Statutory Interpretation

Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a

"For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered. The four things are: a) What was the status of the law before the Act was passed? b) What was the defect of 'mischief' for which the law had not provided? c) What remedy did Parliament propose to cure the defect? d) The reason of the remedy"

Rule as of Sussex Peerage Case (1844)

"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such cases, best declare the intention of the lawgiver." [Tendal CJ]

Pro bono publico

For the public good

Betts and Others v COP BS 1991 SC 36

Gonsalves-Sabola, CJ identified several meanings for the word 'found' when he had to ascribe meaning to s 28)5 of the Dangerous Drug Act, which outlawed being found in possession of narcotics. The his judgement, the word included not only being apprehended at a place, but also being seen or discovered.

R v Ramsonahai and Duke (1961) 3 WIR 535

Here, there was an appeal against conviction for the offence of 'conspiracy with another to prosecute any person for an alleged offence knowing that person to be innocent'. A police officer prosecuted a person on the false allegation of the two appellants. The trial judge first directed the jury that if they believed the evidence, 'it would amount to agreeing to prosecute'. On appeal, the [defunct] Federal Supreme Court held that the words 'to prosecute' are held in their strict sense and do not extend to conspiracy.

Enmore Estates Ltd v Darsan (1970) 15 WIR 192

In this case there was an error of grammar of the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance of Guyana, which the Privy Council ignored correctly in construing the statute.

Pinner v Everett (1969)

In this case, Lord Reid made the point, "it is only when the literal meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to be the intention of the Legislature that it is possible to look for some other meaning of the word or phrase."

Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co (1899) AC 143

In this case, a section of the Betting Act prohibited the keeping of a 'house, office, room or other place' for betting with persons resorting thereto. The issue was whether 'Tattersall's Ring' at a racecourse was an 'other place' within the meaning of the Act. The House of Lords held that it was not, since the words created a genus of indoor places. A racecourse, being outdoors, did not fall into the genus.

Pengelly v Bell Punch Co Ltd (1964) 1 WLR 1055

In this case, the word 'floors' in the phrase 'floors, steps, stairs, passages and gangways' which were required to be kept free from construction, was held not to apply to part of a factory used for storage rather than passage.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Literally " the express mention of one thing excludes all others". This rule of language seeks to exclude by implication that which is not specifically mentioned in the description of a class of things.

Noscitur a sociis

Literally "it is known for the company it keeps". Words derive their meaning from their context or the other words which surround them.

Ejusdem generis

Literally "of the same kind". General words which follow two or more particular words in an Act must be confined to a meaning of the same class.

The Golden Rule

Proceeds upon the assumption that Parliament does not intend an absurd or ineffective result.

Adler v George (1964)

The Official Secrets Act provided that no person shall "...in the vicinity of..." a prohibited place obstruct a member of Her Majesty's forces. D argued that he was not "in the vicinity of" but rather, in the prohibited place. His argument was rejected because the Court felt it would be absurd to suppose that Parliament intended to proscribe such conduct outside the prohibited place, but not inside. Under the golden rule, the Court inserted the words "in or" in the Act, so that persons were now prohibited from obstructing a member "...in or in the vicinity of..." a prohibited place.

Smith v Hughes (1960)

The Street Offences Act made it an offence to solicit sex "...in a street or public place...". The defendant stated that she was soliciting through her bedroom window. The purpose of the act was the avoid persons from being solicited, so it did not matter that the source of the solicitation was on a private premises.

Baptiste v Alleyne (1970) 16 WIR 437

The accused was found outside a house, with his hand through a window choking a female occupant. He was charged with the offence of being 'found in any building with intent...' and was convicted. He appealed against the conviction. CA found that if a person is to be convicted of such an offence there must be clear and unmistakable evidence that he has been, as the section said, 'found in' the building. De la Bastide, JA, for the Court of Appeal said inter alia, "... he cannot in the court's view be said to have been 'found in the building' on a literal meaning or ordinary interpretation of the words of s 29 (d) of the Larceny Ordinance." Conviction quashed.

Davis v R (1962) 4 WIR 375

The appellant parked his car at the airport. He was charged and convicted by a magistrate for an offence which prohibited 'parking a vehicle elsewhere than in the place provided for that purpose and in the manner required by an authorised officer'. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the provision yielded an absurd meaning. Court of Appeal agreed. The Court held that the statute created two offences and the Court introduced the words 'elsewhere than' to qualify the words 'in the manner required' so that the regulation could preserve the object of the Act.

Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HC Cas 61, p 106

The dictum in this case was to become the focal point for the development and application of the rule. Lord Wensleydale (previously Parke B) said inter alia: "...the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther."

Mattison v Hart (1854) 14 CB 357

The first recorded use of the golden rule by Jervis CJ

The Mischief Rule

The oldest rule of statutory interpretation. It attempts to look at what defect, wrong or mischief Parliament was trying to correct when it enacted the particular statute.

Evon Smith v R (2005) UKPC 43

The relevant provision defined 'capital offences' as 2(d) 'any murder committed by a person in the course or furtherance of ... (ii) burglary or housebreaking; (iii) arson in relation to a dwelling house'. The appellant broke into his girlfriend's house and chopped her to death, but did not steal of commit any other felony. The majority judgement treated this as merely murder, not capital murder. Lord Hoffman and Lord Hutton dissented "... it is difficult to see why the Legislature would think that the intruder who breaks in with the express purpose of killing the occupier should be regarded as less heinous."

Harricrete Ltd v The Anti-Dumping Authority et al (Unreported), No 1254 of 2000, decided 31 May 2001 (High Court, Trinidad and Tobago)

The subject of inquiry was the meaning of s 8(3)of the Tax Appeal Board Act of Trinidad and Tobago, in particular the extent of its powers to address the appeals arising from grievances under the Anti-Dumping Act. The court found that the Board had powers only to simply dismiss or allow appeals, as these were the only remedies mentioned in the provision. They could not for example, vacate, nullify, annul or quash such an appeal. The court confirmed that s 8(3), by listing the remedies available and expressing two things, impliedly excluded any other in accordance with the 'expressio' rule.

The Literal Rule

The will and intention of Parliament is best discovered by following the literal or natural meaning of the words in the statute.