PHI115 Final Exam (Not World Poverty & Hunger, look at PPs)

What is the natural, highest good for man? (For Aristotle)

Aristotle answers this question by reaching a series of conclusions. First Aristotle observes that every act we take is for the sake of something else, an "end". Example: Why did you come to class today? 1. came to class in order to meet course requirements 2. meet requirements in order to pass course 3. pass course in order to earn degree 4. earn degree in order to get job 5. get job in order to have money 6. have money in order to buy things 7. buy things order to be fed, safe, entertained 8. Be fed, safe, entertained in order to be happy 2. Next, Aristotle reasons that if there is an 'ultimate' or 'highest' good for human action, it must be that end for the sake of which everything we do is done. On a related note, Aristotle clarifies that this highest good must be a 'final' good in the sense that it cannot be merely a means to an end but must be chosen as an end in itself. Aristotle considers a number of candidates for this 'highest good' before deciding on just one of them: honour, pleasure, reason, virtue/excellence, happiness He chooses Happiness "... for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else." Happiness is, thus, the highest good, "the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world" and that which "by itself makes life desirable and in want of nothing" Example: , imagine an unusual subway system in which all of the different lines have a single final station in common. That is, no matter which line you start out on, you end up at that one Final Station if you ride any line all the way out to its end. Happiness is like that for Aristotle. You may "pass through" many other intermediate stations along the way (i.e., extrinsic goods), but the ultimate goal of all our actions, according to Aristotle, is to attain happiness. 3. What is happiness? Aristotle reasons that since the 'good' of something lies in its function (e.g., a sculptor's good lies in his sculpting skill), the good of a human must lie in the function of a human. Aristotle is looking for that highest good which is unique to humans, and even plants and other animals have as their end to live, so Aristotle wants to identify the sort of life function that is uniquely human. The exercise of the rational soul is that life function unique to human beings. And the good man's function is "the good and noble performance" of the rational soul's activities (p. 54). This 'excellent' exercise of the faculties of one's rational soul is what Aristotle calls (perfect) virtue. Aristotle concludes that happiness (Greek: eudaimonia) is the state one achieves when one's "activity of soul" is "in accordance with virtue" So then, what are these virtues that any rational person should seek in order to be truly happy? Aristotle recognizes both intellectual virtues (skill in mathematics and philosophy) and moral virtues (or 'practical' virtues), the latter being the focus of his discussion. The same principle operates in reverse as well; that is, we 'learn' vice by doing those things that go against virtue. But it is not enough just to do virtuous acts (though this may be the way that one learns them in the first place). Ultimately, one's goal should be to form a virtuous character, so that one wants to and enjoys being virtuous. The truly virtuous person comes to do virtuous actions naturally, and in so doing enjoys a pleasant life, both because it is always pleasurable to be doing what one truly loves to do and because doing anything with excellence is naturally pleasant. Another important (and famous) element of Aristotle's treatment of virtue and vice is his doctrine of the 'mean'

Veaux & Rickert -- Already tested

a

Kant's Moral Theory

"morality consists solely of rational principles." In claiming this, Kant knowingly and intentionally contrasted his approach to Hume's sentiment-based approach." Kant's reason-based approach was made possible by his renewed emphasis on the role of practical reason for morality.

Anderson's conclusions for the problem

"sexual frequency and quality dies as a relationship grows" "the relentless urge to have sex with someone other than one's lover grows stronger as the emotional strength of the relationship develops" "men want more sex than women"

Steinbock level of intelligence graph (look at pp. and objections/answers)

(1) "We feel a special obligation to care for the handicapped members of our own species, who cannot survive in this world without such care." (2) "When we consider the severely retarded, we think, 'That could be me.' It makes sense to think that one might have been born retarded, but not to think that one might have been born a monkey." Steinbock admits that neither of these observations may reflect moral emotions proper, but she suggests that, at the very least, they cannot be considered 'wrong' emotions either. In this vein, Steinbock admits that the first observation above may be a form of speciesism, but if so "it is stripped of its tone of moral condemnation."

Pogge's 3 challenges

(1) The challenge of 'actual history': (This is a response to those who "believe that even the most radical inequality is morally justifiable if it evolved in a benign way") Pogge points out that, in fact, the present radical inequality between rich and poor nations developed largely out of "a very violent history", particularly during colonial times, in which the rich colonial nations exploited the poorer nations and destroyed their political institutions and cultures. Though we aren't directly responsible for what our forefathers did, "how ... can we plausibly claim the fruits of their sins?" (2) The challenge of 'fictional histories': This is Pogge's response to those who would like to raise the bar of proof needed before concluding that we have any moral obligation toward poor countries. It hasn't been proven (by Pogge or others), they say, that today's present inequalities couldn't have arisen by a natural course of historical progression. In other words, these objectors maintain that it is at least possible that the radical inequalities we see in the world today are not due solely to "the horrors of the European conquests" Pogge admits that "any distribution, however unequal, could be the outcome of a sequence of voluntary bets or gambles." However, this kind of explanation is so powerful that it becomes self-defeating: "Appeal to such a fictional history would 'justify' anything and would thus be wholly implausible" (317). Pogge does consider one sort of 'fictional history' account that might be plausible: John Locke's social contract account (remember Rawls?). That account holds that "a fictional history can justify the status quo only if the changes in holdings and social rules it involves are ones that all participants could have rationally agreed to" But ... "The attempt to justify today's coercively upheld radical inequality by appeal to some morally acceptable fictional historical process that might have led to it ... fails as well. On Locke's permissive account, a small elite may appropriate all of the huge cooperative surplus produced by modern social organization. But this elite must not enlarge its share even further by reducing the poor below the state-of-nature baseline to capture more than the entire cooperative surplus. . The citizens and governments of the affluent states are violating this negative duty when we, in collaboration with the ruling cliques of many poor countries, coercively exclude the global poor from a proportional resource share and any equivalent substitute" (3) The challenge of 'present global institutional arrangements': Pogge's third challenge is to those who would argue that the present radical inequality is justifiable because the harms brought by this inequality are not "foreseeable" or "avoidable"; i.e., this present global system, as bad as it is, is still the 'best' we can hope for. Pogge, in contrast, argues that "we are preserving our great economic advantages by imposing a global economic order that is unjust in view of the massive and avoidable deprivations it foreseeably reproduces" (318). There is, according to Pogge, "a feasible institutional alternative under which such severe and extensive poverty would not persist." Therefore, we are morally accountable.

Suicide

killing oneself (normally to relieve suffering)

Monogamy

(1) an agreement by a couple to have sex only with each other (i.e., sexual exclusivity) or (2) marriage between two people

Polygamy

(1) sexual nonexclusivity or (2) marriage between three or more people

Flores is aware of this last point, of course, and responds that viewing gender (in contrast to biological sex) as "chosen" is absurd, what are the two arguments he's making?

(1) what transgender activists mean by a person's gender identity has, at most, only personal relevance and is not socially/publicly "significant," (2) such a chosen identity may actually be false or "contrary to reality."

Disapprobation

(disapproval) to acts of 'vice' (i.e., what we consider morally 'wrong' acts), precisely because they tend to appear 'deformed' and ugly to us. This dis-approbation gives us an aversion to (i.e., motivation to avoid) such acts, and we attribute negative value to them.

The principle of utility

, an action is 'right' or "conformable to the principle of utility" when "the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it" (p. 504) ... that is, when it promotes overall more happiness than unhappiness.

Aquinas then identifies three categories or kinds of inclinations in humans, and from these three kinds of 'good' at which human morality aims. What are these? -- Already tested on

1) Like all other substances/ things, we have a natural inclination to self-preservation. Morally, this means that natural law gives us a duty to preserve human life and ward off any threats to it. 2) Like all other animals, we have a natural inclination to procreate and nurture our offspring. Morally, this (presumably) means that natural law gives us a duty to respect the 'proper' purpose of sex (i.e., reproduction) and engage in it only within appropriate boundaries that promote a healthy family life for the children that arise from it. Like all other rational beings, we have a natural inclination to know the truth about God and maintain a social life. Morally, this means that natural law gives us a duty to "shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live", and so forth.

