Crim investigations -- 4th Am

United States v. Payner (1980)

Defendant charged w/falsifying income tax return. Federal agents lured bank officer to dinner, while other agents entered bank officer's hotel room, removed briefcase, & photographed documents found there. Documents used against Defendant. SCOTUS found defendants lacked standing, because hotel room, briefcase, & documents had belonged to bank officer, not to him.

Byrd v US (2019)

Driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car when he has renter's permission to drive car but is not listed as an authorized driver on rental agreement. Distinguished Rakas because there, it was passenger, here he's driver who took lawful possession after being delegated control by Reed (the actual rentor).

US v. Mendenhall (1980)

Factors that suggest given police-citizen exchange constitutes "seizure" for 4th A purposes: threatening presence of several officers, display of weapon, some physical touching of person, or use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance w/ officer's request might be compelled.

Brigham City v. Stuart (2006)

Facts: 3am police respond to call re loud party. Hear shouts inside and observe two juveniles drinking in backyard and altercation occurring in the kitchen home - 4 adults fighting juvenile. Officers then entered home and announced presence - subsequently arrested respondents and charged. Holding: Police may enter home w/ o warrant when they have objectively reasonable basis for believing occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. Their subjective intent does not matter (e.g. if they were more concerned with arresting rather than helping someone imminently in danger). Regardless of officer's state of mind, as long as circumstances viewed objectively justify the action, it will pass muster. Too loud to knock, so opening screen door to announce presence was reasonable under the circumstances.

United States v. Place (1983)

Facts: Agents exposed suitcases they suspected of containing narcotics to sniff test by dogs; dog reacted positively, which led to a warrant. Holding: Sniff test in airport was not deemed a 4A search. Not an intrusive technique (does not expose non-contraband items to public view) and doesn't tell officers additional personal info other than whether or not there are narcotics. O'Connor thought this was sui generis

Navarette v. California (2014)

Facts: Anonymous 911 call stated that truck driver driving dangerously & had just run person off road. Person gave make, model, color, & license plate number of truck to State of CA highway patrol. Police officer saw truck, driven by defendant, on highway & followed it for 5 mins before pulling it over. Officer didn't note any reckless driving in time he was following truck. Upon approaching truck, officer smelled marijuana. Officer searched truck & found 30 lbs of marijuana. Defendant challenged constitutionality of traffic stop & incident search. Trial court found stop & search to be constitutional. Holding: Anonymous tip via 911 call of reckless driving can support reasonable suspicion necessary for traffic stop if tip accompanied by adequate indicia of reliability (detailed description of vehicle + account of reckless conduct). Anonymous tipster in such case effectively claiming personal, eyewitness knowledge of conduct adds to reliability. 911 call also includes some safeguards bc person can be identified and traced for making false reports reasonable officer could conclude false tipster would think twice before using this. As officer had reasonable suspicion Navarette was driving drunk, stop & subsequent search constitutional. Dissent (Scalia): Under this new rule, so long as caller identifies car, anonymous claims of single instance of reckless driving called in via 911 will result in a traffic stop. Tip is the only basis for stop here driving while being careless is not an ongoing crime. 5 min corroboration actually undermines the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.

Katz v. United States (1967)

Facts: Defendant convicted of violating federal gambling laws. At trial, prosecution entered into evidence recordings of phone conversation obtained after FBI placed wire-tap on outside of public phone booth where call occured. Holding: Even when no physical invasion, wire-tapping public phone booth (electronic intrusion) can constitute a 4A search. 4A protects people, not places. Things knowingly exposed to public, even in own home or office, is not subject to 4A protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in area accessible to public, may be constitutionally protected. Here, phone booth was glass but purpose was to exclude the uninvited ear. Here, gov electronic listening/recording violated privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using phone booth. Concurrence (Harlan, black letter now): Person needs 1) actual, subjective expectation of privacy 2) expectation society prepared to recognize as reasonable. Critical fact here is that person shut door behind him at phone booth. The booth might be accessible to public but it is temporarily a private space for the occupant who expects freedom from intrusion.

Florida v. Royer (1983)

Facts: Defendant in airport fit profile of a drug courier type. Cops talked to him then brought him into a room and asked to search his luggage. Can't prevent them from walking away unless there are reasonable objective grounds for doing so. Walking away, without more, does not add to reasonable suspicion. Holding: Drugs found should be suppressed. At time defendant produced key to his luggage, his detention had already escalated from stop authorized in Terry to a more serious intrusion focus was on moving defendant to another location (beyond limit of Terry stop and had ripened into probable cause arrest situation moving them away from public to private would implicate 4A and 5A issues + conduct was more intrusive than necessary.

United States v. Havens (1980)

Facts: Defendant searched after flight, but evidence suppressed bc of unlawful search. At trial, defendant took stand and denied involvement. On cross, court allowed gov to ask defendant about t-shirt in suitcase + on rebuttal allowed gov agent to testify about the t-shirt. Issue: Whether evidence suppressed bc of unlawful search may be used to impeach D's false trial testimony given in response to cross? Holding: Yes, if D chooses to testify & gives false testimony in response to appropriate Q on cross, illegally obtained evidence that was suppressed in gov's case in chief may be used for impeachment purposes, including in gov's rebuttal case. Court weighed truth-seeking function of trial process more heavily than possibility that use of suppressed evidence for impeachment could undermine exclusionary rule.

Rakas v. Illinois (1978)

Facts: Defendants did not own the car or the rifle/shotgun shells. Defendants were passengers in the car when it was searched (owner driving the car). Holding: Defendants do not have "standing" to seek exclusionary rule because their personal 4A rights were not infringed - this was a search of a third person's premises/property. Since exclusionary rule is an attempt to guarantee 4A, only Ds whose own 4A rights were violated should benefit from rule's protections. Rejects the target theory (standing to invoke exclusionary rule so long as the search or seizure was "directed" at defendant, regardless of whose premises/property is being searched). Standing is just really asking whether or not the defendants themselves had an expectation of privacy and 4A rights were infringed.

Spinelli v. United States (1969)

Facts: FBI conduct surveillance for four days, see defendant cross bridge & park car and enter apt. Anonymous insider tip tells police that defendant is a bookie. Holding: Establishes two prong test for informant tip: 1) adequate basis of knowledge and 2) sufficient facts to establish the veracity of the informant or the reliability of informant's report If lacking on either, look to police's independent corroboration to see if it can revive the deficient tip to become reliable. Reasoning: Court rejects tip here as unreliable - not detailed enough to show veracity/reliability and didn't explain why informant knew what he did (basis?). Rejected a totality of the circumstances approach to determining probable cause. Tip must describe accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that magistrate may know he is relying on something more substantial than casual rumor circulating or accusation based merely on individual's reputation.

