Phil 7 FINAL

Descartes' ontological argument

**COGITO + GOD ARGUMENTS COMBINED BY DESCARTES TO PROVE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD. - if evil demon argument true, then God would be the deceiver/ lead us to conflict between appearance v. reality. - God isn't deceiver b/c he's a perfect being. 3 steps to his solution: 1. i think therefore I am 2. the ontological argument for God's existence 3. God is no deceiver

solipsism

**can only know the existence of your own mind. the doctrine that nothing exists except myself and my own immediate mental states. - Can't know anything about the external world, about the mental states of other people, about my past experiences **Can only know about my own present, immediate experiences - maintains that no matter how sophisticated someone's behavior is, behavior on its own does not guarantee the presence of mentality. - most extreme form of skepticism. - Descartes claimed that knowledge of one's own immediate experience = basis for knowledge of everything else. - Very hard to defend solipsist viewpoint.

skepticism about other minds

- ***KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN MIND - I have privileged access to my own mental states, I know easily w/o reasoning: - whether I feel cold **KNOWLEDGE OF SOMEONE ELSE'S MIND: How do I discover some else's mental states? 1. occasional lies - by observing: their perceptual input from the world and their actions - by talking to them - unfortunately people frequently deceive - linguistic interaction is a highly fallible way of discovering what other people think. 2. i might be the victim of some kind of systematic deception, a massive conspiracy to mislead me - In the Truman Show, Jim Carrey is radically deceived about what people around him are thinking. But how do you know that you are not being deceived in an ambiguous way. 3. zombies and automata. - what if people around aren't thinking anything at all - what if they're just remote-controlled machines or automata devoid of genuine consciousness.

Russell's schematization

- A usually causes B, and usually only A causes B - B occurred Therefore, - A also occurred. OR: Pain usually causes pain behavior and usually only pain causes pain behavior Pain behavior occurred Therefore, Pain occurred.

brain-based psychological continuity

- A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of the same chain of psychologically continuous person-stages and underwritten by a brain persisting through time. - if you have the same brain, you're the same person

Ludwig Wittgenstein

- Analogy for skepticism of other minds: Everyone has a box containing something in it, let's call it a beetle You only know what a beetle from seeing what your box contains. But can't know what other people's boxes contain.

Cartesian dualism

- Descartes' response to fundamental question: What is it for an entity to possess a mind - To have a mind is to possess a soul distinct from 1's body. The doctrine that thinking beings possess immaterial souls entirely distinct from their physical bodies. -Minds aren't located in physical space (altho they're closely related w/ bodies) Mental states = non-physical entities - Mind and body can impact each other causally. - example: mind feels thirsty so body goes and gets Gatorade.

How is Inverted Spectrum problem related to knowledge of others' minds?

- Everyone has their own zone of privacy, private access of your own mind that simultaneously makes it epistemologically difficult (hard to have justified beliefs) to understand other people's mental states.

Objection to the argument from analogy

- How could it be legitimate to extrapolate from my own, one single case, to conclude that pain behavior is only caused by pain?

How does Hempel's Behavioral Definition relate to behaviorism

- If Hempel's account is correct, we shouldn't ask "How do we know given various behavioral symptoms, that Paul really has a toothache? - the toothache is nothing over and above the behavioral symptoms themselves - the behavioral symptoms are evidence of the toothache. - the actual experience of the toothache is manifested in Paul's behavioral dispositions/ symptoms.

pre-established harmony

- Leibniz - a room has clocks all set to the same time, due to someone setting them up that way. - God set up the mental substance (laws to evolution of mind) and physical substance (laws of physics). They harmonize with each other b/c God set them up to be in agreement with each other. - There is just an illusion to interaction btwn mental and physical, because they were setup to harmonize.

materialism

- Materialism - the doctrine that everything that exists is physical (material) - The mental is not some separate realm apart from the physical. The mental is just an extremely complex manifestation of underlying physical phenomena. - Materialists claim that there exists only one kind of stuff: physical stuff. There is no mental stuff out of which our minds are constituted. - In essence, there is nothing more to your mind than your body.

Dualism v. Materialism

- Materialism easily accommodates to the causal interactions between the mind and body. If the mind just is a complex physical phenomena, then there's no mystery about how the mind can causally interact w/ physical entities. - Unlike dualism, materialism seems to avoid epiphenomenalism (b/c the world, including mind is simply physical, and thus they always have an interaction, they are one in the same) - Dualism always fearful of falling into unprobability. Materialist is at a disadvantage.

numerical v. qualitative ID.

