pols 420 exam 1 w/ Q's from study guide

How many states have built nuclear weapons? Who are they?

10 states have built nuclear weapons. They are U.S.A, USSR, U.K., France, China, Israel, India, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea.

What is the difference between an atom bomb (i.e., A-bomb) and a hydrogen bomb (i.e., thermonuclear weapon)?

An atom bomb is a nuclear bomb whose energy comes from fission of uranium or plutonium (both heavy metals). The energy for a hydrogen bomb comes from fusion of hydrogen. Fission is used to create fusion reaction. They generate explosive power that is orders of magnitudes bigger than what you can do with fission bombs.

What do we learn from recent survey experiments designed to assess the nuclear taboo?

As the probability of winning with conventional means goes down with probability of winning with nuclear weapons remains the same (high probability of winning), the approval and preference for using nuclear weapons increases. However, the vast majority of people who said no said that because it would set a dangerous precedent. Less people said no because it's "morally repugnant," which is the idea behind the nuclear taboo.

What is the difference between deterrence and coercion/compellence? Why is compellence more difficult?

Deterrence is an attempt to preserve the status quo by preventing some other actor from taking an action that changes the way things currently are. Compellence is an attempt to change the status quo, and it is a state telling another state to change behavior in same way, and if they don't, there will be some cost to pay. Compellence is more difficult than deterrence because the stakes are often smaller, loss aversion, and the challenger must act first.

What is the dual-use dilemma?

Hedging is when a country pursues dual-use nuclear technology (peaceful and military applications) intentionally to shorten the time it would take you to build a nuclear weapon in the future if necessary. You have nuclear energy, so you could make nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy was not acquired specifically to build nuclear weapons, but the intention is there "just in case" (security motivation).

What is the difference between horizontal and vertical proliferation?

Horizontal nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries that didn't already possess them. Vertical nuclear proliferation is expanding nuclear capabilities in countries that already have them.

What are some examples of nuclear brinkmanship during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis? Why do many people think this was the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age?

Kennedy told Khrushchev to remove the missiles on Cuba or Kennedy would do it for him. Kennedy was threatening nuclear weapons and war (idk if this is brinkmanship or not). There was also an order that the Cuban military would be allowed to use the tactical nuclear weapons on Cuba if the U.S. tried to invade. This was the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age because both countries were threatening war and nuclear weapons, and the U.S. is at Def-Con 2 because of the missiles they thought were going to be sent at the U.S. (even if they weren't assembled yet). Additionally, a U2 spy plane accidentally flew into the Soviet Union, and the U.S. had to sent two fighter jets (armed with nuclear weapons because of the U.S. being at Def-Con 2) to get it back to the U.S. This didn't result in nuclear war, but it could've if the Soviets saw a spy plane and two fighter planes armed with nuclear weapons in their air space as enough of a threat.

What is mutually assured destruction (MAD)?

Mutually assured destruction says that if you have two countries both armed with nuclear weapons, they each know that attacking each other will result in the destruction of both. Therefore, they don't fight. However, MAD hinges on both countries having survivability.

Is there still a nuclear taboo today, according to Nina Tannenwald? Why or why not?

Nina Tannenwald says that the nuclear taboo is unraveling because of President Trump's willingness to heavily consider nuclear first use. He is not interested in disarmament or arms control. He also embraced the view that nuclear superiority matters. Trump's talks with North Korea and the pro-fighting with nuclear weapons rhetoric he used started to normalize nuclear first strikes. His rejection of the nuclear norms can affect the world as a whole and start to complete disintegrate the nuclear taboo.

How can obtaining nuclear weapons influence a state's foreign policy, according to Mark Bell?

Nuclear acquisition appears to have significantly affected state's foreign policy. State uses their nuclear weapons to bolster allies and respond to challenges more independently and with greater steadfastness. A more discriminating typology allows policymakers to more precisely specify the concerns associated with particular potential proliferants. States have sometimes seen nuclear weapons as "status symbols," and powerful states have often sought them. Even after a state has conducted a nuclear test, there may still be policy options available to limit the effects that nuclear weapons have on the behavior of new nuclear states.

