Property Law Practice Questions

Owner bought a home in a suburban residential neighborhood during the winter. In the spring, Owner dug up his entire side lawn and planted a vegetable garden where previously there was just grass. He also acquired five hens that he installed in a fenced-in area equipped with a chicken coop. Owner's neighbor watched his activities with concern and, the day after Owner had finished with his installations, told him that the original grant deed for every lot in the neighborhood (including Owner's) had identical provisions specifically precluding "fowls and other livestock" and requiring "grass lawns on the front and both sides of each home." Owner noticed that in the neighborhood, about 10% of the homes have side-yard vegetable gardens, and one other family has a chicken coop. If the neighbor sues Owner to obtain a court order that he restore the lawn and get rid of the chickens, which would be Owner's best defense? 1. Estoppel, because the neighbor waited until after Owner had made changes to his property before informing him of the restrictions. 2. Restrictions relating to animals do not "touch and concern the land" and there has been waiver with respect to other side-yard gardens. 3. Changed circumstances, because multiple property owners in the neighborhood have chickens and/or side-yard gardens. 4. Lack of notice, because Owner was unaware of the restrictions until he had made changes to his land.

1. Estoppel, because the neighbor waited until after Owner had made changes to his property before informing him of the restrictions.

Governor Stevens of Goodland and his colleagues Vern and Ted fly to Alaska to go caribou hunting, but find no caribou. On the fourth evening, Gov. Stevens breaks out a stash of single-malt scotch, and the men sit around camp drinking into the wee hours. Gov. Stevens is in no shape to hunt the next morning, so Vern and Ted head off without him. Vern picks up the trail of a caribou about 3 miles from camp, and carefully tracks the animal over the next 5 hours. Ted follows behind. When Vern finally sees the caribou, but before he can ready his gun, Ted takes aim and fires. The bullet strikes the animal in the hind quarters, but doesn't bring him down - the huge beast gallops away. After 3 more hours of searching, Ted and Vern return to camp, where they see Gov. Stevens busily cleaning the caribou (there is a bullet hole in the same place, indicating that it is the caribou that Ted shot). The Governor grins and tells them that he awoke to the sound of a caribou tramping through camp, and managed to grab his rifle and kill it. Each of Ted and Vern claim that the caribou rightfully belongs to him. Who has the best claim? 1. Gov. Stevens, because ownership vested with the capture of the animal. 2. Ted, because ownership vested with the wounding of the animal. 3. Vern, because he spent the most effort in obtaining the animal and should be rewarded for his diligence. 4. It is impossible to say; a court should split the value of the caribou 3 ways.

1. Gov. Stevens, because ownership vested with the capture of the animal.

Father conveyed Whiteacre "to Son for his life, and then to Daughter, if she has passed the bar by Son's death, for the duration of her life, and then to Grandson, if he has reached the age of 30." At the time of this conveyance, Daughter was 20 and Grandson was 12. Eighteen years later, at a family celebration of Grandson's 30th birthday, Grandson overheard his aunt (Daughter) mention to Father that she was finishing up her last year of law school. The next day, Grandson paid his father (Son) $50 to sell him all of his interest in Whiteacre. At this point, who holds what interests in Whiteacre? 1. Grandson now owns the property in fee simple absolute. 2. Grandson holds a life estate pur autre vie in the property as well as a vested remainder in fee simple absolute. 3. Grandson holds a life estate pur autre vie in the property, as well as a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute. 4. Grandson holds a vested remainder in fee simple absolute in the property.

1. Grandson now owns the property in fee simple absolute.

On May 29th, Tenant signed a lease to rent an apartment from Landlord with the term commencing on June 1, and Landlord gave Tenant the key to the apartment. When Tenant showed up with her belongings, ready to move in on June 1, she found X living in the apartment. X admitted that he was "technically homeless," but that he had broken in and has been living in the vacant apartment for one week. When Tenant asked him to leave, X told her that he'd rather not, because the apartment had two bedrooms and she should "share the wealth with people less fortunate." What legal rights does Tenant haave with respect to X's occupancy of the apartment? 1. In a majority of states, Landlord will be liable to Tenant for X's presence in the apartment. 2. In a majority of states, Landlord will not be liable to Tenant for X's presence in the apartment because X lacks privity with Landlord. 3. In a majority of states, X can only be removed if Tenant brings an action in ejectment and/or trespass. 4. In a majority of states, X's actual possession will trump the bare legal right to possess conveyed to Tenant.

1. In a majority of states, Landlord will be liable to Tenant for X's presence in the apartment.

Company signed a lease for office space on the ground floor of Landlord's office building. The lease term ends on December 31, 2017. In February 2015, Company assigned its leasehold to Law Firm. Two months after taking possession of the premises, Law Firm stopped paying rent and moved out, taking with it an expensive crystal chandelier that was hanging in the premises. What legal rights does Landlord have with respect to Law Firm's actions? 1. Landlord can sue Law Firm for unpaid rent and for waste, and the law firm's actions operate to terminate the lease 2. Landlord can sue for specific performance to regain the chandelier and reinstate occupancy by Law Firm 3. Landlord has no privity of estate with Law Firm, and thus must sue Company in lieu of bringing any action against Law Firm directly. 4. Landlord has no privity of contract with Law Firm, and thus has no right to receive rent from Law Firm

1. Landlord can sue Law Firm for unpaid rent and for waste, and the law firm's actions operate to terminate the lease

Q has an easement to cross over a path through the center of Lot 1 to access a public road. When the deed of easement was recorded, Lot 1 was undeveloped open space owned by R. Several years later, R wishes to develop Lot 1, and as part of that development wishes to relocate Q's right of way to a strip along the eastern border of Lot 1. Q does not consent to the relocation. Under the modern/emerging trend, can R relocate the easement over Q's objection? 1. Likely yes, as long as the relocation would create no adverse impact on Q. 2. Likely yes, as long as it was reasonably foreseeable that Lot 1 would be developed. 3. No, because easements may not be unilaterally relocated. 4. No, but the development of Lot 1 will operate to terminate the easement.

1. Likely yes, as long as the relocation would create no adverse impact on Q.

M and N were a cohabitating, unmarried couple, who purchased Grayacre to hold "as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship." When M and N decided to terminate their relationship, M moved out, leaving N in sole possession of Grayacre. N eventually married O. Twenty years later N died, leaving O "all my property" in her will. Who holds what interests in Grayacre after N's death? 1. M owns all of Grayacre because of survivorship. 2. M and O each hold half of Grayacre because of severance. 3. M and O each hold half of Grayacre because of partition. 4. O owns all of Grayacre because of adverse possession.

1. M owns all of Grayacre because of survivorship.

On January 1, 2000, L and T enter into a written agreement that provides for T to rent L's warehouse "for 99 years, provided that should Boyack Memorial Hospital be permanently closed prior to the expiration of the stated term, this lease shall terminate on the last day of the following month." The agreement provides for payment of rent annually, on January 1st of each calendar year. Boyack Memorial Hospital closes on October 15, 2016. T does not vacate the premises but remains in possession thereafter. On December 1, 2016, what is T's interest in the property? 1. T is a tenant at sufferance (a holdover tenant) because the lease terminated November 30, 2016. 2. T is a tenant in a term of years lease until December 31, 2098. 3. T has a year-to-year tenancy that will terminate December 31, 2017. 4. T never was a tenant, only a licensee, and the license may have ended by its terms.

1. T is a tenant at sufferance (a holdover tenant) because the lease terminated November 30, 2016.

Grantor conveyed Orangeacre "to A for life or until her son, B, reaches the age of 30, then to B for the remainder of his life, and then to his children." B died at age 25, leaving one child, C. A entered into a contract to have all the trees on Orangeacre cut and sold for timber. Does C have any grounds to object to A's contract to sell the timber on Orangeacre? 1. Yes, because C has a Vested Remainder. 2. Possibly, because C holds a Vested Remainder Subject to Open. 3. Probably not, because C has a Contingent Remainder. 4. No, because C has no interest in Orangeacre.

1. Yes, because C has a Vested Remainder.

Tenant signed a lease with Landlord for a two-year term. The lease was silent with respect to Tenant's ability to assign or sublease. After occupying the premises for one year, Tenant entered into an agreement with X whereby X would "take over the lease from Landlord to Tenant" for a six-month period. The agreement provided that X would pay rent to Tenant, who would then forward the rent to Landlord. After X has paid three monthly payments to Tenant, Landlord informs X that Landlord has received no rental payments because Tenant has failed to forward any monies to Landlord. Landlord has initiated a court action to terminate the tenancy and seek to evict X through judicial process. Will Landlord be successful? 1. Yes, because a landlord may terminate a tenancy and evict the occupant if the landlord is not paid rent. 2. Yes, because the occupancy by X was not sanctioned by the lease 3. No, because X has paid rent 4. No, because X is a subtenant, not an assignee

1. Yes, because a landlord may terminate a tenancy and evict the occupant if the landlord is not paid rent.

A and B were dating when they jointly bought Blackacre, each contributing half of the purchase price. One year later, however, A and B dissolved their personal relationship, and A moved out of Blackacre. B would like to terminate the co-tenancy, but A insists that B has no right to do so other than conveying his half-interest to A at "fair market value." B and A cannot, however, agree on what a "fair market" price for half of Blackacre would be. Can B end the co-tenancy? 1. Yes, because any unmarried co-tenant may obtain involuntary partition in court. 2. Yes, because A must accept a conveyance of B's half-interest for a price that a third-party appraiser sets as "fair." 3. Yes, but only through a judicially ordered sale of Blackacre. 4. No, because partition must be accomplished by voluntary exchange of mutual deeds among co-tenants. 5. No, because there has been no voluntary sale of Blackacre to a third party.

