rusko out of the box

po smrti stalina

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev rose to the top post by overcoming political adversaries, including Lavrentiy Beria and Georgy Malenkov, in a power struggle.[6] In 1955, Khrushchev achieved the demotion of Malenkov and secured his own position as Soviet leader.[7] Early in his rule and with the support of several members of the Presidium, Khrushchev initiated the Thaw, which effectively ended the Stalinist mass terror of the prior decades and reduced socio-economic oppression considerably.[8] At the 20th Congress held in 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes, being careful to omit any reference to complicity by any sitting Presidium members.[9] His economic policies, while bringing about improvements, were not enough to fix the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy. The standard of living for ordinary citizens did increase; 108 million people moved into new housing between 1956 and 1965.[10] Khrushchev's foreign policies led to the Sino-Soviet split, in part a consequence of his public denunciation of Stalin.[11] Khrushchev improved relations with Josip Broz Tito's League of Communists of Yugoslavia but failed to establish the close, party-to-party relations that he wanted.[10] While the Thaw reduced political oppression at home, it led to unintended consequences abroad, such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and unrest in Poland, where the local citizenry now felt confident enough to rebel against Soviet control.[12] Khrushchev also failed to improve Soviet relations with the West, partially because of a hawkish military stance.[12] In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev's position within the party was substantially weakened.[13] Shortly before his eventual ousting he tried to introduce economic reforms championed by Evsei Liberman, a Soviet economist, which tried to implement market mechanisms into the planned economy.[14] Khrushchev was ousted on 14 October 1964 in a Central Committee plenum that officially cited his inability to listen to others, his failure in consulting with the members of the Presidium, his establishment of a cult of personality, his economic mismanagement, and his anti-party reforms as the reasons he was no longer fit to remain as head of the party.[15] He was succeeded in office by Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[16] The Brezhnev era is commonly referred to by historians as the Era of Stagnation, a term coined by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev[17] The Brezhnev era began with a rejection of Khrushchevism in virtually every arena except one: continued opposition to Stalinist methods of terror and political violence.[18] Khrushchev's policies were criticized as voluntarism, and the Brezhnev period saw the rise of neo-Stalinism.[19] While Stalin was never rehabilitated during this period, the most conservative journals in the country were allowed to highlight positive features of his rule.[20] At the 23rd Congress held in 1966, the names of the office of First Secretary and the body of the Presidium reverted to their original names: General Secretary and Politburo, respectively.[21] At the start of his premiership, Kosygin experimented with economic reforms similar to those championed by Malenkov, including prioritizing light industry over heavy industry to increase the production of consumer goods.[22] Similar reforms were introduced in Hungary under the name New Economic Mechanism; however, with the rise to power of Alexander Dubček in Czechoslovakia, who called for the establishment of "socialism with a human face", all non-conformist reform attempts in the Soviet Union were stopped.[23] During his rule, Brezhnev supported détente, a passive weakening of animosity with the West with the goal of improving political and economic relations.[24] However, by the 25th Congress held in 1976, political, economic and social problems within the Soviet Union began to mount and the Brezhnev administration found itself in an increasingly difficult position.[25] The previous year, Brezhnev's health began to deteriorate. He became addicted to painkillers and needed to take increasingly more potent medications to attend official meetings.[26] Because of the "trust in cadres" policy implemented by his administration, the CPSU leadership evolved into a gerontocracy.[27] At the end of Brezhnev's rule, problems continued to amount; in 1979 he consented to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to save the embattled communist regime there and supported the oppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland. As problems grew at home and abroad, Brezhnev was increasingly ineffective in responding to the growing criticism of the Soviet Union by Western leaders, most prominently by US Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.[28] The CPSU, which had wishfully interpreted the financial crisis of the 1970s as the beginning of the end of capitalism, found its country falling far behind the West in its economic development.[29] Brezhnev died on 10 November 1982, and was succeeded by Yuri Andropov on 12 November.[30] Andropov, a staunch anti-Stalinist, chaired the KGB during most of Brezhnev's reign.[31] He had appointed several reformers to leading positions in the KGB, many of whom later became leading officials under Gorbachev.[31] Andropov supported increased openness in the press, particularly regarding the challenges facing the Soviet Union.[32] Andropov was in office briefly, but he appointed a number of reformers, including Yegor Ligachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Mikhail Gorbachev, to important positions. He also supported a crackdown on absenteeism and corruption.[32] Andropov had intended to let Gorbachev succeed him in office, but Konstantin Chernenko and his supporters suppressed the paragraph in the letter which called for Gorbachev's elevation.[32] Andropov died on 9 February 1984 and was succeeded by Chernenko.[33] Throughout his short leadership, Chernenko was unable to consolidate power and effective control of the party organization remained in Gorbachev's control.[33] Chernenko died on 10 March 1985 and was succeeded in office by Gorbachev on 11 March 1985.[33]

24. sjezd KSSS

nedůležitý 1971

masmedia včsr

- kontrolováno (KSČ) - soukromé vlastnictví jakékoliv publikační techniky nebo společnosti masových medií bylo obecně zakázáno - ikdyž kostely mohli vydávaz malé periodické tiskoviny a noviny - i přes informační monopol v rukou KSČ byly všechny publikace pod dozorem vládního Office for Press and Information - cenzura trušena jen na 3 měsice praždkého jara 1968 a znovu zavedena under the terms of the 1966 Press Law - The law states that the Czechoslovak press is to provide complete information, but it must also advance the interests of socialist society and promote the people's socialist awareness of the policy of the communist party as the leading force in society and state. Government concern about control of the mass media was such that it was illegal to own a duplicating machine or to reproduce more than eleven copies of any printed material. Nevertheless, a fairly wide distribution of underground publications (popularly known as samizdat throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) that were established during the Nazi occupation continued throughout communist rule into the 1980s. Newspapers The chief newspaper of the KSČ was the Prague daily, Rudé Právo, which, with a circulation of 900,000 in the 1980s, was the most widely read and most influential newspaper in the country. Its editor in 1987 was Zdeněk Hoření, a member of the Secretariat of the KSČ Central Committee. Its sister publication, Bratislava's Pravda, was the organ of the KSS. Other dailies with large circulations were e. g. Lidová Demokracie, published by the Czechoslovak People's Party (see National Front); Mladá Fronta in Bohemia/ Smena in Slovakia published by the Socialist Union of Youth (see National Front); Práce in Bohemia / Práca in Slovakia published by the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement; Svobodné Slovo, published by the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, and Ľud, published by the Slovak Revival Party. The Czechoslovak Press Agency (in Czech: Československá tisková kancelář, in Slovak: Československá tlačová kancelária ČTK / ČTK) received a state subsidy and was controlled by the federal government through its Presidium. TV and radio The government also controlled several domestic television and radio networks. Czechoslovak Television started broadcasting in 1953 from Prague, in 1955 from Ostrava and in 1956 from Bratislava. Daily broadcasting started in 1959, broadcasting in colour in 1970 from Bratislava. A second TV channel was added in 1970. Since then, the first TV channel was conceived as a federal one (i.e. mostly in Czech, but also in Slovak), the second TV channel was different for the Czech Socialist Republic (in Czech) and for the Slovak Socialist Republic (in Slovak). A third TV channel was added only in the mid-late 1980s. It broadcast the First Programme of Soviet Union Central Television. In addition, many citizens in Czechoslovakia were able to pick up foreign radio and television stations[citation needed] (terrestrially and in late 1980s over satellite). TV stations, for example, could often be picked up (depending on which part of the country one lived in) both from the communist Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, and from the noncommunist countries Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)[dubious - discuss]. The relatively attractive TV programmes from Austria and West Germany had a sizable influence on the population[citation needed]. TV was not jammed by the authorities. The radio station Voice of America and the BBC World Service also had some audiences in Czechoslovakia, and their broadcasts were subject to only occasional jamming. Radio Free Europe broadcasts, however, were extensively jammed.

Anatoly Tarasov

Anatoly Vladimirovich Tarasov (Russian: Анато́лий Влади́мирович Тара́сов; 10 December 1918 in Moscow, RSFSR - 23 June 1995 in Moscow, Russia) was a Russian ice hockey player and coach. Tarasov is considered "the father of Russian ice hockey" and established the Soviet Union national team as "the dominant force in international competition".[1] He was one of the first Russians to be inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame, having been inducted in 1974 in the builders category. Tarasov also played and managed in the sport of football, but is best known for his work in developing the USSR's ice hockey program. Anatolij Vladimirovič Tarasov rusky: Анатолий Владимирович Тарасов (10. prosince 1918 Moskva - 23. června 1995 Moskva) byl legendární sovětský hokejový trenér, označovaný za „otce ruského hokeje".[1] Aktivně hrál fotbal, i když větších úspěchů nedosáhl, neprosadil se výrazněji ani jako fotbalový trenér. Po druhé světové válce byl pověřen vybudováním hokejového klubu CSKA Moskva, přičemž do té doby byl v tamním prostředí bandy hokej s míčkem. Tento sport, hraný na větším kluzišti, zapůsobil na ruský hokejový styl s důrazem na bruslařské dovednosti, útočnost a přihrávky.[2] Tarasov byl nejprve hrajícím trenérem a třikrát (v letech 1948-1950) se jako hráč stal mistrem Sovětského svazu.[3] Tarasov byl trenérem v CSKA v letech 1946 až 1975 s výjimkou let 1960, 1964 a 1972. Od roku 1958 do roku 1972 stál v čele sovětské reprezentace. Zavedl množství tréninkových metod, zejména zaměřených na kvalitu přihrávek. Pod jeho vedením vyrostli v šedesátých letech hráči jako Anatolij Firsov, Venjamin Alexandrov, Alexandr Ragulin, Alexandr Jakušev nebo Konstantin Loktěv a v dalším období např. Boris Michajlov, Vladimir Petrov, Valerij Vasiljev, Alexandr Malcev, Valerij Charlamov nebo brankář Vladislav Treťjak. S CSKA Moskva získal 19 titulů v sovětské lize, devětkrát v řadě dovedl sovětskou reprezentaci k titulu mistra světa a vyhrál jako trenér i tři zlaté olympijské medaile. Jeho dcerou je významná krasobruslařská trenérka Taťjana Tarasovová. V Kontinentální hokejové lize je na jeho památku jedna z divizí pojmenována Tarasovova divize