Did nuclear brinkmanship work in the Berlin Crises (1958-59 and 1961)? What about the Vietnam War? Why or why not? Defend your response with specific facts and logic.

Nuclear brinkmanship did not work in the Berlin crises in 1958-59 and 1961. Stalin/USSR tried to raise the possibility of nuclear escalation if United States didn't pull out of Berlin by making himself look more irrational and crazy (applying madman theory). There are two theories about why it didn't work: (1) it is hard to make coercive nuclear threats credible, and (2) the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It seems that the fact that it is hard to make coercive nuclear threats credible is why this didn't work. Because both the U.S. and USSR had nuclear weapons, it's even more difficult to be credible because of the game of chicken. The U.S. has survivability, so if the USSR had used nuclear weapons against the U.S., the USSR would have been blown up by the U.S. Nuclear brinkmanship did not work in the Vietnam War. The U.S. tried to alert their nuclear forces in order to get the Soviets to convince Vietnam to come to the bargaining table. However, the Soviets did not realize that the U.S. was trying to do that; they thought that the U.S. was warning them to back down on the Sino-Soviet conflict. So, Vietnam was never brought to the bargaining table since Russia misinterpreted the signal, and the war ended in worse than a stalemate for the U.S.

What is nuclear brinkmanship? How does it work?

Nuclear brinkmanship is the manipulation of risk. If a country thinks the other country that is imposing a risk strategy is engaging in risky actions (even if it's only to introduce in the opponent's mind the risk of disaster), the opponent is more likely to be deterred because of them being nervous about the other country being irrational/risky. There are two ways brinkmanship works: automaticity and/or loss of control over decisions on using nuclear weapons, and rationality of irrationality. Automaticity and/or loss of control over decisions on using nuclear weapons includes nuclear alerts and pre-delegation. Rationality of irrationality when leaders intentionally try to cultivate the perception that they're unstable to their adversary may think there's a chance that the other leaders will use nuclear weapons.

Compare and contrast nuclear coercion theory and nuclear skepticism theory.

Nuclear coercion theories says that nuclear weapons (and nuclear superiority) help states coerce their adversaries. They say that nuclear weapons are very destructive, so states with nuclear advantages run greater risks (brinkmanship). This view emphasizes risk and punishment strategies. Nuclear skepticism theory says that nuclear weapons are poor instruments of coercion because it is very difficult to provide benefits in coercion. However, they are very good for deterrence.

What is nuclear latency?

Nuclear latency is having the capability to have nuclear weapons, but they haven't done it yet. If you have the ability to get the fissile material or already have it, you have nuclear latency. These countries could get nuclear weapons very quickly, even if they don't have them currently.

What are the main explanations for why nuclear weapons haven't been used in war since 1945? Which explanation do you find most convincing, and why?

One explanation is the nuclear taboo. The other explanations for why nuclear weapons haven't been used in war since 1945 are deterrence, undesirable long-term consequences of use, lack of military utility, practical considerations (lack of organizational readiness, shortage of bombs/DVs), and obsolescence of war. The two strongest are precedent setting and deterrence.

What are three countries that rely on nuclear energy but do not possess nuclear weapons?

South Korea, Canada, Germany

What is the stability-instability paradox?

Stability-Instability Paradox says that nuclear weapons make large wars less likely, but they make low-level conflict more common.

What is the difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons?

Tactical nuclear weapons are small and meant for use on the battlefield. They are specifically for targeting military targets - troops, equipment, adversary, etc. Strategic nuclear weapons are bigger and more powerful. They are used primarily for deterrence (not on battlefield). They could be used to destroy a city, so some leaders threaten to hold a city at risk to gain leverage against adversary.

What is the credibility problem that states face in a crisis where both sides are armed with nuclear weapons?

