, and whose resignation is crucial for the transition, seems to be needed. o 5) Punishment § Not merely retributive—this doesn't jell well with idea of amnesty. · Provide alternative mechanism to criminal prosecution and punishment that might better serve the needs of certain communities as well as serving the interest of transitioning to less repressive regimes § Comparison · Transitional justice differs form jus post bellum in that the focus f transitional justice is on the processes that lead to a less repressive, and more democratic regime; whereas, jus post bellum is focused on achieving an end to war and establishing of peace. o Closely linked in conversation about R2P, mainly on its 3rd prong: the responsibility to rebuild, especially to rebuild the rule of law. o Chapter 1: Shunzo Majima § Evaluates the US' military occupation of Japan again the standards of jus post bellum, focusing on revconstruction and retribution in particular o Chapter 2: Lawrence Douglas § Focuses on the retributive aspect of jus post bellum. It examines the anomaly that despite the fact that crimes against humanity and genocide were specifically designed to facilitate the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators, no Nazi has been charged with genocide and nore have been charged with crimes against humanity in Western Germany since the assumption of sovereignty by the Federal Republic. o Chapter 3: Michael A. Newton § Makes the case for integrating and regulating traditional community-based dispute resolution with formal state judicial systems in order to promote due process and rule of law in postwar Afghanistan. · Attempts to apply jus post bellum proportionality concern in the context of transitional justice o Chapter 4: Charles Chernor Jalloh § Looks at different legal interpretation of crimes again humanity but takes as his focus the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court. § Looks at amnesties and just post bellum · Defines crimes again humanity: o What are the necessary elements for crimes again humanity? o He holds that the essence of crimes again humanity is the widespread and systematic scale of the attacks against ordinary civilians. § Thus, challenging whether the state or organization plicy requirement is necessary, pointing to international law.

3) John Murray, "Remarks on the Moral Problem of War"

§ Two subordinate questions under this general heading of the nature of war today · 1) concerns that actual state of progress (if it be progress and not a regress to barbarism) in technology of defensive and offensive weapons of war. · 2) concerns the military usefulness, for any intelligible military and political purposes, of the variety of weapons developed. § Three preliminary lines of inquiry to be pursued before the moral issues involved in warfare today can be dealt with, even in their generality: · 1) all wars of aggression, whether just or unjust, fall under that ban of moral prescription · 2) a defensive war to repress injustice is morally admissible both in principle and in fact § Pope of peace disallowed the validity of conscientious objection

2) Daniel R. Brunstetter, Just War Thinkers

· 2) St. Augustine (354-430 CE) o Related to Manichean teaching, questions whether killing is always sinful. His answer is that sometimes killing is not sinful—soldier killing an enemy, nor a judge or his minister killing a criminal, nor someone inadvertently or imprudently killing another is sinful. § Opinion changes throughout the 2nd phase of life o In third in final phase of his life, he wrote City of G_D § Understanding of political power and purpose of war shifted. now sees it as a means of securing some minimal barriers again the forces of disintegration with institutions of political and judicial authority serving to keep conflict in check · The purpose of just war is just to seek to hold the world together: the quest for justice and order is doomed; but dedication to the impossible task is demanded by the very precariousness of civilized order in the world. o Indicates a Christian responsibility to wage just war. As Augustine puts the matter, "Some...fight for you against invisible enemies by praying; you [the soldier] toll for them against visible barbarians by fighting. · 3) Gratian (circa 12th century) o Wide ranging understanding of coercion and violence. § Questions whether war was a s sin and could the evil be compelled to do good, contrasted with whether war was an act of vindictive justice, the character of war as part of a legal process initiated by judge and executed but his ministers, and the lea ownership of property seized as a result of war · Believes that to wage war is a sin o But! Not a pacifist. · 4) Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) o Took from Gratian § Asserted that it is not always a sin to wage war, and he se out criteria for a just war · Three requirement must be met o 1) the war must be waged upon the command of a rightful sovereign o 2) the war needs to be waged for just cause, on account of some wrong the attacked have committed o 3) warriors must have the right intent, namely to promote good and to avoid evil § Concludes that a just war could be offensive and that injustice should not be tolerated so as to avoid war. Nevertheless, argued that violence must only be used as a last resort. · In the battlefield, violence was only justified to the extent it was necessary. Soldier needed to avoid cruelty and a just war was limited but the conduct of just combatants. Aquinas argued that it was only in the pursuit of justice, that the good intention of a moral act could justify negative consequences, including the killing of the innocent during a war.

2) Mark Evans, Just War Theory

· 2. Jus in bello: to fight a war justly, one must employ: o (i) discrimination in the selection of targets: avoiding the direct targeting of those not directly participating in the immediate conduct of war, and taking all reasonable measures possible to avoid casualties among such non-participants. § (i2) Doctrine ofdouble effect: the foreseeable deaths of 'innocents' do not render a war unjust so long as they are not directly intended as the object of policy but are the unavoidable side-effects of a use of force justified by the other criteria of the theory. o (G) Proportionality in the use of force required to secure the just objectives; o (k) just treatment ofall non-combatants: by which is intended prisoners of war as well as non-combatants in the wider arena of the war. o (L) One must observe all national and international laws governing the conduct of war which do not fundamentally conflict with the theory's other moral requirements. · 3. Jus post bellum: to secure the justice sought in the resort to war, one must be prepared to: o (m) help to establish peace terms which are proportionately deter- mined to make that peace just and stable as well as to redress the injustice which prompted the conflict; o (n) take full responsibility for one's fair share of the material burdens of the conflict's aftermath in constructing a just and stable peace; o (O) take full and proactive part in the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation that are central to the construction of a just and stable peace. · Supreme Emergency Exemption: in a situation of supreme emergency only, one may wage war in a way that suspends condition (i). § First three chapters consider jus ad bellum, or 'just cause' o Chapter 1 works on distinguishing "preemption" from "preventive war" by subjecting the putative justification for "the most controversial war of recent times"—the invasion of Iraq. § Preemptive military action is undertaken to eliminate an immediate and credible threat of grievous harm § Preventive war is undertaken when a state believe that war with a potential adversary is possible or likely at some future date and that if it waits, it will lose important military advantages. o Chapter 2 considers the question of humanitarian intervention, which has arguably arise recently as a norm to supplement self-defense as a possible just cause for war.

2) Carsten Stahn, Just Peace After Conflict

· 3) transitional justice o Thinking about justice after atrocity. Advocates for a holistic approach to justice and emphasized the centrality of victim's interests in the quest for a just peace. Says the justice within just peace should not be motivated by considerations of victor's justice or driven by elites and combatants but encompass considerations of restorative justice which recognized the dignity of victims. § 6 core elements: 1) building socially just institutions and relations between states, 2) political acknowledgement of wrong, 3) reparations, including consideration of historical injustices, 4) judicial punishment, 5) apology, 6) and forgiveness. · 4) Intersubjective approaches § Just peace theory: forward-looking dimension: it is deemed to enable a social, nonviolent context in which peace can emerge. § Encompasses not one by a spectrum of different forms of justice: · Retributive: "punitive ideas require moderation," criminal accountabiliy · Procedural: key to the relational dimension of justice · Restorative: justice contributing to societal health—punishment and reparations · Distributive: correction of historical injustice or structural inequalities such as distribution of goods and resources primary element of sustainable peace · —example: retributive or restorative approaches based on objective moral or legal norms, while intersubjective approaches devote greater attention to procedural elements · Kelman says three types of justice § Just peace: "In peace theory, just peace has a hybrid status. It is a bridge between pacifism and the just war tradition.123 Just peace goes beyond stable peace. It is stable peace with justice. It is geared at sustainability. It lies at the intersection of negative and positive peace, which are connected to each other. It captures 'many real-world situations' that exist 'between the ideal-typical negative and positive peace categories'" · "A just peace is not only related to form and process but different dimensions of justice. Justice goes beyond the 'vindication of the rights' which are at the origin of the conflict. It is about the transformation of relationships. Justice itself may be a means to enable peaceful coexistence, stimulate critical engagement about observational standpoints, or foster acceptance of conflicting narratives. Just peace is to some extent a relative peace. Perceptions are key to determine as to whether or not a peace is just. Needs, expectations and priorities develop over time. What is considered just may evolve over time." § Just post bellum: · requires that "war crimes trials be held to punish those guilty of war crimes (formalizing the quasi-judicial function of war), that the victors take responsibility for governing the vanquished in cases where the latter's government collapses as a result of war . . . and that they take active measures to avoid sowing the seeds of future war by, for instance, assisting in the long- term economic reconstruction of the vanquished" o main goal is to contribute to the repair of the relationship damaged prior to and during the course of war such that political interaction is based to a minimally acceptable threshold level on reciprocal agency · Larry may's 6 macro-principles o 1) rebuilding o 2) retribution o 3) restitution o 4) reparation o 5) reconciliation 6) proportionality

3) Garth Evans, "The Solution: From 'The Right to Intervene' to 'The Responsibility to Protect'"

· 4 main conceptual contributions" o 1) first and perhaps ultimately the most useful politically, was inventing a new way of talking about "humanitarian intervention." Changing the language of "the right to intervene" on its head and recharacterizing it not as an argument about the "right" of states to do anything but rather about their "responsibility"—in this case, to protect people at grave risk o 2) The second big conceptual contribution of the ICISS commissioners, very much linked with the first, was to insist upon a new way of talking about sovereignty itself: building squarely on Francis Deng's formulation, we argued that its essence should now be seen not as "control," in the centuries-old Westphalian tradition, but, again, as "responsibility." o 3) The third contribution of the commission was to spell out very clearly what the responsibility to protect should mean in practice, both for the sovereign state itself in meeting its primary responsibility to its own people, and then, if it could not do so, for the responsibility of the wider international community to assist o 4) The fourth and remaining contribution of the commission was to address the unavoidable question of when the most extreme form of coercive reaction, military action, would in fact be appropriate, however much we might hope to avoid that necessity arising. o R2P first seriously embraced in the docttrin of the newly emerging African Union, created in 2002, which unlike its predecessor, the Organization of African Uity, placed the emphasis, when it came to catastrophic internal human rights violations, not on "noninterference" but on "nonindiffernce" o As Annan urged states: § "embrace the "responsibility to protect" as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibil- ity lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required" o Unanimous adoption of the R2P principles by the 2005 World Summit and the UN Security Council § "The Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing ,and crimes against humanity" o Encouraging signs, but a few challenges to R2P § 1) conceptual: to ensure that the scope and limits of the responsibility to protect are fully and completely understood in a way that is clearly not the case now. § 2) institutional preparedness: to build the king of capacity within international institutions, governments, and regional organizations that will ensure that, assuming that there is an understanding of the need to act—whether preventatively or reactively, and whether through political and diplomatic, or economic, legal, or policing and military measures—there will be the physical capability to do so. § 3) political preparedness: how to generate that indispensable ingredient of will—how to have in place the mechanisms and strategies necessary to generate an effective political response as new R2P situations arise.

