Cases: Ch 7 - 11 (Test 2)

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963)

* Supreme Court of CA - 1st court to adopt a general rule of strict liability in tort in product injury cases Greenman sued mfr, Shopsmtih, & the retail delaer, Yuba Power, alleging breaches of warranties & negligence Verdict in Greenman's favero against Shopsmith was appealed Supreme Court - judgment affirmed to est. mfr's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design & mfr, of which plaintiff was not aware, that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended purpose

Parker v. Glosson (2007)

Ch 10, p. 268 * acceptance is not unconditional - failure of the parties to clearly agree Douglas & Sandy Glosson offered to sell 36 acres, including bldgs. Douglas Glosson & Parker agreed on term & signed agreement. Sandy Glosson did not sign - deal fell through. Parker sued for breach of contract. He requested specific performance (an order to sell the property) or damanges. Trial court dismissed suit. Parker appealed. Court of Appeals of NC affirmed trial court's decision to dismiss. ---no meeting of the minds...therefore no contract, when in the contemplation of both parites...something remains to be done to establish contract relations ---agreement for purchase & sale ...expressly provides "this agreement shall become an enforceable contract when fully excecuted copy has been communicated to both parties. ---seller are Doug & Sandy G ---...until executed by all it is inchoate & incomplete & never takes effect as valid contract & this is especially true where agreement expressly provides or its manifest intent is, that is not be be binding until signed

Lightle v. Real Estate Commission (2006)

Ch 7, p 182 Lightle (real estate agent in Anchorage, AK) listed a house for sale by the Leighs. Williamses made offer; offer accepted, conditinal obtaining a mortgage. Another realtor had client Seeley. Lightle said "1st offer dead". Seeley made offer- Leighs accepted. Lightle wrote on Seeley's offer - back-up contract only if Williamses could not get mortgage, which was still in process. Seeley rescinded offer, demanded deposit back, & filed claim against AK Real Estate Comm's real estate surety fund - a state admind. fund to compensate people who lose $ in real estate transactions due to fraud Comm held Lightle committed fraudulent misrep. Awared Seeley damanges & suspended Lightle's real estate liscense. Lightle appealed but upheld by superior court, which acts as an appeals court for Comm. decisions. Lightly appealed again. Supreme cour of AK affirmed superior court's ruling unholding comm. decision Lightle ...[said] that prior deal "is dead," that Seeley's offer had been accepted, & that "the house is yours"...Lightle made a partial disclosure that failed to reveal facts that "might have affected the receipient's conduct in the transaction in hand."...

ASC Construction Equip. USA v. City Commerical Real Estate (2010)

Ch 7, p 183 ASC hired City to serve as ASC's exclusive real estate agent in ATL area. ASC looking fo land to develop for Volvo. City found land- rcvd 5% comm of land purchase. At ASC's request, City called for construction proposals - each developer promised to pay City a commission if it gets job. One developer Seefried called on (3rd party) Catamount Constructors to help w/bid. Seefried & Catamount did not have a contract but anticipated hiring Catmount if it won job. ACS decided to handle construction directly therefore City could not get comm. for arranging construction. ASC told Catamount not to proceed further w/City & hired Catamount to build one of showrooms. City sued ASC for tortious interference with bus. relations. Jury awared City $467, 764 in compensatory damages, interest, & atty fees & $1.25 mil in puntitive damages. GA Court of Appeals - judgment affirmed in part & reversed in part; case remanded City had to show that ASC was a stranger to the prospective comm. arrangement ----concluded that evidence presented no basis ASC was a stranger to City's bus. relationship w/Catamount ----consequently, trial court erred in denying ASC's motion for a directed verdict as to ...claim for tortious interference w/contracted & bus. relationships... ----punitive damages award cannot stand in absense of of a valid claim for totious interference w/ bus. relationsips, it (ASC) cannot be held liable for punitive damages in any amt.

