Civil Rights and Liberties Study Guide

Abortion Cases: Roe v Wade City of Akron v Akron Center Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn v Casey Stenberg v Carhart Gonzalez v Carhart

- Abortion rights and pre-viability regulations- - texas law made it a felony to have an abortion - except if its to save the life of the mother - legal doctrine- standing - exception- capable of repetition yet availing review standing will ultimately be granted - legalizes abortion - there is a constitutional right to abortion - strict scrutiny- fundamental right - viability came hand in hand with the progress - the fetus can live outside the mother without the mother- viability - compelling state interest kicks in with viability - pre- viability regulations at the time roe- whether the regulations reasonably relates to the preservation and protection to maternal health - 1. rights to a abortion - 2. - 3. pre- viability regulations at the time roe- whether the regulations reasonably relates to the preservation and protection to maternal health - says nothing about the fetus

Coates v City of Cincinnati- Content neutral Vagueness exception

- Cincitnnati made a illegal for 3 or more people to assemble themselves on a sidewalk and conduct things in an annoying matter - What is annoying? - The term annoying is far too vague for a reasonable to distinguish what is annoying - This is an independent consideration after you have done the content based or content based stuff- its additional Vagueness- a law that is constitutional if reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited or what is permitted Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Coates was involved with several other individuals in a demonstration and picketing in a labor dispute. They were later convicted for violating a Cincinnati city ordinance prohibiting assembly on public sidewalks if the assembly annoyed other individuals. Appellant claims that such a statute violates his right to free assembly. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An ordinance or statute that restricts First or Fourteenth Amendment rights is unconstitutional if it is overly vague and restricts protected speech and assembly in addition to unprotected actions. Facts. Appellant was a student involved in a demonstration and the other Appellants were pickets involved in a labor dispute. They were later convicted of violating a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that makes it a criminal offense for three or more people to assemble on any of the sidewalks of the city and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passers by. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld Appellants' convictions. Issue. Whether the Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance making it a criminal offense for three or more people to assemble on a public sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passing individuals is a violation of Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights? Held. Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorize the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. In fact conduct that annoys some people, does not annoy others. Therefore it causes guessing as to what the meaning of the standard of conduct is. Although the city argues that the breadth of this statue allows the prevention of lawless conduct on the sidewalks, it could do so with an ordinance that gives reasonable specificity as to what is prohibited. As this ordinance punishes not only lawless, unprotected conduct, and lawful protected assembly, this ordinance is an unconstitutional restriction of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to assemble. Dissent. Any man of average intelligence should know that some kinds of conduct are annoying and covered by the ordinance, while others are not and not covered by the ordinance. Would prefer to deal with the ordinance as with any criminal statute. The statute is not infirm on its face, and since no information was given as to what conduct was charged against the Appellants, the Court is in no position to judge the statute as applied. The fact that the ordinance confers wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances is irrelevant when dealing with conduct at its core. Discussion. The majority in this case clearly states that it will not uphold regulations that vaguely limit an individual's right to peaceful speech and assembly, even if that regulation also protects the public against violent actions. A regulation must clearly outline what conduct is allowed, and what conduct is prohibited if it involves restricting an individual's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The dissent prefers leaving the decision of what conduct is allowed, and what is prohibited to a jury, while the majority believes that it is every citizens right to clearly know what conduct is allowed and what is prohibited before they act, and not leave it up to a jury that could reach a different conclusion depending on the members of the panel.

De jure De facto

- De jure- segregation under the law- the law is what is segregating out the communities/ what violates the 14th amendment - De Facto- occurs of the fact/ where communities self select to segregate on their own - specifically refer to de-segregation

Schad v Borough of Mt. Ephraim- content neutral over broad exception

- Mr schad operated an adult book store -coin operated peep show - curtain rises- naked dancing women- its a machine - New jersey passed a restriction- that prohibited all live nude entertainment - What was the target?- target the peep shows - Court said you were trying to get is this but you restricted all of this - So its over broad - You targeted everyone instead of the peep show- its substantially overboard - Its content neutral and its overbroad - Always go through general analysis Over broad exception- a law is unconstitutionally overboard if it regulates substantially more speech then the constitution allows. Case striking down a municipal ordinance prohibiting nude dancing, that "entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee." * However some non-obscene conduct such as nude dancing and nude musicals contains significant expressive content and therefore may be channeled to certain times and placed if not banned

Simon and Shutter v Victims Bd - content based case

- Son of a sam is a serial killer - He was going to write book and make a whole lot of money - Law requires- that the criminals income gets deposited into an escrow account- goes to the victims - Any criminals trying to make money off their crimes don't get benefits - The court says- this case would be content based restriction - they are restricting the message - limit criminals from speaking from their particular message to make profit - Its subject matter restriction- eliminated the entire subject area - Compelling state interest - there is one that the criminals making money off their crimes - Its not narrowly tailored- Facts of the case To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal. Issue: Did the Son of Sam law violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.

Nix v William

- William escapes from a mental hospital and stays at a YMCA - while he is staying there a 10 year old goes missing - he killed the 10 year old and wrapped her body in carpet and buried in the woods - people saw him but a huge carpet in his car - he gets a lawyer and the lawyer calls the cops and says he will turn himself in - says he they can't talk to the defendant without a lawyer - cops arrested him and in the car the cops were talking to one another about how the parents can't do a christian burial - he eventually confesses and then the lawyer wants to get rid of the evidence but the judge uses inevitable discovery - the confession was illegally derived , but since the cops were already around the body- so the confession was tossed but they still found the body based on inevitable discovery - allowed the body but not confession search and seizure on the hypo limited doctrine- the special needs doctrine - tlo - sitz - in certain special situations that you need to look to an alternative rule to guide 4th amendment searches

Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.- absent clear evidence test

- a families son was killed - a cop was charged with second degree murder of a youth - welch is a publisher of a magazine (ultra conservative) - Gertz is a communist because he's representing the cop - is Mr. gertz is not a public figure - court didn't see him as a public figure - there is a difference between public and private - malice is only proven for public - public official- someone who holds an official title and public figure - there is a test in this case- - absent clear evidence of general fame or no verity in the community and the pervasive involvement in the affairs of society an individual should not be deemed of a public personality - public official and public figure show malice - private individual the states can choose whether to choose malice or negligence Brief Fact Summary: The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Petitioner, Elmer Gertz (Petitioner), was a public figure and that the New York Times standard applied in his defamation action. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the Respondent publisher, Robert Welch Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner attorney sought review. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Because private individuals have less effective opportunities for rebuttal than do public officials and public figures, they are more vulnerable to injury from defamation. Thus, state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals is greater than for public officials and public figures, and States may constitutionally allow private individuals to recover damages for defamation on the basis of any standard of care except liability without fault. Facts: After a policeman killed a youth, the youth's family retained the Petitioner an attorney to represent them in a civil action. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused the Petitioner of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Because the statements contained serious inaccuracies, the Petitioner filed a libel action against the Respondent. The district court held that the New York Times standard applied, which meant that the Respondent escaped liability unless the Petitioner proved that a defamatory falsehood was published with actual malice. The district court entered judgment for the Respondent and the court of appeals affirmed. Issue: Does the standard enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan requiring a plaintiff to establish actual malice to successfully bring a defamation suit against a public figure extend to private individuals? Held: No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) reversed and remanded. Because the Petitioner was not a public figure, the state's interest in compensating injury to his reputation required a different standard from that formulated in New York Times. The Supreme Court held further that the states could define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuries to a private individual. Dissent. The ruling in Gertz elicited four dissenting opinions - in a 5-4 vote. * Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger) wrote a relatively short dissent, the crux of which is protection of

Stanley v Georgia

- allege book making activities - they searched his house - they viewed the film and say it was dirty movies - the court says The government is not allowed to dictate to people what they will and will not read, watch or enjoy. The Constitution strictly protects an individual from such unwarranted intrusion and control. Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioner, Stanley's (Petitioner) home was being searched for evidence of bookmaking when officers found obscene films. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Mere possession of obscenity is not punishable under the United States Constitution (Constitution). Facts: The Petitioner was being investigated for bookmaking. Officers were searching his home when they found 8mm films that they determined to be obscene. They confiscated the materials and charged the Petitioner with knowingly having possession of obscene matter. Issue: Does this law prohibiting possession of obscenity violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held: Yes. The Constitution prohibits making mere possession a crime. Discussion. The government is not allowed to dictate to people what they will and will not read, watch or enjoy. The Constitution strictly protects an individual from such unwarranted intrusion and control.

Time, Inc v. Firestone

- deals with evaluation if a person is a public figure or not - the wife of russell firestone - mary alice and russell decide to get divorced - time inc wrote a story that there was extra ,marital affairs from both sides (time magazine) - mary alice sued because only her husband did - she sued saying they are libel - she was married to an high end family - she married into a family she did not thrust herself in a way politicians due - what happens when you are on actively thrusting yourself in the limelight but she was married into one - supreme court agreed with her- she is a private figure- lower standard for her to prove in court - she got $100,000 in damages

Obergefell v Hodges

- final ruling in same sex marriage - his partner has ALS - went out of state - they got married in the plane in a different state (maryland) - they come back to ohio (DOMA) - he dies - spouse raises the issue BECAUSE he was not entitled to anything because same sex marriage was recognized in ohio - kennedy is on this case- california conservative - right to marry (loving v virginia, turner v safely) - 1. individual autonomy - 2. fundamental right supports a 2 person union that is unique to itself- fundamentally cherished - 3. safe-guarding children- it brings stability - 4. marriage is the keystone to social order- means of stabilization - there is this fundamental right to marry - fundamental right to marry - justice kennedy said- Facts of the case Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Question (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? Conclusion Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court's authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

Michigan v Tyler

- fire broke out in a furniture store - its took 2 hours for officials to arrive to knock down the fire - suspicious bottles were found in the area - 4 hours later- fire chief and deceptive collected information from the sight - 7 hours later more people came out to find more evidence - later on more people came a month later to take picture - the supreme court- the emergency must be ongoing for a reasonable period of time - anything after 2 hours you need to fill out a warrant - the court wanted to lay down the reasonable time for an emergency to be ongoing

State Action Doctrine Cases: Marsh v Alabama Jackson v Metro. Edison Company Shelley v Kraemer Norwood v Harrison Rendell- Baker v Kohn Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority

- is a legal principle that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state and local governments, not to private entities. Under state action doctrine, private parties outside of the government do not have to comply with procedural or substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. - that stops the case from going forward- - constitutional rights and liberties apply only to government action and private actors- subject to a few exceptions - restriction on the government and not to private actors - constitution applies too- civil rights and liberties apply only to governmental things not private actors Has two exceptions: 1. Public Functions- an activity thats traditionally and exclusively an action of the government 2. Entanglement - Government enforcement- Kraemer case -Subsidies-money, land- Norwood case -Government regulation and licensing -Parking authority case Second issue you can bring up is: Equal Protection clause of the 14th amendment

Facially neutral Cases Washington v Davis McClesky v Kemp Palmer v Thompson

- might have a law on the books that may treat everyone equally but their must be a law that discriminates - ex: to be a firefighter you have to be 6ft and 200 pounds - this can discriminate women in a sense

Safford v Redding

- safford middle school - assistant principal pulled savanna out of math class because they thought she was dealing with drugs - opened up her day planner and they found knives, cigarettes .. - brought her into the principals office - principal had a baggy, and some pain killers in it - she denied having it - take her to the nurse and they strip searched her and found nothing - she filed a lawsuit for a civil rights violation towards the school - nature of invasion- middle school child that experienced a strip search - ruled for redding-it was not a reasonable search Content Based Speech- Regulation that specifically restricts the message that is being sent. 2 ways 1. Viewpoint restriction- restriction in which the government is restricting a message or viewpoint 2. subject matter restriction- restricting specific topic -gets the same constitutional test- Narrowly tailored+ compelling state interest +strict scrutiny Content Neutral Restriction- is a restriction that is neither a viewpoint or subject matter- its neutral - intermediate scrutiny

Roth v United States

- selling pictures of naked women - what the court was trying to figure out -what is a definition of obscenity? - 1. average person - 2. applying contemporary community standards appeals - 3. to the pruient interest Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioner, Roth (Petitioner), was charged with violating the federal law against obscenity. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Obscenity is a type of unprotected speech. Obscene material deals with sex in a manner that is appealing to the prurient interest. Facts: The Respondent, the United States (Respondent), passed a law that prohibited the mailing of "obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, or other publication of an indecent character." Petitioner was convicted of violating this statute because he mailed sexually explicit advertisements and a book to requesters. Issue: Is obscenity protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held: No. The federal law banning such speech is constitutional as long as the appropriate standard of obscene is used. Obscenity is "not communication and is without social value." Dissent: This is punishing speech for the resulting thought that it may invoke, not for the act itself. Therefore, the law is unconstitutional. Discussion: All discussions or depictions of sex are not obscene. To be obscene the material must provide no literary or social value and it must have a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. This case is most famous for the footnote describing obscenity as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or exertion, and if it foes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matter."