Stalin a antisemitismus

1917 to 1930 Although the Bolsheviks regarded all religious activity as counter-scientific superstition and a remnant of the old pre-communist order, the new political order established by Lenin's Soviet after the Russian Revolution ran counter to the centuries of antisemitism under the Romanovs. The Council of People's Commissars adopted a 1918 decree condemning all antisemitism and calling on the workers and peasants to combat it.[3] Lenin continued to speak out against antisemitism.[4] Information campaigns against antisemitism were conducted in the Red Army and in the workplaces, and a provision forbidding the incitement of propaganda against any ethnicity became part of Soviet law.[3] State-sponsored institutions of secular Yiddish culture, such as the Moscow State Jewish Theater, were established in Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union during this time, as were institutions for other minorities. As People's Commissar for Nationalities, Stalin was the cabinet member responsible for minority affairs. In 1922, Stalin was elected the first-ever General Secretary of the party—a post not yet regarded as the highest in the Soviet government. Lenin began to criticize Stalin shortly thereafter. In his December 1922 letters, the ailing Lenin (whose health left him incapacitated in 1923-1924) criticized Stalin and Dzerzhinsky for their chauvinistic attitude toward the Georgian nation during the Georgian Affair.[5] Eventually made public as part of Lenin's Testament—which recommended that the party remove Stalin from his post as General Secretary—the 1922 letters and the recommendation were both withheld from public circulation by Stalin and his supporters in the party: these materials were not published in the Soviet Union until de-Stalinization in 1956.[6] After the incapacitated Lenin's death on 21 January 1924, the party officially maintained the principle of collective leadership, but Stalin soon outmaneuvered his rivals in the Central Committee's Politburo. At first collaborating with Jewish and half-Jewish Politburo members Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev against Jewish arch-rival Leon Trotsky, Stalin succeeded in marginalizing Trotsky. By 1929, Stalin had also effectively marginalized Zinoviev and Kamenev as well, compelling both to submit to his authority. The intransigent Trotsky was forced into exile. When Boris Bazhanov, Stalin's personal secretary who had defected to France in 1928, produced a memoir critical of Stalin in 1930, he alleged that Stalin made crude antisemitic outbursts even before Lenin's death.[7] 1930s Stalin's 1931 condemnation of antisemitism On 12 January 1931, Stalin gave the following answer to an inquiry on the subject of the Soviet attitude toward antisemitism from the Jewish News Agency in the United States: National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism. Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism. In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.[8] Establishment of Jewish Autonomous Oblast Main article: Jewish Autonomous Oblast To offset the growing Jewish national and religious aspirations of Zionism and to successfully categorize Soviet Jews under Stalin's nationality policy an alternative to the Land of Israel was established with the help of Komzet and OZET in 1928. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast with the center in Birobidzhan in the Russian Far East was to become a "Soviet Zion". Yiddish, rather than "reactionary" Hebrew, would be the national language, and proletarian socialist literature and arts would replace Judaism as the quintessence of culture. Despite a massive domestic and international state propaganda campaign, the Jewish population there never reached 30% (as of 2003 it was only about 1.2%). The experiment ground to a halt in the mid-1930s, during Stalin's first campaign of purges, as local leaders were not spared during the purges. Great Purge Main article: Great Purge Stalin's harshest period of mass repression, the so-called Great Purge (or Great Terror), was launched in 1936-1937 and involved the execution of over a half-million Soviet citizens accused of treason, terrorism, and other anti-Soviet crimes. The campaign of purges prominently targeted Stalin's former opponents and other Old Bolsheviks, and included a large-scale purge of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, repression of the kulak peasants, Red Army leaders, and ordinary citizens accused of conspiring against Stalin's administration.[9] Although many of Great Purge victims were ethnic or religious Jews, they were not specifically targeted as an ethnic group during this campaign according to Mikhail Baitalsky,[10] Gennady Kostyrchenko,[11] David Priestland,[12] Jeffrey Veidlinger,[13] Roy Medvedev[14] and Edvard Radzinsky.[15] German-Soviet rapprochement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Main article: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact During his meeting with Nazi Germany's foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Stalin promised him to get rid of the "Jewish domination", especially among the intelligentsia.[16] After dismissing Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Minister in 1939,[17] Stalin immediately directed incoming Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to "purge the ministry of Jews", to appease Hitler and to signal Nazi Germany that the USSR was ready for non-aggression talks.[17][18][19][20] According to some historians,[who?] antisemitic trends in the Kremlin's policies were fueled by the struggle against Leon Trotsky.[21][22] In the late 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s far fewer Jews were appointed to positions of power in the state apparatus than previously, with a sharp drop in Jewish representation in senior positions evident from around the time of the beginning of the late 1930s rapprochement with Nazi Germany. The percentage of Jews in positions of power dropped to 6% in 1938, and to 5% in 1940.[18] Relocation and deportation of Jews during the war Following the Soviet invasion of Poland, Stalin began a policy of relocating Jews to the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and other parts of Siberia. Throughout the war, similar movements were executed in regions considered vulnerable to Nazi invasion with the various target ethnic groups of the Nazi genocide. When these populations reached their destinations, work was oftentimes arduous and they were subjected to poor conditions due to lack of resources caused by the war effort.[23][24] After World War II Further information: Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and Night of the Murdered Poets The experience of the Holocaust, which wiped out some six million Jews in Europe under Nazi occupation, and left millions more homeless and displaced, contributed to growing concern about the situation of the Jewish people worldwide. However, the trauma breathed new life into the traditional idea of a common Jewish peoplehood and became a catalyst for the revival of the Zionist idea of creating a Jewish state in the Middle East. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast experienced a revival as the Soviet government sponsored the migration of as many as ten thousand Eastern European Jews to Birobidzhan in 1946-1948.[25] In early 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR announced a plan to build new infrastructure, and Mikhail Kalinin, a champion of the Birobidzhan project since the late 1920s, stated that he still considered the region as a "Jewish national state" that could be revived through "creative toil."[25] From late 1944, Joseph Stalin adopted a pro-Zionist foreign policy, apparently believing that the new country would be socialist and would speed the decline of British influence in the Middle East.[26] Accordingly, in November 1947, the Soviet Union, together with the other Soviet bloc countries voted in favor of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine,[27] which paved the way for the creation of the State of Israel. On May 17, 1948, three days after Israel declared its independence, the Soviet Union officially granted de jure recognition of Israel,[28] becoming only the second country to recognise the Jewish state (preceded only by the United States' de facto recognition) and the first country to grant Israel de jure recognition. Also in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War supported Israel with weaponry supplied via Czechoslovakia.[29] Nonetheless, Stalin began a new purge with repressing his wartime allies, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. In January 1948, Solomon Mikhoels was assassinated on Stalin's personal orders in Minsk. His murder was disguised as a hit-and-run car accident. Mikhoels was taken to MGB dacha and killed, along with his non-Jewish colleague Golubov-Potapov, under supervision of Stalin's Deputy Minister of State Security Sergei Ogoltsov. Their bodies were then dumped on a road-side in Minsk.[30][31] Despite Stalin's willingness to support Israel early on, various historians suppose that antisemitism in the late 1940s and early 1950s was motivated by Stalin's possible perception of Jews as a potential "fifth column" in light of a pro-Western Israel in the Middle East. Orlando Figes suggests that After the foundation of Israel in May 1948, and its alignment with the USA in the Cold War, the 2 million Soviet Jews, who had always remained loyal to the Soviet system, were portrayed by the Stalinist regime as a potential fifth column. Despite his personal dislike of Jews, Stalin had been an early supporter of a Jewish state in Palestine, which he had hoped to turn into a Soviet satellite in the Middle East. But as the leadership of the emerging state proved hostile to approaches from the Soviet Union, Stalin became increasingly afraid of pro-Israeli feeling among Soviet Jews. His fears intensified as a result of Golda Meir's arrival in Moscow in the autumn of 1948 as the first Israeli ambassador to the USSR. On her visit to a Moscow synagogue on Yom Kippur (13 October), thousands of people lined the streets, many of them shouting Am Yisroel chai ('The people of Israel live!')—a traditional affirmation of national renewal to Jews throughout the world but to Stalin a dangerous sign of 'bourgeois Jewish nationalism' that subverted the authority of the Soviet state.[32] Historians Albert S. Lindemann and Richard S. Levy observe that "When, in October 1948, during the high holy days, thousands of Jews rallied around Moscow's central synagogue to honor Golda Myerson, the first Israeli ambassador, the authorities became especially alarmed at the signs of Jewish disaffection.[33]" Jeffrey Veidlinger writes that "By October 1948, it was obvious that Mikhoels was by no means the sole advocate of Zionism among Soviet Jews. The revival of Jewish cultural expression during the war had fostered a general sense of boldness among the Jewish masses. Many Jews remained oblivious to the growing Zhdanovshchina and the threat to Soviet Jews that the brewing campaign against 'rootless cosmopolitans' signaled. Indeed, official attitudes toward Jewish culture were ambivalent during this period. On the surface, Jewish culture seemed to be supported by the state: public efforts had been made to sustain the Yiddish theater after Mikhoels's death, Eynikayt was still publishing on schedule, and, most important, the Soviet Union recognized the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. To most Moscow Jews, the state of Soviet Jewry had never been better.[34] In November 1948, Soviet authorities launched a campaign to liquidate what was left of Jewish culture. The leading members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were arrested. They were charged with treason, bourgeois nationalism and planning to set up a Jewish republic in Crimea to serve American interests. The Museum of Environmental Knowledge of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (established in November 1944) and The Jewish Museum in Vilnius (established at the end of the war) were closed down in 1948.[35] The Historical-Ethnographic Museum of Georgian Jewry, established in 1933, was shut down at the end of 1951.[35] In Birobidzhan, the various Jewish cultural institutions that had been established under Stalin's earlier policy of support for "proletarian Jewish culture" in the 1930s were closed down between late 1948 and early 1949. These included the Kaganovich Yiddish Theater, the Yiddish publishing house, the Yiddish newspaper Birobidzhan, the library of Yiddish and Hebrew books, and the local Jewish schools.[36] The same happened to Yiddish theaters all over the Soviet Union, beginning with the Odessa Yiddish Theater and including the Moscow State Jewish Theater. In early February 1949, the Stalin Prize-winning microbiologist Nikolay Gamaleya, a pioneer of bacteriology and member of the Academy of Sciences, wrote a personal letter to Stalin, protesting the growing antisemitism: "Judging by absolutely indisputable and obvious indications, the reappearance of antisemitism is not coming from below, not from the masses. . . but is directed from above, by someone's invisible hand. Antisemitism is coming from some high-placed persons who have taken up posts in the leading party organs. . .[37] The ninety-year-old scientist wrote Stalin a second letter in mid-February, again mentioning the growing antisemitism. In March, Gamaleya died, still having received no answer.[38] During the night of 12-13 August 1952, remembered as the "Night of the Murdered Poets" (Ночь казнённых поэтов), thirteen of the most prominent Yiddish writers of the Soviet Union were executed on the orders of Stalin. Among the victims were Peretz Markish, David Bergelson and Itzik Fefer. In a 1 December 1952 Politburo session, Stalin announced: "Every Jewish nationalist is the agent of the American intelligence service. Jewish nationalists think that their nation was saved by the USA. . . They think they are indebted to the Americans. Among doctors, there are many Jewish nationalists."[39] A notable campaign to quietly remove Jews from positions of authority within the state security services was carried out in 1952-1953. The Russian historians Zhores and Roy Medvedev wrote that according to MVD General Sudoplatov, "simultaneously all Jews were removed from the leadership of the security services, even those in very senior positions. In February the anti-Jewish expulsions were extended to regional branches of the MGB. A secret directive was distributed to all regional directorates of the MGB on 22 February, ordering that all Jewish employees of the MGB be dismissed immediately, regardless of rank, age or service record. . . .[40]". The outside world was not ignorant of these developments, and even the leading members of the Communist Party USA complained about the situation. In the memoir Being Red, the American writer and prominent Communist Howard Fast recalls a meeting with Soviet writer and World Peace Congress delegate Alexander Fadeyev during this time. Fadeyev insisted that "There is no anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union", despite the evidence "that at least eight leading Jewish figures in the Red Army and in government had been arrested on what appeared to be trumped-up charges. Yiddish-language newspapers had been suppressed. Schools that taught Hebrew had been closed. . . ."[41] The Doctors' Plot Main article: Doctors' plot On 13 January 1953, the Soviet Union's TASS information agency announced the unmasking of a conspiracy of so-called "doctors-poisoners" who had covertly attempted to decapitate the Soviet leadership. The accused doctors were all senior physicians—most of them Jewish—who had allegedly confessed to planning and successfully carrying out heinous assassinations, including the covert murders of such high-profile Soviet citizens as writer Alexander Shcherbakov (died 1945) and politician Andrey Zhdanov (died 1948). The alleged conspirators were accused of acting on behalf of both the American and British intelligence services and an anti-Soviet international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization.[42] As Western press accused the Soviet Union of antisemitism, the Central Committee of Communist Party decided to organise a propagandistic trick, a collective letter by Jewish public figures, condemning with fervour "the murderers in white overalls" and the agents of imperialism and Zionism, and to assure there was no antisemitism in the USSR. The letter was signed by well-known scientists and culture figures, who had been forced to do so by the NKVD.[15] However, the letter, initially planned to be published in February 1953, remained unpublished. Instead of the letter, a vehement feuilleton "The Simple-minded and the Swindlers" was published in Pravda, featuring numerous characters with Jewish names, all of them swindlers, villains, saboteurs, whom the naïve Russian people trust, having lost vigilance. What followed was a new wave of antisemitic hysteria, and a plan by Stalin to send all of the Jews to Siberia,[43][44] similar to other ethnic groups. Only Stalin's death the same year relieved the fear.[15] Similar purges against Jews were organised in Eastern Bloc countries (see Prague Trials). During this time Soviet Jews were dubbed as persons of Jewish ethnicity. A dean of Marxism-Leninism department at one of Soviet Universities explained the policy to his students:[45] One of you asked if our current political campaign can be regarded as antisemitic. Comrade Stalin said: "We hate Nazi not because they are Germans, but because they brought enormous suffering to our land". Same can be said about the Jews. It has been claimed that: "At the time of [Stalin's] death, no Jew in Russia could feel safe."[46] However, throughout this time, the Soviet media avoided overt antisemitism and continued to report the punishment of officials for antisemitic behavior.[47]