3) Daniel R. Brunstetter, Just War Thinkers

· 5) Christine de Pizan (1364-1430) · 6) Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) · 7) Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) · 8) Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) · 9) Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) · 10) Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) o Together with Gentili, just war theory was replaced by international law theory, codified as a set of rules, which today still encompass the points commonly debated, with some modifications § Grounded it in natural law, governmental through of atonement. · 11) Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) · 12) Emer de Vettel (1714-1767) · 13) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) · 14) Francis Leiber (1798-1872) · 15) Paul Ramsey (1913-1988) · 16) Michael Walzer (1935-present) · 17) Jean Bethke Elshtain (1941-2013) · 18) James Turner Johnson (1938-present) · 19) Jeff McMahan (1954-present)

2) Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American Difference

· Chapter 3 o War is America's altar · Confronted by such a tradition of war, the attempts to justify war using just war consideration, no matter how sincerely done, cannot help by be ideological mystifications. § "Just war" proponents argue that war is justified because out task as Christian and as citizens is first and foremost to seek justice. Paul Ramsey understood his attempt to recover just war as a theory of statecraft to be "an extension within the Christian realism of Niebuhr. Ramsey goes on to say more about :justice in war than was articulated in Niebuhr's sense of the ambiguities of politics and his greater/lesser evil doctrine of the use of force—the principle of discrimination, which require that war be subject to political purpose through which war might be limited and conducted justly, that is, that noncombatants be protected. o Part 2: § Aimed to sharpen the focus on violence and war. · Chapter 4 o Often make the point that Christians are not called to nonviolence because we believe nonviolence is a way to rid the world of war; but rather in a world of war, as faithful followers of Jesus, we cannot imagine being anything other than nonviolent. o War is the continuation of politics by other means" should be inverted. Foucault observes, "The role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institution, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals. This is the initial meaning of out inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism—politics is the continuation of war by other means. Politics, in other words, sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war. · Chapter 5 o War is a moral practice. By calling war a moral proactive, I am not suggesting that I believe war to be "a good thing" rather to argue, a la James McClendon, "that powerful practices can be narrated through the New testament notion of 'principalities and powers.'" § Sentimental appeals to peace too often turn out to be the grounds to justify the judgement that even if war is horrible and terrifying, sometimes we must be willing to go to war. · "James failed to see that war is a sacrificial system and any alternative to war must be one that sacrifices the sacrifices of war. Indeed, I will argue that he greatest sacrifice of war is not the sacrifice of life, great as such a sacrifice may be, but rather the sacrifice of our unwillingness to kill—this is why war is at once so morally compelling and morally perverse. o Insists that Christians must insist that it is not what is worth killing for, but what is worth dying for that defies what a society really thinks is true. o Hauerwas—makes the claim that the first task of the church is not to make the world more just, but to make the world the world. That claim is but a correlate of the assertion that the church does not have a social ethic but is a social ethic. I am quite aware that such claims can lead to misunderstandings, but I think they are particularly useful in this context. The church does not do much have a plan or a policy to make war less horrible or to end war. Rather, the church is that alternative to the sacrifice of war in a war-weary world. The church is the end of war. § Christ has shattered the silence that surrounds those who have killed, because his sacrifice overwhelms out killing and restores us to a life of peace. Indeed, we believe that it remains possible for those who have killed to be reconciled with those they have killed · Chapter 6: o C.S. Lewis and violence. Lewis was not a pacifist—but perhaps should have been · Chapter 7: MLK and Christian Nonviolence o King's philosophy in 6 points: § 1) nonviolent resistance is not cowardly but is a form of resistance § 2) advocates of nonviolence do not want to humiliate those they oppose § 3) the battle is against forces of evil not individuals § 4) nonviolence requires the willingness to suffer § 5) love is central to nonviolence § 6) the universe is on the side of justice · Not jus an "ideal" but must be embedded in the habits of people across time in order to make possible the long and patient work of transformation necessary for the reconciliation of enemies Niebuhr critiques that nonviolent resistance is but disguised violence

2) Lisa Cahill, "Theological Contexts of Just War Theory and Pacifism"

· Claims that Hehir's text is profoundly steeped in Catholic just war theory. He deals with "moral obligation," noting that it is legitimate and even obligatory for Christians to strive to transform the social order toward greater conformity to rationally discerned and cross-cultural standards of justice—in the "anarchic" state of the international community, which continues to demand some rational mechanisms for limiting war. o He fears the Pope could be leaning toward passivism § Pacifism and just war theory share a presumption against violence; but there are differences · 1) obvious: permission or prohibition of war itself · Just war theory and pacifism as fundamentally contrasting evolution of Christian identity § Cahill responds to these thoughts

3) Saint Augustine, City of G_D

· Considers illness, disaster, captivity, and other earthly trauma. Says pagan gods have never saved anyone from these o "why must an empire be deprived of peace in order that it may be great?" § Underneath heroicized power struggles lies human frailty and demonic interference, not godly power. He · Says pagan object are worthless and demand more of their human protectors than they give back § Book 4-7 · Considers the role of the gods in the spread of the Roman empire o Without justice, ad kingdom is a mere criminal gang" · Does not believe G_D to be a world soul! Considers this blasphemous. · Critiques the (ever expanding) pantheon: o "noting that it's strange where the Romans decide to subdivide their gods and where they don't: For instance, Virtue gets one temple, though Roman ideas of virtue separate into four categories: prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. If all these qualities can be worshiped under one name, why is the same not so of the gods more generally" o A failure to worship wealth and dismisses the idea that the starts determine worldly events, and critiques fate as the determinant of cause and effects set in motion as the will of G_D · Says Rome just wants glory! And the glory of empire is all they have to show. Quoting the Book of Matthew, Augustine writes, "they have received their reward in full" o Goes on to answer those who now try to assert that the gods are to be worshipped, not with a view to advantage in this present life, but for the sake of that life which is to come after death" · Book 6: o It does away with the idea that the pagan gods can grant a blessed afterlife. · Says gods are names and faced pasted onto natural phenomena but is more forthcoming on the obscenity of civic religious rituals—like cutting of genitals. · Goes on to critique pantheon, finding the system of mismatch worship inconsistent like a popularity contest. § Books 8-10 · Says Socrates Is the first philosopher to work toward moral goodness. Sees himself as uniting Socrates with Pythagoras' intellectual style · To Platonist, they are close in that they believe in a god and morality and goodness, but are wrong about the importance of the body, giving too high of an attention to demons, and failing to disavow polytheism, and failure to embrace Christ o Only reason why they can't make the final step toward Christianity is because they are proud, and Christ was not. § "Christ's purifying synthesis of body and soul, God and man, is the missing piece that Platonic philosophy comes so close to, but does not quite reach" · Ultimate philosophical question: o "How should humans attain happiness" · Miracles different to magic—an appeal to forces lower than G_D. Don't be too dazzled by miracle workers

1) Lisa Cahill, "Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom of Christian Tradition"

· Early Christians were pacifists and discouraged military service for a variety of religious and social reasons. In the age of Constantine, when Christians had a greater stake in the welfare of the empire and pagan rituals were dissociated from the military, Christians began to serve in significantly greater numbers. Nonetheless, a pacifist strand always has been present in Christianity complements this strand insofar as it begins with the presupposition, not that violence, even against injustice, is legitimate, but that violence is presumed to be wrong for Christians. Is violence ever justified? o Thesis of this takes aske the following questions § What kinds of arguments have Christians used in favor of pacifism, and especially nonresistance? § How do pacifists deal with the moral significance of injustice? § How do they interpret biblical examples of violence, especially the wars of the Israelites? § What kinds of arguments have Christians used in favor of force, especially killing? § How do they deal with New Testament nonviolence, particularly the sayings and example of Jesus? § And for both pacifists and just war or holy war advocates, how has the Bible been treated as a canon or as having integrity and authority? § How have specific texts been used to authorize specific conclusions? · Thinkers o Tertullian: does not defend participation in battle and sees military service as a t least a temptation to sin, not only through violence but also (and perhaps primarily) through lewdness and idolatry o Augustine: key to early formulation of Christian just war theory § Influenced by pagan philosophy (Plato and Cicero). Not sure if he is making New Testament (NT) fit current order, or current order fit NT § Force in punishing sin, he argues, is consistent with Christian love and further peace berceuse: · Chastisement encourages reform and deters imitation · Even as death it cannot harm its object in any essential (spiritual) way § Does not specify the circumstances in which the "readiness" for nonviolence is to be acted on o Aquinas: justifies war in terms of a Christian view of natural right and justice § Goes beyond Augustine in addition to the reasons for going to war (jus as bellum) some consideration of means in war (jus in bello), that is, ambushes · Their most significant difference: o Aquinas believe the commitment to a reasonable moral order, knowable in principle by all human beings and forming the basis of a common morality, moves to center state. Blending Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, Aquinas is optimistic about the potential of "natural humanity, hindered though it may be by sin and ignorance, to establish justice and so to achieve a peaceful order governed by law. This is not to say he agrees with Augustine that the peace of this world is imperfect or that he takes the Kingdom of G_D to be present, but rather that the Kingdom builds on and gradually transforms communities and relationships which are naturally congenial to it.

3) Jennifer Welsh, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria"

· Just Intervention (pulling on Just War ethic) o Some interventions are morally acceptable and sometimes morally required, but not all! § Places war in the moral universe. o Presumption of doing no harm, and you have to override this presumption. Where are you going to prevent this presumption? § Presumptively no or presumptively yes (as Ambrose would suggest), might you ask? · Listen to the wisdom of Westphalia on this topic: the presumption should be against intervention. Why? Westphalia came after the religious wars - which was full of chaos. Secondly, great power intervention is often tied to a history of rationalization. States say one thing but are driven by other. The world is full of small states, and they have to be very careful if intervention is looked upon in positive terms. o How do you decide that there should be exceptions? § Just cause, just cause for intervention that is. Just cause for war it is aggression to uphold international order. For intervention, it Is a short list: 3 · 1) Genocide: intention to wipe out a group of people · 2) Ethnic Cleansing: (was happening in the Balkans, which is why there is a distinction) says we will not kill you, but you can't live here, you must move! · 3) Failed State: when authority of the state collapses. o Is intervention to prevent human rights violations a justifying reason for the use of military force alone? § St. Ambrose would say yes, but if that is the case, then you would have a lot of cases of intervention! o Proper Authority: the UN security council authorized intervention. What if you can't get that? § Coalition of the willing. · If sitting at UN in 1945 or 2020, do you want to start with a non-interventionist world or a pro-interventionist world - start with Ambrose, or the charter as it is today? o If adopted a principle of subsidiarity, and you have local standing, intervening powers, could intervention be a good - colonialist?

1) Lisa Cahill, "Theological Contexts of Just War Theory and Pacifism"

· Just war theory and pacifism are not parallel theories about violence; they represent fundamentally different conceptions of Christian identity. o A response to J. Bryan Hehir's essay, which contributes to two disciplines · 1) To student of international politics, it assess the sovereignty of state in the post-cold war world, concluding that just war theory not only needs to be retained but also redescribed in terms of greater attention to political context and to the jus and bellum, and in terms of expansion of the concept of intervention to nonmilitary areas of international interdependence (for example, the environment) · 2) To student of theology, reflects on but also exemplifies the way in which just war theory is inflected by its theological context § Cahill's essay responds to the second!

2) Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibilities of Victory"