You might be wondering, if virtuous acts are naturally attractive to us and vicious acts are not, why anyone would ever be motivated to do the 'wrong' thing. How does Hume address this?

1) The feelings of approbation or disapprobation given rise by our moral sense are relatively calm emotions (to use Hume's word) that emerge from the disinterested contemplation of virtue and vice—i.e., when we are not taking into account our own self-interests. 2) There are numerous other sources of pleasure or pain that may come into play in a given situation, many of them stronger ('more violent') than the feelings of our moral sense, which may overwhelm the latter and motivate us to commit acts of vice.

Hume then provides three "particular instances" or case studies to illustrate his point.

1) Why is incest considered wrong among humans but perfectly innocent among other animals? that incest is wrong for humans precisely because we have the capacity for reason, and it is this that allows us to recognize the 'wrongness' of incest. 2) vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason Hume argues that virtue and vice (i.e., the moral rightness or wrongness of an action) are not found in the action or object itself but in us, in our feelings regarding that action. even the passions (feelings) found in the participants of an event don't contain any virtue or vice in themselves

Arthurs' 3 arguments against opposing points that religion is necessary for morality.

1)Religion is held by some to be necessary in order to provide sufficient motivation for people to do the right thing. Religious motives are far from the only ones people have. For most of us, a decision to do the right thing is made for a variety of reasons. 2)Without the guidance of religious teachings, some claim, we would not know for certain what is right and wrong behavior Consider how much we would need to know about religion and revelation in order for religion to provide moral guidance. Besides being aware that there is a God, we'd also have to think about which of the many religions is true. 3) Without God there would be no morality. Arthur considers two ways in which we might take God to be the ground for morality. The first is known as Divine Command Theory.

Flores's Opposing points & his responses

1. "The brains of, say, men who 'identify' as women have been shown to resemble those of women. This shows that there is a biological basis to their identifying as such. Answer: (a) such resemblances are insignificant (or inconclusive) because these same individuals resemble men in other ways (so if resemblance determines gender identity, which resemblance?) (b) such physiological resemblances may have arisen from repeated behavior (given the plasticity of the brain) instead of having arisen naturally. 2. Well, what about intersex individuals?' The implication is that the existence of intersex individuals somehow shows that the nature of sex is up for grabs for everyone, intersex or not. Answer: Flores responds by noting the rarity of intersex individuals. 3. "But how will a man identifying as a woman affect you?" Answer: "But, alas, LGBT activists are actively working to make it the case that the state and private businesses cover "gender-reassignment" surgeries, that men who identify as women be able to use women's restrooms, that girls who identify as boys be able to play on male sports teams, that we consider it immoral to refer to infants as male or female lest we insidiously impose upon them a 'gender' they might not identify with, that we ban therapy to treat gender dysphoria, and that we generally co-opt language and social norms to reflect pernicious falsehoods about the human body." -- Flores' objection here is a variety of the commonly-expressed resistance to social change on the grounds that "your (so-called) rights are impinging on my rights." But doesn't all major social change require that we find ways to balance the rights of one subset of society against another? Flores continues: "What is relevant is whether we will make public policy and encourage social norms that reflect the truth about the human person and sexuality, or whether we will obfuscate the truth about such matters and sow the seeds of sexual confusion in future generations for years to come."-- There seems to be an implicit slippery slope argument here: If society accepts these new ideas, it will lead to greater and greater "confusion in future generations," which will, now doubt, lead to all manner of degradations and unnamed moral problems

Reiman's four propositions and their justifications on which Reiman's opposition to the death penalty is based -- tested on

1. "Though the death penalty is a just punishment for some murderers, it is not unjust to punish murderers less harshly (down to a certain limit)" Example: Do we rape rapists, torture torturers? 2. "Though the death penalty would be justified if needed to deter future murders, we have no good reason to believe that it is needed to deter future murders" Answer: "The evidence we have strongly supports the idea that we get the same level of deterrence from life imprisonment, and even from substantial prison terms, such as twenty years without parole" Reiman also addresses the "argument from common sense" (which van den Haag used), namely, the argument that people obviously fear death more than imprisonment, so the death penalty must deter more than imprisonment, regardless what the data may or may not suggest. 3. "In refraining from imposing the death penalty, the state, by its vivid and impressive example, contributes to reducing our tolerance for cruelty and thereby fosters the advance of human civilization as we understand it Answer: This "civilizing message" conveyed by refraining from execution-torture (i.e., by the abolition of the death penalty) will, according to Reiman, have a civilizing effect on society, "deterring murder in the long run and thereby making our society safer" 4. Abolition of the death penalty is not merely allowable but is necessary because the practice of capital punishment does significant harm by (1) being irremediably discriminatory and (2) entailing psychological torture of the death row inmate Answer for discrimination: Numerous studies show that killers of whites are more likely to get the death penalty than killers of blacks, and that black killers of whites are far more likely to be sentenced to death than white killers of blacks. Moreover, ... poor people are more likely to be sentenced to death and to have those sentences carried out than well-off people Answer for psychological: Since [the inmate's] guards know they are essentially warehousing him until his death, they treat him as something less than human—and so he is brutalized, taunted, powerless and constantly reminded of it. The effect of this on the death row inmate, as Johnson reports it, is quite literally the breaking down of the structures of the ego—a process not unlike that caused by brainwashing Reiman's Conclusion: "It must be admitted that the death penalty is in practice not merely a penalty of death—it is a penalty of torture until death. [Consequently,] the sentence of death is more than the lex talionis allows as a just penalty for murder—and thus it is unjust in practice"

Rawls argued that instead of the principle of utility, persons in the abstract original position would agree upon two basic principles & his alternative approach

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. Is Rawls saying that wealth should be evenly distributed to all members of society? (see bottom p. 64) Is Rawls saying that wealth should be evenly distributed to all members of society? (No, only that any distribution of wealth—to be just—must benefit everyone, though some may benefit more than others.) Rawls considers an alternative approach using a single "more general conception of justice" that (unlike the two-principle approach we just discussed) would allow for the trading of basic liberties for economic or social benefits: "All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage" Rawls favors his two-principle approach to the above single-principle, however, because having two principles (instead of just one more general principle) allows for their serial ordering and thus the prioritization of the "goods" of basic liberties as more important than other social "goods" such wealth and power.

Gruenke (Transgenderism) -- tested

1. Gruenke first reviews the ways that intersex conditions may develop. Details aside (though they are fascinating), the takeaway of this first section is that "there are multiple pathways of sexual development and that they are not all regulated together. 2. Even more importantly, Gruenke summarizes the scientific evidence for their being a distinct developmental pathway for the brain, one that determines, in part at least, one's subjective perception of gender. Given that we already know the other developmental pathways do not always converge among themselves, it is entirely reasonable, Gruenke argues, that neither will the brain pathway always converge with the other pathways. When it does not so converge, the result would be an individual whose brain physiology leads them to the psychological perception of one gender even though the person's biological sex (as indicated, for example, by external genitalia) does not correspond.

McMillian: How can economic growth be achieved?

1. Investment - in machines, people (education), and ideas (technological advancement) 2. Markets - the more open and less restricted, generally the better; and with healthy, workable financial markets 3. Government - not too much but not too little government investment 4. Sound institutions - "Growth is faster in countries that have secure property rights, workable rules preventing corruption, functional laws of contract, and political stability" (329).

Dr. Bob's two cents on why it seems clear that not every relationship can be viably open.

