Intentional Torts

IIED - elements

(1) intending/in reckless disregard of possible emotional distress to Pl; (2) engages in extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) causing; (4) emotional distress to Pl Infer intent from conduct, if conduct is obnoxious enough

Defamation - elements

*Harm-based tort* (1) Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or carelessly; (2) publishes or causes to be published a statement that is false; (3) causing; (4) injury to Plaintiff's reputation [must be reasonably likely to lower Pl's social standing] Defendant culpably [intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or carelessly] performs an act [publishes a statement] that is false and defaming which causes harm to Plaintiff [injuries reputation].

IIED - who is proper plaintiff?

-Victim of outrageous conduct -Immediate family member IF present when Pl suffers ED and family member suffers ED as well -Bystanders if present and also suffering *physical* harm

Battery

D (1) intentionally (2) touches P's person without consent. When proven, (3) P gets damages Rights based tort - no harm requirement

IIPEA: intentional interference with prospective economic advantage

D <culpably> <acts in a way that> <causes> <a loss of prospective economic interest of P>. culpability can be established: (a) by illegitimate/malicious act, or (d) by legitimate but unjustifiable act ("improper means") - Malicious: motivation to diminish P's welfare - Improper means: hurts P & not broadly beneficial; not adding value to society

Trespass to Land

D enters P's close without authority Rights-based tort - no harm requirement

Defense of property - elements (Claeys definition)

D has (complete) justification to use force on P's person or property if force is not likely to wound*; AND (1) (forcible trespass) P is actually/imminently using force on D's property, or (2) (simple trespass) D demanded P to cease engaging with D's property and P refused that demand. *wound: D may wound if conditioned on the right of self-defense

Self-Defense - elements (Claeys definition)

D has (complete) justification to use force on P's person/property if, by an objective standard, P is assaulting D or D reasonably believes he's in imminent apprehension of bodily harm from some source, and the force D applied was reasonably proportionate to the assault/harm.

Trespass to Chattels

D interferes w/P's chattel without authorization and causes harm - Harm-based tort - Harms - destruction, damage, long deprivation of use (used in a way that the owner could have gotten rental value for) - Conversion is a tort that is focused on secure title, while trespass to chattels is a tort focused on control and usage

Necessity defense - elements

D may claim to exercise a privilege of necessity if (1) D faces a serious threat to his (or someone else's) person/property AND (2) commandeering/using P's property is an objectively reasonable means to respond to the threat (Note: If property is damaged in the course of this necessity, than it must be repaid)

False Imprisonment - elements

D, with intent to confine P, performs an act that results in confinement of P note: intent requirement is very minimal. Consent can be a defense.

Assault - elements

D, with intent to make P experience an immediate apprehension of offensive/harmful contact, performs an act, causing in D an immediate apprehension of offensive/harmful contact.

Defamation - Rights balanced

Df's right to free speech, information vs. Pl's right to reputation, privacy

IIED - interests protected

Df's right to freedom of speech and autonomy vs. Pl's right to emotional well-being, personal safety

Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941)

Fact: D actively induced 3rd party to breach contract with P's ice business without justification. Held: D is liable. A cause of action lies for intentionally and unjustifiably inducing a breach of contract. D needs to know there's a contract AND must intend to break the contract - If D is acting with motive to purely compete, then D is acting legitimately

Grant v. Reader's Digest Assn.

Fact: Reader's Digest published article saying Grant was a lobbyist for the Communist Party, Grant sued for libel but was dismissed at trial because Communist beliefs deemed not necessarily bad for reputation Holding: Trial ruling overturned. It is possible for Pl's reputation to be harmed by allegation that he is a Communist Rule: Defamation protects reputation of person assailed regardless of whether those who would think less of Pl are "right-thinking" or "wrong-thinking" EXCEPT when reputation is affected only among universally wrong-thinking audience (e.g., allegation that someone is an informant affects reputation only among criminals)

Courvoisier v. Raymond (Colo. 1896) (p32)

Facts: D (jewelry shop owner) shot Pl (sheriff) while defending his store from a mob, claims self-defense. Holding: Self defense negates a battery charge even if D is mistaken about the threat, if the mistake and means were reasonable, i.e., circumstances would have led a reasonable man to believe he was in danger of receiving great bodily harm at the hands of the Pl.

Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) p.1120

Facts: D (law firm) poached competitor's at-will employees. Held: inducing termination of an at-will employment relation may be actionable under the standard applicable to claims for IIPEA.

Bird v. Jones (1845) p.60

Facts: D blocked P from walking down a public street to see a boat race. D allows P to walk back the way he came. Holding: No false imprisonment. False imprisonment requires effective physical confinement, rather than a mere loss of freedom without defined limits. Correct cause of action here is "interference with right of way."

Vulcan Metals v. Simmons Manufacturing (1918) p.1060

Facts: D communicated to P that its product (1) works very well (puffing), and (2) was never sold before (misrepresentation contradicted by contract). Held: (1) Puffing is not material misrepresentation, and reliance on puffing is not justifiable. (2) Because verbal misrepresentation did exist, jury should decide whether the contract language was a valid retraction of misrepresentation. + in holding misrepresentation, courts consider: the parties' relative sophistication; how verifiable the info is; whether the other party had a full opportunity to fact-check (examine). + Courts decide what is puffery by looking at totality of the circumstances

Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co. (1910) (p44)

Facts: D had to moore ship to P's dock to save D's ship and damaged the dock. Holding: While necessity defense exists for D, D must still compensate P for property damages incurred by D's voluntary conduct. Since the emergency as not created by P, D must pay for any damage done.

Katko v. Briney (Iowa 1971) (p39)

Facts: D placed "shotgun-trap" in his bedroom to protect against thieves; D's trap permanently injured Pl who was a thief and an intruder. Judgment for Pl. Rule: (Jury instruction affirmed) Right to use reasonable force in the protection of property is subject to the qualification that one may not use such means of force as will take human life or inflict great bodily injury, even though the injured party is a trespasser violating the law.

Bird v. Holbrook (C.P. 1825) (p36)

Facts: D set up spring guns to injure people who enter D's garden, P travels on D's land to retrieve peacock and gets shot in the leg. Holding: D is liable because spring guns cannot differentiate innocent trespassers from thieves. Rule: Defense of property

M'Ilvoy v. Cockran (1820) (p41)

Facts: D severely wounded P who was attempting to tear down a fence on D's land. Holding: D is not required to request a forcible trespasser to leave before retaliating by reasonably proportionate force, but D's force was too large and cannot be justified. Note: Simple trespass requires D to first request Pl to leave.

Alcorn v. Mitchell (1872) p.56

Facts: D spat on P (poor man) in court to humiliate P. Holding: Offensive battery because D acted with the malignant intent to derogate P. Affirmed compensatory damage of $1000 for humiliation in addition to nominal damages for regular battery. Note: intent is not required for battery but helps increase damages.

Longchamps (Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1784 p.58)

Facts: D struck the cane of a French ambassador, which was a very offensive act. Holding: Offensive battery results when a reasonable sense of personal dignity is harmed through contact with anything closely attached to the P's person, even without bodily contact.

Allen v. Hannaford (1926) (p54)

Facts: D threatened Pl (a hired furniture mover) with an unloaded gun. Holding: D's action constitutes assault because P was in state of justifiable fear; regardless of whether the gun was loaded. Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (threatening with unloaded gun) that (3) causes (4) harm (mental anguish)

Tuberville v. Savage

Facts: D verbally warns P while grabbing sword, saying that if the judge is not in town, D would not take insult kindly. Holding: No assault b/c no clear showing of immediate conduct

Brower v. Ackerley (1997) (p56)

Facts: D, billboard business owner, called Pl who had reported D's violations, threatening to kick his ass and giving an impression of stalking Holding: No assault when no objectively immediate threat is found.

