Weeks 2-6 Concepts: Poli Sci 1155 - class notes

State formation - characteristics of "state-ness"

"Relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within....a large contiguous territory" (tilly, 170) Tacit consent to authority of state People pay taxes and at high rates, comply with court decisions, etc. State is the authority Undertakes diverse tasks Take on diverse, multiple tasks Security, defense, infrastructure, education, welfare, public health, environmental protection, foreign policy, etc. Bureaucracies are specialized State fulfills diverse functions through a complex web of agencies and departments → specialized Few internal military challenges Exceptions? Example: ETA in Spain Rules and regulations govern conduct within borders Tilly focused on state as having controls over means of violence and having these specialized bureaucracies Focus on administrative aspect of the state

State formation - war makes states, a protection racket

"War makes states" Rulers who could perform these things survived : thin line between protection racket and state making → is the external threat beyond the border real or imagined and what price is that protection provided? Legit gov'ts protect us from real threats 1. War-making 2. State-making 3. Protection We have a lot of violence/threat of using violence Can't rely on violence alone to be a successful ruler Need a balance between everything And provide protection of people who finance these costly activities 4. Extraction Procuring the means of doing the above three things Finance all of it Build up your bureaucracy: become more complex and sophisticated for the purpose of extraction Protection racket State making resembles protection racket Similar to mafia and what they'd be engaged in A protection racket Role of violence: threaten or use force to keep these coup plotters from trying to overturn you Project power both externally and internally Richelieu disarmament policy, 1620s: in france, led disarmament policy in 1600s Motivation behind policy: get rid of threats to the regime Implemented a nation wide disarmament policy: hard to keep coup plotters at bay if they have weapons/arms What's to be gained from keeping violence in check? As the ruler, with means of producing violence, you have tributes coming in General population: customers Commercial merchants who have the cash and resources to build your army/make war on external rivals In turn: merchants want a protection rent State offers to do this, but for a price Phoenician merchants Pay profits to prince in exchange for so called protection for their businesses

Democracy - South Africa

1910: first government of union of south africa reinforces inherited inequalities By 1948, full-boom apartheid Post WWII, mobilization of the masses, with african national congress (ANC) playing central role Rising costs of repression International community kept an eye on what was going on in south africa Forced them to democratize in 1994 Rising threat of mass revolt, regime force to democratize in 1994

Civil war onset - 3 theoretical traditions

3 theoretical traditions 1. Cultural hypothesis (huntington) 2. Grievance hypothesis (gurr, bates) 3. Feasibility hypothesis (fearon and lation, collier and hoeffer)

State formation - where do states come from, "modern state"

DV: the form of political order ("state" vs other types) Tilly's explanation: a functionalist argument Evidence: case study - european experience of state formation

Democracy - possible conceptual definition of 'democracy'

A system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their action in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (schmitter and karl)

Elections and political parties in autocracies - Al Jazeera and the PRI

Al jazeera: PRI falls as new party rises in mexico Video clip, slide 17 What happens to the PRI → lose election PRI didn't fulfill subsidies and did not repair roads PRI couldn't reduce poverty and crime Didn't deliver on their promises enough

Democracy - Aristotle

Aristotle on democracy Aristotle Spent a lot of time thinking about forms of rule/regimes Form of rule Rule by one Good type (moral worth): royalty Perversion (moral worth): tyranny Rule by the few Good type (moral worth): aristocracy Perversion (moral worth): oligarchy Rule by the many Good type (moral worth): constitutionalism Perversion (moral worth): democracy Not a lot of good decisions come out of "mob" to get their voice heard He believed that some people were better fit to rule when compared to others A prescient critique of our times? When populists argue that they offer a return to a pure form of democracy They are right in a sense But aristotle argues that there's a risk of demogragory Someone wins all the votes

State formation - war-making and state-making

Assumption: external competition Faced with external rivals, how to protect and advance your own interests? External competition → forcing you to go to war Defend yourself when attacked , etc. Resources are scarce/limited So you need to go to war The use of force! For use of force to be effective, you need an army How to build an army? You need money, but where to get money? Need to extract within your borders, extract from general populous using taxation As your army grows, you need a centralized bureaucracy to make sure you can efficiently extract taxes from the population and make sure it gets translate into human capital and assets you need for your army → emergence of a strong state with all differentiated bureaucracies and taxation systems

B. Anderson Reading

B. anderson reading Nation: an "imagined community" Soccer fans: feeling of togetherness when rooting for the same time Nationalism: a political movement with some purpose of aligning nation with self-governed state → E. Gellner Boundaries of a nation and the boundaries of a state don't coincide with one another When the people Line up boundaries of nation and state → when we care about nationalism

Democracy - freedom house

Bloomberg businessweek The rise of elected autocrats threatens democracy Democracy is having a bad run as strong-arm leaders crush political freedoms and china's state capitalist model admirers Freedom house 14 years of democratic decline Get photo from slide New report in 2020 2008: highest percentage ever of free countries 46.1% 2008 and this declined to 40.1% in 2019 One way we might think about democracy: thick ---> expansive view All people have the ability to vote, elections are free and fair, rule of law, etc. Europe US 2009: one of the most democratic countries in the world 94 score freedom house index (out of 100) 2018: flawed democracy Dropped 8 points Large change Fell from 21 to 25 place among 167 countries scored by freedom house

Elections and political parties in autocracies - solution continued (bonus)

Bonus: citizens benefit, too Graph picture Figure 6.3 from the reading, photo also on slide 16 Dictatorial elections related to health outcomes (mortality rates) But this positive externality is a "byproduct"

Civil war onset - feasibility

Build in variables that speak to feasibility Per capita income Log of population: larger the pop size, harder it is for the state to monitor and crack down on insurgencies Percentage of mountainous terrain State is relatively new or not Measure of democracy: -10 to 10 Capture something about political grievances Updated versions of ELF to capture religious and cultural fractionalization * = Percentage of mountainous terrain: positive coefficient with stars Higher the percentage of mountains that a state has, the greater the probability of civil war starting in that place Mountainous terrain makes it harder to shut down insurgencies Oil exporter: Per capita income: higher per capita income = more stable region People have enough money, they feel like they don't need to partake in a civil war Richer countries have more money to put towards forces → squash civil wars New state: don't have a ton of military or economic institutions → more susceptible to insurgencies Democracy: don't have asterisk here Not a relationship between a country being democratic and pulling towards civil war Diversity measures have no statistical relationship with civil war onset All to do with state capacity and little to with political or religious or cultural clashes

State strength - geni index and polity score

Data for country x in 2007 Picture from slide Geni index Polity score Used to gauge the level of democracy in a given country in a given year Ranges from: -10 to +10 Ethnic fractionalization Proportion between 0 and 1 Population size: number of people in country Not very high levels of diversity Polity score: deeply autocratic Why would this lead to civil war? Maybe the polity score is correlated with state capacity or gov't strength Strong military capability Feron and latin's argument When you have a stronger state then you're less likely to see civil war GDP per capita and civil war onset Could be capturing any number of things Gov'ts capacity to monitor what's going on within their country and crack down on first signs of insurgency Or it could be capturing something about economic inequality Geni index can then help us get a better picture Population size As population grows, state's ability to monitor for insurgenices will decline → feron and leighton argument - look at handout (2/4) Data in syria The data was for syria in 2007 → x What would you have needed to observe to decide that there was civil war in syria? What other factors would you need, other than the data, would you consider to see if there was civil war in syria? Who is dying , who is being killed Civilians? How would they have needed to be killed in order to decide to count them as a victim of this conflict? Allocation of resources from the gov't Corruption index → independent variable driving civil war

