25A

Explain Plato's proposals for state regulation of reproduction and child rearing. Why does Plato think the nuclear family should be abolished? (457c-466d)

"All these women should be shared among all the men, that no individual woman and man should love together, and that the children, too, should be shared, with no parent knowing its own offspring, and no child its parent" (457cd). Plato thinks that men and women should be paired together accordingly (based on capabilities, physical appearance, intellect), and after having a child, should give the child up to be raised communally with other children. The children won't know who their parents are. Abolishing the nuclear family will allow for a shared experience of pleasures and pains.

Why does Thrasymachus call justice a vice, injustice a virtue?

"Injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterful than justice. And, as I said from the beginning, justice is what is advantageous for the stronger, while injustice is profitable and advantageous for oneself" (344c). (Thrasymachus) So, acting unjustly actually ends up being more beneficial to a person than acting justly. Thrasymachus shows scenarios in which even when a person acts justly, the unjust person always ends up with precedence (343d-344d). Thus, justice is a vice, and injustice a virtue.

Glaucon says that justice is an intermediate between the best and the worst. What are the best and the worst?

"The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two extremes" (359a).

Materialist philosophers take the nature of a thing to be the matter of which it is composed (e.g., the elements air, earth, fire, and water). How does Aristotle argue that a thing's form is also the nature, and in fact "is the nature more than the matter is"?

"This is why some people say that fire or earth or air or water is the nature of things that exist; some say it is some of these, others say it is all of them. [...] This, then, is one way we speak of a nature: as the primary matter that is subject for each thing that has within itself a principle of motion and change. [...] In another way the nature is the shape, i.e., the form in accordance with the account. For just as we speak of craftsmanship in what is in accordance with craft and is crafted, so also we speak of nature in what is in accordance with nature and is natural. But if something were only potentially a bed and still lacked the form of a bed, we would not yet speak of craftsmanship or of a product in accordance with craft; nor would we say the corresponding thing about anything that is constituted naturally. For what is only potentially flesh or bone does not have its nature, and is not naturally flesh or bone, until it acquires the form in accordance with the account by which we define flesh or bone and say what is it is. [...] Indeed, the form is the nature more than the matter is. For something is called flesh, bone, and so on when it is actually so, more than when it is only potentially so. Further, a man comes to be from a man, but not a bed from a bed. In fact that is why some say that the nature of the bed is not the shape but the wood, because if it were to sprout the result would be wood, not a bed" (193a30-15). Basically, actuality is more important than potentiality. Actuality is the motion/change/activity that represents an exercise or fulfillment of possibility (potentiality).

What does Aristotle think is wrong with the Platonists' approach to natural science? (The Platonists are "those who say there are Ideas.")

"Those who say there are ideas do not notice that they do this too; for they separate natural objects, though these are less separable than mathematical objects. This would be clear if one tried to state things themselves and of their coincidences. For odd and even, straight curved, and also number, line, and point do not involve motion, whereas flesh, bones, and man do--we speak of them as we speak of the snub nose, not as we speak of the curved" (194a). There are two types of nature--form and nature.

How does Aristotle argue that the human good is the good performance of the human function? What is the human function? How does Aristotle get to the conclusion that the human good is "the soul's activity that expresses virtue"?

"We shall find the best good if we first find the function of a human being" (1097b25) Treats happiness as an activity, not a state (certain way of life, not certain dispositions) Happiness is the activity of living well Living well as performing the function of being human, analogous to the good flutist performing the function of playing the flute well. The sort of life of action of the part of the soul that has reason Human function is the souls activity that expresses reason (not sense perception because it would be for animals too, and not just living because it would be for plants too) Excellent mans function is to (express reason) finely and well Each function is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue So the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses virtue (1098a15)

What "small" question does Socrates have after Protagoras' speech? Why does he ask it? How does Protagoras answer Socrates' question? Why does he answer the way he does? (That is, why is this a reasonable way for him to answer, given what he has said in his "Great Speech"?)

"You say that virtue is teachable, and if there's any human being who can persuade me of this, it's you" - Socrates (329c) You said that Zeus sent justice and a sense of shame to the human race, you also said that justice, temperance, and piety and all these thing collectively are one thing: Virtue. IS virtue a single thing, with justice and temperance and piety its parts, or are all the things i have just listed all names for a single entity? Protagoras: Virtue is a single entity, and the things you ask about are its parts Protagoras answers this way because he says Virtue is teachable. When people learn how to be just, temperate, and pious, they become virtuous in a way

What is the relation between a just person and just actions? Is one defined in terms of the other? What makes an action just, on Plato's view?

A just person has a soul in which the elements master and are mastered by one another, able to act harmoniously. (For example, the soul isn't drowned by the appetitive part, but all of the parts have their rightful function and respect.) "To produce justice is to establish the elements in the soul in a natural relation of mastering and being mastered by one another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another that is contrary to nature" (444d).

Glaucon urges Socrates to examine the completely just man and the completely unjust man. Describe each of these. Why does he think it is important to focus on these?

A just person is the most just, but has the reputation of being unjust, no matter what, for his entire life. "Someone who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, does not want to be believed to be good, but to be so. We must take away his reputation. For a reputation for justice would bring him honor and rewards, so that it would not be clear whether he is being just for the sake of justice, or for the sake of those honors and rewards. We must strip him of everything except justice, and make his situation the opposite of the unjust person's. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that he may be rested with regard to justice by seeing whether or not he can withstand a bad reputation and its consequences. Let him stay like that, unchanged, until he is dead--just, but all his life believed to be unjust." By considering these extremes, we will be able to determine who is happier. (361d) In this way, both will reach the extremes, the one of justice and the other of injustice, and we will be able to judge which of them is happier."

Suppose someone threatens to kill my family if I don't confess to a crime I didn't do, and I confess. Is this voluntary or not, according to Aristotle?

According to Aristotle these are mixed actions, but skewed more toward the voluntary side. They are simply the more choiceworthy actions than the alternative, but the person has it within them to choose otherwise. (1110a, 10-15)

What's wrong with democracy (and the democratic soul), according to Plato?

According to Plato the democratic soul is a slave to its freedom. It has no restrictions and thus does whatever it chooses at any given time, whether it be the right or the wrong thing to do. Any attempt at control in the democracy is met with scorn, and thus the people reject it. The democratic soul gives equal weight to necessary and unnecessary desires according to how it feels at the time, rejecting any sort of self-imposed restrictions, and thus it will slowly degenerate into Tyranny

How does Socrates reply to Adeimantus' objection that the guardians in his ideal city won't be very happy?

Adeimantus interjects Socrates' explanation that guardians should not have any private property, and says that in doing this, the guardians will not be very happy (419a). Socrates replies to this by saying that the guardians will be happy as is. The city they are constructing is going to be in general happy, not only contain several happy people. "It would not be at all surprising if these people were happiest just as they are. However, in establishing our city, we are not looking to make any one group in it outstandingly happy, but to make the whole city so far as possible. [...] At the moment, then, we take ourselves to be forming a happy city--not separating off a few happy people and putting them in it, but making the city as a whole happy.

Give some examples of voluntary actions not done from decision. What is required for a voluntary action to be done from decision?