Wilkinson v. Downton

Facts: Df falsely told Pl her husband was injured, causing her to go into shock Holding: Df was liable because shock was foreseeable consequence of his statement Rule: Infer extreme and outrageous conduct from deceit, which showed intent to harm. Only foreseeable consequences of deceit give rise to liability.

Neurosurgery v. Goldman (2003)

Facts: Goldman (D) was a patient, who reported that P's doctor committed sexual harassment to D. P sued for defamation; D counterclaimed fraudulent misrepresentation that P lied to have fired the pervert Dr. Held: No cause of action for misrepresentation. (1) Tort of misrepresentation narrowly applies to business or financial transaction; (2) Goldman fails to sufficiently allege pecuniary damages.

Evenson v. Spaulding (1907) p.1119

Facts: P & D are competitors in buggy/wagon business; D dogged and disrupted P, and also made false representations of P. Held: IIPEA because policy of molestation exceeds the permissible limits of competition.

Keeble v. Hickeringill (1706) p.1119

Facts: P placed decoy ducks in his pond to catch fowl but D interfered by firing loud gunshots and made the birds fly away. Held: D is liable because D was a direct competitor of P's hunting business and D interfered with P's first-mover advantages through improper means. The theory of trade interference applies. Neither party has a property right in the ducks. Underlying rights at issue are economic rights. D maliciously performed an act causing lost economic advantage to P

Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union

Facts: Patterson sues on federal employment discrimination, IIED after laid off from credit union. Presents evidence of racist comment by supervisor, being assigned housekeeping tasks not given to white employees. Holding: Credit union not liable Rule: Threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct is higher than implicitly racist behavior in employment setting Notes: Courts said racist conduct here was not extreme or outrageous enough, BUT social mores can change

Ploof v. Putnam (1908) (p41)

Facts: Ploof moored boat to Putnam's dock to avoid a tempest, Putnam unmoored it, injuring Ploof's family and destroying boat. Is Ploof's entry upon land justified? Holding: Ploof's mooring is justified by necessity.

Stevens v. Tillman

Facts: Stevens was school principal and Tillman was head of PTO who led campaign accusing Stevens of racism. Holding: "Racist" is a watered-down term, not harmful to Df's reputation as a matter of law due to diluted, inconsistent secondary meanings. Rule: Defamatory statement must be (1) not true and (2) not opinion (protect Df's right to express opinion) --> exclusion for "mere name-calling"

Della Penna v. Toyota (Cal. 1995)

Facts: Wholesaler Della Penna (P) resold Lexus to Japan against Toyota's contract; Toyota then blacklisted P. P sued D for distributor interference (IIPEA). Held: D not liable b/c P failed to prove D's "wrongful act" - P has burden of pleading and proving D's interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself - w/o independent wrong requirement, too many lawsuits in regular business practice; malice alone does not make a right a wrong - "Wrong" left open; could be independently tortious act, anti-competitive behavior proscribed by positive law, motivated solely by malice

Coblyn v. Kennedy's (1971) p.58

Facts: department store guard mistook old man for a thief and kept him in the store against his wishes. Holding: D is liable for false imprisonment under objective reasonable man standard. To defend, D should establish a defense of property exception with a reasonable cause, manner, and length of time.

(optional) Morris v. Platt (Conn. 1964)

Holding: Self-defense also protects D from accidentally harming an innocent bystander by force reasonably intended to repel an attack by a third party. Cf. Roman law of Lex Aquilia (wrongful damage): One is allowed to strike only the person who uses force, not a passer-by. [Contrasts with Courvoisier and Morris.]

I de S. and wife v. W de S. (1348) (p52)

Ancient case recognizing the tort of assault Facts: D swung a hatchet at Pl (tavern owner) but did not touch her. Holding: Harm can exist without physical touching; D's assault is an actionable tort

Interlude Class: Why Torts?