Audi v. D'Amato (2006)

Ch 9, p. 243 D'Amato registered domain name www.audisports.com selling goods & services w/Audi logos. Used serveal Audi logos claiming to have permission from an Audi dealershp to use marks. Audi dealerships have no right by contract to grant any use of Audi trademarks. Audi's web sites sells assorted goods w/Audi name & logo on it. Audi sued D'Amato for infringement, dilution & cybersquatting for famous trademakrs. District court held for Audi & issued a permanent injunctin against D'Amato, his web site & domain name. He appealed. US Courts of Appeals affirmed district court's judgment. *D'Amato argued district court's finding of a likelihood of confusion should be reversed b/c Audi did not offer evidence demonstrating ACTUAL confusion ---Lanham Act - only "likelyhood of confusion must be shown" must be shown to obtain equitable relief * D'Amato contended that any proof of consumer confusion is rebutted by a disclaimer on his website "This page is not associated w/Audi...in any way? ---disclaimer doesn't absolve liability for unlawful use of mark identical to Audi's trademark ---a disclaimer disavowing affiliation ...read by consumer after searching website comes too late - infringement under Lanham Act * dilution law ---not based on likelihood of confusin standard but only exists to protect...rights a holder has in maintaining integrity & distinctiveness of mark * cybersquatting ---Anticybersquatting Consumber Protection Act (ACPA) -plaintiff must show defandant's use of a domain name was done in bad faith

Maverick Recordings Co. v. Harper (2010)

Ch 9, p. 250 Harper was shown to have downloaded 37 audio files copyrighted to Maverick as owners. Plaintiff moved for summary judgement for the 37 audio files and was granted as was an injunction against further improper downloads & sharing by Harper. Harper asserted infringements were "innocent" under copyright law & trial court agreed, limiting damages to $200 per violation. Plaintiffs appealed contending infringement was not innocent & damanges should, by statute, be min of $750/infringement US Court of Appeals affirmed district court's findings of copyright liability, reversed its findings that innocent infringement defense, & remanded for further proceedings consistent w/this opinion ---Harper cannot defeat motion for summary judgment merely by claiming some metaphysical doubts as to the material facts... ---district court correctly granted summary judgment on issue of infringement * Harper contended only that she was too young & naive to understand copyrights on published music applied to downloaded music ---argument insufficient to defeat interposition of the (statutory) limitation on the innocent infringement defense ---the plain language of the statute show that infringer's knowledge or intent does not affect its application... * b/c defense does not apply, plaintiff entitled to statutory damages & b/c plaintiff requested min. statutory damages under Copyright Act, they must be awarded statutory damages of $750/infringement * trial court erred by allowing Harper's innocent infringer defense to survive summary judgment

Nystrom v. Trek Co. (2004)

Ch 9, p. 253 * review of patent validity Nystrom recieved the '831 patent for "a board for use in constructing a flooring surface for exterior use (such as a deck)...manufactured to have a...convex top surface which sheds water & at same time is comfortable to walk on. Nystrom sued Trek for infringing '831 patent. Trek manufactures exterior decking planks made from composite wood fibers & recycled plastic. A key part of their defense was that their planks were not cut from logs. District court held key parts of patent invalid & dismissed Nystrom's claim. He appealed. US Court of Appeals reversed district court's summary judgment of noninfringement ---Nystrom argued "board" not limited to conventional wood boards cut from log. Argued claim language "board" does not contain a description of the material from which board is composed & claim should not be so limited * in construing claims, analytical focus must begin & remain centered on langugae of claims themselves ---while some dictionaries define "board" solely in reference to material composition, not all dictionaries are so constrained.... ---'831 patent reveals Nystrom did not disclaim boards made from materials other than logs ---describes invention as "a decking board" ---this is constistent w/ordinary & customary meaning & supports a broader construction than adopted by district court ---district court erred in limiting it to manufacturing steps used to shape wood

US v. Yang (2002)

Ch 9, p. 257 * economic espionage Lee, a Taiwanese native worked in research for Avery, an adhesive mfr. When visiting Taiwan, he was approached by Yang & his daughter about providing info. to their Taiwanese adhesive co. Lee agreed & pd $25,000/yr for confidential info from Avery about new products. When arrangement was uncovered, Lee agreed to participate w/FBI to participate in sting operation to help arrest Yang & prosecute him. When visiting US, Lee met w/Yang & daughter & meeting was filmed. Yangs were arrested, conviceted & fined $5 mil. They appealed, contending materials used in sting were not actual trade secrets so they could not have violated law US Court of Appeals affirmed judgment of conviction --under Modal Penal Code defendant's guilt turn on the "circumstances as he believes them to be", the court held that the govt. was not required to prove what the defendant sought to steal was in fact a trade secret but only that the defendant believed it to be one --b/c Yangs' agreement to steal trade secrets...they took an overt step towards achieving that objective --the mutual understanding or agreement itself is criminal and whether the objective of the scheme actually is as the parties believed to be, unlawful is irrelevant

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916)