1. Jealousy - Jealousy seems to be rooted in insecurity, including the fear that one may lose one's partner. This suggests that an open relationship can be successful only when the relationship is fundamentally secure. 2. Similarly, possessiveness undermines an open relationship. A successful open relationship for most couples seems to include the realization that one's partner does not "belong" to oneself in an absolute sense and that one cannot reasonably meet all of that partner's needs. 3. Many partners in open relationships insist on absolute honesty between each other about all their sexual activities and clear "rules" about the terms of the open relationship (restrictions on what specific sexual activities with others are allowed and in what contexts; a prohibition of polyamory, etc.). 4. the partners in successful nonmonogamous relationships have to be willing to go against the tide of societal norms and (at least until and if Anderson's proposal wins the day) accept the misunderstanding and judgment that inevitably comes when their nonmonogamy is "out."

Kant's Main points

1. Kant departs from Hume's identification of that which is intrinsically 'good'. --a good will is the only thing intrinsically good? 2. Kant argues that a good will is an "indispensable" (i.e., necessary) condition "even of being worthy of happiness" Even if someone were unable to ever achieve any of the goals set by her will, if her will were pure and good, "like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself" 3. The purpose of guiding a good will in the performance of one's duty. Kant is careful to distinguish (1) acting "according to duty" or "as duty requires" from (2) acting "from duty" or "because duty requires". Kant describes people who carry out acts of benevolence because they "find a pleasure in spreading happiness around them" (p.48). No matter how much we might otherwise praise and encourage such actions, Kant says that they have "nevertheless no true moral worth" because they are motivated by the inclination to experience the 'pleasure' of giving. Example: Kant contrasts this to the case of an ill-tempered man who gives to charity, not because he gains any pleasure from it, but because he recognizes his moral duty to do so. In this case, the man's action has true moral worth. 4. Maxim --> Will --> Object Maxim - formal principle determining my choice of one course of action over another Will - My Ability to choose Object - the anticipated outcome or effect of my action; i.e., the purpose I desire to be achieved by my choice The trick, for Kant, is to choose a maxim for our actions that doesn't "borrow" any of its motivating power from an inclination to acquire one or more material outcomes of the action. That is, we should be motivated purely by duty instead of what we (or others) can 'get' from our actions.

So what is this evidence for there being a distinct developmental pathway for the brain? (Gruenke)

1. Some male infants who lose their genitalia in accidents have been reconstructed as girls, with little success. That is, they often grow up to experience the same thing that transgendered people experience—their perception of their own gender does not match their apparent sex. 2. There is fascinating evidence from a study of one particular type of intersex condition, 5-ARD, in which "chromosomal males lack the hormone that masculinizes the genitals, so they appear to be girls," even though their brains (and testes) are masculinized by testosterone. It is worth quoting from the abstract of the study in question itself 3. "There is a strong concordance of occurrence [i.e., of transgenderism] among identical twins, but not among fraternal twins.

Singer's Main Arguments

1. Though humans and other animals are different in important respects (and, thus, clearly do not share some rights), it does not follow that they share no rights whatsoever—anymore than the fact that men and women are different in some ways would entail that they have no equal rights. Thus, while it would indeed be meaningless to extend 'voting rights' to nonhuman animals, it may well be necessary to recognize that they have a right to freedom from abuse and needless suffering. 2. Singer next attempts to determine what is the criterion that will tell us what sort of beings' interests should be given equal consideration. Singer tackles the above challenge by asking "exactly why racism and sexism are wrong" (278). He considers and rejects several possibilities: A. Because all individual human beings are actually equal Singer: No individuals clearly differ in many of their capacities. Because all the different races and sexes are actually equal B. NO: Research hasn't proven this, and if we base equality on this assumption, what happens if research eventually proves that some racial/gender differences do exist?

Brock's 1st opposing view & his response (Euthanasia)

1. Voluntary active euthanasia is the deliberate killing of an innocent person; therefore, it is immoral. the "deliberate killing of an innocent person" is not always viewed as immoral by society. So-called passive voluntary euthanasia (e.g., extubating a patient from a respirator) is commonly viewed as morally acceptable, and yet—Brock argues—there is no significant moral difference between passive and active euthanasia. If we accept the one, we should accept the other. , Brock acknowledges that most people resist classifying passive euthanasia as 'killing', but he attributes this resistance to several needless 'confusions' by which we tend to view anything that looks like 'killing' as a bad thing. Brock urges both physicians and family members in voluntary euthanasia cases (whether active or passive) "to understand that it is the patient's decision and consent to stopping treatment that limits their [i.e., physician's and family's] responsibility for the patient's death and that shifts that responsibility to the patient" Brock's "Ace in the hole" to beat this case: A natural expression of this account of the wrongness of killing is that people have a moral right not to be killed." "But in this account of the wrongness of killing, the right not to be killed, like other rights, should be waivable when the person makes a competent decision that continued life is no longer wanted or a good, but is instead worse than no further life at all." euthanasia is properly understood as a case of a person having waived his or her right not to be killed.

Objections to Mill and his responses

1. it's unreasonable for utilitarians to expect people to be consistently motivated to seek the happiness of all of society. People may care about their loved ones and friends, but for most people it would be too abstract to care equally for everyone. -utilitarianism doesn't require people to be motivated to act based on a duty or concern for the interests of society at large. Instead, utilitarianism takes the benefit to society at large 2. Bentham called the 'felicity calculus' is impractical. that we need not reinvent the wheel each time we make a moral choice. Both our past personal experience and the experience of society as a whole over time has proven that certain types of conduct tend to be more beneficial to all concerned and other conduct tends to be harmful. On this basis we have 'rules of thumb' that we can apply without having to rework the felicity computations. This is why Mill's approach is often called Rule Utilitarianism. Mill argued that following moral rules that have been derived from experience tends in the long run to produce more benefit to society than not following those rules.

Brock's 2st opposing view & his response (Euthanasia)

2. The bad consequences of a public policy allowing voluntary active euthanasia would outweigh any good consequences. Brock considers this a more substantial objection to his arguments for voluntary active euthanasia. He presents what he feels are both the likely "potential good consequences" and the "potential bad consequences" on society of permitting such euthanasia. Brock's Good consequences: A. Respect for the self-determination of competent patients who want to be euthanized. B. Reassurance for many people that they will not be forced to endure a protracted, burdensome dying process ('insurance policy') C. Mercy for patients who actually otherwise face prolonged exposure to pain (physical or psychological) prior to an inevitable death D. Offers a 'better', more humane death for some patients (from view of both patients themselves and observers) Brock's Bad consequences: A. Physicians may be going against their fundamental commitment to care for patients and protect life B. Patients may lose trust in their physicians His Response: No loss of trust as long as voluntary active euthanasia is properly restricted and regulated. C. Society's commitment to provide optimal care for dying patients may be weakened Brock is skeptical of this argument because: 1. There is no persuasive evidence that recognizing patients' right to forego life-sustaining treatment (i.e., passive euthanasia) has eroded society's commitment to quality care for dying patients 2. Only a small percentage of deaths would occur from active euthanasia if it were permitted D. Legalizing active euthanasia may complicate efforts to ensure that patients have a legal right to passive euthanasia (i.e., to refuse treatment) Brock's response: The right to refuse treatment is firmly legally embedded by this point and is not likely to be disrupted by a debate over active euthanasia E. Patients who do not want to be actively euthanized may face pressure from family or society to choose it F. The general legal prohibition of homicide may be weakened G. Slippery slope: permitting voluntary active euthanasia inevitably leads to euthanasia in different, morally unacceptable cases Brock considers this last objection to be the most serious. His response: Minimize any slippery slope effect by having procedures in place to prevent abuses of the policy Brock concludes his essay by arguing that active euthanasia, if legalized, would best be practiced by physicians—and perhaps only by physicians.