1. Yes, because any unmarried co-tenant may obtain involuntary partition in court.

Sylvia dropped her expensive watch in the locker room at the community pool. Tara found the watch on the floor, by the lockers. When Tara told Ulrich, the pool's manager, about finding the watch, Ulrich took possession of the watch "in case the owner returns looking for it." Several weeks later, Tara found out that Ulrich gave the watch to Vinnie, his son, for his 10th birthday. Tara sues to recover the watch. Will she succeed? 1. Yes, because of jus tertii. 2. Yes, because the watch was mislaid property. 3. No, because the watch was abandoned. 4. No, because Vinnie is a bona fide purchaser. 5. No, because Sylvia is the true owner.

1. Yes, because of jus tertii.

A owns Redacre, but is not living there. B moved onto Redacre. Six months later, B delivered a signed, notarized deed purporting to convey Redacre to C. When C arrived at Redacre the next day, she found that D had taken possession of the property. Can C remove D? 1. Yes, because of privity. 2. Yes, because C now owns the property per adverse possession. 3. No, because of possessor rights. 4. No, because she does not own the property per adverse possession.

1. Yes, because of privity.

In 1980, W bought a tract of undeveloped land surrounding a lovely mountain lake. Over the next two decades, he often brought his family to the property during the winter in order to go snowshoeing and cross-country skiing. During a summertime hike in 1999, S came upon the lake. S presumed that the land is owned by someone else, but decided to return there for several weeks in the summers of 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. In 2003, she built a small cabin by the lake. In 2002, W became ill and did not visit the property in the winter of 2003. W died in 2004, leaving his mountain property to his ten-year-old granddaughter V. In 2007, S sold "her cabin" to T, giving him a deed in exchange for $10,000. T spent every summer at the cabin between 2007 and 2015. V turned 18 in 2014. In 2015, while exploring her property for the first time, V discovers the cabin occupied by T. V asks T to leave, and T tells her that he's been there for years and he's not going anywhere. V brings an action in trespass, seeking an injunction. Can T successfully defend by claiming adverse possession, assuming a 10-year statutory period? 1. Yes, because of tacking. 2. Yes, because of color of title. 3. No, because of tolling. 4. No, because summer-only use cannot be considered continuous.

1. Yes, because of tacking.

Grantor conveyed Blackacre "to A for life, and then to B." At A's death, A's widow and sole heir continued to occupy Blackacre. Twenty years later, A's widow brings a quiet title action for Blackacre. Will she obtain clear title to the property? 1. Yes, because she has adversely possessed the property for the statutory period. 2. Yes, because she was the sole heir to A's property. 3. No, because A's estate ended at his death. 4. No, because her possession was not adverse.

1. Yes, because she has adversely possessed the property for the statutory period.

R moved into a condominium that has a declaration provision stating that "no smoking is allowed in the building." R is a smoker, but she is careful to smoke only in her unit, with the doors and windows closed, and she uses a smoke-less ashtray. Her neighbors have never complained of her smoking. Nevertheless, a visitor to her apartment noticed the cigarettes and reported her smoking to the Condominium Association. Will R face liability for smoking inside her own home? 1. Yes, because she violated a term of the declaration. 2. No, unless a court specifically finds that this sort of restriction is "reasonable." 3. No, because R owns her unit in fee simple absolute. 4. No, because no neighbor has complained of smelling smoke.

1. Yes, because she violated a term of the declaration.

Zsa Zsa drops her fur coat off at the Kaufman Center coat check before going to see an opera performance. When she returns, the coat checkers cannot find her coat anywhere. Zsa Zsa sues. Will she prevail? 1. Yes, because the coat checkers are strictly liable. 2. Yes, because the coat checker was negligent. 3. No, because there is no proof of negligence. 4. No, because there was no valid bailment. 5. No, because of assumption of risk.

1. Yes, because the coat checkers are strictly liable.

Landlord leased an empty space on the ground floor of Landlord's office building to Tenant for use as a convenience store. Tenant affixed shelves to the walls of the leased premises. Tenant failed to remove these shelves after vacating the premises at the end of the term. May Landlord claim ownership of the shelves? 1. Yes, because the shelves were trade fixtures that were not removed during the lease term. 2. Yes, because the shelves were trade fixtures and were not permitted to be removed by Tenant. 3. No, and Tenant will be liable for permissive waste for affixing the shelves to the walls of the premises. 4. No, because the shelves were not fixtures.

1. Yes, because the shelves were trade fixtures that were not removed during the lease term.

Grantor conveyed Brownacre "to E for life, and then to F." At age 80, E moved into an assisted living facility, leaving Brownacre vacant. G moved onto the property and lived there openly, telling neighbors that he purchased the property from E, although in fact that was untrue. G lived there until E's death 20 years later. A month after E's death, F brings a quiet title action for Brownacre. Will he obtain clear title to the property? 1. Yes, because there has been no adverse possession of F's interest. 2. Yes, because E's interest in Brownacre was inherited by F. 3. No, because G openly and notoriously continuously adversely possessed Brownacre for the statutory period. 4. No, G lacked color of title.

1. Yes, because there has been no adverse possession of F's interest.

Grantor gifted his property "To Grantee for her life, and then to her first child to marry, provided that if such child should later divorce, then to my then-surviving issue." Which of the following best describes the effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities to this gift? 1. If Grantee has a child when this gift is made, then this conveyance is valid under the Rule Against Perpetuities. 2. Because of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Grantor will take in fee simple absolute when Grantee dies. 3. Because of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Grantor retains a reversion and Grantee's first child to marry has a contingent remainder, both in fee simple absolute. 4. The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to this grant because the contingent future interest is held by the issue of the original grantor.

2. Because of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Grantor will take in fee simple absolute when Grantee dies.

Grantor conveyed Blackacre "to A for her life, and thereafter to B, but if B is ever convicted of perjury, then to C." During A's lifetime, A conveyed "all my interest in Blackacre" to D. A year later, a tax lien is put on the property for failure to pay real estate assessments. Do A or D face possible liability for failure to pay the taxes on Blackacre? 1. A is likely liable to B for permissive waste because A holds a life estate. 2. D is likely liable to B for permissive waste as long as A is still alive. 3. Either A or D would be liable to B for affirmative waste if they intentionally failed to pay taxes. 4. Neither A nor D is liable to B for waste because B's future interest is contingent.

2. D is likely liable to B for permissive waste as long as A is still alive.

A and B hold record title to contiguous lots (Lots 1 and 2 respectively), but both live in a city 2,000 miles away. C, a con artist, delivered a deed to D purporting to convey both of the lots to D. D moved into the house on Lot 1 and remained in residence there, openly. D told neighbors that he owned Lots 1 and 2, paid taxes on both lots, and brought trespass suits against some people who had been crossing the properties without authorization. After fifteen years, D brings a quiet title action. Assuming a statutory period for adverse possession of ten years, what is the likely result? 1. D owns both lots per color of title. 2. D owns Lot 1 due to actual possession. 3. In a jurisdiction requiring good faith, D would not acquire title because C did not own the property he purported to convey. 4. Because A and B live far away and lack actual knowledge of D's occupancy, the statutory period has not yet run against either of them.

2. D owns Lot 1 due to actual possession.

When Buyer bought her property, she noticed a distinct path running from a neighboring property, down a steep hill on her property, and then looping back to the neighboring parcel. She soon realized that the Neighbor's teenage children regularly rode their dirt bikes along that path. There is no recorded easement permitting the Neighbor to bike across Buyers' property. Buyer spoke with Neighbor who stated that the bike path had been in use "for at least 20 years," by Neighbor's family and by the family who had previously lived on Neighbor's property. Assuming this is true, can Buyer stop her neighbors from biking across her property? 1. Likely no, if the prior owner of the property gave the neighbor oral permission to bike across the property. 2. Likely no, if the prior owner of the property did not give the neighbor permission to bike across the property. 3. Likely yes, because whether or not permission was given to the neighbor in the past, the current owner can either use self help or obtain an injunction to stop people from biking across her property. 4. Likely yes, because whether or not permission was given for biking in the past, the current owner can obtain a permanent injunction to prevent further bike-riding across her land, even though she may not use self help to stop the biking in this case.

