PHL113 Exam

Discuss the responses to Divine Command Theory & The Euthyphro Problem (Plato).

(1) Bite the bullet (William of Ockham). Embrace: it is the case that had God willed us to steal from charity, that would be a good thing to do. When biting the bullet, you in general want to say something to make the bullet a 'tasty morsel'. (2) Mysterianism: we are incapable of understanding God's divine nature. If we cannot understand God, we can't understand his motivations - why he does what he does. So we cannot understand why God willed morality the way he did. But if we understand that he is the ultimate power, then at least we know that he is the source of the moral law. Whether he is an arbitrary source remains unknown/unknowable. However we are certainly not forced to think morality is arbitrary. (3) God is the standard of morality (Robert Adams, The Virtue of Faith 1987). Suppose we know God is omnibenevolent - all-loving. Then he cannot command us to do what would be bad for us (e.g. drinking gasoline). But instead of saying that this means He is subject to an external standard, we say that the standard is God's own nature - the standard is internal to him, not 'external'.

What are the two main claims James made?

(1) Eternal things are the best things. (2) Your life will be better if you believe (1). So when considering whether we can have religious belief without evidence, we are wondering whether we can believe the conjunction of (1) and (2) Suppose now that (1) and (2) are both true. We're speaking to the 'saving remnant' here - people who want to believe. Religion needs to be a live choice: James is not speaking to convinced atheists. If (1) and (2) are true, then religion is a momentous choice: we gain by believing, and lose by disbelieving. And, finally, religion is a forced choice: you either believe or you don't believe. Moreover, James thinks that the dictum 'believe only what you have evidence for' is bad because empiricism says that there could be truths for which there is no humanly accessible evidence.

Describe the reasons how Mackie supplements his argument with 'quasi-logical rules' connecting the meanings of "good", "evil", and "omnipotent".

(1) Good always eliminates evil as much as it can (2) There are no limits on what an omnipotent thing can do. Therefore, (3) A good and omnipotent thing always eliminates evil completely. And so we get: P1: God exists, and always eliminates evil completely (supposition, plus (1)-(3) above) C1: If God existed, there would be no evil (from P1) P2: Evil exists (observation) Therefore, C2: Contradiction (C1, P2) Therefore, C3: God does not exist. (C2, P1)

What are the attributes that Western philosophy gives God?

(1) Omniscience: they know everything (2) Omnipotence: they can do anything they want (3) Omnibenevolence: they love every single one of us, and is personally concerned for our welfare

Discuss the logical possibility of good, evil, and God.

(a) To say that good cannot exist without evil is to limit God's power: he cannot create any good without also creating some evil. Can God do what is logically impossible? Some theists have held that God creates the laws of logic. If this is right, then God can create good without creating evil. So the theist needs to hold that God cannot break the laws of logic (once he's created them). (b) The claim that the existence of good requires the existence of evil denies that good and evil are opposed in that good eliminates evil as far as it can. Compare 'big' and 'small': perhaps there cannot be big houses unless there are also small houses. Big and small are relative qualities, not absolute ones: something can be small for a house, but big for a mouse. If there are no big houses, there are no small ones either. But presumably theists don't mean 'good' and 'evil' to signify qualities that are relative in this way. If something is good/evil, it is absolutely so, no matter what else happens. (b*) The existence of evil is a precondition for the existence of good (perhaps because good consists in the elimination of evil). Thus the existence of evil is a necessary cause for the existence of good. But then God is subject to causal laws/laws of preconditions. Therefore: so long as evil exists, God lacks omnipotence - he is subject to laws of logic, or laws of causation/precondition.

Discuss responses to Mackie's argument against the existence of God.

(i) Being omnipotent doesn't mean you can do absolutely anything. Mackie claims that those restricting omnipotence in response to the problem of evil tend to assert unrestricted omnipotence in other areas of their theology. (ii) Evil doesn't really exist, it is just an illusion. E.g. This world of temporal, changing things is an illusion, and it is to this world that evil belongs. Mackie claims that those who take evil to be an illusion assert otherwise in other areas of their theology. (iii)The existence of good requires the existence of evil. Good contrasts with evil, or, good is the elimination of evil

Give a brief recap of Chisholm's argument.

(i) Chisholm accepts the inference from causal determinism (and indeterminism) to lack of moral responsibility. (ii) But he denies that causal determinism and indeterminism are the only options. (iii) He argues that there is agent-causation as well as event-causation, and agent-causation is determined by free choice (not antecedent events).

List the objections to Pascal's Wager on the belief in God.

(i) God is thoroughly incomprehensible to us (theological mysticism). So we cannot believe in him - it is psychologically impossible. We know there is at least one infinite number (the number of finite numbers), but not whether it is even or odd. We can know that, and hence believe in, the existence of something without having beliefs about the properties that thing has. Belief in God does not require holding beliefs about his nature, or what he is like. (ii) The argument assumes that there is only one God (who rewards belief in this way), and you know how to believe in them. What if you wind up believing in the wrong God? There are many religions. If you believe in the wrong one, you will not be saved. The more religions there are, the less likely that Pascal is talking about the right one. This reduces the probability of the you believe, and you are right combination of events - but does not reduce it to zero. Provided that probability is not zero, the possibility of infinite happiness still makes it rational to believe. We should still believe. (iii) The argument assumes that you shouldn't apply a probability of zero to the hypothesis that God exists. But if Pascal's God turns out to be a logically inconsistent being, this is what we should do. If we can figure out that Pascal's God is logically inconsistent, we can infer that he cannot exist, and so dismiss the wager. There is no chance of 'winning'.

What are the reasons for believing in moral relativism?

