IESD PART II
Governance of global land (Creutzig)
• Land has no safeguard due to diverse purposes and stakeholders - agricultural large scale policies remain rare (and unsustainable, e.g., EU) • Global governance of land should learn from local schemes • Environmental protection actions are public goods • Land should be considered a global common pool resource • Regulatory changes needed: conservation (harmonised standards and international financing), innovation (technology and management), reduction of land use through sustainable consumption patterns
Three theories to explain the issue of The Tragedy of the Commons:
(1) Prisoners' dilemma; (2) Freerider problem; (3) Logic of collective action
According to Ostrom "some individuals have broken out of the trap inherent in the commons dilemma" (p 21) due to differences between groups in terms of:
- Communication - Trust - A common identity or solidarity - Power
SEVEN DESIGN PRINCIPLES (OSTROM) + 1 For larger systems
1. Clearly defined boundaries 2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 3. Collective-choice arrangements 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanctions 6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 8. Nested enterprises
Four characteristics of corrupt institutions (Robbins):
1. Not the absence of state-activities but the result of state-apparatus building 2. Corruption more likely when government officials have excessive power and monopoly over a resource 3. Corruption will be higher and more frequent when corrupt participants are monitored and cheating will be punished (cheating here: Going to an honest police officer). 4. Corruption will increase over time when it becomes a local culture
According to Ostrom commitment and monitoring depend on 5 factors
1. Number of appropriators - we can't be too few, or too many. 2. Cost of monitoring - How much does it cost us to go through the monitoring? Examples of fishery - self-monitoring. Areas divided for the certain day. The users themselves can use it => not so costly. But there are other examples from book and articles where self-monitoring is not an option => hiring of monitoring. 3. Benefit from stealing (=non-commitment) - It also depends on how much benefit is given from not sticking to the rules (non-commitment) 4. Punishment imposed - Whether or not you are a believable source of punishment imposed - will the non-committed people feel threatened? 5. Reward that monitors receive for detecting rule-breaking (including moral standing in the community) - it needs to be worth it to report those who break the rules, corruption.
Criticism of Ostrom's approach: NUMBER 1 (Araral)
1. Ostrom's critique of Hardin's tragedy of the commons is valid in small-scale, locally governed commons - applicable to the small scale, on the local level. However, what Araral find is that there seem to be that this idea is valid on a global scale, on larger common pool resources. - Hardin's argument seems to convince more than Ostrom on larger examples
THREE TYPES OF RESOURCES
1. PRIVATE GOODS - Rivalrous, Excludable 2. PUBLIC GOODS - Non-rivalrous, non-excludable 3. COMMON POOL RESOURCES - Rivalrous, Non-excludable
Three solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons:
1. PUBLIC - The state authority to regulate the resource that we have. 2. PRIVATE - The market: turning it into a private resource. 3. COMMON - Common Property Resources (CPR). Elinor Ostrom's suggestion 1990, Governing the Commons
Criticism of Ostrom's approach: NUMBER 2 (Araral)
2.Generalisation of Ostrom's design principles? - To what extent can we apply this on more CPR cases? Does it mean that her argument is applicable to any common pool resource? - Confirmatory bias in following case studies? - Specification problems, coding, operationalisation: What are clear boundaries? - What constitutes success? - What is success to begin with? What are our criteria? - Multi-collinearity: How dependent on each other are the design principles? We are not clear if Ostrom's design principles are dependent on each other or not. - Endogeneity problem: Successful cases because of DP or did initial success lead to development or reinforcement of DP? - Did the success depend on DP or did the success lead to DP? Maybe the DP evolved because the CPR was successful to begin with? - How do we select the cases? Did we select them based on Ostrom's DPs?
Criticism of Ostrom's approach: NUMBER 3 (Araral)
3. Ostrom's critique of privatisation: - How do we define private ownership? Ostrom: individual owners Araral: more forms, e.g., partnerships (clubs, associations), corporate entities (corporations, local villages...) that makes exclusion feasible - Were Ostrom's successful CPR cases privatised to the extent that they made exclusion possible? => Ostrom is very harsh at criticising private property but part of what she is suggesting includes different forms of private property (not just individual). - There are many DP that will work to exclude people form the CPR.
(1) Prisoners' Dilemma and why it is relevant (Hardin)
A pasture open to all - each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons - may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries - finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality = tragedy. - short-term = win, win (3,3) - long-term = tragedy (0,0) - Because of degradation of the resource. Why relevant? These problems aren't solved with technical solutions. A question of co-operation in many cases
Corruption in CPR: broken swords (Sundström)
Covenants with swords vs. covenants with broken swords • Inspectors enforce regulations - Inspectors act blind and corrupt • Sanctioning fines are dealt with by the enforcement chain - Fines get lost from bribes to clerks and judges in the enforcement chain • Whistle-blowing on misconduct is risk free and received seriously - Whistle-blowing is inefficient as it is not prioritized in management and may be risky if colluding colleagues receive this information • Inspectors' wrongdoings result in sanctions - Inspectors' wrongdoings seldom lead to sanctions since top personnel in the agency prosper from the situation
(3) Logic of collective action
Developed by Mancur Olson - specifically set out to challenge the grand optimism expressed in group theory: that individuals with common interest would voluntarily act so as to try to further those interests. "unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests."