- Numerically: one and the same. Example: clark kent and superman. A and B are numerically identical if and only if they share all of the same properties, both intrinsic and extrinsic Leibniz's law concerns numerical identity Qualitatively: things that share all the same properties but can exist in two different locations. Qualitative identity is defined as sharing all of the same intrinsic properties—what an object has based on its essence: colors, size, and molecules

Argument from Analogy

- Pain behavior - behavior you exhibit when you're in pain - In personal case you know that pain and pain behavior exists. - When someone else exhibits pain behavior, by analogy you believe that they're experiencing the same thoughts, feelings, behaviors that you had when you exhibited that behavior. - essentially, you infer on the basis of your own immediate behavior (in the same vein as Descartes' cogito argument, which states that you know you exist based on the fact that you think), you have certain experiences, and thus when you see someone else exhibiting the same behavior you infer they must have the same experiences.

More rigorous form of Russell's schematization

- Pain usually causes pain-behavior, and usually only pain causes pain behavior. - Pain behavior occurred. Therefore, Pain occurred. But I did not myself experience any pain. Therefore, Someone else experienced pain. **PROBLEM: premises aren't really solid, not firm enough to believe.

idealism

- Response to external world skepticism - mind independent reality isn't mind independent, everything is our mental states the ultimate perceiver is God.

behaviorism

- Response to skepticism about other minds - mental states are simply behavioral dispositions. Crudely speaking: claims that there is nothing more to the mind beyond its behavioral manifestations DISPOSITION: a tendency to react in certain ways when placed in certain circumstances. BEHAVIORAL DISPOSITION: a tendency to exhibit certain types of behavior under certain circumstances. - skeptic about other minds asks how one can know that the behavioral dispositions of other people manifest any genuine underlying mental activity. - the behaviorist offers an account of what it is to be in a given mental state. According to behaviorism - we shouldn't ask whether behavioral dispositions manifest underlying mental activity. BECAUSE to the behaviorist, mental activity simply is an appropriate pattern of behavioral dispositions.

PERSONAL IDENTITY Proposal 1

- Sameness of person entails sameness of soul. (Sam) assumes Cartesian dualism - Gretchen's objection: Entails that I can't distinguish that one person is the same person I saw a couple days ago, because I don't have a window to their soul. Modus tolens If A (proposal 1) is true then B (I can never have justified beliefs that I'm dealing with the same numerically identical person) Not A: But I do often have justified beliefs, when dealing with one person to another. Therefore not B.

Dualism and mind-body causation

- Suppose we espouse w/ dualism and interactionism. Then we must hold that 1. the mind can interfere with physical forces impacting the body, thus violating the laws of physics. OR 2. the mind simply reinforces the physical forces impacting the body, thus entailing massive causal overdetermination. both alternatives seem unacceptable. thus dualists seem forced into epiphenomenalism (mind has no causal impact on one's body). but epiphenomenalism seems equally unacceptable

Gretchen's Kleenex box example

- Things that are qualitatively identical are not numerically identical. Two indiscernible kleenex boxes aren't numerically identical; they are at best qualitatively identical.

valid argument

- an argument is valid if the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion or the premises entail the conclusion ***an argument can be valid if the premises are false

behaviorism and idealism

- behaviorism and idealism are metaphysical theses about the nature of reality. -are both metaphysical theories that try to solve epistemological problems about a certain sector of reality. - idealism (metaphysical thesis) is about the nature of the external world to dissolve external - behaviorism is about the nature of mental states - there's nothing more to the mental states beyond behavioral dispositions. - not as much of a gap out of reality and the appearance of reality.

dualism v. monism

- dualists claim that the world contains 2 distinct types of stuff: physical stuff and mental stuff. - monist claim that the world contains only one type of stuff.

physical continuity

- how your body changes over time - I am numerical identical to me, even though my body changes over time (physical continuity) - technically all of your cells have been replaced over and over again,

intrinsic v. extrinsic properties

- intrinsic - properties of the body (internal). what an object has based on its essence: colors, size, and molecules (excluding everything else around it) - extrinsic: how the body relates to things around it. the properties that the object has relating to the outside world, such as its location.