(i) Morality is a social construction (Glaucon in the Republic): if the standards for moral action are socially constructed, then which standards get constructed can vary between societies. (ii) Utilitarianism: if what makes people happy/gives pleasure/prevents pain varies from society to society, then so does what is permitted or forbidden. (iii) Metaphysics of moral facts: if there are no genuine, mind-independent facts about what is right or wrong, then perhaps the next best explanation for our belief that theft is wrong is that we have a social practice of regarding it as wrong. What makes theft wrong is the same kind of thing that makes it wrong to wear a hat indoors - we act as if it's wrong. (iv) Epistemology of moral facts: forming a justified belief about whether a given culture's practices are ethically ok or not requires substantial knowledge of how that culture functions. Perhaps, so substantial you basically need to become part of that culture. (v) History: inattention to specific features of the way other cultures work has, in the past, resulted in some pretty horrific colonial practices. So perhaps we should not make judgements about other culture's practices without first gaining a thorough knowledge of how that culture works.

Discuss the objections to the teleological argument for the belief in God (Paley).

(i) We don't understand the 'design' of the natural world - so it has no design. I.e. P1 is false for entities whose design we don't understand Reply: when we encounter a design that we don't understand we are more likely to infer the existence of a designer, not less likely. (ii) Inhabitants of the natural world sometimes do not function properly. And bad functioning is evidence of lack of design. P1 is false for complex entities that malfunction. Reply: well, some of the objects we've designed manage to malfunction. But that doesn't mean we didn't design them. (iii) Human beings have tailbones - why would we be designed with tailbones? Presence of superfluous parts is evidence of lack of design. P1 is false for entities with superfluous parts. Reply: superfluity of one part of a system does not undermine the appearance of design of other parts. If the other parts appear designed, they maintain that appearance no matter what the rest of the world looks like. (iv) It is a law of nature that the natural world be complex. If something is a product of the laws of nature (like a stone in a field), it is not a product of design. P1 is false for entities produced by natural processes. Reply: Laws only regulate cause-effect relationships, they don't themselves cause anything. So we can't attribute the existence of any particular thing - which will be the product of at least one cause-effect relationship - to the laws of nature alone. (v) Inhabitants of the natural world reproduce. But we don't 'design' our children (at least, not yet!). Complexity is not evidence of design in cases of reproduction. P1 is false for entities that are the product of reproductive processes. Reply: if anything, the fact that an entity can reproduce increases the evidence of design (and designer): reproduction is another level of complexity.

Describe some caveats to Pascal's wager.

(i) You have to take the wager. You can't decline to bet. Agnosticism is not an option. The question of whether God exists is so important that ignoring it is irrational. You must take a stand. (ii) How we act ought to depend in part on whether we believe in life after death or not. I.e. P1. The state of Earthly life is finitely long. P2. The state of death is infinitely long. Therefore, C. Our actions should depend in part on whether we believe in life after death. (suppressed premise [P3]: We should act to improve the quality of our life after death)

Describe the two popular responses to Mackie's argument on the existence of God and evil.

(i) the world is better off with evil in it than without (this is 'the best of all possible worlds', in the words of philosopher Gottfreid Wilhelm Leibniz) Two versions: (a) Aesthetic contrast - the good in the world is more good when contrasted with evil. (b) Dynamic contrast - progress is a (very) good thing, and for progress to occur, there needs to be evil to begin with (so it can be eliminated later on). (ii) evil is the product of free will, which is good for us to have. Evil is not the (direct) product of God's actions, but of human actions - and we can act evilly because God gave us free will. We could even say that free will is a third-order good - it promotes the existence of second-order goods like sympathy, compassion, etc. This requires that sympathy, compassion etc. that are the product of free action are better than when they are the product of determined action. And that second-order evils are prerequisites for the existence of free will. Reply: the possibility (or maybe even actuality?) of choosing evilly is a prerequisite for the existence of free will. (If we never choose evil, we're not choosing freely.). Mackie's response: this makes freedom look like randomness. Genuine free will has it that human choice is the product of human character. But if freedom is randomness, then free actions are not the product of will. And if freedom is randomness, then it is hard to see how freedom is a good thing. Lastly: if humans are free in the sense that God cannot control their actions, then he is not omnipotent. Perhaps God could control us, but his omnibenevolence means he refrains from doing so? But then, why doesn't God just control the evil actions? If these evil actions are in fact prerequisites for goodness, then they are not really evil - contra what most of the bible says about sin.

What is the official precise statement of Divine Command Theory: for every action Φ.

(i) Φ is forbidden if and only if God forbids Φ (i.e., wills that we not do Φ); (ii) Φ is obligatory if and only if God mandates Φ (will that we do Φ); and (iii) Φ is permitted if and only if God has neither forbidden nor mandated Φ. In case (i), Φ is a bad or wrong thing to do; in case (ii), Φ is a good or right thing to do; and in case (iii) Φ is morally neutral.

Describe the Ring of Gyges.

1. A shepherd finds a chasm containing a bronze horse. 2. In the bronze horse there is a body 'of more than human size'. 3. The body is wearing a ring. 4. When the shepherd realizes this, he uses it to obtain a position of power within the king's administration. 5. Then he seduces the king's wife and murders the king with her help... 6. ... and takes over the kingdom. In short: the ring allows its wearer to do whatever they want without consequences.

What are the two important claims in Mills' Utilitarianism?

1. Happiness is the only intrinsic good. All other goods are instrumental 2. The common moral claims (don't kill, don't steal, share your things etc.) promote happiness. Moral action is not intrinsically good, but instrumentally good. Moral action gets us happiness, which is intrinsically good.

What are the positive features of Utilitarianism?

1. It explains the flexibility of morality: Killing is nearly always wrong - but there are exceptions. E.g. self-defence, lying to an axe-murderer, medical experimentation on animals (maybe)? 2. It explains the universality of morality: We have a strong intuition that morality applies to everyone equally (or every able-bodied adult, at least): it is wrong to kill/steal from/lie to anyone, regardless of who they are. This is because utilitarianism takes everyone's happiness into account equally.

Describe Glaucon / Plato's claim in "The Immoralist's Challenge"?

