Pols 3224 final

Spano v. New York

-The court ruled that the tactics used were coercive so they could not trust the statement -5th Amendment attaches during custody and interrogation

Betts v. Brady (1942)

A literate, white man wanted an attorney at government expense. Like many states, Maryland only provided indigents with counsel in rape and murder cases. The suspect was charged with robbery. He was convicted while attempting to be his own defense. On appeal, he asked the SCOTUS to apply the decision in Johnson to the states and incorporating the sixth amendment guarantee. The court refused on 6-3. Citing that the framers never intended for the right to counsel to be a fundamental right. Only in extreme cases where the defendant is helpless or illiterate as in Powells.

Crawford v. Washington (2004)

A testimony cannot be introduced into trial unless the witness can be cross-examined by the accused at the same time only be admissible if the witness is not available. Therefore, taken together, Crawford was denied the right to confrontation because of the out-of-court statement amounted to testimony and Crawford's attorney never had the opportunity for cross-examination.

Barker v. Wingo (1972)

After 5 years of between indictment and trial, 16 continuances. Baker's prosecution was strategic to convict a co-conspirator and use their statement as compelling evidence against Baker. The court felt that length based on a case to case basis. And created criteria for it to be violation 6th Amendment. Based on the length of delay, reason for delay, when did defendant make claim, prejudice to defendant

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009)

At Luis Melendez-Diaz's trial, the prosecution introduced sworn certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that material seized by police and connected to Melendez-Diaz was quite likely cocaine. Melendez-Diaz's attorney objected, claiming that under Supreme Court precedent, the analysts should testify in person and face cross-examination. The Supreme Court agreed and held that because the certificates fell within the "core class of testimonial statements" they were covered by the confrontation clause. The defendant should have had the chance to cross-examine the analysts.

Assoc. Press v. Walker (1967)

Brief overview A consolidated case with Curtis Publishing Co. V. Butts, the courts decided In other words, the First Amendment (and the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states) prohibits either public officials or public figures from recovering damages for libel unless they prove actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. In Walker/Butts, the Supreme Court established a guideline to determine the presence of actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

Before Berkemer v. McCarty, some courts only required Miranda rights be read for those defendants charged with serious offenses. This case is significant because it made clear that the Miranda rule applies to anyone in custodial interrogation, regardless of the seriousness of the offense.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (1971)

Brief Overview George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words "allegedly" or "reportedly" in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors "girlie look peddlers" and "smut distributors". Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges. However, he wanted to sue Metromedia for libel. The court upheld an appeals court ruling that even though a news broadcast contains information about a private citizen it is not libel unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a reckless disregard for the truth or malicious intent at the same time there was a concern for the public. An early defamation case where a plurality of the Court held that the actual malice standard should apply when an allegedly defamatory publication dealt with a matter of public concern (regardless of the public prominence of the plaintiff). Later overturned.

American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut (1986)

Brief Overview In 1986, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit that the definition of "pornography" in the Indianapolis ordinance violates the First Amendment because it is overbroad. The Circuit Court held that the ordinance goes far beyond material that is "obscene." The ordinance "does not refer to the prurient interest, to offensiveness, or to the standards of the community," which are part of the test for what is "obscene" as established by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.

Stanley v. Georgia

Brief Overview a First Amendment-based right of privacy protected a citizen who merely possessed sexual materials in the home.

Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966)

Brief Overview was the United States Supreme Court decision that attempted to clarify a holding regarding obscenity made a decade earlier in Roth v. United States (1957). Since the Roth ruling, to be declared obscene a work of literature had to be proven by censors to: 1) appeal to prurient interest, 2) be patently offensive, and 3) have no redeeming social value. The book in question in this case was Fanny Hill (or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, 1749) by John Cleland and the Court held in Memoirs v. Massachusetts that, while it may fit the first two criteria (it appealed to prurient interst and was patently offensive), it could not be proven that Fanny Hill had no redeeming social value. The judgment favoring the plaintiff continued that it could still be held obscene under certain circumstances — for instance, if it were marketed solely for its prurient appeal. Memoirs v. Massachusetts led to more years of debate about what was and was not obscene and the conferring of more power in these matters to proposers of local community standards.

Lochner v. N.Y. (1905)

Brief overview A setback for labor reformers, this Supreme Court decision invalidated a state law establishing a ten-hour day for bakers. It held that the "right to free contract" was implicit in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967)

Brief overview The Plaintiffs, Butts and Walker (Plaintiffs), were public figures and not public officials. Both were awarded damages for defamation. The Defendant, Curtis Publishing Co. (Defendant), appealed to extend the constitutional safeguards outlined in New York Times to public figures. The issue was: Do the constitutional safeguards required under New York Times v. Sullivan apply to a public figure who is not a public official? the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. Affirmed original the ruling.

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

Brief overview overturned a law that stated public schools would instruct classes in English

Brewer v. Williams (1977)

Clarification, indigent defendants are appointed counsel once any adversarial proceedings have begun.

in re Quinlan (1976)

Constitutional right to privacy protects patient's right to self-determination. A state's interest does not justify interference with one's right to refuse treatment.

Brown v. Mississippi (1936)

Convictions that arise solely from a confession procured through torture must be excluded

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 5-4

Ernesto Miranda, an indigent, uneducated truck driver, allegedly kidnapped and raped an eighteen-year-old woman outside of Phoenix, Arizona. Ten days after the incident, police arrested him and after two hours of interrogation, he confessed to the murder. There were no misconducts performed by the officers in the case and at no point did Miranda ask for an attorney. After the decision is was in Gideon v. Wainright (1963) it was mandated that all indigent criminal defendants receive a defense attorney at government expense, the trial judge appointed a lawyer to defend Miranda's charges. His attorney inadequately defended him by attempting to prove him mentally defective or insane. Miranda was convicted and received a sentence of twenty to thirty years. Conviction stemmed from the confession and the positive ID from the victim on Miranda. Miranda retained new attorneys, who presented wholly different arguments to the Supreme Court. Where Miranda's appeal was combined with three others presenting similar issues. Question What procedural safeguards are necessary in order to ensure the protection of the defendants Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights? Should the confession in this case be excluded as violating the defendant's constitutional rights? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Miranda in this case and created a list of rights that must be recited to a criminal defendant. As the constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination is only effective if individuals are aware of that right, a confession obtained without prior notice to the defendant is inadmissible as a violation of his constitutional rights. Significance Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda is a tour de force on self-incrimination, creating the so-called Miranda warnings that police must read to suspects before any custodial interrogation. However, two major question were let open after the decision in Miranda. What is custody? What constitutes an interrogation?

Weeks v. U.S. (1914)

Established the Exclusionary Rule at the federal level; illegally obtained evidence cannot be used in court.

Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding 8-1

Fact In 2003, Savanah Redding was called from class by the Assistant Principal. In the Principals office, she was shown an unzipped day planner containing several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette. According to Redding the day planner was her but the contents inside the container was not hers. She also said that she let a friend use the container a few days earlier. The principal also confronted Redding with four white prescription strength ibuprofen pills and one over-the-counter naproxen pill. The principal said that he received a report that she was giving the pills to other students and that they were going to take them at lunch. Redding denied the claims and let the administrator and his assistant search her belongings where they found nothing. The principal ordered his assistant to take Savanah to the nurse's office, so she could be strip searched. The nurse prompted her to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in stretch pants and a T-shirt. She was then asked to remove those items and was told to "pull her bra out to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breast and pelvic area to some degree." No pills were found. Her mother later sued for monetary damages from the defendants for conducting a strip search of her daughter in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal district court saw no constitutional violation, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Question Was a strip search a reasonable method to finding evidence of drugs on a minor? Were the administrators of the middle school immune from the civil liability of the Fourth Amendment and liable for damges? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Redding's mother and the Ninth Circuit when it comes to this case. The circumstances in this case differentiates it from previous cases like T.L.O. Mainly because the school administrators searched the young girl to the point of her underwear being expose. Justice Souter writing for the majority iterated "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." that the school did not have enough reasonable suspicion of evidence to "make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts." At the same time, the justices ruled that the administrators were not liable to damages. Since the administrators were attempting to protect the safety of other children and there isn't any precedent of laws that the administrators could have referred to. Significances Savana Redding's age and gender undoubtedly influenced the court's conclusion that her strip search was unreasonable. Outside the context of the public-school setting, however, the justices have been more tolerant of such intrusive searches. This especially has been the case in the setting of a correctional facility.

Richmond Newspapers inc. v. Virginia (1980)

Facts After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action. Question Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."

Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966)

Facts After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial, due to context and publicity, as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial? Conclusion In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.

Powell v. Alabama (1932)

Facts Nine black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of four trials took one day and eight of the nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama. Question Did the length of the trials and ineffective appointment of counsel violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.

Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) 6-3

Facts A 1978 ordinance passed by the city council of Akron, Ohio contained five restrictions on the right to an abortion. All post-first-trimester abortions must be performed in a hospital. Minors under the age of fifteen must obtain written consent of a parent of a court prior to an abortion. A woman must give informed consent prior to an abortion. (ex- a physician must tell her that the "unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception") Twenty-four hours must elapse between the time the pregnant woman signs the consent form and the abortion. Doctors who perform abortions "shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." Question Does the Akron city ordinance violate the right to privacy that is insured under the penumbra of the 14th and 9th Amendment? Conclusion The first four provisions were seen as unnecessary and unconstitutional impediments placed in the way of a woman's right to choose, and the fifth was struck down as unconstitutionally vague. Significance The very first woman to serve on the SCOTUS, Sandra Day O'Connor in her dissent critiqued the decision and trimester notion in Roe v. Wade. To start, she touched on medical advances since the decision in Roe; citing that "viability before 28 weeks was considered unusual," but newer studies indicated viability as early as twenty-five weeks. Even further, she insisted that since the "lines separating viability from nonviability are fading, compelling state interests exist throughout pregnancy. (urged that the trimester approach made by Roe should be abandoned and replaced with one that "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Because of her dissent and polarizing opinions, the Justices proposed three different approaches to restrictive abortion laws.

New York v. Ferber (1982)

Facts A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances. Question Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? conclusion No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment. relative to child pornography, provides that material which exploits children under 16 can be banned even if it does not meet the Miller test for obscenity. . . . applies to live performances and depictions of live performances, not written or drawings.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988)

Facts A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Question Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Conclusion Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject. Ruled that libel was not protected with the protection of free speech. Significance Added that the content had to publicly perceived as truth or actual facts to the Actual Malice standard.

Branzburg v. Hayes (1972)

Facts After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. Question Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.(1972) Ruled against a special First Amendment privilege that would allow the press to refuse to answer grand jury questions concerning news sources.

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011)

Facts Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective. Question Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors? Conclusion Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards. founded that video games were protected under 1st amendment as other forms of media and court nullified law that video games couldn't be sold to minors

Morse v. Fredrick (2008)

Facts At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful. Question Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events? Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event? Conclusion Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

Batson v. Kentucky (1986)

Facts Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him. Question Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four blacks from the jury violate Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws? Conclusion The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.

Katz v. U.S. (1967)

Facts Charles Katz was suspected of illegal bookmaking (placing bets). Based on surveillance, the agents learned that Katz made daily calls from one of two adjacent public telephone booths located on sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. To gather evidence, they attached a listening and recording device to the shared outside top of the telephone booths. The FBI agents has a traditional search warrant to seize certain physical objects (gambling records, bet slips, and so on). However, they did have judicial authorization to gather conversational evidence from a phone booth. With the evidence gathered from the recorded conversation to obtain an eight-count indictment. Katz argued against the evidence being used for his trial, since the phone booth is a constitutionally protected area. Question Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutional protected area and are conversations recorded free from being used as evidence against you? Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? Conclusion The court sided with Katz and deemed that the surveillance did not constitutionally abide by the Fourth Amendment. Katz is important is a landmark case, because first the Court applied the right of privacy to searches and seizures. If citizens have an "expectation of privacy" that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" then they are entitled to it. Under such circumstances the Fourth Amendment applies, and police must conform to its requirements. Second, the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places or things. The majority consequently rejected the physical penetration rule. Now unreasonable seizures apply not only to tangible objects but also to intangible things, such as conversations. The new "expectation of privacy" approach to the Fourth Amendment applies not only to electronic surveillance but to all forms of searches and seizures. Significance The main difference between the decision between this case and Olmstead is because of the decision in Griswold. In 1965 in the conclusion of Griswold v. Connecticut the SCOTUS created a constitutional "right to privacy." So, forty years later after Olmstead failing to survive the physical penetration standard, Katz had assistance from the right to privacy in his argument.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

Facts Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief. Question Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state courts? Conclusion The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived. Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.

Ashcroft v. ACLU (II) (2004)

Facts Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used "community standards" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most "puritanical" communities from being displayed in more "tolerant" ones. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the "community standards" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation. The Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the "strict scrutiny" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally "overbroad" - that is, it applied to too much protected material. Question Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available? Conclusion Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

Terry v. Ohio (1968)

Facts Detective McFadden a thirty-nine-year veteran of the Cleveland police force, was patrolling in plain clothes. During his patrol he observed two men (John Terry and Richard Chilton), he watched as the two paced along the street, "pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times." He noticed every time they passed the store the two men would converse. The officer then observed a third man (Carl Katz) join the men then depart briefly after. They met up again several blocks away from the store. Acting on his suspicion that the men were going to rob the store, the officer approached the trio identified himself as an officer and asked the men to identify themselves. The suspects began whispering and Terry mumbled a response. The officer then spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and found a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He prompted the others to put their hands on the wall, so he could pat them down. The officer found another gun on one of the perps and arrested the two of them for having a concealed weapon. Terry challenged the validity of his initial detention and search. The trial court judge agreed he lacked probable cause, but he held that officers have the right to stop and frisk when they believe their lives are in jeopardy. Question Was the search and seizure of Terry by the method of stop and frisk a violation to the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion The court sided with McFadden since he acted on more than just a pure hunch. Justice Warren iterated that "Such a seizure is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from who they were taken." The decision in Terry expanded the authority of police to investigate possible crimes. If an individual exhibits suspicious behavior that would lead a law enforcement official reasonably to suspect that criminal behavior is occurring or is about to occur, the officer can detain the person to investigate, and may also conduct a pat search of the person's outer clothing to search for weapons, provided there is a cause to believe the person may be armed and currently dangerous.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