NY's highest court eliminated privity requirement & held a mfr liable in tort for negligence for product-related injury to a consumer despiste lack of privity case is still good law today evidence its defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, & that inspection was omitted charge is not of fraud but of negligence if he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow Buick was not merely a dealer but was a mfr of autos. it was responsible for finished product the oligation to inspect must vary w/nature of thing to be inspected ----the more probable the danger, the greater the need of caution

Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp (2005)

ch 10, p. 270 * use of detriment-benefit test to determine whether there is consideration for a contract Gulfstream adopted a dispute resolution policy (DRP) as the only procedure to resolve disputes btwn Gulfstream & employees. Mailed it to employees & would begin in 2 wks & would be condition to continue employment. A group of employees sued, contending there was no contract, so DRP could not be enforced. District court held for Gulfstream. Employees appealed. US Court of Appeals, 11th Cir. affirmed decision. 1. plaintiffs argue DRP does not constitute offer. An offer is he manifistation of willingnes to enter into a bargain...DRP clearly states it is a contract, establishes terms of contract, & explains means of accepting contract. ---Thus, DRP plainly constituted an offer 2. plaintiffs contend they cannot be deemed to have accepted terms of DRP simply by their continued employement, even though DRP expressly provides continued employement is proper means of acceptance. ---Employees accepted DRP through continued employement 3. plaintiffs argued arbitration agreement is unenforceable b/c there is not bargained for consideration for their relinquishment of trial right. Argued employees got nothing in return. ---Plaintiffs received reciprocal promises from Gulfstrem to arbitrate & be bound by arbitration in covered claims. DRP provides Gulfstream will pay arbitration & mediation costs. These promises constitute bargained-for consideration

Hinson v. N&W Construction Co. (2004)

ch 10, p. 272 * application of promisory estopple doctrine which also notes that oral promises can be basis of a contract N&W prepared bid for MS Job Corps Center (MJCC) to build kitchen facility at a training center. In preperation of bid, N&W rcvd quoted bid from Hinson for plumbing for $92,000 (lowest) & next lowest was $139,000. N&W was awared contract. Hinson refused job. N&W had to hire next lowest bidder & pd additional $47,000 do plumbing work. N&W sued Hinson on basis of promissory estopple. Trial Court granted summary judgment to N&W & awared $47,000 in damages. Hinson appealed. Courts of Appeals (MS) affirmed decision. ---an estopple may arise....if it was intended that promise should be relied upon & infact was relied upon & if refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction perpetuation of fraud or would result in other injustices. ---circuit court correctly granted N&W motion for summary judgment on theory of promissory estopple ---Hinson admits providing verbal quote ---Hinson testified reviewing plans & specs. for bldg, worked on quote for approx. 2 weeks, & was satisfied w.his price of $92,000 ---Hinson didn't dispute N&W used his quote for plumbing work in its bid for contract. ---Hinson later explains he refused to do job b/c he had a lot of jobs going

DCS Sanitation Mgmt v. Castillo (2006)

ch 10, p. 277 * convent not to compete - restriction on competition by former employees DCS is a Deleware co. w/main office in OH & operations in 13 states. It cleans food processing plants, including Tyson Foods plant in Dakota City, NE. Casatillo & other employees signed noncompete agreements w/DCS not to directly or indirectly engage in , or in any manner be concerned w/or employed by any person, firm or corp. in competition with DCS or engaged in providing contract cleaning services w/in radius of 100 mi from any customer of DCS , period of 1 yr after termination. When DCS lost contract w/Tyson to competitor, competitor hired Castillo & other former DCS emploeyees to do much of same work. DCS sued employees for breach of contract. District court held for Castillo. DCS appealed. US Court of Appeals affirmed decision. ---District court properly concluded OH has no substantial relationship to parties or transactions. In NE if a court determines a noncompete agreement unreasonable, court will not reform noncompete agreement in order to make it enforceable - application of OH law would violate a fundamental policy of NE law ---an employer...is not entitled to protection against ordinary competition from a pformer employee. A noncompete agreement may be valid only if it restricts former employee from woring for or soliciting former employer's clients or accts. w/whom former employee actually did business & had personal contact ---conclude noncompete agreement were broad & unenforcable...The breadth of the noncompete agreements effectively put the former employees out of the cleaning business w/in an extensive region. --hold district court did not err in concluding NE courts would enforce such overly broad noncompete agreements