Anglo American tort law came out of Germanic pre-legal and legal practice, Roman law, biblical law, and English tradition of 16-18th century Blackwell - Private versus public wrongs - Private wrongs affect the individual, public wrongs affect the community - Public wrongs = crimes = retributive justice - Private wrongs = torts = contracts Logic of Torts - Torts condemns wrongs and specifies the rights that go along with those wrongs - Why not make the law primarily about rights? - Rights are very complex - If rights have to be calibrated in different contexts, it would be difficult for a judge to determine how the high level right would apply in every circumstance - It's easier for the court to wait and see and when there is a wrong, and adjust the right to that wrong - More law is organized around rights, the less focus on victims and justice

False Imprisonment - rights protected

Bodily autonomy

Conversion

Conversion: D interferes w/P's ownership of a chattel without authorization - Conversion is a tort that is focused on secure title, while trespass to chattels is a tort focused on control and usage - Examples: theft, selling something that's not yours, you refuse to return something - Rights-based tort No harm requirement

Posner and Finnis

Posner, Economic Analysis of Law: cost-benefit analysis, govt (including courts) should set incentives beneficial for the most economically productive society. consequentialist. Finnis, Allocating Risks and Suffering: Some Hidden Traps: personal rights-based view more typical to torts. deontologist.

Misrepresentation - elements (Restatement 3rd, p.1052)

RTT Liability for Economic Harm Section 9. Fraud: D (1) fraudulently (2) makes a material misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, (3) for the purpose of inducing P to act; and (4) P justifiably relies on D's misrepresentation, which (5) causes P's economic loss. Section 10. Scienter: A misrepresentation is fraudulent if (a) D is aware of his falsity, (b) D does not have the confidence in the stated or implied accuracy, or (c) D has no basis for his claims. Note: Fraudulently = knowing statement is false, knowing they lack confidence in the veracity of the info, or knowing he lacks the basis for being confident in the info

Offensive battery - rights protected

Reasonable sense of personal dignity

Hudson v. Craft

Summary: Boy boxes in an illegal prize fight. He is injured and sues the fight promoter Holding: D is liable. Tort: Battery D intentionally touches P's person without consent Promoter is liable as an aider and abetter Promoter is liable and the consent of the combatants does not relieve him of that liability Consent of the fighters was void as against public policy Statute in question embodies a public policy to protect right holders whether or not they consent Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (aiding and abetting battery)

Garcia v. Sumrall

Summary: Casebook excerpt regarding whether animals should be fenced in or fenced out. Common law made it duty of the owners of animals to keep them properly enclosed and if they failed to do so the animals trespassed. This rule was changed in America, through statutes and a change in custom, so now owners of premises are required to fence their lands to keep animals out. Still - Custom/implied license does not excuse deliberate or intentional action Tort: Trespass Custom changes

Garratt v. Dailey

Summary: Child pulls chair out from under an old woman. She falls and hurts herself. Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Battery - D intentionally touches P's person without consent - Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (touching P's person, in this case pushing the chair precipitated touching) - Battery is a rights-based tort, and rights-based torts do not need to cause harm. Harm and causation are only relevant in determining damages for these torts - There was intent because D had substantial certainty that P would attempt to sit down where the chair had been

Brown v. Dellinger

Summary: Children trespass, start a fire, and the fire burns down the house Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Trespass to land D enters P's close without authority Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (it is P's close) commits an (2) act (entering P's close without authorization) Harm is not required in a trespass, as it is a rights-based tort Intent is close to strict liability here - we are very far from the core "intent to harm" version of intent. A child doesn't understand that this is not their land/they are trespassing, but they are still at fault Ds are liable for all damages directly caused (Vosburg)

Poggi v. Scott

Summary: Scott rents a basement room from Poggi. Scott sells the wine barrels (that belonged to Poggi) in the basement, without knowing there was wine in the barrels or that the barrels belonged to Poggi. Poggi sues Scott for conversion Holding: Conversion, defendant is liable. Tort: Conversion D interferes w/P's ownership of a chattel without authorization Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (selling the barrels) Intent is selling the barrels without knowing if they belong to him The burden of investigating the ownership of the goods is on the potential converter No harm element to conversion

Assault - rights protected

personal autonomy to be free of bodily fear of imminent and grave danger Assault involves inchoate violence (potential violence). To stop the tort from being overbroad, intent must be tightened. Intent must be specific to make P experience immediate apprehension of offensive or harmful contact.