Facts Dollree Mapp who was suspected of carrying on a number of illegal activities in her Cleveland home. The police continuously attempted to shut down her operations, but she often eluded their capture. This time in May of 1957, the officers tried to enter her home on the grounds that she was harboring a fugitive who was suspected of bombing Don King's home. Upon first arrival the police attempted to enter the home, but Mapp refused since they did not have a warrant. The sergeant radioed for a warrant, left and kept the house under surveillance. Three-hours later, the sergeant returned to the home and tried to enter. This time Mapp did not come to the door, so police forced it open. Mapp's attorney who she called when the cops first came, arrived at her house and was denied entry. At the same time, Mapp was arguing with the officers for breaking in where she was shown a piece of paper (supposed warrant) and stuffed it down her blouse. Mapp was apprehended, and the officers retrieved the supposed warrant and continued to search the house. The officers seized at the time illegal obscene books and pictures from her home. At trial the prosecution failed to produce the warrant with no explanation of why. Mapp was found guilty and sentenced to prison for a term of one to seven years. Her attorney appealed to the SCOTUS and attacked the constitutionality of the obscenity laws and the harsh sentence she received. However, the justices ignored both the claims of the state and Mapp and rather focused instead on their interest in the search and seizure aspects of the case. Question Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (ignored) (Focused rather) If the search that was conducted in the raid of the defendants home violated against their Fourth Amendment? Conclusion The court ruled in favor for Mapp believing that the main violation of rights stemmed from the Fourth Amendment. Justice Clark writing for the majority stated "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left open the state tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is the enforceable against the States, and that the rights to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of the law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment." Significance The application of the exclusionary rule provides yet another example of the Warren Court's revolutionary treatment of the rights of the criminally accused. It also illustrates the highly politicized nature of criminal law. Since 1961, when the court informed states that they must adopt it, the exclusionary rule has been attacked and defended by scholars, lawyers, and judges. Opponents argue that letting a guilty person go free is too great a price for society to pay just because a police officer violated search and seizure guidelines. Supporters fear that if the exclusionary rule is eliminated, police will have no incentive to respect the law.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)

Facts During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, ***, **, ******er, mother***er, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son. Question Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances? conclusion No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene." 1978, Certain things, while not obscene, are inappropriate for the general public, and can not be broadcast publicly.

New York times v. Sullivan (1964)

Facts During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Timespublished an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed. Question Did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, "malice" had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.

Harris v. McCrae (1980) 5-4

Facts During the late 1970's the SCOTUS upheld three statues from cases concerning the state or local restrictions on the funding of abortions. Beal v. Doe (upholding a Pennsylvania law limiting Medicaid funding "to those abortions that are certified by physicians as medically necessary"). Maher v. Roe (upholding a Connecticut Welfare Department regulation limiting state Medicaid "benefits for first trimester abortions {to those} ... that are 'medically necessary'") Poelker v. Doe (upholding a St. Louis policy directive that barred city-owned hospitals from performing abortions) All three cases the court rejected claims that the restrictions at issues interfered with the fundamental right to an abortion as articulated in Roe and that they discriminated on the basis of socioeconomic status and against those choosing abortion over childbirth. After the SCOTUS upheld these cases an even bigger battle erupted over the Hyde Amendment, which limited federal Medicaid funding of abortions to those "where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Pro-choice groups quickly challenged the regulation on three grounds: It violated due process because it impinged on a fundamental right. It denied equal protection because it discriminated against women, especially poor women. It violated the First Amendment because it burdened religious exercise and constituted religious establishment guarantees. Question Did the Hyde Amendment violate a fundamental right to privacy and abortion? Did it fail strict scrutiny for targeting the rights of poorer women guaranteed from the equal protection clause? Did the Amendment violate religious exercise and establish a religion? Conclusion The court rejected all three claims from the pro-choice groups and upheld the regulations. Writing for the majority Justice Stewart stated "cannot overturn duly enacted statues simply because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. Even further he asserted that "regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized in Roe v. Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices . . . . Although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not o its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category."

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)

Facts Just like in the previous abortion case Akron, the SCOTUS reviewed a Missouri law that attempted to regulated abortion. At the same time, the case was six years after the Akron decision; with additional personnel changes (Rehnquist and Scalia) on the Supreme Court Roe's decision was in possible danger. The Missouri law: Prohibited state employees and public facilities from being used to perform an abortion unless the mother's life was in jeopardy. Banned state employees from encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life. Required physicians, prior to performing an abortion, to conduct a viability test on the fetus of any woman thought to be pregnant twenty weeks or more. In addition, the statue's preamble declared that human life begins at conception. This case prompted people to believe on both the pro-life and pro-choice sides that Webster was going to be the case to overturn Roe and make abortion illegal. Question: Do the Missouri Statues violate the fundamental right to an abortion and right to privacy? Conclusion As the court was badly fractured in a 5-4 decision, the court refused to strike down any of the law's provisions. The justices believed that the provisions were consistent with the court's funding decisions for Missouri to ban public facilities from being used for abortions and state employees from performing or encouraging abortions. On the other hand, although the pro-life forces were able to attract five votes to uphold the Missouri law, they did not persuade the court to overturn Roe. In-fact, the court explicitly declared that it would not revisit the issue of abortion. Significance Although, the decision may seem as a strike to the right of an Abortion, in Sandra Day O'Connor continuance to push for "undue burden" approach to abortion restrictions. In the end it was her loyalty to this approach that kept Roe alive and kept Webster from being the landmark decision many had expected.

Gertz v. Welch (1974)

Facts Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling. Question Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? conclusion The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state liable laws involving private individuals and the news media. Under the Gertz case, a person does not become a public figure just because he is involved in a controversy which is heavily covered by the media. Public figures are those who "usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Facts In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court. Question Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Conclusion A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy. Justice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the proper basis for the decision. Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate dissenting opinion. Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional. Established that there is an implied right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution

West Virginia State Bd of Education v. Barnette (1943)

Facts In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency. Question Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? Conclusion In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity. Justices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions. Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law. Significance The main difference between West Virginia and Gobitis was the type of violation the two cases argued. Instead of arguing for freedom of expression of religion Gobitis should have argued freedom of speech.