Deschamps v. Treasure Stae Trailer Court, Ltd. (2010)

ch 10, p. 280 * parol evidence rule in 2003, Rasmussen agreed to sell Deschamps a mobile home trailer park in Great Falls, MT w/ 96 residential spaces for $1,445,000. After sale, Rasmussen died & his estate inherited assests. Deschamps found significant probs. w/water system requiring $400,000 in repairs. In 2006, Deschamp quit making pmts claiming cost of water system made pmts impossible. Estate sued for pmts; Deschamps sued for breach of contract & fraud contending Rasmussen told him water system was in good condition & occupancy rate was higher than it was in fact. Trail court held for estate finding Deschamps' claims were precluded by parol evidence rule. He appealed. Supreme Court of MT affirmed decision ---the parol evidence rule in MT states the execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supercedes all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which precedeed or accompanied execution of the instrument ---agreement memorialized the parties buy/sell transaction & Deschamps coudn't introduce evidence of oral agreements or stmts ostensibly made by Rasmussen that were not included in the agreement ---agreement provided 10 Rasmussen had not conducted an inspection & didn't warrant the property's condition, 2) Deschamps had the right & obligation to inspect the property prior to purchase...5) a merger clause specifying that agreement was the entire agreement & superseded any oral agreement bwn parties, & 6) agreement could only be amended in writing ---Deschamps signed a contract prepared by his agent that contained an unequivocal stmt that Deschamps had not relied "upon any assurances by...the seller as to the condition of the property ---Deschamps arguement was a direct contradiction to the express content of the contract & therefore was precluded under the parole evidence rule ---Deschamps allegation of reliance on alleged fraudulent stmts specifically contradict language of agreement, consideration of them is barred under the parol evidence rule

DeRosier v. Utility System of America, Inc. (2010)

ch 10, p. 289 *damage calculation, issue of mitigation of damages & why a party may not want to have a breaching party correct a prob. DeRosier owned land on a hillside. Before house could be built, lot needed to be filled w/dirt. He saw USA doing construction road work nearby & asked it to dump excess fill dirt on his lot, saving it $ instead of hauling dirt further away. Derosier obtained a permit from city (& gave permit to USA) allowing 1,500 cubit yards of fill to be dumped on his properby (amount he needed). He found out later USA dumped 6,500 cubic yards of fill (excess of 5,000) instead onto his property, violating permit. USA denied repsonsibility but offered to move excess dirt for $9,500. DeRosier sued. Trial court granted him $22,829 in general damanges to pay another co. to remove excess fill & $8,000 in consequential or delay damages for time lost to be able to contruct house while waiting for dirt to be removed. USA appealed, contending DeRosier failed to mitigate damages by not having them move dirt for $9,500 rather than $22,829 to another co. Courts of Appeals (MN) affirmed in part & reversed in part court's decision. ---general damages, as opposed to special damages, "naturally & necessarily result from act complained of."...consequential damanges (or special damages), ususally...refer to those items of damages which, b/c of particular circumstances, are to be distinguished from general damages. Special damages are the natural but NOT the necessary, result of a breach. Although special or consequential damages flow naturally from breach, they are not recoverable unless they are reasonably foreseeable to the parites at time of breach. ---USA claimed - no claim for delay damages in prleading or discovery & no evidence of monetary loss caused by delay introduced at trial --DeRosier specifically mentioned delay in pre-litigation demand but this did not constitute evidence of such damages ---b/c consequential (or delay) damages weren't pleaded & not supported by evidence, conclude district court erred in awarding DeRosier $8,000 as consequential damages for delay in construction. ...when one party to contract defectively perfoms & subsequently offers to correct breach through a new contract, the non-breaching party may generally decline offer & still recover full damages. Facts support DeRosier's decision: 1) $9500 pmt demanded was substantial, 2) DeRosier wasn't unreasonable in believing acceptance could constitute an accord & satisfaction, 3) other hauling services were readily available, 4) DeRosier's relationship w/USA was stained as USA was blaming DeRosier ---District court erred in awarding DeRosier $8000 in consequential damages ---did not abluse its discretion in awarding DeRosier general damages ---DeRosier didn't unreasonably reject USA's $9500 offer & therefore did not improperly fail to mitigate his general damages ---we modify judgment to amount of award for general damages: $22829