2. Likely no, if the prior owner of the property did not give the neighbor permission to bike across the property.

Q owns two adjoining lots and leases one of them to R and one of them to S. S hires a contractor to build a wall along the property line, but the contractor mistakenly sites the wall one inch over the boundary, onto the property leased by R. May R legally withhold rental payments to Q while this wall stands? 1. Yes, because there has been actual eviction and a trespass is a trespass no matter how small. 2. Maybe, but only if Q gave permission to S to build the wall. 3. Maybe, but only if S should have known that the wall encroached onto R's leased property. 4. No, because there was no intent to trespass. 5. No, because landlords are not responsible for trespasses by other people.

2. Maybe, but only if Q gave permission to S to build the wall.

Owner conveyed Silveracre "to Helping Hands Charity, but if it ever ceases to use the property as a homeless shelter, then to Rhapsody Regional Church." Thirty years after the conveyance, Helping Hands Charity closed its operations, transferring all of its property to Developer. Rhapsody Regional Church claims that it is the true titleholder of Silveracre and seeks a quiet title judgment to that effect. Applying modern law, will the Church be successful? 1. Yes, because the Church's possibility of reverter became possessory. automatically upon the Charity's failure to use the property as a homeless shelter. 2. Yes, because the Church's executory interest became possessory automatically upon the Charity's failure to use the property as a homeless shelter. 3. No, because the Church's future interest did not automatically become possessory upon the Charity's failure to use the property as a homeless shelter 4. No, because the Church's future interest was invalidated by the Rule Against Perpetuities.

2. Yes, because the Church's executory interest became possessory automatically upon the Charity's failure to use the property as a homeless shelter.

Tenant lived in apartment 2C in one of Landlord's mixed-use buildings. When Tenant moved in, the commercial space immediately below her was vacant, although the other portions of the first floor contained a wine store and a bank. Two weeks after Tenant moved in, a new commercial tenant moved into the vacant space on the first floor. The new tenant soon opened a "Smoking Lounge" in its commercial space below Tenant's apartment. This lounge is a private club that sells and permits on-site consumption of various tobacco products, including cigarettes, pipes and cigars. It operates from 6pm until midnight every night of the week. Tenant suffers from asthma, and the tobacco smoke seeping from her downstairs neighbor's space triggered more frequent attacks over the following few weeks. After leaving several voicemails for Landlord, with no response, Tenant packed up and moved out of the apartment. One month later, Landlord sued Tenant for unpaid rent, and Tenant raises constructive eviction as her defense. Will Tenant's defense likely be successful? 1. Yes, because the smoke constituted constructive eviction, which breached the implied warranty of habitability. 2. Yes, because the smoke constituted constructive eviction, which breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 3. No, because the landlord has done nothing that would have deprived a reasonable person of any tenant rights. 4. No, because a landlord cannot be held responsible for the legal actions of another tenant occurring outside the common areas.

2. Yes, because the smoke constituted constructive eviction, which breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

L agrees to rent an apartment to T for "as long as T wishes to stay," and T agrees to pay rent to L in a stated amount on the first of each month. After just two months, L notifies T, on March 31st, that T will have to move out by May 1st. Must T comply with L's request and vacate by May 1st? 1. Yes, because L remains the landowner and the landlord always has the right to exclude. 2. Yes, because this is a tenancy at will and L has given sufficient notice. 3. No, because this is a periodic lease and L has given insufficient notice. 4. No, because T was the only party who had the right to terminate the lease. L had no such right.

2. Yes, because this is a tenancy at will and L has given sufficient notice.

Maggie makes an inter vivos gift of Beigeacre to "my children Amy and Bryan for their lives, and afterwards to their children, Kylee, Anita, Larry, and Lorna as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, as long as they never use the property for commercial purposes, and if any of them ever uses the property for commercial purposes, then to my children as joint tenants with the right to survivorship." Maggie dies two months after making this gift. A decade after this gift, Maggie's only son, Larry, is distraught when he finds out that neither Amy nor Bryan is still living on the property and that neither has paid the property taxes on the property, and that there is now a tax lien on the property. Can Larry obtain title to the property to keep the tax lien from being foreclosed? 1. Yes, because Amy and Bryan have committed affirmative waste. 2. Yes, because Amy and Bryan's interest was defeased when they ceased to live on the property. 3. No, although Larry can obtain other legal and equitable remedies. 4. No, because Larry's interest in the property is contingent. 5. No, because only Amy and Bryan's children have standing to sue for waste. 6. No, because Larry's interest was held in joint tenancy. 7. No, because Larry has no interest in the property because of the Rule Against Perpetuities.

3. No, although Larry can obtain other legal and equitable remedies.

A and B owned adjacent lots. A paid B $1,000 to sign an agreement promising that B's lot will be "restricted to residential uses." A recorded the agreement in the land records. Six months later, B sold his lot to C, who proceeded to build a gas station on the property. Can A sue C for damages from violating the residential use restriction? 1. Yes, because the real covenant runs with B's land because it was recorded and touches and concerns the land. 2. Yes, because A and B were in instantaneous privity when the covenant was signed. 3. No, because although A may be able to equitably enforce the promise, A did not create a real covenant that runs with B's land. 4. No, because a residential use restriction does not touch and concern the land.

3. No, because although A may be able to equitably enforce the promise, A did not create a real covenant that runs with B's land.

Y leased half of Z's duplex for a three-year term. Before the end of the first year, Y decided to go to school in another state. Y's older brother, X, a wealthy partner in a local law firm, recently divorced and is happy to take over her lease for the last two years. The lease provides that "Tenant shall obtain Landlord's consent prior to any assignment to be given or withheld in Landlord's sole discretion." When Y approached Z to obtain consent to assign the lease to X, however, Z flatly refuses. Since X has a better and more stable income than Y, Y suspects that the true reason for Z's refusal of the assignment is that the rental rates have increased and she is paying slightly "below market." Y gives the keys to her brother and writes Z a letter that says "I'm moving across the country and my brother, X, has the key. He's the new tenant, so deal with him." Must Z accept Y's brother, X, as the new tenant? 1. Yes, because landlords must always act reasonably in withholding consent to assign 2. Yes, because public policy mandates free alienability of a leasehold interest 3. No, because the landlord did not consent to the proffered substitution of tenant 4. No, because Z is a subtenant, not an assignee

3. No, because the landlord did not consent to the proffered substitution of tenant

Tenant signed a lease with Landlord for a two-year term. The lease was silent with respect to Tenant's ability to assign or sublease. After occupying the premises for one year, Tenant entered into an agreement with Q whereby Q would "take over the lease from Landlord to Tenant" for the remainder of the term at a monthly rental amount that is $200 more than the amount payable under the lease between Landlord and Tenant. The agreement provided that Q would pay the monthly amount to Tenant, who would then forward the amount required under Landlord and Tenant's lease to Landlord. Upon learning of this arrangement, Landlord wishes to preclude the occupancy by Q unless and until the additional rental amount is paid to Landlord (not kept by Tenant). Will Landlord be successful? 1. Yes, because landlords retain the right to all rents payable with respect to the property 2. Yes, because landlords have the right to give or withhold consent to assignments and subleases 3. No, because the lease fails to address the issue of transfer 4. No, because Q is a subtenant, not an assignee

3. No, because the lease fails to address the issue of transfer

X owned two parcels of property, Lots 1 and 2. Lot 2 abuts a public road, and Lot 1 does not. X conveyed Lot 2 to Y by recorded deed, reserving "the right to access the public road across a thirty-foot strip along the western boundary of Lot 2." X built and maintained a gravel road across the thirty-foot strip along the western boundary of Lot 2 which it used to access a his small home on Lot 1. Ten years after the conveyance to Y, X conveyed Lot 1 to Developer who subdivided Lot 1 into 100 single-family building lots. Developer plans on paving the gravel road along the western boundary of Lot 2 and having all the purchasers of those 100 lots use that road to access their property. Can Y enjoin this use of the 30-foot strip of Lot 2? 1. Yes, the proposed use by 100 homeowners is a per se misuse of the easement 2. Yes, the easement over Lot 2 did not run with the land 3. No, if it was reasonably foreseeable that Lot 1 could be subdivided 4. No, but Developer has no right to pave the road over Lot 2

3. No, if it was reasonably foreseeable that Lot 1 could be subdivided

Grantor conveyed Yellowacre to a husband and wife, A and B. The recorded deed's conveyancing and habendum clause merely read, "To A and B, a married couple." A conveyed all his interest in Yellowacre to Friend in exchange for $100,000. Shortly thereafter, A died. Friend claims to be the owner of one-half interest in Yellowacre. Will Friend prevail? 1. Yes, because Friend was a bona fide purchaser. 2. Yes, because the joint tenancy was severed by the sale to Friend. 3. No, in states that still permit property to be held as tenants by the entirety. 4. No, because joint tenancies cannot be unilaterally severed.

3. No, in states that still permit property to be held as tenants by the entirety.

S tells her sister, T, that she may live in her home for "as long as you like" if she pays $300 a month in rent to S. S and T sign a form lease that S finds on the internet, and in the blank labeled "commencement date," S wrote "September 1, 2012." In the blank labeled "expiration date," S wrote "T's choice." What interest does T have in the property? 1. T has a license, not a lease. 2. T has a life estate, not a lease. 3. T has a month-to-month lease. 4. T has a perpetual lease. 5. T has a term of years.