1. Justice originates in the requirement for a peaceful society. Glaucon claims that people 'naturally' want to do injustice, but not have injustice done to them. Observation: Doing an injustice gives one an advantage. E.g. stealing money, rather than working for it. But, the bad resulting from suffering injustice outweighs the good obtained by inflicting it. This is why we don't just go around doing injustice all the time - the negative results outweigh the positives. But: if one could do injustice with no consequences, then it would be rational to do so. Therefore: Anyone that does act justly does so only because there are consequences. So we make laws to help society function. What we call just (or morally correct) is nothing more than what laws command. This is the origin of justice - we impose laws on other people to ensure that society functions. 2. When people practice justice, they do so against their will. Glaucon's argument for the claim that when we practice justice, we do so against our (natural) will takes the form of a thought experiment. Therefore: Glaucon argues that because everyone would be unjust if they wouldn't be found out, the reason people do act justly is because of fear of the law. 3. When people do act justly, they do so against their will. When people do act justly (morally), they do so because they have good (instrumental) reasons (avoid punishment, gain reward in the form of good reputation) for doing so.

What is a declarative sentence?

A declarative sentence is a sentence that says that something is the case.

What is a fallacy?

A fallacy is an argument that is presented as a good reason to believe its conclusion when it actually isn't.

Discuss hypothesis: taxonomy.

A hypothesis can be either alive or dead. A live hypothesis is one that is a 'real possibility', i.e., viable, consistent with current evidence. Implausible hypotheses are 'dead'. A choice between two hypotheses (an 'option') can be one or more of: (i) Living or dead; (ii) Forced or avoidable; (iii) Momentous or trivial. A living choice is when both hypotheses are alive (i.e. viable). A forced choice is where you must believe one of the candidate hypotheses (Agnosticism is not an option). A momentous choice is one that has real consequences. A choice is genuine when it is all three of living, forced, and momentous. When the choice is genuine - living, forced, and momentous - skeptical agnosticism is not the best stance to adopt.

What is a suppressed premise?

A suppressed premise is a premise that is not explicitly stated in an argument, but which is assumed nevertheless.

Differentiate between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

Act utilitarianism: the right thing to do in any particular case is what creates the most happiness. Rule utilitarianism: the right thing to do is to follow the rules which in most cases create the most happiness.

How do you know when an inductive argument is good? When it is cogent?

An (inductive) argument is good if and only if: the truth of the premises gives reason to believe the conclusion or the truth of the premises increases the probability that the conclusion is true. An (inductive) argument is cogent if and only if it is good and its premises are true.

What is an argument?

An argument is a sequence of declarative sentences, some of which are premises and one of which is the conclusion.

What is a sound argument?

An argument is sound if and only if it is valid and its premises are true. Statements, sentences and propositions are not valid or sound, only arguments are.

What is a valid argument?

An argument is valid if and only if its premises can't be true without the conclusion being true too. (it is not possible for the premises to be true and conclusion false)

Describe Galileo's 'falling objects' thought experiment.

Aristotelian physics says that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Imagine a heavy object glued to a lighter object (so they form 'one' object). Does this fall slower or faster than the heavy part by itself?

Discuss Ayer's 'Compatibilist' response.

Ayer endorses global (in)determinism - the claim that every event is either causally determined or is a matter of chance. But he does not endorse the further inference to lack of free will and hence moral responsibility. He wants to make lack of free will compatible with possession of moral responsibility - hence why his view is called 'compatibilism'. Ayer thinks the action is the product of free will if the agent was not compelled (or constrained) to act the way that they did. Consider: (i) I go to the corner store and shoplift a candy bar. versus: (ii) Some other person holds a gun to my head and makes me shoplift a candy bar. (If I don't do it, they will shoot me.) Ayer claims that in case (ii), I am compelled to shoplift the candy bar - but not in case (i). Furthermore, our intuition says that in case (i) I am morally responsible for the theft - and should be punished. But not in case (ii). So: all constrained (or compelled) actions are causally determined, but not vice-versa - not all causally determined actions are constrained. So even if causal determinism is true, not all actions are constrained. Ayer thinks that the causally determined, unconstrained actions are the ones for which we are morally responsible.

Is this argument valid? Is it sound? P1. If Obama is elected, then he will close Guantanamo Bay. P2. Guantanamo Bay is still open. Therefore, C. Obama has not been elected.

Can P1 and P2 be true, and C false? No. So the argument is valid! We already know the argument is valid. So, are all the premises true? Well, even though Obama said he would close Guantanamo Bay if elected, he hasn't done so. So it looks like P1 is not true. No, It is not sound.

How does Chisholm view Ayer's compatibilist response?

Chisholm disagrees with Ayer's 'compatibilist' solution. According to Chisholm, if Ayer and others are right, then (i) S could have done otherwise means the same is (is synonymous with) (ii) If S has chosen to do otherwise, he would have done otherwise. And (ii) is consistent with causal determinism.. Therefore if (ii) and (i) are synonymous, then (i) is consistent with causal determinism. Given that the actions we are responsible for are those such that we could have done otherwise, the existence of moral responsibility is consistent with causal determinism. Chisholm believes that Ayer's argument is valid: if (i) and (ii) mean the same thing, and (i) ascribes free will, then free will and determinism are compatible (or at least, consistent). But he does not agree that the argument is sound. In particular, he does not think that (i) and (ii) mean the same thing.

What is the conclusion to Mary Midgley's argument on moral isolationism?

Conclusion: accepting a claim as a serious moral truth in the context of one culture, means accepting that same claim as a serious moral truth about other cultures. To not do this is to not seriously respect the other culture Seriously respecting the other culture means allowing that it can teach us things - including things about our own culture.

Give examples of deductive vs. inductive arguments.

Deductive : P1 : Socrates is a man P2 : All men are mortal Therefore, C : Socrates is mortal Deductive arguments are such that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Inductive : P1 : Socrates is a man P2 : All men so far have been mortal Therefore, C : Socrates is mortal Inductive arguments are such that the truth of the premises raises the likelihood of the conclusion.

What is empiricism?

Empiricism about X is the view that all of our evidence concerning X can only be obtained through sense experience. There is no 'purely mental insight' into what the world is like (with respect to X). Global empiricism is the view that evidence concerning anything can only come from sense experience.

What are some problems/objections to Utilitarianism and the response to them?