Civil war coding rules

COW: have to have 1000 deaths over conflict F and L: 10000 threshold and mean of 100/year UCDP/PRIO: 25 deaths per year A: 899 deaths over 9 years COW: wouldn't count F and L: wouldn't count UCDP/PRIO: 899/9 → around 99 deaths per year? No info on how the 899 deaths are distributed in those 9 years → MAYBE B: 20 deaths/year for 50 years COW: 20 x 50 → 1000 so yes it would count F and L: no, because there's 20 deaths a year, doesn't meet the average UCDP/PRIO: no C: 1000 deaths over 10 years COW: yes F and L: yes UCDP/PRIO: maybe Not sure about distribution of deaths in those 10 years D: 875 deaths in year one, 0 deaths in year two, 25 deaths in year three COW: no F and L: no UCDP/PRIO: yes Yes in in year one and year three Put this in their dataset as: onset in year one with 875 deaths, year two = no new civil war onset, 25 deaths in year three = onset of new civil war Counted as two separate onsets UCDP counts smaller conflicts as civil war Different than the other data COW catches civil war that lasts a longer period of time - look at table from slides

State formation - centeno argument

Centeno argues that: It is not "war in itself that provides the 'sinews of the state" It's war in conjunction with a powerful group (check this) Lack of conquest External influence Fixity of borders Static borders: hampers state consolidation and efficient forms of war What about variation within the region? Check slide Chile and colombia: contrast with respect to state origins and affect of violence Chile: early stability and protodemocratic system of rule 1833: set the stage for early codification of law for success in fighting foreign wars Colombia: marked instability in early years of independence Low simmering internal war conflict that lasted in 2016 Medium state capacity Middle ground cases Centeno's charge: tilly's model masks "a blinding empirical eurocentrism" The western experiences represents the true.... Arguments with herbst and centeno are quite consistent with tilly's story Less international war Less strong states More international war in europe Stronger states So much diversity within regions Mere presence or absence of international war or pop density can't explain state strength (state strength = dependent variable)

Democracy - chilean coup and how do democracies die

Chilean coup of september 11, 1973 Dictatorship Violent overthrow of democracy → starting of a dictatorship Soldiers supporting the coup led by augusto pinochet take cover as boms are dropped on the presidential palace of la moneda The chilean coup isn't the norm 30% of post WWII autocracies began by replacing democracies 28% were self coups Democratically elected gov't autoritatrianized itself By banning opposition parties, etc. The chilean type scenario initiated only a fight of post 1946 dictatorships HOw do democracies "die" How do democracies die Electing someone that is like a dictator Polarization Elected autocrats trying to quiet those who are popular or famous that threaten their rule What are the warning signs to look out for Case examples that illustrate the process Polarization - factions; formed out of external parties; a preying on fears, crisis Whittling away at the public's trust Democracy is undermine in the name of democracy Undermine the media Table on page 23 and 24 : core symptoms Horse and the stag Hunter put a harness on the horse when the horse wanted the humans help getting the stag They get the stag but by then it's too late Illustrate the basic logic: small steps and the people are going along with the flow until they realize it's too late, too many checks and balances are curtailed

Democracy - claim 1 on how democracies die (levitsky)

Claim 1: democracies erode, little by little No one decisive event that flisp a democracy overnight But there are designs in a would-be authoritarian Rejection of the rules of engagement Denial of legitimacy of opposition Tolerance or support for violence Curtailing of opponents' civil liberties Alberto p in peru Came to power through democrtaitci elections in 1990 He is remembered for corruption and human rights abuses By 1992, he launched a self coup Shuts down congress Suspends the constitution When he came into office There was coalition parties that held control of both chambers of congress Frustrated alberto He started giving speeches that resonated with the american public "Are we really a democracy?" Starts to chip away at the legitimacy of the opposition When the opposition became alarmed they started to push back Alberto tried to argue that these parties were linked to drugs and bad things Alberto started to bypass political institutions to pass policies Alberto with the military to initiate a self coup Argentina 1946 presidential election (perone: check) Built a welfare state to purchase future voter loyalty Chipped away at democracy and construct a political machine De facto rule for more than 7 decades Opposition called him a facist He started to fight back He slowly reformed the argentine agency that launched war (check) Dirty war years followed Contemprory democracies: where democracies seem to have stable roots Bolivia 2019 Eva marales Sought a fourth term to stay in power which was controversial He continued to refute the electoral results Democracy in bolivia seemed stable but then experienced this Like US 2021 Continue to make false claims of electoral rigging

Democracy - claim 2 on how democracies die (levitsky)

Claim 2: don't love democracy enough? Untrue. Democratic breakdown does not occur because people want an authoritarian leader In turn, the would-be-authoritarian doesn't have a "blueprint for autocracy" either Often a populist that is a political outside wins the public's love wins and chips away at democracy Not always intentional The would be authoritarian doesn't come into office with the intent of becoming an authoritarian Activities build up over time Because they are incremental steps, the public doens't notice Back to the horse and stag situation Horse is constrained

Democracy - claim 3 on how democracies die (levitsky)

Claim 3: moments of crisis are risky Leaders, good and bad, have used emergencies to wring out extraordinary powers of constitutions and legislatures Hitler's use the burning of the Reichstag to outlaw communist and social democratic parties Bush and 9/11 to launch war on terrorism He declared he was the decider Duterte's war on drugs: philippines Had a polity score of 8 ( 2018 ) Since 1987 The president of the philippines weaponizes the war on drugs Justify military forces to adopt and keep martial law in place 5000 dealers and users have been killed Police have classified 23000 deaths as plan homicides under investigation Levistky and zeblatt argue that small moments are risky Can spark authoritarians to start stearing a democracy away from itself Covid- 19 Levitsky wrote before the pandemic in 2018 Implications of covid Covid 19 providing cover for elected leaders to derail democracy? State power Giving power of the states for distribution of vaccines What would your hypothesis be?: less democratic the country, better for COVID reform If you wanted to test this hypothesis, how would you about doing so DV IV How to test Spread of COVID Class notes on the prior questions Hypothesis Key words → hypotheses Protests Covid 19 hits country → leaders distract the public → expand executive power Crisis → leaders → distract the public → expand executive power Pandemic → leaders use it as an excuse to discourage voting behavior? → participation in election Stay-at-home order → greater censorship of media Case illustrations: Sri Lanka Rule without checks on executive power

Democracy - Britain

Constitutional changes and regular parliaments after civil war (1642-51) and glorious revolution (1688) Elites wanted to maintain their power Parliament: preserve their interests, and control power of monarchs (elites) Why did parliament win over the crown? First reform act of 1832 removed inequities of ancient regime Remove inequities Establish right to vote based on property and income Passed in context of rising discontent High revolutionary threat High revolutionary threat → threatened the crown, forced the crown to agree to concessions Luddite riots 1811-16 Spa fields riots 1816 Peterloo massacre 1819 Swing riots 1830 High revolutionary threat; military strength changed costs of repression

Regime type and political violence - democracy --> less violence (conventional wisdom)

Conventional wisdom 1: democracy → less violence Accountability mechanism : democracy enhances accountability of the gov't which helps reduce the likelihood of political violence Collier (from the reading) is interested in what democracies do and don't do in developing contexts once an area transitions to democracy Democratic gov't must deliver what citizens want and demand If they successfully do this: they get reelected If they fail: citizens will punish them by voting for another political party Picture of malaysia citizens: not getting better roads from current gov't Conventional wisdom 1: democracy → less violence Legitimacy: as the elected representative, you have the public mandate to do what you said you were going to do Those who don't agree with these policies, they go along with these policies to preserve democracy

Regime type and political violence - democracy --> good for economy (conventional wisdom)

Conventional wisdom 2: democracy → good for economy Democracy is good for the economy Tend to adopt policies that are senstivie to the poor and policies that grow a resilient and healthy middle class Collier warns us that these inherited wisdoms of what a democracy does and doesn't do isn't as straight forward as it seems

Civil war onset - culture hypothesis

Culture hypothesis Conflict will be a result of the clashing of different cultural values and principles "The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" Take place between people in different cultural groups H: greater "cultural" diversity → greater Pr (civil war onset) Places with greater cultural diversity are also places that have a greater probability of civil war onset West vs. all other civilizations Anti-muslim?

