BUS Law Chapter 48
Jay signed a two-year lease containing a clause that expressly prohibited subletting. After six months, Jay asked the landlord for permission to sublet the apartment for one year. The landlord refused. This angered Jay, and he immediately assigned his right under the lease to Kay. Kay was a distinguished gentleman, and Jay knew that everyone would consider him a desirable tenant. Is Jay's assignment of his lease to Kay valid?
Answer: Assignment of a Leasehold. Jay's assignment of his lease to Kay is valid. The lease prohibited subletting but contained no provision forbidding an assignment. The law recognizes a distinction between a sublease and an assignment. A sublease involves the transfer by the tenant (Jay) of less than all of his rights in the lease.
Kirkland conveyed a farm to Sandler to have and to hold for and during his life and on Sandler's death to Rubin. Some years thereafter, oil was discovered in the vicinity. Sandler thereupon made an oil and gas lease, and the oil company set up its machinery to begin drilling operations. Rubin then filed suit to enjoin the operations. Assuming an injunction to be the proper form of remedy, what decision?
Answer: Life Estates. For Rubin. While a life tenant may use the land during his lifetime he cannot commit waste. An attempt by the life tenant to extract all or an unreasonable amount of the mineral wealth is a use not intended by the grantor. As it is a use which would damage the remainderman, it is one which he can enjoin.
Robert and Marjorie Wake owned land that they used as both a cattle ranch and a farm. Each spring and autumn, the Wakes would drive their cattle from the ranch portion of the operation across an access road on the farmland to Butler Springs, which was also on the farmland. In December 1989, the Wakes sold the farm to Jesse and Maud Hess but retained for themselves a right-of-way over the farm access road and the right to use Butler Springs for watering their livestock. In 1996, the Hesses sold the farm to the Johnsons, granting them uninterrupted possession of the property "excepting only that permissive use of the premises" owned by the Wakes. The Wakes continued to use the access road and Butler Springs until 1997, when they sold their ranch and granted the new owners "their rights to the water of Butler Springs," but they said nothing about the access road. The ranch was subsequently sold several times, and all the owners used the access road and watering hole. In 2010, the Nelsons purchased the ranch. Shortly thereafter, the Johnsons notified the Nelsons that they had revoked the Nelsons' right to use the access road and Butler Springs. In 2012, the Johnsons closed the access road by locking the gates across the road. The Nelsons brought this action, claiming easements to both the access road and Butler Springs. In 2012, the Johnsons closed the access road by locking the gates across the road. The Nelsons brought this action, claiming easements to both the access road and Butler Springs. The trial court ruled in favor of the Nelsons, and the Johnsons appealed. Does an easement in favor of the Nelsons exist? Why?
Answer: Easements. Judgment for the Nelsons affirmed. The Johnsons allege that the Butler Springs easement was "in gross," and therefore personal to the Wakes. An easement in gross is merely a personal interest in the land of another. However, an easement appurtenant is an interest which is annexed to the possession of the dominant tenement and passes with the land to subsequent owners. An instrument granting an easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties and the circumstances in existence at the time of the easement's creation. The trial court determined that the Butler Springs easement created in the 1989 Wake-Hess contract was appurtenant in nature, with a dominant estate in the cattle ranch and a servient estate in the farmland. The Butler Springs easement consequently has passed with the cattle ranch (dominant estate) upon each transfer of title. The evidence presented at trial fully supports this interpretation.
Otis Olson, the owner of two adjoining city lots, A and B, built a house on each. He laid a drainpipe from lot B across lot A to the main sewer pipe under the alley beyond lot A. Olson then sold and conveyed lot A to Fred Ford. The deed, which made no mention of the drainpipe, was promptly recorded. Ford had no actual knowledge or notice of the drainpipe, although it would have been apparent to anyone inspecting the premises because it was only partially buried. Later, Olson sold and conveyed lot B to Luke Lane. This deed also made no reference to the drainpipe and was promptly recorded. A few weeks later, Ford discovered the drainpipe across lot A and removed it. Did he have the right to do so?
Answer: Easements. No. Lot A became subject to an easement in favor of Lot B. Although one cannot truly have an easement over his own land, an easement may be created by implication when a grantor has used one portion of his land for the benefit of another in a manner similar to that of an easement and then conveys one of such portions. This result is reached by calling the original use by the owner of the severed estates a "quasi-easement." It is based upon the presumed intent of the parties that they have dealt with the land in the condition in which it exists, i.e., subject to an "easement."
