Exam 2- POLSC 615 (cases)

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)

Did Chaplinsky's conviction violate the First Amendment? Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinksy's conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." He found that Chaplinsky's insults were "fighting words" since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984)

Did Minnesota's attempts to enforce the anti-discrimination law violate the Jaycees' right to free association under the First Amendment? In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked "the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.

U.S. v. O'Brien (1968)

Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech? No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."

Adderly v. Florida (1966)

Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.

Rosenbloom v. Metremedia (1971)

(1) Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for defamatory statements apply to private individuals? (2) If so, is the evidence presented at trial enough to support the damages originally awarded to Rosenbloom? Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

Morse v. Frederick (2007)

1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events? 2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event? Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

Madsen v. Women's Health Center Inc. (1994)

1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences? No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part

McCullen v. Coakley (2014)

1. Did the First Circuit err in upholding the Massachusetts law under the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. If the Supreme Court's ruling in Hill v. Colorado applies, should that ruling be limited or overruled? Yes, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the law is content-based and therefore must be examined under strict scrutiny. A blanket prohibition of speech in areas where only one type of politically charged speech is likely to occur cannot be content-neutral. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the majority opinion did not address the question of whether Hill v. Colorado should be limited or overruled. Because Justice Scalia argued that the law was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he wrote that Hill should be overruled because it contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the law's exemption for clinic employees and volunteers constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it silences abortion opponents while allowing clinic workers and supporters to express their views.

US v. One Book Called Ulysses (1933)

A federal trial judge held that the courts must determine whether the author intended a book to be obscene, the judge that Ulysses was a sincere and honest book and that James Joyce did not intend to incite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts.

Keller v. State Bar of California (1990)

A group of lawyers challenged the use of mandatory state bar fess to fund lobbying on social issues with which they disagreed. The Court said that the compelled association and integrated bar are justified by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. It may not, however, fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside areas germane to the State's interest.

Cohen v. California (1971)

Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "**** the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment? Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, if married, notify their husbands, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.

Regina v. Hicklin (1868)

Case about speech or print to deprave the mind landmark case

Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board (1991)

Content based prohibitions are antithetical to the first amendment

Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974)

Courts says the government cannot mandate responsible journalism (newspapers)

Butts (1967) and Walker (1967)

Decreased the burden to prove malice: "highly unreasonable conduct" Increased coverage of the Sullivan test to public figures (not just government officials) Matters of public interest are now included in the Sullivan Test

New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)

Did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, "malice" had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.

NAACP v. Alabama (1958)

Did Alabama's requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Schneck v. US (1919)

Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech? The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress' wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the "clear and present danger test," Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.

Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Association (1995)

Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Duarte (1987)

Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violate Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association? No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.

Stromberg v. California (1931)

Did a state law prohibitng people from flying red flags as a political statement violate the First Amendment? Writing for a 7-2 majority, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes reversed the conviction because the first reason for prohibiting display of a red flag—"as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government"—was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that where the jury convicted a defendant generally under any or all of the three reasons, and one of those reasons is struck down, the conviction cannot stand. The Court upheld the second two reasons—"as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action" or "as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character"—because they protected against incitement to violence. Justice James C. McReynolds dissented, writing that Stromberg's conviction should stand because the jury convicted her under valid parts of the California law as well. Justice Pierce Butler wrote a separate dissent, writing that the records shows that Stromberg was not convicted under the unconstitutional reason at all, so the conviction should stand.

Roth v. US (1957)

Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).

Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

Did the Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment? In an opinion written by William Orville Douglas, the unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that certain crimes, such as embezzlement, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction without explanation or reason. Moreover, the Court reasoned that because of the social and biological implications of reproduction and the irreversibility of sterilization operations, compulsory sterilization laws should be subject to strict scrutiny. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone stated that he disagreed with the majority opinion's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause and instead cited the Due Process Clause to prevent Skinner from being sterilized.