City of renton v Playtime Theaters- content based- subject matter restriction- with an undesirable secondary effect exception

-Restriction only going to allow 5% can be adult theaters - And there are restrictions as where they can be - A restrictions how many can be in a certain area - No more than 5% can be adult theaters - It is a content based restriction- because of the topic - Its a subject matter restriction-remove the subject matter - However did not apply the test of CSI and narrowly tailored - They created an exception- for content based- where the goal of legislation is not about restricting the content but about removing undesirable secondary effects - This makes it to intermediate scrutiny -The exception is- - Undesirable Secondary Effects- its not good for children, prostitution, increase of drug use - Its not that they don't like adult theaters- its not about the content but the result of the content Brief Fact Summary. A zoning ordinance prohibited adult movie theatres from being located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park or school. The Respondent, Playtime Theatres, Inc. (Respondent), claimed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) were violated by the city ordinance. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. Facts. The Respondent purchased two theatres in Renton, Washington for the purpose of showing adult films. The Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment claiming that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution were violated by a city ordinance, which prohibited adult motion picture theatres from being located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or school. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Petitioner, the City of Renton (Petitioner), holding that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution. On reversal, the Court of Appeals held that the ordinance constituted a substantial restriction on First Amendment constitutional interests and remanded the case for reconsideration as to whether the city had substantial interests to support the ordinance. Issue. Was the zoning ordinance an acceptable time, place, and manner restriction when it outlawed adult movie theaters within 1000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school? Held. Yes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Justice William H. Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court. Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. Dissent. Justice William J. Brennan (J. Brennan) and Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented stating that the ordinance discriminates based on content. The record presented to support the asserted interest is very thin. Even if the ordinance should be treated as time, place, manner restriction, it is still invalid because it does not leave open reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Discussion. The Petitioner's ordinance does not ban adult theaters altogether, but rather provides that such theatres may not be located in certain areas. Thus, it is a time, place, manner restriction. The Petitioner's City Council was predominately concerned with the secondary effects of adult theaters and not with the content of the adult films themselves. The secondary effects were crime, the effects on the city's retail trade, property values, and the effects on the general quality of urban life. The ordinance was not designed to suppress the expression of unpopular views. It was designed to serve the substantial government interests of crime prevention, protection of retail trade, maintenance of property values and the protection of the quality of life. The ordinance allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication by leaving open areas of land in which to place an adult theater. The fact that the land may be substantially already in use is of no significance. The Fir st Amendment of the Constitution does not compel the government to ensure that adult theaters will be able to obtain property sites.

Palmer v Thompson

1972- is impact demonstrated you need both purpose and impact- Brief Fact Summary. Jackson, Mississippi operated public swimming pools, but kept them segregated until it eventually closed or sold them all. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An official governmental action that denies access to public facilities to all citizens does not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Summary Jackson, Mississippi operated public swimming pools, but kept them segregated until it eventually closed or sold them all. Facts: - The city maintained segregated swimming pools while it desegregated the zoo, public golf courses and parks. - The city decided to close all pools instead of desegregating them. - Some of the black citizens then filed suit to force the city to reopen the pools as desegregated facilities. Issue: - Is this closing of swimming pools state action that denies Equal Protection to the black citizens in the community? Holding: - No. A city may choose to close pools for any reason. - The Supreme Court of the United States (Constitution) has never held an act unconstitutional solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it. Legal Reasoning: - A state may not avoid integration by eliminating all of its public services such as school, parks or pools. - It may not close facilities for the purpose of "perpetuating or installing apartheid." Concurrence: - The decision to close the pools affected all citizens equally and though it may have been racially motivated, no one group was more disadvantaged than another as a result.

4th amendment exception cases: Katz v United States Mapp v Ohio Warden v Hayden Michigan v Tyler Illinois v Cabelles Rodriquez v United States Georgia v Randolph Chimel v California United States v Leon Nix v William California v Ciraolo

4th amendment-The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly... - the government will not do anything with out a warrant or probable cause - probable- a crime has or will be committed - 4th amendment applies if the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy - what is a reasonable expectation of privacy? - Katz v US 1967 it identified and defined it - has 2 prongs and both need to be met - 1. must be a subjective expectation of privacy - 2. objective expectation of privacy- reasonable person would believe they have expectation of privacy - if the police violate the 4th amendment their punishment is that the evidence will not be held in trial - exclusionary rule- if they do a illegal search and seizure then the evidence will not be held in trial - Exceptions: - Terry Stop-s a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. Terry v Ohio - Exigent circumstances-occur when the a law enforcement officer has a probable cause and no sufficient time to secure a warrant.- michigan v tyler - auto search- illionois v caballes - consent gerogia v randoff - search incident and arrest- chimel v ca - plain sight/ plain view ca v ciraolo - good faith- leon case - inevitable discovery- illegally seized evidence to be admitted at trial if the judge determines if the evidence would have inevitable discovered outside of the legal search - subjective and objective privacy- first part of analysis

Incorporation Has two cases: Marbury v Madison Adamson v California

A constitutional doctrine whereby selected provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrine of selective incorporation, or simply the incorporation doctrine, makes the first ten amendments to the Constitution—known as the Bill of Rights—binding on the states. Through incorporation, state governments largely are held to the same standards as the federal government with regard to many constitutional rights Other types of Incorporation: - Selective incorporation- is a constitutional doctrine that ensures states cannot enact laws that take away the constitutional rights of American citizens that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights. - Total incorporation- also a minority theory. A doctrine in constitutional law: the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause embraces all the guarantees in the Bill of Rights and applies them to cases under state law compare selective incorporation NOTE: The total incorporation doctrine has never been adopted by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court. - Total Incorporation Plus:Total Incorporation plus other fundamental rights not expressly granted in the Bill of Right

Romer v Evans

Background: Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Question: Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Rationale basis- Romer vs Evans -the standard for evaluating rationale scrutiny the law must be a legitimate governmental interest

Brandenberg v Ohio

Brandenberg test 1960 Brief Fact Summary: An Ohio law prohibited the teaching or advocacy of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The Defendant, Brandenburg (Defendant), a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech promoting the taking of vengeful actions against government and was therefore convicted under the Ohio Law. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and it is likely to incite or produce such action. Facts: The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act (the "Act") made it illegal to advocate "crime, sabotage, violence or . . . terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform." It also prohibited "assembling with any society, group, or assemblage or persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The Defendant, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech promoting the taking of revenge against the government if it did not stop suppressing the white race and was therefore convicted under the Act. Issue: Did the Statute, prohibiting public speech that advocated certain violent activities, violate the Defendant's right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held: Yes. (Per Curiam) The Act properly made it illegal to advocate or teach doctrines of violence, but did not address the issue of whether such advocacy or teaching would actually incite imminent lawlessness. The mere abstract teaching of the need or propriety to resort to violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action. Because the statute failed to provide for the second part of the test it was overly broad and thus in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Concurrence. Justice Hugo (J. Black) I agree with Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) in his concurring opinion of this case that the "clear and present danger" doctrine should have no place in our interpretation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. J. Douglas argues that the how the "clear and present danger" test has been applied in the past is disconcerting. First, the threats to which it was applied were often loud but puny. Second, the test was so perverted as to make trial of those teachers of Marxism all out political trials, which had the effect of eroding substantial parts of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Discussion. In order for "incitement to violence" speech to be constitutionally barred, Brandenburg sets a new standard. The language must (1) expressly advocate violence; (2) advocate immediate violence and (3) relate to violence likely to occur. - member of the KKK- can't make this speech- because it talks about crime, hostile- advocating- sabotage, terrorism, crime - restrict speech in persuade of political reform - punishes people for inciting people - he made the speech - he requesting to someone film it - they filmed it and saw it- Ohio state cynicism statute - they burned a cross - showed brand burg giving a speech that give is suppressing the white race - final test- evaluating to incitement to illegal activity - 2 tests- likelihood intonement illegality in result of the speech - the speech must be to intend to direct intoment illegality

Grutter v Bollinger

Brief Fact Summary. When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School (Defendant), she sued the latter in federal district court, alleging racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of the law school's (Defendant) direct consideration of race as a factor in the admissions process Synopsis of Rule of Law. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan Law School (Defendant) receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of 350 students. The Law School's (Defendant) admissions committee tried to achieve diversity in the student body by requiring admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, a student's essay, GPA score, LSAT score, as well as so-called "soft variables." Plus, the admissions policy specifically stressed the Law School's (Defendant) longstanding commitment to racial and ethical diversity. In this regard, the official admission policy noted that by enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, Defendant sought "to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School." When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, applied for admission but was denied, she sued the Law School (Defendant) in federal district court, claiming racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a 15-day bench trial, the district court upheld Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals reversed. Plaintiff appealed Issue. Is diversity a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission? Held. (O'Connor, J.) Yes. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. In this case, the Law School's (Defendant) admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. Truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admission tracks. Universities also cannot insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. However, as was done here, universities can consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant. The Law School's (Defendant) goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. The evidence indicated that the Defendant engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a "diverse educational environment." In addition, evidence showed that the Defendant gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race by frequently accepting nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants. There was no Law School (Defendant) policy, either de facto or de jure, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single "soft" variable. Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. It also does not require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. Affirmed Dissent. (Rehnquist, C.J.) The Law School's (Defendant) means are not narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts. Stripped of its "critical mass" veil, the program is revealed as an obvious effort to achieve racial balancing. As the numbers demonstrate, the Defendant plainly employs racial preferences in extending offers of admission. It engages in precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls "patently unconstitutional." (Kennedy, J.) The Law School (Defendant) has not demonstrated how individual consideration is, or can be, preserved at this stage of the application process given the instruction to attain what it calls critical mass. (Scalia, J.) Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are not permitted, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding, today's decision seems willfully designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race and state-provided education is no exception. (Thomas, J.) I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators. The majority upholds the Law School's (Defendant) racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti.

Bowers v Hardwick

Brief Fact Summary. A male homosexual was criminally charged for committing consensual sodomy with another male adult in the bedroom of his home. Synopsis of Rule of Law. There is no constitutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. Facts. The Respondent, Hardwick (Respondent), brought suit in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a Georgia statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The Respondent asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest and that the statute violated his constitutional rights. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the statute violated the Respondent's "fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association . . . ." The Eleventh Circuit remanded the decision for trial ruling that the Georgia statute must pass strict scrutiny before it can be upheld. Issue. Whether the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected under the fundamental right to privacy. Held. Justice Byron White (J. White). No. The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any right protected under the United States Constitution (Constitution). There is no precedent to support the Respondent's claimed constitutional right to commit sodomy. Fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) throughout history and through its traditions have in no way set any foundation to include a case such as this under the Constitutional umbrella of protection. "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental." The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed. Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows: Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). "[T]he right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home [as seen in this case] seems . . . to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy." Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). "The Court orders the dismissal of respondent's complaint even though the State's statute prohibits all sodomy; even though that prohibition is concededly unconstitutional with respect to heterosexuals; and even though the State's post hoc explanations for selective application are belied by the State's own actions. At the very least, . . . it [is] clear at this early stage of the litigation that respondent has alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows: Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger). "I find nothing in the Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged here." Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell). Even though the Respondent has no fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, he may "be protected by the Eight Amendment of the Constitution" because the Respondent may be imprisoned for his homosexual acts "for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of sodomy." - Foundational case- tells us where the court was in 1986 - conservative time in the supreme court - police were aware that mr. hardwick was gay - he was drinking outside a bar - he is issued a ticket for being drunk in public - he didn't show up to court - so they issued a warrant - they go to house and they go inside - he wasn't having sex with his partner and the officers arrest both of them - charges were never filed against them - supreme court wanted to hear the case - whether georges anti sodomy law violates - A sodomy law is a law that defines certain sexual acts as crimes. The precise sexual acts meant by the term sodomy are rarely spelled out in the law, but are typically understood by courts to include any sexual act deemed to be "unnatural" or immoral. Sodomy typically includes anal sex, oral sex and bestiality. - justice white- evaluate whether or not private sexual acts in house fall under privacy under the constitution ? - he took a narrow perspective- - historic perspective- - we have to figure out what the right to privacy means - Nothing in the constitution says you can have this act in your house - nothing in the constitution says that they can have sexual acts in the house - until 1961- all 50 states sodomy - states are allowed to regulate that activity - They didn't see an implicit right - 1982 - half the states had anti sodomy laws