Van Den Haag Objections cont. -- tested on

4. The "monetary cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive Answer: "Most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of execution . . . Are flawed at least by the implied assumption that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs during their imprisonment." And, "[a]t any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of doing justice". Notice that with the second comment, van den Haag makes clear that, for him, the principle of retributive justice overrides considerations of utility. 5. "A person sentenced to death suffers more than his victim suffered, and ... this (excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talionis (rule of retaliation)" Answer: - Regardless the ratios of suffering, "unlike the murderer, the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted" (218). - Also, "punishment is to vindicate the law and the social order undermined by the crime"—not "to revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suffering, or to be measured by it" (ibid.). Here, van den Haag seems to suggest that lex talionis does not dictate how much suffering a punishment entails, only that justice be served. 6. "by killing a murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlawful killing" Answer: We don't make this argument with other forms of punishment. "Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnapping; neither are fines thought to legitimize robbery" (218). Besides, van den Haag argues, the murder of an innocent victim is "unlawful and undeserved" whereas execution of the murderer is "lawful and deserved" (ibid.). 7. : The death penalty is "always excessive" because either (1) "no crime—no matter how heinous—could possibly justify capital punishment," and/or (2) "everybody ... has an imprescriptible (natural?) right to life" Answer: The first reason above is, by itself, "a belief [that] can be neither corroborated nor refuted; it is an article of faith" (ibid.). Regarding the second reason above, van den Haag considers the notion "natural and inprescriptible rights" (ibid.) to be simply nonsense. 8. The death penalty "degrades" the murderer and is a threat to "human dignity" Answer: Van den Haag's assertion here that "the murderer has so dehumanized himself that he cannot remain among the living" might be considered just as much an "article of faith" as the one for which he earlier criticized his opponents.

Bentham's Felicity (happiness) calculus

6 measures of pleasure/pain 1. its intensity 2. its duration 3. its certainty or uncertainty 4. its propinquity or remoteness (i.e., how soon it will occur) 5. its fecundity (if an action, how likely it is to be followed by sensations of the same kind—pleasure by pleasure; pain by pain) 6. its purity (if an action, how likely it is to not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind One then must measure the amount of pleasure and pain produced for each individual affected by the action, total up these amounts for all individuals together, and from the overall balance of pleasure versus pain determine whether the action is conformable to the principle of utility and may, thus, be rightly taken.

Polyamory

= a variety of open relationship in which individuals may love and be committed to more than one other person at the same time. Sometimes "primary" and "secondary" partners are distinguished based on the level of commitment, but love is often present even in relationships with secondary lovers.

gender indentity

A person's internal sense of being male, female, or something else

If I have a "right to life", for example, what negative duty might this right of mine impose on other people? What positive duty?

According to the Right's Theory, it is in everyone's self-interest to live together in a society rather than alone in a state of nature. Life in a state of nature would be short, nasty, and brutish. To live in a society, though, people must agree to follow certain rules (don't steal, don't murder, etc.), and these rules imply corresponding rights. Every citizen tacitly makes such an agreement (the social contract) to get the benefits of living in society. Without this social contract, society would be impossible

Egoism

Acting to meet one's own interests

Altruism

Acting to meet someone else's interests

Anderson Adultery and Monogamy -- already tested on

Anderson opens his article by stating that "focusing on the problem of cheating distracts us from the problem of monagamy." The 'problem of cheating' refers to the prevalence of sexual cheating in society. Cheating is considered a problem and, consequently, is widely stigmatized because of (1) the perceived destructiveness of dishonesty in relationships and (2) the belief that sexual fidelity but not infidelity is "healthy, proper, moral, and natural". The 'problem of monogamy' refers to the fact that sexual fidelity to just one partner doesn't come naturally for most humans, despite the common admiration of the ideal: "... monogamy is an uneasy fit for human beings. It's a fashionable social expectation, but not a biological desire. This means that there is a gap between what we want sexually and morally."

Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean -- already tested on

Aristotle views the mean as the perfection of an art, the optimum level of performance that yields excellence in the product: "we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of the works of art, while the mean preserves it" But what exactly is it that is 'kept in balance' in regards to virtue? Aristotle's answer is that it is the "passions and actions" that must be moderated So then, the right 'amount' of a passion or action in an appropriate context yields virtue, whereas an excess or defect of that passion or action yields a vice. On p. 57, Aristotle explores further the notions of 'mean' and 'moderation' and 'perfection' , considering several different ways these terms can be construed within his theory. Virtue . . . is a mean between two vices (Too much to put more, look at his virtue ethics pp for picture example)

McMillan World Poverty

As the introduction to his article suggests, McMillan is responding to the charge that globalization is contributing to the ongoing impoverishment of the developing world. The basic question he asks is, "Why are poor countries poor?" McMillan continues, "The only real solution, therefore, is economic growth, to expand the world's total resources", though McMillan reminds us that in order to eradicate severe poverty we must also take into account "how evenly the growth is distributed" (323-324). In partial answer to his earlier question, McMillan suggests that "[c]ountries are poor because they have been growing slowly or not at all over a long period of time. Shrinking the global inequalities necessitates speeding these countries' growth"

Objections to Kantian ethics

By ruling out any appeal to the consequences of our actions, including what will make people happy, Kant has constructed a remarkably 'rational' but equally severe system of ethics that many feel leaves insufficient room for accommodating the complexities of some situations.

1973 AMA Statement

Disapproving of active euthanasia but allowing voluntary passive euthanasia

Norcross Animal rights -- tested

Fred and children scenario. Prob not on exam.

Deontological theories

Look backward at some non-consequential feature, such as a motive or God's commands

Gallagher (Same-sex marriage) -- tested

Gallagher says that the purpose of marriage for proponents of same-sex marriage is to publicly validate whatever intimate sexual arrangement the parties agree upon Gallagher says their view is "not normative" (View of being for same-sex marriage) Gallagher's characterization of the traditional (and her own) view of the purpose of marriage: Gallagher's response contains 2 basic claims: 1. Only heterosexual couples have the potential to provide one mother and one father to any children they adopt or eventually may create, and even couples who never adopt or 2. create a child still, by being married, help ensure they will not produce out-of-wedlock children.

Gruenke sex reassignment point

Gruenke concludes her essay by acknowledging the danger that some people who request sex reassignment surgery may be harmed by the procedure. She notes, however, that (1) the majority (actually, the vast majority) of sex reassignment surgery patients have no regrets later about having had the surgery, and (2) "Trying to change a legitimate self-perception of gender also does harm."

Flores anorexia analogy

Gruenke is careful to note that not all mismatches between one's subjective perception of gender and one's biological sex need be understood as physiologically-based gender identity, for it's possible that "confusion about identity" may be "rooted in psychological trauma." If, however, psychologists fail to diagnose a trauma-induced gender identity disorder, it would be reasonable to conclude that the gender identity in question has a physiological basis. Finally, Gruenke considers the same sort of objection based on an analogy to anorexia fielded by Flores: The part of the brain that regulates body weight exists so that a healthy weight can be maintained. . . . someone with anorexia wants to achieve a body weight that will lead to electrolyte imbalances that can be fatal. Thus in anorexia, subjective perception is clearly at odds with proper function of the human body. On the other hand, the part of the brain that contributes to the perception of gender doesn't regulate anything, but exists just for psychological identity. One can survive, and even reproduce, without having any gender identity at all. While Gruenke may have rightly pointed out a difference between the subjective perception of the anorexic and that of the transgender person, keep in mind that in order to substantiate an occurrence of the faulty analogy fallacy, it is not enough to highlight differences between the two phenomena being compared (there are almost always at least some differences between any two things you might compare). It is, instead, necessary to show that the crucial similarity on which the analogy rests is either illusory or is (in some relevant sense) not substantial enough to support the analogy.