central difficulty w/ dualism

- it cannot do justice to the causal interactions between mind and body, physical things affect physical things, but the immaterial substance can't affect physical, if they're two different things they can't affect each other. it would be a contradiction to say that something immaterial has an affect on material things.

epiphenomenalism

- opposite of interactionism, descartes rejects this - epiphennomenalism - the doctrine that one's mind exerts no causal impact on one's body but: BODY CAN HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE MIND BECAUSE THE MIND CAN OBSERVE THE BODY'S ACTIONS (I.E. MIND SAYS NOT TO SHAKE HANNAH'S HAND, BUT HANNAH'S HAD SHAKEN, AND THUS THE MIND SEES THE BODY'S ACTIONS), BUT MIND CAN NOT HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE BODY, denies that your thoughts can precede your physical behaviors THE MIND CAN WATCH THE BODY, BUT BECAUSE IT IS A DISTINCT ENTITY (ACCORDING TO DUALISM) IT CAN NOT CROSS OVER INTO THE PHYSICAL REALM AND CAUSE THE ACTION. Mental events are viewed as completely dependent on physical functions and, as such, have no independent existence or causal efficacy; it is a mere appearance. Fear seems to make the heart beat faster; though, according to epiphenomenalism, the state of the nervous system causes the heart to beat faster. - if we accept cartesian dualism, then it seems difficult to avoid epiphenomalism, because the immaterial is different from material, so how could the immaterial mind impact the body. two subsets: occassionalism, pre-established harmony both say that there's God.

causal overdetermination

- overdetermination occurs when a single-observed effect is determined by multiple causes, any one of which alone would be sufficient to account for ("determine") the effect. - every physical event has a physical cause. so every movement of the body has a physical cause. but if a given bodily movement also has a mental cause, then the movement would be causally determined. - argument against interactionism in that it states that there is no need to justify an event with two different causes, there are MORE causes present THAN are NECESSARY to cause the effect.

the ship of Theseus

- paradox: raises the question of whether an object that has had all of its components replaced remains fundamentally the same object. - you can replace all the boards in the ship, (physical change), but does the ship remains the same ship.

princess of bohemia argument

- raised objection to descartes - how can immaterial substance (the soul) have a causal impact on the physical universe. Cartesian dualism - it cannot do justice to the causal interactions between mind and body, physical things affect physical things, but the immaterial substance can't affect physical, if they're two different things they can't affect each other. it would be a contradiction to say that something immaterial has an affect on material things. DESCARTES' REBUTTAL: - pineal gland in the brain is the seat of the soul, to draw a connection btwn immaterial (soul) and physical (brain).

epistemology

- studies our ability to acquire knowledge or justified beliefs about reality - how are we justified in believing the existence of the external world? - Berkeley's solution: idealism, the external world exists by virtue of our perception/ ability to perceive external objects and such -esse est percipi, external world = mind-dependent reality.

metaphysics

- studies the nature, constitution, and structure of reality - ex.: idealism, behaviorism

epistemology

- the study of human knowledge and justification. - epistemologists attempt to deny skepticism about our external world - main concern: study the nature of justified/ reasonable belief - what is reasonable belief and what isn't? what do i have to believe. ' -rational justification for why we should believe PRACTICAL REASON: why it's in your best interest to belief something - Pascal's Wager: - if you believe that God exists you will be granted with eternlal salvation (practical reason) - but there is no epistemic reason to believe in God's existence (if you don't believe in god and he does exist you'll be subject to eternal damnation!!!)

metaphysical possibility

- this is a way the world might have been, it is possible for a certain state of affairs to obtain. - include physically possible situation - ways the world coudd have been are compatible with our laws of physics. v. metaphysical impossibility - not a way the world might have been, there's no possible world in which the SOA obtains. EXAMPLE: it's not possible for the world to contain a square circle. not possible for it to be raining and not raining at the same time.

invalid argument

- truth of the premises doesn't guarantee the truth of the conclusion - e..g fallacy of affirming the consequent: If p then q, Q, Therefore, p. OR, If I get an A, then I pass the course. I pass the course. Therefore, I got an A. OR, If Socrates is a horse, then Socrates is warm-blooded. Socrates is warm-blooded. Therefore, Socrates if a horse.

the dreaming argument

-2nd level of skeptical doubt about the external world Are we dreaming/ always in a dream? Suggests I cannot know anything about the external world on the basis of perception - Still leaves open that we have basic knowledge of a physical universe's existence. Premise 1: If you can't know that you aren't dreaming, then you can't know anything about the external world on the basis of perception Premise 2: You can't know that you aren't dreaming Conclusion 3: Therefore, you can't know anything about the external world on the basis of perception. Are dreams distinguished from waking states by some "dream-like" quality? Some dreams are/ feel extremely realistic, but others have dream-like quality. this distinction is made possible by already assuming that we have knowledge about the external world.

monism

-Claim that the world contains only one type of stuff. -Some monists (idealists) claim that the world contains only mental stuff. -Other monists (materialists) claim that the world contains only physical stuff.