11. sjezd

11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The 11th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held during 27 March - 2 April 1922 in Moscow. The congress was attended by 522 with a casting vote alongside 165 with consultative vote, and elected the 11th Central Committee. The main purpose of the congress was to review the results of the New Economic Policy that was decided in the 10th Congress. As a result, the congress concluded that the capitalist mixed economy in the Soviet Union would need to come to an end. This lead them to resolve that the trade unions were to be given more power in both the economy and politics. [1] During the 11th Congress, Leon Trotsky attacked Sergey Ivanovich Gusev and Mikhail Frunze over Red Army policies, specifically matters of discipline, political doctrine, and relations with the peasantry. Trotsky lost the debate, which resulted in a discrediting of civilian critics of the Red Army. As a result, civilians were increasingly locked out of military-related resolutions following the 11th Congress.[2] The most far-reaching event was the appointment of Joseph Stalin as the party's first General Secretary. Bukharin and Rykov were promoted to the Politburo.

16. sjezd

1930 The 16th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held during 26 June - 13 July 1930 in Moscow. The congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was attended by 1,268 voting delegates and 891 delegates with observer status. It elected the 16th Central Committee. An exercise of devotion to Joseph Stalin, this is the last congress to be dominated by the original leadership of the Soviet Union. Agenda of the Congress Political report of the Central Committee (Stalin) Organization report of the Central Committee (Kaganovich) Report of the Central Revision Commission (Vladimirsky) Report of the Central Control Commission (Ordzhonikidze) Report of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Delegation to the Comintern (Molotov) Completion of the five-years plan for the industry (Kuybyshev) The Kolkhoz movement and the rise of the agriculture (Yakovlev) Tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction period (Shvernik) Elections to the Party's central organs

21. sjezd

1959 The 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took place in Moscow, USSR 27 January - 5 February 1959.[1] It was a mid-term or "Extraordinary" Congress, timed so that Khrushchev could try to consolidate his power over rivals after the attempted coup of the Anti-Party Group in 1957. The Seven-Year Plan of economic development was adopted.

17. sjezd

1934 The 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held during 26 January - 10 February 1934. The congress was attended by 1,225 delegates with a casting vote and 736 delegates with a consultative vote, representing 1,872,488 party members and 935,298 candidate members.[1] During the elections to the 17th Central Committee Stalin received a significant number (over a hundred, although the precise number is unknown) of negative votes, whereas only three delegates crossed out the name of the popular Leningrad party boss, Sergei Kirov. The results were subsequently covered up on Stalin's orders and it was officially reported that Stalin also received only three negative votes.[2] During the Congress a group of veteran party members approached Kirov with the suggestion that he replace Stalin as the party leader. Kirov declined the offer and reported the conversation to Stalin. In public Stalin was acclaimed, not merely as the leader of the party, but as a towering, universal genius in every human sphere. All his former opponents spoke approvingly of him (other than Leon Trotsky, who had been exiled in 1929) and pledged their total support to the party line. In his speech to the 20th Party Congress, Nikita Khrushchev reported that "of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 per cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938)." In addition, Khrushchev said that "of 1,966 delegates [to the 17th Congress] with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority."[3] At the congress Rabkrin was dissolved and its functions passed to the Sovnarkom's People's Control Commission. "Just like in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, the parties of war and revenge, are appearing in the foreground. It is very clear that we're facing a new war." - Joseph Stalin, Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, 1934 Contents 1 Agenda of the Congress 2 List of Elected Members of the Central Committee 3 Aftermath 4 See also 5 References Agenda of the Congress 1. Reports by Stalin (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)), Vladimirsky (Central Revision Committee). Rudzutak and Manuilsky 2. Second five-year plan, speakers:Molotov and Kuybishev 3. Organisational issues (party and Soviet construction), speaker: Kaganovich 4. Elections to the central organs of the Party[4] List of Elected Members of the Central Committee Main article: Central Committee elected by the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Aftermath Stunned by the results of the 17th Party Congress, it's possible that Stalin had Sergei Kirov shot to death by the NKVD on 1 December 1934, having viewed the positive votes for Kirov as a sign of a plot in the Communist Party to have Stalin overthrown because of what they saw as the madness of Stalin's collectivization policies. The assassination of Kirov following the Congress would be a bellwether for the Great Purge of 1937-1938.[5][6]

1973 and 1979 reform (eko)

1973 and 1979 reform Main articles: 1973 Soviet economic reform and 1979 Soviet economic reform Kosygin initiated the 1973 Soviet economic reform to enhance the powers and functions of the regional planners by establishing associations. The reform was never fully implemented; indeed, members of the Soviet leadership complained that the reform had not even begun by the time of the 1979 reform.[68] The 1979 Soviet economic reform was initiated to improve the then-stagnating Soviet economy.[69] The reform's goal was to increase the powers of the central ministries by centralising the Soviet economy to an even greater extent.[70] This reform was also never fully implemented, and when Kosygin died in 1980 it was practically abandoned by his successor, Nikolai Tikhonov.[71] Tikhonov told the Soviet people at the 26th Party Congress that the reform was to be implemented, or at least parts of it, during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985). Despite this, the reform never came to fruition.[72] The reform is seen by several Sovietologists as the last major pre-perestroika reform initiative put forward by the Soviet government.[69]

XX sjezd KSSS

20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held during the period 14-25 February 1956. It is known especially for First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", which denounced the personality cult and dictatorship of Joseph Stalin.[1] Delegates at this Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were given no advance warning of what to expect. Indeed, proceedings were opened by First Secretary Khruschev's call for all to stand in memory of the Communist leaders who had died since the previous Congress, in which he mentioned Stalin in the same breath as Klement Gottwald. Hints of a new direction only came out gradually over the next ten days, which had the effect of leaving those present highly perplexed. The Polish communist leader Bolesław Bierut died in Moscow under mysterious circumstances shortly after attending the 20th Congress. The congress elected the 20th Central Committee. Secret speech Main article: On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences On 25 February, the very last day of the Congress, it was announced that an unscheduled session had been called for the Soviet delegates. First Secretary Khrushchev's morning speech began with vague references to the harmful consequences of elevating a single individual so high that he took on the "supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god." Khrushchev went on to say that such a mistake had been made about Stalin. He himself had been guilty of what was, in essence, a distortion of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The attention of the audience was then drawn to Lenin's Testament, copies of which had been distributed, criticising Stalin's "rudeness". Further accusations, and hints of accusations, followed, including the suggestion that the murder of Sergey Kirov in 1934, the event that sparked the Great Terror, could be included in the list of Stalin's crimes. While denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev carefully praised the Communist Party, which had the strength to withstand all the negative effects of imaginary crimes and false accusations. The Party, in other words, had been a victim of Stalin, not an accessory to his crimes. He finished by calling on the Party to eradicate the cult of personality and return to "the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society." The speech shocked delegates to the Congress, as it flew in the face of years of Soviet propaganda, which had claimed that Stalin was a wise, peaceful, and fair leader. After long deliberations, in a month the speech was reported to the general public, but the full text was published only in 1989. Not everyone was ready to accept Khrushchev's new line. Albanian Communist leader Enver Hoxha, for instance, strongly condemned Khrushchev as revisionist.[2] The speech was also seen as a catalyst for 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary, and was seen as a "major stimulus" to the Sino-Soviet split.[3]