Thornhill v. Alabama (1940)

Did the Alabama law violate Thornhill's right to free expression under the First Amendment? In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that Section 3448 of the Alabama State Code was facially invalid. The Court held that labor relations were "not matters of mere local or private concern," and that free discussion concerning labor conditions and industrial disputes was "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society." The Court found that no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property or of breach of the peace was inherent to labor picketing, and thus deserved First Amendment protection.

NY State Club Association v City of NY (1988)

Did the City of New York violate First Amendment rights to free association when applying anti-discrimination laws to social clubs that were not "distinctly private"? No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court examined the clubs subjected to anti-discrimination laws closely and found "no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom the Law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private viewpoints." In addition, many of the clubs showed characteristics of a public nature. Often strangers attended club functions, partook in meals, and made financial contributions. So long as the clubs were sufficiently open to this type of exposure to outsiders, the clubs could not be closed to certain types of people on account of their race, sex, or religion. Prohibiting this type of discrimination did not impair a club's ability to advance a viewpoint because clubs could still select people for membership based on whether they shared similar beliefs.

Whitney v. California (1927)

Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court held that the state, in exercise of its police power, can punish those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other words, words with a "bad tendency" can be punished. Writing a separate concurrence, Justice Louis Brandeis, joined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued that restrictions on government action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not extend to situations in which speech creates a clear and present danger of an evil outcome. The actions that the defendant took posed only a remote potential harm to the public, and she was involved only in contributing to the preparation of the actions. To satisfy the clear and present danger standard, the risk of harm must be severe, probable, and imminent. Broad statements advocating for revolution at some indefinite date in the future are protected by the First Amendment. Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred rather than dissented because the record showed evidence of a criminal conspiracy, which meant review was inappropriate without proof that constitutional rights were infringed during the criminal trial.

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984)

Did the National Park Service regulations violate the First Amendment by curtailing symbolic speech? In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

Did the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause? The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning it violated the liberty protected by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see fit. While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions of civic matters, the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive.

Wooley v. Maynard (1977)

Did the New Hampshire law unconstitutionally interfere with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates. The Court found that the statute in question effectively required individuals to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." The Court held that the State's interests in requiring the motto did not outweigh free speech principles under the First Amendment, including "the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster. . .an idea they find morally objectionable."

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)

Did the Ninth Circuit err when its holding runs directly contrary to the Seventh Circuit's 2006 decision in Christian Legal Society v. Walker? No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the college's all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student organization forum; and, therefore, did not transgress First Amendment limitations. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, counseled the same result in this case. The Court further reasoned that, considering this constitutional inquiry occurs in the education context, Hasting's all-comers policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote separately, concurring. He agreed with the Court's holding and answered an argument raised by CLS that Hasting's Nondiscrimination Policy would be "plainly unconstitutional" if addressed in this case. He disagreed with CLS noting that while the First Amendment may protect CLS' discriminatory practices off campus, it does not require a public university to validate or support such practices. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy also concurred. He noted that to be effective, a limited forum will exclude some speakers based on their affiliation, as occurred in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented. He critiqued the majority for expounding the principle: "no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of higher learning." He argued that the majority arms public institutions with a "handy weapon" for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups.

New York Times v. US (1971)

Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

Dennis v. U.S. (1951)

Did the Smith Act violate the First Amendment? In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. "No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids."

Edwards v. South Carolina (1963)

Did the arrests and convictions of the marchers violate their freedom of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of their grievances as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Free Petition Clause to extend to the states as well as the federal government. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court reversed the criminal convictions of the black students. It was clear to the Court that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the students under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the state infringed the students' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances. Justice Clark dissented.

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette

Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity. Justices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions. Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law.

New York v. Ferber (1982)

Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter he relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values," and that national unity was "the basis of national security." Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag. The Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country." Justice Harlan Stone dissented, writing that the "very essence of the liberty" guaranteed by the by the Constitution "is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say." Stone's position soon became the majority; the decision was reversed in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)

Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Olmstead v. US (1928)

Did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendments? No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).

Abrams v. U.S. (1919)

Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress' determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government's viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which he concluded did not meet the "clear and present danger" test.