An action that a child or animal takes is not a decision. We do not decide to be happy, nor do we decide to do the impossible. We do not decide to do what is not within our agency to do. We do not decide, for example, to be healthy, but we do decide to do what promotes health. We might voluntarily hold beliefs, but we do not decide to have some beliefs. Everything we decide to to is voluntary, but not everything voluntary that we do do we decide to do. For example, a spur of the moment action is voluntary but we do not decide to do it. Acting on appetite is acting voluntarily but not from decision. We must have the time to think through and choose to do an action; that is a decision.

How does Antiphon argue that the nature of a bed is not its shape, but the material (wood) of which it is made? What does Aristotle think of this argument?

Antiphon thinks that the "nature and substance of a natural thing is the primary constituent present in it, having no order in its own right, so that the nature of a bed would be the wood" (193a10). "A sign of this, according to Antiphon, is the fact that, if you were to bury a bed and the rotting residue were to become able to sprout, the result would be wood, not a bed. He thinks that this is because the conventional arrangement, i.e., the craft making the wood into a bed, is a mere coincident of the wood, whereas the substance is what remains continuously while it is affected in these ways. Aristotle comments on this saying: "In another way the nature is the shape, i.e., the form in accordance with the account. For just as we speak of craftsmanship in what is in accordance with craft and is crafted, so also we speak of nature in what is in accordance with nature and is natural. But if something were only potentially a bed and still lacked the form of a bed, we would not yet speak of craftsmanship or of a product in accordance with craft; nor would we say the corresponding thing about anything that is constituted naturally. In another way, then, the nature is the shape and form of things that have within themselves a principle of motion; this form is not separable except in account. (What is composed of form and matter--for instance, a man--is not a nature, but is natural.)" (193a35). "Indeed, the form is the nature more than the matter is. For something is called flesh, bone, and so on when it is actually so, more than when it is only potentially so.Further, a man comes to be from a man, but not a bed from a bed. In fact that is why some say that the nature of the bed is not the shape but the wood, because if it were to sprout the result would be wood, not a bed. If this shows that the wood is the nature, then the shape s also the nature, since a man comes to be from a man. [...] Nature is what is growing, insofar as it is growing, proceeds from something toward something else. [...] Therefore, the shape is the nature" (193b10-20).

Aristotle says that "virtue makes the goal correct, intelligence what promotes the goal" (1144a10). Explain. What is the role of intelligence in deliberation?

Aristotle believed that "Intelligence is the knowledge of what is just and what is fine, and what is good for a human being." Essentially, intelligence is the knowledge what is indeed virtuous, but it is not virtuousness itself. Virtue is what makes a given goal good or bad, and therefore, something you should try to achieve or not achieve. But one needs intelligence to know what actions one should take to reach that virtuous goal. "Virtue is what makes a decision correct." "Virtue makes us reach an end in action while intelligence makes us reach what promotes the end." Deliberation is a type of inquiry about how to achieve one's goals. Intelligence plays a role in helping one to know which goals one should be striving for, i.e., which goals are choiceworthy.

Aristotle agrees with Socrates that "every vicious person is ignorant," but he doesn't think it follows that all wrongdoing is involuntary. Why not?

Aristotle claims that although every vicious person is ignorant, they are not exonerated from blame and thus their actions are voluntary because they are ignorant of the universal, that is, what is good and what is bad. "Every vicious person is ignorant of the actions he must do or avoid, and this sort of error makes people unjust, and in general, bad. But talk of involuntary action is not meant to apply to ignorance of what is beneficial." (1110b, 25-30)

Aristotle thinks that it may be nearly impossible for a vicious person to do virtuous actions. So how, on Aristotle's view, can we hold the vicious person responsible for her vicious actions?

Aristotle claims that we can blame a person for having a vicious character because their actions create their character. In order to be virtuous you must select an action because it is virtuous and then continue to do virtuous actions until you have a virtuous character. Someone with a vicious has repeatedly done vicious actions to obtains a vicious character, or they have neglected to refrain from doing actions that would lead them to a vicious state of character. "If someone does what he knows will make him unjust then he is willingly unjust." (1114a, 10-12)

How does Aristotle argue that the arrangement of teeth in the mouth (sharp ones in front, flat ones in back) is "for an end"? Are his premises plausible? How might a philosopher like Empedocles reply?

Aristotle offers final causality as his explanation for this regular connection: the teeth grow in the way they do for biting and chewing food and this is good for the animal Crafts are for an end, and crafts imitate nature, so nature must be for an end Where there is regularity there is also a cause for explanation (COME BACK TO THIS) Aristotle argues that the arrangement of teeth in the mouth is for an end, "the final cause". Aristotle argues that the arrangement of teeth in the mouth is for an end: (i) things that occur usually or always cannot be by chance. (ii) things either happen by chance or for some reason. (iii) the arrangement of teeth (and natural things) occurs usually or always. (iv) then the arrangement of teeth (and natural things) must be for a reason/end. These premises are plausible.

Explain the distinction between intelligence and craft knowledge. (How is Aristotle departing from the Socrates of the Protagoras here?)

Aristotle says that "Intelligence is not Craft knowledge, because action and production belong to two different kinds. Production has its end beyond it, but action does not, since its end is doing well itself." Doing well, however, is concerned with intelligence. "Intelligence is the state of grasping the truth involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being." (1140b, 5-10). Aristotle departs from Socrates of the Protagoras here because Socrates says that measurement is both a kind of craft and a kind of knowledge, implying that there is no distinction. (356d-e) The art of measurement is a kind of craft and a kind of knowledge.

Why does Aristotle say that in the case of living organisms, the formal, efficient, and final causes "amount to one" (198a25)?

Aristotle says that there are four causes, "the matter, the form, what initiated the motion, and what something is for" (198a23). He says that the last three of there (the form, what initiated the motion, and what something is for) can be grouped into one-- "for what something is and what it is for are one and the first source of the motion is the same in species as these, since a man generates a man; and the same is true generally of things that initiate motion by being in motion" (198a25). A man has its form to reproduce, a man was set into motion (reproduced) by another man, and a man is to reproduce. All of these have the same final cause (reproduction), so they can all be grouped together into one for this reason.

Explain the dilemma about knowledge Aristotle poses at the beginning of Posterior Analytics 1.3. How does he resolve the dilemma?

Aristotle says that there are two schools of thought about knowledge: "Some people think that because knowledge through demonstration requires knowledge, of the primary things, there is no knowledge; others think that there is knowledge, and that everything is knowable and is demonstrable" (72b5). There are people that believe that there is no knowledge, and there are people who believe that there is knowledge--and everything knowable is demonstrable. The people that think that there is no knowledge think that we face an infinite regress. To them, demonstration is the only way of knowing. They think that there are no primary things, so we cannot know posterior things because of prior things. But, if the infinite regress stops, we won't be able to know anything without demonstration. Also, "if we cannot know the primary things, then neither can we know without qualification or fully the things derived from theml we can know them only conditionally, on the assumption that we can know the primary things" (72b13). "The other part agree that knowledge results only from demonstration, but they claim that it is possible to demonstrate everything, since they take circular and reciprocal demonstration to be possible" (72b17). Aristotle's response to this: "We reply that not all knowledge is demonstrative and in act knowledge of the immediate premises is indemonstrable. Indeed it is evident that this must be so; for if we must know the prior things (i.e., those from which the demonstration is derived), and if eventually the regress stops, these immediate premises must be indemonstrable. Besides this, we also say that there is no only knowledge, but also some origin of knowledge, which gives us knowledge of the definitions" 72b19). Aristotle says we have knowledge through demonstrations, and that demonstrations are deductions expressing knowledge.