Necessity defense - rights protected

right to protect one's (or someone else's) life/property against some serious hazard.

Self-defense - rights protected

right to protect one's bodily autonomy in a reasonable way Right to life creates the defense of self-defense

Defamation - Second Restatement Sec. 558, 568

Written defamation = libel Nonwritten defamation (incl spoken and transitory gestures) = slander

Offensive battery - elements

Rest. 2nd Section 18 (a) D acts, intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact (or an imminent apprehension of such a contact) with P or a 3rd person, AND (b) that offensive contact directly or indirectly results.

Vosburg v. Putney

Summary: A school boy kicked his classmate's leg while class was in session. Since there was a previous injury, the boy's leg grew inflamed from the kick, and he became lame. Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Battery - D intentionally touches P's person without consent - Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (touching P's person, kicking) - Battery is a rights-based tort, and rights-based torts do not need to cause harm. Harm and causation are only relevant in determining damages for these torts - Presume intent as the reasonable consequence from the action. D intends to initiate contact w/P beyond P's expressed consent and beyond any license implied by the social context - Rights implicated: freedom of bodily autonomy versus freedom of association - D intentionally touches Plaintiff with intent to touch plaintiff in a manner not consented to and not impliedly licensed by the relevant social context - Intentional torts - wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether or not they were foreseeable

McGuire v. Almy

Summary: Almy is insane and hurts her hired caretaker, a registered nurse, in a violent attack. Holding: D is liable, despite insanity defense Tort: Battery D intentionally touches P's person without consent Insanity is generally not a defense in tort law - This incentives family/caretakers of the insane people to be careful Courts don't want to determine mental capacity - Battle of the experts problem, not worth the extra expense When there are two innocents, the person who did the wrong should pay Insane person needs the intent to do the action with some idea that the action will lead to the nonconsensual touching of another - Need to conceive of touching a person without your permission - Doesn't matter if you conceive this under a delusion - If you're touching someone with a delusional justification, you've committed the tort - If you touch someone but have no idea you're doing so, you have not committed the tort Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally, with some conception that she would touch the nurse without consent) commits an (2) act (hitting nurse)

McKee v. Gratz

Summary: D removed mussel shells from P's property and made them into buttons Holding: D is liable for conversion, but D only charged with the value of the mussels at the time of conversion Tort: Conversion D interferes w/P's ownership of a chattel without authorization Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (taking mussel shells without authorization) No harm element to conversion Mussels were part of P's property, because they have a fixed habitat and no ability to move However there is a custom for people to wander and collect mussels - a license may be implied from the habits of the country If someone takes property deliberately, the property owner can demand disgorgement. But if the person is a good-faith actor who accidently converts the property, then property owner can just ask for the property value

Dougherty v. Stepp

Summary: D surveyed P's land without marking any trees, cutting any bushes, or leaving any other mark Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Trespass to land D enters P's close without authority Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (it is P's close) commits an (2) act (entering P's close without authorization) Harm is not required in a trespass, as it is a rights-based tort

Mohr v. Williams

Summary: Doctor preformed surgery on the wrong ear. It was a necessary surgery and the patient had already consented to the surgery on the other ear. Surgery led to complications, patient sued. Holding: Judgment for P. Since D is potentially liable, the trial court decision is maintained Tort: Battery D intentionally touches P's person without consent Consent is questionable here and is a matter for the jury to decide Did P give consent to surgery? - Consent is given through: (a) Act by P manifesting consent (b) Intention to provide consent - Doctor's actions were arguably in the scope of P's consent, even though it was the wrong ear Rights-based argument - bodily integrity and personal consent is essential - Scope of consent is defined narrowly - No malice by the doctor needed, just must show intentional action (operating without consent) - Damages will depend on character, extent of injury and good faith of the doctor Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (operating on ear without consent)