Civil war onset - testing predictions (measurement strategies for IVs)

Culture hypothesis Need measure of "cultural / ethnic diversity" Grievance hypothesis Need measure of "level of grievances" within population Feasibility hypothesis Need measure of "state capacity" or other conditions that favor insurgents' ability to mount attacks

Democracy - Aristotle ("tyranny of the majority")

Democracy as "tyranny of the majority?" "Democracy in america " On liberty: john stuart mill (fathter of liberalism → check) Majority could impose its interest that aren't necessarily correct or morally good, at the expense of those in the minority Good life Life worth living Tied to the existence of gov't/regime used to govern Empirical patterns - graph of percentage of people who say it's "essential" to live in a democracy Get graph from slides People are increasingly beginning to believe that living in a democracy is not necessary Not as essential

Democracy - Argentina

Democracy created in 1912 Export boom in the 1880s led to rapidly widening inequality Growing discontent toward partido autonomista nacional (PAN) But instability due to costs of redistribution and repression in constant flux Traditional interests too threatened by the rise of radicals (socialist and anarchist) Mobilize in masses to fuel a reform movement leading up to 1912 Democracy undermined in 1940 Undermined in 1976 Reestablished in 1983 Tumultuous history Low reovlutionary threat; low inequalityl; low costs of represstion

State formation - europe

Different states/empires expanded a lot during this period Europe in 1700 and in 1800 Beginning of empires Europe in 1900 and in 2000 Settled on current pollities Break up of empires Europe in 1500 A large number and a variety of political units vying for power Feudal kingships Empires The church Free cities 194 units But the number of distinct political units starts to fall Europe by 1900 By 1900, variation on our DV is more limited The state is left standing! 194 → 36 units In 2000: 66 states Was the "victory" of states inevitable? There wasn't a deliberate state maker/grand plan There were rulers making improvised choices who respond to immediate tasks Why not other forms of order? City-states Athens, Get rest of notes from slide A kind of darwinian process Rulers who were successful: those that built centralized, differentiated organizations with a monopoly over legitimate use of coercion They arrived at this form of order by responding to immediate tasks and needs Interdependence of warmaking and state making City states couldn't compete as well so they went extinct Get quote from slide "State making is a bit like a protection racket" Protection racket vs. protector Relationship of the protector to the one that actually arbitrates the violence Protection racket: pay for protection By paying, you protect yourself from any retribution Taxes Don't pay your taxes, the police come Monopolizing violence

Regime type and political violence - Economic growth under dictatorship

Economic growth under dictatorship How did south korea sustain helathy economic growth under dictatorship and zaire (DRC) → get graph on slide - gdp per capita 1960: DRC: 220 South korea: 158 1990 DRC: 270 South korea: 6610 Collier would say... Ethinic politics GWF's answer may be "institutions" Taking stock of our argument so far Collier's arguments are conditional Conditional effects of regime type But what drives economic growth? And are ethnic politics all that bad?

Convergence and resurgence

Explaining convergence and resurgence How does "spanish" spread and what explains the resurgence of say "catalan"? Cartoon in the new yorker A process of coordination Cultural feature: general rule What to do when you meet someone you know in the street Trait on that feature: norm Handshake, hug, single kiss, double kiss, etc. A coordination game with constraints (no communication) We both want to achieve a point of coordination and care less about what the particular trait is (example: hug vs. kiss) → both do that same thing together in order to avoid a socially awkward situation Use tacit bargaining How do we get from a "kissing" equilibrium to a "hugging" equilibrium? Floral model doesn't fully capture this Not very clear,, but sometimes this happens Everyone suddenly shifts from one norm to another norm Imagine we're living in a kissing equilibrium, how would we start moving into a hugging model A queue from someone that is high up in society Someone in academia does a study that shows one greeting is better than another Economic cost: interview for job

Civil war onset - feasibility hypothesis

F & L are responding to the cultural clashes/grievance-based arguments They argue: religious diversity that we might consider culture, doesn't trigger civil war IV → (mechanism) → DV F and L's hypohtesis: HI state capacity → insurgency less feasible → LO Pr(ciivl war) States that are stronger are more likely to squash civil wars from happening, troops that can also do this This doesn't mean that grievances or cultural differences don't exist ...only that they aren't a primary driving factor of civil war onset *Even if you harbor that you have feelings of insurgency, you don't start a civil war because of strong state

National identity formation: Gellner IV and DV

Gellner on nation and nationalism DV: emergence of nationalism How does gellner explain the emergence of nationalism? Education is a big part of the story: standard mode of communication among one another Nationalism: a political principal that says that the political and naitonal unit should be congruent One state, one national identity 2 nations could spring up within a single state, then we might have a cultural clash on our hands One group might be moved to make claims to over the other → clash IV: form of social organization (congruence of "culture" and polity")

Argentina's dirty war

Get excerpt from slide Daniel left the house for a meeting before the military came in and they killed his wife and 3 month old daughter was taken by the military At least 500 babies suffered forced disappearances as well Adults also disappeared Gave rise to a movement led by mothers and grandmothers whose children and grandchildren disappeared from the military They gathered each year to peacefully protest and demand the gov't help them find out the fate of relatives that went missing 1989: members of the hunter military were prosecuted for these disappearances Is this a civil war? The facts Guerilla deaths 1969-1972 ( more than 100 deaths per year) Junta in power from 1976-1983 Extrajudiciial killings, torture, forced disappearnaces of leftist subversives, militants, guerillas But few deaths on the side of the state Found disappearances 10,000-30,000 according to rights groups, historians 9,000 according to CONADEP Coding decisions Harff (2003) "politicide" from 1976 - 1980 F and L (2003) "civil war" from 1973 to 1977 UCDP/PRIO "armed conflict" in 1975 (maybe in 1976) COW: --- → no civil war ever in argentina

Elections and political parties in autocracies - getting inside the head of a dictator

Getting inside the head of a dictator Dealing with opposition groups; need to coordinate responses to them Give you enough info to decide whether you want to co-opt them or take them out Sticking with international norms about democratic principles Keep powerful foreign countries from meddling in your affairs More foreign aid flows to electoral regimes Signal that you have a lot support from the public via elections It's costly to be north korea. It's also costly to engage in full-fledged repression all the time Check up on local and regional officials - delegation creates a lot of problems in absence of elections or parties