Davis v. United States (2011)

Facts: In April 2007, police officers in Alabama pulled over defendant and driver. Driver arrested for driving while intoxicated & Defendant arrested for giving false name to police. Police proceeded to search passenger compartment of Driver's car & found gun in pocket of defendant's jacket. At the time of the arrest, New York v. Belton allowed police to search passenger compartment of vehicle incident to lawful arrest. While Defendant's appeal was pending, Belton overruled by Arizona v. Gant. Holding (Alito): Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule. Because exclusion is a court-created remedy, courts should only apply exclusionary rule where deterrent effect of rule outweighs social cost of suppressing potentially reliable evidence. Under Gant rule, search of passenger compartment of Driver's car violated defendant's 4th A rights. However, applying exclusionary rule here will have no deterrent effect. Police didn't deliberately disregard defendant's 4th A rights. To contrary, specifically authorized by 4th A law at that time.

Chimel v. CA (1969)

Facts: Police came to Defendant's home w/ arrest warrant (no search warrant). Wife allowed police in - when defendant came back, arrested him. Then, accompanied by his wife, searched entire home and seized numerous items. Holding: Warrantless search incident to arrest can only cover area within arrestee's immediate control - grabbable space where he might grab weapons or destroy evidence. No comparable justification for searching rooms other than the one which arrest occurs in or even all closed/concealed areas within the room itself. If allowed, this would cause more arrests in the home since it would allow police to search w/o probable cause or search warrant. Similar to a general warrant.

Carpenter v. United States (2018)

Facts: Prosecutors applied for court orders under Stored Communications Act to obtain cell records from Carpenter, on basis of co-conspirators confession he robbed Radio Shacks. Magistrate Judges issued two orders for Carpenter's CSLI (127 days + 7 days; and 13k location data points). Carpenter charged with 6 counts of robbery & 6 counts of carrying firearm during federal crime of violence. Carpenter moved to suppress cell-site data. District court denied motion to suppress. Holding (Roberts): The third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI (over 7 days of data), which records an individual's physical movements. As such, obtaining CSLI from third-party carriers constitutes 4th A search. Guideposts for what is considered an unreasonable search/seizure when 4A was adopted include securing privacies of life against arbitrary power and to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance. Knotts line of cases holds no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements in public thoroughfares, but that is different from more sweeping modes of surveillance. Cell site records are qualitatively different than bank records/phone numbers. In addition, CSLI data is not really "shared" bc carrying cellphones is so pervasive and insistent part of daily life; does not require any affirmative act on part of user (automatic and can't evade). Here, bc 4A controls and that probable cause+warrant is needed, the Stored Communication Act section that requires the gov to only show "reasonable grounds" that records are relevant and material to an ongoing investigation is unconstitutional as applied. But in the majority of cases, a subpoena would be sufficient so long as suspect doesn't have legitimate interest in the records. Dissent (Kennedy): The line between CSLI and financial/phone records is unprincipled and unworkable. Dissent (Gorsuch): 3 possible responses: 1) ignore problem, maintain Smith & Miller, and live with consequences 2) set Smith & Miller aside and try again relying on Katz 3) look for answers elsewhere. Even if Katz may supply one way to prove 4th A interest, never only way. More traditional approaches (property) might be necessary to vindicate 4th A rights. Property line of argument most promising, but forfeited because complaint only pursued under Katz. Pushes broad understanding of property that includes control - reassessment of what constitutes papers & effects. Does positive law give you confidentiality? SCA might itself suggest you have a property interest in it because it gives you some privacy interest.

Brower v. County of Inyo (1989)

4th A seizure doesn't occur whenever governmentally caused termination of individual's freedom of movement (innocent passerby), nor even whenever governmentally caused & desired termination of individual's freedom of movement (fleeing felon), but only when governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. We think it enough for a seizure that person be stopped by very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve result. Not to say precise character of roadblock irrelevant.

Wong Sun v. US (1963)

Facts: After illegal arrest, Hom Way told officers he got his heroin from Blackie Toy, owner of a laundry. Police go to a random laundry and happen to find James Toy (no reason to suspect he was Blackie Toy. Toy was then arrested in his own quarters and implicated Johnny. Agents then found Johnny Yee in his bedroom who gave up his heroin to them. Yee then stated that the heroin had been brought to him by Sea Dong (Wong Sun). Took Yee to find Wong Sun, where no narcotics were found on premises. Each was arraigned and RORed. Several days later, Wong sun and Toy made unsigned confessions. Four items which trial court admitted over objections they were inadmissible "fruits" of unlawful arrest: 1) statements made orally by Toy in bedroom, 2) heroin surrendered by Yee, 3) Toy's pretrial unsigned statement, 4) Wong Sun's similar statement. Holding: In order for fruit of unlawful search/seizure to be excluded, the connection between unlawful conduct & relevant piece of evidence must be so attenuated as to dissipate taint and such evidence may then be admissible. Testimony produced during unlawful search/seizure can constitute a "fruit" Yee's narcotics as to Toy: Wouldn't have found drugs but for Toy's testimony and assistance. The link between Toy's testimony and discovering of drugs was quite immediate. Should be excluded as a poisonous fruit. Toy's unsigned statement: No need to decide this specific issue bc admission of guilt requires extrinsic corroboration Wong Sun's out of court testimony also can't be used at trial against declarant's partner in crime. Wong Sun: Unsigned confession not fruit of arrest bc he had been released on his own recognizance and returned voluntarily several days later to make statement (taint dissipated). Narcotics surrendered by Yee was inadmissible against Toy, but admissible as to Wong Sun, who had no right of privacy in the persons/premises entered to seize.

Florida v. Jardines (2013)

Facts: After receiving tip about house in which marijuana growing, detective approached defendant's house w/drug-sniffing dog, which detected odor of marijuana. As result, detective able to get warrant to search house. Was the dog a search? Holding (Scalia): Using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When gov obtains info by physical intrusion, there is a search. Katz inquiry of reasonable expectation of privacy simply added to this, not replaced it. (PROPERTY LAW strand of 4Am analysis.) Here, gov gathered info in curtilage of home without implied license, which only covers knocking on the door. Dissent (Alito): License to approach door of house is not limited to door knocking and not limited to only those who individual may welcome. Kentucky v. King -> police do not engage in search when they engage in knock and talk (even to get incriminating info) this case is no different except that police recruited a dog to gather the evidence.