First Objection: the existence of sad people brings net happiness down. So does Utilitarianism say we should kill, or deport, all the sad people? Response: Maybe not. We can distinguish rule utilitarianism from act utilitarianism. (a) Act utilitarianism: the right thing to do in any particular case is what creates the most happiness. (b) Rule utilitarianism: the right thing to do is to follow the rules which in most cases create the most happiness. According to rule utilitarianism, killing all the sad people is wrong because in most cases, killing creates unhappiness. Second objection: the organ donor case. Five people are in hospital, each with a different ailment. One has faulty kidneys, the other a bad heart, etc. Harvesting one healthy person's organs would save five lives. Should we do it? Response: Maybe not if we're rule utilitarians..? Could we have a rule saying 'don't harvest people's organs without their consent'? Third objection: morality is not as universal as utilitarianism says. It is intuitively plausible that we have more of a moral obligation to our own families than to total strangers on other continents. Response: Maybe we could say that we're rule utilitarians, and we have a rule that says 'help your family over strangers (all else being equal)'.

Describe some questions on Mary Midgley's view on moral isolationism.

First Question: does the same point apply to members of foreign cultures judging our practices? Understanding - including understanding of other cultures - can come in degrees. Progress is possible - it's not all-or-nothing. If this is true, it holds for ourselves as well as outsiders. Second Question: does moral isolationism forbid positive judgements as well as negative ones? Midgley claims that we need to be able to praise other cultures. But how can we praise, if we can't also criticize? If we can praise, that praise must rest on some kind of understanding. But again, this understanding need not be complete understanding. Indeed, the possibility of praise based on incomplete understanding is required if learning from strangers is to be possible. We need to be able to judge which strangers are worth learning from and which not. But this doesn't require complete understanding - otherwise there would never be anything to learn! Last question: if we cannot judge other cultures, can we even judge our own culture? To judge one's own culture (e.g. is eating meat ok?) one needs a standard of comparison. The standard of comparison can't just be what your own culture does, because everything your culture does meets that standard - automatically. But it is not plausible that every practice occurring in our society is automatically morally permitted.

Describe the casual determinism argument for why to think that there is no free will.

First pass: P1. Causal determinism: for any event E that occurs at time tn, the totality events that occurred prior to tn (i.e. at any tm<n), plus the laws of nature, is sufficient for E's occurrence. Therefore, C1. If E is an event involving a human agent S's action, then E was determined by the totality of prior events plus the laws of nature (both of which S has no control over). Therefore, C2. For any E, S has no control over whether E occurs. P3. If S has no control over E, then S is not morally responsible for E. Therefore, C3. For any E, S is not morally responsible for E.

Discuss first-order good and evil and second-order good.

First-order good and evil, i.e. physical pleasure & happiness vs physical pain & misery. Second-order good: the elimination of first-order evil. Also: second-order good is more important than first-order good - in particular, the second-order good outweighs the first-order evil the existence of which it requires. So the world is better if it contains second-order good (as well as first-order good). But the opposition between second-order good and first-order evil is not quite the same as the original opposition between (first-order) good and (first-order) evil. In particular, first-order good opposes first-order evil, and second-order good minimizes first-order evil (and maximizes first-order good). So God's greatness is not to maximize first-order good, but second-order good. Hence God's goodness is not first- or second-order goodness, but third-order goodness - the maximizing of second-order goodness. And third-order omnipotence / omnibenevolence is consistent with the existence of first-order evil.

What is a counterexample?

For every invalid argument, there is at least one possible situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. This is called a counterexample to the argument.

Briefly discuss Plato's "The Immoralist's Challenge".

Glaucon is one of the characters in Plato's dialogue The Republic. Glaucon argues that justice is an instrumental good, valuable only insofar as it helps us get something else. Moreover, acting justly is 'burdensome': it takes a lot of effort. The investment cost is high.So given how burdensome right action is, we would only do act that way if we could get very good rewards for it. (Think in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.)

Describe the stages of Glaucon's argument in Plato's "The Immoralist's Challenge".

Glaucon's argument for this view proceeds in three stages: (i) Justice originates in the requirement for a peaceful society. (ii) When people practice justice, they do so against their will. (iii) But people have good (instrumental) reasons to act justly. Therefore: moral motivation, insofar as it is rational, is always caused by a desire to better one's own existence. (i) Justice originates in the requirement for a peaceful society. Glaucon claims that people 'naturally' want to do injustice, but not have injustice done to them. Note: this is an empirical claim about what people are like; it requires observations to justify it

What does Mill describe happiness as?

Happiness = pleasure (and absence of pain). So pleasure (and absence of pain) is the sole intrinsic good. Note: it is not (just) your own happiness, but everyone's happiness, that matters. So (e.g.) stealing is wrong because it lowers everyone's happiness more than it increases one's own.

What is hard compatibilism?

Hard compatibilism = we don't have the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. Derk Pereboom rejects both compatibilism and libertarianism - and accepts hard incompatibilism. If hard incompatibilism is true, none of us are morally responsible for our own actions. And so we shouldn't be blamed for our wrong actions, nor praised for our right ones. In fact, Pereboom thinks that accepting hard incompatibilism will improve our moral practices.

Discuss Chisholm's positive view.

Human beings can cause things to happen. This ascription of responsibility conflicts with causal determinism (and indeterminism) Chisholm's third option: in cases of free action, the cause of the event is not another event, but an object - the freely acting agent themselves. Chisholm distinguishes two kinds of causation: event-causation (one event causes another) and agent-causation (an agent causes an event). He calls event-causation 'transuent' causation and agent-causation 'immanent causation'.

Describe how humans have no more control over indeterministic events than over deterministic ones.

If E's occurrence is a matter of chance, S no control over whether E occurs. (It's random.) P1. Event E is indeterministic - whether E occurs is a matter of chance. P2. If E's occurrence is a matter of chance, then S has no control over whether E occurs. Therefore, C. If E is indeterministic, S is not responsible for E.

What does it take for an action to be constrained?

If the circumstances are such that no reasonable person would expect me to choose the other alternative, then the action I am made to do is not one for which I am held to be morally responsible.

What is Mackie's third objection?