Regime type and political violence - handout

Handout - what does collier argue instead? Does the data support that? Eyeball test : map numbers may be off in terms of how they are presented on the hand out, go by title and description map 1 Percent of elections that experienced violence around that period (1980 and 1999) Was there significant violence involving civilian dealth immediately before, during, and after election? Map 2 Polity scores from data set Average polity score of any given country Map 3 ` gdp per capita: average in same period of time Map 4 Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) Encountered this in ferron and leighton Shows us this score for a given country, same time period Darker red: more fractionalized Closer to zero: more homogeneous/sameness you get of a given country Eyeball test of collier's claims What patterns do you see? % of elections map Are they consistent with collier's argument? → try to put in form of a hypothesis Alternative explanations? Russia Polity score compared to africa's then look at election violence

Regime type and political violence - hypothesis 1 (political violence)

Hypothesis 1 on political violence Democracy in low-income states → increased risk Democracy in middle to high income states → reduced risk Consistent with the maps for the most part India? : can spin this to support collier's gov't How much income or economic point is enough Figure from slides Theoretical cut off point Around tanzania and guinea Why doesn't the traditional theory of democracy apply in the bottom billion countries? Perverse outcomes of electoral regimes -> collier's argument In low income countries Lack of reliable info about incumbent performance If politicians learn they can get votes without reliable info then we might get bad politicians..... "Bad" quality politicians select into politics Politicization of ethnicity It's very cost effective to get votes by leveraging ethnic identity in your favor Playing the ethnic card is much easier Pg.40: electoral competition creates a darwinian struggle In the absence of restraints, most cost effective means won't be good governance

Regime type and political violence - hypothesis 2 (political violence), ELF

Hypothesis 2 on economic growth (collier) Greater ethinic fractionalization + autocracy → less economic growth If voters have strong ethinci identities and loyalties, politicians pick up on this and organize parties and elections along ethnic identities Remove incentives from the leader to choose sound economic policies Autocracy Ethnic identity an expedient way of mobilizing support Cooperation harder to achieve with lots of ethnic groups ELF map Countreis that score high: indonesia and philippines relatively high levels of ELF and low polity scores But are doing ok in terms of gdp per capita Moldova and ukraine : balkan states Doing ok in terms of gdp per capita

Democracy - japan?

Japan is usually considered a liberal democracy Friendly with countries in the EU and the US Is it a true democracy It's a proportional representation system Cabinet National diat: two houses → both have roughly equal power House of reps House of counselors LDP (liberal democratic party) has the bulk of seats in house of reps Current prime minister of japan → part of LDP This party has been in power since the end of WWII Democracy : a "level playing field?" In many regimes, democratic competition is undermined less by fraud or repression than by unequal access to resources, media, and state institutions Levitsky and way 2010 journal of democracy

Hypothetical polity: steps 1-3

Imagine a hypothetical polity As you get congruence of culture and polity → nationalism develops Stage 1: agrarian polity Little incentive to promote cultural homogenization Main units of social organization are small - villages, with local patois States has no incentive to promote universalized literacy or homogeneous culture with centrally imposed norms Stage 2: industrialization hits, industrial society Rapid urbanization, growing population as result New growth-oriented economy → complex division of labor → need for universal, standard form of communication National standardized education system → centralized mode of cultural reproduction In this way, "culture" and "state" become congruent Cultural homogeneity manifests itself as nationalism Use the same language, get a standardized education system (educated the same way) The state and the culture become congruent Stage 3? But it's not all smooth sailing: produce a disturbance and inequality between the well-off and the poor. Not just along economic lines, but also ease of access to this modernized lifestyle (education, etc.) → barriers to communication Barriers to communication increasingly salient in late stages of industrialized society The barriers existed before, but they start to matter more when market an political forces are bringing distant group members together in the same place More interaction Uneven industrialization → region left behind is less likely to assimilate if defined by "entropy-resistant" traits (traits that don't diffuse across society easily: religion, color of your skin, etc.) Creation of folklore and myth around the group's particularity can become the basis for claims to nationhood Gellner's first claim: Nationalist practices emerge when minority groups (especially with different traits) perceive a threat from majority groups More likely to break off and want to create a nation state Gellner's second claim: Gellner links nationalism to industrialization beginning Industrialization in europe in mind when writing this Nationalism isn't possible without a transition to a modern, industrialized society (modernity) Do we buy gellner's argument? Is nationalism nto possible without industrialization/modernity? What about the resurgence of nationalism in post-industrialized societies? (ex: currrent US, sweden, germany) Nationalism in non-indutrial noes? No attention to how interstate relations might affect nationalism Explanation is path-dependent Can't predict which "nations" will emerge, because cultural basis of identity is arbitrary Gellner is quite optimistic about nationalism End of the reading

National Identity : individual characteristics

Individual characteristic that you associate with yourself How others identify you (social recognition) Conditions under which these different identities become more or less salient regional or local identity - "Michigander" Your familial identity/role - sibling, parent, peer Career status / profession / occupation - student Major / concentration Cultural identity - religion Socioeconomic background The kinds of cultural/social language that you use, codes you abide by Conditions that 'switch on' certain identities What other group members are around you at the time; social networks What you care about Political beliefs, political affiliation, ideology, philosophy Nation / race and ethnicity Give people a sense of belonging to a larger social environment, a mark of membership Facilitate communication Reflects values, preferences, beliefs that might shape political outcomes

Elections and political parties in autocracies - information problem 1

Information problem : 1 Knowledge is power Considered isolated populations in your territory Population in outer edges might be upset about the lack of economic opportunities Collect info from hard to reach places and keep tabs on the population's grievances Any signs of fracturing support Who might be a political opponent Where do these problems arise Are you being blamed for social and economic problems, etc. Need to keep tabs on your populace

Identity as political

Karl marx and engels - economic sources Class identity as source of political identity Haves and have nots Bourgeoisie who controlled means of production and those who did the work Weber - social sources Not just material status, but other cross-cutting identities (example: ethnicity/race, religion, local region, cultural symbols) Can be formed on basis of socially-recognized characteristics 1970s: tajfel's minimal group theory Conducts a study: sources of identity is more than we thought Took young men Showed them paintings by two artists: kadinsky and klee Asked which style they prefer Then randomly assigned to kadinsky or klee You were asked to distribute money: were asked how much of this $100 would youw ant to give to another member that's part of your group Then give some money to a member in the klee group How would you divide up $100 Kadinsky members gave more to kadinsky members Klee gave more to klee members Even with random, arbitrary groupigns, you observe in-group favoritism and bias against the out-group Replicated by social psychologists (example: t-shirt explanation) Shirt experiment: split people into shirt groups: blue shirt group and green shirt group Blues put blue shirts on Greens put green shirts on Then allocate points to members of their group and members of the other group People favored those of their group

Why don't civil wars make states?