Chaplinksy v New Hampshire

Brief Fact Summary. Chaplinsky was convicted under a State statute for calling a City Marshal a " **** " and a "****" in a public place. Synopsis of Rule of Law: "Fighting words" are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) Facts: A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is on any street or public place or calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a City Marshal a "*****" and a "**** fascist" in a public place and was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute. Issue: Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky's comments violate his free speech rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held: No. The lower court is affirmed. Considering the purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes of speech that have never been protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. These include "fighting words," words that inflict injury or tend to excite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of such little expositional or social value that any benefit they might produce is far outweighed by their costs on social interests in order and morality. The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of the meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the Statute as applying only to "fighting words". Therefore, the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right of free speech. Discussion: By holding that "fighting words" are not protected forms of speech the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form of content based restriction on speech that is permissible. The student should consider what characteristics distinguish a "fight word" from a bona fide criticism. One difference may lie in the speaker's intent. "Fighting words" are intended to inflict harm, bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate ideas. Another difference may lie in the differing likely effects of each: "fighting words" are likely to provoke the average person to violence while bona fide criticisms are not. - handing out religious pamphlets in a public square - related to WW2 - cited for disturbing the peace - he starts telling the police that they are fascist - words directed to someone in a confirtation manner - engage them in a conflict - its my constitutional right to free speech - the court says:certain well defined narrow limits:lewd, obscene, profane, liabless or insulting and fighting words - court says: you know what- that speech is to breach peace

New York Transit Authority v Beazer

Brief Fact Summary: A New York City Transit Authority rule barred the employment of persons who use narcotics. The Transit Authority applied the rule to all persons taking methadone - a drug widely used in the treatment of heroine addiction. Synopsis of Rule of Law: State legislation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) merely because the classifications that it makes are imperfect. Facts: A New York City Transit Authority rule barred the employment of persons who use narcotics. The Transit Authority applied the rule to persons taking methadone - a drug widely used in the treatment of heroine addiction. The District Court concluded that there were substantial numbers of methadone users who were just as employable as members of the general public and that the Transit Authority could have determined which users were not employable by resort to normal personnel screening procedures. Issue: Where a substantial number of methadone users were capable of performing jobs at the Transit Authority, does the Constitution permit the Transit Authority to make a blanket exclusion of all users from all jobs at the Transit Authority? Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals, affirming the District Court, is reversed. Justice John Paul Stevens stated that the assumptions upon which the Transit Authority's rule are based concern matters of personnel policy that do not implicate the concerns the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution are intended to protect. The Transit Authority's rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency. The rule is not directed against any class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait. Therefore, it does not create the likelihood of bias on the part of the ruling majority. Dissent: Justice Byron White (J. White) said that the Transit Authority uses a rule that classifies fully employable methadone users as dispositively different from the general population without any justification. With the irrationality and invidiousness of the rule uncovered, it must fall as it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Discussion: This case calls into question what it means to treat two people equally under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. What happens when providing equal treatment to two people will not result in equal treatment because the two people are not similarly situated? The "relevant difference" requirement holds that treating people differently can only be justified on the basis of differences between people relevant to the purpose of a rule. Over inclusive- separate issue- a law regulates more than it needs too in order to accomplish its goal New York transit authority v Beazer (1979) - passes a policy no one under methadone maintenance can be employed by NY transit authority - worried about recovering methadone addicts that might relapse - can be constitutional over inclusive - was not so over inclusive that it would be unconstitutional Rule: Beazer: the law the is constitutionally over inclusive were a law regulates more then it needs to in order to accomplish its goal

Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center- mentally retarded people

Brief Fact Summary: A Texas city denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals found that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law: Denial of a permit for the operation of homes for the mentally retarded violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution where such denial is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Facts: A zoning ordinance for the City of Cleburne (the City) permitted a wide variety of uses on a proposed cite of land, including for hospitals, for sanitariums and for homes for the aged, but excluded the operation of homes for the insane or feebleminded. The City, acting pursuant to the ordinance, denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance and the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Issue: Did the denial of a permit for the operation of homes for the mentally retarded violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution? Did the lower court err in treating the mentally retarded as a "quasi-suspect class" and therefore subjecting the law to "middle level scrutiny?" Held: Yes and Yes. The Court of Appeals is affirmed in its judgment. Justice Byron White (J. White) stated that to withstand Equal Protection review, legislation that distinguishes between mentally retarded persons and others must be rationally related to further a legitimate governmental interest. The ordinance fails on both scores. The governmental interests, e.g., the avoidance of apprehensiveness of mentally retarded persons, are not legitimate. Moreover, the means the government employs are not rationally related to the achievement of its stated interests. Dissent: Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) stated that the City's ordinance clearly would have been valid under the traditional rational basis test. If the ordinance is to be invalidated, it must be done so pursuant to a standard more rigorous than the minimal rational basis test. Concurrence: Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) stated that the record demonstrates that the permit was denied because of the irrational fears of the neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would have lived in the home. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) stated that although he disagreed with the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) applied, he shared in the Supreme Court's judgment that the ordinance is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Discussion: One thing to consider is whether the Supreme Court in fact applied an intermediate standard of review in this case instead of the rational basis standard the Court asserted it was using. Given that the mentally retarded suffer from an immutable characteristic, should the courts accord discriminations against them with a heightened scrutiny standard of review? - conservative US supreme court - it was purchased - was 13 mentally retarded- disabled were going to live in this center - the center requested a conditional use permit - They denied it - the mentally impaired is being discriminated towards - there is a history of discrimination towards these group of people - increase of scrutiny - justice white- wrote the opinion- moderate conservative - concluded- proper standard of review- rational basis - argument- anytime the court elevates the level of scrutiny- the legislative will be less inclined to help them up - his concern if you elevate the scrutiny against the disabled the legislators would will be less inclined

Gonzalez v Carhart

Brief Fact Summary: A federal statute was passed that bans so-called partial-birth abortions. Its constitutionality was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. Synopsis of Rule of Law: The federal nationwide ban on so-called "partial-birth abortions" is constitutional. Facts: Following the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), which struck down the Nebraska law that prohibited abortions in which the physician delivers a "substantial portion" of the fetus into the woman"s vagina in order to perform a procedure that kills the "unborn child" and that lacked a health exception, Congress passed a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1531, that basically bans partial-birth abortions and addresses the constitutionally offensive portions of the Nebraska statute. The federal statute, unlike the Nebraska statute, defined the prohibited procedure as a deliberate delivery of a "living fetus" to the point that either the entire head (in a head-first presentation) or any part of the fetal trunk past the naval (in a breech presentation) is "outside the body of the mother," followed by an "overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus." In addition, the "overt act" requirement distinguishes the intact dilation and evacuation (D&E) from the standard D&E because the act that induces death, such as puncturing the skull with scissors and then vacuuming out the brain, must be separate from the delivery and occur after the delivery to an anatomical landmark. In contrast, in a standard D&E, death occurs in the womb by way of dismemberment by traction when pieces of the fetus are pulled through the cervix; that is not an overt act or a "delivery" covered by the statute. A third difference between the federal statute and the Nebraska statute is that the federal statute only applies when the physician"s intention from the outset was to employ the prohibited procedure. It would not apply to an "accidental intact D&E" that may occur if the fetus unintentionally slips past one of the anatomical landmarks. Issue. Is the federal nationwide ban on so-called "partial-birth abortions" constitutional? Held. (Kennedy, J.) Yes. The federal nationwide ban on so-called "partial-birth abortions" is constitutional. The 2003 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act avoids vagueness problems by spelling out "anatomical landmarks" on the fetal body and setting physician intent requirements that provide reasonable notice of the particular abortion procedures prohibited. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "that requiring doctos to intend dismemberment before delivery to an anatomical landmark will prohibit the vast majority of D&E abortions." The statute does apply both previability and postviability because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether it is viable outside of the womb or not. But, under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 506 U.S. 833 (1992), which reaffirmed a woman"s right to choose an abortion previability, the issue in this facial challenge was whether the statute imposed a substantial obstacle to late-term, but previability abortions. Casey recognized the state"s interest "in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child." That interest allows the state to restrict abortion methods that doctors might otherwise choose, "in order to promote respect for life." The health exception recognized in Casey and Stenberg cannot be interpreted in a way to "set at naught" the government"s interest in fetal life. Here, there is "documented disagreement whether the Act"s prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women." When medical uncertainty is present, the Court defers to legislative choice. In addition, the mother"s health exception requirement cannot be interpreted to preclude regulation of abortion methods that further the government"s interest in protecting and respecting fetal life when there is only uncertainty in the medical community about whether a specific abortion method is ever medically necessary. In this case, Congress sought to promote respect for life by drawing a bright line between abortion and infanticide. The statute also recognizes "the bond of love the mother has for her child" by saving her from the sorrow of undergoing what she may not be told until later is a gruesome procedure. The Act is not invalid on its face. Dissent. (Thomas, J.) The opinion "accurately applies" Casey and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), however those decisions, while "current jurisprudence," have "no basis in the Constitution." Concurrence. (Ginsburg, J.) The reconstituted Court"s "alarming" decision disrespected precedent, gutted the long-standing health exception requirement, and showed an obvious "hostility" to abortion rights. The ruling "refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously." It ignores district court findings that intact D&E is safer for women with certain conditions and generally offers safety advantages over standard D&E, instead siding with a statute that even the majority recognized contains factual errors. The Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety. Discussion. Do not forget that this decision answered a facial attack on the statute, leaving open the possibility that the statute, as applied, may not survive constitutional scrutiny. Medical uncertainty may reverse the direction of this case; if, for example, a partial-birth abortion became medically necessary to save the life of a woman, the statute may not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Washington v Davis

Brief Fact Summary: A higher percentage of black applicants than white applicants failed a qualifying test administered by the District of Columbia Police Department. Some of the unsuccessful black applicants claimed these effects constituted unconstitutional discrimination against them. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Proof of a disproportionate impact is not enough, standing alone, to ground a finding that a law amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Facts: The District of Columbia Police Department administered a test to applicants for positions as police officers. The test measured verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading comprehension. A higher percentage of the black applicants than the white applicants failed the test. Respondents, unsuccessful black applicants, claimed the test constituted a violation of equal protection, because it had the effect of disproportionately disqualifying blacks for police service. Respondents did not allege discriminatory purpose on the part of the government. The District Court ruled against the Respondents. Issue: Was proof of the disproportionate effects of the qualifying exam sufficient to ground a finding that the exam unconstitutionally discriminated against the respondents? Held: No. The Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, is reversed. Justice Byron White (J. White) said our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law can be a violation of equal protection on the basis of its effect, without regard for governmental intent. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it alone does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The police force's efforts to recruit black police officers are evidence that the police department did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. The exam is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of ensuring that police officers have acquired a particular level of verbal skill. Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Steven) said that frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be a showing of what actually happened. A Constitutional issue does not arise, however, every time some disproportionate impact is shown. Discussion: After this case, a court confronted with a law that has a disproportionate effect on a racial minority, must first determine if the law is race specific. If it is, either because the law is facially discriminatory or because the law was motivated by a racial discriminatory purpose, the law will probably be invalidated under the strict scrutiny standard of review. If the law is non-race specific, the court will apply the rational basis standard of review, regardless of the law's impact on racial minorities. -applied to join police force - they need to take a test - result of the test- demonstrated a disportionate amount of african americans were not accepted to the force - It violated equal protection - it was a neutral test- on its face - argument made- the outcome of the test shows a disportionate impact - is that enough to move it up to strict scrutiny - the supreme court said its not sufficient - facially neutral law- show discriminatory purpose and disportioncate amount - you need both of these things - facially evident case you do one IRAC - facially neutral you have to do an extra IRAC - before going into an IRAC - Initial issue that must be addressed is whether Facially neutral (or violates) resulted in discriminatory impact and purpose - Rule- supreme court Washington v Davis - analysis you have to look in fact pattern - disportioncate impact or purpose - and then another analysis

Roe v Wade

Brief Fact Summary: Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Facts: Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Issue: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment? Held: The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State's concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State's interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion. For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State's interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother's life, based upon the State's interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child. Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case. Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins. - texas law made it a felony to have an abortion - except if its to save the life of the mother - legal doctrine- standing - exception- capable of repetition yet availing review standing will ultimately be granted - legalizes abortion - there is a constitutional right to abortion - strict scrutiny- fundamental right - viability came hand in hand with the progress - the fetus can live outside the mother without the mother- viability - compelling state interest kicks in with viability - pre- viability regulations at the time roe- whether the regulations reasonably relates to the preservation and protection to maternal health - 1. rights to a abortion - 2. - 3. pre- viability regulations at the time roe- whether the regulations reasonably relates to the preservation and protection to maternal health - says nothing about the fetus