Sharashka

= The Experimental Design Bureau (Russian: Опытное конструкторское бюро, Opytnoe konstruktorskoe bûro;) commonly known as sharashka (Russian: шара́шка, [ʂɐˈraʂkə]; sometimes sharaga, sharazhka) = neformální jméno pro tajný výzkum a výzkumné laboratoře při sytému sovětských gulagů - vědci a inženýři byli vězni vybraní The scientists and engineers at a sharashka were prisoners picked from various camps and prisons and assigned to work on scientific and technological problems for the state. Living conditions were usually much better than in an average taiga camp, mostly because of the absence of hard labor. The results of the research in sharashkas were usually published under the names of prominent Soviet scientists without credit given to the real authors, whose names frequently have been forgotten. Some of the scientists and engineers imprisoned in sharashkas were released during and after World War II, continuing independent careers and some becoming world-renowned. History In 1930 Leonid Ramzin and other engineers sentenced in the Industrial Party Trial were formed into a special design bureau under State Political Directorate (GPU), which was then the Soviet secret police. In 1938, Lavrenty Beria, a senior NKVD official, created the Department of Special Design Bureaus at the NKVD USSR (Отдел особых конструкторских бюро НКВД СССР). In 1939, the unit was renamed the Special Technical Bureau at the NKVD USSR (Особое техническое бюро НКВД СССР) and placed under the leadership of General Valentin Kravchenko, under Beria's immediate supervision. In 1941 it received a secret name, the 4th Special Department of the NKVD USSR (4-й спецотдел НКВД СССР). In 1949, the scope of sharaskas significantly increased. Previously the work done there was of military and defense character. The MVD Order № 001020 dated November 9, 1949 decreed installation of "Special technical and design bureaus" for a wide variety of "civilian" research and development, particularly in the "remote areas of the Union".[2] The 4th Special Department was disbanded in 1953 when, shortly after Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev and other members of the Politburo had Beria arrested and executed for espionage and treason. Notable sharashka inmates Main page: Category:Sharashka inmates Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a writer. His novel In the First Circle is a vivid account of life in sharashka Marfino. Lev Kopelev, a writer, another inmate of Marfino (a prototype for Rubin from In the First Circle) Sergei Korolev, an aircraft and rocket designer, later the chief designer for the Soviet space program. Valentin Glushko, a chief rocket engine designer. (His biography at MN) [link non-existent] Andrei Tupolev, the chief designer of the aircraft families Tu and ANT. Vladimir Petlyakov, the chief designer of the aircraft families Pe and VI (The Petlyakov aircraft). Vladimir Myasishchev, an aircraft designer. Leonid Kerber, an aircraft radio equipment designer. Robert Ludvigovich Bartini (or Roberto Oros di Bartini) an aircraft designer and scientist. Helmut Gröttrup, a German rocket scientist from the Peenemünde laboratory. (Its head Wernher von Braun was acquired by the US). Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov, an aircraft designer (arrested for a brief period). Léon Theremin, a pioneer of electronic music, the inventor of the theremin and a passive eavesdropping device. Nikolay Timofeev-Ressovsky, a geneticist and radiobiologist (His biography at genetics.org). Leonid Ramzin, the inventor of the straight-flow boiler ( His biography in Russian). Yuri Kondratyuk, a pioneer of astronautics and spaceflight, the inventor of the gravitational slingshot.

8. sjezd

8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1921 The 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (b) was held in Moscow 18-23 March 1919. The Congress was attended by 301 voting delegates who represented 313,766 Party members. A further 102 delegates attended with speaking rights, but no vote. It elected the 8th Central Committee. Contents 1 Debates 1.1 18 March 1.2 19 March 1.3 22 March 2 Decisions of the Congress 2.1 Elections during the Congress 2.1.1 Adoption of Resolutions and Decisions 3 References Debates The Congress agenda was: Report of the 7th Central Committee Programme of the R.C.P.(B.) Foundation of the Communist International War situation and war policy Work in the countryside Organisational problems Other business 18 March Vladimir Lenin's opening words were dedicated to Yakov Sverdlov, who had died on 16 March. He also submitted the Report of the Central Committee. Mikhail Kalinin replaced Sverdlov as Soviet head of state, a position he held till his death in March 1946. 19 March RCP(b) Party Programme, adopted at the 8th Party Congress Delegates at the congress. First row, left to right: I. Smilga, V. Schmidt, S. Zorin. Middle row, left to right: G. Evdokimov, J. Stalin, V. Lenin, M. Kalinin, P. Smorodin. Upper row: P. Malkov, E. Rahja, S. Galiev, P. Zalutsky, J. Drobnis, M. Tomsky, M. Kharitonov, A. Joffe, D. Ryazanov, Badaev, L. Serebryakov, M. Lashevich The Report on the Party Programme introduced the principal issue of the day. The congress adopted a new Party Program. This program included a description of capitalism and imperialism, and compared two systems of state - the bourgeois-democratic system and the Soviet system. It specified the specific tasks of the Party in the struggle for socialism: completion of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie; administration of the economic life of the country in accordance with a single socialist plan; participation of the trade unions in the organization of the national economy; socialist labour discipline; utilization of bourgeois experts in the economic field under the control of Soviet bodies; gradual and systematic enlistment of the middle peasantry in the work of socialist construction. The congress adopted Lenin's proposal to include in the program in addition to a definition of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, the description of industrial capitalism and simple commodity production contained in the old program adopted at the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. Lenin considered it essential that the program should take account of the complexity of the economic system and note the existence of diverse economic formations in the country, including small commodity production, as represented by the middle peasants. Nikolai Bukharin, however, proposed that the clauses dealing with capitalism, small commodity production, the economy of the middle peasantry, should have been left out of the program. Bukharin and Georgy Pyatakov differed with Lenin on the national question. Bukharin and Pyatakov argued against the inclusion in the program of a clause on the right of nations to self-determination; claiming that the slogan that would hinder the victory of the proletarian revolution and the union of the proletarians of different nationalities. Lenin's rejection of the standpoints of Bukharin and Pyatakov was accepted After the first Politburo was created in October 1917, in order to manage the Revolution, this second Politburo was voted by the Congress of the party, and appointed with five full members (Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev and Nikolay Krestinsky) and three non-voting members (Grigory Zinoviev, Nikolai Bukharin and Mikhail Kalinin). The first Orgburo was also set up. Stalin and Krestinsky were members too. The other three members were Elena Stasova, Beloborodov, Serebryakov plus candidate member Muranov. 22 March The Congress sent greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic: "The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party sends ardent greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Our Congress is convinced that the time is not far distant when communism will triumph all over the world. The working class of Russia is making every effort to come to your aid. The proletariat throughout the world is watching your struggle with intense interest and will not permit the imperialists to raise their hands against the new Soviet Republic

Brežněv k moci

= odstranění a náhrada Chruščova ve funkci vůdce Svazu - do 1962 pozice stabilní ale stárnul a jeho vvkonnost nebyla přesvědčivá (nestabilní) - hromadící se eko potíže Svazu ->tlak na Chruš vedení - zvenčí B zůstal loajální Chru ale 1963 se zapojil do spiknutí na sesazení vúdce -hlavním hybatelem - 1963 Br nahradil Frol Kozlova (protegé Chru) ve funkci Tajemníka UV -> pozice pravděpodobného nástupce Chru - 1964 Chru ho udělal zástupcem druhým tajemníkem = zástupce prvního - 1964 na dovolenou - během toho se dohodli spiklenci - Jenom Anastáz naznačila nebezpečí Chru ->sesadili ho, ale on nebojoval - poté měnšina vedená Mikojanem - sesadit z fce 1. tajemníka, ale necht hopředsedou ministrů x většina vedená Brežněvem ho chtěla odstranit z aktivní politiky celkově - Politbyro ovlivněné B odhlasovalo sesazení Chru - stejný den B do fce 1. tajemník - viděn jako prozatimní řešení -> Alexei Kosygin hlavou vlády, Mikoyan stále hlavou státu - Brezhnev a jeho frakce souhlasili s obecnou linkou strany po Stalinově smrti ale Chru reformy odstranili většinu stability svazu - jeden z důvodů Chru pádu -> neustále překračoval ostatní čl strany - and was (dle spiklenců) "in contempt of the party's collective ideals". - Vladimir Semichastny, head of the KGB,[19] was a crucial part of the conspiracy, as it was his duty to inform Khrushchev if anyone was plotting against his leadership. - Nikolay Ignatov, who had been sacked by Khrushchev, discreetly requested the opinion of several Central Committee members. - After some false starts, fellow conspirator Mikhail Suslov phoned Khrushchev on 12 October and requested that he return to Moscow to discuss the state of Soviet agriculture. - Finally Khrushchev understood what was happening, and said to Mikoyan, "If it's me who is the question, I will not make a fight of it." - While a minority headed by Mikoyan wanted to remove Khrushchev from the office of First Secretary but retain him as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the majority, headed by Brezhnev, wanted to remove him from active politics altogether.[20] - - Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny appealed to the Central Committee, blaming Khrushchev for economic failures, and accusing him of voluntarism and immodest behavior. - Influenced by Brezhnev's allies, Politburo members voted on 14 October to remove Khrushchev from office.[21] - In addition, some members of the Central Committee wanted him to undergo punishment of some kind. x Brezhnev, who had already been assured the office of the General Secretary, saw little reason to punish his old mentor further.