3 lvls of skeptical doubt about the external world

-LVL 1: Perceptual error - calls into question particular beliefs about my immediate surroundings - e.g. misperceived a raccoon for a cat - in dim lighting be skeptical of your perception - not so thorough form of skepticism - LVL 2: Dreaming argument - suggests that i can't know anything about the external world on the basis of perception - still leaves open that we have basic knowledge of a physical universe's existence - LVL 3: the evil demon argument - calls the very existence of an external world into question.

the Turing test

-a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. -can a computer think? Turing: the question whether machines can think is itself "too meaningless" to deserve discussion. - However, consider the more precise—and somehow related—question: can a digital computer do well in a certain kind of game that Turing describes ("The Imitation Game"), - Descartes: no mere machine could talk and act in the way in which adult human beings do.

Arnauld's triangle

-the mere fact that Descartes can conceive of some state of affairs doesn't show that the state of affairs is possible. Someone might imagine a right triangle such that the square of the hypotenuse doesn't equal the sum of the squares of the sides. But by Pythagorean theorem, no such triangle is possible. - Not even God could bring such a triangle into existence.

conceivability

-to perceive of something mentally the conceivability agreement - a state of affairs is conceivable without contradiction if it doesn't involve any kind of logical or definitional incoherence. - to say that a SOAs is conceivable is to say that we can coherently think about it.

the ontological argument (not og to Descartes)

1. I can conceive of a perfect diety. 2. If a being doesn't exist that is farther away from perfection; a deity that exists is more perfect than a deity that doesn't Therefore, 3. The deity that I am conceiving exists (i.e. God exists).

the conceivability argument

1. If I can conceive of some state of affairs without contradiction, then that state of affairs is possible (God could bring it about) 2. I can conceive of myself as existing without my body. Therefore, 3. It is possible for me to exist without my body. 4. It's not possible for my body to exist without my body existing. Hence by Leibniz's Law Therefore, I am distinct from my body.

three different responses to the turing test.

1. If a machine passes the Turing test, then it can think. o Turing sometimes seems to endorse this position. But it is problematic. It basically seems to presuppose some kind of behaviorism. - Moral: you can build a machine that passes the Turing test, but that doesn't really think. - If the individual is only looking up answers on the "table" 2. No machine can think. A machine that passes the Turing test can only simulate thought. o But why should we find this analysis even remotely attractive? It seems to enshrine a very parochial kind of chauvinism about the mind. - Why can't we have an artificial rendering of the brain? - Because there's something special, and inherently unique, about the neuronal tissue of which brains are made. 3. If a machine passes the Turing test, then that proves us with good reason to believe it can think. o Most plausible of the three reactions to the Turing test. o But one might argue that successful performance on the Turing test provides at best a very weak reason for believing that a machine thinks, need more tests.

3 lvls of skeptical doubt about other minds

1. Occasional lies - calls into question particular beliefs about other people's mental states. 2. Systematic deception (The Truman Show) - suggests that I cannot know anything about other people's mental states. 3. Zombies, automata - Calls the very existence of other minds into question.

Proposal 6

A* and B* are person stages of the same person if and only if they have the same brain PROBLEM: i. Julia gets in car accident, body destroyed, brain functioning, inviting u to consider should her brain be transported to another body. ii. Issue: does personal identity reside in your brain?