· Most advocates of jus post bellum are adamant that just belligerents are entitled to do more than simply restore the status quo. Orend and Walzer strongly imply that they are required to do more. Why? By very definition, the pre-war status quo contained within it the seeds of future conflict and the Augustinian idea that wars are fought in order to preserve the peace means that the victors are certainly entitled and possibly obliged to remove those seeds of potential future war in order to satisfy jus post bellum - because a peace that contains the seeds of future war cannot, by this account, be considered just. The problem, as Orend sees it, is exacerbated by the fact that war itself is so destructive and changes to much that the purpose must be a more secure peace: · "Thus, Orend argues that the aim of a just war must be 'a more secure possession of our rights, both individual and collective. The aim of the just and lawful war is the resistance of aggression and the vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities'.33 Both Orend and Walzer's language here implies a degree of obligation that sits uncomfortably with minimalist jus post helium. With that in mind, therefore, I suggest (following Vattel) that according to the minimalist version of jus post be Hum the victor may prosecute the war 'to obtain justice and to put himself in a state of security' but is entitled to choose not to, and decide instead to settle for the restoration of the status quo." o In contemporary international society, these rights are tempered in important respects by positive law—almost entirely neglected by advocates of jus post bellum—which insist that there are only 2 types of lawful war: wars of self-defense and collective enforcement authorized by the UN Security Council. · Article 2[4], Article 51, Article 39 · Which version of rights should provide the basis for a minimalist conception of jus post bellum? Bot Just War writers and legal theorist have attempted to get around this, and similar problems associated with other aspects of the legitimacy of war, by insisting upon a radical separation of international law and the Just War tradition. o Some prominent contemporary Just War thinkers have tended to criticize the UN Charter System for forbidding aggressive war and downplaying the tole of justice in determining a war's legitimacy § Consider the UN Charter Paradigm: e · Clark: legitimacy claims are articulated and assessed by reference to three subordinate sets of norms: o Legality, morality, and constitutionality. First two are self-evident, and constitutionality refers to political sensibilities about what can properly be done, and how affairs should be conducted § Minimalist in short: jus post bellum be limited to the vindication of those rights that gave just cause for war in the first place. So does minimalism make just post bellum redundant, since it is based on rights and limits already covered by traditional Just War Thinking? · The 1949 Geneava Convention and 1977 Additional Protocols constute a comprehensive set of regulaitons limiting what the victors are entitled to do to civilians in occupied territoties. o Insists "that all persons be treated humanely, and specifically prohibits murder, torture, corporal punishment and mutilation, the taking of hostages, collective punishments, humiliating and degrading treatment and threats to commit any of these acts (paras 9.3 and 9.4)" § Iraq: "Walzer argues that manifestly unjust wars waged for conquest or economic aggrandizement are unlikely to foster a just peace since both these type wars involve acts of theft. Nevertheless, with one eye clearly on Iraq, he argues it is possible that a premature act of pre-emption or a misguided military intervention might topple a tyrannical regime. In such circumstances, although the war itself would remain unjust, and a just peace would not retrospectively change its normative status, the peace might still be just in itself" o Minimalist perspective is predicated on the assumption that victors will seek to exploit the vanquished as far as possible for their own benefit, a not unreasonable assumption given warfare's long history of sacked cities, annexed territories and forcibly acquired riches. § Maximalist propositions: · In contrast to minimalist, the maximalist approach to just post bellum begins form the proposition that there is a 'presumption against war' in just war thinking and that the victors acquire special responsibilities towards the vanquished that go above and beyond the responsibility not to exact more from the foe than is necessary to restore and secure the rights whose violation necessitated war in the first place. · Victors have a responsibility to guarantee the security of people in occupied lands that goes beyond the legal duty to do no harm to civilians in occupied territories · To begin the political and economic reconstruction of the vanquished country. o Justification: "we want wars to end with governments in power in the defeated states that are chosen by the people they rule—or, at least, recognized by them as legitimate—and that are visibly committed to the welfare of those same people (all of them)" § Modern states wage war when they believe they have justice on their side and seldom doubt the justice of their cause. · In the wake of Nuremberg trials, UN established an International Legal Commission (ILC) with the task of creating a global war crimes court. Following Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Security Council sought to punish perpetrators by creating two and hoc war crimes tribunals. These culminated in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which came into being in 2002, which is empowered to prosecute for genocide , war crimes, and crimes against humanity in circumstances where the host national is either unable or unwilling to investigate complaints. o The idea of prosecuting war crimes as opposed to shooting them or releasing them is hardly new, but in the service of the maximalist approach to just post bellum it has assumed the statis of a post-war duty. § Kellogg, defining legitimate war as one that aims to right a wrong creates an obligation to try those guilty of various crimes for at least 2 reasons · 1) It makes no 'strategic sense' to wage (presumably) just war yet stop short of prosecuting war criminals · 2) she offers a robust moral defense of retribution, insisting that "declining to do full justice for those who have been most grievously wronged by aggression...leads to the perpetration of further moral injustice on both the victims of war crimes and on innocents"

1) Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibilities of Victory"

· Natural vs. Positive Law o Recent questions about justice after war (jus post bellum), fueled in large part by moral questions about coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many have consequently and wrongfully come to argue that jus post bellum is a third strand of Just War thinking. This article evaluates this position, arguing that there are broadly 2 ways of understanding moral requirements after war: · 1) a minimalist position which holds that moral principles derived largely from jus and bellum and just in bello concerns should constrain what victors are entitled to do after war · 2) a maximalist position which holds that victors acquire additional responsibilities that are grounded more in liberalism and international law than in Just War thinking. § Finding fault with both approaches, the article ultimately argues that it is premature to include just post bellum as a third element of Just War thinking and concludes by setting our 6 principles to guide further thinking in this area. o The article notes: · The push to include jus post bellum in just war thought inspired by ethical and prudential questions raised by international attempts to rebuild war-torn societies and the US-led occupation of Iraq · Consider reading Noah Feldman's What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building · Augustine argued war is only legitimate to the extent that it is fought to preserve a just peace. o "Indeed, at least one prominent commentator argued that the 2003 Iraq war could not be considered a humanitarian intervention because the allies failed to provide for the post-war reconstruction of" § The general acceptance of the place of jus post bellum in shaping the legitimacy of war has masked significant unanswered questions. In particular, problems remain in relation to the different philosophical foundations and scope of jus post bellum, its relationship to the other elements of Just War thinking, and the extent to which the responsibilities of just post bellum apply after every type of war. § Minimalist Approach · Says principle purpose of jus post bellum is to prevent excess by victors through limiting what they are entitled to do. o Use Grotius and Vattel and Kant o View just wars in terms of rights vindication and argue that combatants are entitled to wage war only to the point at which their rights are vindicated. · "According to Vattel, 'when a sovereign has forced to go to war from just and weighty reasons, he may continue the operation of the war until he has attained the lawful object of it, which is to obtain justice a to put himself in a state of security. If the victors enforce a peace that goes bey the legitimate vindication of rights, they potentially create grounds for a just war be waged against them, if the other jus ad bellum criteria" · The conception of legitimate war as a quasi-judicial activity involving rights vindication has long been a staple of just war thinking and became prominent after the tradition's turn towards legal positivism in the sixteenth century. § Grotius saw three images of just war: o All of which, in short, justify war as a means of protecting or enforcing rights in an international anarchy where there was no possibility of authoritative arbitration. · 1) war as judicial acts · 2) war as litigation · 3) war as defense of the common good § Vettel · There are three causes for just war: o 1) claiming rightfully owned property o 2) punishing the aggressor or offender o 3) self-defense · Where do state rights come from and what are they in relation to enforcing ends by means of war? o Grounds that depend on a mixture of positive or volitional law and natural law · Thus, for proponents of a minimalist approach to just post bellum, then, victors are entitled to protect themselves, recover that which was illicitly taken, punish the perpetrators and—in the Grotian but not the Vattelian schema—prevent, halt, and/or punish those who gravely violate natural law by, for instance, committing genocide against their people. This may include military occupation, but not taking the reins of a government/imposing a government on the vanquished. § Must be mindful of relations with the occupied population (1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent Protocols), and with the sovereign authority of the vanquished state that persist even after a particular government has collapsed. · "the occupying powers are only entitled to assu the role of de facto administrators and 'unwarranted interference in the dom affairs of the occupied territory' is incompatible with the" o The question, then, is asked if the occupying powers only have the rights restore the status quo ante?

2) Reinhold Niebuhr, "Part III: Love and Justice in International Relations"

· Niebuhr writes that contrition is the politically relevant form of love, and in this work, he goes on to reveal—referencing his popularized term "uneasy conscience"—his own uneasy conscience for engaging in the compromises and coercions of the power struggle of his day. Notable among these is Gandhi, he writes that it is intolerable that Gandhi should make his pretension of sainthood into an instrument of political power. Apparently, sainthood in the service of politics is a contradiction in terms. o "If a man believe that it is G_D's will for him to be involved in the coercions of government even unto war, should he not fulfill this calling with as good a conscience as he can muster of other callings of G_D?"

2) John Yoder, The War of the Lamb

· Part 2: "The Dialogue with Just War" o facilitates a discussion between the just war tradition and ono-violent direct action. o Yoder develops 2 key arguments § 1) the just war tradition and non-violent direct action are "pertinent to one another's integrity." Non-violent direct action disciplines just war theory by challenging just war theory to explore the meaning of last resort, including developing non-violent training programs. On the other hand, the just war tradition structures non-violent direct action. For example, the just war tradition challenges non-violent direct action to seriously consider the ramification of "just intentions," such as boycotts that "rupture the normal social flow." § 2) just war theory needs to take itself more seriously. He states that the just war tradition is seldom effective through history and "has never been seriously respected by responsible decision makers." For the just war theory to be employed, it needs to be developed mechanisms for responding to unjust wars. Until there are viable initiative for responding to an unjust war, the just war theory is not a practicable option.

3) John Yoder, The War of the Lamb

· Part 3: "Effective Peacemaking Practices" o Explores contributions to peach theology from secular sources. These disciplines demonstrate that conflict is a natural aspect of community and a "sign of life and growth," resulting form encountering new people and new ideas. § Challenges churches not to avoid conflict but rather provides techniques for resolving conflict. He also addresses Christian actions in the broader society, arguing that Christians "be perfect," loving both friend and enemy as G_D loves all. · Christians should also refrain from assuming positions of rule, opting to act as servant. · Finally, Christians engage in the war of the Lamb knowing that death is itself victory. He believe that the strength of this approach is that it avoids creating a dualism between the moral standards applies to Christians and the moral standards applied to non-Christians. o Lastly, he provides a Christological argument for liberating Christ, including a discussion of liberation theory

3) John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"

· Principles restricting conduct of war o (i) The aim of a just war waged by a just well-ordered people is a just and lasting peace among peoples, and especially with the people's present enemy. o (ii) Well-ordered peoples do not wage war against each other (§§5, 8), but only against non-well-ordered states whose expansionist aims threaten the security and free institutions of well-ordered regimes and bring about the war.7 o (iii) In the conduct of war, well-ordered peoples must carefully distinguish three groups: the outlaw state's leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. The reason why a well-ordered people must distinguish between an outlaw state's leaders and officials and its civilian population is as follows: since the outlaw state is not well- ordered, the civilian members of the society cannot be those who organized and brought on the war.8 This was done by the leaders and officials, assisted by other elites who control and staff the state apparatus. They are responsible; they willed the war; and, for doing that, they are criminals. But the civilian population, often kept in ignorance and swayed by state propaganda, is not responsible. This is so even if some civilians knew better yet were enthusiastic for the war. No matter what the initial circumstances of war (for instance, the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Ferdinand, by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo in June 1914; or the ethnic hatreds in the Balkans and elsewhere today), it is the leaders, and not the common civilians, of nations who finally initiate the war. In view of these principles, both the fire-bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in the spring of 1945 and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all primarily attacks on civilian populations, were very grave wrongs, as they are now widely, though not generally, seen to have been. o (iv) Well-ordered peoples must respect, so far as possible, the human rights of the members of the other side, both civilians and soldiers, for two reasons. One is simply that the enemy, like all others, has these rights by the Law of Peoples (§10.3). The other reason is to teach enemy soldiers and civilians the content of those rights by the example set in the treatment they receive. In this way the meaning and significance of human rights are best brought home to them. o (v) Continuing the thought of teaching the content of human rights, the next principle is that well-ordered peoples are by their actions and proclamations, when feasible, to foreshadow during a war both the kind of peace they aim for and the kind of relations they seek. By doing so, they show in an open way the nature of their aims and the kind of people they are. These last duties fall largely on the leaders and officials of the governments of well-ordered peoples, since only they are in the position to speak for the whole people and to act as this principle requires. Although all the preceding principles also specify duties of statesmanship, this is peculiarly true of (iv) and now (v). The way a war is fought and the deeds done in ending it live on in the historical memory of societies and may or may not set the stage for future war. It is always the duty of statesmanship to take this longer view. o (vi) Finally, practical means-end reasoning must always have a restricted role in judging the appropriateness of an action or policy. This mode of thought—whether carried on by utilitarian reasoning, or by cost-benefit analysis, or by weighing national interests, or by other possible ways—must always be framed within and strictly limited by the preceding principles and assumptions. The norms of the conduct of war set up certain lines we must not cross, so that war plans and strategies and the conduct of battles must lie within the limits they specify. The only exception is in situations of supreme emergency, which I will discuss below. · The ideal statemen is suggested by the saying: the political looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation · Supreme emergency exemption o Permits us to set aside, in certain special circumstance, the strict status of civilians that normally prevents their being directly attacked in war. · Christian Doctrine: o "The Law of Peoples is both similar to and different from the familiar Christian natural law doctrine of just war.29 They are similar in that both imply that universal peace among nations is possible, if all peoples act according to either the Christian natural law doctrine or the Law of Peoples, which does not preclude the natural law or any other reasonable comprehensive doctrine. However, it is important here to take a step back and to see where the essential difference lies between the two; that is, in how they are conceived § Natural law is thought to be part of the law of G_D that can be known through the natural powers of reason by our study of the structure of the world. By contrast, the Law of Peoples falls within the domain of the political as a political conception. That t is, though the Law of Peoples could be supported but the Christian doctrine of natural law, its principles are expressed solely in terms of a political conception and its political values." § Concluding reflections · "The conflicts between democracy and reasonable religious doctrines and among reasonable religious doctrines themselves are greatly mitigated and contained within the bounds of reasonable principles of justice in a constitutional democratic society." · "The crucial fact for the problem of war is that constitutional democratic societies do not go to war with one another (§5). This is not because the citizenry of such societies is peculiarly just and good, but more simply because they have no cause to go to war with one another. Compare democratic societies with the nation-states of the earlier modern period in Europe. England, France, Spain, Hapsburg Austria, Sweden, and others fought dynastic wars for territory, true religion, for power and glory, and a place in the sun. These were wars of Monarchs and Royal Houses; the internal institutional structure of these societies made them inherently aggressive and hostile to other states. The crucial fact of peace among democracies rests on the internal structure of democratic societies, which are not tempted to go to war except in self- defense or in grave cases of intervention in unjust societies to protect human rights. Since constitutional democratic societies are safe from each other, peace reigns among them"