Lazar Kaganovič

Lazar Mojsejevič Kaganovič (rusky Лазарь Мойсеевич Каганович, 10. listopadujul./ 22. listopadu 1893greg. Kabany, poblíž Radomyšle, Ruské impérium - 25. července 1991 Moskva) byl sovětský politik a blízký spolupracovník Josifa Stalina. Jeho bratrem byl politik Michail Kaganovič. V roce 1918 působil Kaganovič v Rudé armádě. V té době byl předsedou Nižněnovgorodské oblasti. V letech 1919-1920 byl také vůdcem Voroněžské gubernie. V roce 1922 působil Kaganovič v Turkmenistánu, kde byl jedním z vůdců bolševického tažení proti místním muslimským rebelům (bašmakům), a také vedl následující trestné výpravy proti místní opozici. V roce 1924 se stal Kaganovič členem ústředního výboru. V letech 1925-1928 byl Kaganovič vůdcem komunistické strany Ukrajinské SSR. Na Ukrajině byl znám svou přísnou politikou pronásledování kulaků (majetných rolníků) a odporem vůči umírněné politice Nikolaje Bucharina, který argumentoval ve prospěch pokojné integrace kulaků do socialismu. Když byl roku 1934 zvolen generálním tajemníkem místo Sergeje Kirova opět Stalin, Kaganovič do volby rozhodující měrou zasáhl. Podle pravidel kandidát, který měl méně nepřátelských hlasů, se stal generálním tajemníkem. Předtím, než Kaganovič volby zmanipuloval, dostal Stalin 292 nepřátelských hlasů, zatímco Kirov jen tři. Konečné výsledky po Kaganovičově zásahu ukázaly, že Stalin prošel jen se dvěma nepřátelskými hlasy. V roce 1930 se stal Kaganovič členem politbyra. Dohlížel na uskutečňování Stalinovy hospodářské politiky, včetně kolektivizace zemědělství a rychlé industrializace. Ve třicátých letech Kaganovič organizoval stavbu moskevského metra (jedna síť nesla do roku 1955 jeho jméno). Během té doby dohlížel na ničení mnoha městských památek včetně katedrály Krista Spasitele. V roce 1932 vedl nelítostné potlačení dělnické stávky v Ivanově. Hladomor na Ukrajině Kaganovič podporoval politiku kolektivizace a byl mu lhostejný hladomor na Ukrajině, při němž zemřely miliony Ukrajinců hlady. Podobná politika také způsobila enormní utrpení v sovětské středoasijské republice Kazachstánu, na Krymu, na Volze a dalších částech Sovětského svazu. Kaganovič cestoval na Ukrajinu, do středního Ruska, severního Kavkazu a Sibiře, a požadoval zrychlení kolektivizace a další represe proti kulakům. Kaganovič byl za hladomor na Ukrajině hodně zodpovědný. Za teroru, za války a krátce po ní Kaganovič, Stalin, Postyšev a Vorošilov v přátelském objetí v lednu 1934 V letech 1935-1937 pracoval Kaganovič jako lidový komisař pro železnice. Ještě než začal velký teror, organizoval zatčení tisíců správců železnic a manažerů jako předpokládaných sabotérů. V letech 1937-1939 sloužil Kaganovič jako komisař pro těžký průmysl. V letech 1939-1940 sloužil jako komisař pro ropný průmysl. Každý z jeho úkolů byl spojen se zatýkáním, což mělo zlepšit disciplínu ve shodě se Stalinovou politikou. Ve všech stranických konferencích požadoval Kaganovič zvětšené úsilí v pátrání a pronásledování špionů a sabotérů. Pro svou krutost ve výkonu Stalinových požadavků dostal přezdívku Železný Lazar. Jedním z mnoha, kteří zahynuli během teroru, byl i Lazarův bratr, komisař leteckého průmyslu Michail Kaganovič. V roce 1941 Stalin prohlásil, že Michail sympatizoval s pravicí. Lazar Michailovi tuto událost oznámil telefonem. Ten den Michail spáchal sebevraždu. Během Velké vlastenecké války zastával Kaganovič pozici komisaře (člena vojenské rady) Severokavkazského frontu a Transkavkazského frontu. V letech 1943-1944 se stal opět komisařem pro železnice. V letech 1944-1947 byl Kaganovič komisařem pro stavební materiály. V roce 1947 se stal prvním ministrem Ukrajinské komunistické strany. Během let 1952-1957 byl prvním vicepremiérem rady ministrů. Pozdější doba Příkaz k vyvraždění zajatých polských důstojníků podepsaný Stalinem, vrchním sovětským vůdcem, Klimentem Vorošilovem, významným maršálem Rudé armády, Molotovem, sovětským diplomatem, a také Anastázem Mikojanem, vrchní autoritou Státního výboru obrany a souhlas k vraždě podepsaný Michailem Kalininem a Lazarem Kaganovičem Kaganovič byl znám vysokou pracovní výkonností, osobní loajalitou vůči Stalinovi a celkovým nedostatkem vlastních názorů. Ačkoli byl členem politbyra, začal po Stalinově smrti roku 1953 rychle ztrácet vliv. V roce 1957 se spolu s nekompromisními stalinisty Vjačeslavem Molotovem, Klimentem Vorošilovem a Georgijem Malenkovem účastnil nepodařeného stranického převratu proti Nikitovi Chruščovovi, který roku 1955 zahájil se svým spojencem Nikolajem Bulganinem proces destalinizace. Následkem neúspěšného převratu byl Kaganovič přinucen odejít z politbyra a ústředního výboru a dostal pozici ředitele malé uralské továrny na výrobu draslíku. V roce 1961 odešel do penze. Lazar Kaganovič zemřel v 97 letech, těsně před zánikem Sovětského svazu. Byl posledním žijícím starým bolševikem. Je pohřben na Novoděvičím hřbitově v Moskvě

Glasnosť

Glasnosť Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Výraz glasnosť (rusky: гла́сность) pochází z ruského jazyka a znamená „otevřenost" v politickém smyslu. Toto slovo bylo zavedeno ve spojitosti s dalším politickým pojmem přestavba - perestrojka (rusky: перестройка) v někdejším Sovětském svazu za vlády Michaila Sergejeviče Gorbačova, posledního prezidenta SSSR před rozpadem. Termín označuje politiku maximální otevřenosti o činnosti státních orgánů a minimálního potlačování svobod slova a informací. Je jedním z klíčových směrů reforem, navržených generálním tajemníkem KSSS a prezidentem SSSR M. Gorbačovem, obecně známých pod názvem Přestavba. Glasnost in the USSR Glasnost and the dissidents On 5 December 1965, a key event in the emergence of the Soviet civil rights movement, often known as the Glasnost rally, took place in Moscow when protesters on Pushkin Square led by Alexander Yesenin-Volpin demanded access to the closed trial of Yuly Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky. They specifically asked for "glasnost", i.e. the admission of the public, independent observers and foreign journalists, to the trial, something that was required in the newly issued, but not widely available, Code of Criminal Procedure. With a few specified exceptions, Article 111 of the Code stated that judicial hearings in the USSR should be held in public. Such protests against closed trials continued throughout the post-Stalin era. Andrei Sakharov, famously, did not travel to Oslo to receive his Nobel Peace Prize because he was standing outside a court building in Vilnius (Lithuania), demanding access to the 1976 trial of Sergei Kovalev, an editor of the Chronicle of Current Events and prominent rights activist.[3] Glasnost and Gorbachev In 1986, aware of the term's historical and more recent resonance, Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers adopted "glasnost" as a political slogan, together with the obscure "perestroika". Glasnost was taken to mean increased openness and transparency in government institutions and activities in the Soviet Union (USSR).[4] Glasnost apparently reflected a commitment to getting Soviet citizens to discuss publicly the problems of their system and seek solutions.[5] Gorbachev encouraged popular scrutiny and criticism of leaders, as well as a certain level of exposure by the mass media.[6] Some critics, especially among legal reformers and dissidents, regarded the Soviet authorities' new slogans as vague and limited alternatives to more basic liberties. Alexei Simonov, president of the Glasnost Defence Foundation, would define the term as follows: "Glasnost is a tortoise crawling towards Freedom of Speech".[7] Various meanings of Gorbachev's "glasnost" Between 1986 and 1991, when the USSR attempted and failed to reform itself, glasnost was frequently linked with other generalised concepts such as perestroika (literally: restructuring or regrouping) and demokratizatsiya (democratisation). Gorbachev often appealed to glasnost when promoting policies aimed at reducing corruption at the top of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and moderating the abuse of administrative power in the Central Committee. The ambiguity of "glasnost" defines the distinctive five-year period (1986-1991) at the end of the USSR's existence. There was decreasing pre-publication and pre-broadcast censorship and greater freedom of information. The "Era of Glasnost" saw greater contact between Soviet citizens and the Western world, particularly the United States: restrictions on travel were loosened for many, allowing increased business and cultural interchange[citation needed]. International Relations under Glasnost Gorbachev's interpretation of "glasnost" can best be summarized, translated, and explained in English as "openness". While associated with freedom of speech, the main goal of this policy was to make the country's management transparent, and circumvent the narrow circle of bureaucrats who previously exercised complete control of the economy. Soviet history under Stalin was re-examined; censored literature in the libraries was made more widely available;[8][9] and there was a greater freedom of speech for citizens and openness in the media. Propaganda about the supposedly higher quality of consumer goods and quality of life in the United States and Western Europe began to be transmitted to the Soviet population,[10] along with western popular culture.[11] Glasnost in Russia since 1991 The outright prohibition of censorship was enshrined in Article 29 of the new 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation.[12] This did not end attempts by officials to restrict access to information in post-Soviet Russia or pressure by the authorities on media outlets not to publicise or discuss certain events or subjects. Monitoring of the infringement of media rights in the years from 2004 to 2013 would find that instances of censorship were the most commonly reported type of violation.[13] There were also periodic concerns about the extent of glasnost in court proceedings, as restrictions were placed on access to certain cases for the media and for the public