If there is second-order good, then there is second-order evil, the promotion of first-order evil. And it would seem that second-order evil is more important than first-order evil. Indeed, most theists stress second-order evil more. Second-order evil plainly exists. So we could state the problem of evil in terms of second-order evil. And now our proposed solution - taking God's goodness to be third-order goodness - won't work anymore. Could we state a new solution in terms of minimizing second-order evil, thereby crediting God with fourth-order goodness? We could - but now it looks like we might be started on a regress - for every new version of the solution there's a new version of the argument, and so on and so on, forever.

What is a thought experiment?

Imagining some scenario or situation, and reflecting on the outcome.

Why be moral?

In Plato, Republic Book II, the answer to this question is that morality is the rule of society imposed through consequences - be moral, or face the (negative) consequences. In John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, the answer is that we should be moral because of the positive consequences. Lastly, in Mary Midgley, 'On Trying Out One's New Sword on a Chance Wayfarer', a new set of questions is introduced, begging the question - Are there any universal moral truths? Does everyone have the same reasons to act the same way?

Differentiate between intrinsic good and instrumental good.

Intrinsic good = good for its own sake. (Beauty, pleasure, love - We desire these things for their own sake, not for what other things they can help us gain) Instrumental good = good because it gets you something else. (Money, power - Most people desire money & power not for themselves, but for what other things they can get you) Something can be both an intrinsic and an instrumental good.

Does naturalism entail physicalism?

It's often assumed that it does - or even that they are the same thing. But strictly speaking, naturalism is a methodological doctrine - it is a claim about how we should do philosophy. Physicalism is an ontological doctrine - it's a claim about what exists. Naturalism entails physicalism only if our best scientific theories are themselves physicalistic.

Describe Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument for dualism about the mind (the 'what Mary knows' argument), and give one objection to it.

Let physicalism be the claim that all information is physical information. Suppose Mary has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room, with a black-and-white television, and she dreams in greyscale. Mary is an extremely talented vision scientist; she knows the ideal theory of how human colour perception works. So, she knows all the physical information. One day she leaves her room and sees a red rose for the first time, and says, 'so that's what red looks like'. It looks like Mary has learnt something new - what red looks like - but by hypothesis she already knew all the physical information. Therefore she has learnt non-physical information, and so physical is false. Objection (1): Mary has learnt something she already knew, but under a different mode of presentation [think Fregean sense]. Objection (2): Mary hasn't learnt any new information - she's learnt a new skill, that of how to visually distinguish red things from non-red things.

___ is the mathematical study of one particular feature of arguments : the consequence relation that holds between the premises and the conclusion.

Logic

What reason for believing in moral relativism does Mary Midgley focus on in 'On Trying Out One's New Sword on a Chance Wayfarer'?

Mary Midgley focusses on answer (iv): epistemic access to the standards by which a given practice is judged requires substantial (perhaps total) immersion in that culture.

Is there any stronger argument for physicalism, than that our best scientific theories are physicalistic?

Maybe we don't want to be hostage to the development of science - what if future science starts legitimately talking about non-physical phenomena, like parapsychology? One attempt at such a stronger argument is David Lewis's 'An Argument for the Identity Theory'.

Discuss Midgley's claims on moral isolationism.

Midgley claims that moral isolationism doesn't just forbid moral judgements of other cultures, but moral judgements in general. And if we take 'moral judgements' to be nothing more than judging some action to be an example to aim for or avoid, then moral isolationism rules out justified judgements of actions in general. This extends Midgley's conclusion from moral action, to action in general - whether doing such-and-such is a good idea. Midgley's objection to moral isolationism is that it is fatal to practical philosophy. Nevertheless it is a bad result if we are just incapable of practical philosophy - we evaluate actions all the time, so it would be bad if it turned out that this is completely misguided. Finally: moral isolationism undermines its own motivation. Ethical/cultural relativism results (in part) from a desire to be respectful of other cultures.

Mary Midgley argues that we must be able to form justified judgements about other cultures because if we couldn't, we wouldn't be able to make justified judgements about our own culture either. Describe her argument for this.

Midgley observes that if we are to make justified judgements our own cultural practices, we must do so against an independent standard. For if we did not, then we would not be able to be justified in negatively judging our own culture, which is absurd. But if we can justifiably judge our own culture against an independent standard, then we must have some apprehension of such a standard. If we apprehend an independent standard for cultural practices, then we can judge other cultures against this standard too. Therefore, we can be justified in judging the practices of other cultures.

Discuss the objections to Ayer's compatibilist response.

Objection 1: 'all causes equally necessitate'. Ayer's answer: If 'necessitate' just means 'cause', then the claim is a tautology (i.e. is uninformative, and does not constitute an objection). But if 'necessitate' means 'compel', then the claim is not true. Not all causes equally compel.. Unconstraining causes do not compel. Objection 2: If causal determinism is true, then "the future can be explained in terms of the past: and this means that if one knew enough about the past one would be able to predict the future. But in that case what will happen in the future is already decided." Ayer's response (1): "If the implication is that some person has arranged it [the future], then the proposition is false." (ibid.). It does not follow that our actions don't matter - our actions "are causes as well as effects" (ibid.) We can (in principle) predict the future does not entail that our actions have no impact. It also does not entail that all of our actions are constrained (which is what Ayer thinks is necessary for the elimination of moral responsibility). It only means that what will happen (given what has happened + the laws of nature) will happen. And part of what will happen is the product of our actions (constrained and unconstrained alike). Thus causal determinism (and indeterminism) are compatible with the existence of moral responsibility.

What are the objections + responses to Mills' Utilitarianism?

Objection: does this mean that the moral thing to do is just sit around eating ice cream and watching TV all day? Doesn't this make morality seem very base? Response: People are made happy by noble things. So utilitarianism is consistent with the nobility of moral action. Anyone saying otherwise is short-changing what people are really like. "The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conception of happiness.". The fact that we know it's false that humans would be content with base pleasures shows that the utilitarian does not have to operate with this conception of happiness. Some kinds of pleasures are more desirable than others. In particular, mental pleasures are superior to bodily ones. When someone prefers bodily pleasures to mental ones (e.g. in cases of addiction) we consider them to not be well-functioning. We consider it a good thing to cultivate appreciation for mental pleasures.