United States v. Leon (1984)

Facts In 1981 police in Burbank California received a tip from a person of unproven reliability identifying Patsy Stewart and Armando Sanchez as drug dealers. The informant specified that the pair possess small quantiles of weed in their home and larger amounts in a separate on Price Drive. Police began surveillance in the area and spotted a car belonging to Ricardo Del Castillo, who had a history of drug possession. Further inspection into Del Castillo probation records led them Alberto Leon, a known drug dealer. After continued surveillance of the residents, and information from a second informant, Officer Cyril Rombach, a veteran detective, drew up an affidavit to obtain a search warrant, which a judge issued. With the warrant, police searched several residences and seized large quantities of drugs. Leon, Stewart, Sanchez, and Del Castilo were arrested. In the trial stage the defendant's attorneys argued that the search warrant was invalid. Since the informant lacked established credibility, the judge did not have probable cause to issue the warrant. The government's lawyers admitted that the defendant had a valid point but insisted that the courts decline to throw out the entire case because of a defective warrant. They said the officers had acted in "good faith" that the police believed they had a legitimate warrant and acted accordingly. Question Does the exclusionary rule bar the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant when there is insufficient probable cause to support the warrant? Conclusion `The court sided with United States and accordingly modified the exclusionary rule. Justice White delivered the opinion to the court saying, "In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of bored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause." In Justices White's opinion he views that the purpose of exclusionary rule is to serve as a deterrent against police misbehavior. When police act in good faith, as they did in this case, the punitive aspect of the exclusionary rule become irrelevant. Significance This case and a similar case Nix v. Williams weakened the exclusion rule a bit that was mandated in the court's decision in Mapp. In Nix the court established an additional exception to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery exception. After 1984 the justices appeared to have reached a truce of sorts over the exclusionary rule. The liberal justices seemed pleased that the conservatives had not succeeded in overruling Mapp altogether, and the conservative justices were satisfied that they had introduced sufficient exceptions to make the exclusionary rule reasonable. As a consequence, the status of the status if the exclusionary rule did not undergo significant change for the next two decades.

FCC v. Fox Television Studios (2009)

Facts In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped. The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect." Question Did the court of appeals err in finding the FCC's indecency policy unconstitutionally vague in its entirety? Conclusion Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's standards, as applied to the broadcasts in this case, were vague. The FCC did not give proper notice to broadcasters that they would be fined for fleeting expletives, so the practice violated due process. However, Justice Kennedy carefully noted that the Court did not decide whether the practice violated the First Amendment or that the indecency policy itself was unconstitutional. Only the way the policy was applied in this case was unconstitutionally vague. The FCC is free to modify its policy in light of this decision. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, stating her belief that FCC v. Pacifica was wrong when it was decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

Arizona v. Gant (2009) 5-4

Facts In August of 1999 Tucson police officers received an anonymous tip that a residence under their jurisdiction was being used to sell drugs. As officers went to the residence, they knocked on the door and Rodney Gant answered the door. He told them the owner wasn't home and that he would return later. When the officers left the house, they checked police records and discovered that Gant had an outstanding warrant for a suspended license. The officers returned with back up, upon arrival they arrested a man in the back yard for giving false identification and a woman in the front of the house for drug paraphernalia. As they were being apprehended, Gant pulled into the drive way and got of his car. When the officers spotted him, an officer called his name and Gant walked towards him and ten to twelve feet away from his parked car. He was immediately placed under arrest for the driving with a suspended license. The officers called for back-up and placed him into one of the officer's car since the other two were in the previous two. As he was in the back of the cop car the officers searched his vehicle where a gun and a bag of cocaine was found. He was then charged with drug violations from the evidence found. His attorney argued that the evidence should be inadmissible because the officers conducted a warrantless search in violation of the fourth amendment. The state insisted that the search was valid since it was done on "incident to the arrest" of the vehicle recent occupant. The trial court aggreged and he was sentenced to three years in prison. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the decision. Question Was the search conducted on Gant's car a sufficient "incident of a valid arrest" exception to the requirement of a warrant even though the suspect was already handcuffed and placed in the back of the cop car? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Gant and the Arizona Supreme Court in this case. Justice Stevens writing for the majority stated that "police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offence of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search." Significance The majority opinion in Gant rigorously applies the requirement in Chimel that a search incident to a valid arrest can extend only to the area under the arrested suspect's immediate control. Therefore, once a suspect has been secured and placed in a patrol car, a search of his vehicle is no longer justified on that basis. However, the court also recognizes the "circumstance unique to the vehicle context" by allowing searches of the automobile after arrest and without warrant, if it is reasonable to believe that the car contains evidence associated with the offense upon which the arrest is based.

Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health (1990)

Facts In January 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was in a serious car accident that led to her being found in a ditch lying face down w/o detectible respiratory or cardiac function. Although, they were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat, Cruzan remained unconscious and was taken to the hospital. As short- and long-term medical efforts failed she began to degenerate to a persistent vegetative state. She required feeding and breathing tubes to remain alive. Although, experts suggested she could live another 30 years, there was no prediction of improvement from her condition. Her parents Lester and Joyce asked doctors to remove her feeding tubes, a step that would leave to Nacy's death. When the hospital staff refused, the Cruzans sought permission from a state court. They argued that "someone in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right to refuse or direct the withdrawal of 'death prolonging procedures.'" They even presented that she one told a friend that "she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live it at least halfway normally." The trial court ruled in their favor, but the state supreme court reversed. Told the parents they needed "clear and convincing evidence" that their daughter would have wanted her feeding tubes withdrawn. Question Does the right to privacy allow a family to remove necessary feeding tubes to live in a loved one who is under persisting vegetative state guaranteed in the due process clause? Conclusion The court clearly ruled that the 14th Amendment's due process clause permits a competent individual to terminate medical treatment. As to incompetent patients, the majority of the justices suggested that states may fasion their own standards, including those that require "clear and convincing evidence" of the patient's interests. Therefore, the parents petitioned a Missouri court two months after the decision and brought along three of Nancy's coworkers who testified that she would not want to live "like a vegetable."

Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)

Facts In January of 1960, police arrested Escobedo for the murder of his brother-in-law, Manuel Valtierra. They attempted to interrogate him, but on the advice of his lawyer, Escobedo refused to make any statements and was released. Afterward Escobedo's friend DiGerlando another suspect told police that Escobedo had indeed shot Valtierra because the victim had mistreated his sister. Ten days after the murder, police again arrested Escobedo, as well as his sister Grace. As they made their way to the station the officers told the two that DiGerlando told them the whole story and that they might as well confess. Escobedo further declined and asked for his lawyer upon arrival at the police station. He was denied council while his lawyer was in the lobby demanding to speak to his client, but he was refused access. Escobedo was questioned for over fourteen and a half hours until he made damaging statements that were later used against him. Both DiGerlando and Escobedo were found guilty in the killing. Escobedo later appealed claiming that he was denied his right to counsel and that counsel should have been present during the interrogation. Question Did the denial of counsel during interrogation constitutes in violation of the Sixth Amendment? And if so, could their statements have been inadmissible, as it was obtained in violation of their fifth and sixth Amendment rights? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Escobedo that the denial of council and use of statements during interrogation was a violation. Justice Goldberg writes for the majority that when a criminal case is focused "on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." The statement should have been inadmissible, as it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. If a defendant knows their rights it can be voluntarily waived if they choose. If they don't know their right their confession is not voluntary. Significance Danny Escobedo had been denied his right to counsel, and the majority found this right to be a primary defense against violations of the self-incrimination clause. If an attorney is present, it is unlikely that police would use even subtle methods to coerce a confession from a suspect. The Escobedo majority held that the right to counsel begins at the accusatory stage of the process, defined as the point at which the investigation ceases to be general and focuses on a specific individual. The right is in effect for every critical stage of the process, which includes all interrogations.