3. T has a month-to-month lease.

Tenant signed an agreement to lease an apartment in Landlord's multi-family building "from year to year, commencing with January 1, 2010." On November 1, 2015, Landlord informs Tenant in writing that the lease will terminate on December 31, 2015 because Landlord will be converting the building to a condominium. When, if at all, will Tenant's lease terminate? 1. Tenant's lease will terminate on December 31, 2015 because Landlord has notified tenant of the termination in writing with adequate notice. 2. Tenant's lease will terminate on March 31, 2016 because year-to-year tenants are guaranteed six months' notice of termination. 3. Tenant's lease will terminate on December 31, 2016 because the lease will automatically renew for a year on January 1, 2016. 4. Tenant's lease will not terminate based on this notice because a landlord may not terminate periodic tenancies in order to convert a building into a condominium.

3. Tenant's lease will terminate on December 31, 2016 because the lease will automatically renew for a year on January 1, 2016.

S and T owned and lived on two contiguous lots (Lots 1 and 2 respectively). S built a fence along what she believes to be the boundary of Lot 1 and 2, but mistakenly located the fence five feet over the boundary line on Lot 2. Eight year after building the fence, S sold the property to U, and that same year, T died, leaving his property to V. U mowed and maintained the property on "her" side of the fence for another three years before U and V both discovered from an updated survey that the fence is actually located five feet away from the boundary, encroaching onto Lot 2. V brings an action to have the fence removed, and U claims that she has acquired title to the five-foot strip of land on "her" side of the fence. Assuming a ten-year statutory period for adverse possession, will V or U win title to the five-foot strip? 1. V will win title to the strip, because there has been no actual acquiescence to a new boundary and the precise location of the actual boundary was not apparent. 2. V will win title to the strip, because U has only possessed the strip of land for three years. 3. U will win title to the strip, because the possession was "open and notorious." 4. U will win title to the strip, because she did not build the fence.

3. U will win title to the strip, because the possession was "open and notorious."

S was five years old in 1990 when T moved into an empty home on Blackacre, owned by S. In 2000, S, now age 15, became legally insane and was institutionalized. In 2011, S, still institutionalized, died, leaving U as his heir. The same year, T also died, leaving V as her heir. Four years later, V institutes a quiet title action for Blackacre. Assuming the statute of limitations for ejectment is 10 years in this jurisdiction, who most likely owns Blackacre and why? 1. U owns the property because V has only possessed the property for four years. 2. U owns the property because of tolling. 3. V owns the property because of tacking. 4. V owns the property because T had already acquired title prior to her death.

3. V owns the property because of tacking.

Brother and Sister purchased Blueacre together, with Brother contributing 90% of the purchase price and Sister contributing 10%, and they agreed that they would hold interests in that same proportion. Two years after buying Blueacre, Brother married a widow with four children, and all five of his new family members moved into the house on Blueacre. Sister decided to give Brother and his new family some space, so she moved in with a friend who lived nearby. One year after she moved out, Sister received a bill from Brother for 10% of the amount that he had paid in scheduled mortgage and assessed real estate taxes for Blueacre. Is Sister required to pay these costs? 1. Yes, because Sister remains a co-owner of Blueacre. 2. No, because there has been no ouster. 3. Yes in part. Sister needs only pay those costs that exceed 10% of the fair rental value of Blueacre for the past year. 4. No, because Sister was constructively ousted by Brother's use of Blueacre. 5. No, because the co-tenancy was severed when Sister moved out.

3. Yes in part. Sister needs only pay those costs that exceed 10% of the fair rental value of Blueacre for the past year.

Buyer moved into "Nice View Estates" two years ago, when the subdivision was almost completely built out. Although he noticed at the time that the homes seemed to have a uniform feel about them (all had non-enclosed front patios, attached one-car garages, and were one-story "rambler" style homes), neither Buyer's deed nor his title report for the property showed any specific restrictive covenant with respect to his lot. Last month, Buyer hired a contractor to remodel his home by adding a second story, which would nearly double the square footage of his home. After contractor obtained the appropriate permits from the county and started construction, some neighbors brought a suit to enjoin the project. Apparently, in the case of every lot in Nice View Estates except Buyer's lot, the deed from the developer included a deed covenant limiting the height of homes to one floor, and the developer of the subdivision had specifically told all the initial buyers (except Owner, it seems) that the entire subdivision would consist of single-story homes. Is it possible that Owner's home improvements may be lawfully enjoined? 1. Yes, because of the Conservation Easement doctrine. 2. Yes, because of the Average Reciprocity of Advantage doctrine. 3. Yes, because of the Implied Negative Reciprocal Servitude doctrine. 4. No, because Owner had no actual notice of the restrictions in the community.

3. Yes, because of the Implied Negative Reciprocal Servitude doctrine.

X and Y are neighbors. X starts taking bagpipe lessons, and for at least an hour every evening, the sounds of X's novice attempts at bag-piping resonate loudly through the neighborhood - so loudly that the glass shakes in Y's home and Y can "barely hear herself think." Y has asked X to cease playing the bagpipes, but X refuses. X assures Y that "it will sound a lot better in a few months," once he "gets the hang of it." Can Y do anything to stop X's bagpiping? 1. Yes, if Y has an appurtenant easement over X's property. 2. Yes, if Y has a negative easement over X's property 3. Yes, if the adverse impact of X's behavior outweighs the benefit of X learning to play the bagpipes. 4. No, if X's property and Y's property are part of a common interest community. 5. No, because X and Y lack horizontal privity. 6. No, because there is no public nuisance.

3. Yes, if the adverse impact of X's behavior outweighs the benefit of X learning to play the bagpipes.

In exchange for $200,000, X delivered a deed for a ten-acre parcel to Y. Y immediately recorded the deed and established residence on a home located on one acre of the property. The rest of the property was unimproved, and Y did nothing to improve or maintain the remaining 9 acres. Twenty years later, it is determined that Z is actually the true record owner of the property, and Z brings a quiet title action. Assuming a ten-year statutory period for adverse possession, what is the most likely result? 1. Z will obtain clear title because Z is the true record owner, and nemo dat quod non habet. 2. Z will obtain clear title to all but the one-acre area Y actually possesses, and Y will be granted title to that parcel. 3. Z will lose title, and Y will be granted title, to the entire ten-acre parcel because of color of title. 4. Z will lose title to the entire ten-acre parcel if Y knew or had reason to know that the deed from X was invalid.

3. Z will lose title, and Y will be granted title, to the entire ten-acre parcel because of color of title.

A and B both live along River, with A living upstream from B. A began farming his property and diverted approximately 20% of the water from River to irrigate his crops. B objected to A's use of the water from River because B operates a mill on River and the volume of water flowing through the mill has decreased due to A's irrigation. Under what doctrine(s) can B prevent A's diversion of the River's water for irrigation use? 1. Under the natural flow doctrine, because irrigation is considered an "artificial use." 2. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, because B's mill was built before A began farming. 3. Under the reasonable use doctrine, because it is unreasonable to use 20% of a river's waters for irrigation. 4. Both 1 and 2. 5. All of the above.

4. Both 1 and 2.

E and F orally agreed that F will rent "one of the rooms in E's house" for "fair market rent" for a period of "six months commencing January 1." Why would this lease be invalid or unenforceable? 1. This oral lease is invalid because it fails to describe the premises. 2. This oral lease is invalid because it fails to set rent. 3. This oral lease is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. 4. Both A and B. 5. All of the above.

4. Both A and B.

Grantor conveyed Redacre "to A for so long the property is not sold." What interest in Redacre does A have? 1. Fee Simple Determinable 2. Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent 3. Fee Simple Subject to Executory Limitation 4. Fee Simple Absolute

4. Fee Simple Absolute

C and D were next-door neighbors who both loved to celebrate Christmas with outdoor lighting displays. C agreed to purchase lights for both of their lots and to install a huge joint-display each December (including Santa on a sleigh with galloping reindeer, Frosty the Snowman, a nativity scene, Victorian-era carolers, etc.). C promised to install the display by December 1st and to take it down on January 10th each year, and to run all the electricity through her home. D agreed to pay C half of her out-of-pocket costs for lights and electricity. The two drafted and recorded a "Declaration of Covenants" to this effect. Several years later, D moved away, conveying her land to A. A does not celebrate Christmas and does not want any part of C's holiday light display plans, but C argues that he is bound by the recorded Declaration to allow her to put up the display on both yards and to pay for half of the costs. What is A's best defense to this claim? 1. An agreement to pay money does not touch and concern the land. 2. The agreement did not run with the land because A lacked notice of it. 3. This agreement created an easement in gross, not an appurtenant easement. 4. It would violate public policy to enforce this agreement against A.