Murray v. United States (1988)

Facts: Agents went into warehouse and saw numerous burlap-wrapped bales of marijuana. Agents left warehouse while warrant was obtained. Warrant application didn't mention prior entry & contained no information gathered upon first entry into warehouse. Upon obtaining warrant, agents reentered warehouse & seized bales, which were found to contain marijuana. Murray moved to have evidence in warehouse suppressed, arguing warrant invalid because warrant application didn't mention prior entry. Holding: Independent source exception to poisonous fruit doctrine includes evidence initially discovered during illegal search but subsequently acquired through independent/lawful source (aka warrant). However, burden on police to show that no info gained from illegal entry affected either law enforcement's decision to seek a warrant or magistrate's decision to grant it. Here, was search pursuant to warrant in fact genuinely independent source of the info/evidence here? Not the case if decision to seek warrant was prompted by what they had seen during illegal entry or if info was presented to Magistrate to affect decision.

United States v. White (1971)

Facts: At defendant drug trial, government agents permitted to testify to conversations defendant had w/ government informant. Government agents had overheard these conversations through a wire-tap the informant had been wearing, allowing them to hear every word in real time. Police placed concealed radio transmitter on informant - conducted interception without warrant or court order. Holding (White): A right against unreasonable searches & seizures doesn't protect people from misplaced expectations of trust & therefore no 4th A search & seizure when person D speaking with secretly government agent or informant wearing wire & recording what is being said. Precedent in Hoffa allows for associates who are actually government agents to turn to the police this here is no different just because convo is being transmitted and recorded. \Defendants assume the risk when they confide in others about the illegal activity. Recordings are also accurate and reliable, more so than just memory of police agent would be weird to say that there's a 4A privilege instead against a more accurate version of events. Dissent (Douglas): Eavesdropping and technologically advanced electronic surveillance cannot be equated privacy would vanish completely if we allow gov to penetrate walls/doors to listen in on convos. Dissent (Harlan): Expectation of privacy and assumption of risk are circular and reflect what laws translate into rules the customs/values of past and present. "Katz test can lead to the substitution of words for analysis."

Bond v. US (2000)

Facts: Border Patrol officer boarded bus and squeezed soft luggages in overhead storage. Felt brick-like objects on one bag and obtained consent to open and discovered meth blocks. Holding: This manipulation of exterior of bag constituted a search. Distinguished Riley/Ciraolo bc difference between visual vs. tactile observations (latter is more intrusive). Reasonable expectation of privacy that don't expect passengers/others to feel their bags in an exploratory manner.

Arizona v. Hicks (1987)

Facts: Bullet fired through Defendant's floor and injured man in apt. below. In course of a valid exigency search, Officer noticed expensive stereo components, suspected they were stolen and moved components in order to read/record the serial number. Called in serial number to HQ, which advised him they matched serial # stolen by armed robbery - he then seized. Holding (Scalia): Moving something in order to uncover/expose concealed portions is a search. Probable cause is required in order to invoke plain view doctrine (in order to search/seize items in plain view). Moving stereo constituted separate search from search for shooter/victim that was lawful objective of entry. Viewing things in plain sight not independent search b/c does not further invade privacy interest, but taking actions to view concealed portion of apt or its contents is new invasion to privacy and unjustified by exigent circumstances. Here, officer only had reasonable suspicion that stereo was stolen, not probable cause, thus could not invoke plain view doctrine. Dissent (O'Connor): Sure, you need probable cause to conduct a full-blown search; but here, this is a mere cursory inspection of an item in plain view this inspection should need lower standard of cause reasonable suspicion should suffice. Some searches are so minimally intrusive that some countervailing gov interest should prevail balance between gov interest and privacy = should take the reasonable suspicion standard approach.

Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980)

Facts: Defendant & others being detained in home of 3rd party while police conducting search. Police emptied handbag of woman seated next to Defendant, & found illegal drugs. Defendant claimed ownership of drugs, & later moved to suppress, arguing search of handbag illegal. Holding: SCOTUS found Ddefendant lacked standing to challenge search. Defendant had known woman who owned purse for only few days, had placed drugs in purse just before police arrived, perhaps without woman's consent, & had never sought or had been given access to purse in past. Factors showed that D had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in purse, & thus, didn't suffer any 4th A harm. Mere ownership of evidence itself, as opposed to privacy interest in the place searched, insufficient.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

Facts: Defendant convicted of possessing obscene materials, which were unlawfully seized during unlawful search of D's home -refused police entry into home without warrant but police entered forcibly and searched without a warrant. Holding: All evidence obtained by searches/seizures in violation of 4A inadmissible in state court (reasoning no longer applicable)

Illinois v. Caballes (2005)

Facts: Defendant stopped for speeding, dog sniffed truck, found weed. Holding: Sniff was proper because it did not prolong legitimate traffic stop. Compare to Rodrigues v. United States (2015) - D's 4A rights violated when he was detained longer than necessary for a routine traffic stop in order to facilitate a dog sniff.

Arizona v. Gant (2009)

Facts: Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in patrol car. He had just exited car and walked towards police officer (10-12 ft from car) when he was arrested. Police then searched his car and discovered cocaine and a gun. Holding: Police may search vehicle after recent occupant's arrest only if 1) arrestee within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search or 2) reasonable to believe crime-related evidence located in vehicle (this is less than probable cause).

Riley v. California (2014)

Facts: Defendant was arrested for firearms offense and searched incident to the arrest. Police found items associated with Bloods gang. Police accessed info on phone looking for evidence of gang content. Def was charged based on this phone content which had evidence re shootings he was involved in. Holding: A government may not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances. Absent precise guidance from founding era assess degree of intrusion into individual's privacy vs. degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Chimel concern 1 (officer safety) doesn't apply; Digital data cannot itself be a weapon to harm arresting officer or to effectuate escape. Chimel concern 2 (preventing destruction of evidence); no doubt phone could be seized to prevent destruction of evidence while seeking warrant. However, responses include turning phone off or putting it in a Faraday bag. And if law enforcement truly has reasons to believe that evidence will be wiped, they may be able to rely on exigency exception. Exigency will still allow police to search phone without warrant in extreme circumstances difference is that there, a court will examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search, rather than blanket rule allowing search/

Terry v. Ohio (1968)

Facts: Experienced police officer observed two men walk up to store window, peer inside, & walk away. Officer found behavior suspicious and approached men & identified himself as police. After patting down defendant, officer discovered gun in his coat pocket. Holding: When an officer observes unusual conduct that reasonably leads him to assume that criminal activity is afoot and that the people he is interacting with are armed, the police officer may conduct a limited search for weapons. Whether a reasonably prudent man in circumstances would be warranted in belief that his safety or that of others was in danger requires not just hunch but specific articulable reasonable inferences (which can be in light of his experience). Emphatically rejects the notion that stop and frisk is outside the purview of 4A just bc it does not rise to the level of search or seizure. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person and any frisk is necessarily a search of the person's body even if it's just a patdown. Was Officer's actions to search reasonable here? Inquiry depends on 1) whether officer's action was justified at its inception and 2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

United States v. Watson (1976)

Facts: Fed postal inspectors had tipster arrange meeting w/ defendant who had stolen credit card. Inspectors then arrested defendant without warrant. Holding: Public arrests don't require warrant and are expressly authorized by statute. Congressional judgment that it is reasonable under 4A to arrest without warrant so long as there is probable cause.