Graham v Richardson- Alienage

Brief Fact Summary: Arizona required State residents to be a United States citizen or a resident of the United States for at least fifteen years to be eligible for welfare benefits. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Restrictions based on alienage are generally subject to strict scrutiny. Facts: The Respondent, Richardson (Respondent), was denied welfare benefits solely on the basis of being a resident alien who has resided for less than fifteen years in the country. The Respondent alleges that the residency requirement of the Arizona welfare statutes is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Issue: May Arizona distinguish between resident aliens and citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held: No. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) also notes that a "person" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses both resident aliens and citizens, thereby affording legal aliens equal protection of the laws. J. Blackmun, writing for the Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court), declares that restrictions based on alienage are akin to classifications based on race or nationality, in that they are subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court concludes that the State's "desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens" is not a compelling government interest for purposes of strict scrutiny, and thus the statute is unconstitutional. Discussion. The important holding of Richardson is that aliens are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection and that in general, statutes based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny. Arizona law says you are :only entitled to benefits if you are a 1.legal citizen - legal resident if you have been in the country for at least 15 years she was a resident- but hadn't lived there for more than 15 years she has a green card though yes it is discrete and insular such a legal residents are discrete and insular that needs heightened protections strict scrutiny narrowly tailored less restricted means they struct down this residency as violates the 14th amendment

Warden v Hayden

Brief Fact Summary: Defendant was pursued to his home, and arrested. Evidence used against him was found during a search that was unwarranted. Synopsis of Rule of Law: "'The exigencies of the situation,' in which the officers were in pursuit of a suspected armed felon in the house which he had entered only minutes before they arrived, permitted their warrantless entry and search" and "the distinction prohibiting seizure of items of only evidential value and allowing seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband is no longer accepted as being required by the Fourth Amendment." Facts: Defendant Hayden was arrested in his home after a robbery. The robber had been followed by two cab drivers to the residence. Their dispatcher notified the police, who arrived in short order and were permitted to enter by Mrs. Hayden, the defendant's wife. As they searched the house, police found weapons, ammunition, and clothing that the robber was described as wearing. The police had no search warrant. Issue: "[Whether] there is under the Fourth Amendment a 'distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime.'" Held: No. First, the court made clear that the search without warrant was valid as "the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Under the circumstances "speed . . . was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that [the defendant] was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect [sic] an escape." Second, the court reject the distinction between items of evidential value and those that include contraband, fruits of a crime, etc. "as based on premises no longer accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment." This reasoning is premised on the fact at "[o]n its face, the provision assures the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .,' without regard to the use to which any of these things are applied." Moreover, the transitive nature of property rendered such a distinction meaningless and "irrational" as "depending on the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects" may be "mere evidence" in one case and "instrumentality' in another." Dissent. J. Douglas premised his dissent on historical precedent and a strict reading of the Constitution, concluding that the "constitutional philosophy is . . . clear. The personal effects and possessions of the individual (all contraband and the like excepted) are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any rummaging by police." Concurrence. J. Black concurred, but did not write and opinion. J. Fortas, joined by the Chief Justice, agreed with the result, but did not agree with the court's "repudiation" of the "mere evidence" distinction. Given the nature of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, an unwarranted search "is justified [by] . . .'hot pursuit,'" but that scope "does not include permission to search the entire building in which the arrest occurs, or to rummage through locked drawers and closets, or to search at another time or place." Exigent Circumstances-no warrant is necessary where an emergency exists such that the police don't have enough time to obtain a warrant - for reasons of public security

Cruzan v Dir. Missouri Dept of Public health

Brief Fact Summary: Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." After it became clear that Cruzan would not improve, her parents requested that the hospital terminate the life-support procedures the hospital was providing. The hospital and subsequently the State court refused to comply. Synopsis of Rule of Law: A State may condition the exercise of a patient's right to terminate life-sustaining treatment on a showing of clear and convincing evidence of the desire of the patient to exercise such a right. Facts: Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." In order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and hydration tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for recovery, Petitioners, Cruzan's parents, asked hospital employees to terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employees refused to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support, because clear and convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan herself would have chosen to refuse treatment. Issue: Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment? Did Missouri's procedural requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's desire to terminate life support before it is terminated violate the Constitution? Held: No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed. Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions. The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri's interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses. Dissent. Justice Brennan: Missouri may constitutionally impose only those requirements necessary to ascertain Cruzan's wishes. The "safeguard" employed by the Missouri courts imposes a markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden. No proof is required to show an incompetent person would wish to continue treatment. Concurrence. Justice O'Connor: Would emphasize that the Supreme Court of the United States does not decide the issue whether a State must give effect to the decisions of a surrogate. In Justice O'Connor's view, such a duty may well be constitutionally required to protect one's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. Justice Scalia: Would have preferred that The Court announced clearly that the federal courts have no business in this field. The United States Constitution says nothing on this topic. The nine justices of this Supreme Court are not better at making this decision than nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory. Discussion. This case is labeled a "right to life case." Most of the attention, however, is focused on burden of proof standards for showing a person's intent with regard to a life-threatening matter. This type of case, where a person requests that her life be left to natural processes, must be distinguished from cases that involve assisted suicide, whereby a doctor will take an affirmative step to induce a person's death. competent v incompetent

Railway Express Agency v New York

Brief Fact Summary: The Appellant, Railway Express Agency (Appellant), brought suit against the Appellee, the State of New York (Appellee). The Appellant argued that a statute prohibiting advertising on vehicles, except for notices upon business delivery vehicles engaged in the regular work of the owner, are unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law: The Equal Protection Clause does not seek to protect so called discrimination in determining whether allowing advertising on vehicles and not allowing advertising on other vehicles is unconstitutional. Facts: The Appellant operates about 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells space on the exterior of the trucks for advertising. The advertising is for the most part unconnected with its own buisnes. The Appellant was fined for violating a state statute, which prohibits advertisements on the side of vehicles, except when the advestising is connected to the owner of the vehicles business. The statutes purpose was to protect the safety of pedestrians and other vehicle drivers by eliminating distractions on the streets. The judgment of conviction was upheld in the Court of Special Sessions as well as the Court of Appeals. The Appellant argued that this distinction between advertising on vehicles violates the Equal Protection Cluase of the Fourteenth Amendment as the statute draws lines that are not justified by the aim and purpose of the regulation, which is to lessen distractions caused by advertsing. Issue: Whether the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by allowing advertising of products on a vehicle sold by the owner of the vehicle, versus general advertising on a vehicle, unrelated to products sold by the owner of the vehicle. Held: Affirmed. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by this statute that prohibits advertising on vehicles except when the advertising is connected to the owner of the vehicles business. Concurrence: Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in the same way and the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while those who do so for their own commercial ends, but not for hire be allowed to continue? The answer is that the hiring may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt with differently than those who act on their own, as there is a real difference between doing in self interest and doing for hire. It is one thing to tolerate action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a price. Discussion: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution is invoked where a law treats similarity situated people differently. If the law is found to treat similarly situated people differently, then it must be determined what standard of review will be used. In this case, the Supreme Court did not think this was an Equal Protection Issue: But, they found if this were an Equal Protection issue, it would be upheld under a rational basis review. Rational basis scrutiny was used because it was a classification based on economic welfare. If rational basis scrutiny is applied, the plaintiff has to show the measure being challenged is not rationally related to any legitimate interest. Practically, any police power regulation, which furthers a health, safety or welfare purpose will be considered legitimate. In this case since the statute's purpose was to further the safety of the public, the statute will be upheld.

Norwood v Harrison

Brief Fact Summary: The Appellants, Delores Norwood and others (Appellants), are the parents of four schoolchildren who are challenging the state of Mississippi's textbook lending program. They claim that the program encourages discrimination by providing textbooks to the children who attend private, segregated schools. Synopsis of Rule of Law: The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) is violated when a state provides aide to students of private, segregated schools because it encourages continued racial discrimination. Facts: The number of private schools in Mississippi has increased over the years since mandatory desegregation. The state of Mississippi has a 33 year-old program that provides free textbooks to all students in both public and private schools. Since the program began, the number of all white private schools greatly increased. The Appellees, Harrison and other (Appellees), claim that the state must provide assistance to private schools that is equivalent to assistance provided to public schools. The Appellants filed a class action on behalf of all the students in Mississippi to enjoin the textbook lending program. The Appellants argued that by supplying the textbooks to the segregated private schools, the state was directly supporting segregated education, in violation of the student's constitutional rights to fully desegregated schools. The district could found that the lending program did not violate the Constitution. Issue: Does a state funded program that benefits both public and private school students equally, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution simply because some of the private schools have racially discriminatory admissions practices? Legal Reasoning : Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first observed that in the past, the Supreme Court had enjoined state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. The Supreme Court found that the textbook lending program was analogous to those tuition grants. A textbook lending program is a form of tangible, financial assistance, which benefits the private schools and supports the discrimination exercised by those schools. Even though the intent of the program was not to discriminate, but to help children in the state, the effect of the assistance results in discrimination and is, therefore, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated "A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination." Discussion: The aide provided by the state is a vital component of education and necessary for the private schools to carry out their goals. By supplying these basic instruments, the government is endorsing the practice of segregation. Equal Protection violations will result when either the effect or the intention of the state action is discrimination. - Norwood v Harrison (1973) - Mississippi legislation- the city would buy books and then the state would lend out the books to the private and publics schools - private wouldn't let african americans go there - case goes to US supreme court - when the state of mississippi loaned those books to the private schools that makes this them a public school and there for the private actors rights are no longer standing Falls under entanglement: Subsidy-a sum of money granted by the government or a public body to assist an industry or business so that the price of a commodity or service may remain low or competitive.

Gitlow v New York

Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioner, Gitlow (Petitioner), published a communist manifesto for distribution in the United States. He was charged with plotting to overthrow the United States government. Synopsis of Rule of Law: State statutes are unconstitutional if they are arbitrary and unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the state to protect public interests. Facts: The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy because he was an advocate of socialist reform in the United States. The Petitioner is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party. He served as the business manager for the paper that was run by the organization. In 1919 he published the group's manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution from the New York City headquarters. Issue: Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive the Petitioner of his First Amendment constitutional right to freedom of expression? Held: No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the state's police power. It is within the state's power to prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate. Dissent: A state may not prohibit speech unless it presents a clear and present danger to the public interest. Discussion: Freedom of speech and press do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak without being held responsible for the results of such speech. The state may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens.

Rendell- Baker v Kohn

Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioner, Rendell-Baker (Petitioner), brings suit because she was fired from her position as a school counselor in retaliation for her opinion of administrative policy. Five others were later fired after they voiced their intention to form a union. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Private conduct is not state action simply because the private entity serves a public function. Facts: The school in this case provides education to students that have difficulty adhering to the traditional curriculum of the public school districts. The Respondent, Kohn (Respondent), is the administrative director of the privately owned school who accepts students with drug, alcohol, or behavioral problems from local public high schools. Students are referred to the school under Massachusetts Acts of 1972 and the school districts pay the tuition for the referred students. These public funds accounted for 90+% of the school's operating budget. In 1977, Petitioner was fired by Respondent for her role in a student-staff council tasked with making hiring decisions. In the spring of 1978, five other teachers were fired for writing a letter to the school's board of directors supporting Respondent's dismissal. The students responded by picketing the home of the president of the board and were threatened with suspension. A local paper was made aware of the situation and the 5 teachers told the president they were going to form a union. Issue: Is a private school's dismissal of its staff considered state action when the majority of its students' tuition is provided by the state? Held: No. The decision to discharge the Petitioners was not compelled or influenced by any state regulation. Although the general operations of the school were regulated by the state, specific personnel matters were left to the school. The most intrusive regulation by the state was that it had the power to approve those hired as vocational counselors. Dissent: Because the school receives almost all of its funds from the state and is heavily regulated, a close nexus exists between the school and the state. So, the school's action must be considered state action. This analysis relies on the previous decisions that define a symbiotic relationship and the entanglement between the state and a private actor. Discussion: Just by providing funding to the school and general operating regulations the state is not running the school. The school is a private entity similar to a corporate contractor that relies on numerous governmental contracts for business. The actions of the school are not an extension of the state as it makes independent management decisions.

Katz v United States

Brief Fact Summary: The petitioner, Katz (the "petitioner"), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner's end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's contention that the evidence should be suppressed. Synopsis of Rule of Law: The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place. Facts: The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner's end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted. Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person? Held: Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible. Dissent. Justice Hugo Black ("J. Black") filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations. Concurrence. Justice John Harlan ("J. Harlan") filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable. Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable. - what is a reasonable expectation of privacy? - Katz v US 1967 it identified and defined it - has 2 prongs and both need to be met - 1. must be a subjective expectation of privacy - 2. objective expectation of privacy- reasonable person would believe they have expectation of privacy

Matthew v Diaz

Brief Fact Summary: The Appellees, Diaz and others (Appellees), were denied enrollment into a federal insurance plan solely on the basis that they were not citizens of the United States. Synopsis of Rule of Law: The federal government may restrict aliens from receiving or qualifying for benefits enjoyed by United States citizens. Facts: The Appellees were denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program and therefore, challenge the constitutionality of this denial. Specifically, the Appellees challenge the requirement that aliens can only qualify for the federal medical insurance program if he or she becomes a permanent resident and resides in the United States for at least five years. The District Court held the eligibility condition to be unconstitutional. The judgment of the court is reversed. Issue: Whether Congress may, under the United States Constitution (Constitution), condition an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United States for a five-year period and admission for permanent residence. Held: Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution protects aliens and citizens. However, this protection does not lead to the conclusion that "all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship . . . ." Also, The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution concerns relationships between aliens and states, not between aliens and the federal government. The judgment is reversed. Discussion: The Constitution allows the federal government more freedom in its exercise of power over aliens then that of the states.