4. It would violate public policy to enforce this agreement against A.

L, a owner of a small 6-unit apartment building, advertised two of the units for rent. He had two applicants the day after he ran the ad seeking tenants. One was S, a young, single woman who owns a small dog. The other was T, a Hispanic man, mid 30s, who wears glasses. L decided not to rent to either of them. He asserts that the reason he rejected S was that he knows dogs make way too much noise and "can cause an apartment to stink." He claims the reason he rejected T was because he "can't trust people who wear glasses." Unless a plaintiff can prove that L was lying with respect to his subjective motives, which of the following statements are true? 1. L violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent to someone with a pet 2. L violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent to someone who is Hispanic and L violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent 3. L likely acted unreasonably with respect to S, probably violating state law 4. L likely acted unreasonably with respect to T, probably violating state law

4. L likely acted unreasonably with respect to T, probably violating state law

N died at age 98, leaving his home "to my darling wife, O, for the remainder of her life, and then to her last child to reach the age of 30." At N's death, O was 95 and has one child, age 62. After O's death the following year, what is the state of the title for the property? 1. O's 63-year-old child holds in life estate. 2. O's 63-year-old child holds in fee simple absolute. 3. O's heirs hold in fee simple absolute. 4. N's heirs hold in fee simple absolute.

4. N's heirs hold in fee simple absolute.

In September, E's neighbor, F, verbally promised that she would cut down the monstrously large and mostly dead tree located on her property "by March 1st at the very latest." This tree abuts the border between E and F's lot and blocks sunlight to a significant portion of E's yard. Although E is an avid gardener, she was not ever able to get much to grow in the shade of this tree. After F promised to take down the tree, E spent many afternoons planting tulip bulbs in a garden she created on her lot in the shade of the tree. E was looking forward to finally having some sun to grow flowers in that spot during the coming spring. Now, however, it is March 15th, and F still has not taken out her tree. E knows that her tulips will never bloom without adequate sunlight. Although E asked F last week to please make good on her promise to take out the tree, F has refused. E wants to sue to force F to take out the tree. Will she likely succeed? 1. Yes, because E can specifically enforce her negative easement rights to light 2. Yes, because F specifically covenanted to remove the tree, and tree removal touches and concerns the land 3. No, because F's promise was a license, and licenses are revocable at will 4. No, because E cannot obtain an oral negative easement

4. No, because E cannot obtain an oral negative easement

The Board of Directors of Homeowners' Association recently voted to prohibit members and family and guests of members from use of the community pool area between 9pm and 9am. This resolution was in response to the frequent complaints of a 65-year old neighbor who happens to live next to the pool. This neighbor objected to teenagers "hanging out" in the pool area at night. Owner, a thirty-year-old member of the community, works long hours and is never home until after 9pm. In the past several summers, he has enjoyed spending serene post-work moments sitting peaceably by the pool. Owner is enraged that this resolution purports to stop his enjoyment of the common area - area that he "pays good money" to enjoy, and otherwise has no time to use. If Owner sues for a declaratory judgment that the rule prohibiting peaceful nighttime use of the pool is void for unreasonableness, will he succeed? 1. Yes, if Owner can prove that he voted against this rule. 2. Yes, if Owner can prove that the Board of Directors did not follow the procedures set forth in the bylaws in passing this rule. 3. No, but Owner will not have to pay whatever portion of the assessments are applied to pool maintenance if he legitimately can no longer use the pool during the new hours. 4. No, because Owner bought his home subject to the homeowner association covenants, conditions and restrictions, and therefore he has no right to challenge rulemakings of the Board of Directors.

2. Yes, if Owner can prove that the Board of Directors did not follow the procedures set forth in the bylaws in passing this rule.

Property owners X, Y and Z each own farms located above an underground aquifer. The aquifer is considered "percolating," rather than flowing in a permanent channel. X builds a water park and extracts over 90% of the water from the aquifer for use in the park. Can Y and Z enjoin this use of the water from the aquifer? 1. Yes, if the state has adopted the rule of capture approach to underground water. 2. Yes, if the state has adopted the correlative rights approach to underground water. 3. No, if the state has adopted the reasonable use approach to underground water. 4. No, if the state has adopted the common enemy approach to underground water.

2. Yes, if the state has adopted the correlative rights approach to underground water.

Randy and Melissa were married only one year before Randy died, leaving Melissa pregnant and devastated. Randy never changed his will, and the will left all his property "to my children, Andrew and Lyle." Can Melissa obtain a portion of Randy's estate? 1. Yes, if they lived in a community property state. 2. Yes, if they lived in a non-community property state. 3. Yes, because intestacy statutes in every state specify at least a portion of an estate goes to a surviving spouse. 4. No, unless she can prove that the will is invalid (forgery, not witnessed, etc.) 5. No, because they were only married a year. 6. No, unless her child is later born alive.

2. Yes, if they lived in a non-community property state.

Grantor conveyed Blueacre "to Brother for life, then to my grandchildren who attain the age of 18." At the time of the grant, the Grantor is 60 and his one child is 25 and his only grandchild, A, is 2 months old. At the time of Brother's death, Grantor has two grandchildren: A (age 20) and B (age 10). Five years thereafter, Grantor's third grandchild, C, is born. At this point, Grantor's grandchildren are A, age 25, B, age 15, and C, a newborn. Assuming this jurisdiction has abolished the doctrine of destructibility, who now holds what interest in Blueacre? 1. A, B, and C each have vested remainders subject to open. 2. A has a fee simple, and B and C each have an executory interest. 3. A has a fee simple, B has an executory interest, and C has no interest. 4. A has a fee simple, and B and C each have a contingent remainder. 5. A has a fee simple absolute, and B and C have no interest.

3. A has a fee simple, B has an executory interest, and C has no interest.

Grantor conveyed Blackacre "to Church, but if the property is ever used for non-church purposes, then to P." One year after this conveyance, Church leased the property to R for use as a restaurant. After the restaurant opens on Blackacre, who holds what interests in Blackacre? 1. P owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, and R is a mere trespasser. 2. P owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, subject to R's lease. 3. Church owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, subject to R's lease. 4. Church owns Blackacre in fee simple subject to executory limitation, subject to R's lease, and P holds an executory interest in fee simple absolute. 5. Grantor owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute because her Right of Entry has become possessory.

3. Church owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, subject to R's lease.

Tenant entered into a one-year lease of Landlord's apartment commencing September 1. Several months later, Tenant accepted a summer job in another city starting at the end of May, so she asked Friend if she would move in on June 1st and pay rent for the months of June, July, and August. Friend agreed. The lease had a provision that "tenant shall not sublet without landlord's consent, given or withheld in landlord's sole discretion." Tenant did not talk to Landlord about Friend moving in, and when Friend sent Landlord rent on June 1st, Landlord returned the rent to Friend and told her that she would have to move out. He then sent Tenant a letter stating that she had breached the lease. Has Tenant breached the lease? 1. Yes, because Tenant has violated an express lease provision. 2. Yes, unless Landlord's failure to approve Friend's residency was unreasonable. 3. No, because the lease contained an unlawful restraint on alienation. 4. No, because Friend was not a subtenant.

4. No, because Friend was not a subtenant.

F owned two adjacent lots, called Lot 1 and Lot 2. F built a home and a man-made fishing pond on Lot 1. He then sold Lot 2 to E. The recorded deed to E stated that he was conveying "Lot 2 of XYZ Subdivision, together with a strip of land between Lot 2 and the pond on Lot 1 and the right to use the pond for fishing." E did not like to fish and never used the pond while she lived on the property, but after she sold the property to D, she took a fishing class and decided that she actually loved fishing and wanted to take advantage of the pond. The deed from E to D merely conveyed "Lot 2" and said nothing about a strip of land to the pond or rights to fish in the pond. Who has what rights to the strip of land from Lot 2 to the pond on Lot 1 and the right to fish in the pond? 1. E has fee simple title over a strip of land together with an appurtenant easement to fish in the pond. 2. E has an easement in gross allowing her to access the strip of land and to fish in the pond 3. D has an appurtenant easement allowing her to access the strip of land to fish in the pond 4. Neither E nor D has the right to access the strip of land and to fish in the pond

3. D has an appurtenant easement allowing her to access the strip of land to fish in the pond

C and D were husband and wife. C and his brother, B, owned Beigeacre in a joint tenancy. B conveyed his interest in Beigeacre to his sister-in-law, D. Thereafter, C died leaving all of his property to the Red Cross. What is the state of the title? 1. D holds 100% of Beigeacre in fee simple absolute. 2. D and the Red Cross each hold 50% of Beigeacre as tenants in common. 3. D holds 50% of Beigeacre, and Red Cross holds 50% of Beigeacre subject to any elective spousal share of D. 4. B holds 100% of Beigeacre in fee simple absolute.