How does Aristotle argue that we are responsible for our own states of character?

Aristotle says that we are responsible for our own states of character because we have the choice to take actions that will create good or bad states of character. If we do bad actions because we have a vicious state of character then we do not have the choice not to do these actions. But we had the choice to refrain from taking actions that would lead us to that state of character to begin with. Analogously, if a person become sick from living incontinently then he is not free to be sick. But he was free to live continently and thus not be in this predicament in the first place. (1114a, 15-20)

Why does Aristotle think that one cannot have full virtue unless one is intelligent? Why does he think that one cannot be intelligent unless one has full virtue?

Aristotle thinks that one cannot have full virtue unless one is intelligent because we each are born with a natural disposition to certain virtues but not all of them, and in order to obtain all virtues and be fully virtuous one must know what actions to take to become virtuous, and unless one is intelligent one will not be able to discern which actions to take. Correct reason is reason expressing intelligence. And the state involving correct reason is virtue, intelligence being that correct reason. Therefore one needs be in a state of virtue in order to to express correct reason (intelligence).

Why does Aristotle think that the happiest human activity is study (or contemplation)? What makes study superior to exercises of the "civic virtues" like courage and justice?

Aristotle thinks that study is the most continuous and pleasant action in accordance with virtue that will make us truly happy. Study is liked for itself alone, and it has no result beyond it. Why the happiest human activity is study (1177a13-1178a): "Hence complete happiness will be its activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is the activity of study." For this activity is supreme, since understanding is the supreme element in us, and the objects of understanding are the supreme objects of knowledge. Further, it is the most continuous activity, since we are more capable of continuous study than any continuous action. Besides, we think pleasure must be mixed into happiness; and it is agreed that the activity in accord with wisdom is the most pleasant of the activities in accord with virtue." "Moreover, the self-sufficiency we spoke of will be found in study more than in anything else." "Besides, study seems to be liked because of itself along, since it has no result beyond having studied. But from the virtues concerned with action we try to a greater or lesser extent to gain something beyond the action itself." "Rather, as far as we can, we ought to be pro-immortal, and go to all lengths to live a life in accord with our supreme element; for however much this element may lack in bulk, by much more it surpasses everything in power and value. Moreover, each person seems to be his understanding, is he is his controlling and better element." "For what is proper to each thing's nature is supremely best and most pleasant for it; and hence for a human being the life in accord with understanding will be supremely best and most pleasant, if understanding, more than anything else, is the human being. This life, then, will also be happiest." It is also what the gods would do, and since it's godly, then it follows that it would be the best thing for us to do as well. Study is superior to the exercises of courage and justice because they aim at some other end and are choiceworthy or something other than themselves (1177b18-27): Hence among actions in accord with the virtues those in politics and war are preeminently find and great; but they require trouble, aim at some [further] end, and are choiceworthy for something other than themselves. But the activity of understanding, it seems, is superior in excellence because it is the activity of study, aims at no end apart from itself, and has its own proper pleasure, which increases the activity. Further, self-sufficiency, leisure, unwearied activity (as far as is possible for a human being), and any other features ascribed to the blessed person, are evidently features of this activity. Hence a human being's complete happiness will be this activity, if it receives a complete span of life, since nothing incomplete is proper to happiness."

Aristotle agrees with Socrates that incontinence is a kind of ignorance. He also agrees with ordinary people that an incontinent person knows (or believes) what is best but does something else. How can he have it both ways? In what way does the incontinent person have knowledge, and in what way does she lack knowledge? Pay careful attention to Aristotle's distinctions. (Book 3, 1146b10-1147b19).

Aristotle thinks that there are two kinds of knowledge: universal and particular, which also refers to perceptual. Someone who acts incontinently lacks perceptual (particular) knowledge, and not full (universal) knowledge. So, the incontinent person has the universal knowledge, but does not have the particular knowledge (is ignorant of the particular knowledge).

Describe Aristotle's method in his examination of incontinence.

Aristotle wants to reconcile Socrates' view and the common sense view of incontinence. He agrees with Socrates that there is some kind of ignorance involved in being incontinent, but also agrees that incontinence does occur, as held in common belief. He ventures to answer why incontinence occurs, fusing together Socrates' view and the common sense view, because he believes both views have truth to them.

Oedipus killed an old man at a crossroads. The old man turned out to be his father-though he did not know this, and had no way of knowing. Would Aristotle say that Oedipus killed his father voluntarily? Explain. Would Aristotle says that Oedipus killed the old man voluntarily?

Aristotle would not say that he killed his father voluntarily because he was ignorant of the particulars rather than the universal. The particulars being, "to whom he is doing the action, what the action is, about what/to what he is doing it, what he is doing with it, for what result, in what way." He must also feel regret for his action. (1111a, 15-20) Yes and no. Aristotle would say that he killed the old man voluntarily, since he was not ignorant of that particular (him being an old man). But the old man he killed happened to be his father, and so if we define it that way then he was ignorant of the fact that the man he killed was his father.

How does Socrates explain apparent cases of incontinence, e.g. smoking a cigarette though you know it's bad for you?

As explained above, your wrongly measure that the temporary pleasure you are attaining from the cigarette is better to your overall pleasure Essentially, for Socrates, there is no such thing as incontinence, as you cannot truly know what is in your best interest(namely, what is most pleasurable), and act against it. as this is your ultimate goal when someone does something that is not in their best interest, they are actually doing what they think is in their best interest, they just have wrong knowledge

Why does Plato think that the prisoners in the cave are "like us"? In what sense do we argue about mere shadows? - indeed, about shadows of artifacts, not of real things?

As such, Plato did not only draw this story from his initial Theory of Forms, but also related it to the theory of stages of life. In his study of forms, Plato suggested that the forms that appear to human beings as the world are only a reflection of the more ideal and perfect forms (Dooley 39). Case in point, Plato's main idea was that human beings should not only rely on their physical senses in judging the true forms of things in the world but should also include thought and reason to logically evaluate what they perceive. It is only through proper understanding of the forms that individuals perceive that true knowledge can be acquired. In the same sense, the prisoners in the cave represent humans who are blinded by their physical senses in obtaining the true knowledge about forms (Dooley 39).

What are Socrates' reasons (at the beginning of the dialogue) for doubting that virtue can be taught?

Brings example of how when ships are needed shipbuilders are called (this is the attitude towards practical manners). But when it comes to deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise (carpenter, black smith, shoemaker...) The reason for this is because they do not think it can be taught (319e Protagoras) Same with private life wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to other the virtues that they posses Pericles teaches his sons everything but his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up virtue on their own wherever they might find it (320)

What does Aristotle mean by a "coincidental cause"? Give an example.

By coincidental cause, Aristotle means luck or chance. Aristotle means a cause that could have happened for a reason, but has happened rightfully, coincidentally. (The example from the other study guide is quite accurate: "Example: A statue of so-and-so fell onto the man who had murdered so-and-so. By chance that the murderer met his proper justice.") From the book: "We say, for instance, that a friend in a foreign country fame by luck and paid the ransom and then went away, when he did the action as though he had come in order to do it, though in fact that was not what he came to do. This end is achieved coincidentally, since (as we said before) luck is one of the coincidental causes" (199b20-25).

At 74b, Socrates asks: "do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?" Explain.

By this statement Socrates means that sticks or stones can be in one sense equal and in another sense unequal. They participate in the form Equal but only partially, for they are not perfectly equal, but every time you see something that is equal you think of the form Equal.