The credibility problem that states face when both sides are armed with nuclear weapons is the game of chicken. If you have nuclear weapons, you can inflict a lot of punishment on an adversary in the event of war, which SHOULD give you leverage. However, if both countries had nuclear weapons, it's hard to be credible because of mutually assured destruction. You need to be able to convince the other country that there's no way that you wouldn't use nuclear weapons on the other country so that they don't use them back.

Be able to understand how the expected utility of war influences whether or not deterrence is successful.

The expected utility of war is B * Pr(B) - C * Pr(C). B is the benefits you expect from doing something; Pr(B) is the probability that those benefits will occur. C is the costs you expect from doing something; Pr(C) is the probability that those costs will occur. If a country's expected utility of war is negative, deterrence will likely be successful. If a country's expected utility of war is positive, deterrence will likely be unsuccessful.

What is the fundamental problem of causal inference?

The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we can't observe two things to compare at the same time. If someone is currently at war with nuclear weapons, we can't really figure out if they would still be at war if they didn't have nuclear weapons. We can't observe them having nuclear weapons and not having nuclear weapons at the same time, so we can't calculate the causal effect as the difference between the two.

Identify the main implications/tenets of the theory of the nuclear revolution (TNR).

The implications of the theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) are peace (nuclear weapons bolster deterrence and war is too costly, so great powers shouldn't fight major wars); preserving status quo (loss aversion and induces stalemates among major powers because it difficult for anyone to impose change upon the system); crises rare; high credibility unnecessary (costs are so high, so even with the probability that these costs will be imposed low, it should be enough to deter); and nuclear superiority irrelevant (even with just a few nuclear weapons you can inflict so much pain that, in most cases, it should be enough to deter).

What are the limitations of brinkmanship, according to nuclear skepticism theory?

The limits of brinkmanship are the will to do it and difficulty in signaling. Brinkmanship is effective because it's dangerous, so that makes some countries not want to do it. Leaders have to give up control (which they want), so things may spiral out of control. Additionally, the other side may not notice your signal, and the signal could be misperceived.

What are the main motives for investing in nuclear energy, according to class lecture? Which argument do you find the most persuasive?

The main motivations for investing in nuclear energy are energy security, climate change, prestige, and hedging. It helps energy security because it allows for diversification of sources and the problem of foreign dependence decreases (don't want to allow other countries to cut off your other energy). Nuclear power plants don't emit greenhouse gases, so they are seen as attractive for dealing with climate change (but it is controversial because of the amount of nuclear power needed to decrease global temperature at all). It helps with prestige because of the connection of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, so nuclear energy has status attached to it. It helps with hedging because it allows countries to pursue dual-use nuclear technology intentionally to shorten the time it would take them to build a nuclear weapon in the future if necessary.

What are the main risks of relying on nuclear energy?

The main risks of relying on nuclear energy are cost, accidents, terrorism, waste management, and nuclear proliferation. It is a lot more costly up front to build a nuclear power plant (but costs are made up in the long term). Accidents like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl happen, which can damage communities and turn opinions against nuclear energy. Many terrorists try to target power plants in order to get the massive destruction we saw in accidents, too. Nuclear energy creates spent nuclear fuel that needs to be dealt with somehow. More countries having nuclear energy increases potential hedging, and it could lead to nuclear proliferation.

What are the main strategies of deterrence? What what aspect of the expected utility of war do they manipulate?

The main strategies of deterrence are punishment, denial, and risk. Punishment manipulates the Cost variable. Denial manipulates the Probability of Experiencing Benefits variable. Risk manipulates the Probability of Experiencing Costs variable.

What is the nuclear taboo? How do we know if it exists?

The nuclear taboo is the normative prohibition against first use. It says that nuclear weapons are morally repugnant (not something that any normal person would reasonably contemplate), and it delegitimizes nuclear weapons as weapons of war. We know it exists because nuclear weapons haven't been used since 1945, and they are being considered less and less throughout the decades.

