POL 470
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816): Did Virginia's law trump the federal treaty?
During the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property.
Mississippi v. Johnson (1867): Could the Supreme Court constitutionally issue an injunction directed against the President?
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that it had "no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties...." The Court held that the duties of the President as required by the Reconstruction Acts were "in no sense ministerial," and that a judicial attempt to interfere with the performance of such duties would be "an absurd and excessive extravagance." The Court noted that if the President chose to ignore the injunction, the judiciary would be unable to enforce the order.
Murphy v. Ford: Asking to declare fords pardon of Nixon unconstitutional Contended that you cannot pardon a person who has not been indicted or convicted
Hamilton wrote that a well timed pardon may restore tranquility to the nation. Ford took steps to end the division caused by watergate and move the attention elsewhere. He was trying to restore the tranquility of the nation. As per ex parte garland, the pardoning power is unlimited, except in times of impeachment. May be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or after. The pardon cannot restore offices that are forfeited
Flast v. Cohen (1968)*: Did Flast, as a taxpayer, have standing to sue the government's spending program?
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court rejected the government's argument that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers barred taxpayer suits against federal taxing and spending programs. In order to prove a "requisite personal stake" in such cases, taxpayers had to 1) establish a logical link between their status as taxpayers and the type of legislative enactment attacked, and 2) show the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of Congressional taxing and spending power. The Court held that Flast had met both parts of the test.
Baker v. Carr (1966)* Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?
In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation. Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
Watkins v. US (1957)*: Did the activities of the Un-American Activities Committee constitute an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power?
In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the activities of the House Committee were beyond the scope of congressional power. The Court held that both the authorizing resolution of the Committee and the specific statements made by the Committee to Watkins failed to limit the Committee's power. The Court found that because Watkins had not been given sufficient information describing the pertinency of the questions to the subjects under inquiry, he had not been accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment thus invalidated Watkins' conviction.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer (1952)*: Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills?
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Ex Parte Grossman (1925): Did the president have the constitutional authority to commute a sentence for criminal contempt of court?
In a unanimous decision, the Court found that a presidential pardon for a criminal contempt of court sentence was within the powers of the executive. There is nothing in the words "offenses against the United States" that excludes criminal contempts in the Constitution. Actions that violate the dignity or authority of the federal courts violate the law of the United States, making these contempts offenses against the United States. The president's pardon authority includes such offenses. Without destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment, the president's powers are to act as checks against undue prejudice or needless severity in such sentencing by the judicial branch.
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819): Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers?
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers.
US v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936) : In the Joint Resolution, did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President?
In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the majority upheld the Joint Resolution. The Court reasoned that the federal government could not exceed its enumerated powers regarding internal issues but had a much broader scope of discretion in foreign affairs. Because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Roosevelt thus had the discretion to determine what impact a certain policy might have on foreign affairs and make decisions accordingly, even had Congress not authorized him. Justice McReynolds authored a dissenting opinion.
NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014)*: 1. Was the Senate " in recess" under the Recess Appointments Clause when President Obama appointed three people to the Board on January 4, 2012? 2. Does the Recess Appointments Clause grant the President the power to fill only vacancies that occur during the official recess of the Senate?
No, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a pro forma session does not create a recess long enough to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause. While the term "recess" in the Clause refers both to inter-and intra-session recesses, its legislative history and historical context indicate that the term should be presumed to mean a recess of substantial length. The Court held that the three-day break that occurs during pro forma sessions does not represent a significant interruption of legislative business and therefore cannot justify the exercise of the Clause. Additionally, a pro forma session cannot be viewed as a single, long recess because the Senate retains its capacity to conduct business during such sessions. Because recess appointments made during a recess that was shorter than ten days have been so historically rare, the Court held that ten days was the appropriate presumptive lower limit to place on the exercise of the Clause. The Court also held that the Clause applies to vacancies that occur during a recess as well as those that originally occur before a recess but continue to exist at the time of the recess. Although a plain reading of the Clause does not require such an interpretation, the historical context of the wording favors the more broad reading because a vacancy can be considered a continuing state. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence in judgment in which he argued that the Recess Appointments Clause was only meant to cover breaks between congressional sessions rather than breaks within them. Therefore, the appointments in question are invalid because they were made during the session. Justice Scalia argued that a plain reading of the text as well as the historical meaning of the term "recess" clearly places it in opposition to the term "session," and it is therefore illogical to interpret the Clause as allowing appointments while Congress is in session. In offering a broader reading of the Clause, the majority opinion disregards the Clause's purpose: to preserve the balance of power between the President and the Senate regarding appointments. Justice Scalia also argued that the majority's ten-day rule cannot stand because it is based purely on judicial interpretation of historical practices without any textual basis. For these same reasons, the Clause should be read as only granting the President the power to fill vacancies that originally occurred during a recess. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence in judgment.
Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013)*: Do the petitioners have standing under Article III of the Constitution to argue this case? Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state of California from defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman?
No, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the merits of the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in which there is an "actual controversy," which means that the complaining party must have suffered a "concrete and particularized injury" that can be redressed through court action. In this case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.
Nixon v. US (1993)*: Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution?
No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."
Clinton v. Jones (1996)*: Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office?
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.
US Term Limits v. Thornton (1995)*: Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution?
No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'"
US v. Nixon (1974): Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?
No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.
Powell v. McCormack (1969)*: May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution?
No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him.
Bush v. Gore (2000)*: Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?
Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.
Morrison v. Olson (1989)*: Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers?
The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.
Bowsher v. Synar (1986)*: Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers?
The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch.
Mistretta v. US (1989)*: Did the Act violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution?
The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an "intelligible principle" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.
Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981): Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legal claims against Iran?
The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.
INS v. Chadha (1983)*: Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine?
The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.
McGrain v. Daughtery (1927): Was the Senate committee out-of-bounds in issuing its contempt order since the purpose of the investigation had nothing to do with the committee's legislative purpose?
The Court upheld Daugherty's contempt conviction, establishing a presumption that congressional investigations have a legislative purpose. This presumption was not overcome by showing that the committee also had another purpose, such as exposure of wrongdoing. This presumption would later restrict the Court's hand in clear cases of congressional overreaching while investigating communists after World War II.
Ex Parte McCardle (1868): May the Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the High Court after that jurisdiction has been given?
The Court validated congressional withdrawal of the Court's jurisdiction. The basis for this repeal was the Exceptions Clause of Article III Section 2. But Chase pointedly reminded his readers that the 1868 statute repealing jurisdiction "does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)*: Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections? South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)*: Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections?
The Fifteenth Amendment is a valid constitutional basis for the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court upheld the Act as constitutional. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870. Justice Black dissented in part. He argued that while he would have upheld most of the Act, he would have struck down certain provisions as beyond the scope of Congress's power.
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
The U.S. Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review—the power of the federal courts to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional. ... President John Adams named William Marbury as one of forty-two justices of the peace on March 2, 1801.
Barenblatt v. US (1959)*: Did the House Committee's investigation into Barenblatt's affiliations with the Communist Party transgress his First Amendment protections which limit congressional inquiries?
The divided Court found that the Committee's actions did not violate the First Amendment and, thus, upheld Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. Justice Harlan noted that the First Amendment does not protect a witness from all lines of questioning. As long as the Congressional inquiry is pursued to "aid the legislative process" and to protect important government interests, then it is legitimate.
Humphrey's Executor v. US (1936)*: Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere with the executive power of the President?
The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily on the Court's decision in Myers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executive department." The FTC was different, argued Sutherland, because it was a body created by Congress to perform quasi-legislative and judicial functions. The Myers precedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation.
Ex Parte Milligan (1866)*: Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal?
Writing for the Court, Justice David Davis held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Specifically, it is unconstitutional to try civilians by military tribunals unless there is no civilian court available. The military commission therefore did not have jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, and he was entitled to discharge.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)*: Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?
Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.
Myers v. US (1926)*: Did the Act unconstitutionally restrict the President's power to remove appointed officials?
Yes. After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President's appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. According to Taft, to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed."
Clinton v. City of NY (1998): Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015)*: Does a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as "Israel," if requested to do so, impermissibly infringe on the President's power to recognize foreign states?
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority holding that the federal statute unconstitutionally usurped the President's power to recognize foreign nations as it relates to passports. The Court held that, although the Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of recognition of foreign nations, the Reception Clause in Article II of the Constitution—which states that the President will receive foreign ambassadors—grants the President the power to recognize foreign states. The fact that Article II also vests the President with the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors gives the President further control over recognition decisions. his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that this case presented a political question beyond the purview of the judiciary, but because precedent precluded political resolution, he joined in the majority opinion.
Did the subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide violate the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution?
Yes. The Court held that because the work of aides was critical to the performance of legislative tasks and duties, they were nothing less than legislators' "alter egos" and thus immune from subpoenas by the Speech and Debate Clause. Aides were exempted from grand jury questioning so long as Senators invoked the privilege on their behalf. Moreover, the Court held that the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause did not extend beyond the legislative sphere, ruling that Senator Gravel's arrangements with the Beacon Press were not constitutionally protected.
In re Neagle (1890)*: Was the state obligated to obey the writ even though no national statute empowered the Attorney General to provide judges with bodyguards?
Yes. The Court held that the Attorney General acted appropriately since assigning Neagle as Field's bodyguard assured that the nation's laws would be faithfully executed. Furthermore, Neagle's actions were consistent with a congressional statute which provided U.S. Marshalls with "the same powers, in executing the laws" as state sheriffs and deputies (who would have been allowed to deter an attack on Field's life).
Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982)*: Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?
Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history."
In Korematsu v. US (1944), the Supreme Court ruled that in a time of great "emergency and peril," the internment of Japanese Americans was
legal for national security.