Halwani Virtuous Adultery

Halwani recognizes that not all couples will fit his characterization as 'typical', and he takes this fact to be an advantage of his account, since it allows for cases of "virtuous adultery" when the adultery in some way promotes the personal "flourishing" of the adulterous spouse or seems to compensate for a lack of flourishing in the marriage itself.

Applied ethics

How may normative moral theories be applied so as to resolve specific controversial issues?

Flores (Transgenderism) -- tested

In his response to the 2014 suicide of Leelah Alcorn (to whom Flores insists on referring, as Leelah's Christian parents did, by her male birth name "Joshua"), Flores makes two initial claims: 1. "Joshua was not a girl—he was a boy . . . No amount of surgical mutilation of body parts, effeminate behaviors, or artificial female appearances can make a man a woman." Flores' first argument seems question-begging. Clearly, Flores insists that Leelah was "really" a boy/man on the basis of Leelah's biological sex—but transgender activists would argue that the more relevant concept here is Leelah's gender. 2. The modern "confusion" over gender identity "is literally leaving casualties in its wake." This is based on purported harm caused by the gender identity movement (i.e., a consequentialist or utilitarian argument). It's validity will depend on the extent to which Flores can show that this movement actually does (or will) cause significant harm to society (and greater harm than that caused by the view of people such as Leelah's parents and Flores himself).

Adultery

Infidelity in marriage

How is this imprinting of the eternal law manifested in these things?

It is manifested by whatever "natural inclinations" the thing has.

What does one's desire to have sex with someone else say about one's love for one's original partner, according to Anderson?

It is possible to love one person and be committed to the long-term health and strengthening of that relationship but at the same time want to have sex (or even actually have sex) with someone else. At this point Anderson suggests that open relationships constitute "more honest forms of loving" that could help solve both the problem of cheating and the problem of monogamy, but he admits that cheating largely remains "the only rational choice to have one's emotional and sexual desires met in a culture that stigmatizes open relationships/marriages."

But what exactly does Kant mean by 'being able to will that my maxim become a universal law'?

Kant doesn't simply mean that my maxim is acceptable if everyone would accept or like to have my maxim as their own maxim whenever they are in a similar situation. This would leave open the possibility that they might do so because it somehow serves their interests (e.g., a maxim such as "Lie whenever it is to my advantage to do so"). Instead, by 'universalizing' my maxim, Kant is asking whether I can do so without undermining my rationality. In other words, never treat people as being only a means to your ends.

Kant's Capital Punishment

Kant's idea is that justice can only be brought back into "balance" by a punishment that is exactly equal to the evil of the crime itself. Scales of Justice example: A crime upsets the balance of justice to the degree determined by the nature and severity of the crime. The scales of justice can be brought back to balance only by an equal action back upon the criminal. (pp. slide 18) Thus, for Kant, "whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice" (214). This is the only way that an "equalization of punishment with crime" can be achieved

Mill's Cultivation of noble character

Mill goes on to argue that the utilitarian standard of 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number' is best achieved by the cultivation of noble character, for at least two reasons: 1. those who cultivate a noble and virtuous character on an ongoing basis are less likely to succumb to the temptation 2. There is no doubt that a noble character "makes other people happier.

Right's Theory

Modern societies around the world have been significantly influenced and shaped by the legal-ethical notion of "rights" and the related notion of a "social contract". What exactly is a "right" in this sense, and how does it differ from the notion "the right" (and "the wrong") that we've been using in most of our discussions up until now? "rights" may logically entail both 'positive' and 'negative' duties. When someone has a positive duty, it means they have a duty to do something toward someone. A negative duty, in contrast, is a duty to not do something toward someone.

Morals behind Pogge's World Poverty

Morally, the usual approach focuses on whether or not we have positive "moral duties to help the poor abroad" (319). Pogge, in contrast, focuses on "our [negative] duties not to harm", specifically, "duties not to expose people to life-threatening poverty and duties to shield them from harms for which we would actively be responsible" (ibid.). Empirically, the usual approach focuses on "how developing countries should design their economic institutions and policies in order to reduce severe poverty within their borders" (i.e., 'local' factors). Pogge, in contrast, focuses on "the role that the design of the global institutional order plays in the persistence of severe poverty" Regarding the latter (global) perspective, Pogge presents an analogy of a classroom to show why it isn't enough to focus just on factors internal to developing nations to explain persistent poverty: "Suppose there are great performance differentials among the students in a class, with some improving greatly while many others learn little or nothing. And suppose the latter students do not do their readings and skip many classes. This case surely shows that local, student-specific factors play a role in explaining academic success." "But it decidedly fails to show that global factors (the quality of teaching, textbooks, classroom, and so forth) play no such role. A better teacher might well greatly improve the performance of the class by eliciting stronger student interest in the subject and hence better attendance and preparation" Pogge then proceeds to list a number of significant "global factors relevant to the persistence of severe poverty" (319), including the protectionist practices of rich countries, their strict enforcement of intellectual property rights around the world, their "vastly disproportional contributions to global pollution and resource depletion", and the way rich countries often serve to 'enable' corrupt rulers of poor countries:

How are religious beliefs looked at traditionally?

Necessary for good morals

Rawl's Veil of Ignorance -- tested on

No one in the initial position knows his or her individual advantages over others. Example: Imagine that you have two children but just one cookie, and you want to ensure that the cookie is divided fairly between the two children in such a way that they can't (reasonably) complain about the outcome (of course, children aren't always reasonable, but we'll ignore that fact for present purposes). Does anyone know a "trick" that some parents use to accomplish this, a trick in which the parent doesn't have to actually divide the cookie him- or herself? The trick is to allow one child to cut the cookie but the other child to pick which child gets which half. Notice how this puts pressure on the first child to divide the cookie as evenly and fairly as possible, precisely because that first child doesn't know which half of the cookie he or she will end up with. Rawls' veil of ignorance works like this. Each party to the hypothetical initial position would be motivated to negotiate for the most fair version of a social contract possible because each person is 'blind' to his or her own natural advantages over the others. The point is that for any present social system to be considered just, it must be possible in principle to envision that this system could have been derived from the hypothetical "initial position".

Mill's test for determining a higher quality pleasure

Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of a feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure Given this test, Mill is confident that we value our 'higher' mental faculties (e.g., intellectual curiosity, artistic appreciation, the capacity for loyalty and love) more than the mere 'bodily pleasures' we share with lower animal forms

Steinbock animal rights cont.

On such grounds Steinbock argues that our natural tendency to count human interests above the interests of other animals must be taken seriously and, if possible, given some moral justification. What, then, might account for our strong tendency to give greater moral value to human well - being over the well -being of other animals? Steinbock feels that we need to take a second look at uniquely human capacities that may have moral relevance. She lists the following (289 - 290): 1. The capacity to be held morally 'responsible' for what one does. 2. The capacity to be motivated by altruistic concerns (concern for the needs and interests of others) 3. The capacity to desire self - respect 4. A minimal level of intelligence, which is a prerequisite for morally - relevant capacities such as the above

Transgender

Persons whose gender identity, gender expression, or behavior does not conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth

Hume considers the feeling of beauty and approval we give to virtuous acts a variety of 'pleasure' and the feeling of disapproval we give to vicious acts a variety of 'pain'.

Pleasure is, for Hume, the ultimate human 'good' (having positive value), whereas pain is the ultimate human 'bad' (having negative value); this accounts for why we have an attraction to the one but an aversion to the other.

Pogge World Hunger

Pogge explicitly challenges what White called "the standard view" that members of rich countries have no duty to relieve the suffering of the poor in other countries. Pogge makes "three mutually independent" arguments to challenge the above view.