United States v. Drayton (2002)

Facts: Greyhound bus made scheduled stop. While bus stopped, three police officers boarded bus, explained they were conducting inspection, requested cooperation, & began asking passengers for permission to search bags for drugs & weapons. Defendant consented to incriminating search after possibly intimidating tactics. Trial court found consent voluntary & therefore allowed drug evidence to be admitted at trial. Holding (Kennedy): Police may request consent to search, even if no basis for suspecting individual of illegal activity & does not advise bus passengers of right to decline cooperation. Citizen not subject to 4th A seizure if reasonable person would feel that he is free to decline request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Here, the totality of circumstances would not cause a reasonable person to feel he was not free to leave. Dissent (Souter): Three officers who position themselves in such a manner might make reasonable person believe he is not free to leave; bus is narrow and difficult to leave.

Maryland v. King (2013)

Facts: In 2003, police obtained DNA profile of an unidentified rapist. In 2009, defendant was arrested for unrelated assault. Police took DNA sample as part of a standard booking procedure and identified defendant through a database. State court admitted DNA evidence & convicted King of rape. Holding: When officers make arrest for serious offense supported by probable cause & bring suspect to station to be detained in custody, taking & analyzing cheek swab of arrestee's DNA is legitimate police-booking procedure that is reasonable under 4th A. A buccal swab is an intrusion into human body, so clearly it is a search. To be reasonable, warrantless search must further legitimate government interest that outweighs search's intrusion upon searched individual's privacy. Legitimate government interests are: accurate identification, ensuring safety of law enforcement staff, determining with more accuracy whether & to what extent bail should be offered, & potentially freeing person who has been wrongfully convicted of arrestee's prior crime. Intrusion to arrestee minimal, and arrestee's expectation of privacy once in custody severely reduced. Running swab through database is additional search. Could violate, but here was reasonable. Scalia (dissent): police had already identified D when they arrested him. This is therefore not for the purpose of identification but rather for the purpose of discovering evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Unconstitutional - can't engage in suspicionless searches for law enforcement purposes and unsolved crimes, need individualized suspicion here. Livingston might not agree - Terry shows that in reasonable analysis we don't need individualized suspicion; Scalia here is trying to redefine this framework by saying that we should stick to individualized suspicion.

Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000)

Facts: Indianapolis set up drug vehicle checkpoints to stop predetermined number of vehicles, and can conduct search only by consent or if "particularized suspicion," such as drug dog reaction of sign of intoxication. Officers have no discretion to vary procedure, and sites predetermined weeks in advance. Plaintiffs filed class action alleging 4th Am violation. Holding: Suspicionless roadside checkpoints established for the primary purpose of promoting general interest in crime control violates 4A. 4A search/seizure is usually unreasonable absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing (with limited exceptions). Legitimate secondary purpose (keep impaired motorists off road & verify licenses/registration) not sufficient -- easy to institute illegal searches as long as license verifications included, to make search legal. Discerning purpose may be difficult for courts but they do it all the time to sift abusive gov conduct from those which are lawful. Dissent (Rehnquist): Balance effectiveness of roadblock against interest of those who had been stopped. Can't randomly stop cars, but if you have fixed checkpoints along border or as part of drunk driving program, can uphold them: no potential for arbitrary enforcement, transparency for citizens - less humiliating & stigmatizing, search is efficient & less probing, visible & therefore subject to political checks

Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984)

Facts: Intoxicated man driving, leaves car in ditch then staggers back home. Police use hot pursuit exception to enter his home without warrant. Holding: This is not hot pursuit because Welsh was not running away from scene of crime. Severity of crime is a factor to be assessed in deciding whether exigency permits you to go into home.

United States v. Banks (2003)

Facts: Knock and announce warrant search. Defendant was in the shower and did not hear announcement. Holding: Knock and announce then breaking down door 15-20 seconds later was reasonable bc there was reasonable suspicion of exigency. Timing is based on time it takes to flush away evidence, not time it takes to get to the door.

Warden v. Hayden (1967)

Facts: Man had robbed business and ran back to his home. Police entered and searched his home without warrant. Holding: Warrantless search upheld. Only thorough search would have ensured that suspect was only man present and that police had control of weapons on premises that could be used for escape.

Florida v. JL (2000)

Facts: Miami-Dade Police received anonymous tip that man matching defendant's description had gun at bus stop. Officers stopped & frisked defendant & found gun. Defendant moved to suppress gun on grounds that it was found during unlawful search. Holding: Stop and frisk not justified. Without corroboration, anonymous tip that person carrying gun does not create reasonable suspicion to justify stop & frisk under 4th A. An anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity. Only if anonymous tip is further corroborated and exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion. There may be instances when the danger alleged is so great as to justify a search without reliability showing (e.g. tip of bomb carrier; or in areas where there is diminished 4A privacy such as schools and airports).

United States v. Jones (2012)

Facts: Nightclub owner suspected of large-scale drug trafficking operation. FBI agents applied for warrant that would allow them to place GPS tracking device on Jones's vehicle in effort to track movements. Federal district court issued warrant but gov conceded to noncompliance of warrant. For 28 days, Government used device to track defendant's movements & collected more than 2,000 pages of data. Defendant indicted on multiple counts of drug-related offenses. District court suppressed data obtained while vehicle parked in garage adjoining Defendant's residence. Holding (Scalia): Warrantless placement of GPS tracking device on undercarriage of vehicle in order to track person's movements on public streets constitutes unlawful search in violation of 4th A because it is a property trespass. When gov intrudes upon a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain info, that constitutes a search. Vehicle is "effect" for 4th A purposes. No doubt that at time of 4A passage, such a physical intrusion would be a search -> property was sacred and protected at passage of 4A (phrasing of 4A to list of property would be superfluous if only protected persons). Katz supplemented, did not repudiate property-based conception of 4A. Concurrence (Sotomayor): Physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance in future cases, majority provides little guidance. And we need something more than Katz test to preserve privacy bc expectations of privacy evolve with change in technology. GPS is also unique because it can chill associational/expressive freedoms. We may also have to reconsider premise that no reasonable expectation of privacy in info voluntarily disclosed to third parties Ill-suited to digital age. Concurrence (Alito): Majority opinion is highly artificial. Would instead ask whether reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by long-term monitoring of movements of vehicle.