2) Saint Augustine, City of G_D

· Question, why does the divine mercy extend even to the godless and ungrateful? o "Augustine quotes Matthew 5:45 for an answer: Sun and rain fall alike on the righteous and the unrighteous. God's patience is there for the wicked in the same way that God's "chastisement" can strengthen the good. The question, Augustine says, is not why good things happen to bad people or vice versa, but how people read and deal with their experiences in this world." · Christian suffering leads to moral improvement because its seen through the eye of faith. A Christian, perceiving the world's suffering, reflect on their own complicity in sin. · Notes that many question have died from disease: o Responds that "everyone dies sooner or later, and that in spite of the body's instinctive squeamishness, it makes no sense to fear death if one is living a good life and has a true belief in the life to come. Better to die a lowly death as a Christian than a comfortable death as a godless man." § Does not mean that the living can disrespect the body before death. It isn't just an article of clothing, but part of a person's nature · Christian woman suicide and sexual crime. Don't admire them for their suicide: "In short, it's not possible to be polluted by another person's lustful actions. Purity is a mental virtue, a choice of inner acceptance or rejection, and being the victim of sexual crime can't affect one's inner attitude." Keep a clear conscience and shun suicide o Also, love thy neighbor and shun it again § "However, rules against murder don't mean that there should be absolutely no killing. What matters is whether one is working as an instrument of God. Augustine raises the example of Abraham, whose willingness to kill Isaac was a matter not of bloodlust but of obedience." · Says Christians have the consolations of pilgrims: know where they're headed, they can enjoy—and endure—this life. · "Augustine mentions "two cities" of the world: the City of God and the City of God's enemies. Nonetheless, some in the enemy city will be converted and some in the City of God will not reach the final destination. Augustine notes: "In this world, in fact, these two cities remain intermixed and intermingled with each other until they are finally separated at the last judgment." In the pages that follow, Augustine intends to relate the origin, course, and appointed end of these two cities" § "Augustine's intention in the rest of this book will be to explicate the nature of the worldly and divine Cities, with the help of God and with the aim of enhancing the glory of His City. Augustine will therefore examine the accusations of those who say that Rome fell because of a lack of pagan sacrifice. He'll consider troubles in Rome that happened before sacrifice was forbidden; by demonstrating the good that the true God has done for Rome; and by answering those who argue that the Roman gods should be worshipped with an eye on immortality rather than earthly gain." · Claims lack of any divine guidance in the establishment of Roman law, and the subsequent decadence of Roman cities, demonstrate that the false gods had no interest in protecting those who worshipped them. Indeed, they seemed more invested in Roman suffering.

2) Brian Orend, The Morality of War

· Summary of war: o "At the end of the war, Saddam was in a very difficult position. On the one hand, he was still in power and had prevented radical ayatollahs from taking over his country. On the other, the war pushed him into debt, and he faced huge reconstruction costs. He asked both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to forgive the debts he owed them, on grounds he "saved" them from being swept out of power by the ayatollahs. The two countries refused, and Saddam grew furious. His other big problem was that Iraq's military was restless—and huge. Having grown to over one million men during the long Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's military was disappointed that Saddam had called off the war against their despised enemy. Moreover, Iraq's military has long played important roles in various coups and revolutions within Iraq. Saddam feared armed revolt. So, he hit upon a "solution": invade and conquer Kuwait. This would occupy the army, cancel part of Iraq's debt, and give Iraq control over a lucrative asset it could use to help pay for reconstruction. And it might just scare Saudi Arabia into debt forgiveness as well. So, the order was given and then executed in the hot days of August 1990. None of these reasons, of course, justify Iraq's invasion—they merely explain it. War for any kind of economic gain is strictly ruled out, as is the old politician's trick of using war abroad to try to solve (or, at least, distract attention from) problems at home. Saddam did try to argue that Kuwait had been driving down the world price of oil—and thus Iraq's own revenues— by supplying too much oil to the world market. But, again, even if that were true—and it is not clear it was—that's an economic issue and thus not one where military force is a proportionate response. (Remember our forestry example earlier.) Saddam then tried to suggest that—since the ancient Otto- man empire used to administer both Iraq and Kuwait together—Kuwait "belonged to" Iraq anyway, as its "Nineteenth province." Even if it were true, it would be like now arguing that, since Canada used to be part of the British Empire, it should once again today be run from the Mother of All Parliaments in London. Such an argument ignores everything which has happened between then and now—notably, how a new political community came into existence and came therefore to deserve separate protection. Saddam, finally, tried to argue that Kuwait was stealing Iraq's oil by "slant-drilling" across the border into Iraq's wells. This was, however, a lie; and, even if it were true, it would still just be an economic issue wherein demanding compensation would be appropriate but not armed invasion. Saddam's base motives of plunder and pleasing his military became undeniably clear when he authorized them, in the fall of 1990, to pillage Kuwait: raping women at will; stealing private property on a whim; crushing any Kuwaiti resistance; and wreaking havoc constantly. Amnesty International's December 1990 special report, on the behavior of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait, makes for chilling—even revolting—reading in this regard. We know, from what we have already established, that this kind of freely- chosen, flagrant aggression causes a state to lose its usual right not to be subjected to armed attack, either by the victim community or others coming to its aid. Kuwait's puny armed forces quickly succumbed during the August 1990 invasion. In the fall of 1990, the international community—led by America—generated a huge military build-up in neighboring Saudi Arabia (i.e., "Operation Desert Shield") and reflected on what to do.Perhaps it might here be objected that the theory developed thus far establishes that states forfeit rights against attack only when they unjustly attack other states which do not deserve it (i.e., states which are minimally just). While Iraq's attack against Kuwait was unjust—because of the political and economic motives—was Kuwait itself a minimally just state deserving of protection? Well, Kuwait was widely recognized as the legitimate government of that territory; indeed, it had membership in the UN. Kuwait was also, at that time, not involved in violating the rights of other states; unlike Iraq, Kuwait was not using its army to invade, pillage and overthrow foreign governments. But was the Kuwaiti state seen as legitimate by its own people, and making every reasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of its own people? When regular elections are not held, it is hard to judge whether a people genuinely approve of its regime. Plus, the rights of women in most Muslim countries are often seen as not being as fully realized as they should. Does this mean the Kuwaiti regime was not legitimate? It certainly raises issues. But three points stand out: 1) there was uncoerced social peace in Kuwait prior to Iraq's invasion; 2) the Kuwait regime did not attack and brutalize its own people the way the invading Iraqis did in the fall of 1990 (thus the Kuwaiti government had a much better claim to rule that society than Iraq did); and 3) the Kuwaiti regime no longer existed when the West went to war in January 1991, anyway. And most Western societies, including America, satisfy the criteria of minimal justice. The West went to war to defend the Kuwaiti people from Iraqi conquest and brutalization, not so much to restore the old Kuwaiti regime. The old regime was restored, it is true, in the spring of 1991 after the war was quickly won by America and its allies. This does not mean the war was unjust in its beginnings. The war may not have had all the desirable effects, but the war was just (in its cause) as a war of other-defense against a country which committed aggression perhaps not the very second when it crossed Kuwait's borders but certainly when it unleashed its campaign of plunder and brutality against an unarmed Kuwaiti population. Failure to resist such aggressive attacks rewards the aggressor and, as such, structures incentives in favor of more aggression in international society. It also penalizes the victim, by doing nothing to reverse the effects of the aggression. By attacking the Kuwaiti people, Saddam's Iraq committed aggression. When it did so, it forfeited its rights not to be attacked in response. There is very high consensus that this war was just in its cause, and indeed it was authorized by numerous UNSC resolutions and supported by a clear majority of just war theorists · Just cause, right intention, public declaration of war by a proper authority, last resort, probability of success, proportionality § 3) Jus ad Bellum #2: Non-Classical Wars · Terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism, civil wars · Anticipatory attack vs. preventative war o US 2003 invasion of Iraq was an anticipatory attack looking for WMDs § 4) Jus in Bello #1: Just Conduct in War & 5) Jus in Bello #2: Supreme Emergencies · "In the midst of war, a state should adhere to two sets of rules: one external, the other internal. The external rules are the familiar jus in bello rules, and they regulate one's conduct with the enemy. They include discrimination and non-combatant immunity; benevolent quarantine for POWs; due care for civilians; the DDE; proportionality; no means mala in se or "methods evil in themselves"; no reprisals; and obey all international laws on weapons prohibition. The internal rules, just as important but not stressed nearly enough, concern one's conduct with one's own citizens, be they civilian or soldier. Ultimately, these rules boil down to the need to realize their human rights as best as can reasonably be expected during wartime." · Discrimination and non-combatant immunity, prohibited weapons

2) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War

· The failure was the ideological driven policy of the Bush administration, which from the beginning favored regime change and war over containment. Also, the state that opposed the war on the grounds that containment was working were not themselves making it work. They were not participants in, or even supporters of the containment system. o Lesson: if measures short of war are to work against evil or dangerous regimes, they have to be the common work of a group of nations. They require multilateral commitment. Collective security us be a collective project. § Lastly, a note for the use of force, need jus ad bellum to be extended to jus ad vim; thus, it will cover just and unjust uses of force (just short of war) like containment. o Preventive war is not justifiable either in standard just war theory or in international law, but what we might think of as "preventative force" can be justified when we are dealing with a brutal regime that has acted aggressively or murderously in the past and give us reason to think that it might do so again. In such cases, we aim at containment but hope for regime change. o Summary: o The language with which we argue about war and justice is similar to the language of international law. But this is not a book about the positive laws of war. § Two reasons: legal positivism has become uninteresting in the age of the UN, and the law is oriented in terms of policy and goals § Walzer presents a theory about when war is and is not morally defensible. He expounds upon the legitimate means to fight in a war, holding all soldiers to the same standards. · Assuming a common sense of morality grounded in a belief in human rights, he challenges the realist paradigm of waging war, which places no restrictions on war and bases foreign policy decisions on interest, not values. Instead, Walzer argues that war is morally evaluated int 2 distinct ways, namely: o 1) jus ad bellum or justice of war o 2) jus in bello or justice in war. · The two are separable, as it is possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for those on the unjust side to fight justly o First address the justice of war—Jus ad Bellum: · He explains that the initiation of war is an act of aggression and therefore criminal. Such a violation of a state's territorial integrity and political sovereignty justifies a military response from the victim and other states. Walzer additionally considers a state justified in responding militarily to a sufficient, not necessarily imminent, threat of force. In addition to self-defense, Walzer permits military intervention in three cases: large-scale military struggles for secession or national liberation, a war in which another foreign power has already intervened, and cases of extreme violations of human rights. In such cases, the onus is on the intervening party to justify its involvement. Walzer sets a high bar in cases of humanitarian intervention, requiring massacres, enslavement, or similar violations: Wars are limited and should not become crusades. Walzer calls upon adversaries to make peace when goals have been reached, arguing that it is not typically necessary to replace the regime of a country. Acknowledging that unconditional surrender and regime change were indeed necessary in the case of Nazi Germany, Walzer maintains that the war with Japan could have ended with conditions and without the use of nuclear weapons in 1945.

3) Robert Williams, "Jus Post Bellum"

Class notes from IGA 220: · Orend's principles for jus post bellum: o 1) proportionality and publicity § The peace settlement should be both measure and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed o 2) Rights vindication: § The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war o 3) Distinction § Distinction must be made between leaders, soldiers, and civilians o 4) Compensation § Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination o 5) Rehabilitation § The postwar environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime.