List the objections to James's arguments for the belief in God.

Objection: doesn't this license us to believe whatever we want? Answer: no. It only permits belief without evidence if the option is genuine - live, forced, and momentous. It does not license belief without evidence for speculative questions, such as abstract metaphysical questions.It does not license belief in dead hypotheses, such as particular religious claims one finds implausible. An option is live (for an individual) if that individual finds that claim plausible. Given that the religious question is a genuine one, agnosticism is not a rational choice.

Discuss objections to Chisholm's "third option".

Objection: willfully causing an action in the way that engenders moral responsibility requires knowing that you're doing it. We aren't held responsible for things we don't know we're doing But people need not know what they are doing to their brains to be responsible for their actions.. So what you cause your brain to do is not something you're morally responsible for And if you're not responsible for what your brain does, you're not responsible for 'downstream effects'. Reply: distinguish "making E happen" from "doing E". In doing E, you make a lot of other events happen. So while you don't do anything with your brain, you make things in your brain happen in the course of doing other things (like moving ordinary material objects around). And so you're still the cause (agent-cause) of the relevant events in your brain - that then event-cause muscle movements, motion of your arm, etc. You're still responsible for the things you do, even if not for all the things you make happen. Objection: just what is 'agent-causation' anyway? What is the difference between S making E happen, and S's just happening? There is no difference in terms of events prior to E. And there is no difference in terms of E itself. Reply: Does this answer the question 'what is it for an agent to cause an event?' Chisholm admits the question has force - but argues that believers in event causation face an analogous question: 'what is it for one event to cause another?' The problem of giving a philosophically satisfactory analysis of causation is old and difficult.

"Logic is the mathematical study of one particular feature of arguments : the consequence relation that holds between the premises and the conclusion." Why should this (^^ - the study of seemingly disparate questions like what ultimately exists, which actions are the right ones, what is a person, is the future determined, etc...) matter to philosophy?

One very important aspect of philosophy is the use of arguments to arrive at new hypotheses - and perhaps knowledge.

What is naturalism?

Our theories about ourselves and our place in the world should respect our best scientific theories. In other words, philosophy that contradicts science is no good.

Give the teleological argument in premise conclusion form.

P1. Complexity is evidence of purposeful design (Assumption) P2. Purposeful design requires a designer (or creator). (Assumption) P3. The natural world is complex. (Observation) Therefore, C1. The natural world displays evidence of purposeful design. (P1 & P3) Therefore, C2. The natural world displays evidence of its designer (or creator). (P2 & C1) And so, given that we should believe what rational consideration of the evidence tells us to believe, we should believe in the designer of the universe - i.e., in God.

Describe Mackie's argument against the existence of God: the Problem of Evil from a distance.

P1. God is omnipotent. P2. God is wholly good (omnibenevolent). P3. Evil exists. Therefore, C. Contradiction - at least one of P1, P2 or P3 is false.

Describe Mackie's argument against the existence of God: the Problem of Evil from a more close up distance.

P1. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. P2. There is evil in the world. Therefore, C1. Contradiction. Therefore, C2. P1 is false.

Describe Pascal's Wager in premise conclusion form (from a distance).

P1. If God exists, and you believe in Him, you will go to heaven forever after you die (and get infinite goodness). P2. If God exists but you don't believe, you'll go to hell forever (and get infinite badness). P3. If God does not exist but you believe, you'll have less fun than otherwise (and get finite badness). P4. If God does not exist and you don't believe, you'll have slightly more fun (and get finite goodness). Therefore, C. We should believe in God.

Give an example of Denying the Consequent (Modus Tollens).

P1. If P, then Q. P2. Not-Q. Therefore, C. Not-P.

Give an example of Affirming the Antecedent (Modus Ponens).

P1. If P, then Q. P2. P. Therefore, C. Q.

Give an example of Fallacies: Affirming the Consequent.

P1. If P, then Q. P2. Q Therefore, C. P The Gates-Fort Knox argument was an instance of this fallacy.

Give an example of Fallacies: Begging the Question.

P1. P Therefore, C. P This argument form is always valid...arguments that beg the question are not good though, because they fail to give us a good reason to believe the conclusion.

Give an example of how an argument should be structured.

P1. Socrates is a man. --> (P1 means premise 1) P2. All men are mortal. --> (P2 means premise 2) Therefore, C. Socrates is mortal. --> (C means conclusion) This argument is in premise-conclusion form. But not all philosophical arguments are given in premise-conclusion form.

Describe James's argument for the belief in God from a distance.

P1. There can be no rational evidence for or against God's existence. (Supposition) P2. God's existence is a genuine hypothesis. (Term to be defined) P3. If H is a genuine hypothesis for which there can be no rational evidence for or against, you are permitted to believe H. (Supposition) Therefore, C. You are permitted to believe in God.

Give an example of Fallacies: The fallacy fallacy.

P1. Your argument for your conclusion 'P' is fallacious. Therefore, C. 'P' is false.

Describe the teleological argument for the belief in God in detail.

P1: Complexity is evidence of purposeful design. You see a stone on the ground - there is no particular reason to think that someone put it there (the presence of the rock may be the product of purely natural, 'unintentional' events; you see a watch on the ground - someone must have put it there.) The existence of the watch (and perhaps its location) is the product of at least one person intending to construct a watch (and put it in a certain place). P2: Purposeful Design Requires a Designer (or Creator). If any of the parts were not exactly as they are, or they were arranged slightly differently, the watch would not function. The same cannot be said of the stone - if any of the stone's parts were different or arranged differently, we would have a slightly different (though equally well 'functioning') stone. P3: The Natural World is Complex. -is an observation. While there's a little room to quibble about complexity being relevant to a standard (what's complex for a watch may not be complex for a smartphone), it would require some fancy philosophical footwork to try to deny the natural world is complex.

Describe Lewis' Identity theory argument in detail.