3. D holds 50% of Beigeacre, and Red Cross holds 50% of Beigeacre subject to any elective spousal share of D.

Barak devised his property, Whiteacre, to "Donald and Hillary, jointly and not as tenants in common, until either of them is sworn is as President of the United States, and thereafter to Jill for her life." Who holds what interests in Whiteacre? 1. Donald and Hillary hold a life estate as tenants in common, Jill holds a vested remainder in life estate, and Barak holds a reversion in fee simple absolute. 2. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple subject to an executory limitation as tenants in common, Jill holds an executory interest in life estate, and Barak holds a reversion in fee simple absolute. 3. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple subject to an executory limitation as joint tenants, Jill holds an executory interest in life estate, and Barak holds a reversion in fee simple absolute. 4. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple subject to an executory limitation as joint tenants, Jill holds an executory interest in fee simple absolute, and Barak retains no interest because this is a "devise" and therefore we know that that he is dead. 5. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple absolute as joint tenants. 6. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple absolute as tenants in common. 7. If Donald and Hillary are married, they hold a life estate as tenants by the entirety, with Jill holding the remainder.

3. Donald and Hillary hold a fee simple subject to an executory limitation as joint tenants, Jill holds an executory interest in life estate, and Barak holds a reversion in fee simple absolute.

Drug Store signs a lease, as a tenant, in a shopping center. The lease explicitly states that "the Premises will be used as a drug store, and that landlord will not permit any other drug store to operate in the shopping center." One month after entering into the lease with Drug Store, the landlord signs a lease with Grocery Store for space in the shopping center. Grocery Store has an in-store prescription drug counter. Drug Store seeks to terminate the lease because Grocery Store will compete with their customer base and frustrate their business plan. May Drug Store terminate the lease without incurring liability to the landlord? 1. Yes, because Landlord's breach of the restrictive covenant by leasing to Grocery Store amounts to a constructive eviction 2. Yes, because Landlord's breach of the restrictive covenant is a material breach justifying Drug Store's termination 3. No, because even though Drug Store can obtain an injunction to keep Grocery Store from operating in the shopping center, it cannot 4. No, because Landlord has likely not breached the restrictive covenant by leasing to Grocery Store 5. No, but Drug Store may assign its leasehold to any other commercial entity in order to avoid the commercially unreasonable situation of having to run an unprofitable enterprise

4. No, because Landlord has likely not breached the restrictive covenant by leasing to Grocery Store

Q's brother owned 100 acres of land and told Q that she was "welcome to come and live on one of the acres." Q moved to the property, fenced in one acre, built a house, moved in and planted an orchard. Q lived there for 11 years. Then, Q's brother died. Q's brother's heir, (Q's nephew) then brought an action of ejectment to remove Q from the property. Assuming a ten-year statutory period for adverse possession, will Q be able to successfully defend this ejectment action? 1. Yes, because Q has occupied that acre for the statutory period. 2. Yes, because of tacking. 3. No, because Q's brother may have been unaware of Q's occupancy. 4. No, because Q's brother never intended to convey the acre to Q.

4. No, because Q's brother never intended to convey the acre to Q.

Doctor bought a parcel of commercial property, converted it to office space, and started doing dental reconstructive surgery there. Unfortunately, a blacksmith forge operated next to Doctor's new office, and the hammering and smells associated with blacksmithing significantly bothered Doctor's patients and interfered with Doctor's ability to perform precise and careful oral surgery. Can Doctor get a court to enjoin the blacksmith operation next door? 1. Yes, because a blacksmith forge is a nuisance per se. 2. Yes, as long as he pays the blacksmith a judicially determined amount to relocate. 3. No, because he "came to the nuisance." 4. No, because even if the blacksmith forge is a private nuisance, he may be forced to accept damages rather than obtain an injunction.

4. No, because even if the blacksmith forge is a private nuisance, he may be forced to accept damages rather than obtain an injunction.

Grantor conveyed Whiteacre "to C, but if C ever divorces, then her estate shall end." C divorced in 2004, but continued to reside on Whiteacre. Twelve years later years later, C brings a quiet title action for Whiteacre. Will she obtain clear title to the property? 1. Yes, because she has adversely possessed the property for the statutory period. 2. Yes, because the defeasing condition in the grant was void as against public policy. 3. No, because C's rights to the property terminated upon her divorce. 4. No, because her possession was not adverse.

4. No, because her possession was not adverse.

P leases farmland from Q. P harvested and sold apples that grew on trees located on the leased farmland. Q claims the right to share in the profits from the sale of apples. Will the Q be able to obtain at least some portion of the profits from the sale of apples? 1. Yes, because fructus naturales are considered part of the land and thus are owned by Q. 2. Yes, because apples are movable, tangible personal property, governed by the state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2. 3. Yes, because apples are fixtures under the meaning of the state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9. 4. No, because tenants obtain usufructuary rights to leased property.

4. No, because tenants obtain usufructuary rights to leased property.

Homeowner built a beautiful home on his 10-acre wooded property, straddling a waterfall and extending several levels down the slope of a hill. Homeowner built the home just 5 feet away from his property's boundary with another 10-acre parcel, because that was where the waterfall was located. At the time Homeowner built the home, this neighboring 10-acre parcel was undeveloped woodland, but twenty-five years later, the neighboring owner sold the undeveloped property to Developer. Developer obtained rezoning and subdivision approval for the property to be developed as 30 homes. This plan would involve removing most of the trees and constructing four homes within 20 feet of Homeowner's elaborate home. The development as planned would substantially change the setting in which Homeowner's home is situated and will diminish Homeowner's property values. Can Homeowner stop the planned development of the neighboring parcel? 1. Yes, because Homeowner has obtained a negative easement over the neighboring parcel and the planned development would limit his easement rights. 2. Yes, because Homeowner's house was located on the property before the planned development, and the planned development would adversely affect his parcel's value. 3. Yes, because cutting down trees in a wooded area lacks utility and will be able to be enjoined as a nuisance. 4. No, because the planned development violates no servitude and is likely not a nuisance.

4. No, because the planned development violates no servitude and is likely not a nuisance.

When X bought a condominiumunit in Happy Halls Condo for $60,000, the deed to X from the developer contained a reservation of a right of first refusal to buy the property for $65,000 if X offered the property for sale during the first two years of ownership. The developer transferredthis right of first refusal to Happy Halls Condo Association one year after X's purchase. Nine months after that, X listed her condominium unit for sale. The market price for condominium units in the vicinity had increased dramatically in the 21 months since X had bought the unit, and X had listed the property for sale for $90,000. The Happy Halls Condo Association informed X that it was exercising the right of first refusal and would be acquiring her unit for $65,000. Can the Association legally compel X to sell the unit to the association for $65,000? 1. Yes, because this property right was reserved in the deed to X. 2. Yes, because $65,000 is a higher price than the amount that X paid for the property. 3. Yes, because the right of first refusal in question only lasted 2 years, well within the 21-year RAP period applicable to entities. 4. No, because the right of first refusal price is below market. 5. No, because the right of first refusal was retained by the developer and was non-transferable. 6. No, because of the Rule Against Perpetutities

4. No, because the right of first refusal price is below market.

Testator devised Whiteacre "to my widow for life, then to our grandchildren, but if the property is thereafter used as a place of gambling, then title shall revert to my estate." At his death, Testator had one grandchild who was one year old. Testator's widow survived her husband for five years before her death. Testator's only grandchild sold Whiteacre to a developer who opened a convenience store on the premises. The store sells lottery tickets. Assuming that the sale of lottery tickets would be found to render the convenience store a "place of gambling," will the developer lose title to Whiteacre by selling lottery tickets? 1. Yes, because the defeasible condition would have been met. 2. Yes, because Testator's heirs hold a reversionary interest. 3. No, because the rule against perpetuities invalidates the future interest. 4. No, because there is no automatic reversion in this case.

4. No, because there is no automatic reversion in this case.

In 2000, Testator conveyed Tealacre, "to Andrew for his life, and then to Beryl's then-alive children for their lives, and then to their surviving spouses, if any." Testator left all of his remaining property "to the Red Cross." In 2001, Beryl died, leaving two children, Charlie and Dawn.Beryl's will left all her property to her boyfriend, Jim. In 2008, Charlie died. Charlie's will left all his property to his girlfriend, Kim. In 2009, Andrew died. Andrew's will left all his property to his widow. In 2015, Dawn died, leaving her husband, Edward a widow. Dawn's will left half her property to Edward and half to the Red Cross. In 2016, who holds what interests in Tealacre? 1. Edward holds Tealacre in fee simple absolute. 2. Edward and the Red Cross each hold a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre. 3. Andrew's widow holds a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre. 4. Kim and Edward each hold a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre. 5. Jim holds a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre. 6. The Red Cross holds a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre. 7. The interest in Tealacre is still contingent and therefore void. 8. The interest in Tealacre is still contingent, but if USRAP applies, the contingent interest remains valid until 2090.