Proposal 7

A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of the same chain of psychologically continuous person-stages and underwritten by a brain persisting through time. - Same issue as proposal 2 b/c it's susceptible to body-switching counterarguments

Proposal 5

ACKNOWLEDGES THE PROBLEM W/ 4* WHICH ENTAILS THE EXISTENCE OF DUPLICATES WHICH DEFIES/ CONTRADICTS THE DEFINITION OF NUMERICAL IDENTITY. A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of psych continuous personal stages (Proposal 4) + there doesn't exist some distinct chain of psychologically continuous person stages - If there were a duplicate, you wouldn't be the same person anymore. if another Maya pops up in the room then I can no longer say that I am the original Maya Addresses the epistemological consequences - if there exists a duplicate, we can no longer have justified beliefs of our personal identity, I don't know that I am me if there is a duplicate out there Under proposal 4*: i can know that im the same person despite there existing a duplicate of me Proposal 5: i cant know that im the same person if a duplicate of me exists

occasionalism

ATTEMPT TO DEFEND EPIPHENOMENALISM. -Malebranche - Maybe the appearance of causal interaction btwn mind + body = some kind of systematic illusion. - God takes your intention as an occasion to cause your arm to move - You are not doing the causing, it's God. - There is an appearance that you are making your arm to go up b/c every time you want your arm to go up it does, but in fact God is moving it for you. This is the illusion. - Violates the idea that the world is a closed physical system. - seems like a desperate reaction to epiphenomenalism.

Objection of inverted spectrum

According to the doctrine of supervenience, any two entities that share all the same physical properties must also share all the same mental properties. Yet Normal (clone 1- sees red as red normally) and Abnormal (clone 2 - sees red as green, abnormally) share the same physical properties (brain structure) while processing different material properties. Thus, Normal and Abnormal provide an apparent counter-example to supervenience. BUT!!!! (OBJECTION) How do you know that creatures like Normal and Abnormal are possible? - "Well, I can easily imagine two such creatures?" Yes, but that only shows that Normal and Abnormal are conceivable. As we've seen, conceivability does not entail possibility. So maybe the inverted spectrum is not possible even though it is conceivable.

Leibniz's Law and argument from doubt

Arnauld's argument from doubt is fallacious b/c it is an invalid usage of Leibniz's Law

PROBLEM W/ CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT

B/C OF DESCARTES' ASSUMPTION OF CONCEIVABILITY ENTAILS POSSIBILITY IN HIS FIRST PREMISE. conceivability argument entails that things that are metaphysically impossible can exist, by virtue of the fact that you can conceive of a state of affairs which are metaphysically impossible 2 COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT: the amnesia argument + Arnauld's triangle.

Counterxample to behaviorist analysis of belief

But what if S doesn't speak English? - the notion that believing something is disposed to uttering certain words isn't correct -the belief is something over and above those English words. What if S wants to deceive us about her beliefs.

conceivability entails possibility

DANGEROUS ASSUMPTION MAKES IN THE FIRST PREMISE OF HIS CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT. the conceivability agreement - a state of affairs is conceivable without contradiction if it doesn't involve any kind of logical or definitional incoherence. - to say that a SOAs is conceivable is to say that we can coherently think about it. Does the mere fact that we can imagine some SOAs without contradiction and thus conceive of it mean it's possible? - Descartes: yes - Arnauld - no

Why does dualism lead to epiphenomenalism

Dualism: the doctrine that thinking beings possess immaterial souls entirely distinct from their physical bodies. I am distinct from my body because there are two types of stuff, the mental and the physical. My mind is mental and unextended. My body is physical and extended. However, dualists argue that mind and body can impact one another causally. WHY IS INTERACTIONISM IMPLAUSIBLE FOR DUALISTS? 1. every physical event must have a physical cause according to the laws of physics, so it seems impossible for the unextended mind to affect the physical body. 2. It is for this reason that both mind and body affecting the body is causally overdetermined. Every movement of the body has a physical cause. But, if a given bodily movement also had a mental cause, that would be more than is necessary. So if we espouse both dualism and interactionism, then we must hold that: 1. either the mind can interfere with physical forces and violate the laws of physics OR 2. the mind simply reinforces the physical forces impacting the body, thus entailing massive causal overdetermination. It seems we are forced to accept epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that one's mind exerts no causal impact upon one's body (the mind is just along for the ride).

the clone argument (the duplication argument)

Gretchen proposes this through kleenex box example, to define the concept of numerically identity, and thus personal identity. - suppose there's a clone that's indistinguishable from you. does that mean they're numerically identical to you. No. Because I can be standing at one point. The clone could be standing at another. Thus, by Leibniz's Law, clone and I are not the same.

The Inverted Spectrum

How do I know that my perception of red is the same as yours? EX: Apple is red (truth) Anytime clone 1 sees something in red, clone 2 sees it as perfectly inverted as green. - Your perception could be unique to you; different from that of others, you don't know what others perceive.

veil of perception

How do you know there are any objects @ all beyond the veil of perception? Descartes' evil demon can't be fooled about whether it seems that there's a tree beyond veil of perception.