P1: Experiences are defined by their causal roles. Experiences are caused by external things, and can cause external things. Experiences are (typically) individuated (told apart) by their causes, and what they themselves cause. In order to tell if someone has had two different experiences, or the same one twice over, we look at what caused the experiences, and what they will cause. P2: Physics is explanatorily adequate. Physics will (ultimately) provide an exhaustive explanation for all physical phenomena. Does not rule out non-physical phenomena; just that we will never need to appeal to non-physical phenomena when explaining physical phenomena. Putting P1 and P2 together gets us that experiences are individuated by their causes, and physics will eventually be able to tell us what these causes are. We will never have to 'reach outside' physics to find something's cause. If there is a causal relation between two events, both events are within the purview of physics. So if an experience is (individuated by) a causal relation between (sensory) input and (motor) output, then it is in the purview of physics - and hence a physical thing. C: Experiences are physical things. The argument doesn't tell us which physical things experiences are - just that because they have causes and effects, they must be physical. But Lewis claims that if experiences are physical things, there is 'little doubt' about which physical things they could be: brain states. So if minds are physical things, then there can be 'little doubt' as to which physical things they are: brains.

Give an example of Fallacies: Denying the Antecedent.

P1: If P, then Q. P2: Not-P. Therefore, C. Not-Q. Example: P1. If Gates owns all the gold in Fort Knox, then he is rich. P2. Gates does not own the gold in Fort Knox. Therefore, C. Gates is not rich P1 and P2 are true, But C is false. Therefore the actual world is a counterexample to this argument.

Describe Glaucon's argument from the Ring of Gyges in premise-conclusion form.

P1: There are two ring-wearers: one begins just (A), the other unjust (B). [thght. exp.] P2: A wearer of the ring of Gyges faces no consequences for their actions. [thght. exp.] P3: For every person, is there are no consequences to their actions, they will act unjustly [empirical claim justified by discussion of (i) above] Therefore, C1: A will act unjustly. [P2, P3] Therefore, C2: A and B will act unjustly. [C1, P1] Therefore: Glaucon argues that because everyone would be unjust if they wouldn't be found out, the reason people do act justly is because of fear of the law.

Derk Pereboom claims that belief in moral responsibility is not necessary for the coherency of most of our moral practices. Give one such practice and the reason Pereboom thinks it does not require belief in free will.

Possibilities include judging actions, incarceration of criminals, hope for the future, being in loving friendships and romantic relationships. -The main thing to concentrate on in the judging actions case is that we can say someone's action was good, bad, regrettable, etc. without holding them responsible for it. E.g. if I accidentally trip someone up I'm not responsible, but it's a bad, regrettable thing, that I can hope I don't do again in the future. -The thing to concentrate on in the incarceration of criminals case is that when someone has an infectious disease, we quarantine them until they're better, but don't hold them responsible for having the disease (at least not usually). Likewise if we view criminality as a disease, we can incarcerate criminals until they are rehabilitated without thereby holding them responsible for their criminal actions. -The thing to concentrate on in the hope for the future case is that even though we might know the future is fixed, we don't know what it is fixed to be, and so we can still hope that it will be one way rather than another. -The thing to concentrate on in the relationship cases is that we love people for their character, appearance, compatibility with ourselves, and so on; but we have no control over these things and so aren't responsible for them. -[in general: 2 marks for identifying a case, 3 for connecting to lack of responsibility]

Discuss the Paradox of Omnipotence.

Question: can an omnipotent God create beings with a will so free that He cannot control them? Or equivalently: can an omnipotent being create rules by which He himself is bound? If 'yes', then once God creates free being/law of logic/causal law X, He is no longer omnipotent (because he can't control/is subject to X). If 'no', then God is not omnipotent - there are things He cannot do. A solution: Distinguish first-order and second-order omnipotence. First-order omnipotence: unlimited power to act. Second-order omnipotence: unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have. At all times God has first-order omnipotence: at no time do any beings have the power to act independently of God. Third option: deny that God is in time. But then the assertion "God made beings with a will so free he cannot control them" doesn't even make sense. In order for God to make us, there has to be a time before which he hasn't made us, and after which he has. It is hard to see how this could be, if God is not in time.

Describe Reductio ad Absurdum.

Reductio ad absurdum ('reduction to absurdity') is the following argument form: P1. Suppose (for the sake of argument) that A is the case. P2. A entails a contradiction (or some other kind of absurdity). Therefore, C. A is not the case. The problem of evil is an argument by reductio: The alleged properties of God contradict ordinary observation. Therefore, God does not exist. Or at least, doesn't have those properties (omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence) which amounts to saying he's not the monotheistic Judeo Christian God. But note: when it comes to reductio arguments, officially speaking, any of the premises can be rejected - it is the combination of all premises that leads to the conclusion. But usually one premise (the assumption for reductio) is more plausibly rejected than any other.

What does Mary Midgley call her view on moral relativism?

She calls this view moral isolationism: different cultures are morally isolated, in that no cross-cultural judgement of a practice can be justified. Midgley argues that moral isolationism overgenerates, or proves too much: if no cross-cultural judgement of a practice is ever justified, then no intra-cultural judgement of a practice is justified either. We can't judge our own moral practices.

What dilemma is faced as a result of the lack of control over indeterministic and deterministic events?

So we face the following dilemma: (i) If every event is causally determined, we have no free will. (ii) If every event is indeterministic, we have no free will. If every event is either causally determined or indeterministic, we have no free will.

What is Socrates' response to Glaucon's claim?

Socrates' ultimate response in the Republic: the just possessor of the ring would not use it to their own unjust advantage. If they were to do so, they wold be a slave to their own appetites. And if they do not, this shows that they have realized that being just can make them happier than being unjust - because there is happiness in knowing one can resist one's appetites.

What words have indications in arguments given in paragraphs?

Sometimes an argument has to be extracted from paragraphs/large texts. The Conclusion is often signaled by words like "therefore", "hence", "thus", and "then". Premises are often signaled by words like "since", "because", "given that", and "for", and often take the form of rhetorical questions plus an answer (conclusions can also take this form, less often). Many arguments contain premises of the "if... then..." form.