Florida v. Riley (1989)

Facts: Officer flew over property in helicopter at height of 400 ft to investigate tip of marijuana growing. Saw marijuana plants in greenhouse with naked eye. As result, warrant issued & marijuana found growing in greenhouse. Defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana under Florida law. Holding: Aerial observation of area within curtilage of home from helicopter at altitude of 400 feet (legal fly zone) not search requiring a warrant under terms of 4th A. Subjective expectation of privacy here (curtilage and shielding with roofing) - but it is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor. In the age of private/commercial flights in public airways, unreasonable to expect they won't be seen by naked eye. Concurrence (O'Connor): Just because police can legally be in skies doesn't mean expectation of privacy is same as from public road, because it is difficult to block off aerial views w/o giving up enjoyment of curtilage completely. But, burden should be on defendant to prove expectation was a reasonable one, and they didn't. Dissent (Brennan): Ordinary citizens do not have access to helicopters, and legality of position does not make it less of an intrusion. (In Katz the police were legally located.) Correct question is whether public observation of curtilage was so commonplace that Riley's expectation of privacy could not have been considered reasonable. Burden should be on government to prove expectation was not a reasonable one, as it has better access to empirical data.

Mincey v. Arizona (1978)

Facts: Officer purchased heroin from Defendant, came back with police and knocked on apt. Defendant's acquaintance opened door and Officer Headricks slipped in - exchanged shots in bedroom w/ Mincey - Headricks died. Police officers guarded scene and looked for other victims - did not search/seize any evidence. Homicide detectives then came in and gathered evidence and searched entire apartment. Did death of police officer create exigency to allow search of entire apt without warrant? Holding: Warrantless searches must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Seriousness of offense under investigation does not itself create exigent circumstances. Here, 4 day search that completely went through house cannot be considered emergency search. No exigent circumstance beyond the homicide - no indication evidence would be lost, destroyed, removed during time to obtain warrant.

Draper v. United States (1958)

Facts: Paid repeat informant gave fed agent a precise description of the defendant's clothing at a time he was alleged to be carrying drugs. Informant's previous tips had worked out. Police arrest Defendant based on accurate info and find drugs. Holding: There was probable cause here based on informant tip. Past accuracy a plus.

Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)

Facts: Patrol officers stop car. 3 passengers in front seat. driver had syringe in pocket for purposes of taking drugs - created probable cause to search car for contraband. Officers searched car and found purse in backseat which respondent claimed was hers - respondent passenger was not suspected of criminal activity. Officers searched and found brown pouch and container containing meth + drug paraphernalia. Holding: Police can search all containers in a car, including personal effects of passenger (though can't search passenger's own body). Court looks to whether action was unlawful search/seizure under common law when 4A was framed; if not, then evaluate whether it was reasonable by assessing intrusion into personal privacy vs. legitimate gov interest. Warrantless searches of containers in automobile are reasonable. Privacy expectations are reduced in car, no less for passengers than drivers. Gov interest is substantial - would impair effective searches if passenger belongings were barred. Passengers could be engaged in common enterprise w/ driver and have some interest in concealment.

Whren v. United States (1996)

Facts: Plainclothes police officers observed car stop for abnormal time at intersection, w driver looking down at passenger lap not reasonable suspicion. It then made a sharp right turn without signaling and sped off and unreasonable pace, and officers pulled over car. When police approached car they observed plastic bags of cocaine in defendant's hands. Defendant convicted over objection that traffic stop was pretextual. Holding: Except w/ inventory searches & administrative inspections, when probable cause of illegal conduct exists, officer's true motive for searching or detaining person does not negate constitutionality of search or seizure. Police had probable cause to believe that traffic code had been violated but argue that in civil traffic regulation context, probable cause is not enough police will always be able to catch a motorist in a technical violation. Petitioners ask for a test that whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given. "Reasonable officer" standard ineffective because it will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on specific policies in place, and 4A shouldn't turn on these distinctions. When probable cause that traffic offense has occurred, officer's subjective motives for detaining motorist don't invalidate officer's actions under 4th A. If D believes he has been targeted by police because of race, remedy lies in Equal Protection Clause, not 4th A.

California v. Greenwood (1988)

Facts: Police collected defendant's garbage, which was left outside on curb for collection. Evidence from trash offered as probable cause to support issuance of warrant authorizing search of defendant's home. Search yielded evidence that led to arrest on drug charges. Holding (White): Warrantless search of trash left outside on curb does not violate 4th A, because person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in publicly accessible place. Trash regularly exposed to public where it may be invaded by animals & other members of public. People place trash out for collection w/ knowledge it will be taken into possession of third party & w/ no guarantee trash collector will not subsequently pick through it. Police are not doing anything different from what a member of the public can do. Dissent (Brennan): A trash bag is like any other container - a common repository of personal effects. Includes intimate info and shows habits of eating, reading, recreational habits, intimate details like sexual practices, health, personal hygiene can piece together a person's intimate details that they have an expectation of privacy in. Mere possibility that some meddlers might open and rummage through trash does not negate reasonableness of the privacy expectation. Ordinance forces people to place garbage on the curb.

United States v. Elkin (6th Cir. 2002)

Facts: Police found drugs in building after warrantless entry. Police claimed they saw marijuana plant and had reasonable belief that D was aware of police was there and on to him. Holding: Facts here gave police sufficient reason to believe evidence could be destroyed - thus created exigency.

California v. Ciraolo (1986)

Facts: Police inspected backyard curtilage via fixed-wing aircraft at 1000 ft and discovered marijuana. Yard was shielded by two fences from street observation. Court held aerial surveillance not a search.

California v. Acevedo (1991)

Facts: Police intercepted marijuana package and saw Daza accept package and take back to home. Daza leaves apt, stopped and searched and found marijuana. Later, defendant arrives to apt and leaves w/ brown bag size of marijuana packages that were intercepted. defendant places bag in trunk and drives away. Police fear they will lose evidence, stop car and open trunk and find bag with marijuana. Holding: Clear cut rule eliminates warrant requirement for closed containers in cars. Under the new rule, need probable cause that car contained illicit items and that container can contain them. But probable cause to believe a container has contraband does not justify a search of the entire car. Here, allows a warrantless search of the paper bag but did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in other parts of the car. Concurrence (Scalia): 4A is so riddled with exceptions that warrant requirement is basically unrecognizable the best path out of this is to return to reasonableness as a first principle. Dissent (Stevens): Creates weird circumstance where you have to get a warrant to search briefcase out on public streets yet no need for one locked in trunk of the car. Why is one's privacy interest diminished by removing it from public thoroughfare and placing it in a private vehicle?