Objection to materialism

IN LINE WITH NAGEL'S OBJECTION: SUBJECTIVITY OF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE Mary is in a room she has glasses on that make her only see black and white Studies everything there is to know about color and perception in a physically tangible way once she steps out of the room and takes off her glasses and sees a color other than black and white, she'll experience/feel something that can not be learned by virtue of physical objects.

Descartes' counterargument to Arnauld's response

If I can CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY conceive of some state of affairs then that state of affairs is possible. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of myself existing without my body. But I cannot clearly and distinctly conceive of a triangle that violates the Pythagorean theorem. But: what does clear and distinct mean Why does it apply to mind and body dualism but not to Arnaulds triangle Moreover, why does it fail to apply to amnesia prof.

modus ponens

If p, then q. P, Therefore q.

Descartes Argument from Doubt

In having doubts about my body I should be having doubts about myself - acknowledges evil demon argument claiming that he doubt the existence of physical bodies. - but then acknowledges cogito argument - that he cannot doubt his existence so long as he's doubting or thinking. Formulation: P1: I can doubt the existence of my brain and my body (evil demon argument - skepticism about the external world) P2: I cannot doubt the existence of my mind (cogito - I think therefore I am) Therefore, C: My mind isn't the same thing as my brain or body

Behaviorist analysis for "S believes that p"

John believes that there's a cat next to him. - Belief forms the basis for action - what you believe to be true informs how you act. S believes that p if and only if when S is asked "Is it the case that p?" S will answer "Yes it's the case that p" - Behavioral disposition - when you're asked about your belief, you're disposed to answer. - Belief = affirm p. - Behaviorist ideology: that affirmation is manifested as a verbal answer.

Supervenience

Many philosophers find it possible - Doctrine that if two entities share all the same physical properties (physical duplicates) then they also share all the same mental properties (mental duplicates) - MENTAL SUPERVENES ON THE PHYSICAL (The A's supervene on the B's) - No difference in the A's without a difference in the B's - Most minimal possible form of materialism, materialists endorse supervenience. - if materialism is true: everything supervenes on the physical. - the world is nothing but comprised of physical stuff, i.e. the mental, biological, and social features of the world are nothing but physical features of the world. - if something changes in the mental, it entails that something changes in the physical.

Hempel's Behaviorial Definition of "Paul has a toothache"

Paul has a toothache if and only if: a. Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds b. At the question "What's the matter" Paul utters "I have a toothache" c. Closer examination reveals a decayed tooth w/ exposed pulp. d. Paul's blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions show such and such changes. e. Such and such processes occur in Paul's central nervous system.

Proposal 4

RESPONSE TO CIRCULARITY OF PROPOSAL 3 sameness of person if and only if sameness of continuity of memory caused in the appropriate way Essentially, memory caused in the appropriate way entails that the actual event caused the memory, not someone else (Dave's menorah example) telling me about that event to induce the memory. - avoids apparent memory + identity, has more specific definition of memory DOESN'T ACKNOWLEDGE REID'S BRAVE OFFICER EXAMPLE

Proposal 4* (reformulation of Proposal 4)

RESPONSE TO REID'S BRAVE OFFICER EXAMPLE sameness of person if and only if sameness of continuity of memory caused in the appropriate way in which each stage remembers the stage immediately preceding or prior (PERSON STAGES) - B has to remember A and D has to remember C, and so forth OBJECTION/ COUNTERARGUMENT: Duplication argument comes here: 2 diff person stages can exist. Problem: It entails that 2 separate people who count as the same person can be at different places at once. If Sam is saying that God is creating a heavenly duplicate, then isn't possible that God can create 2 heavenly duplicates, but if he creates 2 duplicates, then they both have memories caused in the appropriate way. If God made 2 numerically identical beings according to Proposal 4* they could both exist at different places at the same time, because proposal 4 is just saying that they need to belong to a chain of psychologically continuous person-stages. You just need to be a part of the psychologically continuous chain of person-stages. Being at two places at the same time, is a contradiction to definition of numerical identity. - By Proposal 4*'s definition of numerical identity, duplicate 1 and duplicate 2 are the same person, because they belong to the same chain of psychologically continuous person stages, in that when the chain breaks (i.e. when the duplicates of the original person are formed) the two duplicates both remember the events of the last person-stage (F).