3) Brian Orend, "Kant's Ethics of War and Peace"

Class notes from IGA 220: o Remember Just war § Step 1: presumption of mode of argument § 2: three questions that help you find a morally justifiable exception: why, when, how § From this, you get the seven criteria of just war o ONE: So why? Just cause question! (first question) § Augustine addressed this because he thought his Christian neighbors in Rome had to passivist. Augustine says war can only be taken when there has been a injury/offense/violation of one state to another. § War not to be understood as one more arrow in the quiver of a sovereign leader. Politically/legally, this is not obvious. Morals try to correct this. § So, what kind of violations justify use of force: 3 different kinds · 1) going to war to protect innocent human life being attacked. You can take life in order to protect life. o Walzer argues that best case study is aggression, to see how this plays out. § When state transgresses boundaries of another, there is a presumption that the use of force is a legitimate instrument to respond o There are broader uses in history: Punish, or to take back what had been taken from you in war § Lately been the defense of other though. Defense is the first reason. Aggression is · 2) to prevent large scale, systematic violation of human rights: genocide · 3) The idea that in a domestic setting, if government is making decent human life impossible, there is the "right to revolution" à when the prince become the enemy of everyone, then the prince has lost the right to rule o TWO: So, when? Proper Authority § Proper authority. War is dangerous, and gets worse than you think it will be, so who has the right to initiate this activity in the world? That's why you ask beyond Just Cause question. § Those who have responsibility for political community, has broader responsibilities that the average person, so a ruler has more rights than most people. The right to use force is connected with the responsibly to protect a community. · Accepts the idea that rights of state is what creates proper authority. This change after the 17th century. Westphalia Treaties: end religious wars in Europe. Gave view of international politics that has had some continued use to this time. It said 3 things o 1) world is made up of sovereign states - no one over you o 2) states should be pledged to nonintervention to internal affairs in another country o 3) need to secularize world politics. · This all said, even leaders today need legitimization through global agreement o THREE: So, Right Intention § Someone goes to war to confront an injustice that is going on and to create a basis to restore an order of peace · Orend and Walzer correct old way of saying this: to restore the status quo of what existed before. Their argument is that what existed before is what cause the war. So just work to secure peace. § Just war can never be fought out of hatred and revenge - Augustine. · Said the worst evils of war is not that people die, but the force that it sets loose in human nature because of war. War leads to the desire to dominate. § The morally concerned should treasure this. It takes political analysis to note right intention. o FOUR: Last Resort § War should be pursued as a last resort. § Another way to demonstrate that you can override assumption against the use of force, you try to find other ways to fight evil that is coming out: diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, sanctions, etc. · Note, that there is always (Spitzer) time for another convention in Geneva. o FIVE: Moral Possibility of Success § Lives at intersection between moral purpose and strategic capability. § Danger? Can send people to fight a known losing battle (suicide). You can fight a war that goes on forever, disposing of life and limb o SIX: So, When: Proportionality § Appears twice in just war ethic - when and how § About measure of the evil that needs to be opposed and the kind of force that you need to defeat it. Right intention and just cause are not enough. § To the best of your ability to judge don't fight a war that brings more harm than good. § Needs to be tested three times: before war, during the war (like in Vietnam), and after the wars have been fought (assess the lessons of the war in terms of proportionality) o SEVEN: So, How: The principle of Discrimination/ non competent immunity and Proportionality § Never acceptable to attack non-competence or civilians · Difference between intentional murder and war · Three types of moral rule: absolute rule (no exception), prima facia rule (can be overridden over the time) o Fr. Hehir determines it to be absolute! · Principle o 1) Non competent immunity: was strategy directly targeting civilians? Yes? Then not moral o 2) proportionality/principle of double effect § Double effect: sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or "double effect") of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end. · Action you take is justified, but you know flowing from it is evil. Can you still do it? The action is okay if o Action is right o Only intend good effect o Can't achieve in goal by violating non-competence discrimination o Even if have legitimate target, must assess what you are going to do, and what will be the proportional damage à don't want to kill civilians, but know you will, judge proportionality. o Just ad bellum (the right to go to war) vs jus in bello (how to fight) à Orend paper § Thinking of just war ethic, as a block with the 7 criteria, there are two way to distinguish it § Just ad bellum à why and when questions. If cannot satisfy these things, the war is questionable or just wrong. Assuming you can, things then turn to jus in bello à here the two principle of How, non-competent immunity and principle of double effect come into use. · Jus post bellum à how you end a war, this is new o Take ww2, clearly had jus ad bellum, but obliteration bombing as a policy, bombing civilians, this principle was adopted on both sides. Had a compromised jus in bello, but no one talked about this while fighting! o Just and justified § Idea of just war is that force can be used to prevent injustice à just cause. Justification, you examine war as a whole, not just cause, and look at total war and decided if it passes the test of justification. o Intention à comes up in jus ad bellum and jus in bello § In jus ad bellum, why are you going to war - competition, revenge, etc.? what is you purpose and motive. Again, Augustin say you can't go into war out of hate § Jus in bello, have to find what constitutes legitimate targets and illegitimate targets. What is you purpose, for example, of carrying out a bombing policy? o Goal in the war to break an enemy will to fight à seems contrary to just war theory. § Fr. Say it is, and in military strategy, there is always the goal of breaking the will of the enemy. It is a questionable strategy, and even more so when you consider how you are going to break the will. § If you're going to break the will of a population, by for example bombing, doing something that is so painful that it will force them into submission, it is immoral. Strategists are much more willing to use this than moralist. § Curious then? Have to break will of citizens, and not just front line to win a war. That is why nondiscrimination is held as an absolute principle by some people

2) Jennifer Welsh, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria"

Class notes from IGA 220: o The article was given because the country was almost the first of major intervention in the 1990s - Libya you have interventions in the 21st century § The article does not simply describe what happens but brings out judgment and consequences. It considers a decision to go into Somalia, the surgical (meaning "quick") strike, many people thought it would be an in-and-out - in the particular case of Somalia, to solve the food problem being lodged at the docks by war lords. Moreover, the idea was you go in a clear the way to help starving people. It says there is no such thing as a surgical intervention - a short term. · If this proposition is taken as a policy proposition, will nations stay away from humanitarian intervention, or go in knowing that they are doing so for the long haul? So, will this statement, that there is no surgical strike, help people generate support or not? · Do you think strategic thinkers I the military would differ from elected individuals? · Normative framework (what should be): three dimensional o Moral perspective: ethical framework would be Just War ethic o Legal: international law and UN charter on use of force in 20th century o Political: Westphalia organization of states à sovereignty and non-intervention are the two principles that govern this, and they're reflected in international order and UN charter § Legal/political will at times clash with the moral! Legal supports non-intervention, like the Westphalian order. Moral demands intervention · Kosovo intervention by NATO à legally wrong and morally right. The moral argument is more interventionist than the legal argument. · Three things to consider: o 1) What is conception of moral community o 2) What is the understanding of war o 3) What does the moral order say about intervention and what does the legal? § War was understood as an instrument of justice in Medieval times, it was a penal conception of war. in that framework, intervention was regarded as obligatory at times. St. Ambrose: he who knows evil is being done, and you do nothing about it, you are not different than the evil does. Great saint, scary potential prime minister § Reduce the reasons for force as much as you can, inside the political (religious, economic) community. In 20th-21st century, our community is not as integrate as medieval community, or as atomistic as the recognition of sovereignty would have us to believe. That is why you have intervention. During the Cold War, the legal argument was · Proxy wars vs humanitarian intervention o Proxy was ideological and not normative, it was self-interested, unlike humanitarian intervention. · In 1990s, go from bipolar world to multipolar war: and have 2 changes o 1) structure of power: debates about how the new multipolar order should be structured. § Sovereignty challenged normatively and morally. o 2) intervention undergoing a critique. Tested in the 1990s, because with danger of great power politics receding, at the same time, states began to explode from the inside! (Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, etc.) § Enormous human suffering, large scale human rights violations/loss of human rights. In that setting, people asked, what should be done - people starving, genocide, ancient conflicts reemerging? Less of a concern about the escalation of a great power's involvement, and more about should intervention happen or not! o Question: if people are calling for help from inside of a country: should we help, who should do it, and under what term. What do you think about moral, legal, and political frameworks? o Theories of international relations: realism and liberalism § Realism: value order in world politics, protecting the sovereignty of the state. Believe interventions should be rare, interest driven, successful § Liberals: believe that norms should enter into politics, also that states should have the right to decide their future. They are ambivalent · Also, small states don't find the idea of intervention to be attractive, even if it is necessary. Large states don't worry about intervention because large states are not intervened upon!

1) Samantha Power, "Bystanders of Genocide"

o Considers the US government's failure to respond to Rwanda, providing a clearer picture than was previously possible of the interplay among people, motives, and events. IT reveals that the US government knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives but passe dup countless opportunities to intervene § The US did virtually nothing "to try to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit US policy objective § The American system remained predicated on the noblest of values while allowing the vilest of crimes · Romeo Dallaire: o Major general in the Canadian army who at the time of the genocide was the commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda

1) Robert Williams, "Jus Post Bellum"

o Contributes to the recent efforts to develop jus post bellum principles by first noting some of the ways that jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations serve to constrain what can legitimately be done after war. We argue, however, that the constraints grounded in traditional just war theory do not offer sufficient guidance for judging postwar behavior and that principles grounded in the concept of human rights are needed to complete our understanding of what constitutes a just war. A just peace exists when the human rights of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the war § "The just war tradition is based on the paradox that killing may be necessary to save lives, that the devastation of war may be required to prevent the destruction of deeply held values./ o Jus ad bellum § moral reasoning that justifies the resort to war—proper authority, just cause, last resort, right intention, and perhaps other concerns o Jus in bello § legitimacy of the means used to wage war · "Conventional division sometimes obscures the fundamental inseparability of motive and means. If war can only be justified by a concern for the lives and dignity - in essence, the human rights - of those we seek to defend (whether our own citizens or the victims of attack or oppression elsewhere), then how we wage that war will matter a great deal. It is inconsistent to go to war for the defense of human rights if such a war is likely to result in the deaths of extraordinary numbers of the civilians we seek to save or, on balance, increase their misery. Likewise, it is inconsistent to claim to be waging a war for the defense of lives from future terrorist attacks if such a war is likely to increase those attacks or result, on balance, in less security" § A just war is one that seeks to right a wrong, and, not incidentally, at a cost that will not leave us wondering whether or not the wrong that has been righted might have been preferable to the wrongs we have left behind. o It must be expected to produce less evil than a reliance on diplomacy, less evil than economic sanctions, less evil than passive resistance, less evil than doing nothing—less evil, that is, than anything we can plausibly offer as an alternative. · "What happens after the shooting stops and the surrender is signed is important to the moral justification of warfare, just as the means employed is." o Grotius (1949:375) approvingly quoted Aristotle's view that "the purpose of war is to remove the things that disturb peace." o Aquinas (1916:II:2, Q. 40, Art. 1) maintained that a just war is one that is waged with proper authority, just cause, and right intention." § Objections to the argument that just post bellum concerns are adequately addressed by jus ad bellum principles: · 1) Consider right intention: o The right intention principle prohibits the pursuit of unjust ends. To go to war with right intention, therefore, is to fight for a just peace. · 2) Relates to the potential for changes in the moral landscape in the course of a war. Dealing with situations "on the ground" obscures events not only for the individual soldier but for those who make policy as well. o Question: What ought to be the foundation of jus post bellum principles? First, a reasonable account of the basis for existing just war theory: § Just war theory is commonly regarded as an artifact of Christian ethics—with good reason—but to leave the argument there is to ignore major difference between Augustine and Grotius, to name but two. It is also to smooth over profound differences in the medieval world and the modern world. There also an appeal to Natural law, which has offered a broader foundation for just war theory, one that would appeal both to Christian and to astute non-Christians. · Walzer: § "Nevertheless, as Walzer is quick to point out, a "doctrine of human rights" is central to his understanding of just war theory. Without attempting to ground the theory of human rights in natural law or utilitarianism or various accounts of human qualities, Walzer (2000:xxi-xxii) asserts that "the arguments we make about war are most fully understood ... as efforts to recognize and respect the rights of individual and associated men and women." · Argues that his exceptions to the general rule of non-intervention are based on standards that "reflect deep and valuable, through in their applications difficult and problematic, commitments to human rights. o In spite of the centrality of human rights in Walzer's account of the war convention, his just war theory, like traditional accounts, us fundamentally centered on the state. His concern, to put it differently, is more with the ethics of national security than with the ethics of what has more recently come to be called human security. § "After major combat operations in the Iraq War ended, many of America's European allies cited what Secretary of State Colin Powell called the "Pottery Barn rule": "You break it, you own it" · "The just war tradition, after all, is a set of standards for moral reasoning concerning means and ends in the use of force. It is not a checklist or a decision tree capable of producing definitive conclusions. Principles merely assist us in doing the difficult work of moral reasoning; they do not absolve us of responsibility for that work." § Another quote: the status of soldiers changes with the onset of peace. Soldiers become, for as long as their presence is necessary, the moral (and sometimes the functional) equivalents of policemen.