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977)

Facts In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees. Question Did the Arizona rule, which restricted legal advertising, violate the freedom of speech of Bates and his firm as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion The Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products, and helping to allocate resources in the American system of free-enterprise. The Court held that allowing attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the administration of justice, and, in fact, would supply consumers with valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services.

Halbert v. Michigan (2005)

Michigan removed the right to counsel for indigent defendants who pled guilty at trial and were trying to make the first appeal of their cases. Indigent defendants who plead guilty are entitled to state-paid legal help on appeal.

Michigan v. Bryant (2011)

Moving closer to the descent of the Melendez-Diaz decision of constituting some witness statements as a testimonial and others not. The court held that a statement made to police by a victim of a crime scene was not testimonial even though the victim died before the start of the trial. The courts reasoning, in this case, was that the statement was nontestimonial in nature because it was made with the purpose of assisting the police in an ongoing emergency situation.

Vacco v. Quill (1997)

New York statute prohibits suicide and assisted suicide but allows refusal of lifesaving treatment. No violation of equal protection. Laws don't involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications. No strict scrutiny. [make same points as Glucksberg]

Illinois v. Gates (1983) 6-3

Facts In the Bloomingdale suburbs of Chicago, police officer received a detailed anonymous letter. In the letter was detailed information on suspected drug traffickers in the area Sue and Lance Gates. The letter proclaimed that the couple often shipped $100,000 worth of drugs from Florida to Illionois. The letter also listed that the two have an upcoming shipment coming and will be going down to Florida to retrieve the drugs. The police department confirmed the evidence and noticed that Lance Gates had an upcoming plane trip to Florida where he was to meet his wife and drive back to Illinois with the drugs. As the officers surveyed the couple in Florida, they retrieved a warrant to search the home and the car. The officers found over 350 pounds of marijuana in their car and evidence of drug trafficking in their house. Gates attorney argued that the officers did not follow the Aguilar-Spinelli test in obtain probable cause from an anonymous letter. Specifically, the letter failed to state how the writer came upon the information a requirement deemed necessary by the test. The judge in the case agreed and said the evidence could not be used at the trial. The prosecution appealed. Question May a judge issue a search warrant on the basis of a "partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip? Conclusion The court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Due to the fact that everything the witness wrote in the letter was either true or partially true. The court felt that the letter showed the anonymous writer's veracity and integrity. Believed that the information obtained most likely came straight from the source of Gates. In order to facilitate police efforts, the SCOTUS created the totality-of-the-circumstances standard. This standard assisted law enforcement agents under these situations: If convinced that probable cause to search exists, a judge may issue a warrant that specifically defines the area to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Police are authorized only to search the area described in the warrant. They may only seize only things listed on the warrant, unless they find items whose very possession is a crime. Finally, police must execute the warrant in an orderly and timely fashion. With these requirements met, the search and seizure are likely to be found reasonable. Significance This cases decision altered the standard of having sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant. Before this case some felt that it was difficult to gain probable cause from informants. Now the standard is looser to allow officers to conduct their matters as they see fit. As long as it is abided by this new rule.

United States v. Jones (1967)

Facts In this Antoine Jones was the owner of Levels, a nightclub in the District of Columbia. He was suspected by the FBI and police department of trafficking cocaine. In their investigation, the agent had surveillance over him, a camera watching outside of his club, a device to register any numbers of phone calls he made or received, and a wiretap of his phone. The wiretap and surveillance all required a warrant, which the police obtained. The agents also received a warrant to covertly track Jones car through a GPS device. The one requirement the agents had was to apply it in a ten-day period and it must be attached within the District of Columbia. At the same time, they changed the batteries of the GPS in another parking lot in Maryland. Tracking over twenty-eight days of evidence and over two thousand pages of data on the car's movement. (couldn't tell who was driving the car, if there were passengers, and what the driver and passenger did it that area). Based on intercepted calls the agent knew of an expected shipment of cocaine in October 2005. After sending several search warrants in various locations. They caught Jones and found a large amount of cash, cocaine, weapons, and drug paraphernalia in the car. He was sentenced to life in a jail and forced to pay $1 million dollars. However, court of appeals reversed the decision based on warrantless use of GPS device. The United States asked the SCOTUS to review the case. Question Whether the attachment of a GPS device to an individual's vehicle. And subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on the public streets, constitutes a sear or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Conclusion In a unanimous decision presented by Justice Scalia he makes clear that the government violates the Fourth Amendment when it physically intrudes on a suspect's constitutionally protected space with the purpose of gathering information against the individual. Katz did not repudiate the trespass approach. Rather, the physical penetration standard and the reasonable expectation of privacy approach exist together. Significance According to the majority in Jones, the combination of these two standard expanded Fourth Amendment protections beyond what would be covered if just one of the two test were be used exclusively.

Butler v. Michigan (1957)

Facts John H. Griffin's book <i>The Devil Rides Outside</i> traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler's application for leave to appeal. Question Does the Michigan obscenity statute violate free speech rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes. Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Michigan statute unduly restricted the freedom of speech because it took only a single trial judge's determination that the material could potentially corrupt minors to prohibit its dissemination. The Court noted that, although the State may attempt to protect juvenile innocence as part of its power to promote general welfare, the restrictions should be reasonably related to the evils of obscene material. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred without writing a separate opinion.

Herring v. United States (2009)

Facts July of 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Dean Herring had driven to the coffee county (Alabama) Sheriff's Department to reclaim some possessions from his impounded truck. Anderson knew Herring had history of criminal activity, so he asked his clerk to check for any outstanding records. She found nothing. Then the investigator called the neighboring county (Dale County) and asked if he had any warrants. Dale authorities reported that their computer records listed an outstanding arrest warrant for failure to appear for Herring. Andersons clerk asked for the town to fax over a copy of the warrant for confirmation. At the same time, the investigator and a partner detained and arrested Herring when he drove out of the impoundment lot. A search incident to the arrest revealed meth in Herring's pocket and a pistol in his vehicle (prohibited to have as a convicted felon). However, as soon as Herring was arrested Dale county called back the clerk to inform her that a mistake was made, and the warrant was outdated and canceled. Herring was charged with violations of federal drug and weapons laws. His attorney moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his client's arrest was based on erroneous information it was unlawful, and the search was therefore invalid. Question Does the Fourth Amendment require exclusion of evidence obtained on the basics of an inaccurate arrest warrant? Conclusion In this case the SCOTUS sided with the United States on the arrest and accepted the exception of the exclusionary rule. The good faith reliance on a facially valid arrest warrant by the police will not require exclusion of the evidence discovered. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable search and seizure. Where the mistake occurs as the result of clerical error, the exclusionary has no deterrent effect. If the officer had a reoccurring process of negligent arrest the decision may have been different. Error was not systemic nor reckless. Significances Hudson and Herring remind us of the controversial nature of exclusionary rule question. In both cases the justices split, 5-4, with the conservative majority rejecting the position that exclusion is required. These decisions underscore the current court's position that suppression of evidence, in Justice Scalia's words, is "our last resort, not our first impulse."