Proposal 3

Sam (and Locke): sameness of person if and only if sameness of CONTINUITY of memory OBJECTION: 1. It's circular: - Sam defines memory as apparent memory from the same person (identity) - In this definition, however, he uses identity to prove identity. OBJECTION 2: Reid's officer argument - A. person stage of officer at 5 years old B. captured flag C. made a general A=B (soldier (B) remembers being young child, B=C So, by law of transitivity, A=C

Proposal 2

Sameness of person if and only if sameness of body. Body-switching objection: Freaky Friday example: you know who you are without even seeing your body - Can have justified beliefs of whether or not you're the same person without having the same body.

fallacy of affirming the consequent

Socrates example. reverse way of trying to prove a conclusion, based on a given forward premise, thus false. if p then q, q, therefore p. invalid - true premises can't lead to a false conclusion.

How does the Inverted Spectrum disprove supervenience?

Supervenience - a change in the mental entails a change in the physical - Apple is red (truth) - Anytime clone 1 sees something in red, clone 2 sees it as perfectly inverted as green (but says it's red). - They'll use the same words as us (not about language), about their actual experience - Epistemological worry: clones have exact same physical brain structures so you can't do CT scan on their brain and deduce that they're having a diff experience based on their brain structure. - But the mental of clone 2 (which perceives apple as green) does not reflect a change in the physical (apple which is red) Apple cannot physically be both red and green - Supervenience doesn't hold true. Inverted Spectrum contradicts supervenience - Can't agree w/ supervenience: there can be no change in the mental without change in the physical - Inverted spectrum denies materialism

the amnesia argument

Suppose I have amnesia 1. If I can conceive of a SOA then that SOA is possible (adopts premise where Descartes goes wrong) 2. I can conceive of a world in which I exist but Michael Rescorla doesn't exist (this is possible/ true) Therefore, 3. It is possible for me to exist without Michael Rescorla existing But, 4. It's not possible for Michael Rescorla to exist without Michael Rescorla existing. Hence by Leibniz's Law, (find a characteristic that one thing has that other doesn't) 5. I am not Michael Rescorla. Valid application of Leibniz's Law but false conclusion because of 1st premise. DEMONSTRATES HOW THE SLIDES FROM CONCEIVABILITY TO POSSIBILITY TO GENERATE PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS.

CONCLUSION ABOUT BEHAVIORIST ANALYSIS OF BELIEF.

Taken on their own beliefs don't generate actions. Beliefs generate actions only in junction with desire. - Just because you believe that a ham sandwich is in your fridge doesn't mean you're going to get it. You have to desire to get the ham sandwich. The links between mental states and behavior (how mental states cause behavior) are much more complex and less direct than behaviorists claim. *Behavior and mental state is only sort of direct when you experience an immediate, extreme form of pain.

belief

a mental representation of an attitude positively oriented towards the likelihood of something being true.

the computational theory of mind

argument of materialism, your mind is a computer The comptuational theory of mind o We ourselves are computers - computational theory of mind holds that the mind is a computation that arises from the brain acting as a computing machine.

Problem with epiphenomalism

body affects mind, but mind does not affect body. This is unattractive because some actions cannot be thought of as driven by anything other than the mental Fear seems to make the heart beat faster; though, according to epiphenomenalism, the state of the nervous system causes the heart to beat faster.

psychological continuity

continuity of memory, linked memory in chain A*-B*-C*, next link in change appears to remember experiences of earlier link

David Cohen's menorah example

demonstrates apparent memory: - According to David (pg. 30) the difference is that real memory is "caused in the appropriate way," while apparent memory is not. - Knocked over menorah at 1 year old, can't remember doing that. o Shows that what elevates an apparent memory to a really memory is not simply that you're the person that experienced the event (David is the person that experienced in the event but doesn't have real memory just apparent), has apparent memory from his parents telling him about menorah incident all the time o Need to appeal to idea of apparent memory caused in the right way.

skeptic about other minds

epistemological challenge raised by the skeptic: given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds? solipsism - the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist. Conclusion: My knowledge of my own mental state = more secure than my knowledge of other people's mental states. Apparently I can't know anything at all about other people's mental states. I can't even know that other human bodies aren't automata. In general, a skeptic about some subject matter is someone who denies we have knowledge about the subject matter. Skeptic about other minds, denies that we have knowledge of the existence of other minds.