Scheerer v. Fisher (2010)

ch 10, p. 291 *quantum meruit Scheerer, a real estate agent, helped arrage for Fisher to buy some commercial real estate for $20 mil. The property seller & Fisher, the buyer, each promised to pay Scheere a 2% commission, but deal fell apart b4 complete. Fisher then formed new co. & had a 3rd party, Antonio, buy the property & sell it to Fisher's new co. Scheerer rcvd no commission & sued for breach of contract or quantum meruit for reasonable compensation. Trial court held there was not contract or basis for pmt to Scheerer. He appealed. Courts of Appeals (NC) reversed court's decision. ---plaintiffs argue trial court erred in dismissing claim of quantum meruit for failure tostate a claim upon which relief can be granted. We agree. ---plaintiffs entitlted to seek alternative forms of relief if plaintiff's allegation in their claim for quantum meruit are accepted as true, no contract exists & quantum meruit is not included as remedy per se. ---recovery in quantum meruit will not be denied where a contract may be implied from the proven fats but the express contract alleged is not proved to recover in quantum meruit, plaintiffs must show: 1) services were rendered to defendants, 2) services were knowingly & voluntarily accepted, 3) services were not given gratuitously ---1) defendants had a prior professional relationship w/Scheere & therefore knew Scheerer was a real estate agent, 2) defendants knew plaintiffs were working on behalf of defendants to find property suitable for defendants to purchase, 3) plaintiffs told defendants such property was for sale, 4) both parties expected plaintifffs to be pd a commission, 5) defendants were ready, willing, & able buyers & in fact purchased properties located by plaintiffs undisputed facts establish conduct demonstrating defendants took action to deny Scheere compensation that was earned for services he rendered. Although original contract he negotiated failed to close, law implies a promise to pay some reasonable compensation for services rendered. Plaintiff's allegations state a valid claim for relief in quantum meruit

Crest Ridge Construction v. Newcourt (1996)

ch 11, p. 302 * intent to contract Crest Ridge was a newly formed construction co. Awarded a subcontract on job to provide wall panels. They rcvd quote from Newcourt for panels. Contract w/Newcourt stated "subject to credit approval. Since it was a new co. credit dept. did not find much info about Crest Ridge. Over next 6 mths detailed discussion about specs. of panels continued & shipment was set. Newcourt hen demanded pmt in full. Industry practice was mpt 45 days after shpment, so subcontractor could present goods to general contractor, who would pay the bill. When Crest Ridge could not pay up front, Newcourt cancelled order. B/c of cancellation, Crest Ridge had to find another supplier at a higher price to fill order. It sued Newcourt. Jury awarded $70214 in damages. Newcourt appealed. US Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. affirmed judgment. ---Newcourt argued phrase "subject to credit dept. approval" illustrated it never agreed to extend credit thus its demand of pmt up front constituted no breach of contract ---evidence was sufficient to show parties formed a contract. UCC provides that a contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agmt., including conduct by both parites which recognizes existence of contract --exchange of price quote, purch. order, documents contruction industry considers to have binding effect ---parties conducts illustrated they thought they made a deal - 6 mths discussing specs of panels "subject to credit dept approval" does not constitue refusal to grant credit ---rqmt. of credit dept. would be unnecessary unles sparties contemplated some form of credit ---parties left terms of pmt blank in their exchange of price quot & P.O., pmt was due either upon delivery or perhaps according to "general usage" in either case, Newcourt breached agmt by demanding full pmt in advance

Axelson v. McEvoy-Willis (1993)

ch 11, p. 304 *battle of the forms - terms in contract conflict ---parties had formed contract prior to final form contract so terms did not control the agmt. UCC would settle dispute & allow damanges to be pd McEvoy hired to build oil rigs. Contacted Axelson about building acuators, complex pieces of equip. for rigs. Axleson sent price quote good for 60 days. McEvoy said it needed more time & accepted no deviation from its standard form of contract. Axleson granted more time. Parties dickered for mths until McEvoy sent "letter of intent" spelling out terms but said it needed to see tech specs to finalize deal. Axelson did not want to provide spec w/o firm order b/c specs include trade secrets but after being assured order was done deal, sent specs. Mths later afer work stared, McEvoy sent PO containing all terms of contract & nothing else applied. 1 term was McEvoy had right to cancel order at any time & was not liable for losses. After Axleson sent 28 actuators & 8 more ready to ship, McEvoy cancelled contract, which called for delivery of another 40. Axleson sued. Trial court found McEvoy in breach, honding that earlier discussions, not final doc., applies. Damages were $684,905 + int. McEvoy appealed. US Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. affirmed decision. ---UCC - a contract for sale of goods may be made in manner sufficient to show agmt, including conduct by both parties which recognizes existence of such a contract...even though the moment of its making is undetermined. ---hard to tell exactly when this contract was perfect ---quote by Axleson can be construed as an offer letter of intent said form of PO was to follow in due course does not avail McEvoy ---b/c parties had meeting of the minds mths b4, the additional terms on the June form PO never became part of the contract conduct of parties recognize the existence of a contract. Parties' writings don't agree on particular cancellation provision, so the law provides one