gorbačev a skon strany

Gorbachev and the party's demise (1985-91) Gorbachev was elected CPSU General Secretary on 11 March 1985, one day after Chernenko's death.[34] When he acceded, the Soviet Union was stagnating but was stable and may have continued largely unchanged into the 21st century if not for Gorbachev's reforms.[35] Gorbachev conducted a significant personnel reshuffling of the CPSU leadership, forcing old party conservatives out of office.[36] In 1985 and early 1986, the new party leadership called for uskoreniye (Russian: acceleration).[36] Gorbachev reinvigorated the party ideology by adding new concepts and updating older ones.[36] A positive consequence of this was the allowance of "pluralism of thought" and a call for the establishment of "socialist pluralism" (literally, socialist democracy).[37] He introduced a policy of glasnost (Russian: openness, transparency) in 1986, which led to a wave of unintended democratization.[38] According to Russian scholar Archie Brown, the democratization of the Soviet Union brought mixed blessings to Gorbachev; it helped him to weaken his conservative opponents within the party but brought out accumulated grievances which had been oppressed during the previous decades.[38] Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, as seen in 1986 In reaction to these changes, a conservative movement gained momentum in 1987 in response to Boris Yeltsin's dismissal as First Secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee.[39] On 13 March 1988, Nina Andreyeva, a university lecturer, wrote an article titled "I Cannot Forsake My Principles".[40] The publication was planned to occur when both Gorbachev and his protege Alexander Yakovlev were visiting foreign countries.[40] In their place, Yegor Ligachev led the party organization and told journalists that the article was "a benchmark for what we need in our ideology today".[40] Upon Gorbachev's return, the article was discussed at length during a Politburo meeting; it was revealed that nearly half of its members were sympathetic to the letter and opposed further reforms which could weaken the party.[40] The meeting lasted for two days, but on 5 April, a Politburo resolution responded with a point-by-point rebuttal to Andreyeva's article.[40] Gorbachev convened the 19th Party Conference in June 1988. He criticized leading party conservatives Ligachev, Andrei Gromyko and Mikhail Solomentsev.[40] In turn, conservative delegates attacked Gorbachev and the reformers.[41] According to Brown, there had not been as much open discussion and dissent at a party meeting since the early 1920s.[41] Despite the deep-seated opposition for further reform, the CPSU was still hierarchical; the conservatives acceded to Gorbachev's demands because he was the CPSU General Secretary.[41] The 19th Conference approved the establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and allowed for contested elections between the CPSU and independent candidates. Organized parties were not allowed.[41] The CPD was elected in 1989; one-third of the seats were appointed by the CPSU and other public organizations to sustain the Soviet one-party state.[41] The elections were democratic but most elected CPD members were against any more radical reform.[42] The elections marked the highest electoral turnout in Russian history; no election before or since had a higher participation rate.[43] An organized opposition was established within the legislature under the name Inter-Regional Group of Deputies.[43] An unintended consequence of these reforms was the increased anti-CPSU pressure; in March 1990 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the party was forced to relinquish its political monopoly of power, in effect turning the Soviet Union into a liberal democracy.[44] The CPSU's demise began in March 1990, when party elements were eclipsed in power by state bodies.[44] From then until the Soviet Union's disestablishment, Gorbachev ruled the country through the newly created post of President of the Soviet Union.[44] Following this, the central party apparatus played little practical role in Soviet affairs.[44] Gorbachev had become independent from the Politburo and faced few constraints from party leaders.[44] In the summer of 1990, the party convened the 28th Congress.[45] A new Politburo was elected, previous incumbents except Gorbachev and Vladimir Ivashko, the CPSU Deputy General Secretary were removed.[45] Later that year, the party began work on a new program with a working title, "Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism".[45] According to Brown, the program reflected Gorbachev's journey from an orthodox communist to a European social democrat.[45] The freedoms of thought and organization, which were allowed by Gorbachev, led to a rise in nationalism in the Soviet republics, indirectly weakening the central authorities.[46] In response to this, a referendum was held in 1991, in which most of the union republics[b] voted to preserve the union in a different form.[46] In reaction to this, conservative elements within the CPSU launched the August 1991 coup, which overthrew Gorbachev but failed to preserve the Soviet Union.[46] When Gorbachev returned after the coup's collapse, he resigned from the CPSU and operations were handed over to Ivashko.[47] The CPSU was outlawed on 29 August 1991 on Soviet territory, extended its further ban on 6 November on Russian soil by Yeltsin and Gorbachev resigned from the presidency on 25 December; the following day the Soviet Union was dissolved.[48] On 30 November 1992; the Russian Constitutional Court not only upheld this decree, but barred the CPSU from ever being refounded. It accepted Yeltsin's argument that the CPSU was not a true party, but a criminal organisation that had ruled the Soviet Union as a dictatorship in violation of the Soviet Constitution. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian adherents to the CPSU tradition, particularly as it existed before Gorbachev, reorganised themselves as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Today there is a widespread flora of parties in Russia claiming to be the successors of CPSU. Several of them used the name CPSU. However, CPRF is generally seen (due to its massive size) as the inheritor of the CPSU in Russia. Additionally, the CPRF was initially founded as the Communist Party of the Russian SFSR in 1990, some time before CPSU was abolished and was seen as a "Russian-nationalist" counterpart to CPSU.

širší čistky

Eventually almost all of the Bolsheviks who had played prominent roles during the Russian Revolution of 1917, or in Lenin's Soviet government, were executed. Out of six members of the original Politburo during the 1917 October Revolution who lived until the Great Purge, Stalin himself was the only one who remained in the Soviet Union, alive.[5] Four of the other five were executed. The fifth, Leon Trotsky, had been forced into exile outside the Soviet Union in 1929, but was assassinated in Mexico by Soviet agent Ramón Mercader in 1940. Of the seven members elected to the Politburo between the October Revolution and Lenin's death in 1924, four were executed, one (Tomsky) committed suicide and two (Molotov and Kalinin) lived. However, the trials and executions of the former Bolshevik leaders, while being the most visible part, were only a minor part of the purges. A series of documents discovered in the Central Committee archives in 1992 by Vladimir Bukovsky demonstrate that there were quotas for arrests and executions as for all other activities in the planned economy.[38] The victims were convicted in absentia and in camera by extra-judicial organs - the NKVD troikas sentenced indigenous «enemies» under NKVD Order no. 00447 and the two-man dvoiki (NKVD Commissar Nikolai Yezhov and Main State Prosecutor Andrey Vyshinsky, or their deputies) those arrested along «national» lines. A characteristic of all the mass operations of the NKVD was flexibility: first, the numbers - the so-called limit - could be easily increased; second, it was left entirely to the NKVD officers whether a particular prisoner was to be shot or sent to the prison camps; third, the time-limits set for the completion of single operations were extended time and again. The victims were executed at night, either in prisons, in the cellars of NKVD headquarters or in a secluded area, usually a forest. The NKVD officers shot prisoners in the head using pistols

vývoj ks

After the founding of the Soviet Union in 1922, Lenin had introduced a mixed economy, commonly referred to as the New Economic Policy, which allowed for capitalist practices to resume under the Communist Party dictation in order to develop the necessary conditions for socialism to become a practical pursuit in the economically undeveloped country. In 1929, as Joseph Stalin became the leader of the party, Marxism-Leninism, a fusion of the original ideas of German philosopher and economic theorist Karl Marx, and Lenin, became formalized as the party's guiding ideology and would remain so throughout the rest of its existence. The party pursued state socialism, under which all industries were nationalized and a planned economy was implemented. After recovering from the Second World War, reforms were implemented which decentralized economic planning and liberalized Soviet society in general under Nikita Khrushchev. By 1980, various factors, including the continuing Cold War, and ongoing nuclear arms race with the United States and other Western European powers and unaddressed inefficiencies in the economy, led to stagnant economic growth under Alexei Kosygin, and further with Leonid Brezhnev and a growing disillusionment. After a younger vigorous Mikhail Gorbachev (b.1931), assumed leadership in 1985, (following two short-term elderly leaders who quickly died in succession), rapid steps were taken to transform the tottering Soviet economic system in the direction of a market economy once again. Gorbachev and his allies envisioned the introduction of an economy similar to Lenin's earlier New Economic Policy through a program of "perestroika", or restructuring, but their reforms along with the institution of free multiparty elections led to a decline in the party's power, and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the banning of the party by later last RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin and subsequent first President of an evolving democratic and free market economy of the successor Russian Federation. A number of causes contributed to CPSU's loss of control and the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s. Some historians have written that Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost" (political openness) was the root cause, noting that it weakened the party's control over society. Gorbachev maintained that perestroika without glasnost was doomed to failure anyway. Others have blamed the economic stagnation and subsequent loss of faith by the general populace in communist ideology. In the final years of the CPSU's existence, the Communist Parties of the federal subjects of Russia were united into the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). After the CPSU's demise, the Communist Parties of the Union Republics became independent and underwent various separate paths of reform. In Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation emerged and has been regarded as the inheritor of the CPSU's old Bolshevik legacy into the present day.