Halwani Monogamy & Adultery Views

Premise 1: Love, trust, and affection are 'goods' in committed romantic relationships and are largely what make these relationships constitute, in part at least, a person's 'flourishing' life. Premise 2: Adulterous actions (usually) run counter to this ideal (i.e., they threaten the preservation of these goods) and are, for this reason and from the perspective of virtue ethics, morally wrong. Conclusion: The virtuous person will, accordingly, maintain fidelity to his or her partner. Halwani suggests that Kantian Moral Theory (and, we might add, many conservative versions of religious morality) is unable to account for many people's intuition that the woman's adultery is in this case not wrong, whereas Virtue Ethics is able to provide a more straightforward analysis that honors this intuition. The success of Virtue Ethics in accounting both for the typical 'wrongness' of adultery as well as the exceptionality of cases such as the one just described depends, according to Halwani, on the way the theory is able to analyze the connection between sex and love in the context of what it means to be a virtuous person with a flourishing life. Halwani concludes his article by arguing that utilitarianism provides a less successful account of adultery than does virtue ethics. For example, Halwani says act utilitarianism cannot account for the wrongness of adultery in a case where there are unforeseen 'benefits' of the adultery (e.g., the children that arise from the affair end up having careers that are hugely beneficial to humanity). Halwani ends his article by stressing that Virtue Ethics allows for there to not be "one single answer" to each moral question ... because "Part of what it is to be a virtuous person is to be sensitive to the details of the situation and to be sensitive to the fact that one is a member of a certain kind of community and culture." These are factors that partly determine what constitutes a 'flourishing' life in any particular context and how particular factors will impact that flourishing positively or negatively.

Wolfson on why Gallagher's claim is wrong in both principle and practice

Principle: (it unfairly excludes homosexuals and their children from the rights and benefits that come with marriage, while allowing that same privilege to other classes of citizens who similarly lack procreative potential—the elderly, infertile, etc.), Practice: (society has not fallen whenever marriage or parenting has been acknowledged on a non-procreative basis: witness adoption by infertile couples; witness the results of the legalization of same-sex marriage in Denmark.

Rachels' Euthanasia arguments and opposing viewpoints -- already tested on

Rachels argues against this policy, concluding that both types of euthanasia should be allowed. Rachels paints the following scenario: Patient is in unbearable pain and is virtually certain to die within days. Patient requests to be euthanized. They have 2 options, Passive euthanasia to relieve suffering; (APPROVED BY AMA - but may take patient longer to die, hence greater suffering) Active euthanasia to relieve suffering; (DISAPPROVED BY AMA - even though patient will die sooner, hence less suffering) 1. "Once the initial decision not to prolong [the patient's] agony has been made, active euthanasia is actually preferable to passive euthanasia, rather than the reverse." 2. The AMA's position "leads to decisions concerning life and death made on irrelevant grounds" Look at PP for more scenario examples.

Rachels' argument for ethical egoism

Rachels argues that there is no logical error in ethical egoism, but that the consistent ethical egoist will have to desire that she maximize her own self-interests while everyone else sacrifices their self-interests out of altruistic concern for her.

Steinbock Euthanasia & Opposing viewpoints -- tested on

Rachels misinterpreted the 1973 AMA Statement to allow passive but not active euthanasia, when in reality (according to Steinbock) it disallows both. Steinbock in essence agrees with Rachels that both active and passive euthanasia, as commonly understood, involve the intention to bring about the patient's death. Steinbock argues, however, that the clause of the AMA Statement that allows for the "cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong ... life" need not refer to the intentional termination of life at all, but may instead have some other intention. If so, then withdrawing treatment in these cases wouldn't count as (passive) euthanasia at all. Opposing points: 1. A doctor may support the cessation of extraordinary measures out of respect for a patient's refusal to accept further treatment. This is not the same as 'intending' for the patient to die. Response: "The purpose of the right to refuse medical treatment is not to give persons a right to decide whether to live or die, but to protect them from the unwanted interferences of others. . . [It is a right] to be left alone" 2. A doctor may support the cessation of extraordinary measures "where continued treatment has little chance of improving the patient's condition and brings greater discomfort than relief" (160). Again, according to Steinbock this is not the same as intending to bring about the patient's death. Steinbock characterizes the sort of treatment described above as "extraordinary", precisely the sort of treatment the AMA Statement allows doctors to withdraw. When a doctor chooses to withdraw ineffective 'extraordinary' treatment (with the patient's agreement), this may be seen as the doctor simply deciding "to provide the most appropriate treatment for that patient at that time" (161), which is precisely what doctors should be expected to do. 3. Rachels' point that both active and passive euthanasia should always be both equally allowed and that active euthanasia is generally the better option (because it minimizes suffering): 1. She disagrees with Rachels' characterization of passive euthanasia as the option that tends to cause more suffering. Observing that "[t]he decision not to operate need not mean a decision to neglect" (163), Steinbock suggests that passive euthanasia may in many cases be preferable to actively bringing about a quicker death (because it allows time for the patient to spend time with loved ones, etc.) 2. She concludes with a 'slippery slope' concern: "I am worried that there will be a tendency [to assume active euthanasia is always better] if active euthanasia is regarded as morally equivalent to the withholding of life-prolonging treatment"

Rawl's Social Contract Theory -- tested on

Rawls suggest that a just society is one based on principles of fairness, which "free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association" Notice the hypothetical nature of this agreement: It is what such persons "would accept in an initial position of equality". Rawls isn't saying that we ever consciously make such an agreement. It is a rational, hypothetical abstraction. For Rawls, crucial to the nature of this hypothetical agreement is that it is made under a "veil of ignorance"

Mill's Utilitarianism

Taking into moral consideration not only the quantity of pleasure and pain produced by an action but the quality as well. Mill argues that the quality and kind of pleasure must be taken into account in addition to the quantity of pleasure.

Reiman's view on the Death Penalty & His arguments that are against it. -- tested on

Reiman presents and defends four propositions, together which lead to the conclusion that "it is good in principle to avoid the death penalty and bad in practice to impose it" First, however, he rejects several weak arguments against the death penalty. 1. If murder is wrong, then the death penalty is wrong as well Answer: This argument can be defeated by reductio ad absurdum: If the above claim is true, then it will also be the case that all punishments are wrong. For example, if kidnapping is wrong, then imprisonment is wrong. If taking someone's money against their will is wrong, then fines are wrong. And so forth. 2. Innocents are sometimes wrongly convicted and if they receive the death penalty there is no way to correct the wrong done to them Answer: However, Reiman notes that Kant's categorical imperative only prohibited using others "as mere means (that is, in total disregard of their own desires and goals)" (ibid.). But "even criminals don't want to be crime victims," so they too benefit from a general deterrence. Furthermore, it would seem that "society has the right to threaten punishment to defend its members"—a form of societal self-defense (ibid.).

Singer's conclusion

Singer concludes that the "principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat humans" So, it is not that humans all have the same level of 'intelligence' or same level of 'moral sensitivity', etc., and that we then insist on treating them equally on this basis—because they don't, anymore than they all have the same gender or skin color! Unless one can show that humans and only humans have some feature that is not simply arbitrarily identified as the criterion for being worthy of moral consideration, then we must let go of the illusion that only humans may properly be considered objects of moral action. Following Jeremy Bentham (the founder of Utilitarianism), Singer identifies what he feels to be a much more satisfactory criterion than 'human': sentience, or the capacity to experience either suffering or enjoyment. Here is Singer's reasoning

We should treat human beings 'humanely' simply because they are human, and humans are 'special' in some sense as compared to the rest of Nature. Why is this answer unacceptable to Singer?

Singer rejects this answer because he views it as raw bias, a bigotry exactly parallel to other bigotries like sexism and racism.

Steinbock (Animal Rights) -- already tested

Steinbock agrees that sentient beings deserve some moral consideration due to their ability to experience pleasure and pain, but she argues that the degree of consideration due them is less than that due to human beings. Sentience does matter for morality.