Herring v. United States (2009)

Facts: Police investigator asked Coffee County's warrant clerk if any warrants out for defendant's arrest. When none were found, investigator asked clerk to check w/clerk in Dale County, who reported one active arrest warrant. Investigator asked that copy of arrest warrant be faxed over as confirmation. However, when Dale County clerk looked for actual warrant she could not find it & discovered that warrant had been recalled. She immediately called to tell Coffee County clerk, who radioed to tell investigator. In the 10 minutes while this happened, investigator already pulled Defendant over, arrested him and, after conducting search of car, found drugs & gun. He moved to have drugs & gun suppressed at trial because no warrant for arrest & thus initial arrest unlawful. Holding (Roberts): Where error (even if by police) was result of isolated negligence attenuated from arrest, exclusionary rule will not apply. Error that arises from nonrecurring negligence is far removed from core concerns we are trying to deter. Police misconduct must be sufficiently deliberate for exclusionary rule to have potential deterrent effect (has to be deliberate/reckless/grossly negligent/ or at least recurring/systemic negligence). Here, no indication errors systemic or widespread. Dissent (Ginsburg): Exclusionary rule has goals besides deterrence: judiciary to avoid taint of partnership w/ official lawlessness, reassure citizens that gov doesn't profit from lawless behavior, minimize risk of undermining trust in gov.

Hudson v. Michigan (2006)

Facts: Police obtained warrant to search defendant's home. Police arrived at defendant's home, announced presence, but only waited 3-5 seconds before entering house. Upon searching home, police found drugs & firearms which defendant moved to suppress at trial, arguing police didn't wait long enough before entering home in violation of 4th A rights. Rule of Law (Scalia): Exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of knock & announce rule. No but-for causation because they would have found the evidence either way pursuant to warrant. Purpose of knock & announce rule is to protect lives & prevent injury to people & property. However, once warrant issued, individual has no more privacy in evidence described in warrant. Excluding evidence found in violation of knock & announce rule provides little deterrence to police & has significant detrimental effect on society. Evidence found by police in defendant's home admissible because social cost of excluding it outweighs any deterrent effect knock & announce rule may have.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)

Facts: Police officer made routine traffic stop without probable cause & asked for permission to search car. Brother of car's owner gave consent, and even helped open trunk and glove compartments. Upon searching vehicle, officer discovered 3 stolen checks, later linked to defendant, 1 of 6 passengers riding in car. State trial court allowed evidence of checks to be admitted at trial, & defendant was convicted of theft. Holding: Voluntariness is a question of fact based on the totality of circumstances. Knowledge of right to refuse is one factor but need not be established as the sine qua non of an effective consent. Includes accounting for subtly coercive police questions + subjective state of person who consents (not objective reasonableness test). Burden is on the prosecutor to prove that consent was in fact freely and voluntarily given. We shouldn't require police to affirmatively advise individual they have right to refuse.

United States v. Robinson (1973)

Facts: Police officer stopped Cadillac on reliable info that driver's license had been revoked. 3 occupants and police officer arrested defendant/driver, searched his person and found cigarette package whose contents police could not immediately identify. After opening it, discovered that contained heroin. Holding: Yes, search may be made of person of arrestee by virtue of lawful arrest regardless of the type of crime. Search of person is not only to discover fruits of evidence but also to disarm suspect. We also treat all types of arrests regardless of the crime the same. Police must make quick ad hoc judgments in these circumstances case-by-case adjudication delineating whether evidence destruction/potential weapon was in a certain situation is no good for the field. Since custodial arrest based on probable cause is an intrusion under 4A, a search incident to arrest requires no additional justification. Both an exception to warrant requirement and also "reasonable" under 4A.

Illinois v. Gates (1983)

Facts: Police receive anonymous letter stating that defendants were selling drugs with details about their staggered travel to Florida. Detective pursued tip and learned husband had reserved flight to FL, boarded flight and went to hotel, then left to drive car northbound back to Chicago. Warrant application included these observations in affidavit + anonymous tip letter. Police found 350 pounds of marijuana in trunk and found weapons, marijuana, other contraband in home. Defendants moved to suppress evidence b/c not sufficient probable cause Holding: Totality of circumstances analysis of what is probable cause - fair probability that evidence of crime will be found. In informant context, veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all important - but deficiency of one may be compensated for by stronger shower of another. Reasoning: Here, letter alone cannot pass probable cause (basis of knowledge not demonstrated). Anonymous tips rarely can pass rigid Aguilar-Spinelli test bc they often will not give extensive recitation of their basis of knowledge and their veracity is usually unknowable. Approach here values corroboration of details of informant tip by independent police work. Not problematic that all activity witnessed by police was innocent - tip makes them suspicious + fact that all corroborating details were accurate. Reliability of informant becomes less of an issue once police independently verify info. Here, tip also included info not just easily obtainable but of future actions not easily predicted. Dissent (Stevens): Informant here made a crucial mistake on tip - claiming that wife would fly there and leave car and fly back - that is unusual activity, whereas it is not unusual for husband to fly out and join wife and drive back together.

Minnesota v. Carter (1998)

Facts: Police received tip from anonymous informant that drug transaction was occuring in first floor apartment. Based on tip, officer went to apartment building and observed defendants putting white powder into bags through crack in the blinds. PO obtained warrant and conducted a search. Defendants had only been at apartment for few hours and had promised owner drugs in exchange for using her apartment. Trial court denied suppression motion, holding that defendant wasn't overnight social guest (per Olsen) and thus couldn't claim 4th A protections. Holding (Rehnquist): Where defendants are only present in home for a brief time, solely for commercial purposes, and have no prior relationship with the owner, does not have reasonable expectation of privacy and their 4A was therefore not violated by the search. But 5 justices seem to agree that social guests in a home have a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore have "standing." Under Rakas, 4th A protects people's reasonable expectations of privacy & while protections generally only apply when individual in own home, in few instances individual may claim 4th A protection when in another's home. This was case in Minnesota v. Olson. However, in this case, defendant was only present in apartment for brief time, solely for commercial purposes, & no prior relationship w/owner. Concurrence (Breyer): Agrees w dissent that respondents should get 4A protection, but doesn't think a 4A violation occurred. Dissent (Ginsburg): When homeowner/lessor personally invites guest into home to share in common endeavor, guest should share host's shelter against unreasonable search/seizure

Illinois v. Lidster (2004)

Facts: Police set up checkpoint at same location where fatal hit-&-run accident occurred week earlier, in hopes of obtaining information from drivers who might have been in vicinity at time of crime. Defendant swerved as he approached checkpoint, nearly hitting police officer; breath smelled of alcohol, & failed field sobriety test, leading to arrest & conviction for DUI. Holding: Checkpoints for info gathering purposes are okay. Purpose of checkpoint was to ask vehicle occupants, as members of public, for help in providing information about crime in all likelihood committed by others. Like certain other forms of police activity, crowd control or public safety, information-seeking stop not kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of relevant individual. Law ordinarily permits police to seek voluntary cooperation of members of public in investigation of crime. 4th A's normal insistence that stop be reasonable in context will still provide important legal limitation on police use of information-seeking checkpoint. Here, relevant public concern grave. Police investigating human death. Stops interfered minimally w/ liberty 4th A seeks to protect.