Is chance a cause, in Aristotle's view? Explain.

Chance is not a cause in Aristotle's view, simply a coincidental cause. The end that is reached in these cases is reached coincidentally, not deliberately. However, for that reason chance could be labeled a cause of itself because it does seem to reach an end.

What is wisdom in the soul? What is courage? Temperance? Justice?

Courage: "I imagine, then, that we call each individual courageous because of the latter part--that is, when the element of his that is spirited in kind preserves through pains and pleasures the pronouncements of reason about what should inspire terror and what should not" (442c). Wisdom: "But we call him wise, surely, because of the small part that rules in him, makes those pronouncements, and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous--both for each part and for the whole, the community composed of all three" (442c5). Temperance: "Isn't he temperate because of the friendly and concordant relations between these same things: namely, when both the ruler and its two subjects share the belief that the rationally calculating element should rule, and do not engage in fraction against it?" (442c10) Justice: "Each element within him does its own job where ruling and being ruled are concerned" (443b).

Give an example of a deduction with true premises that are explanatory of the conclusion, and an example of a deduction with true premises that are not explanatory of the conclusion.

Deduction W/true premises that is explanatory P1: All cats are mammals P2:All mammals are animals Conclusion: All cats are animals Deduction W/true premises that ISN'T explanatory P1: Socrates is pale P2: Pale things reflect light Conclusion: Socrates Reflects light

What are the four stages in the cave? How do they correspond to the four parts of the Divided Line?

Divided Line Visible (longer) Imagination (lowest) Reflections of things in the water or shadows Belief (low) Originals of those images (the thing being reflected) Intelligible Thought (high) Dealing with the second Base inquiry on hypotheses, proceeding to to a first principle EX: Math Understanding (highest) Dealing with the highest Grasps by dialectical power, treating its hypothesis not as first principles Understanding of the truth by the good itself (intelligible) Four stages of the cave Stage 1 Shadows of the objects the prisoners see Stage 2 The objects themselves seen in the dim light of the cave Stage 3 Objects seen in clear sunlight Stage 4 Up close examination of the object (adjust to sunlight)

Aristotle says that among the natural things are "the simple bodies, such as earth, fire, air and water." What "principle of motion and stability" do these simple bodies have?

Earth, fire, air, and water have within themselves a principle of motion and stability in place, in growth and decay, or in alternation. (This is paragraph from the group doc)--The fundamental assumption in Aristotelian physics was that the natural state of sublunary matter is rest. Earth, air, and water must seek their natural place at rest in the center of Earth unless stopped by an impenetrable surface like the ground or a table. The natural place of rest of the element fire is somewhere above us (but well below the Moon). The air we see around us is a mixture of the elements air and fire (after all, air, at least in Greece, has warmth), so its behavior is complicated by the competition between the tendency for fire to rise and air to fall. Except in very complicated situations such as when air and fire were mixed together, motion was not a natural state of affairs. (Earth → Water → Fire → Air)

Aristotle says that according to materialist philosophers like Empedocles, nature acts "not for some- thing, but by necessity." What does he mean? How do these philosophers account for the features of organisms?

Empedocles Zeus' rain falls out of necessity not because it makes grain grow making grain grow is just a coincidence of the rain falling Same example with animals face, its by coincidence, any animal that doesn't have its teeth in a certain way doesn't survive (by necessity) Not in order to have its teeth that way, but because it couldn't not

In what way does Plato think the senses are unreliable as sources of knowledge?

Even the poets tell us that our senses of sight and seeing are not clear or precise Our other senses can hardly be accurate as they are all inferior of these The body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom The body keeps us busy in a thousand ways because of its need for nurture If certain diseases befall it, they impede our search for truth It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes from the body

What is an end? What is it for one end to be "higher" than another, that is, for the second to be "subordinate" to the first? Give some examples. What is meant by "the highest end"?

Every human activity aims at some end that we consider good Highest ends are ends in themselves, must be for its own sake, must be the supreme good subordinate ends may only be means to higher ends The highest end is "happiness" because more than anything else it seems complete without qualification (1097b1) Honor, pleasure, understanding and every virtue is a subordinate end?

It clearly makes sense to talk about the purpose or end of an artifact like a lectern or teapot or door. But what does Aristotle mean when he talks of the purpose or end of a living creature-a tree, a dog, or a human being?

First, Aristotle makes clear why it makes sense to speak of living things as having a purpose or end: "In general, craft either completes the work that nature is unable to complete or imitates nature. If, then, the products of a craft are for something, clearly the products of nature are also for something; for there is the same relation of later stages to earlier in productions of a craft and in productions of nature" (199a15). "If we advance little by little along the same lines, it is evident that even in plants things come to be that promote the end--leaves, for instance, grow for the protection of the fruit. [...] If plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit, and send roots down rather than up for the sake of nourishment, it evidently follows that this sort of cause is among things that come to be and are by nature. And since nature is of two sorts, nature as matter and nature as form, and the form is the end, and since everything else is for the end, the form is must be what things are for"

Why is it important for Aristotle that virtue and vice be in our power?

For Aristotle it is important that virtue and vice be in our power because otherwise we could not be blamed for having vice or praised for being virtuous. (1113b, 15-20)

What is the difference between doing a virtuous action and doing a virtuously action virtuously?

For an action to be done virtuously Agent must know that actions are virtuous Agent must decide on the actions for itself (not for other motive) Action are with certainty and firmness (notes) Virtuous acts should cause pleasure of you don't want to do it you're already not virtuous DON'T KNOW THE DIFFERENCE To be virtuous we must know that we are doing a virtuous action (can't be by accident), we must choose to do the virtuous action for itself and not some other reason, and we must have a habit/tendency of doing virtuous actions (the virtuous action stems from our character and is not just some whim of the moment).

Why does Plato think that no sensible property could explain why beautiful things are beautiful, or why large things are large? What does he think can explain why beautiful things are beautiful?

For instance, something is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty, and for no other reason. While others might try to explain the beauty of an object in terms of its color or shape, Socrates suggests that ultimately, the simplest and best explanation is given by the Theory of Forms. Something might also be beautiful in one context but not in another.

How does Aristotle define a "nature"? Explain what work is done by each part of the definition.

From Glossary: A subject has a nature if and only if it has an internal principle initiating the subject's own motion and rest. A natural thing "has within itself a principle of motion and stability in place, in growth and decay, or in alternation" (192b15). "This is because a nature is a type of principle and cause of motion and stability within those things to which it primarily belongs in their own right and not coincidentally" (192b21).

Aristotle says that Plato departed from Socrates and "separated the Forms" because he accepted the Heraclitean doctrine that all sensible things are "in flux." How should we understand this doctrine, and what does it have to do with Plato's belief in non-sensible Forms?

From the other group's study guide: The doctrine of flux states that sensible things are always in flux i.e. your hair is growing, your nails are growing, your skin is shedding, you are dying. If knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities i.e. the forms, apart from those which are sensible; for there can be no knowledge of things which are in a state of flux.

What justification does Plato give for believing in the Forms? Is it a reasonable one?

From the other group's study guide: We have knowledge of the absolutes. We can't get this from sensory experiences. We get sensory experiences from the moment we are born. So, if we have the ability to see whether something is equal or not, we have to have had prior knowledge of what it IS to be equal. Therefore the forms are not sensible, and were known to us before we were born.