Times, Inc. v. Firestone (1976)

Facts Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging "extreme cruelty and adultery". The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone's extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Question Did the Florida court's judgment violate Time's First Amendment protections? Conclusion No. In a 6-2 vote, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard for media reports on public figures did not apply. Firestone was not a public figure as defined by prior precedent. The Court also held the Florida judgment invalid because the court awarded damages without determining fault. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence, stating that the ultimate question is whether Time exercised reasonably prudent care in light of the ambiguous divorce decree. Justice Potter Steward joined in the concurrence

United States v. Williams (2008)

Facts Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of "pandering" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of "any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any "braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography. Question Does the PROTECT Act abridge First Amendment freedom of speech by outlawing the pandering of material that is believed to be, or claimed to be, illegal child pornography? Conclusion No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Hudson v. Michigan (2006)

Facts Michigan police obtained a properly issued warrant to search the home of Booker T. Hudson for drugs and firearms. The officers knocked on the defendant's door, however, they did not wait a reasonable amount of time for Hudson to answer the door; three to five seconds after knocking they entered the home. Inside they found a surprised Hudson and proceeded to search, finding a large quantity of illegal drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of his chair. Hudson was charged with unlawful possession of drugs and firearms. His attorneys argued that the evidence should be excluded from the trial because police had failed to comply with the traditional "knock-and-announce" rule. The trial court granted Hudson's motion to suppress the evidence, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. He was convicted of drug possession and later appealed on the argument again. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the use of evidence and the conviction. Hudson requested U.S. Supreme Court review. Question Does the Fourth Amendment mandate exclusion of evidence discovered when the police, armed with a warrant, fail to comply with the "knock-and-announce" protocols? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Michigan in this case, insisting that the police officers' error did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for the court "In sum, the social cost of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce are considerable; the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin with, and the extant deterrence's against them are incomparably greater than the factors deterring warrantless entries when Mapp was decided. Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified . . ." Significance In Hudson the court failed to apply the exclusionary rule when the error was committed by the police. The majority reasoned that exclusion is appropriate only when the error directly contributes to the seizure of the evidence. Finding the illegal drugs in Hudson's home in no way was the result of the failure by police to comply fully with the knock-and-announce rule.

Miller v. California (1973)

Facts Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision. 1973 ruling that determined the obscenity clause to related to works that lack literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (LAPS test) Significance Modified the test for Obscenity *[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964)

Facts Nico Jacobellis, manager of the Heights Art Theatre in the Coventry Village neighborhood of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, was convicted and fined $2,500 by a judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for exhibiting the film, The Lovers (Les Amants), and his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Question Could the state of Ohio ban the showing of a French film called The Lovers (Les Amants) which the state had deemed obscene? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Jacobellis, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly The First Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth, protected a movie theater manager from being prosecuted for possessing and showing a film that was not obscene.

Missouri v. Siebert (2004)

Facts Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17 -year-old Donald Rector, who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Several days after the fire, Seibert was interrogated by a police officer. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get a confession from her first. Once she had confessed, the officer took a short break from questioning, then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. Based on this second, Mirandized confession, Seibert was convicted. She appealed, charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession, though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights, inadmissable. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Elstad to argue that an initial, un-Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert, overturning the conviction. Question Does the rule from Oregon v. Elstad that a defendant who has made an un-Mirandized confession may later waive her Miranda rights to make a second confession (admissible in court) still apply when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold her Miranda warnings? Conclusion No. In a decision with no majority, a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible - even if the two-stage interview was unintentional, as it was in Elstad - if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote, found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. Justice Kennedy wrote, "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Then, the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made."

U.S. v. Stevens (2010)

Facts Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest. Question Is 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? conclusion Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid.

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Facts Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. Question Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Conclusion 7-2 decision for Jane Roe The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. Significance After the decision in Roe the SCOTUS created a trimester approach to determine when the interest of a woman and the interest of the state was more compelling.

Roth v. U.S. (1957)

Facts Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. Question Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973). A 1957 Supreme Court decision ruling that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Significance Created the standard for obscenity "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."

Reno v. ACLU (1997)

Facts Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Question Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized? Conclusion Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues. a law that bans sending "indecent" material to minors over the Internet is unconstitutional because "indecent" is too vague and broad a term

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Facts Similar to the Bowers case it began with a police officer visit to a private residence. After receiving a phone call about a possible weapons disturbance, police officers in Houston entered the apartment of John Geddes Lawrence. Where they observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two men were arrested and eventually convicted of violating a Texas law that made it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in sodomy. Unlike the law in Bowers, this law only applied to participants of the same sex. Lawrence and Garner said the statute violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, a similar provision of the Texas constitution, and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. After Texas courts, relying on the SCOTUS decision in Bowers, they rejected the claims, and the two men appealed to the SCOTUS. Question Did the Texas law violate the right to privacy by outlawing sexual conduct between individuals of the same sex? Conclusion The SCOTUS stuck down the Texas statutes outlawing engaging in sexual conduct between the same sex. In doing so, the decisions in Lawernce v. Texas made the case a constitutional watershed. Not only because of the majority sympathetic treatment of gays and lesbians, but also because it is rare for the court to reverse itself. Kennedy claimed that in Bowers the justices "overstated" the historical premises on which their analyses relied, that they failed "to appreciate the extent of the liberty interest at stake," and that they did not take into account contemporaneous developments regarding the liberty of adults to decide how to conduct their private lives. Finally, note the majority's continuing commitment to a right to privacy flowing from the 14th Amendment's due process clause- and its reach to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Rather than relying on Stanley to determine the law's constitutionality, the proceedings used cases such as Griswold and Casey.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973)

Facts State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution. Question Did the Georgia injunction against the films violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression? conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law. The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002)

Facts The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747. Question Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech when it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber? Conclusion Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC (1969)

Facts The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged. Question Do the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations, concerning personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum scarcity made it "idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment. With respect to the regulation of personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates, the FCC's requirement that the subject of the attack be provided with a tape, transcript, or broadcast summary, as well as an opportunity to respond without having to prove an inability to pay for the "air-time," insured a balanced and open discussion of contested issues. The requirement that political editorializing be presented for and against both sides of the debated issues also contributed to the balanced discussion of public concerns. A 1969 case in which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on radio and television broadcasting. These restrictions on the broadcast media are much tighter than those on the print media because there are only a limited number of broadcasting frequencies available.

Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Com. of NY (1980)

Facts The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals. Question Did the PSC's ban on advertising violate the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.

Rumsfield v. Forum of Academic & Inst. Rights (2006)

Facts The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds. Question Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) 6-3

Facts The court took up Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, which permits state-licensed physicians to dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient. In 2001 the Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a rule asserting that the statute was unlawful. Claimed that the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) of 1970, enacted by congress to regulate the legitimate and illegitimate trafficking of drugs, criminalizes the use of controlled substances to assist suicide. He declared that any physicians dispensing drugs for this purpose were not engaging in the legitimate practice of medicine and could lose their privilege to write prescriptions. The state, a physician, a pharmacist, and some terminally ill state residents challenged the rule. Although, Ashcroft was no longer Attorney general, but his successor Alberto Gonzales stood by Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA. Question Does the CSA violate the right to privacy in conducting an assisted suicide by a physician? Conclusion The SOTUS expressed its firm disagreement with the Gonzales/Ashcroft rule. In Justice Kennedy opinion written for the majority, he breaks down the context of the CSA act. Noting that the act mainly concerns the prohibition of doctors using their prescription writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally understood. However, the statute at face value does not manifest the intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.

Ashcroft v. ACLU (I) (2002)

Facts Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad. Question Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment? Conclusion No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Facts When an Atlanta police officer arrive at Michael Hardwick's home to serve him with an arrest warrant for failure to keep a court date. One of Hardwick's housemates answered the door and no idea if Hardwick was home or not but allowed the officer to check the house for him. As the officer walked down the hallway the he spotted Hardwick engaging in sexual conduct with another man. Hardwick was arrested for violating the Georgia law that prohibited the practice of oral and anal sex. Although the DA did not want to pursue the case, Hardwick and his ACLU attorney challenged the law, asserting that it violated the fundamental right to privacy as articulated in Griswold and should be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. The appeals court ruled for Hardwick, but the state sought the SCOTUS to review the case. Question Did the court of appeals err when it concluded that Georgia's sodomy statute infringes upon the fundamental rights of Homosexuals and required the state to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the constitutionality of the statute? Conclusion Splitting 5 to 4, the court upheld the Georgia law. Writing for himself, Burger, O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist, White said, "Fundamental liberties. . . are characterized as those. . . that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"- a type of liberty that, according to White, homosexual sodomy was surely not." At the same time, White's majority opinion also dismissed the importance of Stanley, giving it a rather narrow reading: it protected the performance of some otherwise illegal activity only if the First Amendment was implicated. Because Bowers did not raise a First Amendment objection to sodomy laws, Stanley was not applicable.

Ross v. Moffitt (1974)

Indigent defendants are not entitled to attorneys for discretionary appeals after their first appeal is unsuccessful

Douglas v. California (1963)

Indigents have a right to court-appointed counsel during the first appeal process.

Kyllo v. U.S. (2001)

Overall Danny Kyllo was suspected of growing marijuana by federal drug agents inside of his home in Oregon. In order to gather evidence, the agents set up a thermal imaging device across from his home. The agents believed that they did not need a warrant to set up the devices since they never entered onto his property. When they found what they were looking for and help from an informant the agents got a warrant and arrested Kyllo for having over one hundred marijuana plants. The SCOTUS held that the use of the thermal imaging device without a warrant violated the fourth amendment. The government, therefore, had intruded where Kyllo had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

Overall In this case Wolf was a physician who was suspected of performing illegal abortions. In order to build a case against Wolf, a deputy sheriff took an appointment book from Wolf's office. Authorities followed up on the names in the book, gathering enough evidence to convict him. His attorney argued that because the case against his client rested on illegally obtained evidence, the court should dismiss it. However, to implement his arguments, the court would first have to incorporate the Fourth Amendment to the states and then impose the exclusionary rule on the states. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the court that he agreed the Fourth Amendment should be incorporated to the states by the 14th Amendment. "To be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures was deemed a fundamental right, 'basic to a free society.'" However, the court refused to hold that the exclusionary rule was a necessary part of the Fourth Amendment and upheld Wolf's conviction. The justices felt that the rule was one method of enforcing search and seizure rights, but not the only one. Significance The justices in this time period failed to uphold the importance of the exclusionary rule that was made by the Weeks case in 1914. After this case, there was growing tension between state and federal search and seizure rules. However, due to personnel changes this was not the last case of the matter.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington (2012)

Overall In this case the justices, held that routine strip searches of incoming detainees at a county jail are constitutionally permissible even when the new inmate faces minor charges and has not yet been convicted. The majority reasoned that jail officials have ample justification to check newly arriving detainees for infectious diseases, weapons, drugs, and other contraband in order to secure the facility and protect other members of the inmate population.

Orozco v. Texas (1969)

Overall Miranda warnings must be given to any person being interrogated who is in custody at the station or outside the station. The D's familiar surroundings did not result in a lack of inherent compulsion caused by the interrogation. If Miranda rights are limited to interrogations in the station house, then police will have an incentive to hold interrogations in other locations so as to evade Miranda requirements. A reasonable person in the D's situation would have felt deprived of his or her freedom of action in a significant way, according to the Miranda custody standard.

Carroll v. U.S. (1925)

Overall This case began the jurisprudence of car search case. In this ruling the SCOTUS held that automobile do not deserve the same degree of protection as people and homes. In general, the court has given th police broad authority to search cars without warrants because: Cars are mobile, and thus evidence can quickly be removed from the area under investigation Automobile windows allow outsiders to look in and thus drivers have a lower expectation of privacy inside a car than they do in their homes. The government has a pervasive interest in regulating cars. Significance In this case the SCOTUS established that cars deserve little constitutional protection from warrantless searches. However, since their blanket decision, the court was faced with many car questions starting in the 70's. Such as: How far may such searches extend? May police search only the area where driver and passengers sit? What about the glove compartment and trunk? Are luggage and other containers in a car fair game? What degree of justification or cause do law enforcement officials need before they can conduct warrantless searches of cars? If an automobile is impounded, may police search and inventory the contents?