Lack of conquest External influence Fixity of borders It is "not war in itself that provides the 'sinews of the state" Centeneo reading

Laitin

Laitin's tipping game for minorities Get graph from slide Percent speaking center language Payoffs: payoff for picking up a regional language or language of the center What brings you over the tipping point? Economic payoffs In-group support (stigma/rewards within minority) Out-group support (rewards from majority) Gellner's story Failure of minority to assimilate into the culture → key moment for a political entrepreneur to create myths and folklores Catalan nationalists as cultural entrepreneurs (like the canadiens who moved first to put on a helmet) Bonus payments for authors to publish in cataln (economic payoff) Subsidized catalan TV and dubbing foreign programs in catalan (in-group reward) If you don't know the language, you can't partake in watching these shows National identity as coordinated beliefs Laitin's definition of nation (40-41) A coordinated set of beliefs about identity, whos members affirm ownership over a stat based on that set of beliefs

State formation - latin america continued (lack of conquest, external influence, fixity of borders)

Latin america: lack of conquest : centeno talks about wars after independence, even tho these may have been present prior to independence Total war vs. limited war Features of limited war Staggering debts Professionalized military without popular participation Lack of unifying national myth Centeno knows with these civil wars (limited war) Domestic gov'ts rely on outside states to finance war against internal challengers Result: many gov'ts are incurring large debt financed by elites within countries or external actors (US) Doing this instead of building up bureaucratic system by taxation Because the wars are internal to the state → hampers patriotism and unifying myths Need this for cooperation symbolism / patriotism Latin america: external influence Immediate neighbors weren't exactly rivals Neighbors shared immediate history, social structures Foreign powers ensured peace Little opportunity/incentive to expand given geopolitical status quo Brazil won't wake up and go out and try to conquer argentina and peru, bolivia, etc. Balance of power in continent Latin america/; fixity of borders Acceptance of colonial borders Fixity over time No politically recognized state has disappeared through territorial conquest

Democracy - testing A and R's theory

Let's put A and R's theory into hypothesis form that we can test Democratization is more likely in places with High revolutionary threat (high income inequality, economic crisis) Low costs of redistribution (low investments in land, high mobile capital) High costs of repression (international sanctions against repression) Preliminary test of plausibility of hypotheses Think of two counties: 1 country that has democratized and one that hasn't Democratized Taiwan Not democratized Russia → check North korea → check (pretty sure)

Democracy - when do you get democracy?

Micro-foundations of democratization People are making strategic choices about democracy But who are these actors? → who are these people? And what do they care about? What are their incentives/preferences? A and R's dependent variable? Democratization (or not) Majority of population can vote and express their desire of type of policies and gov't is supposed to represent the wishes of the population Minimalist: instead of representing the people, they represent what the leader wants Democracy "The majority of the pop is allowed to vote and express that preferences about policies, and the gov't is supposed to" Get rest of notes from slides Not democracy Get rest of notes from slides Violent struggle People clashing Engaging in a war of independence Features of A and R's argument The regime as the product of a distributional conflict, where agents have clear preferences over economic outcomes Balance of power (de jure: formal power vs. de facto: informal power) determines how the conflict plays out We've come across different types of evidence so far Statistical analysis Case studies A mix of the two Theoretical model Modeling assumptions and patterns about the world

Nation and Nationalism

Nation and nationalism What are symbols, ideas, or features you associate with a US identity? American flag - stars and stripes Red, white, blue Freedom! Democracy Pledge of allegiance Freedom of speech Statue of liberty ; liberty bell Bald eagle - patriotic Official national bird Diversity - "melting pot" Cowboys Land of opportunity, upward social mobility, the "American Dream" Individuality , meritocracy More effort and time you put into it, the more you're rewarded Hollywood Guns and war Byson National mammal of the US

Elections and political parties in autocracies - not risk free, why do elections and have parties?

Not-risk-free Introducing elections into a regime isn't risk-free Malaysia A single party: at first (the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)) Dominated ruling coalitions from the country's independence in 1957 Malaysia's opposition coalition pakatan harapan (PH) achieves a stunning election upset in 2018 Constellation of opposition parties that helped getting rid of UMNO Coordinate with one another and finally overthrow the current party Why bother with elections and parties? They serve an instrumental purpose of the autocrat But a tradeoff: the degree to which they have stabilizing or destabilizing effects is still unresolved

State formation - Tilly's theory

Observable implications Greater population density → stronger states? See whether difference in density leads to variation in strength of that state later on More wars → stronger states? Look for places that are engaged in lots of war, do they have stronger states than other places that aren't engaged in as much war? "War makes states" What does tilly mean? Rulers face competition from external rivals → develop army (war making) → taxes (extraction) in exchange for security (protection) → more complex administrative capacity (state making) → make war in turn → rulers face competition from external rivals Circular cycle: get diagram from slide

Elections and political parties in autocracies - parties and elections as a solution (benefits 1-3)

Parties and elections as a solution Benefit 1: solve info problem vis-a-vis your populace, potential opposition Benefit 2: solve internal principal-agent problem Even if the elections are fairly uncompetitive, they can generate useful info the elites about how they're local officials are doing Competitive autocracy: local officials have to compete for these position within the party Because the ruling party loses an election, it is more of a reason to be more competitive to win the nomination Or you will be out of a job if you don't get the nomination Local and regional officials now have an incentive to work a little harder Benefit 3: ensure stability by cultivating "invincibility" image Signal and demonstrate to the population and large and potential opponents about how strong you are and how much support you already have Long term benefit: help dictators build a strong operational apparatus in order to intimidate others and create a public image of invincibility Has to be done just right If it looks like you rigged it, it can bring down your regime Mexico 1925-2000 Photo from 1996 Ruling party engaged in elections without major threats Why bother with elections? Used elections to prolong its rule: deter opponents and co-opt supporters by showing strength and appeal to make it look like there's no other viable choice other than the PRI (mexico ruling party at the time) Pri in power for over 70 years without interruption

Game theory (prisoner's dilemma)

Useful for understanding strategic interactions Useful for mapping preferences onto strategies and outcomes Outcomes we can observe Be familiar with the intuition underlying the game The problem of committing to something will be a common theme Committing to not pick up weapons Committing not going after someone else's potatoes

Regime type and political violence - policy implications of democracy promotion

Policy implications of democracy promotion around the world US Prided itself in promoting democracy around the world Reputation as being the beacon of a modern liberal democracy Democracy promotion? Cartoon from slide → giving a memo to a dictator(ship) What else should go in this memo, given the arguments we have explored? Should you even send it? What should we be careful about when promoting democracy? Economic inequality (A & R: aussimor and robins reading → check spelling) Responsiveness to local populations (this is a familiar problem to domestic elites - recall malaysia, or the demise of the PRI in mexico) Ethnic diversity may be linked to economic inequality Elections alone don't make democracy (collier; conceptual class) Costs associated with repression (A & R) Presence of the military? Revolutionary impulses Let's not promote democracy! Recall the positives that come out of electoral authoritarian regimes - health outcomes (geddes et al.) Maybe don't send this memo at all: positive externalities from authoritarian regimes Health outcomes are better under an authoritarian gov't *in established democracies, they aren't immune to breakdown

Democracy - response to those challenges

Polity score → polity IV , be increase in democracies and a dip in autocracies in around 1970 or so Ranges from +10 (most democratic) to -10 (least democratic) Maximalist definition: it's based on dozens of features Global trends graph: get from slides Freedom house: look on WS Polity IV: look on WS Code countries in each year for how democratic or autocratic they are Handout examples Parcom: extent to which alternative preferences to leadership can be ... 5 factors Factional polity Ethnic based political factions Compete for political influence Measuring democracy Aggregate indices, like polity score, are based on a maximalist view Premise: democracy isn't just one thing - it has lots of different aspects Index measures are also continuous (dichotomous measure that says "democracy" or "not democracy") What might a minimalist (thin) definition be useful? A maximalist (thick) one? Think about this question and kinds of research questions one or the other will serve you better Defining "coup" Minimalist vs maximalist definitions The definition you use should be guided by your research question, the kind of hypothesis you want to test Level of success? → thick Minimal understanding → attempt or goal of political change, regardless of whether it was successful or involved in violence Somewhere in between thick and thin Assignment 1 Operational definition No ambiguity between five different coders whether it would be a coup or not a coup Assignment 2 Individual No outside research All info that is needed is in the assignment instructions and in my head And creativity: new hypothesis Reading Elites and citizens Autocratic leader: when would it make sense for you to democratize → choose democracy over autocracy