Šelepin Alexandr Nikolajevič

Alexander Nikolayevich Shelepin (Russian: Алекса́ндр Никола́евич Шеле́пин; 18 August 1918 - 24 October 1994) was a Soviet politician and security and intelligence officer. A long-time member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he served as First Deputy Prime Minister, as a full member of the Politburo and as the Chairman of the KGB from December 1958 to November 1961. He continued to maintain decisive influence in the KGB until 1967; his successor as KGB Chairman, Vladimir Semichastny, was his client and protégé.[1] Intelligent, ambitious and well-educated,[2][1] Shelepin was the leader of a hard-line faction within the Communist Party that played a decisive role in overthrowing Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Opposed to the policy of détente, he was eventually outmaneuvered by Leonid Brezhnev and gradually stripped of his power, thus failing in his ambition to lead the Soviet Union. Service under Khrushchev Though closely identified with Stalin (and being somewhat of a favorite of his), Shelepin was not affected by De-Stalinization and the gradual consolidation of power by Nikita Khrushchev after Stalin's death in 1953. Indeed, Khrushchev personally liked Shelepin and, because of his rise through the Communist Youth League, saw him as an ally against the secret police and security agencies that had been all-powerful under Stalin. Shelepin accompanied Khrushchev on the Soviet leader's trip to the People's Republic of China in 1954, and met with Mao Zedong. Following this, he mobilized thousands of young Communists in support of Khrushchev's 'Virgin Lands' program.[2] In early 1958, Khrushchev appointed Shelepin as Central Committee Secretary in charge of the Party Organs Department, and, in December 1958, Shelepin became the Chairman of the Soviet central intelligence and security service, the KGB, replacing Army General Ivan Serov. Khrushchev saw Shelepin as a very good choice for KGB chief, for several reasons; Shelepin's background completely outside state security, his higher education and intellectual approach greatly distinguished him from his predecessors, and his appointment was intended to improve the public image of the KGB.[2] Shelepin attempted to return state security and intelligence to its position of importance during the Stalinist era. However, the people he favored were completely different than those preferred by his predecessors. With Khrushchev's full backing, Shelepin recruited many young university graduates to the KGB (especially favoring those with a background in law and the social sciences) and he demoted or fired many career state security officers, replacing them with officials from Communist Party organizations, and, especially, from the Communist Youth League. As a result of Shelepin's ambitious policy, the KGB became a substantially different organization from the Stalin-era security services, with a more sophisticated and intellectual approach, that would be further encouraged by future Chairman Yuri Andropov. Shelepin proposed and carried out the destruction of many documents related to the Katyn massacre of Polish officers to minimize the chance that the truth would be revealed.[5][6] His 3 March 1959 note to Nikita Khrushchev, with information about the execution of 21,857 Poles and with the proposal to destroy their personal files, became one of the documents that were preserved and eventually made public.[5][6][7][8] The policy of providing KGB support to left-wing nationalist liberation movements in wars of national liberation in Latin America, Asia and Africa was another important innovation of Shelepin's new approach as KGB Chairman, adopted during the summer of 1961 by Khrushchev and the Central Committee following a detailed proposal by Shelepin. Fidel Castro and Cuba strongly supported an aggressive policy of military assistance to national liberation movements with Che Guevara, in co-operation with Ben Bella of Algeria, also playing a leading role.[9] Coup against Khrushchev Shelepin left the KGB in November 1961 and became a First Deputy Prime Minister; Khrushchev also made him Chairman of the powerful new Committee of Party and State Control, from where he still exercised control over the KGB, which was taken over by his client and protégé Vladimir Semichastny. He was a principal player in the coup against Khrushchev in October 1964, obviously influencing the KGB to support the conspirators.[10] Shelepin probably expected to become First Secretary and de facto leader of the USSR when Khrushchev was overthrown. Shelepin occupied a powerful position, controlling the KGB and leading a large hard-line faction within the Party,[11] as well as holding two high-level posts, one in the Council of Ministers as Deputy Prime Minister and one in the central party apparatus as a member of the Secretariat. However, he lacked influence in the military, and was viewed very suspiciously by most Central Committee and Government officials outside his faction, who were well-aware of his ambitions.[12] Alexander Solzhenitsyn suggested that Shelepin had been the choice of the surviving Stalinists, who asked "what had been the point of overthrowing Khrushchev if not to revert to Stalinism?"[citation needed] As far as his own views on the role of Soviet policy went, Shelepin opposed the relaxation of tensions with the United States in foreign affairs, and favored a return to domestic policies that promoted discipline and centralization within the wider Union.[13] Shelepin's reward was to be made a full member of the most important political body, the Politburo, in November 1964, following the successful overthrow of Khrushchev —by a significant margin its youngest member, at the age of 46. But he still held ambitions of becoming the leader of the Soviet Union. Fall from power Shelepin's colleagues on the Politburo watched him carefully, seeking to halt his ambitions. So as to weaken his substantial power base, Shelepin was stripped of the Deputy Premiership at the end of 1965 and from 1965-1970 witnessed the systematic dismissal of his most powerful allies within the Party and Government.[14] In May 1967, he lost all of his influence in the KGB, as Brezhnev replaced Semichastny with Yuri Andropov. Shelepin survived as a full member of the Politburo until 1975, when he rapidly fell from power, being successively demoted to a number of lower positions, until his retirement in 1984. Brezhnev was able to outmaneuver Shelepin, as his approach was more nuanced and more acceptable to the average Party official. Shelepin wanted centralization, discipline and strict oversight of officials domestically, and confrontation on all fronts with the United States abroad; whereas Brezhnev was happy to offer predictability, stability and job security to the party officials, and pursue a balanced foreign policy, combining détente with proxy wars.[1] Shelepin died in Moscow on 24 October 1994, at the age of 76, and was buried in the Novodevichy Cemetery. Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions In office 1967-1975 Preceded by Viktor Grishin Succeeded by Alexey Shibaev Chairman of the Party and State Control Committee In office 23 November 1962 - 6 December 1965 Preceded by Position established Succeeded by Position abolished 2nd Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) In office 25 December 1958 - 13 November 1961 Premier Nikita Khrushchev Preceded by Ivan Serov Succeeded by Vladimir Semichastny Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers In office 23 November 1962 - 9 December 1965 Premier Alexei Kosygin Preceded by Mikhail Yefremov Succeeded by Zia Nureyev First Secretary of the Komsomol In office 30 October 1952 - 28 March 1958 Preceded by Nikolai Mikhailov Succeeded by Vladimir Semichastny Full member of the 22nd, 23rd, 24th Politburo In office 16 November 1964 - 16 April 1975 Member of the 22nd, 23rd Secretariat In office 31 October 1961 - 26 September 1967 Personal details Born Alexander Nikolayevich Shelepin 18 August 1918 Voronezh, Soviet Russia Died 24 October 1994 (aged 76) Moscow, Russian Federation Citizenship Soviet (until 1991) and Russian Nationality Russian Political party Communist Party of the Soviet Union Alma mater Moscow State University (1941)

Alexej Kosygin

Alexei Kosygin From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search "Kosygin" redirects here. For other uses, see Kosygin (disambiguation). Alexei Kosygin Алексей Косыгин Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union In office 15 October 1964 - 23 October 1980 Deputy First Deputy Premiers[show] Preceded by Nikita Khrushchev Succeeded by Nikolai Tikhonov First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers In office 4 May 1960 - 15 October 1964 Premier Nikita Khrushchev Preceded by Frol Kozlov Succeeded by Dmitriy Ustinov Additional positions Personal details Born Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin 21 February [O.S. 8 February] 1904 St. Petersburg, Russian Empire Died 18 December 1980 (aged 76) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Citizenship Soviet Nationality Russian Political party Communist Party of the Soviet Union Spouse(s) Klavdia Andreyevna (died 1967) Residence House on the Embankment Profession Teacher, civil servant[1] Military service Allegiance Russian SFSR Service/branch Red Army Years of service 1919-1921[2] Rank Conscript Commands Red Army Battles/wars Russian Civil War Vzestup Během čistek kolem roku 1937 prodělal závratnou kariéru. Od roku 1935 pracoval v textilních závodech v Leningradské oblasti. Od roku 1939 byl členem sovětského kabinetu (rada lidových komisařů SSSR, RLK) jako lidový komisař textilního průmyslu (1939-1940). Svým kariérním vzestupem v leningradské oblasti byl spojen se stranickou klikou A. A. Ždanova, tak jako N. A. Vozněsenskij, A. A. Kuzněcov a další. Toto politické seskupení v letech 1939-1949 zaujalo důležité místo v sovětské mocenské hierarchii a aktivně vstupovala do mocenských bojů v Kremlu. Kosygin se stal Stalinovým favoritem a specialistou na lehký a spotřební průmysl, státní finance a plánování. Během pozdního stalinismu působil v řadě klíčových funkcí. Vykonával funkci náměstka předsedy rady lidových komisařů (RLK) SSSR (1940-1953), předsedy RLK RSFSR (1943-1946), ministra financí (1948) a vedl různá specializovaná byra resortních ministrů v Radě ministrů SSSR. Zásadním zlomem v jeho kariéře byla Ždanovova smrt v roce 1948, leningradská aféra (1949-1950) a vzestup kliky kolem Gregorije Malenkova a Lavrentije Beriji. Tehdy částečně ztratil Stalinovu důvěru a jeho život visel na vlásku. Sám si nebyl jistý svým dalším setrváním ve vrcholné politice a vůbec na svobodě. Na XIX. sjezdu KSSS v říjnu 1952 se jeho politický pád projevil ztrátou členství v novém politbyru (prezidiu ÚV). Po Stalinově smrti, když došlo k dělení moci mezi jeho pohrobky, byl Kosygin opominut úplně a přestal být i kandidátem předsednictva ÚV. V prvních letech po Stalinově smrti 1953-1957 se propadl na žebříčku, i když znovu byl jmenován náměstkem předsedy Rady ministrů SSSR a později se spolupodílel na vytváření plánů rozvoje ekonomiky. Cestu do předsednictva mu otevřely dramatické zvraty ve vztazích uvnitř předsednictva ÚV KSSS - pád starých členů politbyra Molotova, Kaganoviče, Malenkova, oslabení pozic mladých technokratů M. G. Pervuchina, a M. Z. Saburova v roce 1957. Předseda vlády Kosygin a americký prezident Lyndon B. Johnson v roce 1967 na Glassboro Summitu Chruščov, který upevňoval své pozice ve vládním kabinetu, se potřeboval opřít o zkušené ekonomy a znalce sovětského hospodářství. Jedním z nich se stal i Kosygin. Postupně vystoupal na post prvního náměstka předsedy Rady ministrů - tedy přímo Chruščova. Vzhledem k tomu, že se Chruščov zabýval zejména řízením zahraniční politiky a stranického aparátu, na ekonomiku (mimo experimenty v zemědělství) mu příliš času nezbývalo. Kosygin tak začal fakticky plnit úlohu předsedy vlády. Když byl v říjnu 1964 Chruščov stranickou oligarchií svržen, Kosygin byl jmenován předsedou Rady ministrů oficiálně. V zemi se vytvořilo kolektivní vedení, v jehož čele stanul triumvirát Brežněva, Kosygina a Nikolaje Podgorného, doplněný Michailem Suslovem, A. Šeljepinem a dalšími členy politbyra. Zpočátku se zdálo, že Kosygin nahradí nevýrazného Brežněva, ale opak se stal realitou. V prvních letech působení v úřadu vystupoval aktivně a předkládal řadu návrhů na reformu ekonomiky. Hlavní slovo si také přisvojil v otázkách zahraniční politiky. Nenalezl však podporu ani u sovětské technokracie či regionech a už vůbec ne uvnitř stranického aparátu ÚV. Konzervativní postoj Brežněva a jeho politbyra však hlubším a systémovým změnám zabránil. Stal se tak pouhým vykonavatelem stranických rozhodnutí a jeho význam pozvolna upadal. Ještě během řešení krize v ČSSR v období pražského jara vystupoval s Brežněvem jako rovnocenný partner. Proslulou se stala jeho neformální návštěva Československa spojená s ozdravným pobytem v Karlových Varech. Jeho postoj k československým reformám však nebyl oproštěn od sovětských dogmat, a proto vystupoval proti dubčekovské politice, i když se v Kremlu řadil mezi umírněné a odpůrce unáhleného vojenského řešení. Nakonec on i váhavý Brežněv byli přesvědčeni jestřáby a dali souhlas k vojenskému zásahu. Konec kariéry Kolektivní vedení však brzy vzalo za své. Stále více se ocital pod palbou stranických aparátčíků. Brežněv se všemožně snažil oslabovat jeho úlohu, i když k samotnému odvolání se dlouho neodhodlal. V sedmdesátých letech se zhoršoval Kosyginův zdravotní stav a přišel o zásadní vliv na sovětskou politiku. Stagnaci ekonomiky již nemohl ovlivnit. Krátce před smrtí byl v tichosti zbaven svého úřadu i členství v politbyru. Jeho nástupcem se stal Brežněvův chráněnec Nikolaj Alexandrovič Tichonov. Teprve smrt mu přinesla větší publicitu - byl slavnostně pohřben vedle Leninova mauzolea u Kremelské zdi. Takovéto pocty se dostalo jen několika desítkám sovětských státníků. Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin (Russian: Алексе́й Никола́евич Косы́гин, tr. Aleksej Nikolajevič Kosygin, IPA: [ɐlʲɪˈksʲej nʲɪkɐˈlajɪvʲɪtɕ kɐˈsɨɡʲɪn]; 21 February [O.S. 8 February] 1904 - 18 December 1980)[3] was a Soviet-Russian statesman during the Cold War. Kosygin was born in the city of Saint Petersburg in 1904 to a Russian working-class family. He was conscripted into the labour army during the Russian Civil War, and after the Red Army's demobilisation in 1921, he worked in Siberia as an industrial manager. Kosygin returned to Leningrad in the early 1930s and worked his way up the Soviet hierarchy. During the Great Patriotic War (World War II), Kosygin was a member of the State Defence Committee and was tasked with moving Soviet industry out of territories soon to be overrun by the German Army. He served as Minister of Finance for a year before becoming Minister of Light Industry (later, Minister of Light Industry and Food). Stalin removed Kosygin from the Politburo one year before his own death in 1953, intentionally weakening Kosygin's position within the Soviet hierarchy. Stalin died in 1953, and on March, 20 1959 Kosygin was appointed to the position of Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), a post he would hold for little more than a year. Kosygin next became First Deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. When Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964, Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev succeeded him as Premier and First Secretary respectively. Thereafter, Kosygin formed a troika with Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, that governed the Soviet Union in Khrushchev's place. During the latter half of the 1960s, Kosygin initially emerged as the most prominent figure in the post-Khrushchev troika. In addition to managing the Soviet Union's economy, he assumed a preeminent role in the nation's foreign policy by leading arms control talks with the US and directly overseeing relations with other communist countries. However, the onset of the Prague Spring in 1968 resulted in a severe backlash against his policies that enabled Brezhnev to eclipse him as the dominant figure in the Politburo. While he and Brezhnev disliked one another, he remained in office until being forced to retire on October 23, 1980, due to bad health. He died two months later on December 18, 1980.