Michigan State Police v Sitz

Brief Fact Summary: The constitutionality of a sobriety check point was at issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law: The checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment because "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program." Facts: The Michigan State Police established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program. It only went on for one day. "Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of the traffic flow where an officer would check the motorist's driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer's observations suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately." The Respondents, licensed drivers in that the state of Michigan (the "Respondents"), filed suit to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from subjection to the checkpoints. The Michigan Police Department agreed to postpone further implementation of the check points pending the outcome of the litigation. The trial court ruled that the program violated the Fourth Amendment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to hear this case. Issue: [W]hether a State's use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution[?]" Held: The court first observed that the police department agrees there is a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. Also, that the question becomes whether the stop is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The majority went out of its way to point out, "[a]s pursued in the lower courts, the instant action challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally. We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers." The court found that the appropriate test to be applied is the balancing test from [Brown v. Texas], which involves "balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical." On the other hand, "the weight bearing on the other scale - the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints - is slight. [The Court] reached a similar conclusion as to the intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus, accurately gauged the 'objective' intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure an d the intensity of the investigation, as minimal." As to the subjective intrusion on individual drivers the majority observed, "[t]he 'fear and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop." "Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in [Martinez-Fuerte]." The Michigan Court of Appeals inappropriately construed the effectiveness of the program. The majority observed "for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers." Further, "[u]nlike [Prouse], this case involves neither a complete absence of empirical data nor a challenge to random highway stops. During the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, the detention of the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the arrest of two drunken drivers. Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. In addition, an expert witness testified at the trial that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped. By way of comparison, the record from one of the consolidated cases in [Martinez-Fuerte] showed that in the associated checkpoint, illegal aliens were found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint. The ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped (considering that on occasion two or more illegal aliens were found in a single vehicle) was approximately 0.5 percent. We concluded that this 'record. . . provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint,' and we sustained its constitutionality. We see no justification for a different conclusion here." Dissent: Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion. "[I]t seems evident that the Court today misapplies the balancing test announced in [Brown v. Texas]. The Court overvalues the law enforcement interest in using sobriety checkpoints, undervalues the citizen's interest in freedom from random, announced investigatory seizures, and mistakenly assumes that there is 'virtually no difference' between a routine stop at a permanent, fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a sobriety checkpoint. [The dissenting justices] believe this case is controlled by our several precedents condemning suspicionless random stops of motorists for investigatory purposes." Discussion. In is interesting to read the majority and dissenting opinions along side one another so as to see how the different judges reach their decisions. - michigan dui checkpoint - prevent people from drunk driving - public safety

Chimel v California

Brief Fact Summary: The defendant, Chimel (the "defendant"), was arrested inside his home and police asked him for consent to search the home. The defendant refused the request. The police proceeded nonetheless, incident to the lawful arrest and searched in different rooms. The police also had the defendant's wife open various dresser drawers and remove their contents. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Incident to a lawful arrest, a search of any area beyond the arrestee's immediate control, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), unless there is a clear danger that evidence may be destroyed or concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm to the arresting officers. Facts: The police came to Defendant's home with an arrest warrant for an alleged burglary. The police asked permission to "look around" the house. The defendant refused the request and the police proceeded to search the home anyways. The police also made the defendant's wife remove contents of various dresser drawers. The police seized coins and medals which were later used to convict the defendant of burglary. Issue: Where a defendant is lawfully arrested inside his home, is a warrantless search of the area beyond the defendant's immediate control constitutional? Held: Any search in an arrestee's home beyond arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Dissent: Where there is probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that the items which are the subject of the search may be removed prior to police obtaining a search warrant, a warrantless search of the area beyond an arrestee's immediate control is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Concurrence: Given the variety of circumstances which police encounter, this decision will create additional burdens on law enforcement. Whether or not the warrant requirement will protect individual rights in each and every local situation is uncertain. Discussion. Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence. Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. - they had an arrest warrant - they arrest him - then they search the house - they didn't have a search warrant but they only had an arrest warrant - whether if the search was allowed - upon arrest police are allowed to search the immediate control of the individual - he walked in and he was right there

Vacco V Quill

Brief Fact Summary: Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute forbidding assisted suicide was challenged as unconstitutional. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Although there is a distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide, neither violates the Equal Protection Clause since they apply evenhandedly to all. Facts: Quill (Plaintiff) and three gravely ill patients who have since died sued the New York State Attorney General (Defendant). They urged that because New York (Defendant) permits a competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and the refusal of such treatment is "essentially the same thing" as physician-assisted suicide, Defendant"s ban on assisted suicide was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed, but the court of appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that those in the final stages of fatal illness who were on life-support systems were allowed to hasten their deaths by choosing to have those systems removed; but those who were in a similar situation, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, were not allowed to hasten death by self-administering drugs prescribed by a doctor. The court of appeals concluded that this supposed unequal treatment was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. Issue.: Although there is a distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide, does this distinction operate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by treating individuals who wish to end their lives differently? Held: (Rehnquist, C.J.) No. Although there is a distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide, neither violates the Equal Protection Clause since they apply evenhandedly to all. Logic and current practice support New York"s (Defendant) judgment that the two acts are different and, therefore, Defendant may treat them differently, consistent with the Constitution. A doctor who assists a suicide must, necessarily and unquestionably, primarily intend that the patient be made dead. The law has long used actors" intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have the same result. The overwhelming majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisted suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by prohibiting the former but allowing the latter. New York"s (Defendant) statutes outlawing assisted suicide do not infringe fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications, and therefore are entitled to a strong presumption of validity. On their faces, neither Defendant"s ban on assisted suicide nor its statutes that allow patients to refuse medical treatment treat anyone differently or draw any distinctions between individuals. Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all unquestionably comply with the Equal Protection Clause. Reversed. Concurrence. (Souter, J.) The reasons that lead me to conclude that the prohibition on assisted suicide in Glucksberg is not arbitrary under the due process standard also support the distinction between assisted suicide, which is banned, and practices such as termination of artificial life support and pain medication that hastens death, which are permitted. Discussion. Assisted suicide and euthanasia are officially prohibited, but doctors are not criminally prosecuted for either. Juries do not usually convict physicians who assist in their patients" suicides. - physician assisted suicide - not a consistent- from stop people from committing suicide - you are involving the medical party - they did not find an equal protection claim

Goodridge v Dept of Public Health

FACTS In Mass., a gay and lesbian support organization (GLAD) sued the state's Department of Health for their failure to issue same-sex married couples a marriage license. GLAD sued under the equal protection clause. GLAD also argued that there are many other benefits accompanying a marriage license, such as property rights and tax benefits which same-sex couples unjustly cannot receive. The state of Mass. argued that there was a legitimate governmental interest in discriminating on the basis of gender, in that the institution of marriage existed to promote procreation; and because same-sex couples could not further than goal, the state had an interest in disallowing their marital rights. The state also argued that there were parental benefits in promoting different sex relationships. Finally, the state argued that there would be administrative inconvenience in suddenly allowing same sex couples to marry. ISSUE Whether the denial of a marriage license to same sex couples violates the equal protection clause and/or the Mass. state constitution. HOLDING/ANALYSIS Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall be allowed marital rights in the state of Mass. The court wrote that the state's arguments for denying marital rights to same sex couples did not supply enough justification in terms of the "governmental interest" sought in their procurement. The court argued that modern day technology and fertilization techniques nullified the procreation argument. Same sex couples, through adoption of other fertilization methods could procreate. Secondly, the court found no productive argument favoring the notion that same sex couples were inferior parents to children. Finally, the court believed the state did not demonstrate adequate administrative difficulty to fully deny a single class of citizens their basic marital rights. As such, the state failed to supply their legitimate governmental interest burden.

Turner v FCC- content nuetral case

Facts of the case - Must carry law- piece of legislation that puts a restriction on cable tv programming - Local channels need to be afforded- - This must carry program was a constitutional based - Its content neutral - They are just saying we want to afford to make sure that they are getting the local channels - Making it a requirement - They have to afford it to have all these local channels - Its intermediate scrutiny- people need to locally informed - Must carry law achieve that ability- yes it does The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Issue: Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment? Conclusion: No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

New York Times v Sullivan

Facts of the case Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. - strict liability standard - damages and falsity- - critized Montegemory chief and police - new york times published an advertisement - coming out and arresting protesters - in a aggressive - didn't put police in a nice way - some of the things are false- so he files an law suit - the people that put the advertisement in said that some of things they said were false - yes there is falsity - is this sufficient under the constitution - during this time civil rights movement - policy concern was - if you are someone who wants to perpetuate at movement and you go to a publisher is they publish it - this case took place in Alabama - strict libel standard - goes to supreme court- chilling affect to slow down free speech - warren said- classify the nature of the plaintiff - not all plaintiffs are the same in free speech - plaintiff is a public official - trump, obama, clinton- have inherent power to get their message out- they are public figures - public officials have access to clear their name- then private individuals - had to prove actual malice- known falsity to reckless disregard of the truth IF YOU ARE PUBLIC OFFICIAL YOU MUST PROVE- FALSITY, DAMAGES AND ACTUAL MALICE Question Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.

City of Akron v Akron Center

Facts of the case In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: 1.all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, 2.parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, 3. doctors to counsel prospective patients, 4. a twenty-four hour waiting period, 5. and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court. Issue: Did several provisions of the Akron ordinance violate a woman's right to an abortion as guaranteed by the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and the right-to-privacy doctrine as implied by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.

Lawrence v Texas

Facts of the case Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling. Question Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled? Conclusion No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents. justice kennedy- addressed- justices whites long held tradition (was designed—— child predators)

New Jersey v T.L.O

Facts of the case T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools. Question Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools? Conclusion No decision. In an anonymous opinion, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, stressing that New Jersey chose not to include the Fourth Amendment question in their petition. Justice Stevens felt that it is not the role of the Supreme Court to offer guidance on questions the parties did put at issue. - caught smoking in the ladies room - she's a freshmen in high school - with the original search they find rolling weed paper and a box of cigarettes - secondary search: pail slips and other stuff - was their subjective exception regarding the purse? yes - was their an objective exception regarding the purse? yes - was their a warrant? no - a special needs doctrine- an alternative standard-balancing test- used in specific test - individuals right to privacy - maintaining order and discipline-public safety in a school is a high priority - if the states interest outweigh the individuals interest/privacy.... this is the balance test.. if the search was reasonable? - ultimately is the states search reasonable?- she got caught smoking in the bathroom - was a reasonable to do the secondary search? yes because they find more

Stenberg v Carhart

Facts of the case: A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

Schenck v United States

Facts of the case: During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Issue: Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

US v Koramatsu

Facts of the case: During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. Issue: Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent? Held: The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril." Discrimination against a specific group-

Illinois v Cabelles

Facts of the case: During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop? Conclusion: Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

Nyugen v I.N.S

Facts of the case: In 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. At age six, Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Nguyen and Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father. Issue: Is 8 USC section 1409(a)'s statutory distinction, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father, consistent with the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "[section 1409(a)] is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection." "For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives,'" wrote Justice Kennedy, "[f]or reasons to follow, we conclude [section 1409(a)] satisfies this standard." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented, noted that "[n]o one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications."

N.T.E.U. v Von Raab

Facts of the case: In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information. Question Did the regulations violate the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion No. The Court held that the "substantial interests" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified "departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's "first line of defense" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a "diminished expectation of privacy."

Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

Facts of the case: In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit "all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting." The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation. Issue: Does an amendment to a state's constitution to prohibit race-and sex-based discrimination and preferential treatment in public university admission decisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that this case was not about the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, but rather about whether the voters of a state can choose to prohibit the use of race preferences in the decisions of governmental bodies, specifically with respect to school admissions. The plurality held that the attempt to define and protect interests based on race ran the risk of allowing the government to classify people based on race and therefore perpetuate the same racism such policies were meant to alleviate. While voters may certainly determine that some race-based preferences should be adopted, it is not the role of the courts to disempower the voters from making such a choice. If certain issues were decided to be too sensitive to be addressed by voters, it would be denying the voters their right to debate and act through the lawful democratic process. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the use of racial preferences might reinforce racial awareness and therefore do more harm than good. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that a state law that provided equal protection by not allowing the use of racial preferences at least facially did not violate the Constitution. Justice Scalia argued that judges should not be in the position of dividing the country into racial blocs and determining what policies are in each one's interests. Additionally, Justice Scalia saw no reason to allow local subordinate authorities to have more power over the use of race-based preferences than the voters of the state. Since the amendment in question prohibits the use of racial preferences, it patently provides equal protection under the law rather than denying it. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, while the Constitution allows local, state, and national communities to implement narrowly tailored, race-conscious policies, it is the voters and not the courts who should determine the merits of such strategies. The amendment better allowed for this process to take place because it took the power to decide whether to implement race-conscious policies away from unelected actors and placed it firmly in the hands of the voters. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the democratic process does not in and of itself provide sufficient protection against the oppression of minority groups, which is why the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment exists. Although equal protection is typically construed as referring to the treatment of different groups under existing laws, it also protects against the implementation of new laws that would oppress certain groups on the basis of race, among other things. Because the amendment in question creates one admission process for those who do think race should be considered and a separate one for those who do not, it places special burdens on minority groups in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Judicial precedent holds that governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause when it has a racial focus that places a greater burden on minority. The amendment in question both has a racial focus and places a greater burden on the minority; therefore, it violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the voters of a state cannot democratically ratify an amendment that violates the Constitution. Justice Sotomayor argued that the plurality and concurring opinions allow a majority of voters in Michigan to prevent the elected university boards from implementing constitutional race-sensitive admission policies, and therefore they ignore a key purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissenting opinion.

Rodriquez v United States

Facts of the case: On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop. Issue: Is the use of a K-9 unit, after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop's duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the use of a K-9 unit at the conclusion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it was conducted reasonably, which this one was. Justice Thomas also argued that the rule announced in the majority's opinion would result in arbitrary enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections and created artificial lines between common police practices at traffic stops. Additionally, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case because the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue to hold Rodriguez and use the K-9 unit. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the appellate court did not address the issue of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to use the K-9 unit, and that court should be allowed to do so. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion's analysis was arbitrary because it relied on the order in which the officer conducted his inquiries.

Georgia v Randolph

Facts of the case: Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents. Issue: Can police search a home when one physically present resident consents and the other physically present resident objects? Conclusion: No. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn v Casey

Facts of the case: The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required 1. informed consent and a 2. 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. 3. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). 4. A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. Issue: Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? Conclusion In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld (agreed) most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.

California v Ciraolo

Facts of the case: The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction. Issue: Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion: The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims. 2 fences (10ft) and theres maurijuana planted the police were in an airplane and went over the the property plain sight

United States v Virginia

Facts of the case: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

Abrams v United States

Facts of the case: The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Issue: Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a classic libertarian pronouncement.

Plyer v Doe

Facts: In May 1975, the Texas legislature revised its education laws to withhold from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not legally admitted into the United States. The 1975 revision also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not legally admitted to the country. Issue: Whether, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens? Held: No. If the State is to deny a discrete group of children the free public education it offers to others residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. The state does not adequately show such an interest in this case. The state must show that its classification of a subject class has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Court finds it difficult to understand the states goals in limiting the education of children of illegal immigrants. Whatever these interests may be they are insubstantial when looking at the costs of not educating these children for the State and the Nation. Dissent. Finds sound policy arguments against the Texas legislature's choice, and therefore this law is not unconstitutional. By rendering this decision the Court is compensating for the inaction of Congress, and it is not the duty of the Court to make up for the ineffectiveness of the political branches of government. Concurrence. The facts of this case shows the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. When the State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote, placing these children at a permanent disadvantage similar to disenfranchisement. The State's denial of education to these children bears no substantial relation to any substantial state interest. It is hard to argue that anyone benefits from the creation of a subclass of illiterate persons, many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime. Discussion. This case is very similar to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In this case the Court, like in Rodriguez, uses the rational relationship test to determine the constitutionality of a state law impacting education. Unlike Rodriquez, the Court in this case feels that the cost of allowing this law, i.e. a large illiterate group of children, outweighs the benefits provided to the State through this law. The concurrences in this case argue for a different approach to reach the same conclusion, while the dissent feels that the Court should universally withhold judgment in those cases that are meant for the political branches of govern

Ambach v Norwick

Facts: New York education statutes forbid the certification of any perspective teacher who is eligible for United States citizenship, but refuses to seek naturalization. The Respondents both are foreign citizens eligible to seek naturalization who have refused to do so. Their refusal to seek naturalization is the sole requirement for certification as a teacher that they have not met. They brought suit, alleging that the requirement denies to them equal protection of laws. Issue: May the State deny teaching certification on the basis of alienage without violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held: Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) argues that the unequivocal bond that citizenship establishes makes it a rational distinguishing trait for the purposes of a state exercising its governmental functions. This he compares to the police power discussed in Foley, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). In particular, J. Powell notes that a teacher "has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities." An oath of allegiance, he feels, is not a suitable substitute for citizenship itself. Dissent: Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) argues that the New York Statutes in question are irrational. In particular, he believes that the statute takes educational opportunities away from students. Discussion: Norwick extends the rational basis test to more tangential areas of government function. Under the majority's reasoning in Norwick, there is no clear horizon to a State's ability to discriminate against legal aliens as government employees. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) argues that hiring support staff would not raise a legitimate state interest in discrimination. The majority says that the horizon is the ability to influence policy. However, the dissent argues that a teacher is not in such a position, as indeed the dissent in Foley had argued about police.

Mass. Bd. of Retirement v Murgia- about age

Facts: The Respondent was an officer in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police. Upon his 50th birthday, the Respondent was required to comply with state law and retire, although a physical examination just four months prior had determined the Respondent to be healthy and capable of all his job functions. The Respondent brought suit in United States District Court, alleging that the compulsory retirement law for Massachusetts State Police denied him of equal protection under the law. Issue: May Massachusetts use an age classification to determine compulsory retirement of its police officers? Held: Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed. The Supreme Court of the United State's (Supreme Court) majority states that although there has been age discrimination in the past and at present, it does not represent the same type of "purposeful unequal treatment" that has been shown on the basis of race or national origin. As such, the Supreme Court states that rational basis review is the proper level of scrutiny in the current case. Police work can be physically arduous and the individual officers must be capable of executing their duties fully in the interest of public safety. As individuals grow older, they are no longer as physically able as individuals in their 20′s and 30′s. Although Massachusetts requires routine physicals annually for all officers over the age of 40, there is no requirement that it base retirement solely on the results of these physicals. There is a rational basis for using a set age as a proxy, and hence, the Supreme Court finds no equal protection violation. Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissents, arguing that the right to work is a fundamental right and hence proper for a heightened level of scrutiny, as well as that the discrimination against the elderly is more widespread and systemic than the Per Curiam opinion admits. Discussion. The central holding of Murgia is that age classifications are subject only to rational basis review. Given the relatively small gain in administrative convenience in the present case (officers approaching 50 are physically examined annually, anyhow), one might argue that the majority is looking at the larger picture of how age classifications are used in this country (for example, driver's licensing, drinking age, voting rights, statutory rape, etc

San Antonio School District v Rodriquez

Facts: The State of Texas provides for free primary and secondary education for the children of the State. The state provides a set amount of funding for each district based on the number of students in the district. The district makes up the difference in operating expense with funds from local property taxes. This reliance on property taxes results in a large disparity in per student spending between property rich and property poor districts. Respondents allege that this denies the children in poor district Equal Protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue: Is education a fundamental right for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: No. Reversed and remanded. If education is a fundamental right, classifications affecting access to education are subject to strict scrutiny. There is no mention of education in the Constitution. Thus, there is no explicit constitutional guarantee. The question is now one of whether education is implicitly a fundamental right. The Court notes that Respondents do not argue that there is some quantum of education that is fundamental and which the class is not receiving. Nor do they argue that the class is entitled to the best education provided by public schools in Texas. Without explicit or implicit constitutional protections, the fiscal decisions of the State of Texas are beyond review of the Court, unless they lack a rational basis. Such a lacking is not found by the Court. Thus, the Court applied the rational basis test to require the Texas law to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Dissent. Justice William Brennan dissents along two arguments: (1) the funding system of the State of Texas lacks a logical basis, and (2) that the explicit or implicit constitutional guarantee analysis advanced by the Court ignores the Court's previous decisions. Justice Thurgood Marshall argues that a right's "fundamentality" depends on the importance of the right in effectuating constitutional guarantees. Justice Marshall argues that education is so important to the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment and to participation in the political process to create a significant nexus between education and these rights, making it fundamental. "As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the non-constitutional interest draws closer," the more appropriate heightened scrutiny becomes. Thus, Justice Marshall would apply a more stringent test than rational basis. Discussion. The Court notes that a fundamental right gives rise to strict scrutiny by the Court where legislation creates classifications surrounding the right. This is most easily understood as a policy decision by the Court, with the majority holding that the preferable policy is to limit the amount and type of legislation which is subject to strict scrutiny. The importance of this case lies in an understanding of the different levels of equal protection analysis.

Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority

Facts: - A coffee shop, located in a government owned parking garage, refused to serve the Appellant, Burton (Appellant), simply because he was black. Issue: Is the lessee of government property a state actor Holding: - The construction and maintenance of the building were derived completely from governmental funds and the Appellee was responsible as the facility landlord. - The Coffee Shoppe received a benefit from the state by being located in the parking garage. At the same time the state received the benefit of increased revenue from the restaurant's customers. - Therefore, a "symbiotic relationship" existed, whereby the state "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." - When a state leases its property in the manner present in this case, then the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) applies as if it were a covenant written into the lease agreement. Legal Reasoning: Since its connected to the structure then it is public entanglement Other opinions: In concurrence with the majority's opinion, the concurring justice reached the same conclusion differently. Part of an exception in entanglement: Government regulation and licensing -Parking authority case

Brown v Board of Education 2

Facts: - After its decision in Brown (1) which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. - Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief. - court dealing with implementation and de-segregation - with all deliberate speed- thats how de-segregation is going to take place - congress was on board- there wasn't enough votes in 1954 Issues: What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Legal Reasoning: - The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. - Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. - They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

Adamson v California

Facts: - Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in California state court after his refusal to take the stand and testify was commented on by opposing trial counsel. - At murder trial, appellant chose the strategy of not taking the stand and subjecting himself to cross-examination regarding former crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery that he had committed. - Under a California statute, his attempt to protect himself from impeachment of his veracity nonetheless allowed prosecution to make reference to his refusal to testify, and he was convicted. - Appellant argues that the California statute's allowing opposing counsel to comment on his refusal to testify ran counter to the Fifth Amendment's ban on a defendant's compulsion to testify - the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue: Is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applicable to the states?- unfair outcome in the case Legal Reasoning: - The court affirms the appellant's conviction. - The due process clause does not include all of the federal Bill of Rights. Here, it did not protect a defendant's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials. - They also rejected the idea that protection versus self-incrimination was a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. - The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state may abridge the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship as long as due process is not violated. The decision to not testify did not serve as an admission of any element of the crime. - Proof of the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt still remained with the prosecution, thus the federal constitutional due process standard was met. Other opinions: J. Frankfurter. Do not force the states to include the specific provisions of the Bills of Rights into their lawmaking. The Fourteenth Amendment's definition of due process is enough of a guiding hand to this court on whether a state has violated constitutional rights. This applied incorporation - right in self- incrimination - defendant is choosing not to testify and because he is not the prosecutor is saying thats his way of saying he did it - it wouldn't have made a difference if the comment was made or not - it didn't cause an unfair trial

Miliken v Bradley

Facts: - Attempts to integrate the Detroit schools had been unsuccessful. - The District Court redefined the area in question from the city itself to the outlying school districts in the metropolitan area, a total of 54 school districts, including the Detroit district itself. - The proposed redistricting would cause significant administrative and financial problems for the resulting school system. - Detroit is referred as de jure - can school districts go outside of their districts and go to neighboring districts - de facto is allowed de jure is not - court says no- you couldn't do this - these were all permissible under the constitution and this one isn't Issue: May District Courts redraw the boundaries of integrated school districts to achieve integration in a segregated district? Legal Reasoning: - Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger), writing for the majority, notes that there are many practical difficulties in the proposed plan. - It is unclear what the status of currently elected school officials would be in the new "super district;" how taxes would be levied and distributed and who should make curriculum decisions. - The scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. - In the present case, the discriminatory acts of a single district must be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. - Thus, if district lines were drawn on the basis of race, or if discriminatory acts of one district caused segregation in another, an interdistrict remedy may be in order. However, this is not the case here.