Griffin v. Clear Lakes Trout (2007)

ch 11, p. 306 * example of court filling the gaps Clear Lakes- fish hatchery, had deal w/Griffith-trout grower for 6 yrs: Griffith buys small trout from CL & sell back when grown to "market size". Price set at rate/lb. After 3 yrs, CL customers began to demand larger fish. Some adjustments were made but Griffith left w/too many fish, deeply in debt & could not easily change its operations. Sued CL for breach for "refusing to accept & pruchase in a timely manner market size trout. CL claimed not contract ever existed b/c trout differ as to what market size was. District court found for Griffith, holding parties knew that market size was 12-16 oz. CL appealed. Supreme Court (ID) affirmed decision ---UCC - in order to have enforceable contract, does not require a doc itemizing all specific terms of agreement. Determination whether circumstances of cae, including parties' conduct are "sufficient to show agmt" parties' interpretaions coincided during 1st 3 yrs of contract ---at time of contract formation, parties had understanding about what fish were "market size" ---negates CL's contention that there was no meeting of the minds as to meaning of term ---Griffith also showed evidence of similar treade usage predating contract

Lee v. R&K Marine (2004)

ch 11, p. 315

MDM Group Assocs. v. CX Reinsurance Co. (2007)

ch 7, p 185 suit by ins. agency (MDM - ins. broker) due to ins. co. (CX) refusal to continue to provide agency insurance policies, thereby causing agency to lose current & presective customers jury awarded MDM $6.75 mil in damages. CX appealed Court of appeals (CO) reversed judgment & remanded case w/directions to enter judgment for CX ----MDM cannot assert tortious interference as to the ins. contracts btwn CX & the insured ski resorts...Nor can MDM assert a claim against CX for prospective contractual relations if CX were expected to be a party to that contract

Hicklin Engineering v. RJ Bartell (2006)

ch 9, p. 255 * infringement of trade secret - what belongs to employee & what belongs to employer For 7 yrs Bartell worked as independent contractor for Axi-Line Precision, a division of Hicklin that designs & makes test equipment for vehicle transmissions. Bartell quit working for Axi-Line & formed a competing business selling transmissions testing equip. Hicklin sued for violation of WI's Uniform Trade Secret Act. Judge held for Bartell. Hicklin appealed. US Court of Appeals vacated district court's judgment & case remanded for proceedings consistent w/opinion --Bartell did not have agreement with Axi-Line to avoid future competition nor to use his drawings & ideas for any other entity --district court concluded this to mean Bartell may do as he pleases w/any info. Axi-Line furnished him, plus whatever he developed on his own --as an independent contractor, he presumptively owned his work product --in absence of agreement, nonexclusivity is the norm *things are otherwise when client rather than independent contractor develops the info. --law of trade secrets follows same approach to ownership, both in general & in WI --Bartell did not aquire any rights in Axi-Line's trade secret data just b/c he used those data in the performance of his duties *Would record permit a reasonable jury to find Bartell know that Axi-Line treated at least some of the data it provided as trade secrets? It would. --the info. nature...is one reason. Many of these details (especially materials & tolerance) would be hard to obtain in reverse engineering --Axi-Line's safeguards, of which Bartell knew are another reason. The firm took standard precautions, Bartell himself suggested to Axi-Line that certain plans bear confidentiallity agreements and Axi-Linetold Bartell to include appropriate legends in CAD models & these detail models were not shown to customers or competitors * from Bartell's knowledge & the norm that a client's info remains its property after an independent contractor has worked w/the data, a reasonable jury could infer that Bartell implicitly agreed to use the dat for Axi-Line's benefit's rather than his own --WI doesn't require an express written contract of confidentiality...& breach of an implicit promise to hold info for the client's sole benefit in turn violates Trade Secrets Act * on remand the parties & trier of facts will need to separate Axi-Line's contribution (which Hicklin owns) from Bartell's (which he owns), determine which of Axi-Line's data are trade secrets; ascertain whether Bartell recognized these data as confidential, pin down use that Bartell made of those trade secrets, & if necessary decide whether WI law permtis such use. If Hicklin prevails on these issues, district court will have to select appropriate remedy