DC v. Heller (2008)

Do the provisions of the District of Columbia Code that restrict the licensing of handguns and require licensed firearms kept in the home to be kept nonfunctional violate the Second Amendment? The ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violate the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the first clause of the Second Amendment that references a "militia" is a prefatory clause that does not limit the operative clause of the Amendment. Additionally, the term "militia" should not be confined to those serving in the military, because at the time the term referred to all able-bodied men who were capable of being called to such service. To read the Amendment as limiting the right to bear arms only to those in a governed military force would be to create exactly the type of state-sponsored force against which the Amendment was meant to protect people. Because the text of the Amendment should be read in the manner that gives greatest effect to the plain meaning it would have had at the time it was written, the operative clause should be read to "guarantee an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." This reading is also in line with legal writing of the time and subsequent scholarship. Therefore, banning handguns, an entire class of arms that is commonly used for protection purposes, and prohibiting firearms from being kept functional in the home, the area traditionally in need of protection, violates the Second Amendment. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Second Amendment does not create an unlimited right to possess guns for self-defense purposes. Instead, the most natural reading of the the Amendment is that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes but does not curtail the legislature's power to regulate nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons. Justice Stevens argued that the Amendment states its purpose specifically in relation to state militias and does not address the right to use firearms in self-defense, which is particularly striking in light of similar state provisions from the same time that do so. Justice Stevens also notes that "the people" does not enlarge the protected group beyond the context of service in a state-regulated militia. This reading is in line with legal writing of the time that contextualizes the Amendment in relation to state militias and post-enactment legislative history. Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests, and it does not provide absolute protection from government intervention in these interests. Historical evidence from the time of ratification indicates that colonial laws regulated the storage and use of firearms in the home. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt an interest-balancing test to determine when the government interests were sufficiently weighty to justify the proposed regulation. In this case, because the interest-balancing turns on the type of analysis that the legislature, not the court, is best positioned to make, the Court should defer to the legislature and uphold the restrictions. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in the dissent.

U.S. v. Alvarez (2012)

Does 18 U.S.C. 704(b), the Stolen Valor Act, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, concluding that false statements of fact should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, as drafted, the Stolen Valor Act violates intermediate scrutiny because it applies to situations that are unlikely to cause harm. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. Congress could not draft the Stolen Valor Act more narrowly, while still preventing the substantial harm caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.

Hill v. Colorado (2000)

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker? No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)

Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (2005)

Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree? No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988)

Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy. Justice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the proper basis for the decision. Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate dissenting opinion. Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional.

Gertz v. Welch (1974)

Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state liable laws involving private individuals and the news media.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)

Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances? No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

Masson v. New Yorker (1991)

Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure? No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.

Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986)

Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly? No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."

Gitlow v. New York (1925)

Does the First Amendment prevent a state from punishing political speech that directly advocates the government's violent overthrow? In an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications. Despite the small scale of Gitlow's actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too insignificant to have an impact. The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states. In dissent, Justice Olver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow's call to action was abstract and would not resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient imminence to warrant punishing the speech.

Snyder v. Phelps (2011)

Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint. Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler.

Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution? Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

McDonald v. Chicago (2010)

Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states? The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Justice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's "text, history, or underlying rationale" that characterizes it as a "fundamental right" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.

US v. Miller (1939)

Does the Second Amendment protect an individual's right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun? The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds reasoned that because possessing a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.

Rumsfeld v. FAIR Inc. (2005)

Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment? No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Spence v. Washington (1974)

Does the Washington statute violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that that statute, as applied, violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that Spence's display was symbolic speech entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that each state should decide how the American flag should be protected. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, expressing that states have an interest in protecting the American flag as an important symbol of national unity. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)

Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

Carpenter v. US (2018)

Does the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, which include the location and movements of cell phone users, violate the Fourth Amendment? The government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into existing precedents, but tracking person's movements and location through extensive cell-site records is far more intrusive than the precedents might have anticipated. The Court declined to extend the "third-party doctrine"—a doctrine where information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy—to cell-site location information, which implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS tracking does. One consideration in the development of the third-party doctrine was the "nature of the particular documents sought," and the level of intrusiveness of extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held narrowly that the government generally will need a warrant to access cell-site location information.