What is the simplest design for a nuclear weapon?

The simplest design for a nuclear weapon is a gun type bomb, which is a fission bomb. There are two spheres of Uranium 235, and you detonate a conventional explosion. This rams the two spheres together very quickly, which creates a massive explosion that releases a lot of energy.

What are the two things that make nuclear weapons unique compared to conventional weapons, according to class lecture?

The speed at which they cause mass destruction and the radioactive effects after

Compare and contrast the spiral and deterrence models.

The spiral model says that actions that you take that increase/decrease your adversary's expectation of the probability of cost/benefits will increase conflict. This focuses on escalation happening precisely because of actions taken that are meant to deter. The deterrence model says that actions that you take that increase/decrease your adversary's expectation of the probability of cost/benefits will deter conflict.

What are the three problems in nuclear coercion, according to nuclear skepticism theory? When will nuclear coercion work based on this theory?

The three problems in nuclear coercion are redundancy, high costs, and low stakes. Nuclear coercion only works when there is a conventionally weak coercer, high stakes, and reduction in costs of nuclear first use.

What are the three basic steps to building a nuclear weapon?

The three steps are acquisition of fissile material, weapon assembly, and integrating the weapon with delivery system.

What are the two fissile materials that are suitable for use in a nuclear bomb? Explain how each material is produced.

The two fissile materials are weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium. When uranium comes out of the earth, it's more than 99% Uranium 238, so you have to enrich it. After you mine it, you convert the Uranium 238 into gas and put it into a gas centrifuge (or something that works similarly) so that the Uranium 238 and 235 will pull apart at different speeds (which separates them). You are trying to get the concentration of Uranium 235 of the highly enriched uranium to 90% in order to use it for nuclear weapons (although it can be used at a smaller percentage with more of it). If you reprocess spent nuclear fuel, one of the byproducts is plutonium. Plutonium can be separated from the rest of the byproducts in a hot cell.

What exactly can nuclear weapons deter? Why do scholars disagree about the answer?

There are three views about what nuclear weapons can deter. View #1 says that nuclear weapons can deter anything. View #2 says that nuclear weapons can deter major conventional war. View #3 says that nuclear weapons can deter nuclear use. What view you abide by depends on how easy (or not) you think it is to control escalation.

In class, we conducted a survey experiment to assess whether nuclear deterrence works. Explain the purpose of the experiment. What did we find?

We were trying to compare answers about whether two groups of people would go into conflict with another country if they had nuclear weapons versus if they didn't have nuclear weapons. We found that the majority of those who were asked if they would go to war with a country with nuclear weapons would choose not to go to war. And the majority of those who were asked if they would go to war with a country without nuclear weapons would choose to go to war.

What is weaponless deterrence, also known as latent nuclear deterrence? Explain the three mechanisms by which it can work.

Weaponless deterrence is using nuclear programs to gain influence internationally without possessing actually assembled nuclear weapons (but you have the capabiltiy to do it). The first mechanism is deterrence by proliferation, which is threatening a country to preserve the status quo by threatening to build nuclear weapons. This threat is costly, even as a policy choice, because some countries do not want other countries to have them. The second mechanism is deterrence by delayed attack. Even if you can't implement a nuclear attack right away, if you can do it in a time that's shorter than the time you expect a war to last, then traditional nuclear deterrence can work. The third mechanism is deterrence by doubt. If you can create uncertainty about what you possess (even if you aren't armed), this could deter.

What are the main factors that determine whether a military threat will be perceived as credible?

World leaders, when other leaders are making threats, are thinking through the calculation about whether the threat will actually be carried out (depending on expected utility of war). If the other country thinks that there's no way that you'll do what you're threatening, they will not change their behavior based on that threat. The country has to have the capability to do what they're threatening to do (militarily in this case), or they won't be able to successfully deter. You usually need to have survivability in order to deter countries from attacking you since you would be able to attack back. You need reliable command and control because the other country you're threatening needs to believe that the order will be followed through with.