Sweatt v Painter

Facts: - Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. - When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. - school is not accredited- black school - no matter how much money the state through the kids would never feel equal Issue: Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Legal Reasoning: - In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. - The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. - The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. - The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena. Other opinions: Desegregation case

Jackson v Metro Edison Company

Facts: - Petitioner sought damages and injunctive relief against Respondent for terminating her electrical service for alleged nonpayment, claiming she had not been afforded notice, hearing and an opportunity to pay amount due. - She claimed that under state law, she was entitled to reasonably continuous electrical service and that the Respondent's termination constituted state action without procedural due process Issue: Whether Respondent's termination of Petitioner's electricity constituted state action? Holding: - No. Judgment of the lower state courts affirmed. Although Respondent had a monopoly, that fact is not determinative in considering whether Respondent's termination of service constituted state action. - Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the PPUC has not put its weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transform a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the PPUC into "state action." - All of Petitioner's arguments taken together show no more than that the Respondent was a heavily regulated private utility, enjoying a partial monopoly and that it elected to terminate service to Petitioner in a manner which the PPUC found permissible under state law. Legal reason: - The district court found that the termination did not constitute state action and was not subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the appeals court affirmed. - The Court held that the state was not sufficiently connected with the utility company's action in terminating petitioner's service to make its conduct in so doing attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. - The Court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether petitioner's claim to continued service was "property" for purposes of that Amendment.

Shelley v Kraemer

Facts: - Shelleys owned title to land which was bound by a restrictive covenant against non-caucasions( negro or Mongolian race) - the neighborhood restriction had been operative since 1911, when the holders of the properties agreed to a 50 year contract pledging not to sell to a person of those 2 races - Kraemer a resident of the neighborhood whose deed bore a similar restriction sued to restrain shelley from taking possession of the property Issue: Under federal property law, does a race-restrictive covenant violate any 14th Amendment rights or public policy when the residents who petition in this situation are already living on the land which was covenanted and which they violate by means of race? Holding: - Yes. The States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand. - Enjoyment of property rights is an essential freedom sought by the Framers of the 14th Amendment. - But for the discrimination on basis of race or color, petitioners were denied those rights. Legal reasoning: - These are not the traditional city, state or town councils passing laws to a discriminatory effect, but neighborhood covenants to the same effect. - These are private individuals, and the first consideration is whether that fact removes these cases from 14th Amendment concern. - Since the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has held the 14th Amendment does not protect people from private actions, as only the states can. - But here there is more, as the covenants were upheld by the state courts, and not by voluntary adherence, so there is an actionable cause by petitioners after all. - But for the state court actions, petitioners would have been able to live in their homes and occupy their properties w/o restraint. - 1. the use of a gov't mechanism( gov't enforcement mechanism) - shelley v kramer (1948) - ways to put certain restrictions on properties - ccr- convenants, conditions,restrictions - wanted to white wash the city - kraemer is a neighbor and isn't happy about it - the ccr is issued by the owner of the property not by the state of missouri - question: does the constitution apply to private conduct... - entangle the private activity and with the court

Craig v Boren

Facts: - The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. - Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. - preventing drinking and driving Issue: Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Legal Reasoning: - Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. - Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective. - The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. - J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees', Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional. - court does not like stereotypes Other Opinions: the state must rationally relate to a legitimate governmental interest

Brown v Board of Education 1

Facts: - This case is a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. - Several black children (through their legal representatives, Ps) sought admission to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. - The plaintiffs alleged that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. - the tangible were all equal but the intangible wasn't - 1952-1953, 1954-1955- fred vincent died Issue: Is the race-based segregation of children into "separate but equal" public schools constitutional? Legal Reasoning: - No. The race-based segregation of children into "separate but equal" public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. - Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the physical facilities and other may be equal. - Education in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. - The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in American life today. - The separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place in the field of public education. - Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. - A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they would receive in an integrated school system. - Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.

Marbury v Madison

Facts: -John Adams was denied reelection/ so control of both Houses of Congress fell to the Jeffersonians - Adams sent his nominations for the second wave of judicial appointments to the Senate and they were confirmed on March 3 - All commissions were signed by the president and by Marshall - Adams term expired before all the commissions could be delivered by John Marshals brother, who delivered 4 undelivered certificates - James Madison was the new secretary of state and under instructions from President Jefferson refused to deliver these 4 remaining commissions - William Marbury one of the 4 designated but uncertified judges brought suit to recover his commission Issue: Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? Legal Reasoning: - Power of appointment was exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power, has been performed - The signature is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made - The commission being signed the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law - It is not guided buy the will of the president - the commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, so it gives mr. Marbury the right to hold for five years. - If he withhold his commission, he is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law but violative of a vested legal right. - everyone has the right to claim the protection of the law, whenever he/ she receives an injury - Signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president appointed him and it was sealed by the secretary of state, so it is a conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature and of the completion of the appointment- legal right of office for 5 years - Having this legal title to the office he has a consequent right to the commision - a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy - It remains to be inquired whether he is entitled to the remedy for which he applies.

Marsh v Alabama- public function

Facts: Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, was arrested for trespassing after attempting to distribute religious literature in a privately owned Alabama town. A Corporation owned a town called Chickasaw in Alabama. The town was accessible and used freely by the public except for the fact that the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned title to the town and paid the police. Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness was told she needed a permit to distribute her flyers. However, Marsh declined to obtain a permit and refused to leave the sidewalk. Marsh was arrested and charged with violating Alabama's anti-trespassing statute. Marsh claimed that applying the statute to her violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Rule: A private entity that acts like a governmental body and performs a public function is subject to the United States Constitution (Constitution). Issue: Is the Constitution applicable to privately owned towns? Legal Reasoning: Yes, it applies, because the town acts like a government body. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first recognizes that if Chickasaw had been a municipality the anti-trespassing statute would not be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court specifically states that a private town is not the same as a private homeowner. Meaning, it is not appropriate to suppress unwanted religious expression in the town like it would be in a private home.

United States v Leon

Good faith exception Brief Fact Summary: A search warrant was issued to search the Respondent, Leon's (the "respondent") residence wherein a large quantity of illegal drugs was found. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued was found to be insufficient on its face. The evidence was suppressed at trial. Synopsis of Rule of Law: Reasonable reliance upon an otherwise invalid search warrant does not render evidence obtained during the search inadmissible. Facts: Fact summary omitted from case. Issue: Whether evidence obtained under a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached judge, but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause shall be excluded? Held: Justice Byron White ("J. White") filed the majority opinion. No, only when a warrant is grounded upon an affidavit knowingly or recklessly false has the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") suppressed the evidence obtained as a result. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather to punish magistrates and judges for their errors. Second, there exists no evidence that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution ("Constitution") and that their actions would require the ultimate sanction of exclusion. Third, there is no evidence that suppression of evidence obtained under a search warrant will have any deterrent effect upon judges and magistrates. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to law enforcement officials and as such are neutral and have no stake in the outcome of criminal prosecutions. The suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those instances where exclusion would promote the purposes of the exclusionary rule. An officer acting in good faith and within the scope of a search warrant should not be subjected to Fourth Amendment constitutional violations. It is the magistrate's or judge's responsibility to ascertain whether the warrant is supported by sufficient information to support probable cause. However, the officer's reliance must be objectively reasonable. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy where the magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth. Dissent: Justice William Brennan ("J. Brennan") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall ("J. Marshall"). The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution must be read to condemn not only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but also the subsequent use of any illegally obtained evidence. The exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's limitation upon governmental encroachment of individual privacy. The Court's only support for its decision is that even though the costs of exclusion are not very substantial, the potential deterrent effect in these circumstances is so marginal that exclusion cannot be justified. The chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The good faith exception will encourage police to provide only the bare minimum necessary for securing a search warrant. Concurrence. Justice Harry Blackmun ("J. Blackmun") filed a concurring opinion. If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. Discussion: This case presents the good faith exception provided to law enforcement officials in reliance upon search warrants issued by neutral and detached judges that later are revealed to be lacking in probable cause. The officer must reasonably rely upon the search warrant while obtaining the evidence. The judge must be neutral and detached. The affiant must not have provided false information. - they got a permit (search warrant) to go look at his 3 residences - they got the information from an informant- drug trafficking information - the warrant should have never been valid - the anonymous tip wasn't a trustworthy source even though they found stuff - he was an unreliable snitch-the informant - the warrant shouldn't have been issued - so anything they took or they look at doesn't count - it was a bad search - good faith exception- they are good trustworthy 3rd party - is a legal doctrine providing an exemption to the exclusionary rule. - good faith exception- if the police obtain a warrant and obtain evidence base on the warrant and later discovered that warrant should have not issued, the search or seizure will still be viewed as appropriate - they believed the information was legitimate - the saw everything was followed and the warrant was issued

Freedom of Speech Cases: Simon and Shister v Victims Bd Turner v FCC City of renton v Playtime Theaters Coates v City of Cincinnati Schad v Borough of Mt. Ephraim

Majority position can limit speech- but must have an adequate reason Free speech facilities- allows conversations that stimulate that goes 1. Democratic 2.If you restrict free speech then you restrict the way our government changes 3. Core values- individual autonomy- element that goes hand in hand with freedom of speech 4. Need for tolerance- hearing things we disagree with need to be able to hear things you don't agree with

Feiner v New York

Preferred freedom test Facts of the case: On March 8, 1949, Irving Feiner, a white student at Syracuse University, made an inflammatory speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. During the speech, which was intended to encourage listeners to attend a leftist rally, Feiner made several disparaging remarks about local politicians, organizations, and President Truman. A crowd gathered, and several listeners began "muttering" and "shoving." One listener threatened Feiner. Two officers on the scene, fearing violence, asked Feiner twice to end his speech. After he refused, the officers arrested Feiner for inciting a breach of the peace. A trial court found Feiner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. On appeal, Feiner argued his arrest violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. The Onondaga County Court and the New York Court of Appeals each denied his claim. - student- he's on a street corner - making derogatory about local politicans - hes an extreme leftist - he's talking to people on the student - he created a crowd- some where against - a riotous environment - the charge was for violating breach of peace - he was trying to create a hostile violence environment- african americans to rise up and go out a cause a riot - hostile audience- to get his audience to get up and do something - applied clear and present danger test- - applied the PREFERRED FREEDOM- WAS THE TEST APPLIED - speech is likely to produce clear and present of danger-of a series of subset of evil that raises high above inconvenience, annoyance or unrest Question Did Feiner's arrest for inciting a breach of the peace violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, the Court applied the "clear and present danger" principle it originally articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919). According to the Court, Feiner's arrest was a valid exercise of "the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets." The Chief Justice dismissed the notion that the arrest amounted to the suppression of free communication. "It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."

Thomas v Collins- content based

Preferred freedoms Facts of the case: A Texas law required union officials to obtain an organizer's card before soliciting possible members. A judge convicted a labor organizer of contempt for speaking at a union rally without a permit. Issue: Does the Texas law requiring labor organizers to secure permission to solicit members violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes, the law was unconstitutional. It interfered with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly which possesses "a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." - all labor organizations- receive a permit - he was president and vp- came to Texas to address a mass meeting - at a texas plant - he did not go through the process to get a permit - its not a pro union state - apply for a permit to the texas attorney general - if you don't- he got arrested- sentence to 3 days of jail and fined - he court and challenges this process- because restricting his freedom of speech - the law was unconstitutional - content based - its not narrowly tailored - they were targeting labor unions - this activity does not meet the standard - the rule- accordingly whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place must have clear support in public danger, actual, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. - only the gravest abuses— paramount interest - there has to be public danger, or impending danger

Terminiello v Chicago

Preferred freedoms Facts of the case: Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot. Issue: Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." - giving a speech in a auditorium, many people came to support him, 800 people came out to see him - very charismatic speaker- modern day donald trump - he was charged- chicago ordinance- violated breach of peace - stir public anger, disturbance- chicago ordinance - outside the area- hostile protesters outside - hes convited - pays $100 - courts analyzes the nature of the restricition - breach of peace is a justified infringement of the free speech - the court says- the nature of free speech is to invite dispute - the test we are going to apply freedom of speech though not absolute-- is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that raised far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest - likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."