disprove Hempel's statement

find counterexample to one of his many right-hand side parts. 1. TALENTED ACTOR: You could be in pain w/o exhibiting pain behavior 2. SUPERSPARTANS: people who value being stoic, train themselves to not indicate they're in pain when they are - you could exhibit pain behavior w/o being in pain. - seems false that appropriate behavioral dispositions are a necessary condition for being in pain. 3. NON-HUMAN ANIMALS - also get toothaches but won't be able to say "I have a toothache

The imitation game

hypothetical situation a person and a machine are behind curtain, carry on a whole conversation with a judge judge can't tell whether they're speaking to machine or person

How to disprove an "if and only if" statement

if and only if statements are only true when both sides are true or both sides are false. Example: Donald Trump will be reelected if and only if people like him. - Show right-hand side is true but left-hand side is false or vice versa: Example: The 3 sides of a triangle are equal if and only if one of the internal angles is 55 degrees - one of the internal angles of an equilateral triangle cannot be 55 degrees, must be 60 degrees - therefore that iff statement is false.

Descartes and interactionism

is an interactionist, believes that the mind and body causally interact. By adopting cartesian dualism, you adopt interactionism

Nagel's objection to materialism

materialism leaves out "the subjective character of experience". Materialism omits what it is like to feel pain, to see the color red. Etc. Consciousness = the qualitative aspect of experience (what it is like) Nagel thinks that materialism cannot give a satisfactory account of consciousness. Physics, no matter how sophisticated it becomes, will never capture what it is like to feel pain, to see the color red, to navigate like a hat, etc, which exists.

metaphysics v. epistemology

metaphysics studies the nature, constitution (the thing itself), and strcuture of reality. EXAMPLE Questions: - Does God exist? epistemology studies our ability to acquire knowledge and or justified beliefs about reality - can i KNOW anything about the external world on the basis of perception.

Leibniz's Law

proving identity of object/ two objects/ entities are = If A and B are the same object, then they have exactly the same properties. EXAMPLE: Superman is flying across the sky Jimmy Olsen is not flying across the sky. Therefore, Superman is not Jimmy Olsen. Superman and Jimmy Olsen do not share the property of flying. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH LEIBNIZ'S LAW YIELDS FALLACIOUS ARGUMENTS: Leibniz's Law isn't valid whenever we are discussing notions such as belief, doubt, justification and knowledge - cannot prove that A and B are distinct entities using Leibniz's Law in such cases. What constitutes a property? Anything that you can attribute to a physical object. INVALID EXAMPLE: Lex Luthor doubts that Superman exists (Superman has property that LL doubts his existence) Lex Luthor doesn't doubt that Clark Kent exists (Clark Kent has property that LL doesn't doubt existence) Therefore, Clark Kent and Superman aren't the same person. NEED PHYSICAL PROPERTY TO DISTINGUISH THE TWO.

Why is zombie/ automata level of skeptical doubt (doubting existence of other's minds because they might be remote-controlled machines) not compelling?

someone else must be doing the remote controlling!

interactionism

the doctrine that the mind CAN enter into causal interactions with the physical world an enormously plausible doctrine. almost everyone believes in interactionism

idealism

the thesis that all reality is a construct out of mental phenomena. no such thing as mind independent reality, endorses mental-dependent reality. IDEALIST: can know about the xternal world. but we need to reconceptualize the external world and realize that it is directly accessible within our minds/ mental constructs which represent the physical phenomena around us. Historically most significant response to skepticism posits that the physical universe is dependent on our thoughts and perception/ mind, since all that we can directly access is our own thoughts + perceptions idea - mental representation/ item that purports to represent some element of extra-mental reality basic stuff of thought BISHOP BERKELEY: There's no mind-independent reality distinct from our ideas. The physical universe itself = a construct of our ideas// physical objects are simply collections of our ideas. ***ESSE EST PERCIPI (its being consists in being perceived). denies evil demon argument because evil demon argument says you can't know anything about the external world but idealism says you can so long as you think and perceive things, they exist.

sound argument

valid + true

fundamental problem for idealism

when we all leave a room, does the furniture inside the room cease to exist just because we're not looking @ it, it doesn't exist. BERKELEY'S REJOINDER - claims that God is always perceiving these objects even when humans aren't// the object continues to exist because it consists of ideas in the mind of God.