Kentucky v. King (2011)

Facts: Police set up controlled crack cocaine buy. Suspect then entered apt, where marijuana smell emanated. Police knocked on door and announced "police"! Police then heard noise inside that made them believe evidence was being destroyed - they then announced they would enter and kicked down door. Found respondent (not original suspect) and marijuana/cocaine in plain view. Holding: Exigent circumstances exception applies to officer-created exigency so long as officer's conduct was not unreasonable or unconstitutional (e.g. gain entry by means of actual/threatened violation of 4A). Police-created exigency doctrine would require something more than fear of detection by police causing destruction b/c that will always be reason for destroying evidence. Rejects subjective bad faith test -- 4A requires objective view of actions) Rejects reasonable foreseeability test - would insert unpredictability; rejects time to secure warrant test - there are many legitimate reasons police may want to speak w occupants - consensual search may be better; rejects test that reasonable person believes police entry is imminent/inevitable - too subtle and would require analysis of tone of voice, forcefulness of the knock etc. Police can't threaten to violate 4A (can't threaten to knock down door.)

Brendlin v. California (SCT, 2007)

Facts: Police stopped a car with 2 people inside. Officers recognized passenger as parole violator w/ outstanding arrest warrant. Passenger placed under arrest; subsequent search turned up various items used to manufacture meth. Holding: passenger seized when car stopped - Brendlin had no effective way to signal submission while car still moving on roadway, but once it came to a stop he could, & apparently did, submit by staying inside. When police detain number of people in order to investigate one, all members of group have been "seized."

Utah v. Strieff (2016)

Facts: Police surveilling house for suspected illegal drug activity questioned defendant after hev visited briefly without reasonable suspicion/probable cause. After getting his ID, officer found an outstanding warrant for minor traffic offense and arrested/searched defendant on that warrant, finding drugs. Holding (Thomas): Attenuation factors: 1) temporal proximity 2) intervening circumstances, 3) purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. Here, no temporal proximity, but finding a warrant is a significant intervening circumstance that favors admission. Dissent (Sotomayor): PO's sole purpose here was investigative warrant check was part and parcel w officer's illegal expedition for evidence in hope something would turn up. Incentivizes law enforcement to stop someone unlawfully then run a warrant search, and there are lots of outstanding warrants for minor things. Also, not an isolated occurrence.

Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Facts: Police used thermal imager (standing on public street) to determine whether defendant was growing marijuana in his house, and subsequent warranted search revealed indoor growing operation. Holding (Scalia): Obtaining by sense-enhancing tech any info regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into constitutionally protected area constitutes a search. TEST: If you couldn't have gained information without physical intrusion into constitutionally protected area at time of the framing (1791), search. [Unless, perhaps, the tech is in general public use] Goal to preserve degree of privacy that existed when 4th A adopted. Dissent: doesn't show you anything else that could be intimate. Public officials shouldn't have to avert their eyes and tech from things emitting outside of home. Don't constrain tech that hasn't been invented yet judges are not good at making predictions about evolution of tech.

Georgia v. Randolph (2006)

Facts: Police, responding to domestic disturbance call made by wife, arrived at Defendant's house. When police arrived, Defendant's wife proceeded to tell them Defendant used cocaine. Police asked for permission to search home for evidence. Defendant's wife gave consent but Defendant, who was present, refused. Based on wife's consent, police proceeded to search home despite Defendant's objections & discovered cocaine in Defendant's bedroom. Cocaine admitted into evidence at trial because, the court reasoned, Defendant's wife had authority to consent to the search. Holding (Souter): Police may not enter home without warrant to search for evidence (absent exigency) where they obtain consent from occupant but a co-occupant is present and objects to the search. Here, primary assumptions include equal authority of all of occupants but also assumptions about how people act in light of equal authority: guest unlikely to enter when invited by 1 occupant but expressly told to stay away by another. Furthermore, Minnesota v. Olson, holds that overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy in house in which he is staying because host unlikely to invite someone into home over objection. In such situations, one occupant has no authority over other to demand resolution in own favor. Dissent (Roberts): If person shares info/papers/places with another, he assumes risk other person will in turn share access to that information/papers/places w/ gov. A person cannot interpose an objection when third party shares info/papers, so shouldn't be able to for places.

United States v. Sharpe (1985)

Facts: Pulled over car on suspicion vehicle transporting contraband; smelled marijuana, subjected the vehicle to 20 min search & found large quantity of marijuana. Holding: SCOTUS upheld legality of stop. Cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. Brevity of invasion of individual's 4th A interests is important factor in determining whether seizure so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion; need to consider law enforcement purposes to be served by stop as well as time reasonably needed to effectuate purposes. No bright line rule - common sense and human experience must govern. Consider: whether police diligently pursued means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel suspicions quickly; whether police acting in swiftly developing situation (courts should not second-guess); whether police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize & pursue alternative course of action.

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)

Facts: Riding in 4 separate cars, police officers entered high drug area of city to investigate drug transactions. Officers in last car of caravan witnessed Wardlow standing by building holding opaque bag. When Wardlow looked at car he began running away, & officers in last car gave chase & caught him. One of officers immediately conducted pat-down to search for weapons. Officer felt something in bag that appeared to be weapon & when he removed it he discovered it was handgun. Wardlow arrested for unlawful use of weapon by felon. Trial court held stop & frisk was lawful & allowed the gun to be introduced as evidence at trial. Issue: Whether an area of high crime + individual fleeing at the sight of officers is sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk Holding: Search upheld. Area of high crime + individual fleeing at the sight of officers is sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk, though each individually would not amount to reasonable suspicion. Running from police not exercise of Florida v. Royer disengagement right, but instead amounts to evasive & suspicious behavior that properly leads law enforcement officers to reasonably believe unlawful activity occurring. 4th A doesn't require that police exhaust all lawful explanations before they may develop reasonable suspicion, & Terry opinion acknowledges police may stop innocent people from time-to-time. Dissent (Stevens): Many legitimate reasons to start running. Even innocent people may run from the police bc they don't want to be potential suspect or have to testify as a witness or might just conclude that there is criminal activity nearby bc of police presence and therefore want to get out. Minorities might also believe that contact w police itself can be dangerous for them. Many innocent reasons for flight are exactly concentrated in high crime areas.