3) Lisa Cahill, "Theological Contexts of Just War Theory and Pacifism"

o Cahill's thoughts § Pacifism is not a theory at all, but a way of life, in a sense which is not true in a parallel manner for just war theory · It is a communal practice in imitation of Christ's servanthood and cross. It imitates the qualities of G_D disclosed in Jesus Christ—mercy, forgiveness, inclusiveness. Finds context in the NT § Just war theory has 2 historical forms o 1) paradoxical and dialectical, it takes its lead from Augustine and retains that the biblical love command as a function moral guide even when killing is undertaken o 2) love as a motive for social action and mounts the discussion on natural, rational, philosophical, or public terms. § Aquinas is a leader here. · Paradox of Just War theory as a Christian enterprise: a religion of love paradoxically promotes a theory of killing. Says Hehir is writing our of a Thomistic version of just war theory, despite the fact that recent papal intervention have exhibited more than the usual does of Augustinian pull about whether just war is really justified.

1) Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum

o Introduction: § Examined the potential merits and criticisms of jus post bellum—not from one disciplinary standpoint, but from the angle of multiple disciplines and perspectives § Just post bellum: has its most traditional and systemic grounding in just war theory. Brian Orend has defined jus post bellum as a natural corollary of just ad bellum and jus in bello. · "It seems, then, that just war theorists must consider the justice not only of the resort to war in the first place, and not only of the conduct within war, once it has begun, but also of the termination phase of the war, in terms of the cessation of hostilities and the move back from war to peace. It seems, in short, that we also need to detail a set of just war norms or rules for what we might call jus post bellum: justice after war" · Outside of just war theory, the concept is even more terra nova § Questions: Which norms fit within jus post bellum? Are there secondary norms as well as primary norms? What are the sources of these norms? Do they apply equally in all types of armed conflict (whether internal, international, or something else)? Do they apply equally across all temporal phases of a conflict? Do they apply equally (or at all) to non-state actors, coalitions of states, as well as states? How does a contextualized approach work in practice? How do they interact with other related normative frameworks? How would jus post bellum impact different constituencies, such as women, local populations, or insurgents? What is the value of a common frame of reference and a cohesive approach to peacebuilding? § Definition: · Larry May: building on the historical and philosophical foundation of the concept, argues that jus post bellum "concerns the moral and legal consideration that pertain to situation where a war or armed conflict has come to an end"—jus post bellum as lex ferenda; even if its principles are not codified in "black letter law," it can still be binding from a moral standpoint. · Mark Evans: it is "the account of what justice permits and/or requires in the ending and aftermath of war"—bearing a "legal" and "moral" treatment · Dieter Fleck: presents a "legal" definition of just post bellum, arguing that the complexity of post-conflict settings may justify the consideration of just post bellum as a distinct legal branch, or a "partly independent legal framework," positing, however, that establishing its norms will require both formal and informal approaches, cooperative action, and creative flexibility · Jen Iverson: takes Fleck's thoughts further, arguing that jus post bellum is best understood as "by definition primary a system or body of law—or legal principles/norms—that apply during the transition from conflict. · Could also be considered a broader, functional point of view that captures more aspects of an area rich with potential theoretical, legal, and practical scholarship. · James Gallen: task of jus post bellum as to restoring civic trust and rule of law—to offer a description of the existing international law, policy, and theory as applied to given transitions and seek to justify this practice by reference to its value goals in a unified or coherent fashion." · Jennifer Easterday: takes the view of a broad "inter-public" approach to law in jus post bellum, considering that the "las" of jus post bellum is comprised of not only the laws and norms stemming from settled bodies of international law, but also of developing normative practices of nonstate actors and organizations. Thus, she considers it from a functional perspective, arguing that it creates valuable sites of coordination and discourse in post-conflict situations—she argues that this holistic view of jus post bellum would fill gaps currently found in the law and practice of post-conflict peacebuilding. § The book does the following 6 things · (1) to critically investigate the contours, meaning, and critiques of jus post bellum, including its relationship to related paradigms. · (2) to analyze the treatment of the concept across disciplines, and to explore how it connects to causes of armed conflict and strategies and critiques of peacebuilding, including the very definitions of "armed conflict" and "peace" · (3) to clarify different legal meanings and components of the concept, including its implications for contemporary politics and practice and its relationship to "jus ad bellum" and "jus in bello" · (4) to highlight dilemmas in relation to the ending of conflict, including the distinction between "conflict" and "post-conflict" (i.e., indicators for the ending of conflicts, "exit" strategies, the relationship to sustainable peace and prevention strategies); · (5) to distil a set of principles in key areas (sovereignty, consent, reconstruction, derogation, environmental protection, accountability) that inform the creation and sustainability of resilient and peaceful post-conflict societies; and · (6) to clarify the function of, need for, and opportunities for developing the study of jus post bellum.

1) Brian Orend, The Morality of War

o Introduction: consider war as Carl von Clausewitz suggest when he said that it is "the continuation of policy by other means:" "War is the intentional use of mass force to resolve disputes over governance. War is, indeed, governance by bludgeon. Ultimately, war is profoundly anthropological: it is about which group of people gets to say what goes on in a given territory." o The book focuses on the "big picture" of war—the more important ethical principles behind it and how such principles apply to actual cases of armed conflict. · Just war Just war theory's core premise is that sometimes countries can be morally justified in going to war. Pacifism, by contrast, is best understood as the view that war is never morally justified. Realism, the third big perspective on this issue, disagrees with both pacifism and just war theory by suggesting that war has nothing to do with morality—it is all about naked self-interest, survival, and the pursuit of power over one's rivals. o Chapters § 1) History of Just War Theory o "Nearly all major religious documents—from the Bible to the Bhagavad-Gita, from the Tao-teching to the Koran—refer to warfare and moralize about it." · Just War Theory: o Early Christianity and AugustineàThe Dark Ages and Holy WarsàAquinas and Legitimacy Vitoria and the Spanish ConquestàGrotius and the wars of ReligionàLocke, Kant, and the Revolutionary EraàThe coming of codification—WWI and collapseà Rebirth and WWIIàOur time () § 2) Jus ad Bellum #1: Resisting Aggression o Core proposition of just war theory, uniting all its theories, is this: sometimes, it is at least morally permissible for a political community to go to war. this is to say that there can be such a thing as a morally justified war; and WWII, on the part of the Allies, is often trotted out as the definitive modern example. Some even refer to this conflict as "The Good War." § The 1991 Persian Gulf War · In august of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait—large, militaristic country aggressively attacking a smaller neighbor. Why? o Saddam had many reasons, none of them justified but most of them revolving around the fact he had just finished a miserable, destructive conflict with Iran. § From 1980-89, Iran and Iraq slugged it out in a very expensive and bloody war with roots stretching far back in the past. 1 million people lost lives in the Iran-Iraq War, in which Saddam portrayed himself as the savior of moderate Muslims from the fury of radical Islam, which had just come to power in a revolution in Iran in 1979.

1) John Murray, "Remarks on the Moral Problem of War"

o Catholic perspective on use of force, technology, and the Church § Three distinct standpoints from which it is possible to launch a discussion of the problem of war presently · 1) consider the possibilities of destruction and ruin, both physical and human, that are afforded by existent and project developments in weapons technology o No inherent limits to the measure of chaos that war might entail § Christian pacifism: · Relative pacifist (war evil because weapons of today are so destructive—popular for many Protestant sects) vs. absolute pacifist (war is evil due to use of force/violence—not completely/publicly held by the Church) · 2) considering the present historical situation of humanity as dominated by the fact of Communism · 3) considering that today there exists a mode of international organization that is committed by its charter to the preservation of peace by pacific settlement of international disputes.

2) Larry May, Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law

o Chapter 2: Larry May § Examining reparations and restitution through the lens of transitional justice, contest the conventional view that justice requires that people should get what is their due. In opposing the standard view, May argues that, after mass atrocity, in restitution and reparations: · 1) those wronged should sometimes demand less than their due · 2) compensation should not necessarily be paid by the wrongdoer but by the one who is in a position to do so. o The hope is that these two will more effectively move war-torn states to a just and lasting peace—the aim of transitional justice—with priority given to those who are the most vulnerable. § Begins this by tracing the origins of transitional justice back to the concept of Meionexia—taking too little—and its opposite pleionexia—takin too much · Employs Aristotle and Grotius o Argues that in some cases, it is a virtue for the just victors of a battle to temper their compensatory claims, even if this means taking less than they are justified in demanding in order to facilitate the transition to peace. § Goes on to reexamine restitution and reparations · Defines restitution as the process of restoring what has been stolen or lost to a rightful owner. Reparations are due when one damages an item or relationship yet, unlike restitution, the item remains in the original owner's possession. o May's account acknowledges that the wrongdoer has a duty to give restitution and reparations for the harmed committed, yet unlike the traditional account, he does not limit this duty solely to the wrongdoers; rather, he argues that the focus should be placed on rectifying the harms does so as to ensure that at least one of the goals of restitution and reparations. o Chapter 3: Phil Clark § Begins the string of essays concerning punishment after war. States that central to both of the key frameworks explore in this anthology—jus post bellum and transitional justice—is a focus on addressing past crimes through international law. · However, he argues that the current top-down approach that emerged in the aftermath of WWII, what he calls the Nuremberg model, is becoming increasingly outdated in the face of decentralized conflicts where non-state perpetrators (like economic actors that Kyriakakis will highlight) play major roles. This new type of conflict means that trials cannot be relegated only to those highest in the chain of command. o Notes that the community-based courts in Rwanda called gacaca—modified customary practices that acr as courts—challenge the Nuremberg model, and concludes that it proves to be an effective way of dealing with the challenges that modern combat pose for the Nuremberg model. o Chapter 4: Jovana Davidovic § Offers a deeply insightful look into the nearly three decades of oppression suffered by East Timor, and the subsequent and woefully inadequate attempt to implement traditional justice mechanisms, specifically in terms of persecution of those responsible. Says that due to lack of convergence of various commissions on how to arrange the prosecutorial courts, a local ad hoc tribunal emerged, which proved to be a monumental failure. · Two lessons to be learned from this failure o 1) in most cases, secondary aims thwart the primary aims. That is, single-goaled mechanisms or institutions of transitional justice have a better chance at being successful o 2) if an institution is not capable of meeting its primary transitional justice goals, then arguing in favor of the institution by pointing to secondary objective that it might fulfill fails to give sufficient reasons for supporting it.

1) John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"

o Introduction: law of peoples = a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice. Book considers how the content of the Law of People might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar to, but more general than, the idea I called justice as fairness. The idea of justice is based on the familiar idea of the social contract, and the procedure followed before the principles of right and justice are selected and agreed upon is in some ways that same in both the domestic and the international. The book will discuss how the Law of Peoples fulfills certain conditions, which justify calling the Society of peoples a realistic utopia and shall also return to and explain why I have used the term "peoples" and not "states." § In a Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls indicates how justice as fairness can be extended to international law for the limited purpose of judging the aims and limits of just war. he goes further in this book § Theory of Justice summary: · Argues in support of Rawls' theory of justice as fairness, which commands: o Equal basic rights o Equality of opportunity o Raising the prospects of the least advantaged in society · To do this, Rawls employs a though experiment call the original position. In the original position, mutually-disinterested rational persons, in a hypothetical original situation, shielded from the particulars of society and their place in it by what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance, agree on the kind of society in which they choose to live. This thought experiment leads Rawls down a social contractarian philosophical journey that addresses distributive justice from a Kantian perspective, with the aim of offering an alternative to utilitarian doctrines. o Through the original position, Rawls reasons the two principles of justice, which dictate that: § Each person has the same claim to a full scheme of equal basic liberties § That offices and positions are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and § That social and economic inequalities must be arranged so that they benefit the least-advantaged members of society. Rawls refers to this last proposition as the difference principle. · An important element of Rawls' 2 principles is that the first, that requiring equal liberty, is given priority of the second principle, and within the second principle equal opportunity is given priority to the difference principle. This theory includes: o 4-stage sequence o Addressed the problem of intergenerational justice o Argues for inclusion of natural duties and obligation withing the conception of justice o Justifies civil disobedience and conscientious refusal as essential to any conception of justice, and addresses the good, the right, self-respect, the excellences, shame, envy, and the principles of moral psychology. · It's all aimed to be an alternative to utilitarianism · Final articulation of two principles o "First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. o "Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. § "First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. § "The Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare): The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. There are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship" (266).

3) Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibilities of Victory"

o "As I have mentioned earlier, some critics of the 2003 invasion of Iraq argued that it was the United States' failure to properly prepare for the peace that undermined the war's legitimacy" § As the article continues · There is a broad consensus among theorist of jus post bellum that if a government falls as a result of just war, then the victor acquires all the responsibilities of government. o "Where wars settled by negotiation, such negotiations usually focused on the redistribution of territories, financial payments for damages and the future control of armaments. Since 1945, however, both types of war-ending have become rarer. On the one hand, a significant body of law has developed prohibiting both the alteration of borders by force (uti posseditis) and foreign rule, the latter under the commonly accepted norm that sovereignty derives from the will of the people.82 On the other hand, various international institutions, ad hoc coalitions and individual states have intervened as peacemakers with greater frequency. What might be labelled 'new peacemaking' goes beyond measures designed to help belligerents reach compromise and includes building political structures that respect human rights, permit self-determination, punish wrongdoers, and promote social, economic and legal reconstruction." § This perspective, which is implicitly founded on the view that peace should be understood positively as the acquisition of certain societal goods (such as the fulfilment of basic needs and rights, mechanism for non-violent conflict resolution, an inclusive political and economic order), insist s that those who set themselves up as peacemakers acquire the responsibility to help build positive peace. · Although the UN has developed a track record of running transitional governments, dating back to the trusteeships of the 1950s, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission goes some way towards formalizing the idea that international society bears a collective responsibility for rebuilding states and societies after war o Noting Iraq, it suggests that international society may acquire the responsibilities even if its peace and security institutions played no part in initiating, or intervening, in the war that precipitated the need for transitional government. o On transitional government, from a maximalist perspective, a perspective might be to argue that the distinction between occupation and the assumption of government based on the 1907 Hague regulations, so crucial to the minimalist case, is obsolete. · In short, maximalist case insists that victors are obliged to do more than simply refrain from unduly harming the vanquished. For, because war always produces bad consequences, victors have a moral and legal obligation to do more than merely satisfy their won rights afterwards. They must also remove the seeds of potential future war by punishing those guilty of initiating aggressive war and positively assisting the civilian population in the building of legitimate and peaceful variants of maximalism suggest that these additional duties only accrue after certain types of war (such as war against a genocidal state), other variants insists that the responsibilities inhere after all types of war when the government has collapsed. This begs the additional question of what responsibilities as s victor has towards enemy civilians if the vanquished states does not collapse, especially in cases where the vanquished state was both the cause of war and a persistent violator of its citizens rights. Iraq 1991 is a case in point. o 5 problems with maximalism § 1) maximalism lacks a justification on why the victors acquire extra responsibilities in every type of war § 2) maximalism is uncertain about the relationship between jus post bellum and the overall legitimacy of different types of war § 3) Although maximalism is an additional to minimalism not a replacement, there is the possibility that a maximalist approach might violate the requirements of minimalism § 4) maximalist ideas are almost utterly alien to classical Just War consideration—there is no sense either within that tradition or within international law more broadly that belligerents are morally or legally required to perform all the tasks expected by maximalists § 5) the maximalist approach assumes a general consensus on the most appropriate form of post conflict society whereas it could be plausibly argued that no such consensus exists. § So, the additional of a third element to just war thinking is much more problematic than has hitherto been acknowledged. 6 points that claim it is premature: · 1) The justice of the peace should be evaluated independently of the justice of the war. · 2) The responsibility to uphold the jus post bellum is collective o "Because the rights and commensurate obligations associated with jus post bellum are universal, international society—through its most appropriate institutions—has a duty to oversee jus post bellum. Furthermore, as I argued earlier, the only way to legitimize the peace after an unjust war or a war whose justice is indeterminate is to permit international institutions to either oversee and authorize a particular peace or assume responsibility for the peace themselves. This involves two sets of duties. First, through the UN Security Council especially, international society has a duty ensure that victors do not go beyond the limits set by minimalism in the punishment and restructuring they exact on the vanquished. Although states that are unjustly attacked have a right to remove the threat of future war by reconstituting the aggressor, they do not have an inherent right to restructure a state however they see fit. On the one hand, it is a commonly established norm that the system of government reflect the 'will of the people' in one way or another. On the other hand, the Security Council enjoys primary responsibility for international peace and security and, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, the treatment of a state after war is of pivotal importance to international security more broadly. This is not to say that the Council is a perfect and representative body but insisting on collective oversight reduces the likelihood of abuse and self-interested restructuring whilst increasing that likelihood that the 'will of the people' and needs of international order will be taken into consideration. The second element of collective responsibility relates to cases where a just victor lacks the material capability or political will (in cases where the just party has either been attacked or intervened to halt a genocide). As discussed earlier, it is problematic to rule out the use of force in circumstances where force could do good but where the relevant actor is unable to build the peace. In such circumstances, once again, those charged with global responsibilities for international peace and security ought to acquire a responsibility to help rebuild after war, thus helping to remove the seeds of future conflict." · 3) Different responsibilities emerge from different types of war · 4) rights vindication is a vital constraint but is already a component of jus and bellum and jus in bello · 5) There is an important difference between entitlement and obligation. o Thus it is premature. There is a lack of consensus that cast doubt of the authoritativeness of jus post bellum. Whilst it may guide the ethicist pen, without a degree of authoritativeness there is no reason to think that politicians and soldiers will feel obliged to act in accordance with the new rules. As I indicated earlier, legitimacy derives from a consensus about agreed moral principles and political judgments about how they ought to be applied in specific cases.

1) Jennifer Welsh, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria"

o "Despite the commitment made by all heads of state attending the 2005 World Summit to uphold the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P), atrocity crimes continue to be committed by states and non- state actors. This essay argues that assessments of R2P's effectiveness too often overlook the political nature of the principle-with the strengths and weaknesses that this status entails-and apply rigid standards of success that both underestimate its contribution to building capacity to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes and overemphasize the role of military intervention. It also suggests that R2P is best understood as a "duty of conduct" to identify when atrocity crimes are being committed and to deliberate on the best form of collective response. The cases of Libya and Syria have nonetheless raised fundamental questions about the prospect of catalyzing international efforts to protect populations, particularly when there is dis- agreement over the costs and benefits of a coercive response." o The paper looks at the fractious debates about r2P's impact § Heads of state adopted the principle of the responsibility to protect (r2p) at the 2005 World Summit held at the UN headquarters in NY. · Affirmed the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations form genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, but also accepted a collective responsibility and declared their preparedness to take timely and decisive action, through the Security Council and in accordance with the United Nations charter, when national authorities manifestly fail to protect, and peaceful means have proven inadequate. § Two preliminary points · 1) while there is contestation about some aspects of R2P, the points of contention among UN member states have diminished substantially over the past decade. o There's an implementation framework based on three pillars: § 1) pillar one emphasized the primary responsibility of individual states to protect their own populations (whether nationals or not) from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity § 2 & 3) while pillars two and three call upon the international com- munity to assist states in fulfilling these responsibilities and to respond collectively if national authorities manifestly fail to do so/ · 2) the principle has made significant progress in the formal deliberations of key intergovernmental bodies in a relatively short period of time. o "Resolutions and decelerations, however, are ultimately about words; on their own, they do not tell us enough about the degree to which R2P has been internalized. We therefore require deeper consideration of what the principle of responsibly to protect can reasonably be expected to do, and what contributions it has concretely made to realize the goal of atrocity crime prevention and response. § The principle of R2P arose primarily our of moral and political, tather than legal, consideration, and was built on the conviction that state sovereignty is enhanced through more effective protection. · As a political principle, r2p was designed to: · 1) legitimize a shift in expectations about how the international community should view situations involving atrocity crimes o It helped create a category of acts that are, by their very nature, its use of international concern by establishing a "floor of decency · 2) mobilize greater will and capacity to act. § Development and diffusion of R2P has been partially responsible of the increased volume in academic and policy-related research on risk factors and triggers for atrocity crimes, sources of national resilience, and preventative mechanisms. o That the principle of R2P has not done is dictate what particular response should follow in every case of protection failure, particularly when it comes to the option of military intervention. o So, what can we expect R2P to do? § "will differ from case to case. § Given this complex political and normative landscape, what can we expect r2p to do? I have argued elsewhere that what the principle demands, at a minimum, is a "duty of conduct" on the part of members of the international community: to identify when atrocity crimes are being committed or are imminent and to deliberate on how different actors (national, regional, and international) can and should respond. This duty of conduct is particularly demanding for bodies such as the un Secretariat or Human Rights Council, which do not have the same level of politicization built into their DNA as a body like the Security Council" · The growing acceptance of the responsibility to protect now makes it more difficult for the Security Council to justify inaction in the face of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. o Thus, R2P "presents a multifaceted political agenda, involving tiered responsibilities and a mix of preventive and responsive tools. Yet at the heart of the principle remains a call to implement the international community's responsibilities to protect populations from atrocity crimes, no matter where those populations reside. In short, while prevention may be the preferred approach, it does not always succeed § So, how has its "duty of con- duct" has been affected by the examples of Libya and Syria? Three main effects can be identified: · 1) these cases have highlighted the epistemic problems associated with arriving at a collective view on an atrocity · 2) they have illustrated the difficulty of determining when military force should be considered · 3) they have underscored the challenges that arise in effort to estimate and wight costs when deliberating over the appropriateness of a military § A concern recent cases has been the degree to which evidence for alleged atrocity crimes, particularly in video or photographic form, has been publicly contested as exaggerated or fabricated. § Another question: whether the use of miliary means must literally be the last resort, or whether R2P's "duty of conduct" entails only an obligation to assess if on military means are likely to succeed. § Another concerning the use of force is the imperative for decisions-makers to assess reasonable prospects for success, given the unintended and destructive consequences that military means invariably bring about o Core argument: that the responsible to protect should be seen as a political principle, with all of the strengths and weakness that this status entails. There is little doubt that, after only a decade, r2p has been established as a key feature of the normative and diplomatic landscape. We have also seen evidence of its ability to inspire research, galvanize resources for capacity building, catalyze institutional change, mobilize collective attention, and even raise the political cost of inaction. What is has not achieve, but which is too much to expect, is the consistent and robust international response to all protection crises.