New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)

Overall This case involved a 14-year-old freshman and a friend who were suspected of smoking in the girls' bathroom. T.L.O was told to come into the Vice Principal's office where she denied the smoking in school. The principal demanded to see her purse, and when she gave it to him, he opened it and saw a packet of cigarettes and after looking further cigarette papers, a small pipe that contained a bit of marijuana, and other items that suggested drug use and distribution. The matter was turned over to the police. The juvenile court over the case moved to suppress the evidence, claiming an unconstitutional search. However, the SCOTUS ruled that the search was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Significance In doing so the justices balanced the student's need for individual privacy against the school's interest in maintaining order, safety, and a proper educational environment. The court concluded that in public school context, warrantless searches do not require probable cause, but only a reasonable suspicion that the student is violating the law or school rules. In subsequent cases, the court used T.L.O rationale to uphold warrantless, suspicion less drug testing of high school athletes as well as drug testing of students involved in other forms of extracurricular activities. Also, age and gender have a big factor of reasonableness or not

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976)

Short facts After the state of Missouri passed legislation the required women to bring written consent that required women to bring written consent from herself, her spouse, or from an unmarried minor parent before they could receive an abortion. Conclusion Justices found no constitutional violation of requiring a woman to bring written consent for herself. However, struck down spousal and parental consent as a violation of the constitution and inconsistent with Roe. Significance Justice Blackmun in his majority opinion included "We emphasize that our holding parental consent is invalid does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for the termination of her pregnancy." -Opened doors to possibility of some form of required parental consent.

Johnson v. Zerbist

Ruled that Indigent defendants involved in federal criminal prosecutions are entitled to be represented. Although Johnson was a major ruling, like Powell, its scope was limited.

Swain v. Alabama

SCOTUS recognized that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause."

Dickerson v. United States (2002)

The petitioner, Charles Thomas Dickerson made a statement regarding a bank robbery to the Federal Bureau of Investigations without receiving his Miranda rights. A federal law was in place that allowed the admission of statements if they were voluntarily made.

Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)

States may not ban partial birth abortions if they fail to allow an exception to protect the health of the mother

Olmstead v. United States (1928)

Supreme Court allowed the use of wiretaps on telephone lines without a court order. Interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply only to physical intrusion and only to the search or seizure of material things, not conversations.

Maryland v. Craig (1990)

Supreme Court ruled that constitutionally the testimony of a six-year-old allege child abuse victim via one-way closed circuit television was permissible. Sided this way mainly because there was a dispute that the child testified under oath, was not subject to cross-examination, and the court was able to observe the child as they testified it was permissable.

Poe v. Ullman (1961)

The Court held that a plaintiff's challenge to a state statute prohibiting the receipt of medical advice for the use of contraceptives was not ripe for review since the state had never enforced the statute and therefore there was no controversy.

Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)

The Court held that the right to physician-assisted suicide did not exist in the Constitution and that state prohibitions were constitutional.

Johnson v. Louisiana/Apodaca v. Oregon

The Supreme Court consolidated these case to determine if a nonunanimous jury verdict still constituted as a guilty verdict. Mostly in the case where 9-3 or 10-2 verdict was reached. In this case, the court sided that a less than unanimous verdict does not violate the Sixth Amendment. A lack of unanimity is not the equivalent of the doubt. "By obtaining nine votes to convict, the State satisfied its burden of proving guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.

Williams v. Florida (1970)

The court answered a question regarding the size of a jury. Ruled in favor of Florida citing that it was a historical accident that jury sizes contain twelve individuals. Citing that all the constitution required was a jury that is sufficiently large to allow actual deliberation and to represent a cross-section of the community.

Vermont v. Brillon (2009)

The court considered whether delays caused solely by an indigent defendant's public defender could violate the defendant's speedy trial rights and be charged against the state pursuant to the test in Barker. The defendant Brillon argues that the court should answer in the affirmative because public defenders are paid by the state. Writing for 7-2 Court, Justice Ginsburg held against Brillon. She noted that "assigned counsel generally are not state actors for purposes of a speedy-trial claim," and so applying Barker, she attributed most of the delay to the defendant's counsel and not the state.

J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994)

The court found that the equal protection clause prohibits discrimination based on gender in the selection of jurors. Extended the Batson ruling.

Davis v. Washington (2006)

The justices agreed that prosecutors could introduce victims' emergency phone calls to 911 even in the victims are not in court for cross-examination. In the same opinion, however, the court refused to allow a victim's statement to police given at the crime scene, to be used at trial unless the victim was willing to be cross-examined.

Alabama v. Shelton (2002)

The justices of the Rehnquist Court reinforced this basic premise. Lereed Shelton, convicted of third-degree assault, was sentenced to a jail term of thirty days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. The question the Court addressed whether the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as delineated in Argersinger and Scott, applies to a defendant in Shelton situation. (Regardless of the range of penalties available to a judge, indigent criminal defendants may not be sentenced unless they have been offered legal representation provided by the states.

Strickland v. Washington (1984)

To show that ineffective assistance of counsel violated the right to counsel, defendants must prove that the attorney committed specific errors that affected the outcome of the case. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense

US v. Salerno (1987)

U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ability of a magistrate to confine an offender on the presumption that he/she is dangerous and will commit further crimes. Giving the court the opportunity to pursue compelling interest other than the right to bail.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

facts After the court's decision in Webster, Pennsylvania revised its Abortion Control Act, which the court had struck down with a 5-4 vote in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (1986). Given the membership changes on the court and the Webster decision, the state thought the court would now uphold the amended law. The Pennsylvania law required: Informed consent and a twenty-four-hour waiting period before abortions could be performed. Parental (or judicial consent for minors.) Spousal notification Comprehensive record keeping and reporting of the following information for each abortion performed: The name of the physician. The woman's age. The number of prior pregnancies or abortions she had had. The weight and age of the aborted fetus. Whether the woman was married. If relevant, the reasons the woman failed to notify her spouse. Before these provisions went into effect 5 women's clinics challenged the provisions constitutionality. Although, a federal district court agreed with clinics, the Third Circuit of U.S. Court of Appeals disagreed. At the time, O'Connor's "undue burden" standard was the law of the land. In use of the standard the Appeals court decided the provisions except spousal consent did not place an undue burden of a woman's right to an abortion. All but the spousal consent provision passed the ration basis test. The spousal consent provision, in the court's view, placed an undue burden on the abortion decision by exposing women to spousal abuse. (Applied strict scrutiny test and provision could not stand). However, Samuel Alito disagreed with his appellate court colleagues on this portion of the decision. Alito dissent to uphold the spousal consent provision caused the appellate court to have a mixed decision. Because of that the state and the clinics appealed the supreme court. The country no longer wanted a vague decision, so the SCOTUS was urged to either affirm or overturn Roe. Question Does the Pennsylvania "spousal consent" provision violate the right to privacy and the right to terminate pregnancy? Should the decision in Roe be overturned? Conclusion The court did not overrule Roe; to the contrary, it reaffirmed the "central holding" of the 1973 decision that a woman should have "some" freedom to terminate a pregnancy. At the same time, the "joint opinion" gutted the core of Roe. The Trimester framework was gone. Under Casey states may now enact laws-regulating the entire pregnancy-that further their interest in potential life so long as those laws are rationally related to that end and do not put an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Laws that do not meet this standard will be subject to strict scrutiny, such as the spousal notification provision at issue in Casey. Significance The Undue burden approach, which O'Connor originally proposed in 1983 in her Akron dissent, could lead to very different outcomes in abortion cases. Justice Scalia's dissent indicates that many provisions at issue in Casey that the court upheld under the undue burden standard would have been struck down under Roe's strict scrutiny approach.