Steinbock argument animal rights

Steinbock challenges, however, Singer's claim that "the principle of equality requires that, no matter what the nature of the being, its suffering [must] be counted equally with the like suffering of any other being" sentience "is the only relevant consideration for equal consideration of interests" First, she notes that Singer's position has counter-intuitive results: "It means, for example, that feeding starving children before feeding starving dogs is just like a Catholic charity's feeding hungry Catholics before feeding hungry non-Catholics" (288). Steinbock's point is that most of us view the second but not the first scenario as bigotry. But if speciesism is just another form of bigotry as Singer suggests, it would seem we should see both scenarios as equally involving bigotry.

World poverty and hunger

The 'standard view': "We have a negative duty to not kill people by our actions ... but we do not have a positive duty to prevent people from dying of starvation by feeding them. They do not have a positive right to food. To be sure, it is a good thing to give to charity to prevent this, but such generosity is supererogatory—it is not required by duty, and lies above and beyond the requirements of morality. It is morally optional" (314). Same goes for the poor's 'right' to money and our 'duty' to give it to them.

Why does rachels' refute psychological egoism?

The argument poor and she refutes this by showing that humans are at times clearly capable to genuine acts of altruism, she doesn't state how acts of genuine altruism are motivated at least in part by self interest which leaves the more moderate claim that our actions may be motivated by both self-interest and concern for others. Rachels argues that there is no logical error in ethical egoism, but that the consistent ethical egoist will have to desire that she maximize her own self-interests while everyone else sacrifices their self-interests out of altruistic concern for her.

Aristotle's Conclusion

The contemplative, philosophical life, is the best and happiest, and that form of life closest to God's own.

What does Aquinas say is the first self-evident principle of speculative reason? What is the first principle of practical reason?

The first principle of speculative reason is the law of noncontradiction, that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time". This is the basis for all other laws of logic. Likewise, the first principle of practical reason is that "good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided". All other moral precepts are simply more specific applications of this first principle

capital punishment & it's two basic approaches.

The legally authorized killing of someone as punishment for a crime. "How do we justify punishment?" Two basic approaches: Utilitarian and Retributive Utilitarian: Deterrence of crime is the only possible justification of the death penalty for utilitarians White mentions two basic Retributive principles: (1) the principle of proportionality and (2) lex talionis.

Anderson mentions several responses or 'solutions' to the problem that he feels are not really solutions at all.

The moralist stance: "men should not act on their desires, no matter how strong" The woman-blaming strategy: "Women are told, often by other women, that they need to put more effort into meeting their husband's desires to prevent them from straying" The life-of-loneliness option: "those unhappy with monogamy ... should never enter into relationships in the first place" The divorce option: "others wish for the family unit to dissolve, simply because one has cheated"

principle of proportionality

The punishment has to fit the crime

McMillian, "who gains from growth?" / "Does it benefit the poor or only the rich? and his findings from the data

The two basic concepts that come in are poverty and inequality. 1. "Poverty is usually reduced ... by economic growth" (325) 2. "The poor become better off in lockstep with everyone else. The degree of inequality within a country, in other words, tends to stay constant over time" (ibid.) 3. "The amount of poverty reduction depends on the degree of inequality. In countries with low inequality, growth has a bigger impact on poverty than in very unequal countries" (ibid.). 4. "Inequality in itself can be a hindrance to growth" (326) McMillan's main conclusion from these various findings is that economic growth in a country does generally raise many people out of poverty, though he recognizes that there are other factors that may limit or prevent that from happening.

Rachels' Ethical egoism

The view that what is right to do is whatever best promotes one's self-interests. This is a teleological theory bc it determines rightness based on result's of one's actions.

Anderson believes that "All of this 'morality' tears families apart." What does Anderson suggest instead as a solution?

The way out of the monogamy gap is for us to begin equally valuing sexually open relationships, alongside monogamous ones. Whatever serves the population best

Singer on Animal Rights -- already tested

This is a classic argument by a well-known philosopher. Peter Singer argues that 'speciesism' is just as immoral as 'racism' and 'sexism' or any other bigotry against an oppressed group.

Van Den Haag Capital Punishment (Objections 1-3) -- tested on

Van den Haag responds to a number of objections to capital punishment and argues in its favor. 1. : There is a "maldistribution" of capital punishment that is either "discriminatory or capricious." Therefore, capital punishment should be abolished. Answer: Don't confuse justice with equality: "The only relevant question is, does the person to be executed deserve the punishment? Whether or not others who deserved the same punishment, whatever their economic or racial group, have avoided execution is irrelevant. . . . Justice requires [only] that as many of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless whether others have avoided punishment" He considers this "a straw man for empirical as well as analytical reasons: "maldistribution inheres no more in capital punishment than in any other punishment" 2. Capital punishment should be abolished because there are "miscarriages of justice" that occur when an innocent person is executed for a crime he didn't commit. Van den Haag himself concedes that "the most grievous maldistribution occurs when [the death penalty] is imposed on the innocent" Answer: The benefits of capital punishment outweigh this harm: "miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing justice" 3. There is "no conclusive statistical demonstration that the death penalty is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments" (217). Therefore, the death penalty should be abolished. Answer: I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it were shown" that the death penalty doesn't add a deterrent effect. He adds, "Still, I believe the death penalty, because of its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and deters some prospective murderers"

voluntary vs. nonvoluntary vs. involuntary / active vs. passive

Voluntary: With patient Consent Non-voluntary: Patient hasn't said Involuntary: Against Patient wishes Active Euthanasia: withholding or withdrawing treatment that would have prolonged life Passive Euthanasia: actively intervening to bring about death

What extra benefit does sharing in God's reason provide human beings?

We are able to comprehend the 'natural law' in us, which means we have a natural moral conscience that allows us to evaluate the rightness or wrongness of our actions. This, in turn, presumably allows us to exercise our freedom of will in ways that are good for us and pleasing to God.

Psychological egoism

We naturally (and necessarily act from self interest. (Psychological theory). Rachels' refutes this type.

Philosophical issues in Animal Rights

What is the criterion of moral standing and who deserves moral consideration? Rationality or self-consciousness? The ability to experience pleasure and pain? Membership in the human species? The capacity to have moral concerns (moral responsibility, altruistic or moral reasons, the desire for self-respect)? What is the moral standing of infants, severely retarded persons, persons with advanced senility, or comatose patients? Is eating meat wrong?

Methethics

What is the nature of morality? For examples, is morality absolute or relative; that is, do moral principles exist independent of humans or are they constructs/inventions of the human mind?

Normative ethics

What moral principle of set of principles (norms) best determines what is right and wrong conduct?

Theory of the good

Whereas a "theory of the right" is a normative moral theory that guides us as to what we should or should not do, a "theory of the good" is a theory of what human's value (either positively or negatively). For example: happiness and pleasure are often taken to be basic 'goods' in this sense. Some would argue that they are intrinsic goods, that is, good or valuable in themselves. Other things like money are often considered extrinsic goods because their value is derived from their connection to intrinsic goods (e.g., money can buy things that bring happiness or pleasure, etc.). Conversely, something is 'bad' if it has negative value, that is, if it is something we wish not to have. For example, pain (physical or emotional) is often considered the prototypical 'bad' thing.

Wolfson (Same-sex marriage) -- tested

Wolfson wonders why, if Gallagher believes marriage is such a beneficial institution, she would not want all couples, including same-sex couples, to have the legal right to participate in it. 1. Wolfson then addresses the doubt that Gallagher cast on the body of research that has found gay and lesbian parents to be just as capable as heterosexual parents. --Wolfson notes that both the American Psychological Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics have publicly affirmed the findings of a significant body of research indicating that same-sex parents can provide a healthy, stable home-life for children. 2. Wolfson makes the point (p. 127) that "what counts is not the family structure, but the quality of dedication, commitment, self-sacrifice, and love in the household". Ex. - When non-gay convicted murderers, deadbeat dads, and, for that matter, even game-show contestants on Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire? who never met before are all free to marry at will" "The law, the courts, and the Constitution," Wolfson reminds us, "have also long recognized that people marry for reasons other than procreation."