Democracy - Singapore

Post WWII, a political awakening Late 1940s and early 1950s markec by labor unrest 1955, force the british to introduce new constitution 1959 After 1963, LKY's People's Action Party (PAP) rapidly established one party regime Economic growth, low inequality, low costs of repression because popularity maintained through social welfare High revolution threat, high inequality, increasing costs of repression

State formation - africa history

Pre-colonial period Map on slide Monarchical political units with varying levels of centralization Lots of small gerontocracies Diverse terrain, lots of land, less competition Geography Some differences from the european story already Diverse terrain: high costs to extending power Abundance of land: low pop density and less competition Colonial period Force migration Slave trade 4 waves of slave trades, 1400-1900 Trans-atlantic slave trade begins in 15th century - 12 million Labor of africa: exploitation of gold Colonialism "Scramble for africa" 1880-1912 1885: berlin conference arbitrary division of borders New borders were drawn up arbitrarily and decided where the borders were: every tenth cultural group Between major colonial powers: regulate trade during new imperialism King leopald II from berlin Known for unspeakable acts of violence Deciding who is going to take each piece of africa What happens to the form of political order? Authority centered in capital + indirect rule Cash crop economies + mines Mines extract valuable natural resources Belgium is brutal of how they extract the resources Independence Wave begins in 1957 witch Ghana What happens to the political order? Authority centered in capital + indirect rule Colonial administration making deals with chiefs: centered capital Stays after independence Fixity of borders Inter-state cooperation Inter-state war is bad New global norm: promotes interstate cooperation rather than going to war with external rivals The borders from colonial administrators were now fixed and being monitored and enforced by international organizations like the UN

How do you turn a peasant into a frenchman?: weber reading

Pre-third republic (1870) A person living in Bretagne identifies strongly as a Breton, not french Would speak Breton or Gallo *how does such a breton farmer start identifying, first and foremost, as "French"? Local patois was the norm Example: breton, basque, bearnais, catalan Rich, localized idioms, jargon, dialects Get maps from slide 25% of the population didn't speak french Big number of the communes don't speak french Speaking local patois: breton, basque, bearnais, catalan, etc. Rich, localized idioms, jargon, dialects In local schools of some departments, these classes were being taught in local speech so the students could understand what they were saying Even though it was reported that french was in general use "The third republic found a france in which french was a foreign language for half the citizens" (weber, 70)

Two perspectives on political identity: Gellner reading (primordialism vs. constructivism)

Primordialism vs. constructivism Primordialism Sleeping beauty view Intrinsic, inherent identity, innate: sleeping under the surface and it needs an awakening Resonates with power, emotion of group identities Salience in response to threats posed by an "other" But how to explain the emergence / creation of new political identities? (how to explain attachments ot t-shirt colors, or to kandinsky vs. klee) Constructivism Frankenstein's monster view Identities are artificially constructed : almost out of thin air "The central mistake committed both by the friends and enemies of nationalism is the supposition that it is somehow natural" (gellner, 150) "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (168) Identities are changeable, but subject to constraints Ascriptive traits matter (entropy resistant traits: fixed - place you're born into), but what's key is the menu of possible identities and their boundaries Some parts of your identity are more important than others: context Lacking in the pull and power of emotion of primordialist view Gellner on nation and nationalism DV: emergence of nationalism How does gellner explain the emergence of nationalism?

Elections and political parties in autocracies - principal-agent problem 2

Principal-agent problem : 2 Can't be everywhere at once When the dictator (principal) delegates to local officials (agents), there is an additional monitoring problem Monitoring activities of your own local officials Might keep state resources for themselves Engage in opposition Engage in low level corruption Local officials skirt on responsibilities because they're not as invested because they're self-intrusted Any relationship in which one part (agent) is contracted by another (principal) to do something on the principal's behalf Agent has more info than the principal The principal can't always ensure that the agent acts in the principal's best interests Picture of cartoon on slide Examples of principal agent problems University housing vs. student If you pay monthly rent or pay an annual rent for university housing, the water heat and electricity is included in this rent You as the student don't care how much water, electricity you use Landlord prefers that you use only as much as you really need You, the agent, don't have incentive to be frugal with heat, water, electricity, etc. Restaurant owner vs waiter Owner hires a waiter to run the restaurant while the owner is away Customers won't get proper service if waiter doesn't work hard → lose customers → revenue fall Vise versa Given that the owner is collects the revenue, the waiter doesn't have as much incentive to work hard

How do we measure identities?

Problem of observation •Proxies?: ELF had a lot of problems...Leaves out geographical distribution, change over time, degree of cultural difference; conflates # and size of group •Sometimes, there are no good proxies.: Surveys asking people directly to reveal their identitiesIs this a good method? When might we be interested in self-reporting? What methods are then available to us?

Schelling's tipping model

Schelling's tipping model Example of wearing helmets First person puts on the helmet If the social norm was that wearing a helmet isn't manly enough then the first person to put on a helmet will incur a cost It's helpful when you are well known in the industry Example of foot-binding Common until recently in china Feet being squished Affluent households adopt this practice for the daughters and it was a social sign of status Cost began to outweigh the social benefits: resulted in no foot binding Example of taking to the streets Russia Other examples? Wearing a seatbelt when driving Regulation → changed costs of not putting seatbelt on Smoking Use of smartphones / apps Use of masks Use of cannabis Acceptance around use of cannabis Attitudes toward same-sex marriage Attitudes toward gendered division of labor Attitudes toward marriage timing; maybe having children? What these examples have in common: Switching behavior is costly Expectations about how other people wlll behave (coordination) Expected payoffs attached to your particular action Example: what do you stand to gain/lose if you don't practice foot-binding? Wearing helmets? Laitin's insight Language has these elements Language adoption therefore works through a similar logic

Regime type and political violence - Singapore (the outlier)

Singapore: an outlier? Consistent polity score of -2 Ranked #2 in gdp/capita in 2019 US #8, japan #30 It's a diverse and multiracial population Indians Asians Etc. Religion and multiple language are spoken In one state Collier would predict that poor economic outcomes would occur in singapore because of low polity score but that's not true

How to operationalize civil war onset

Singer (1982) → basis for COW Military action internal to the state, with active participation of the gov't Gov't has to be one of the parties Effective resistance by both sides Fearon and laitin (2003) → based on COW Fighting between state and organized, non-state groups seeking control of government/territory or change of policy intention/motive that's motivating non-state groups Need to want to take over the gov't or piece of territory or change policy at the state level Kills at least 1000 over its course, with at least 100/year on average At least 100 killed on both sides, including civilians attacked by rebels UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset Contested incompatibility that concerns gov't and/or territory Use of armed force between 2 parties, of which one is gov't Weapon involvement At least 25 battle deaths/per year Lower than fearon and laitin proposed UCDP counts smaller conflicts as civil war Different than the other data COW catches civil war that lasts a longer period of time How to operationalize civil war onset? What to do with overlapping insurgencies in a country? Separate conflicts or same conflict? Absolute or relative levels of violence? Are 1000 deaths in india comparable to 1000 deaths in nauru What kinds of deaths should we count? Battle deaths only (just soldiers and rebels)? Civilian deaths? Why? If we include civilian deaths, what nature of deaths? Need to be killed by government forces or rebel forces