Blondell v. Consolidated Gas

Summary: Gas company customers put "governors" on the company's gas meters. Gas company sued for trespass to chattels, arguing that governors increased risk of gas explosion Holding: Ds are liable Tort: Trespass to Chattels (Note: this is debatable! Court treated this more like trespass to property) D interferes w/P's chattel without authorization and causes harm Since gas meters are not movable, they are more like property than like chattels. Thus, the harm element is not necessary Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (placing governors on gas company's meters) (3) causing (4) harm to the Plaintiff Harm element is relaxed in Blondell because the meters are not movable consistent to their intended use - more like a property case

Intel v. Hamidi

Summary: Hamidi sent emails criticizing Intel through Intel's electronic mail system Holding: D is not liable. Trespass to chattels does not encompass electronic communications that do not damage the recipients computer systems Tort: Trespass to chattels D interferes w/P's chattel without authorization and causes harm Court had to determine whether this was more like trespass to chattels (harm-based, harm element) or if it was more like trespass to property (rights-based, no harm element) - Property argument: Email address aren't movable, can't change domain name, can't change addresses, thus in a virtual sense server is immovable for its intended use - But If you had trespass to property for internet servers, then you could have people sue just for unsolicited emails - Court ruled it was more like trespass to chattels (harm-based, harm element), and thus, because there was no harm Hamidi was not liable Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably commits an (2) act (sending emails through server) (3) causing (4) harm to the Plaintiff (court found no harm in this case)

Kremen v. Cohen

Summary: Kremen registered domain name sex.com with Network Solutions. Network Solutions then gave the domain name to Cohen, after Cohen fraudulently claimed the name. Kremen sued both Cohen and Network Solutions for conversion Holding: Ds are liable for conversion Tort: Conversion D interferes w/P's ownership of a chattel without authorization Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (giving away domain) Even though Network Solutions only gave away the domain negligently under fraud, they still committed the conversion by giving away the domain Conversion applies for intangible objects

Marsh v. Colby

Summary: Man fishes in a private pond Holding: Not trespass because it is custom that people can fish in lakes/ponds that are not enclosed and do not have signs saying not to Tort: Trespass

Talmage v. Smith

Summary: Man threw a stick at two trespassers. Stick hit a third trespasser he did not see Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Battery D intentionally touches P's person without consent Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (touching P's person, in this case hitting with stick) It doesn't matter that D didn't intend to hit P, because he intended to hit someone Battery is a rights-based tort, and rights-based torts do not need to cause harm. Harm and causation are only relevant in determining damages for these torts

Maye v. Yappan

Summary: P gave D permission to dig for gold, under the mistaken belief that the land involved was D's. The land really belonged to P. Holding: Conversion, D is liable even though they acted in good faith. Tort: Conversion D interferes w/P's ownership of a chattel without authorization Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally, deliberately dug for gold) commits an (2) act (digging on P's land) No harm element to conversion Intent: It does not matter whether the Ds acted willfully or maliciously, D just has to intend to do the action

White v. University of Idaho

Summary: Piano teacher drummed his fingers on his student's back. This caused severe injury to the student. Holding: Tort committed, defendant is liable Tort: Battery D intentionally touches P's person without consent Generic Tort: Defendant (1) culpably (intentionally) commits an (2) act (touching P's person without consent) Issues w/Restatements: - Although Second Restatement requires harmful/offensive contact, the court said they didn't accept Second Restatement in this case - Third Restatement specifies that actor need not intend to cause harm or offense to the other - Battery is a rights-based tort, and rights-based torts do not need to cause harm. Harm and causation are only relevant in determining damages for these torts