I am not going to study White's problem cases, it has already been a ? and if it is on there, i will have another question to choose from.

a

Halwani's argument for the wrongness of adultery assumes that

a committed relationship by its very nature has or contains elements of value (i.e., 'goods') and is something thus worth guarding and preserving. Halwani seems to support this assumption on the grounds that A. the "love, trust, and affection" in a committed relationship are "healthy emotions and are an important part ... of any conception of a virtuous and flourishing person" (p. 115), and B. the committed partners love each other and want to be with each other "for an indefinite period of time" (p. 115). Though sexual fidelity does not "guarantee" a flourishing relationship, Halwani says such fidelity is "in most cases" a prerequisite for a flourishing relationship

Physician-Assisted Suicide

a doctor helping a patient commit suicide (merges euthanasia with suicide)

Kant's Categorical Imperative

a higher principle of reason meant to guide our selection of the maxims that determine our actions in particular situations. The categorical imperative is the essence of law, i.e., of a mandate for action stripped of any reference to individual interests. It is thus completely objective (and, Kant says, thereby worth respecting). Kant contrasts a categorical imperative of this sort from 'hypothetical' imperatives, which tell us what we should do in order to get something else

Open relationship

a relationship in which committed partners agree that each may engage in sex with other people (note: terms of the agreement vary widely)

Swinging

a variety of open relationship in which a committed couple (often jointly) engages in sex with other couples or singles, where the sex is typically of a relatively impersonal nature (i.e., "sex just for pleasure")

Halwani discusses several such cases of "failure to conform to the ideal"

adultery in a "drunken moment" adultery by an "abused woman" adultery by a mistreated unfulfilled husband (Also case that opens article) He also considers that "open marriages" may be appropriate in some cases, especially if the 'outside' sex involved is "highly impersonal so as to avoid the possibility of emotional intimacy with the new sexual partner"

How does Aquinas say that humans can identify what is 'good' and, therefore, is to be pursued?

all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently, as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.

Aquinas' Natural Law Theory

an act is 'right' if the action promotes the attainment of what is naturally good for us (or, more exactly, only if performing the action doesn't violate any of the basic human values/goods derived from our nature). This is a deontological theory.

Sex

assigned at birth, refers to one's biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes such as chromosomes, hormone prevalence, and external and internal anatomy."

Mill: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied"

because humans have higher mental faculties, a human dissatisfied is better than being a pig (who has less mental faculties)

Lex Talionis

eye for an eye

Teleological theories

focus on the consequences or results of the actions they produce

Brock's Euthanasia

he is directly addressing only the morality of voluntary active euthanasia by a competent adult who "makes a fully voluntary and persistent request for aid in dying" He then notes that the "central ethical argument" for such voluntary active euthanasia is based on the same "two fundamental ethical values" that are also used to support the "consensus on patient's rights to decide about life-sustaining treatment" (i.e., passive euthanasia): 1. Individual self-determination (autonomy) "people's interest in making important decisions about their lives for themselves according to their own values or conceptions of a good life, and ... being left free to act on those decisions" Why does Brock think that such self-determination is so valuable? -taking responsibility -for one's life human dignity What arguments does Brock give that the right of self-determination should extend to the right to control the manner, circumstances, and timing of one's death? 1. death is of utmost concern to most people 2. Modern technology creates increased possibility of lingering, lower-quality life 3. the great variability among people on how to value quality of life vs. life extension makes individual control imperative 2. Individual well-being when a competent patient decides to forgo all further life-sustaining treatment then the patient . . . commonly decides that the best life possible for him or her with treatment is of sufficiently poor quality that it is worse than no further life at all. Brock's core argument, then, is that these same two values that underlying the popular support for passive euthanasia can, in fact, just as easily provide support for active euthanasia. Like Rachels, then, Brock is arguing that there is no morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia.

Divine command theory/argument against it -- already tested on

morally right actions are right because God commands them—that is the divine act of commanding these actions is itself what makes those actions right. (Deontological) On what basis would God know to call these features of his character morally 'right'?

euthansia

killing someone else (or allowing to die) in order to relieve suffering (aka 'mercy killing')

Bentham (Utilitarianism)

like Hume before him, considered pleasure or happiness to be the highest human 'good', but Bentham incorporated the quantification of pleasure and happiness (and their opposites, pain and misery) into his ethics in ways that go far beyond Hume. A thing's 'utility' is simply its tendency to produce good, as good is defined by Bentham in essentially Humean terms.

If morality is not dependent on or grounded in religious belief per se, in what is it grounded?

morality is inherently social, grounded in our status as social beings (pp. 26-27). Morality is social in the following ways: Morality requires that we share a socially-acquired language Morality governs relationships among people by defining our mutual responsibilities We are subject to criticism by others for our actions To think morally requires that we set aside our private, subjective perspective and adopt the objective perspective of others, imagining how they might respond to the choices we make ("public" moral conscience)

Aristotle's Virtue Ethics

morality is more than merely following certain rules, it is about achieving virtue, where virtue is the rational pursuit of the ultimate human good, namely, happiness.

Hume: "It is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. What is the meaning of this?

our faculty of reason (what he often calls the 'understanding') can only help us reach judgments of truth or falsehood concerning statements of fact (i.e., what is). What reason cannot do is cause us to value or prefer one thing over another so that we have motivation to act. The latter comes to us through our faculty of what Hume calls 'taste'. Hume argues that we tend to feel a natural attraction to virtuous acts because they appear 'beautiful' to us. Our response to virtue is, thus, one of 'approbation' (approval), and we assign positive value to virtuous acts.

Utilitarianism -- already tested on

prominent teleological theory that has in view a particular theory of the good, namely, the view (expressed by Hume) that pleasure or happiness is the fundamental human value.

Sexual orientation

refers to an individual's enduring physical, romantic, and/or emotional attraction to another person, whereas gender identity refers to one's internal sense of being male, female, or something else. Transgender people may be straight, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or asexual, just as nontransgender people can be.

Gender

refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for boys and men, or girls and women. These influence the ways that people act, interact, and feel about themselves. While aspects of biological sex are similar across different cultures, aspects of gender may differ.

White's Theories of the right -- breaks into 2 theories

tell us what is morally right and what is morally wrong. (this is what all normative theories do, provide principles or rules or norms so that we can understand what we should and shouldn't do.

Hume's Ethical Subjectivism -- already tested on

the moral feelings or 'sentiments' of approval and disapproval that all humans exhibit, feelings that may be viewed as grounded in aesthetic judgments of beauty and deformity. more a meta-ethical theory than a normative theory, given that its aim is to tell us what morality is as a matter of fact (i.e., aesthetic judgments), not what morality ought to be or which particular normative moral theory is 'correct'.

Speculative reason

the rational capacity we use in areas like mathematics and science in order to explain the world around us.

Practical reason

the rational capacity we use to guide our actions, that is, to decide what we should or should not do. Practical reason is, thus, the basis of morality.

Fidelity/Infidelity

when a partner in a committed relationship maintains (i.e., is faithful to) the terms of the relationship. Note that—social stigma notwithstanding—fidelity understood in this way is possible (indeed, normally expected) for partners in open and polyamorous relationships. Infidelity is the opposite

Cheating

when one partner in a committed relationship has sex (or romantic relations) with someone outside that relationship in violation of the terms of the relationship (and typically without the committed partner's knowledge)