State formation - herbst's argument; africa

State making was costly and unattractive → herbst's argument Abundance of land, low pop density "Sticky" impact of colonial legacies on forms of rule Fixity of borders and new international norms Low incentive for taxes: weak states in this region Are you convinced by herbst? Influence of imperial, western powers impact the states after independence Lasting impact Still areas today that are not developed and are still living like pre-colonial times Reversal of development outcomes: some of the wealthy pre colonial kingdoms are now some of the most poor areas in the world Potential alternative hypotheses? Identity of the colonial power Pre-colonial features might explain today's state consolidation Dependence on economic relief, outside actors Places like the US invests in africa No incentives of african rulers to make policy concessions to african people because of economic relief

Prisoner's dilemma

State of nature is like dilemma in a prison Jack and jill are partners in crime But they're not very good at being covert so they get caught by the police Sit in their interrogation rooms separately: wondering if they should tell the truth or not? The detectives offer jack and jill the same deal → if no one speaks, each get 2 years If both talk, each get 5 years If jack talks and jill stays quiet, jack goes free and jill gets 10 years and vise versa What would you do?: stay quiet or talk? - look at table about this and the NE equilibrium

Cultural identity and rational choice: state rationalization, floral model

State rationalization Multi langual france until 1870s Undermined by state control over education, conscript armies Floral model from Leighton's chapter Popular subversion of local cultures De Swaan's floral model Flower photo from slide Center: spanish Around the center... Basque Catalan Galician Valencian Dark orange center: monolingual spanish-speakers Light orange center: bilingual "monopoly meditators" Speak some spanish and other languages Enjoy rents from a monopoly over translation But as more people adopt language, the value of the service declines → centralized education in spanish Petals (white): monolinguals in regional languages Not a story about a top down reform Why is spanish the language of the center and used in education? Why not converge on basque or catalan

State rationalization: weber

State rationalization Solution: centralized reforms centered on language to achieve goal of unity School systems Teaching in french Teaching about patriotism in french Modernization Conscript armies Conscript armies became the school of the nation where french was spoken Served state interests, infused young men with language of the state and the cultural language and values of what it means to be french Not just about having a standard language: all immaterial stuff that comes with it *voila! you have a french citizen Slow shift in mindset over generations that was needed in order for this change to occur 1850s and onward, growing adaptation of french Coincided with modernization and industrialization Used as a common language in order to do their job: politics (1870s), working in factories, etc.

The cultural foundations of nation: evolutionary processes vs. instrumental action

The cultural foundations of nation: evolutionary processes vs. instrumental action Gellner: culture replaces structure in industrializing society Failure to assimilate into majority culture due to entropy-resistant traist is key moment for creation of myth around group's particularity, becoming basis for nationalism Industrialization central, but hard time explaining (example: african nationalism or nationalism in advanced industrialized economies; 'glass ceiling' argument applies, but cause may not always be industrialization) Weber: "Peasants into Frenchmen" Periods of instability/flux as a breton, say, and periods of stability as french, with state rationalization setting off a process of change in mindset over generations Laitin: cultural identity as a set of coordinated beliefs Tipping model + role of cultural entrepreneurs Rational choice/self-interest account to explain why individuals would buy into new identities; explain shifts in collective identity in either direction

Democracy - status quo, repress or democratize

The non-democratic status quo Citizens: one actor Elites: other actor Society is made up of citizens and elites What do they care about? Citizens prefer democracy because democracies are kinder to citizen's economic interests → de facto power Elites prefer non-democracy because they get to keep more stuff that only they have → de jure power Democracy implies that elites need to redistribute economic goodies that they would otherwise be able to keep for themselves De facto power determines if there will be a democracy → check this De jure: political power allocated formally by institutions or political systems US: executive power is the de jure power that's allocated to you by being voted into office Actors are forward looking Assess the costs of revolt (relatives to SQ) → de facto power (citizens) Would we be successful? Will I be jailed? When citizens demand democracy, they are expressing a want to have political power Uncertain if you will have the same de facto power tomorrow Incentive: use de facto power you have today to create institutions that will give them access to de jure power Institutions make policies durable Set rules of distribution in the future Who gets a piece of economic pie today, tomorrow, day after that, etc. → future Institutions are hard to reverse, difficult to destroy Elites need to be willing to grant democratization Citizens and elites will engage in some sort of calculus as to what they are going to do Elites must assess the cots of repression (relative to democratization and redistribution) Is this life worth the trouble of dispatching the military and the police? Assess the costs relative to the cost of democratizing → redistribute economic wealth so it trickles down to the citizens Possible strategies → de jure power Repress democratize/redistribute Possible strategies → de facto power Do nothign (status quo (SQ) Revolt (force institutional change to secure de jure power) Commitment problem in the status quo → c = citizens, E= elites C moves first, decide whether to revolt or not If c chooses not revolt → e's turn..... E then moves, set a tax rate (how much redistribution of economic goods occurs) Revolution is extremely costly → only going to pick some tax rate that benefits citizens when the threat of revolting is quite high Get graph from slides Best strategy: what you think the other actor is going to do E cannot make a credible promise to set a tax rate that benefits C.... E can renege on the promise, set most preferred T Repress or democratize? Let's add richness to this prior model C decides to revolt or not If not revolt → SQ If they choose to revolt E can either repress OR grant democratization, which results in redistribution How does E choose to repress or democratize? How does C choose to revolt or not revolt? If you are confident that the elites won't punish you for a revolt, more willing to engage in a revolt Get picture of model from slides

Elections and political parties in autocracies - rise of competitive authoritarianism

The rise of "competitive authoritarianism" - levitsky and way (check way) Opposition parties compete against incumbents in elections Not a level playing field Favors ruling gov't Still the opposition can forge substantial support Not deep autocracies: some level of political competition happens Feature democratic characteristics Elections Multiparty Media isn't free Restricted by the gov't Use electoral fraud or arrests of potential challengers or harassment of opposition Picture Museveni campaign posters Served as president since 1986 in uganda Why both with elections at all? Put yourself in the shoes of a dictator What do you worry about? Relations with donors and perhaps other countries in regards to funding: 1980s and 1990s donors refused to give certain dictator governments aid because of their elections What benefits do you reap from elections and parties?

Role of language: weber?