Glaucon argues that no one practices justice willingly. Explain.

Glaucon argues that no one practice justice willingly because when placed in the same scenario, both the just and unjust person would act the same way ("unjustly"). "Suppose we grant to the just and the unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and see where their appetite would lead. And we will catch the just person red-handed, traveling the same road as the unjust one. The reason for this is the desire to do better. This is what every nature naturally pursues as good. But by law and force, it is made to deviate from this path and honor equality (359c). Ring of Gyges thought-experiment (359d-360c) Gyges, a shepherd, finds a ring that can turn him invisible. So, he uses it to enter the kingdom, seduce the king's wife, kill the king, and take over the kingdom. Now, if there were two of these rings, and one of them was worn by a just person, and the other by an unjust person, both would carry out the same actions. "Now no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice, or bring himself to keep away from other people's possessions and not touch them, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go into people's houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. And in so behaving, he would do no differently than the unjust person, but both would pursue the same course" (360b-c). This thought-experiment is strong evidence that no one is just willingly. "This, some would say, is strong evidence that no one is just willingly, but only when compelled. No one believes justice to be a good thing when it is kept private, since whenever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, all men believe that injustice is far more profitable to themselves than is justice" (360cd). "For someone who did not want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who did not touch other people's property, would be thought most wretched and most foolish by everyone aware of the situation. Though, of course, they would praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice.

At 357b-357e, Glaucon distinguishes three classes of goods. What are they? In which class does he put justice? In which class does he think "most people" put justice?

Glaucon's three classes of goods: A good we welcome for its own sake "There is a sort of good we would choose to have, not because we desire its consequences, but because we welcome it for its own sake, enjoying, for example and all the harmless pleasures from which nothing results afterward beyond enjoying having them?" (357b5). A good we love for its own sake, and also for the sake of its consequences "There is a sort of good we love for its own sake, and also for the sake of its consequences--knowing, for example, and seeing, and being healthy? For we welcome such things, I imagine, on both counts" (357c). A good that we choose not to have for its own sake, but for the sake of the wages and other things that are their consequences "A third kind of good, which includes physical training, medical treatment when sick, and both medicine itself and other ways of making money. We would say that there are burdensome but beneficial to us, and we would not choose to have them for their own sake, but for the sake of the wages and other things that are their consequences" (357cd). Most people think that virtue is "the burden kind: the one that must be practiced for the sake of the wages and the popularity that come from a good reputation, but that is to be avoided just because of itself" (358a).

How does Protagoras reply to Socrates' arguments that virtue cannot be taught?

He says the story about how Epimetheus begged Prometheus to assign the abilities himself, and he ****ed up the distribution (321b) used all the powers and abilities on the non reasoning animals, and he left the human race completely unequipped Prometheus steals from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the practical arts together with fire (he was charged with theft) Zeus sent Hermes to earth to give them justice and sense of shame (art of politics) so they can maintain order in cities and bond to unite Zeus told Hermes to give justice to all (322b) Protagoras: particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared by all Conclusion: it is reasonable to admit that everyone is an advisor of virtue on the grounds that everyone has a share of it BUT people do not regard this as natural or self-generated but as something taught and carefully developed (323c)

How do Hippias' answers illustrate the "compresence of opposites" insensible things and properties? Give some examples.

Hippias' answers illustrate the compresence of opposites because each answer he gives of a fine thing is proven not to be fine in another context. A girl is both fine and not fine, but she has some of the form of fine in her, which is what Socrates/Plato is after.

What does Protagoras' speech tell us about (a) how he thinks virtue is taught, and (b) what virtue is?

Human beings consider virtue to be something acquired through training For no one punishes a wrong doer in consideration of the simple fact that he has done wrong, unless one is exercising the mindless vindictiveness of a beast This attitude towards virtue shows that virtue is learned, and this is the attitude of all those who seek requital in public or private (323a) NEXT, answers the problem about good men teaching their sons everything that can be taught, but not making them better than anyone else in the particular virtue They teach their kids everything in school (grammar, letters, language, and athletics) Says this is all essentially teaching them virtue It is to our collective advantage that we posses justice and virtue and and so we all gladly tell and teach each other what is just and lawful Virtue is a sort of skill? Everyone has, but others perfect But as Flute players they would all turn out to be capable when compared with ordinary people who never studied the flute (327c)

What does Aristotle think is the proper way to think about the relation between the form of a wall (or an eye) and its matter? What does he mean by "hypothetical necessity"?

Hypothetical necessity in nature: A form is hypothesized, and so a matter is necessitated. If there is to be a saw, there must be iron. The necessity belongs mainly to the material cause (necessarily iron teeth will cut something softer like wood). But it is also in a way in the form: the form of sawing implies cutting, cutting implies teeth, and teeth imply something hard like iron.

What does the second stage in the allegory of the cave (i.e., looking at the fire and the figurines that cast shadows on the wall) represent?

In humans it represents us being blinded by physical senses in obtaining the true knowledge about the forms

What is injustice in the soul? In the city? In what sense is injustice "contrary to nature"?

Injustice is when the different elements of the soul or the different parts of the city "rule and are ruled" by one another. This means that there are elements or parts that are at the mercy of other elements or parts. This is contrary t nature because it causes disease and weakness.

What does Thrasymachus mean when he says that justice is "nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (338c)? Who are "the stronger?"

Justice is "what is advantageous for the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who does the rational calculation correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere--what is advantageous for the stronger" (339a). (Thrasymachus) "The stronger" are the rulers of the city (the lawmakers, essentially) (339c).

going to dentist (painful) to reduce future pain What place do the virtues have in the Stoic conception of the good life, and why? What about wisdom?

Living in accordance with virtue is as living in accordance with nature Nothing is of value except an attitude adapted to the natural organization of the cosmos Wisdom is (not in book, online) good sense, good calculation, quick wittedness, discretion, and resourcefulness

What are natural virtue and cleverness, and how do they relate to full virtue and intelligence?

Natural virtue is virtue that you are born with. It makes you prone to certain types of activity, but you are at this point blind because you don't know why it is that you do this activity and thus you need understanding to become fully virtuous. Cleverness is the ability to successfully achieve a goal, which is necessary for intelligence, but it does not tell you what your goal ought to be.

What is the difference between necessary and non-necessary appetites or desires? Explain what Plato means when he says that the rational part of the oligarchic man's soul is enslaved to his necessary desires.

Necessary desires are desires that we cannot train ourselves to overcome and thus are desires that we actually need. Unnecessary desires are desires we can train ourselves to overcomes and thus we don't need and should attempt to overcome. When Plato says that the rational part of the soul is a slave to his necessary desires in an Oligarchic man's soul it is because he is using rationality as a means to satisfy his necessary desires, but his rationality is not in charge.

Would Plato say that a businessman who rationally organizes all of his desires so that he can make money most efficiently has a soul ruled by the rational part? Why or why not? What kind of soul would Plato say such a man has?

No, Plato would say that a man who efficiently uses his money to make more money is ruled by the appetitive part of the soul. He does not refrain from indulgence because it wrong but because it is not an effective way to make more money. He is rationally calculating, but only to the extent as to fill his appetitive desires. His soul is oligarchic because he is engaging only in necessary appetites. He may be using rationality, but it is not for the sake of morality, and thus he is not ruled by rationally since he would otherwise come to the understanding that he should be moral.