Corruption in Natural Resource Management - What is Robbins suggestion?
Most ideologies or perspectives relate corruption to the absence of a strong state and the general lack of ruleof-law. => Perhaps not the best definition? - Alternative: look at corruption as the existence of alternative norms and rules, rather than the lack of rules
Ostrom's suggestion to solve the ToC:
Self-governance on the local level by the appropriators of a CPR
Public management as proposed solution to solve ToC -Assumption and Problem (Young)
The Tragedy of the Public Domain Assumption: Rules and decision-making to protect the commons from destructive effects unregulated use has. Problems: Problems: i) Gridlock from breakdown of policymaking processes - you may end up in a situation where policy making is completely stopped and hindered. You can't get a winning coalition. ii) Corruption, subsidies for specific groups - corruption in the form of the activities of special interests, iron triangles and lobbyists leading to subsidies, tax breaks, and a host of other outcomes favoring the interests of certain user groups. iii) "Institutional arthritis" - the political system is very slow => takes a very long time before something is being done - inability to respond to problems in time
Private property as proposed solution to solve ToC - Assumptions and Problems (Young)
The Tragedy of the private property Assumption: The rational individual owner has an interest and the possibility to harvest sustainably. Problems: i) Killing the goose that lays the golden egg - a private owner may well have an interest to harvest something very rapidly, take all of the resources and then sell the land for property. Maybe going on to do the same elsewhere. ii) Non-consideration of non-market values - The private owner is interested in having his personal gains, maybe from timber. What you also have in a forest is ecosystems and biodiversity - the private owner may not have the interest in these (like, subsistence resources, habitat for wildlife, protection against soil erosion, recreational opportunities, spiritual experiences, storage for carbon dioxide). iii) Ignoring the impact of unintended negative side effects - forest being cut down leading to floods in the villages.
Example of successful CPR case: Törbel, Swizerland (Ostrom)
The number of appropriators seem to be important. • Access strictly limited • Fines for breaking the rules were very strict • Administrated by a local officer (Gewalthaber) - could admit new people to the CPR or decline. • Alp association, annual meetings - a forum where you can learn to trust each other.
Putting an end to corruption? Traditional vs. Robbins suggestion
Traditional solution: 'oversight levels' in the bureaucracy and to monitor lower-level officials. Robbins: Better solution might be to reform underlying patterns of social inequity and local power-imbalances on which corruption is built?
(2) Free-riding and real-life examples:
We have a situation where we cannot exclude someone from a collective action: whether or not they decide to participate in the collective action, they will still get the benefit. => it is logical to not participate if you will still get the benefits. • Raking leaves in your neighbourhood • Bringing food to a joint party • Sneaking into a concert without paying
The Tragedy of the Commons
When a resource is a common pool resource, that means, it is rivalrous in consumption, but it is not possible to exclude others from using it, this resource tends to get overused, leading to degradation of this resource
Why do institutions persist? / Why are they difficult to change? (Ostrom)
• Because they embody an equilibrium. • Because they are taken-for-granted. • Path-dependency!
When do institutions change? (Ostrom)
• Critical junctures (war, economic crisis etc) • Marginal groups; previous 'policy losers' often catalysts of change • Institutional entrepreneurs
What makes it easier to cooperate? (Ostrom)
• Homogeneous interests and social attributes • Existence of an arena to talk • Participants have a similar view of the problem • Difficult to induce CPR officials to bend rules • Small number of participants • Mutual trust and shared norms among participants • Networks • Leadership exists
Why are institutions important? (Ostrom)
• Provision of certainty about the behavior of others. • They can give incentives. • Moral and cognitive filters for interpretation and action
Two ways to deal with the solutions of private and public domain (Young)
• Regulatory and top-down - Made e.g. by groups of users or governments: - "Societies can devise systems of rules that impose prohibitions or requirements on the actions of users of natural resources and ecosystem services and proceed to promulgate the regulations needed to move these rules from paper to practice." • Normative and bottom-up - Important part of the picture, not least in small-scale traditional societies - go to the locals, they are necessary in order to create norms on how we can and cannot use resources: - "It directs attention to normative constraints that emerge in the form of social practices."
Corruption in CPR (Sundström)
• States play an important role for CPR governance (see also Mansbridge): enforcement and coordination/facilitation • Relationship: State and users => Regulations can be in place, but not be followed. - relationship between users and inspectors built on bribes (monetary and non-monetary) - Pre-existing relationships => inadequate enforcement or participation of officers in illegal fishing