Right to Die cases: Cruzan v Dir. Missouri Dept of Public health Washington v Glucksberg Vacco V Quill

Right to die/ rights to physiscian assisted - the liberty clause - privacy - clear and convincing evidence - barrier/ burden of proof - prove a habeas corpus - missouri required- demonstrate that the incompetent wanted to ended their life because they were not going to get better - cruzans friend - preponderance of evidence - does have a number associated with it - Probable cause-reasonable probability that crime has or will be committed - reasonable suspicion - the police want to search you- they can if they have a reasonable suspicion - they put a clear and convincing line on what is competent and incompetent - case goes to the supreme court - the court said- Missouri courts- did was constitutional to preserve her interest to live - preserving human life - state has a lot of interest in protecting its citizens - you need to put barriers - evidentiary barriersr to protect the welfare of society for incompetent people

Dennis v United States- balancing test

Risk formula test Brief Fact Summary: The Petitioners, Dennis and others (Petitioners) were convicted for (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged. Synopsis of Rule of Law: For an impediment on free expression to be permissible, the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability of coming about, must sufficiently outweigh the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger. Facts: The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or willfully advocate the overthrowing of any government in the United States by force or to attempt to commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought up on charges under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. It was clear from the record that the leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a revolution when the opportunity came. The Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged. Issue: Was the statute invalid by its own terms because it prohibited academic discussions on topics such as that of the merits of Marxism-Leninism? Held: No. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) We must apply the "clear and present danger" test. Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of the Government by force is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Obviously, "clear and present danger" does not mean the government may not act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of being executed. On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the touch and go nature of our relations with other countries with whom the Petitioners were ideologically aligned. Thus, the convictions of the Petitioners were justified. Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (Justice Black) While it is true that unfettered communication of ideas does entail danger, the benefits in the eyes of the Founders of this Nation, derived from free expression were worth the risk. Justice William Douglas (Justice Douglas) If this were a case where the speaker was teaching techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President, or the planting of bombs, I would concur in the judgment. But, the reality is that no such evidence was introduced at trial. Concurrence. Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) An individual cannot claim the constitutional protections of the First Amendment in advocating or teaching the overthrow of government by violence. I think such conduct can be made a crime, even without requiring a showing of an extremely high probability of success of a scheme. Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) The results we have reached are the product of a careful weighing of the following factors: (1) that social value of the speech being prohibited; (2) the chilling effect on legitimate speech that the punishment of any form of speech may have; and (3) the interest in the government in security. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is essentially allowing the prohibitions of advocacy of a particular doctrine in this case - the overthrow of the government by force. In later opinions the Supreme Court will adopt a more rigid test that focuses on whether a speaker is advocating actions. - 11 communist members convicted under the smith act - smith act- can't do anything to overthrow t\he gov't - its a felony - he helped plan communist group - he was teaching communist stuff - another test- plurality- balancing test - speech overthrowing the gov't can be restricted - it can be really bad stuff - taking the gravity of the harm that can be done , and weighing it against free speech - speech is attended to cause this harm then it goes to restrict - if the speech is hypo- or just a discussion- - they are trying to quantify - mr dennis- 20 years in prison- federal prison

In re marriage cases

Summary In 2004, the State Supreme Court of California ordered the city and county of San Francisco to stop issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples and said that legal action could proceed about whether California's restriction of marriage to different-sex couples violates the state's constitution. Lambda Legal, the National Center of Lesbian Rights and the ACLU promptly filed a lawsuit against the state to win the right to marry for same-sex couples throughout California. The case has moved through the California court system and in May 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled that barring lesbian and gay couples from civil marriage violates the California Constitution.

McClesky v Kemp

Summary McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state. Facts: - Defendant, who was sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer, challenged the constitutionality of his sentence, citing a study performed by Professor David C. Baldus (Baldus Study). T - his study purported to show that black defendants were more likely to receive capital punishment than white defendants, particularly when the victim was white. - Defendant alleged that this proved his sentence was the result of unconstitutional racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. - He further claimed that the Georgia death penalty statute violated the Eighth Amendment by giving the jury too much discretion in deciding upon a death sentence, such that racial bias could influence their decision. - there was no discriminatory case in this case so it doesn't work - You have to show both Issue: - Did the Georgia death penalty statute racially discriminate against Defendant in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: - No.The Baldus Study provided by defendant does not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a factor in defendant, himself, receiving the death penalty. - The study does not support an inference that the jury, in his own case, acted with purposeful racial discrimination - a threshold showing for proof of an Equal Protection violation. - No. The Baldus Study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial discrimination effecting a jury's decision to impose the death penalty. - Discretion in the criminal justice system is not in and of itself an Eight Amendment violation, particularly in light of the fact that in many instances discretion works to the benefit of the criminal defendant. - Moreover, insomuch as the Eighth Amendment applies to all punishments, if defendant prevailed on these grounds, courts would soon be faced with similar claims for every other type of penalty. - The disproportionate sentencing alleged with respect to race could also be expanded to discrepancies in sentencing in relation to other minority groups, or gender, or facial characteristics. - The basis on which defendant challenges his sentence, statistical comparisons, lacks any limiting principle. Legal reasoning: - Defendant need only demonstrate that there was a risk that his sentence was imposed as a result of racial prejudice. - The Baldus Study adequately demonstrates that risk by showing that more likely than not a black defendant will receive a death sentence as compared to a white defendant. ( - Justice Blackmun.) The Baldus Study demonstrates a clear pattern of differential treatment in imposing the death penalty on the basis of race. - Defendant has met his burden of showing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and the burden should have shifted to the state to disprove that allegation. - (Justice Stevens.) The majority's concern, that allowing Defendant's claim to prevail would sound the death knell for any death penalty statute in Georgia is unfounded. - The Baldus Study indicates the existence of certain categories of extremely serious crimes, when death is imposed by juries regardless of the race of the defendant or the victim. - Narrowing the class of death-eligible offenses to just those categories would allow Georgia to have a non-discriminatory capital punishment statute. Concurrence: - The majority holds that a defendant challenging his sentence on the grounds of discrimination must demonstrate actual discrimination in his own case; statistical comparisons of sentencing among different racial groups is not sufficient to show an Equal Protection violation. - Neither is the mere fact that racial discrimination may potentially inform a juror's decision as to defendant's sentence enough to make the entire concept of discretion in the criminal justice system "cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment

Swann v Charlotte -Mecklenberg

Summary: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. - school said the busing transportation hard Facts: - In the wake of Brown II, many school districts still sought to maintain vestiges of their pre-Brown I segregated systems. - Defendant school districts brought suit, alleging that District Courts had overreached their authority, broad as it may be, under Brown II. Issue: What is the scope of District Court authority under Brown II? When is it appropriate for the court to invoke that authority? - 1st issue racial quota based on the population you had to have certain amount of people - US supreme court does not have quotes - de-segregation- if you can't figure out a way to do then you can use lose quotas - court said racially quotas was accepted - 2nd issue- ones school - They were violating the constitution - the kid gets to choose - de facto - 3rd- school district- way to manipulate the population to funnel in into certain schools- the answer is no - 4th- busing- is it constitutional to mandate busing - they said- de-segregation have to have able to have bus - the court is permissible to bus- as long as it doesn't conflict with their education - the court said- it can't take away from the education Legal Reasoning: - The authority is broad, but is appropriate only where local districts have failed to bring themselves into compliance with Brown I on their own accord. - Remedial authority does not put judges "automatically in the shoes of school authorities." - Mathematical racial quotas are an allowable exercise of judicial authority, when used as a starting point after a "total default" of the school board's duty. - Single-race schools are not per se a "mark of a system that still practices segregation by law." The court "should scrutinize such schools," and the burden is on the school district to demonstrate that the school's racial makeup is not the result of past or present de jure segregation. - The courts may redefine district lines to desegregate the systems, even though such redistricting may cause initial inconvenience and burdens. - Busing is an appropriate remedy, as well, as long as the time involved in the busing does not risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process.

Gratz v Bollinger

Synopsis of Rule of Law: Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission. Facts: The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions, the University implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A student that is from an underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points towards his or her over all score. The groups of students typically come from African-American, Hispanic, and Native American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary artistic talent only receives 5 points under the admission system. Also every student that is from an underrepresented group, and is otherwise qualified, is typically accepted into the school. A group of white student's, that were determined qualified by the University, where denied admission. Issue: Whether a School's admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points to students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Held: Yes. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or town where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous cases, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant should be individually assessed. Each student's admission should be based on the student's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education. An admission system that grants points for certain characteristics such as race is not an individual assessment. When applicants are being chosen for a program and part of the reasoning is based on race, any discrimination made is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since the White students are being discriminated based on race, they are a suspect class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show the system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not narrowly tailored. Simply Dissent. The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race sole reasons for denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things such residency, grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan design is better fit than other plans to ensure diversity. Discussion. The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with individual assessment will be impractical. However, this court states that just because it will be difficult to achieve such standards, it does not render their actions constitutional.

Libel Cases: New York Times v Sullivan Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc. Time, Inc v. Firestone

about lying- written slander is spoken - written falsehood - that written falsehood is resulted in damages (legal remedy) Flow Chart - alleged libel—— state action doctrine——— classify the nature of the plaintiff - usually private individuals suing private individuals - SAD never comes into play with libel because shelley v kramer. only way to enforce libel is through the court system. Use of libel mechanism

Regents of University of California v Bakke

don't get standard review black letter law race can be considered a factor of many Summary: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. Facts: - The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for "disadvantaged minorities." - The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. - The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Issue: Is the special admissions program of the University of California constitutional? Can race be considered as a factor in the admissions process? Holding: - The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process. - Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles. J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. - The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal - minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment. Legal Reasoning: - Justices William Brennan (J. Brennan), Byron White (J. Brennan), Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall), and Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissent, believing the special admissions program to be constitutional. - In particular, the Justices argue that the racial classification in the present case is remedial, serves an important government objective and also substantially related to that objective and thus insulated from the Fourteenth Amendment's general prohibition of such classifications. - J. Marshall writes separately in support of J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun. - Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents, citing that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the denial of any individual on the basis of race from participation in any program receiving federal funding. - J. Stevens argues that prohibiting white students from participation in the special admissions program is a direct violation of Title VI. Concurrence. - J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur so much as the Supreme Court's opinion allows race to be considered as a factor in the admissions process. - However, the Justices believe that in this particular example, race should be allowed as a single determining factor. - J. Stevens concurs to the extent that the special admissions program is impermissible. - However, J. Stevens holds that the constitutional issue is not reached, because the federal statutory ground (Title VI) prohibits the activity directly.

Affirmative Action Cases: Regents of University of California v Bakke Gratz v Bollinger Grutter v Bollinger Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

refers to admission policies that provide equal access to education for those groups that have been historically excluded or underrepresented, such as women and minorities. - affirmative action- bakke and grutter - compelling interest - sufficient: - diversity - what is a compelling interest - National security - remedial legislations - what is not compelling - malice - invidious discrimination - It fails the narrowly tailored part - then don't do a narrowly tailored analysis - they didn't do this - race + - not qouta - Strict scrutiny - race - state - facially neutral- - discrimination impact - discrimination intent

Mapp v Ohio

she didn't let the police in... they were looking for a fugitive they break in without a warrant they find all these porn doctrine of incorporation- fundamental unfairness they incorporate the exclusionary rule- constitutional mandate the outcome: the evidence was excluded- her conviction was overturned exclusionary rule is to keep police in check Exceptions: 1. Terry stop Facts of the case Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. she has porn Question Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) Conclusion The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

Washington v Glucksberg

whether to end someones life is a fundamental right- if its not rational basis and if it then its strict scrutiny - is the right to end ones life a fundamental right? - its not- banning suicide- 700 years disapproving suicide - judio christian ethics - apply rational basis - ethics of doctors - people who are depressed - all these were rationally related to governmental state issues - so they banned people from assisting others of suicide or killing themselves no fundamental right for assisted suicide theres a rational basis- for assisted suicide Brief Fact Summary: The Supreme Court of the United States held that a law that prohibits anyone (including physicians) from aiding or causing another to commit suicide is constitutional Synopsis of Rule of Law: The "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not include the right to assist suicide. Facts: It is a crime to assist suicide in Washington. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents are physicians who practice medicine in Washington. Respondents occasionally treat terminally ill patients and claim that they would help these patients end their lives if not for Petitioners' ban on assisted suicides. In January 1993, Respondents, along with three terminally ill patients (who have since died), and a non-profit organization that counsels people considering physician assisted suicide sued in the United Stated District Court claiming that Petitioners' assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional. The District Court invalidated the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, but then reversed itself en banc and affirmed the District Court. The en banc decision held that "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death" and the state's assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional. Issue: Whether Washington's prohibition against "causing" or "aiding" a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Held: No. The en banc judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. There is consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right of assisting suicide. To hold that such a right is fundamental in nature would be to reverse centuries of legal doctrine. Therefore, assisting suicide is not a fundamental right. The Constitution requires the state ban to be rationally related to legitimate government interests. Petitioners have an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." Suicide is a serious health problem. Further, Petitioners have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, as well as an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect and mistakes. The ban on assisting suicide is thus rationally related to these legitimate state interests. Concurrence. There is no generalized right to commit suicide. There is no need to address Respondent's question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. The majority's holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge. The legislature has more competence to address this issue than the Court. The Court's formulation of the "liberty" interests is incorrect. Additionally, the majority's holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid, and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge. Discussion. Once the Court held that assisting suicide is not a fundamental right, it was easy to satisfy the rational basis test and hold that the law was