Parish v. ICON (2006)

p 195-196 Parish was jumping on a trampoline, made by Jumpking, surrounded by a safety need made by ICON. He did a somersault, landed on head & rendered quadraplegic He sued ICON & Jumpking for failure to warn of dangers involved using product. Distrcit Court granted summary judgment for mfrs. Parish appealed. Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed ruling. ----concluded that a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that defendant's warnings were inadequate

Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish (2009)

p 198 Gish (a long haul trucker) & his worker's comp. ins. carrier, sued for design fefect contending that trailer should have not had a ladder that allowed a person to climb up to the trailer & that the rail on top of the trailer is too narrow to walk on safely. Timpte argued that danger of being on the rail was open & obvious. Disctrict court granted summary judgment for Tempte. Appeals court reversed. Timpte appealed. Supreme Court TX reversed court of appeals' judgment & rendered judgment reinstating trial court's summary judgment ----not evidence that design defects alleged rendered trailer unreasonably dangerous ----risk-utility factors confirm that design of Super Hopper trailer was not defective as matter of law. Had Gish adhered to warning, his accident would not have occured. Additinally, widening side walls of trailer....would have increaded cost & weight of trailer while decreasing utility; therefore, the width of top rail not a desgin defect that renders trailer unreasonably dangerous ----the ulitility of the ladder as constructed is high

Moran v. Sims (2004)

p 215 Sims owned property surrounded by the Morans' property. ----His deed recorded in 1985 but family has had ownership for over 50 yrs. ----Property was accessed by driveway across the property bought by the Morans in 1996. Sims asked court to grant him an easement. ----Trial court held Sims had presective easement that allowed use of the driveway on Morans' property. ----Morans' appealed. * court of appeals, MS affirmed trial court's decision ----elements of adverse possessions were sufficiently proven

Nielsen v. Gold's Gym (2003)

p 220 * commercial lease case Peterson (Gold Gym) signed a preprinted commercial lease agreement with Nielsen to lease the premises in a strip mall, The bldg was still under construction. Peterson discovered that it would cost $168,000 to imporve the bldg shell to be ready for the gym. Peterson & Nielsen could not come to agreement re: who would pay for interior improvements. Peterson walked away & Neilsen leased to another party ----Nielsen sued for $112,000 in damages for breach on contract for having to rent the space for less than Peterson had agreed. ----trial court held the lease to be unenforceable for lack of agreement to the nature & extent of the property to be leased. ----Nielsen appealed * Supreme Court (UT) affirmed trial court's judgment of dismissal ----it was not clear from the lease who was required to pay for thoe tenant-based modifications to bldg shell ---the cost of the improvements would constituted a significant portion of the overall costs associated w/lease ----case persuades us that it [cost] was an essential part of the bargain to be reached ----the lease agreement was ambiguous due to missing terms, specifically those terms governing pmt of tenant improvements. -----trial court's interpretation of contract after finding ambiguity was not challenged on appeal ---unhold trial court's ruling that the contract was unenforceable for lack of mutual assent as to the essential terms governing which party was to pay for tenant improvement

Saadala v. East Brunswick Zoning Board of Adjustments (2010)

p 223 7-Eleven wanted to take over gas station property across street & a neighboring vacant lot zoned residential & build a retail gas operation as part of 7-Eleven & requested that preexisting nonconforming use be extended. ----Saadala, a resident in the area, opposed the classification requested by 7-Eleven, but it was approved by the Zoning Board. ----decision was affirmed by county trial court ----Saadal appealed * Superior Court (NJ), Appellate Div. reversed Law Division's judgment ----conclude that 7-Eleven's plan for the establishment of a mini-mart, which woulod add the retail sale of gasoline to its current operation of a convenience sttore, would not involve simply an expansion of the convenience store or the former shell gas station but rather a substantial change in the use of the properties ----7-Eleven has not shown that there is anything about its property that makes it "peculiarly fitted" for a mini-mart....the East Brunswick zoning ordinance expressly permits this type of commercial use in another zoning district ----7-Eleven failed to make the showing of "special reasons" required for approval of a use varience for its redevelopment pman