Give an example of a deduction with true premises that are explanatory of the conclusion but not primary and immediate. What kind of premises are primary and immediate?

P1: all triangles have inward angles adding to 180deg P2: This geometric shape has inward angles adding to 180 deg C: This geometric shape is a triangle (Book 2, ch 2 72a line 1-10) Explanatory: expresses knowledge, the conclusion follows from the premises. Primary: basic truths, appropriate, axiomatic, Immediate: self-evident, no prior explanation needed, readily known

Why does Plato think that the prisoners in the cave would be reluctant to turn around and walk towards the light? Explain how this part of the allegory applies to us.

Pained and irritated When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities. (Don't know how exactly it relates to us, but kinda intuitive)

How does Plato characterize democracy and the democratic soul? What features of the democratic soul correspond to the freedom and equality of the democratic state?

Plato characterizes the democratic soul as initially caring more about unnecessary desires, but eventually giving equal weight to both necessary and unnecessary desires. The features of the democratic soul that correspond to freedom and equality are as follows: in a democracy everyone is free to do as they please with no legal behavioral restrictions, and as such a democratic soul is free to follow whatever desires or appetites it pleases on a whim.

Socrates' aim at the end of book 5 is to distinguish true philosophers from the "lovers of seeing and hearing." Who are the lovers of seeing and hearing? What distinguishes them from philosophers?

Plato dives existence into 3 parts: what is completely, what is in no way, and what is and isn't. The lovers of seeing and hearing are the people who admire things in the physical world that contain the form beauty but in other ways they aren't beautiful. These things both are and aren't. This separates them from philosophers who are able to comprehend the Beautiful itself- these. The Beautiful itself is what is.

What kinds of phenomena does Plato take to show that the soul has different parts?

Plato uses the phenomena of being in opposite states at the same time to show that the soul must have distinct parts. He says that one thing cannot undergo or be opposite things at once, and if it is, it is actually many things. So, the phenomena that humans experience is being thirsty, but unwilling to drink (opposite states), thus showing that the soul (with which one feels these emotions) is actually multi-faceted, and has at least two elements to it (436a-439d).

Explain Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. (How is Aristotle departing from Plato here?)

Practical knowledge involves the virtues and is the ability to see the right thing to do in the present circumstances EX: Political Science (can change) Theoretical Knowledge is intellectual or philosophical activity Highest faculty of human beings Astronomy is an example of this (cannot change) (theoretical is better than practical)

What is the nature of pleasure, according to Epicureans?

Sense perception Complete absence of pain is the highest pleasure

Plato says that the communal breeding arrangements he recommends lead to "the greatest good" for the city. What is this good?

Sharing is the greatest good for a city (464b). Specifically, the sharing of women and children by auxiliaries (464b). "For we said, as you know, that if these people are going to be real guardians, they should not have private houses, land, or any other possession, but should receive their upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their guardianship, and should all eat communally" (464bc).

Why does Aristotle think that the happiest life cannot be a life devoted to pleasant amusements?

Simply said, he thinks it is "stupid" if we spend our whole lives trying to amuse ourselves. "Happiness, then, is not found in amusement; for it would absurd if the end were amusement, and our lifelong efforts and sufferings aimed at amusing ourselves. For we choose practically everything for some other end--except for happiness, since it is [the]end; but serious work and toil aimed [only] at amusement appears stupid and excessively childish. [...] But the happy life seems to be a life in accord with virtue, which is a life involving serious actions, and not consisting in amusement" (1176b-1177a).

Explain how Socrates uses hedonism to show that incontinence is impossible.

Socrates being a hedonist believes that our lives goal is to make it as pleasurable as possible No one would willingly go against this ultimate goal If they do, it is because they lack the art of measurement, which is knowledge, that should be used to determine what is the most pleasurable(best) thing to do

What is Socrates' justification for requiring that each person in his city do the one job for which he or she is most naturally suited, and not dabble in others?

Socrates believes that each person is different, and has different capabilities, and thus should do the job that he is most suited for. This will be most efficient for the city. "[...]we are not all born alike. On the contrary, each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one job, another to another" (370ab). One person will do better if he practices one craft. "The result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced, if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited and does it at the opportune moment, because his time is freed from all others" (370c).

How does Socrates define fear (358d)? Why does his account of incontinence, together with this definition of fear, imply that courage is neither standing up to what you fear nor not having fear? What does he think courage is?

Socrates says no one goes towards what they consider to be fearsome both courageous and cowardly go toward what which they are confident for The courageous person does not go towards what he fears because what he fears is not what is in his best interest Cowardice is ignorance about what is and is not to be feared Courage is knowledge(wisdom) about what is and is not to be feared

Why does Socrates start an investigation into the just man by inquiring about the just city?

Socrates says that a examining a larger thing that is similar to a smaller thing will help us better understand the smaller thing, as the larger one is easier to examine. "Perhaps, then, there will be more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in cities, and afterward look for it in the individual, to see if the larger entity is similar in form to the smaller one" (369a).

Socrates says that justice "isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him..." Explain.

Socrates says that justice must be reached internally in a person for it to reflect in the city. "It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements n his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, become his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave--lowest, highest, and middle--as well as any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the acquisition of wealth or concerning the care of his body, or even something political, or concerning private contracts. In all of these areas, he considers and calls just and find the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and wisdom the knowledge that oversees such action; and he considers and calls unjust any action that destroys this harmony, and ignorance the belief that oversees it" (443d-444a).

Explain how Socrates argues (on behalf of "the many") for hedonism, the view that "pleasure and the good are the same" (351e).

Socrates: If one completes their life, having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well? Protagoras: Yes, so long he lived having taken pleasure in honorable things Socrates: Isn't a pleasant thing good insofar as it is pleasant, that is, if it result in nothing nut pleasure (Protagoras hesitates to say yes) Socrates: You call pleasant things those which partake of pleasure or produce pleasure? Most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it when i asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of those

What is incontinence (a.k.a. akrasia, weakness of the will, or "being overcome by pleasure")?

Some People think that while knowledge is present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge but rather anything else—sometimes anger, pleasure, pain, fear (knowledge dragged around as if it were a slave) (352) Socrates: Weighing is a good analogy, if you weigh pleasant things against painful, and if the painful is exceed by the pleasant, whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near, you have to perform the action in which the pleasant prevails (356b) Art of measurement (which is knowledge) helps us determine what is more pleasurable If you choose incorrectly it's because of lack of knowledge (wrong measurement) Akrasia is: being overcome by pleasure, which is ignorance (357e) Akrasia: weakness of will=being overcome by pleasure: incontinent

What are the two characteristic features of Thought (the third stage of the Divided Line, 510b-d)? How does Plato illustrate them by means of mathematics? What are some other examples of Thought (in addition to mathematics)?

Specifically about mathematical and technical subjects It is the capacity for, process of, or result of discursive thinking, in contrast with the immediate apprehension that is characteristic The weakness of dianoia is that it must begin by taking as true unproven assumptions. We are, in effect, presupposing a model of reality before we begin our deliberations. But any model, be it logical, geometrical, or moral, is only imperfect. Its conclusions may be, and frequently are, wrong. Our selection of assumptions, moreover, is bound to be influenced by our passions and prejudices. Our dianoia thinking tends to reflect the values and prejudices of whatever subpersonality is currently activated. We then see reality partly — through a glass darkly. Moreover, the principle of cognitive dissonance may cause us to ignore, distort, or rationalize away any data which do not fit our preconceived model.