Camara v. County of SF (1967)

Facts: San Francisco Housing Inspector entered apartment building where Def resided to make routine inspection. After being told Def was living on ground floor in violation of building's occupancy permit, inspector demanded to inspect area. Def refused to allow inspector in and was issued citation requiring appearance at office of district attorney. When def didn't appear, inspectors returned to building demanding entry pursuant to § 503 of Housing Code. Upon refusal, was charged & arrested. Holding: Administrative searches require consent or warrant under 4th A. However, obtaining warrant doesn't require probable cause that particular place to be inspected is in violation of code; only probable cause that general area requires inspection. Factors in determining reasonableness here: 1) program had a long history of judicial and public acceptance, 2) public interest demands all dangerous conditions be prevented/abated and doubtful that any other canvassing technique would work, 3) inspections are not personal in nature or aimed at discovering evidence of crime - limited invasion of privacy. Warrant is not a rubber stamp here guarantee that decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable gov interest.

Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001)

Facts: TX state law makes misdemeanor not to wear seat belt - authorizes arrest w/o warrant. Defendant driving w/ kids and not wearing seatbelt. Officer pulled over defendant for this violation then arrested her and took to police station. Atwater filed 1983 suit against Turek Holding: 4A does not forbid warrantless arrest for minor criminal offenses only punishable by fine. Unclear whether peace officer's authority to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanor restricted at time of 4A framing. Problem with basing distinction on penalty is that officer may not readily be able to tell at the time. Not a big deal - you get magistrate review, legislature can pass statutes barring warrantless arrest for misdemeanors, and practical/political considerations means that these silly arrests will not occur often (regulation by community standards). Dissent (O'Connor): It is clear that defendant's dignity clearly outweighs any interest city can raise in this specific case.

Florida v. Jimeno (1991)

Facts: Trujillo informed defendant he believed defendant was carrying narcotics, & that he would be looking for narcotics in car. Objectively reasonable for police to conclude that general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within car which might bear drugs. Holding: 4th A satisfied when, under circumstances, objectively reasonable for officer to believe that scope of suspect's consent permitted him to open particular container w/ in automobile.

California v. Hodari D (1991)

Facts: Two officers on patrol. As they were approaching small car, youths huddled around car saw officers & took off running. Suspicious (but no reasonable suspicion yet), officers gave chase. Just before one officer caught up w/ him, Hodari D. tossed crack cocaine he had been carrying. Hodari D. moved to have drug evidence excluded at trial & motion was denied. Holding (Scalia): 4th A seizure occurs where police exercise physical force over subject where subject submits to officer's show of authority. Not a seizure if the subject does not yield. While arrest can occur by slightest application of physical force, if subject frees himself from such restraint arrest & seizure come to end until subject is brought back into police custody. Hence, when he threw drugs away before officer caught him, he abandoned drugs & confiscation was not fruit of seizure.

Fernandez v. CA (2014)

Facts: When police went to Defendant's apt to question him about robbery, crying woman answered door and told officers she had been in fight and only other person in apt was her 4-yo son, but Defendant then appeared and refused search. They arrested him for assaulting woman and took him to police station. Then returned to house and obtained consent from woman to search Holding: An occupant who is absent due to lawful detention or arrest stands in same shoes as occupant who is absent for any other reason and cannot consent.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976)

Held: approved suspicionless stopping of vehicles at permanent checkpoint on highway leading away from Mexican border. Balance of interests: significant government interest in routine checkpoints vs. limited 4A rights intrusion.

Delaware v. Prouse (1979)

Held: declined to permit random, suspicionless police stops of cars to check licenses/registration (but would allow other spot checks that had more constrained discretion/less intrusive.

Mich Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990)

Held: suspicionless roadblock stops to check for drunk drivers was permissible due to magnitude of drunk driving problem and unlike stops in Prouse, all cars were being stopped.

United States v. Place (1983)

Holding: Can do a Terry seizure of luggage. When officer has reasonable belief that traveler is carrying luggage w narcotics, Terry permits officer to detain luggage briefly to investigate circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that investigative detention is properly limited in scope. Here, 90 min detention of luggage without probable cause was not reasonable.

Payton v. New York (1980)

Holding: Court struck down a New York statute that authorized warrantless entries into private homes for the purpose of making felony arrests.

Illinois v. James (1990)

Holding: Havens only applies to Ds and not other witnesses. Witnesses already face threat of perjury charge if they lie. Ds might also fear their own witnesses would make some statement in sufficient tension with tainted evidence to allow gov to introduce it for impeachment - might chill D's ability to bring his/her own case + witnesses

Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)

Holding: Intrusion based on consent of third party whom police reasonably believed possessed common authority over premises is constitutional (mistake is okay). In order to satisfy "reasonableness" requirement of 4th A, what is generally demanded of many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of government is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.

Maryland v. Wilson (1997)

Holding: Mimms applies to vehicle passengers as well.

Penn v. Mimms (1977)

Holding: Officer can command person out of their car as part of Terry-style stop and frisk. Makes face-to-face confrontation safer and officer safety outweighs the minimal additional intrusion of asking driver to step out of vehicle.

Maryland v. Buie (1990)

Holding: Police may as a precautionary matter and w/o probable cause/reasonable suspicion look into closets/other spaces immediately adjoining place of arrest from which attack could immediately be launched. But to search areas not adjoining immediate scene, there must be articulable reasonable suspicion that the area swept harbors individual posing danger to those present.

Michigan v. Long (1983)

Holding: Search of passenger compartment is permissible Terry search if police have reasonable suspicion to believe that suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of the weapon, because investigative detentions of suspects in vehicles are dangerous to police even though suspect is outside car at time of search. (he will be permitted back into the vehicle at some point.)

Arizona v. Johnson (2009)

Holding: When a driver/passenger is lawfully detained in connection with a traffic stop, police may pat down person whenever they have reasonable suspicion that person is armed and dangerous, regardless whether police also have cause to believe the vehicle's occupant is involved in criminal activity. Inquiry into matters unrelated to the traffic stop do not convert encounter into something other than lawful seizure.

Florida v. Bostick (1991)

Seizure does not occur simply because police officer approaches individual & asks few questions. So long as reasonable person would feel free "to disregard the police and go about his business," encounter is consensual.

Hoffa v. United States (1966)

Successful efforts of informant to obtain confidence of suspect & to elicit statements from him only indicate wrongdoers misplaced belief that confidant he voluntarily confided to would not reveal info. No 4A interest in that information.