The role of language Policies rolled out to the far provinces to educate citizens in french - a kind of didactic propaganda Begin educating citizens in french By end of second empire (1870) Those in the rural areas understood a lot of french, even though they might not have spoken it

Hobbes on social order - Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Illustration Written during English Civil War (1642-1651): english political theorist Published in 1651 Abraham boss made the illustration Latin on top: translates to → there's no power on earth to be compared to him Referring to leviathan: monstrous, made to look like a humanbeing Body is made up a bunch of little individuals Wears a crown: authority Right hand: sword → use of force Left hand: crosier (septor) → authority Wields these two things over this territory Hobbes writes this during english civil war: experiencing civil unrest. He wanted to restore political order. He endorses the creation of a leviathan that arises out of the need for fundamental order

Hobbes - state of nature

What is life like in the "state of nature?" Hypothetical scenario in which we live in a society before political governance or anything that looks like a state Every man is enemy to every man Living in the state of nature: what it would look like Looking after yourself mentality: selfish, prioritize yourself over others Self-interested Chaotic and anarchy No one to tell anyone else what to do Competition → state of chaos Base needs for living take priority over some greater achievements or goals when people might have when they work together Brutish, short life A state of "war, wehre every man is enemy to every man" where life is short, brutish → get rest of quote from slides Why is hobbes so pessimistic? Mistrust of one another Some people enjoy exercising power over others: enjoy having this "glory" People are uncertain about people's intentions, stakes are very high, one false move and you can get killed in the state of nature Let's say you build a potato patch in this plot of land, then someone else comes along and steals your potatoes So then you decide to put a fence up around the patch Then someone takes down your fence Then you decide to team up with madison and a few others and create neighborhood watch over potatoes No possibility for industry or leisure or productive activity Everyone else will pray on you so there's little incentive for you to grow potatoes In this state of uncertainty, it's rational for people to plan for the worst, out of risk aversion People plan for the worst out of fear Mean: pre-emp any ravaging Others may feel they need to make a pre-emptive attack on you - look at game theory table and explanation

Democracy - what's democracy ? (lists)

What's "democracy?" List of countries that are undeniably democratic Denmark Norway New zealand France Canada Sweden United states??? List of countries that are undeniably undemocratic (autocracy or dictatorship) China Russia Argentina Myanmar North korea China Saudi arabia israel/palestine Russia Venezuela Key characteristics that democratic countries share, undemocratic countries share Democratic Representativeness of the population Diversity Equality Fundamental human rights are guaranteed by the government Elections happen - free and fair Access to voting Government held accountable People have the right to criticize government Relatively stable economy; low unemployment rate; social equitable welfare; low income inequality

Democracy - when might a maximalist view be useful? When might a minimalist view be useful?

When might a maximalist view of democracy be more useful? A minimalist view? Maximalist Emergence of democracies in certain countries Minimalist Overall trends Our brainstorm from last class List of democracies and not democracies Maximalist vs. minimalist The maximalist view recognizes the multidimensionsality of democracy But.... How to tell differences across subcomponents? Country x: score of 8, but very little freedom of expression Country Y: score of 8, but meaningful freedom of expression How to distinguish change in the overall level? Country x: 8 --> 9, by boosting freedom of expression but a decline in other aspects If income equality is already a part of our definition, how to test whether income equality → democracy? Here a minimalist definition may be more attractive (and if you're comparing a lot of countries across a lot of years because there might not be available info)

State formation - New puzzle: what explains timing?

Why did states come about in europe when they did?: period of time tilly focusses on Competition: innate part of the human condition Why didn't state formation happen much earlier than that period that tilly talks about Demographic changes might explain timing Population density Greater competition over land/resources, need more territory → need more extraction and war-making → state-making But what explains rising population density in the first place? Technological advances: advances in transportation technology, army innovation, etc. Further development of capitalism (protestant reformation) Growing international trade Geography + coincidence → food production → pop density

Explaining civil war onset - what is a coup? : operational and conceptual definitions

Why do we get civil war in some places but not others? 1. Cultural hypothesis: source of civil war are these fixed, deeply held cultural convictions that comes into conflict with each other 2. Grievance hypothesis: can be political, economic, social → when people are unhappy, then they have more incentives to start a civil war 3. Feasibility hypothesis: if you're facing a strong state with great military → have the capacity and people to crack down on insurgency Less incentive to try and start an insurgency GDP per capita: wealthier countries have less civil war Mountainous terrain: more places to hide, the state will be less likely to monitor you Lead to higher probability of civil war What is a coup? Intention? Use of violence? Actors? Success? Duration? Coup: Conceptual definition Describes the fundamental features of the variable we want to study Operational definition Set the "rules" of how we measure the variable

From peasant to frenchman

from peasant to frenchman Pre-revolutionary france - restoration Crown had little interest in spreading use of french Only relevant as an instrument of rule Used for court documents, public officials used it in public affairs but was slow in learning the language of france Only spead to areas that had connections to the court and versailles In 1789, revolutino is afoot On the eve of the third republic, multiplicity and particularism of local patois posed an apparent problem for ideological unity "All citizens had to understand what the interests of the republic were and what the republic was up to..the regime needed an effective vehicle for info and propaganda, but it could hardly have one if the population didn't know french" (weber, 72) Unity of the republic demands the unity of speech

Democracy - minimalist and maximalist definitions

hat is democracy Do we need to observe alternation? Or is the possibility of it enough? Example: japan's LDP Minimalist vs. maximalist definitions Minimalist or "thin" (thin concept of democracy) Schumpeter 1942 Loook for competitive elections: yes or no Przeworski et al 2008 Ex ante uncertainty Irreversibility and repeatability Alternation required After elections happen, can't be overthrown Boix 2003 Participation required Competitive elections and people to participate Maximalist or "thick" Dahi 1971 Contestation (frequent and fair) Competition between political elites Elections need to be frequent, regular, and fair Equal citizenship Information about alternatives of the current incumbent Freedom of speech + right to assembly High rates of participation required Diamond and morlino 2004 8 dimensions Aggregate index (example: polity IV) Conceptual (operational) issues to work out Participation Are people coming to vote Or do we care about formal: in principal, everyone is eligibility to vote Access to political arena Responsiveness of government Socioeconomic inequality Checks and balances Strength of civil society (de)centralization of power

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State formation - latin america

state-strength - relatively weak How do we know? Centeno gives us some reasons map from slides Public goods provision is rather week with high levels of inequality within investment of education, in the health sector, etc. Map analysis Region is on the lower end of how much the gov't is spending compared to western europe (tilly says there's high levels of gov't expenditures in europe) 2016 map analysis LA catching up but central america is falling behind Brazil is sort of a stand out country here Bureaucratic capacity to extract taxes is limited Large debts to finance internal violence instead War making is happening within state borders As a result: the gov't is racking up debt in order to combat these internal challenges Monopoly over legitimate use of violence is questionable High crime rates Central america (el salvador) Internal challenges to state in hinterlands (periphral parts of the countries) What explains Get from slide Latin america: initial observations More settler colonies compared to SSA Tensions over political control among socioeconomic elites But in many parts, juntas declare independence (no mass mobilization) Military declares indpeendence without popular participation of general public Military insituttions take the charge and do this Regional experience of civil wars Result: lot of internal struggles, armed conflicts, civil wars → didn't see much of this in africa or much of this in europe (tilly's argument)

Civil war onset - Grievance hypothesis

ust a bunch of people that have grievances against the gov't or people in other countries Relative deprivation: discrepancy between what people think they deserve vs what they can actually get Grievances as a result of inequalities between groups (economic, ethinic, religious, urban/rural divide etc.) or discontent with policy Map on slides insert here Malaku conflict 1999-2002 Before: Suharto regime grated Christian and Muslim groups roughly equal distribtuion of power Grievances between christians and muslims This central gov't granted both groups an equal distribution of power Not a big disparity between these two large groups 1998: suharto regime falls After: decentralization, land, redistribution, competitive elections for district positions carrying prestige and economic benefits Grievances → christian-muslim violence Nepal Neglect of development in rural parts → Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) DV: civil war onset Guatemala El salvador The phillippines Zimbabwe *get notes for these from slide Greater economic inequality or... More undemocratic form of gov't or.... More discrimination against minority groups ----> greater probability of civil war onset ("Pr(ciivl war onset))