What recommendations do the Stoics and Epicureans, respectively, make for living a good life?

Stoics Set desires to be in accord with the external world, so they are in line with how the external world really is, will be a good life Epicureans A virtuous life, with moderate asceticism (abstaining from indulgence) will be the best way to pleasure Friendship is also important

How do Stoics and Epicureans differ about the good, or highest end of human life?

Stoics: external conditions of the world, neither good nor bad (determinism) Nothing is good moral virtue nothing is except an attitude adapted to the natural organization of the cosmos Nothing that is up to us is good or bad Set desires to be in accord with the external world, so they are in line with how the external world really is Epicureans Pleasure is the highest good, and the end is attaining pleasure Complete absence is the highest pleasure Stoics: external conditions of the world, neither good nor bad (determinism) Nothing is good moral virtue nothing is except an attitude adapted to the natural organization of the cosmos Nothing that is up to us is good or bad Set desires to be in accord with the external world, so they are in line with how the external world really is Epicureans Pleasure is the highest good, and the end is attaining pleasure Complete absence is the highest pleasure

What account of virtue is suggested by Socrates' rejection of incontinence? What does Socrates think we need in order to avoid "being overcome by pleasure"?

The account of virtue that is given is that it is teachable since it is knowledge (of what is good) Thinks all virtues are one (? from notes) Knowledge vs True Belief we only have a true belief until something pleasant comes by pleasant won't throw us off unless you have Knowledge Art of measurement if this is virtue, its teachable

How does Aristotle's unmoved mover move the sphere of the fixed stars? How can something that doesn't change cause change in something else?

The first heaven, The outmost sphere of fixed stars, is moved by a desire to emulate the first cause/mover By being an object of desire and understanding

What is a "first mover" (Physics VIII.5)? Why does Aristotle think there must be at least one eternal first mover?

The first mover is the unmoved mover, it moves not because of any other reason but by itself there must be at least one unmoved mover because otherwise movement would be eternal with no beginning Aristotle: It is impossible for there to be no beginning Must be moved by its own AGENCY

Aristotle says that four different things might be meant by "cause." What are they? What are the four causes of a door?

The four different causes: Material Formal Efficient Final The four different causes of a door. Why is there a door? Material- because there's wood arranged in a particular way Formal- because it's shaped in a certain way/it has these sorts of features (essential to doors) Efficient- because the doormaker put the door together from wood Final- because the doormaker wanted to make the door for one purpose/end

Why aren't the guardians allowed to have any private property? (416d-417b)

The guardians "will save both themselves and the city" if they are humble and do not own any private property. "If they acquire private land, houses, and money themselves, they will be household managers and farmers instead of guardians--hostile masters of the other citizens, instead of their allies. They will spend their whole lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, much more afraid of internal than of external enemies." Also, the guardians are to be lied to and told that they have silver and gold in their souls gifted to them by the gods, which will prevent them from wanting any physical goods.

What is the difference between incontinence and intemperance, and between continence and temperance?

The incontinent person has knowledge that their action is not what is best for them, but the intemperate person is simply acting on pleasure. The continent person knows that he has bad desires, and does not act upon them, whereas the temperate person isn't aware of having bad desires.

Glaucon tells a story about the origins of justice. What is it? What view of human nature underlies it?

The origins of justice: "People say, you see, that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad. But the badness of suffering it far exceeds the goodness of doing it. Henec, those who have done and suffered injustice and who have tasted both--the ones who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it--decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants; and what the law commands, they call lawful and just. That, they say, is the origin and very being of justice" (358e-359a). The human nature that underlies it: "[justice] is between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two extremes. People love it, not because it is a good thing, but because they are too weak to do injustice without impunity" (359a-b).

What sorts of sense perceptions does Plato call "summoners" (523b .)? What effect do summoners have on the soul? How do they draw us towards knowledge of the forms?

The summoner has caused sensation to become problematic and has thus made the soul aware of the inadequacy of simple perception for providing knowledge of reality. EX: of three fingers If it was just one finger, no summoning because it's just a finger But when there are 3 fingers, one is both longer and shorter and this is a contradiction The soul, now turning its attention to intelligible objects rather than sense perceptions, has been summoned to think

What are the three parts of Plato's city? What is the job of each?

The three parts are rulers, guardians, and producers (guardian, auxiliary, and moneymaking classes), corresponding to reason, spirit, and appetite. The rulers are to rule, and the guardians to guard, and the producers to produce, and there should be no meddling into other parts, as this will destroy the city. "When the moneymaking, auxiliary, and guardian class each do their own work in the city--is justice" (434c).

What are the three parts of the soul, and how do they match up with the parts of the city? What is the natural role of each part? (439d-441a)

The three parts of the soul are the rational element, the appetitive element, and the spirited element. The rational corresponds with the rulers (guardians), and the spirited with the guardians (auxiliaries), and the appetitive with the producers (moneymakers). The rational element is the element in the soul with which one calculates. The appetitive element is the element in the soul with which one feels passion, hunger, thirst, and is stirred by other appetites. The spirited element is ambitious and responds to emotions.

Describe the tyrannical soul and explain how it is analogous to a tyrannical state.

The tyrannical soul is, in Plato's eyes, the worst soul because it is a slave to its unlawful desires. It will do anything to satisfy these desires, desires which will harm the rest of society because they are so wretched.

Why does Plato think that the successful tyrant is the most wretched and least free of all people?

The tyrannical soul is, in Plato's eyes, the worst soul because it is a slave to its unlawful desires. It will do anything to satisfy these desires, desires which will harm the rest of society because they are so wretched.

How does dialectic differ from mathematics? What is the goal of dialectic?

They cannot see it while wide awake as long as they make use of hypotheses that they leave undisturbed, for which they cannot give any account First principle is unknown Middle steps and conclusion are put together out of what's the unknown Can't be knowledge Dialectic Journeys to the first principle itself in order to be made secure This is called "thought" Goal of Dialectic Obtain Knowledge Must be able to give account of the form of the good (Rulers must have dialectic above all)

Why does Aristotle say that adequate students of ethics must have been brought up well, with good habits? Does he think that his book alone can make someone good?

Things are known in two ways, for some are known to us, some known without qualification<but not necessarily know to us>. Our starting point should begin from what is known to us This is why we need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be adequate students of what is fine and just (1095b4-6) (DON'T KNOW ANSWER TO QUESTION PART 2) One is only a good judge of what one knows well. Thus adequate students of ethics must have been brought up well with good habits because only then will they have the experience necessary to really understand ethics. (They must be good to judge what is good and they are only good if they are in the habit of being good.) Aristotle thinks that for someone who is brought up well they would know that being good is the starting point and would not need reason to know why it is good to be good. His book only provides the knowledge which makes it easier for reason to discern what the right thing is.

What is Plato's justification for giving all the political and military power to the guardians and depriving the producing class of any political participation? What is the guardians' main goal in governing?

This idea starts with the basic principle that each person should do the one job that he is best suited for. So, a producer should ONLY be producing, and a guardian only guarding. "Each person must practice on of the pursuits in the city, the one for which he is naturally best suited" (433a). These guardians are to be "philosopher kings." "Until philosophers rule as kings in their cities, or those who are nowadays called kings and leading men become genuine and adequate philosophers so that political power and philosophy become thoroughly blended together, while the numerous natures that now pursue either one exclusively are compelled not to do so, cities will have no rest from evils" (473d-e). Why should certain people then be philosopher kings? "One can defend oneself by showing that some people are fitted by nature to engage in philosophy and to take the lead in a city, while there are others who should not engage in t, but should follow a leader" (474bc).

Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates, Cephalus, and Polemarchus all share a mistaken assumption about justice. What is it?

Thrasymachus says that Socrates, Cephalus, and Polemarchus speak about justice as "the right, the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous," but they are not specific in what they mean by this (336d).

How does Socrates argue that the lovers of seeing and hearing and are lovers of opinion, not knowledge?

Thus they are lovers of opinion but not of actual knowledge because they don't understand what beauty is but simply have opinions about things that are or are not beautiful. They see something that both is and isn't, but don't understand full existence, e.g., the forms.

How, according to Aristotle, do we become virtuous?

Two sorts of Virtue Virtue of thought Arises and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs experience and time Virtue of character results from habit This kind of character virtue arises naturally If something is by nature habituation cannot bring it into another condition

What is the primary (unmoved) mover like? Why does Aristotle say, "Its way of life has the same character as our own way of life at its best has for a short time" (Metaphysics XII.7)?

Unmoved mover is pure understanding Unmoved mover is always in a state of wonder, always understanding itself When we understand things we are temporarily put in the state of the unmoved mover, thats why its the best form

What does Aristotle mean when he says that the virtues (of character) are states? What is a state? How does Aristotle argue that the virtues are not feelings or capacities?

Virtue is a (a) state that decides, (b) consisting in a mean, (c) the mean relative to us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason, (e) to the reason by reference to which the intelligent person would define it It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency If something arises in us by nature, we first have the capacity for it (ex; senses) Virtue by contrast, we acquire just as we acquire crafts, by having previously activated them

What kind of state of character is a virtue? What does Aristotle mean when he says that virtue is a state "consisting in a mean"? (Does this mean that our actions and feelings should always be "medium- strength"?) How is the mean determined?

Virtue is a state that decides Consisting in a mean The mean relative to us Which is defined by reference to reason To the reason by reference to which the intelligent person would define it It is a mean between two vices, one of excess, one of deficiency No mean of excess or of deficiency Not every action or feeling admits of the mean Some things are automatically bad Adultery, theft, murder They are base themselves, not in excesses or deficiencies Determined by the reference to which the intelligent person would define it

True or false? For Aristotle, being virtuous is a matter of being strong enough to overcome your emotions and feelings when they tempt you to do something inappropriate. Explain.

Virtue is concerned with actions and feelings (every action or feeling imples pleasure or pain), hence virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain Bad effects of pleasure and pain are the reason why people actually define the virtues as ways of being unaffected and undisturbed by pleasures and pains (1104b25) Virtue is that state that does the best actions concerned with pleasures and pain, and vice is the opposite

What place do the virtues have in the Epicurean conception of the good life, and why? What about wisdom?

Virtues exist as a form of prudence, to calculate what is in one's own best interest Virtues such as courage, moderation are needed in order to attain happiness instrumental goods We need wisdom to see which pleasures are really pleasurable, and which pains are necessary to produce pleasure going to dentist (painful) to reduce future pain

Materialists try to explain the features of things by appealing to features of their matter. How does Aristotle use the example of a wall to show that this is implausible? In what way is the example of a wall (an artifact) relevant to the kinds of cases Aristotle is really interested in (e.g. an eye)?

Wall example Material cause is why its possible to exist purpose of wall is to give protection the wall requires the laws of nature to work as they do but its not the purpose of why the wall exists A wall wouldn't work without balance, but its because of the protection that walls provide that they exist The wall requires these things, but did not come into existence because of them other than the fact that they are the material cause Eye Example Function of an eye is for sight Part of the formal cause of the thing What it is to be an eye is to be an organ of sight (efficient cause: what did the question, but not how it was done)

How does Aristotle argue that happiness is the highest end of human actions? What does he mean when he says that happiness is "complete" and "self-suffcient"?

We don't do anything that isn't for the sake of happiness Happiness is most choice worthy of all goods We do not think any addition can make happiness more choice worthy; hence it is most choice worthy We regard something as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choice worthy and lack nothing; and that is what we think happiness does

What kind of answer is Socrates looking for when he asks Hippias "what is the fine?"

When Socrates is asking Hippias about what the fine is, he is not asking for examples of fine things, but he wants to know what makes each fine thing fine.

What is wisdom in the city? What is courage? Temperance? Justice? (441e-442d)

Wisdom: Wisdom is "the craft of guardianship. And the ones who possess it are those rulers we just now called complete guardians. Because it has this knowledge, then, how do you describe the city? As prudent and really wise" (428a5-10) Courage: "So courage, too, belongs to a city because of a part of itself--because it has in that part the power to preserve through everything its belief that the things, and the sorts of things, that should inspire terror are the very things, and sorts of things, that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of educating it. [...] I mean that courage is a sort of preservation. [...] The preservation of the belief, inculcated by the law through education, about what things, and what sorts of things, inspire terror. And by preservation "through everything," I mean preserving it through pains, pleasures, appetites, and fears and not abandoning it" (429c-d). Temperance: "Temperance is surely a sort of order, the mastery of certain sorts of pleasures and appetites. People indicate as much when they use the term "Self-mastery"--though I do not know in what way. [...] Beside its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part and makes the city either courageous or wise. Temperance does not work like that, but has literally been stretched throughout the whole, making the weaker, the stronger, and those in between all sing the same song in unison--whether in wisdom, if you like, or in physical strength, if you prefer; or, for that matter, in numbers, wealth, or anything else. Hence we would be absolutely right to say that this unanimity is temperance--this concord between the naturally worse and the naturally better, about which of the two should rule both in the city and in each individual" (432a-b). Justice: "[...] Each person must practice one of the pursuits in the city, the one for which he is naturally best suited. [...] This, then, my friend, provided it is taken in a certain way, would seem to be justice--this doing one's own work. [...] After our consideration of temperance, courage, and wisdom, I think that what remains in the city is the power that makes it possible for all of these to arise in it, and that preserves them when they have arisen for as long as it remains there itself. And we did say that justice would be what remained when we had found the other three" (433a-c).

How does Plato argue that the guardians should include women as well as men? How does he reply to the objection that since men and women have different natures, they should do different jobs?

Women will be birthed and reared in the same way as men, so they should have the same opportunity to be guardians if they are suited. Plato says that the differences of natures in concerns of guardianship between men and women are like the differences of nature of bald and long-haired men. "In the case of both the male and the female sex, then, if one of them is shown to be different from the other regard to a particular craft or pursuit, we will say that is the one who should be assigned to it. But is it is apparent that they differ in this respect along, that the female bears the offspring while the male mounts the female, we will say it has not yet been demonstrated that a woman is different from a man with regard to what we are talking about, and we will continue to believe our guardians and their women should have the same pursuits" (454d). "Then, my friend, there is no pursuit relevant to the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she is a woman, or to a man because he is a man; but the various natural capacities are distributed in a similar way between both creatures, and women who can sare by nature in every pursuit, and men in every one, though for the purposes of all of them women are weaker than men" (355d).

Is the knowledge the guardians must have any different from the knowledge the completely just individual must have? Why or why not?

what distinguishes the philosopher-king from everyone else: he knows the Form of the Good, and so he has an understanding of everything (not the best answer)