6. The Red Cross holds a fee simple absolute interest in Tealacre.

Gordon Ross devises Blackacre "to Dwight for life, and then to those of his children who pass the state's bar exam." Fifty years later, Dwight died at the age of 98. Dwight had two children, Susannah and Caleb. Susannah, a 60-year-old lawyer at her father's death, had passed the state's bar decades earlier. Caleb was a 55-year-old elementary school teacher when his father died with no intention of ever going to law school or taking the bar. At Dwight's death, who holds what interests in Blackacre? 1. Susannah and Caleb hold a contingent remainder as tenants in common in fee simple absolute. 2. Susannah and Caleb hold a contingent remainder as joint tenants in fee simple absolute. 3. Susannah and Caleb hold an executory interest as tenants in common in fee simple absolute. 4. Susannah holds fee simple title that she may eventually be forced to share with Caleb. Caleb has an executory interest. If Caleb's executory interest ever becomes possessory, he and Susannah will hold Blackacre as tenants in common. 5. Susannah holds fee simple absolute title. Caleb has no interest. 6. The property now belongs to Gordon Ross's estate.

6. The property now belongs to Gordon Ross's estate.

L owned four lots - each one a quarter of a large rectangle. (You may want to diagram this.) Going clockwise from the northwest corner of the rectangle, the lots are numbered 1, 2, 4, and 3. Lots 1 and 3 (1 north of 3) are bounded on the west by the highway, and Lots 2 and 4 (2 north of 4, and 2 directly east of 1, and 4 directly east of 3) are bounded on the east by a large lake. L had a home on Lot 2, near the lake, and used a dirt path across Lot 1 (just north of the border with Lot 3) to reach her home on Lot 2. L conveyed Lots 1 and 3 to M, and M constructed a house on Lot 1 and moved in. The deed from L to M expressly provided that "the grantor retains a right of way across the northern thirty feet of Lot 3 to access Lot 2 and 4." This deed was not recorded. Notwithstanding the provision in the deed to M, L continued to use a dirt path across the southern part of Lot 1 to access the highway. There is no obvious path across Lot 3, and L and never crossed over Lot 3. Three years later, L conveyed Lot 4 to N in a deed that contains no reservation of easement. N has no actual knowledge of the deed to M. After the conveyances described above, what right, if any, does N have to cross Lot 1 and/or Lot 3? 1. N has no right to cross either lot because N has access to Lot 4 via the lake. 2. N has an express easement to cross Lot 3. 3. N has an implied easement to cross Lot 1. 4. Any express easement to cross Lot 3 did not run to N because the deed containing it was not recorded, but N has an easement by necessity to cross Lot 3. 5. Any express easement to cross Lot 3 was extinguished by non-use, but N has an easement by implication to cross Lot 3.

2. N has an express easement to cross Lot 3.

Oliver purchased a set of collectible coins from the bank. On the way home, he stopped for lunch and the coin set fell out of his bag under the booth where he sat. Amy, the waitress, finds the coin set while clearing the table. Mr. Brown, the owner of the restaurant, tells her to hand the coins over to him, but Amy refuses, asserting that she is the finder, so she will keep them. Mr. Brown forcefully takes the coin set from Amy. Does Amy have the legal right to get the coins back? 1. No, because the coins belong to Oliver, not Amy. 2. No, because Amy found them as an agent for Mr. Brown. 3. Yes, because Amy was the first finder, and first finders have rights over everyone but the true owner. 4. Yes, because coins are treasure, and per the doctrine of treasure trove, the finder has superior rights. 5. Yes, the coins were lost, not mislaid, so Amy's rights are superior to the owner of the locus in quo.

2. No, because Amy found them as an agent for Mr. Brown.

L, M, N, O, and P purchased property "as joint tenants with rights of survivorship." Shortly after they bought the property, P deeded "my interest" in the property to herself. She recorded this deed. A month later, O leased "my interest" in the property to J for a ten-year term. Just days after O entered into this lease, N died, leaving "my interests" in the property to K. Who holds what property interests in the property after N's death? 1. P, J, K, M, and L are tenants in common, each holding 20% of the ownership of the property, and O holds a reversionary interest in J's 20%. 2. P and J each hold 20% interest as tenants in common, O holds a reversionary interest in J's 20%, and M and L each hold 30% interest as joint tenants with each other. 3. P holds 20% interest in the property as a tenant in common with O, M, and L, who are joint tenants equally sharing the remaining 80%. 4. M and L are joint tenants, each holding 50% of the interest in the property.

2. P and J each hold 20% interest as tenants in common, O holds a reversionary interest in J's 20%, and M and L each hold 30% interest as joint tenants with each other.

Twenty years ago, Wife devised her property "to Husband for life, and then to those of my children who have attained the age of 35." Husband is now 65 and their three children are now adults aged 35, 32, and 28. A few years ago, Husband became estranged from his adult children. Husband has started making renovations to the home on the property, including combining three small bedrooms into one massive master bedroom suite, putting in a swimming pool, and cutting down numerous trees to build a golf course on the grounds. If the children bring an action for waste against Husband, what will be the likely result? 1. All of the children will likely be able to enjoin further renovations because of waste. 2. Some, but not all, of the children may be able to enjoin further renovations because of waste. 3. Husband will likely lose his interest in the property because of waste. 4. Husband faces no liability for waste if these renovations may increase the property's value.

2. Some, but not all, of the children may be able to enjoin further renovations because of waste.

Grantor conveyed Whiteacre "to A for life, and then to A's children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship." A had three children at her death, B, C, and D. B and C were had married and moved to another state, but D still lived on Whiteacre at her parent's death. D decided to get a roommate to live with her on Whiteacre and help pay its maintenance costs, and therefore entered into a one-year lease agreement with E. E paid a total of $6,000 during the course of E's one-year lease, and D used $3,000 of that amount to pay for taxes, mortgage payments, and necessary expenses for the home on Whiteacre. At the end of the year, B demands "his share" of the rents paid by E. Does B have any right to monies paid by E as rent for Whiteacre? 1. Yes, B has a right to $2,000, because B holds 1/3 of the property. 2. Yes, B has a right to $1,000, because B did not contribute to necessary upkeep. 3. No, because there has been no ouster. 4. No, because the lease was personal between D and E.

2. Yes, B has a right to $1,000, because B did not contribute to necessary upkeep.

Tenant rented a house from Landlord for a 1-year term commencing January 1. When Tenant failed to pay rent on September 1, Landlord went to the house to investigate. She found the lawn un-mowed and several newspapers in plastic bags on the front porch. Tenant's belongings remained in the house. Surmising that Tenant must have abandoned the premises, Landlord changed the locks, put Tenant's belongings in storage, and put a "for rent" ad in the paper, stating "small 2BR home for rent, $600/mo. Available immediately." The first applicant to rent the home was A, a first-year law student. Landlord dislikes lawyers, however, so she refused to rent her the property to A. The second applicant, B, was of a religion that Landlord particularly dislikes, so she refused to rent the property to B either. Landlord finally found a renter to her liking at the end of September and signed a lease with that tenant starting October 1st. On October 2nd, Tenant returned from vacation and demanded possession of the house. Did Landlord's actions violate any law? 1. Yes, Landlord's refusal to rent to both A and B was illegal. 2. Yes, Landlord illegally changed the locks on the home. 3. Yes, Landlord illegally refused to reasonably mitigate damages. 4. No, Landlord has not violated any law because the house is privately owned, residential property.

2. Yes, Landlord illegally changed the locks on the home.

Tenant rented apartment unit 2D from Landlord. There are 10 units on each of 5 floors in the building, all owned by Landlord. On October 1st, a new occupant moved into unit 3D, immediately above Tenant. Apparently this occupant is a professional dancer and practices dancing at home during the evening hours. Sometimes the dance practice sessions are not tremendously intrusive, but at least ten hours a week, Tenant's upstairs neighbor practices tap-dancing, which creates a tremendous racket in Tenant's apartment. The noise has been so awful that Tenant is unable to enjoy being at home during those times. When the tap-dancing starts, Tenant immediately vacates his unit. He usually stays away for a couple hours, either at a friends' house, the library, or a local eatery. After the very first instance of tap-dancing, Tenant complained in writing to Landlord, but Landlord has done nothing to address the situation. It is now November 6th and this has been going on over a month. Does Tenant have a valid claim against Landlord? 1. Yes. If a court finds that the tap-dancing is a significant interference with Tenant's quiet enjoyment of his unit, Tenant can win a constructive eviction claim against Landlord 2. Yes. If a court finds that the tap-dancing amounts to a nuisance, Tenant can win a constructive eviction claim against Landlord. 3. Yes. If a court finds that tap-dancing in an apartment building is an unreasonable use of property, Tenant can win an implied warranty of habitability claim against Landlord. 4. No. Tenant does not have a valid cause of action against for constructive eviction against Landlord under these facts.

4. No. Tenant does not have a valid cause of action against for constructive eviction against Landlord under these facts.

Tenant signed a lease with Landlord for a one-year term, ending on August 31. The lease provided for monthly rental payments of $500. On September 1, without vacating the premises, Tenant sent Landlord a check for $500. Landlord cashed the check. On September 15th, Landlord informed the Tenant that the premises had been rented to another party and that Tenant must vacate by September 30 or face eviction. Assuming Tenant will not voluntarily leave, when is the earliest that Landlord will be able to remove Tenant from the premises? 1. Immediately, because Tenant has a tenancy at sufferance and Landlord has indicated that he wishes to reclaim possession. 2. September 30, because Tenant has a tenancy at sufferance and Landlord has indicated that he wishes to reclaim possession. 3. September 30, because Tenant has a month-to-month periodic tenancy and Landlord has indicated that he wishes to terminate. 4. October 31, because Tenant has a month-to-month periodic tenancy and Landlord has indicated that he wishes to terminate. 5. August 31 the following year, because Tenant has effectively renewed the term of years tenancy.