Describe the Euthyphro Problem.

The Euthyphro problem (so-called for its famous appearance in Plato's Euthyphro) aims to face Divine Command Theory with a dilemma: either that theory entails its own falsity, or, it entails the obvious falsehood that morality is arbitrary. The problem is usually presented as this: Suppose Divine Command Theory is true. Then Φ is a good thing to do if, and only if, God wills that we ought to do Φ. But, does God will that we ought to Φ because Φ is a good thing to do? Or, is Φ a good thing to do because God wills that we ought to Φ? In case (a), God wills that we ought to Φ because Φ is a good thing to do. Therefore, Φ is good by measure of a standard external to God; it is Φ's counting as good by this standard that gives God a reason to will us to Φ. But then Divine Command Theory is false: it is not the case that Φ is good because God willed it so. In case (b), Φ is a good thing to do because God wills us to Φ. Therefore, the reason we ought to Φ is that God wills us to. Recall that God is all-powerful - so, presumably, he could have willed us to not-Φ instead, should he have chosen to do so. Indeed, what is God's reason for willing us to Φ? If it doesn't come from the independent (or perhaps pre-existing) fact that Φ is good, then it seems that God willed us to Φ just because he wanted to. This makes morality look implausibly arbitrary. Here's a slightly different way to make the point: Case (b) says that 'Φing is good' and 'God wills us to Φ' mean the same thing. But then 'Φ is a good thing to do because God wills us to Φ' means: 'God wills us to Φ because God wills us to Φ'. And this claim is trivial (and trivial philosophical claims are not interesting). So the Divine Command Theorist faces a dilemma: a choice between two options, both of which are bad. (i) Divine Command Theory entails its own falsity; or (j) Divine Command Theory entails an obvious falsehood (that morality is arbitrary). Either way, Divine Command Theory is implausible.

What is the Identity Theory?

The Identity Theory is the claim that the mind = the brain.So: every experience is a physical (neurochemical?) state. Note: that experiencing red = neurochemical state X does not entail that we know that the two are identical. It may take scientific investigation to find this out. Just as how water = H2O, but it took a lot of scientific investigation to figure this out. The Argument (Lewis) P1: Experiences are defined by their causal roles. P2: Physics is explanatorily adequate. Therefore, C1: Experiences are physical things. Therefore, C2: The thing doing the experiencing - the mind - is also physical.

Describe the teleological argument for belief in God.

The argument, from a distance, is that the complexity of the natural world is evidence that it was designed, and evidence of design is evidence of a designer. From the Greek telos 'end' or 'purpose', and logos 'order' or 'knowledge'. Also often called the argument from design. Examples: The telos of a book is to be read, The telos of a motorcycle is rapid, dangerous personal transport, etc.

Discuss Hume's trope theory.

Trope theory says that the fundamental objects - the basic building blocks of reality - are tropes: specific instances of properties in places at times. Ordinary objects are bundles of tropes that are 'compresent' at sequences of times and places. General properties (like red) are collections of tropes that 'resemble' each other. Applying bundle theory to the self gets us the claim that while we can never conceive of the underlying, constant self, we do perceive bundles of properties (of 'the mind') happening together at the same time. In other words: while there is no self, there are bundles of thoughts happening together at the same time.

Why does free will matter?

Two main reasons: (i) Phenomenology ("seeming like"): our experience of the world appears, very strongly, to involve experience of freedom of the will. (ii) Moral responsibility: freedom of the will appears to be a precondition for the existence of moral responsibility. I.e. Blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, etc.

What is Utilitarianism?

Utilitarianism is the view that in any given situation, the morally right thing to do is what will result in the most happiness for the most people. The reason we should be moral is because it makes everyone happier.

What is Free Will?

Various answers are possible. But a good starting point is: One (popular) conception: human agent S freely willed to do action/bring about event E if and only if S could have chosen not to bring about E. In such cases, we will say that S has control over E. You are not morally responsible for what you couldn't have made otherwise. Couldn't have done otherwise → Not responsible. Are responsible → could done otherwise. Having the ability to choose to not bring about an action or event is a necessary condition for being morally responsible for the outcome of that action or event. SO: You are responsible ↔ if you could have done otherwise. Being able to have done otherwise - i.e. having control - is necessary and sufficient for being morally responsible

Is this argument valid? P1. Napoleon was a very tall man. P2. The moon is made of cheese. Therefore, C. 2 + 2 = 4

Well, is it possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false? Again, no - because it is not possible for C to be false. So the argument is valid.

Is this argument valid? P1. Obama was born in Kenya. P2. 2 + 2 = 5 Therefore, C. Obama is not eligible to be president.

Well, is it possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false? Surprisingly, no - because it is not possible for P2 to be true. So the argument is valid. The argument is not sound however.

Is this argument valid? P1 : If Gates owns all the gold in Fort Knox, then he is rich. P2 : Gates is rich. Therefore, C : Gates owns all the gold in Fort Knox.

Well, is there a possible situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false? Yes - the actual world is just such a situation. So the argument is not valid. The actual world is a counterexample to the argument.

What are you doing when you show that an argument is fallacious?

When you show that an argument is fallacious, you remove one reason for believing its conclusion - this is not the same as believing that the conclusion is false. The same goes for showing an argument is unsound.

Is James's question: is belief in God compatible with (global) empiricism?

Why it might not be: Suppose all our evidence can only come from sense experience. Suppose also that the world would be the same whether God existed or not. Then there can be no (observational) evidence for (or against) God's existence. William James's goal in 'The Will to Believe' is to show that empiricism does not have this consequence - we can both be empiricists and allow that religious belief is permitted.

What is compatibilism?

free will and causal determinism are compatible

What is incompatibilism?

free will and causal determinism are not compatible. Libertarianism = we have the free will required for moral responsibility; and so causal determinism is false.

What is indeterminism?

quantum mechanics says that some events are indeterministic - whether they occur is a matter of chance

What is moral relativism?

whether or not a given practice is morally forbidden or permitted can be judged only by the standards of the culture in which the practice occurs.