On January 1, Mrs. Irene Kern leased an apartment from Colonial Court Apartments, Inc., for a one-year term. When the lease was entered into, Mrs. Kern asked for a quiet apartment, and Colonial assured her that the assigned apartment was in a quiet, well-insulated building. In fact, however, the apartment above Mrs. Kern's was occupied by a young couple, the Lindgrens. From the start of her occupancy, Mrs. Kern complained of their twice-weekly parties and other actions that so disturbed her sleep that she had to go elsewhere for rest. After Mrs. Kern had lodged several complaints, Colonial terminated the Lindgrens' lease effective February 28. The termination of the lease was prolonged, however, and Mrs. Kern vacated her apartment, claiming that she was no longer able to endure the continued disturbances. Colonial then brought this action to recover rent owed by Mrs. Kern. Will Colonial prevail? Has Mrs. Kern been constructively evicted? Explain.
Answer: Eviction. Yes, she has been constructively evicted. A constructive eviction is said to occur when the beneficial enjoyment of an apartment by the lessee is so interfered with by the landlord as to justify an abandonment. It does not suppose an actual ouster or dispossession by the landlord.
Smith owned Blackacre in fee simple absolute. In section 3 of a properly executed will, Smith devised Blackacre as follows: "I devise my farm Blackacre to my son Darwin so long as it is used as a farm." Sections 5 and 6 of the will made gifts to persons other than Darwin. The last clause of Smith's will provided: "All the remainder of my real and personal property not disposed of heretofore in this will, I devise and bequeath to Stanford University." Smith died in 2012, survived by her son Darwin. Smith's estate has been administered. Darwin has been offered $100,000 for Blackacre if he can convey title to it in fee simple. What interests in Blackacre were created by Smith's will?
Answer: Future Interests. Darwin received only a qualified fee title and therefore has no power to convey title in fee simple absolute. The words "so long as it is used as a farm" purports to create a possibility of reverter in Stanford University. The answer is based upon common law rules rather than statutory provisions
At the time of his marriage to Ann, Robert owned several parcels of real estate in joint tenancy with his brother, Sam. During his marriage, Robert purchased a house and put the title in his name and his wife's name as joint tenants, not as tenants in common. Robert died; within a month of his death, Smith obtained a judgment against Robert's estate. What are the relative rights of Sam, Smith, and Ann?
Answer: Joint Tenancy. Upon Robert's death, his brother Sam, as surviving joint tenant, became the sole owner of the property owned by Robert and Sam in joint tenancy prior to Robert's marriage to Ann. Upon the death of Robert, title to the house being in Robert and Ann as joint tenants, title passed by operation of law to the surviving joint tenant Ann. The judgment creditor, Smith, acquired no rights in any of the property jointly owned by Robert and Sam and by Robert and Ann. At the time Smith obtained a judgment against Robert's estate, all of the joining property of which Robert was co-owner was then owned by Sam and Ann, respectively, as surviving joint tenants, in fee simple absolute.
In 1969, a deed for land in Pitt County, North Carolina, was executed and delivered by Joel and Louisa Tyson "unto M. H. Jackson and wife Maggie Jackson, for and during the term of their natural lives and after their death to the children of the said M. H. Jackson and Maggie Jackson that shall be born to their intermarriage as shall survive them to them and their heirs and assigns in fee simple forever." Thelma Jackson Vester, a daughter of M. H. and Maggie Jackson, died in 2011, survived by three children. M. H. Jackson, who survived his wife, Maggie Jackson, died in 2012, survived by four sons. The children of Thelma Jackson Vester brought this action against M. P. Jackson, a son of and executor of the will of M. H. Jackson. The children of Vester contended that through their deceased mother they were entitled to a one-fifth interest in the land conveyed by the deed of 1969. The executor contended that the deed conveyed a contingent remainder and that only those children who survived the parents took an interest in the land. Discuss the contentions of both of the parties.
Answer: Remainder Interests. Judgment for executor affirmed. The distinction between a vested and a contingent remainder is the capacity to take upon the termination of the preceding estate. Where those who are to take in remainder cannot be determined until the happening of a stated event, the remainder is contingent. Only those who can answer the roll immediately upon the happening of the event acquire any estate in the properties granted. Here the estate in remainder was not given to the children of M.H. Jackson and Maggie Jackson, but by clear and express language to those children and only those who survived their parents. Since Mrs. Vester did not survive her parents, there was nothing for her children, plaintiffs, to inherit. It affirmatively appears from the complaint that plaintiffs acquired no interest in the land by virtue of the deed from Tyson and wife to M.H. Jackson and others.
In her will, Teressa granted a life estate to Amos in certain real estate, with remainder to Brenda and Clive in joint tenancy. All the rest of Teressa's estate was left to Hillman College. While going to Teressa's funeral, the car in which Amos, Brenda, and Clive were riding was wrecked. Brenda was killed, Clive died a few minutes later, and Amos died on his way to the hospital. Who is entitled to the real estate in question?