Smith v. Kulig (2005)

p 225 * trespass to land Kulig owns a bldg w/bus. on ground fl & apts on 2nd fl. Street door to apt. kept locked so only tenant & guests have access. At back of bldg is a fire escape . Tenants told not to use fire escape unless emergency. "no trespassing" sign posted on fire escape. Smith was visiting Wolf in bldg. Smith used fire escape, bolts came off & fell to his death. His estate sued Kulig. ----trial court dismissed suit, holding smith to be a trespasser. ----holding was appealed * Supreme Court (ND) affirmed judgment ----court found Smith a trespasser b/c Smith did not have right to use fire escape an an entry or exit to bldg & there was no emergency situation ----no trespassing signs on property negates any impled consent upon which Smith could claim to have been a lawful occupant of the premise while using the fire escape in contraversion of warnings against such use ----landowner does not owe a duty to a trespasser other than to refreain from harming the trespasser in a willing & wanton manner ----landowner is not under any affirmative duty to give a trespasser warning of concealed perils ----only owes a duty to not knowingly or willfully expose a trespasser to hidden danger or peril ----no evidence Kulig knew or had reason to know the fire escape was in a dangerous condition

Atkinson v. City of Pierre (2005)

p 226 * nuisance actions can be based on enforcement of statutes or common law standards Tour Ice has produced ice at its location in the bus. district for yrs. Atkinson was a resident at an apt complex across street from ice plant. ----Atkinson sued both for nuisance , contending noise level from operations was higher than she should have to tolerate ---- trial court held for defendants ----Atkinson appealed * Supreme Court (SD) affirmed ruling ----every municipality shall have power to declare what shall constitute a nuisance & prevent, abate & remove . W/in a city's express authority is the implied power to declare what shall not constitute a nuisance ----the Major of Pierre confirmed that no other complaints from any other residents around the ice facility were filed ----we (Supreme Court) cannot say that the city's refusal to declare Tour Ice's operation a nuisance was palably unreasonable. ----moreover...can find no error in court's refusal to declare the business a private nuisance

Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc. (2006)

p 230 * premise liability case a blind employee of Acme was walking to back of store w/white cane. Campisi was walking down another aisle, around a corner, & tripped over cane suffering injuries. ----Sued Acme for premise liability based on negligence ----jury awarded $115,000 in damages ----trial judge granted Acme judgment notwithstanding the verdict ----Campisi appeal * Superior Court (PA) affirmed court's order reversing jury's verdict & entering judgment for Acme ----no liability exists when dangerous conditions know or obvious to the invitee unless the proprietor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge ----conclude that even if employment of the blind increases risk of accident such as Appelant's, such risk does not overcome a customer's responsibility to avoid the unknown & obvious dangers presented upon exiting a grocery store aisle ----trial court properly found Appelant failed to prove the existence of Acme's legal duty to her

Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermarket of Omaha (1994)

p 231 * product liability - bus. not providing sufficient security to help crimes from occuring on its property Erichsen went to No-Frills one morning. Upon returning to her car, she was assaulted, beaten, robbed, & dragged over 1 mile hanging from the car of her assailant, suffering serious injuries ----sued No-Frills for negligence failing to warn her of criminal acitivity, & for failing to protect her from criminal activities that were forseeable b/c 10 criminal events in previous 16-mth period ---trial court held defendants did not violate a duty of care to Erichsen ----she appealed * Supreme Court (NE) remanded for further proceedings consistent w/opinion that appelant has alleged sufficient facts in her petition to overcome the demurrer of appeleees (motion to dismiss) ----a possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entery for his bus. purpose is subject to liability to members of the public while they are on the land for such a purpose ----owner of property is not an insurer of the land or he visitor's safety while on it - he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to kow that the acts of the 3rd person are occuring, or are about to occur ----a duty to undertake reasonable precautionary measures will be imposed on the landlord when there is a sufficient amount of criminal activity to make further criminal acts reasonably foreseeable

Powell v.Washburn (2006)

p. 216 * property owners sue to enforce original covenants 1988 Washburn, a real estate developer, recorded the Declerations of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) for Indian Hill Airpakr ----1996 the County amended its ordinance to permit use of RVs as residences ----2002 Powell & others sued Washburn requesting injunction to prohibit use of RVs as residences w/in Airpark ----trial court held CC&Rs did not permit RVs as residences ----appeals court reversed ----decision was appealed by Powell Supreme Court (AZ) vacated appeal's court decision & affirmed trial court's judgment ----Restatement consistend w/long-standing AZ case law holding that enforcing intent of parties is the "cardinal principle' in interpreting restrictive covenant ----...the plain intent & purpose of the restriction was to limit residences in the Airpark to mobile or manufactured homes, constructed homes, or hangar-homes...base conclusion on language used in CC&Rs & the purpose for which the restrictions were created