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977)

Employees of the Detroit BOE challenged the constitutionality of an agency-shop agreement which required teachers who did not join the union to pay a service fee to the union. Some teachers argued that this fee violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The Court held that the BOE could not compel non-union members to pay the fee so long as the union acts to promote the cause which brought the group together; as an individual cannot withdraw financial support merely because he disagrees with strategy. A union can spend funds to support political candidates or advance other ideological causes not germane two its duties as a collective bargaining representative, but only if financed from funds or dues from members who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so by threat of loss of job.

Cox Broadcasting (1975)

States cannot restrict the publication of truthful and public transformation (still good law)

Presser v. Illinois (!886)

States may strictly regulate private military groups

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Miller v. California (1973)

Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

US v. Cruikshank (1876)

KKK Deprives blacks right to assembly and bear arms

University of Wisconsin v. Southworth (2000)

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable? Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976)

No gag order on pretrial proceedings even if meant to protect the defendant from prejudicial publicity

Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

Should the Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education be overturned so that public employees who do not belong to a union cannot be required to pay a fee to cover the union's costs to negotiate a contract that applies to all public employees, including those who are not union members? In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State of Illinois' extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violated the First Amendment, meaning that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, which held otherwise, was overruled. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court began by stating that the district court had jurisdiction over Janus' suit, as he was undisputedly injured in fact by the state's agency fee system, and the harm he suffered could be redressed if he prevailed in court. Moving on to the merits, the Court concluded that the state's collection of agency fees from nonconsenting public employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that Abood was incorrect in deciding otherwise. The Court stated that requiring individuals to endorse ideas they disagreed with runs counter to First Amendment principles, and that even under a more permissive standard than the "exacting" strict scrutiny that the Court had applied in evaluating the constitutionality of agency fees in the past, the Illinois scheme could not pass muster. The Court explained that neither of Abood's two justifications for agency fees, which were maintaining "labor peace" and eliminating the risk of "free riders," could survive under this standard, finding that both problems could be mitigated through less restrictive means than agency fees. The Court also rejected newer state interests that had been asserted, which were to support bargaining with a sufficiently funded agent and increasing workforce efficiency, stating that unions could be effective without agency fees. The Court further reasoned that stare decisis principles did not require deference to Abood, finding that Abood was poorly reasoned, lacked workability, and that over time it had become an "outlier" in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. It also stated that Abood's uncertain status, along with the short-term nature of collective bargaining agreements and unions' ability to protect themselves when agency-fee provisions were critical to their bargains all militated against giving Abood decisive weight. In light of these reasons, the Court concluded that the practice of states and public-sector unions collecting agency fees from nonconsenting employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that no further agency fees or other forms of payment to a public-sector union could be collected, nor could attempts be made to collect such payments from employees without their consent. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent faulted the Majority for upsetting the balance that Abood brought to public-sector labor relations, and for disregarding stare decisis principles for no special reason. It also criticized the Majority for issuing its decision without considering the consequences it could have in light of the fact that over 20 states had elaborate statutory schemes built on the Abood decision, thousands of contracts involving millions of employees relied upon those laws, and the government services that these public-sector employees performed impacted the lives of tens of millions of Americans. Justice Sotomayor filed an additional dissenting opinion.

Tileston v Ullman (1943)

The Court denied review of Connecticut law prohibiting the use and advice on use of contraceptives because no one could demonstrate they had been harmed. The statute had been on the state's books for over three-quarters of a century without ever having been enforced.

Butler v. Michigan (1957)

The Court struck down a law that made it a crime to "distribute material found to have a potentially harmful influence on youth" Court stated that it was incompatible with the 1st amendment to reduce reading material viable to adults to that which is fit for children. The Court killed the Hicklin test but failed to provide a new standard