Answer: Remainders. Clive's heirs-at-law. This question involves the application of basic rules with respect to life estates, remainders, and joint tenancies. Upon Teressa's death, Brenda and Clive became the owners of the real estate as joint tenants, subject to the life estate of Amos. Upon Brenda's death, the surviving joint tenant, Clive, owned the real estate subject to the life estate of Amos. Upon Clive's death, in the absence of a will, his heirs-at-law became the owners in fee of the real estate, subject to Amos' life estate. Upon Amos' death, Clive's heirsat-law became the outright owners of the real estate
Panessi leased to Barnes, for a term of ten years beginning May 1, certain premises located at 527-529 Main Street in Cleveland. The premises were improved with a three-story building, the first floor being occupied by stores and the upper stories by apartments. On May 1 of the following year, Barnes leased one of the apartments to Clinton for one year. On July 5, a fire destroyed the second and third floors of the building. The first floor was not burned but was rendered unusable. Neither the lease from Panessi to Barnes nor the lease from Barnes to Clinton contained any provision regarding loss by fire. Discuss the liability of Barnes and Clinton to continue to pay rent.
Answer: Tenant's Obligations: Destruction of the Premises. Barnes is liable for rental after the destruction of the premises, but Clinton is not liable. The lessee of an entire building is deemed to have leased the real estate, consisting of the land and the improvements. Since after the destruction of the building, Barnes is still in a position to make use of the land, he is deemed liable for the payment of the rent. The lease of an apartment, however, is not considered to carry with it a lease of the land; consequently, such a lessee is not liable after the destruction of his apartment.
Ames leased an apartment to Boor for $600 a month, payable the last day of each month. The term of the written lease was from January 1, 2011, through April 30, 2012. On March 15, 2011, Boor moved out, telling Ames that he disliked all the other tenants. Ames replied, "Well, you're no prize as a tenant; I can probably get more rent from someone more agreeable." Ames and Boor then had a minor physical altercation in which neither was injured. Boor sent the apartment keys to Ames by mail. Ames wrote Boor, "It will be my pleasure to hold you for every penny you owe me. I am renting the apartment on your behalf to Clay until April 30, 2012, at $425 a month." Boor had paid his rent through February 28, 2011. Clay entered the premises on April 1, 2011. How much rent, if any, may Ames recover from Boor?
Answer: Tenant's Obligations: Eviction or Abandonment. Boor is liable to Ames for the rent ($600) that accrued on March 31, 2011, and for $175 a month thereafter until April 30, 2012. A lease vests in the lessee's exclusive possession of the premises for its duration. He gains an estate in the land. He cannot relieve himself of his rent obligation by abandoning the premises. His promise to pay rent is an "independent covenant," and he continues to be liable on it even though he abandons the premises.
In 1985, Ogle owned two adjoining lots numbered 6 and 7 fronting at the north on a city street. In that year, she laid out and built a concrete driveway along and two feet in front of what she erroneously believed to be the west boundary of lot 7. Ogle used the driveway for access to buildings situated at the southern end of both lots. Later in the same year, she conveyed lot 7 to Dale, and thereafter in the same year, she conveyed lot 6 to Pace. Neither deed made any reference to the driveway, and after the conveyance, Dale used it exclusively for access to lot 7. In 2012, a survey by Pace established that the driveway overlapped 6 inches on lot 6, and he brought an appropriate action to establish his lawful ownership of the strip on which the driveway approaches, to enjoin its use by Dale, and to require Dale to remove the overlap. Will Pace prevail? Why?
Answer: Transfer of Property: Easement by Prescription. Decree in favor of Dale. Dale had effective and actual possession of the strip in question, and the statute of limitations had run against Pace.
In 2000, Roy Martin and his wife, Alice; their son, Hiram; and Hiram's wife, Myrna, acquired title to a 240-acre farm. The deed ran to Roy Martin and Alice Martin, the father and mother, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and to Hiram Martin and Myrna Martin, the son and his wife, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Alice Martin died in 2008, and in 2011, Roy Martin married Agnes Martin. By his will, Roy Martin bequeathed and devised his entire estate to Agnes Martin. When Roy Martin died in 2013, Hiram and Myrna Martin assumed complete control of the farm. State the interest in the farm, if any, of Agnes, Hiram, and Myrna Martin on the death of Roy Martin.
When Alice Martin died, Roy Martin, her husband, as surviving joining tenant in one-half of the farm, became sole owner of that half of the title. Roy Martin's death did not cast his half of the title upon his son, Hiram Martin, and his wife, Myrna Martin. When Roy Martin dies, his second wife, Agnes Martin, could correctly assert a claim to one-half of the farm, as sole beneficiary under her husband's will. Hiram and Myrna Martin continued to own one-half of the farm in joint tenancy upon the death of Hiram's father, Roy Martin