1) John Carlson, "Is There a Christian Realist Theory of War and Peace?"

o "Just war's engagement with pacifism has shaped the discourse of war within and beyond Christian ethics. Less attention has been given to Christian real ism's relationship to just war thought or to the possibilities such a dialogue might disclose. This essay examines certain features of the Christian realist Reinhold Niebuhr's moral, theological, and political thought to consider the promise of a Christian realist theory of justifiable war" o Niebuhr is historically aligned with Just War thinking § Offers a vigorous alternative or realism, though he may not embrace the tradition himself § Also, this is why he is important: · "As one of the preeminent religious voices of his day, Niebuhr ably and accessibly brought theological and ethical reflection to bear upon the political events of the mid-twentieth century, especially matters of war and peace. The contributions and cautions he offered then to religious believers, citizens, and statesmen are germane today as well: his concern for political humility, his skepticism about states' claims to justice, his vigilant negotiation between idealism and cynicism. Perhaps most important, he helps us scrutinize the processes by which we deliberate morally about war. His realism, formed by his theological anthropology, helps us evaluate how we justify morally our occasions for war. These ideas have not received the attention due in just war debates." o Explore whether Niebuhr belons in just war corpus o Propose that, in spite of his reticence about systematic theory, he contributes virtually to an inchoate Christian realist theory or tradition of war and peace. o Yoder asks how many ways there are to think morally about war: · Non-pacifist typologies o Holy war o Just war thought o Realism, Rambo position, which accents the honor, virility, and virtue of combat · Each draw from the language of just war. There are further variants within these as well o Niebuhr is likely an ethical variant of realism § Discussion of some variants of just war · Just war presumption o "Generally, those who contend that just war's starting point, shared with pacifism, involves a presumption against war applied just war criteria in more casuistic, rigorous—some would say legalistic—ways that opposed invading Iraq." · Just war classicism o "Other just war thinkers who eschew this approach, favoring instead a view of "just war as statecraft" that privileges just war's "classical" roots and primary moral criteria (e.g., legitimate authority, just cause, right intention), took a more permissive view that supported the invasion on just war ground." o On to Niebuhr § Essay argues that while Niebuhr believe that war could be morally justifiable, he was not a just war thinker, properly thinking. · He first talks about it in The Nature and Destiny of Man o Says two pars of out essential nature or perfection are best understood through natural law, which corresponds to out finite creaturely dimensions in the natural order ("natural justice"); and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, which he associates with the human spirit ("original justice"). o Critiques natural law for it common tendency to place "undue confidence in human reason," despite the fact that reason cannot be exempted from "the disease of sin"; this has the effect of making natural law a "vehicle of human sin." o "In short, Niebuhr views just war theory as pretentious in its effort to render definitive normative judgments based upon historically contingent categories. The moral categories, principles, and norms that natural law claims are applied with an exaggerated confidence in human reason, which denies how sin impairs our rational faculties and how self-interest undermines our claims to justice. For him, just war theory stands or falls—and if it falls, it falls without grace—within the framework of his critique of natural law and his broader theological thinking about love and justice: "Human freedom places the requirements of 'original justice' as ultimate possibilities over the requirement of natural law. There is no justice, even in a sinful world, which can be regarded as finally normative. The higher possibilities of love, which is at once the fulfillment and the negation of justice, always hover over every system of justice."

1) Larry May, Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice

o "Transitional justice concerns the moral and legal consideration that apply to situation where a new, normally more democratic, regime is being formed after a mass atrocity or oppression. Jus post bellum concerns the moral and legal consideration that apply to situation where a war or armed conflict has come to an end. In both cases, justice pertains to situation where peace is being established. It is not merely peace that is the issue, but a just peace, where mutual respect and the rule of law are key considerations. The chapters in this book take their point of departure the securing of peace. § Though having much in common, the literatures on the two diverge · Jus post bellum theorist want a just peace, not merely any peaceful settlement of hostilities, they focus on the stopping of hostilities; transitional justice theorist may urge a continuation, or initiation, of hostilities aimed at overthrowing of an oppressive regime in order to replace it with a government that is more democratic. · Transitional justice literature focuses on making the world a more democratic place as a means toward a just social order. Some of the concept's theorist speak positively about the use of armed conflict to bring about the ends they seek § Their differing conceptions of the relationship between justice and peace are one major reason to try to bring them together in dialogue with each other, as we attempt to do in this volume. o Introduction § In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial—criminal trials in one and truth commissions/other hybrid trials for other § Victims out a primary focus as well § Introduction outline the major concept in play in the literature on just post bellum and transitional justice. it also discusses the import of bringing these two separate literatures together. · Jus post bellum o All principles aimed at securing a just and lasting peace at the end of war or armed conflict. o Main historical contributors were Francisco Vitoria, a Dominican theologian in the 16th century, and Hugo Grotius, a lawyer and diplomat in the 17th century o 1) retribution § One of the most important and difficult condition to satisfy is retribution—bring those to account who committed wrongs either by initiating an unjust war or by waging war unjustly. · Especially problematic because holding criminal trials and then punishing often-popular state leaders sometimes makes another condition of jus post bellum, reconciliation, very difficult to satisfy. o 2) reconciliation § After a war or armed conflict is over, a key consideration of post bellum justice is that the parties come to a lasting peace where mutual respect for rights is the hallmark. o 3) rebuilding § The condition that calls upon all those who participated in devastation during war to rebuild as a means to achieve a just peace. o 4) restitution § Return the goods or their equivalent that have been taken o 5) reparations § Concerns the repair or remedy for goods that have been damaged or for injuries received. o 6) proportionality § Whatever is required by the application of the other five normative principles of jus post bellum must not impose more harm on the population of a party to a war than the harm that is alleviated by the application of these postwar principles. · More of a meta-principle than the other two just war proportionality principles, as bellum and in bello proportionality.

2) Albert Marrin, War & The Christian Conscience

· The major Christian response to war reflect the uneasiness that conscientious men have always felt when confronted with violence. When viewed as closed systems of thoguth, whose exclusiveness is reinforced by tradition and dogma, the responses are irreconcilable. Yet the fact that they are derived from a common source-principle, Christian love, make them to a certain extent complementary. For each response has made its own unique contributions to man's pursuit of his supreme goal as a social being: peace on earth based on love, brotherhood, and justice. § "In any case, every civilization uncovered thus far has engaged in war, and , as Ruskin observed, has achieved its greatest triumphs culturally while dominant militarily. But civilizations have also seen their aspirations and their accomplishments blasted, their pride and their glory humbled, by war."

3) Immanuel Kant, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals

· Three qualities that all moral maxims in the kingdom of ends must possess o 1) all maxims must be treated as though their form Is based on universal principle o 2) each maxim must have a matter that treats rational beings as ends in themselves o 3) toe each the kingdom of ends, each maxim should be underscored by the categorical imperative. · Opposite of autonomy is heteronomy. · Scloses by arguing ththat the best and most moral will is the autonomous will. § Third Section · Transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason, Kant argues that freedom is a key component of the rational will. He wants to explain the connection between freedom and morality and demonstrate why someone would choose to subject themselves to the categorical imperative and join the kingdom of ends. Kant concedes that certain ideas of morality can be circular since it seems as though we require morality to experience free will, but morality requires willfully subjecting ourselves to stringent laws. The key to separating the two concepts is to split the world into what is governed by "appearances" and "things in themselves." This distinction leads all rational beings to understand we are bound by natural laws (including morality) that have a foundation in the realm of reason. He then explains that rational beings know they are free through reason, and it allows us to participate in an intelligible world that allows our actions to conform with free will. Here, we could not help but act morally. The alternative, which is living in a sensible world, would still be moral because we can still understand that we ought to be moral. While this does not conclusively prove the existence of intrinsic human freedom, it does demonstrate that freedom and morality are connected by reason. o Says humans can influence events through their free wills § "As such, a will can only attain true freedom when it is pursuing morality. This establishes morality as a byproduct of freedom. Kant writes, "For since morality serves as a law for us only as for rational beings, it must hold for all rational beings as well, and as it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved as a property of the will of all rational beings [...]" (57, 4:448). He states a free will would have to follow the categorical imperative since it relies on maxims that encourage reason. Kant concedes that this might be difficult to conclusively prove but says we can use a priori cognition to realize we are in control of our own reason. He wants to use a positive conception of freedom in his discussion, meaning he will refer to freedom to act in a certain way." o Asked why free-willed rational beings would agrees to subject themselves to the categorical imperative—there is no room for self interest in the kingdom of ends, and he questions whether humans can ever truly separate themselves form their instincts. § "An ideal world is that which combines elements of the intelligible and the sensible—our rational faculties allow us to distinguish between seeming and being, thus allowing us to apply the categorical imperative to view each other as ends in themselves. Since we are all free to make these choices, this suggests we can each actively work to be a better person." · This proves the categorical imperative is possible. · Concludes by noting that reasons itself does not show we are intrinsically free because we may have difficulty looking past out sense. However, it does demonstrate freedom is justified by out existence as ends in themselves. o At this point in Kant's inquiry, freedom connects reason, morality, and the categorical imperative. Reason also allows us to seek what makes certain ideas possible. This makes it difficult to identify its core characteristics because in an ideal world we all experience unconditional freedom. Thus, at this point in our inquiry, we must rely on our a priori understanding that we are free.

1) Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American Difference

· We celebrate and praise the heroism of those who fight, and we are saddened that some must make the "ultimate sacrifice" to preserve out "freedom." Those so honored, however, do not necessarily think, given the reality of war, that they should be regarded as heroes. To be sure, those who are actually engaged in combat—those who see the maimed bodies and mourning mothers—struggle more than the rest of us to make sense of the reality of war." o Purpose: to convince Christians that war has been abolished and encourage them to not to work for the abolition of war, but rather help them realize that in the cross of Christ war has already been abolished." (woah!) § The statement that there is a world without war in a war-determined world is an eschatological remark. Christians live in two ages in which, as Oliver O'Donovan puts it, "the passing age of the principalities and powers has overlapped with the coming age of G_D's kingdom. · Eschatology: a hope which, defying present frustration, defines a present position in terms of the yet unseen goal which gives it meaning. · The world being the world is not condemned to live violently, but rather the violence that grips it is the result of sin. This understanding of church and world is, therefore, a "duality without dualism" because Christians believe that the church is what the world can be. Because Christians believe we are what the world can be, we can act in the hope that the world can and will positively respond to a witness of peace, which begins with Christians refusing to kill on another in the name of lesser loyalties and goods o Yoder observes that to imagine a world in which war has been abolished requires that we live in a community that celebrates and shares a language that helps us see an alternative world. According to Yoder, because the church is that kind of alternative community, Christians can see things that other people cannot see, we can notice what others fail to notice, and we can make connections that otherwise would be overlooked. § Tran observes that most soldiers "cannot long live with the memory of killing if the nation does not provide both narratives and narritival enactments that circumscribe those memories within the national myth, engrafting killers into the lore of patriots." That, of course, is what did not happen for those who fought in Vietnam. And lacking any culminating liturgies, the Vietnam War seems to have never ended—particularly for those who fought in it. This means, according to Tran, "for the first time in American history, soldiers came home killers" because they were not given the means to return to "normality." · Those who die in war make those for whom they have died feel obligated to accept the gift of their death and, more importantly, "be obliged to repay this gift of their heroic deaths in some appropriate way." § Nonviolence: · I have avoided focusing on war because to do so might give some impression that nonviolence is all that Christianity is about. If nonviolence becomes an abstraction, an ideal Christian pursue that can be separated form out convictions about the cross and resurrection, nonviolence threatens to become another manipulative form of human behavior. o Part 1: § Try to show that war as a moral and liturgical enterprise is shaped by death-denying politics that is an affront to the Christian passion of life. War is a theological challenge to the to the very intelligibility of Christian practice. That many insist on the coherence of Christianity, I believe, has its roots in the Christian legitimization of war. · Chapter 1 § Noting the role that elites play in determining general attitudes toward belief and unbelief. For example, the skepticism of academic elites in British society had more effect in England because elites have more prestige in British society than elites in America. § War is America's central liturgical act necessary to renew our sense that we are a nation unlike other nations. · At times, "liberal" means the stronger can dominate the weak as long as they follow market rules, while at other time it means the attempt, usually through stat agency, to achieve freedom for all to develop their capacity. § Wealth makes war necessary; yet American assume that we never go to war to sustain out wealth, because they understand war as a moral enterprise commensurate without being a democracy. That America must fight an unending war against terrorism means Americans have a common enemy that unites us. o Religious right § Through claiming to represent a conservative form of Christianity, the religious right is politically a form of Protestant liberalism. The religious right makes a fetish of this or that belief (e.g., , the substitutionary account of the atonement they take to be the hallmark of Christianity), but by doing so they play the game determined by the great separation—that is, Christianity becomes primarily a matter of "belief" · Ch. 2 o American is a sense § To be American often means you want the approval of people you assume are more sophisticated than you are, and Americans assume that European are more sophisticated because they have all that "history" · America is the first great experiment in Protestant social formation it is a synthesis of evangelical Protestantism, republican political ideology, and commonsense moral reasoning. o America is a culture of death because Americans cannot conceive of how life is possible in the face of death. "Freedom," as understood in American culture, names the attempt to live as through we will not die, and lives lived as though death is only a theoretical possibility can only be sustained by a wealth otherwise unimaginable.