4. October 31, because Tenant has a month-to-month periodic tenancy and Landlord has indicated that he wishes to terminate.

X and Y are neighbors. They entered into a written agreement saying that "X and his successors and assigns" could harvest "one bushel of apples" from Y's apple tree each September. Is this agreement enforceable by X and future owners of X's property against Y and future owners of Y's property? 1. Unless this agreement was recorded, it likely would be unenforceable as against Y. 2. Even if this agreement was recorded, it would not be enforceable at law against future owners of Y's land because X and Y lacked horizontal privity. 3. Because of the "successors and assigns" language, X can freely assign this agreement to any party he wishes, even without selling his land. 4. This agreement will bind future owners of Y's land who know about this arrangement.

4. This agreement will bind future owners of Y's land who know about this arrangement.

For Christmas, Z delivered to his neighbor Y a "Deed of Easement" which granted to Y "the perpetual right to camp, hunt and fish" on a Greenacre, a parcel of land that Z owns in the mountains, about an hour away from Y and Z's homes. Y recorded this document. Y worked with the local Boy Scouts and was thrilled to have the ability to use Greenacre for outdoor activities with the boys. Five years later, Y moved away and sold his home to X. Y gave up his position with the local Boy Scouts, and W took over as the new scoutmaster. Z thereafter died, leaving all his property to V. Who has the right to use Greenacre now? 1. W automatically succeeds to Y's right to use Greenacre because this was an easement in gross 2. X automatically succeeds to Y's right to use Greenacre because this was an appurtenant easement 3. Y's right to use Greenacre terminated when he sold his home and moved away, because the easement was personal and not assignable 4. Y continues to have the right to use Greenacre

4. Y continues to have the right to use Greenacre

Owner owned two parcels of land, A and B. B was located just north of a public highway and A was located north of B and had no direct access to a public road. Owner built a home on A and paved a driveway across B to the home on parcel A. Owner then sold parcel B to Buyer. The deed said nothing about the path across parcel B, but Owner continued to use the driveway. A year after the conveyance, a new public road was built along the northern boundary of parcel A. Can Owner lawfully use the paved driveway across parcel B? 1. No, Owner never had any legal right to cross parcel B because she landlocked herself 2. No, Owner previously had an implied easement across parcel B, but this easement terminated when the new public road was built 3. No, Owner does not yet have, but could eventually acquire, a prescriptive easement across parcel B 4. Yes, Owner had and still has an implied easement across parcel B 5. Yes, although Owner has a mere license right to cross parcel B and this can be terminated at Buyer's option

4. Yes, Owner had and still has an implied easement across parcel B

K filled out a rental application for half of a duplex and gave it to the landlord, L, who lives in the other half of the duplex. "I really hope this works out," said K. "My partner's work is just around the corner from here, and since we're going to be having a baby soon - her egg in my body - we want to be in a safe, family neighborhood." If L refuses to rent to K, will L have violated the Fair Housing Act? 1. Yes, L will have violated the Fair Housing Act if he refused to rent to K because of her sexual orientation 2. Yes, L will have violated the Fair Housing Act if he refused to rent to K because of her pregnancy 3. Yes, L will have violated the Fair Housing Act unless he can prove that he has a religious objection to homosexuality 4. Both A and B. 5. None of the above

5. None of the above

Ike conveys to Mamie for life, then to Albert for life if Albert survives Mamie, then to Ike's heirs.

M = LE A = Cont. Rem (LE) I = Reversion (FSA)

Ike conveys to Mamie for life, then to Albert for life if Albert is then married, then to Mamie's heirs. (Albert is married at the time of the grant)

M = LE A = Cont. Rem. (LE) M = Vst. Rem. (FSA)

Ike to Mamie for life, then to Albert for life, then to Mamie's heirs.

M = LE A = Vst. Rem. (LE) M = Vst. Rem. (FSA)

Ike conveys to Mamie for life. The next day, Ike records a deed conveying his interest "to my heirs" (Ike is still alive).

M = LE I = Reversion (FSA)

Ike to Mamie for life, then to Ike's heirs.

M = LE I = Reversion (FSA)

I conveys to Mamie for life, then to Ike's children.

M = LE I's children = Cont. Rem. (FSA) I = Reversion (FSA)

Ike conveys to Mamie for life, then to Mamie's issue.

M = LE Mamie's issue = Cont. Rem. (FSA) I = Reversion (FSA)

X just lost his job and went through bankruptcy, and he has very little money. He asks Y, the owner of a half-empty building near his former home, if he can rent an apartment "cheap." Y tells X that most of the apartments in the building "aren't ready to be rented." Y had to stop a major renovation partway through for financial reasons, so some of the apartments have exposed wiring and pipes and are missing essential things, like a toilet. X asks Y if he can stay in one of these unfinished apartments for $25 a month. "I can't afford more," explains X, "and it is better than living on the street." Y agrees and they sign a written lease. What is true regarding the legal status of X's obligations under the lease? A. X may be able to avoid the lease as illegal B. X may be able to obtain a reduction of his rent even below $25 a month C. If drafted properly, with clear disclosures, this arrangement is enforceable D. Both A and B. E. None of the above

D. Both A and B.

Maude conveys to Harold; however, if Charlie ever recants his belief in predestination, then to Charlie. (Charlie dies 8 years later, having never recanted).

Initially, H = FS/EL and C=EI (FSA) Now, H = FSA

Maude conveys to Harold, but if Harold ever professes a belief in predestination, then to Lizette. A year later, Harold dies, having never professed a belief in predestination.

Initially, H = FS/EL, L = EI (FSA) Now, H's estate = FSA

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie if Charlie recants his belief in predestination before he reaches the age of 50. One year later, Harold dies. Charlie is 30 years old and has not (yet?) recanted.

Initially, H = LE, C = Cont Rem (FSA), O = Reversion (FSA) Now, O = FS/EL, C = EI (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life, and then to Charlie if Charlie has recanted his belief in predestination by then, and otherwise to Lizette. Immediately upon learning of the conveyance, Charlie recants.

Initially, H = LE, C = Cont. Rem (FSA), L = Cont. Rem (FSA) Now, H = LE, C = Vst Rem (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie for life; however if Charlie has not conveyed his belief in predestination by Harold's death, to Lizette. Upon learning that Harold has fallen ill, Charlie recants.

Initially, H = LE, C = Cont. Rem. (FSA), L = Cont. Rem. (FSA) Now, H = LE, C = Vst. Rem. (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie for life; however if Charlie has not recanted his belief in predestination by the time Harold dies, then to Lizette. The next week, Lizette dies.

Initially, H = LE, C = Cont. Rem. (LE), L = Cont. Rem. (FSA), O = Reversion (FSA) Now, H = LE, C = Cont. Rem. (LE), L's estate = Cont. Rem. (FSA), O = Reversion (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie for life if Charlie has recanted his belief in predestination, then to Lizette. Two years later, Harold has a fight with Charlie and conveys his life estate to Lizette.

Initially, H = LE, C = Cont. Rem. (LE), L = Vstd Rem (FSA) Upon the conveyance from H to L, L = LE (life of H), C = Cont. Rem. (LE), L = Vstd Rem (FSA) Now apply the doctrine of merger. Then you get: L = FSA

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie. A year later, Charlie conveys his interest to Maude.

Initially, H = LE, C = Vst Rem (FSA) Now, H = LE, M = Vst Rem (FSA)

Maud conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie for life, then to Charlie's children. Charlie dies the next day, leaving one child, Mary.

Initially, H = LE, C = Vstd Rem (LE), C's children = Contingent Rem (FSA) (or, if we know that C already has one child, Vst Rem subj. to open (FSA)) Now, H = LE, M = Vstd Rem (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life, then to Charlie for life if Charlie has recanted his belief in predestination before Harold dies, then to Lizette. A year later, Charlie recants. Six months thereafter, Harold conveys his estate to Lizette.

Initially, H = LE, Ch = Cont. Rem (LE), L = Vst Rem (FSA) When C recants, H = LE, C = Vst. Rem. (LE), L = Vst. Rem (FSA) When H conveys to L, we have: L = LE, C = Vst Rem (LE), L = Vst. Rem (FSA). Merger DOES NOT apply here because we have an intervening VESTED remainder.

Maude conveys to Harold for life. A year later, Maude conveys her interest to Charlie.

Initially, H = LE, M = Reversion (FSA) Now, H = LE, C = Reversion (FSA)

Maude conveys to Harold for life. A year later, Harold conveys his interest to Charlie.

Initially, H = LE, O = Reversion (FSA) Now, C = LE (life of H), O = Reversion (FSA)

Ike to Mamie for life, then to Mamie's heirs.

M = FSA