vztahy s 3. světem za Brežněva

All self-proclaimed African socialist states and the Middle Eastern country of South Yemen were labelled by Soviet ideologists as "States of Socialist Orientation".[114] Numerous African leaders were influenced by Marxism, and even Leninism.[113] Several Soviet think tanks were opposed to the Soviet leadership's policy towards Third World self-proclaimed socialist states, claiming that none of them had built a strong enough capitalist base of development as to be labelled as any kind of socialist. According to historian Archie Brown, these Soviet ideologists were correct, and, as a result no true socialist states were ever established in Africa, though Mozambique certainly came close.[114] Kosygin (left) and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (right) signing the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1972 When the Ba'ath Party nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Iraqi Government sent Saddam Hussein, the Vice President of Iraq, to negotiate a trade agreement with the Soviet Union to soften the anticipated loss of revenue. When Hussein visited the Soviet Union, he managed to get a trade agreement and a treaty of friendship. When Kosygin visited Iraq in 1972, he and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the President of Iraq signed and ratified the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The alliance also forced the Iraqi Ba'athist government to temporarily stop their prosecution of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The ICP was even given two ministerships following the establishment of an alliance between the Soviet Union and Iraq.[115] The following year, in 1973, al-Bakr went on a state visit to the Soviet Union, and met Brezhnev personally.[116] Relations between the two countries only soured in 1976 when the Iraq Ba'athist regime started a mass campaign against the ICP and other communists. Despite pleas from Brezhnev for clemency, several Iraqi communists were executed publicy.[117] After the Angolan War of Independence of 1975, the Soviet Union's role in Third World politics increased dramatically. Some of the regions were important for national security, while other regions were important to the expansion of Soviet socialism to other countries. According to an anonymous Soviet writer, the national liberation struggle was the cornerstone of Soviet ideology, and therefore became a cornerstone for Soviet diplomatic activity in the Third World.[118] Soviet influence in Latin America increased after Cuba became a communist state in 1961. The Cuban revolution was welcomed by Moscow since for once, they could point to a communist government established by indigenous forces instead of the Red Army. Cuba also became the Soviet Union's "front man" for promoting socialism in the Third World as the Havana regime was seen as more marketable and charismatic. By the late 1970s, Soviet influence in Latin America had reached crisis proportions according to several United States Congressmen.[119] Diplomatic and economic ties were established with several countries during the 1970s, and one of them, Peru bought external goods from the Soviet Union. Mexico, and several countries in the Caribbean, forged increasingly strong ties with Comecon, an Eastern Bloc trading organisation established in 1949. The Soviet Union also strengthened its ties with the communist parties of Latin America.[120] Soviet ideologists saw the increasing Soviet presence as a part of the "mounting anti-imperialist struggle for democracy and social justice".[121] Iranian Emperor Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Empress Farah Pahlavi meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow, 1970. The Soviet Union also played a key role in the secessionist struggle against the Portuguese Empire and the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa.[122] Control of Somalia was of great interest to both the Soviet Union and the United States, due to the country's strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea. After the Soviets broke foreign relations with Siad Barre's regime in Somalia, the Soviets turned to the Derg Government in Ethiopia and supported them in their war against Somalia. Because the Soviets changed their allegiance, Barre expelled all Soviet advisers, tore up his friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, and switched allegiance to the West. The United States took the Soviet Union's place in the 1980s in the aftermath of Somalia's loss in the Ogaden War.[123] In Southeast Asia, Nikita Khrushchev had initially supported North Vietnam out of "fraternal solidarity", but as the war escalated he urged the North Vietnamese leadership to give up the quest of liberating South Vietnam. He continued to reject offers to assist the North Vietnamese government, and instead told them to enter negotiations in the United Nations Security Council.[124] Brezhnev, after taking power, started once again to aid the communist resistance in Vietnam. In February 1965, Kosygin traveled to Hanoi with dozens of Soviet air force generals and economic experts. During the Soviet visit, President Lyndon B. Johnson had allowed US bombing raids on North Vietnamese soil in retaliation of the recent Pleiku airbase attack by the Viet Cong.[125] In post-war Vietnam, Soviet aid became the cornerstone of socio-economic activity. For example, in the early 1980s, 20-30% of the rice eaten by the Vietnamese people was supplied by the Soviet Union. Since Vietnam never developed an arms industry during the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union who assisted them with weapons and materiel during the Sino-Vietnamese War.[126] The Soviet Union supported the Vietnamese in their 1978 invasion of Cambodia, an invasion considered by the First World, most notably the United States, and the People's Republic of China to be under the direct command of the Soviet Union. The USSR also became the largest backer of the new puppet state in Cambodia, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). In a 1979 summit Jimmy Carter complained to Brezhnev about the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, to which Brezhnev replied that the citizens of the PRK were delighted about the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge-led government; in this, as historian Archie Brown notes, he was right

Afghánistán za Beržněva a vztahy se SSSR

Although the government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, formed in the aftermath of the Saur Revolution of 1978, pursued several socialist policies, the country was "never considered socialist by the Soviet Union", according to historian Archie Brown.[129] Indeed, since the USSR had backed the previous regime under Mohammed Daoud Khan, the revolution, which had surprised the Soviet leadership, created many difficulties for the Soviet Union.[129] The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Afghan communist party, consisted of two opposing factions, the khalqs and the parchams; the Soviet leadership supported the latter, which had also join Moscow in backing the previous Daoud regime.[130] After engineering the coup, however it was the Khalq faction that took over the reins of power. Nur Muhammad Taraki became both President and Prime Minister of Afghanistan, while Hafizullah Amin became the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and, from May 1979, Prime Minister. The new Khalq government ordered the execution of several high-standing and low-standing members of the Parcham faction. To make matters even worse, Taraki's and Hafizullah's relationship with each other soon turned sour as opposition against their government increased.[131] On 20 March 1979 Taraki travelled to the Soviet Union and met with Premier Kosygin, Dmitriy Ustinov (Defence Minister), Andrei Gromyko (Foreign Minister) and Boris Ponomarev (head of the International Department of the Central Committee), to discuss the possibilities of a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Kosygin opposed the idea, believing that the Afghan leadership had to prove it had the support of the people by combating opposition on its own, though he did agree to increase material aid to Afghanistan. When Taraki asked Kosygin about the possibilities of a military intervention led by the Eastern Bloc Kosygin rebuked him once more, again telling him that the Afghan leadership had to survive on its own.[132] However, in a closed meeting without Kosygin, the Politburo unanimously supported a Soviet intervention.[133] In late 1979 Taraki failed to assassinate Amin, who, in a revenge attack, successfully engineering Taraki's own assassination on 9 October. Later, in December, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan at the behest of Khan. On 27 December a KGB unit killed Amin. Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction, was chosen by the Soviet leadership as Amin's successor in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention.[134] Unfortunately for the Soviet leadership Karmal did not turn out to be the leader they expected, and he, just as his predecessors had arrested and killed several Parcham-members, arrested and killed several high-standing and low-standing Khalq members simply because they supported the wrong faction. With Soviet troops still in the country, however, he was forced to bow to Soviet pressure, and released all Khalq prisoners. To make matters even worse for Karmal several of the previously arrested Khalq-members were forced to join the new government.[134] At the time of Brezhnev's death, the Soviet Union was still bogged down in Afghanistan.

bolševik

Bolševici Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Stranická schůze. Zleva sedí : Avel Enukidze, Michail Kalinin, Nikolaj Bucharin, Michail Tomskij, Michail Laševič, Lev Kameněv, Jevgenij Preobraženskij, Leonid Serebrjakov, Vladimir Lenin a Alexej Rykov. Bolševici (rusky большевики) je původně frakce Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické strany a bolševismus je jejich hnutí, resp. učení. Později pojem bolševismus označoval i obecně podobný směr sociálně-demokratických, resp. komunistických stran (později byl tento směr spíše označován jako marxismus-leninismus, ale to je širší pojem). Obsah 1 Dějiny 1.1 Bolševizace 2 Reference 3 Externí odkazy Dějiny Pojem „bolševik" je používán od 2. sjezdu Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické strany v roce 1903, na kterém se strana rozštěpila na frakci radikálních tzv. bolševiků (doslova „majících většinu") a ostatních tzv. menševiků (doslova „majících menšinu"). Bolševismus se zakládal na Leninově učení o diktatuře proletariátu, imperialismu a socialistické revoluci, které chtěli dosáhnout ozbrojeným povstáním bez spolupráce s liberálními stranami. Vedl je sám Lenin. Naopak menševici byli zastánci klasického marxismu, a tedy tvrdili, že komunismu lze dosáhnout pouze v ekonomicky vyspělém státě, s masovou podporou, a příslušné postupné „revoluci" musí nejprve předcházet „buržoazní revoluce" (která se v Rusku na rozdíl od západní Evropy - např. Francouzské revoluce - nikdy neuskutečnila, neboť v marxistickém chápání bylo Rusko stále „feudálním státem"). Trockij, Sverdlov, Zinovjev a další bolševici stráží Ustavodárné shromáždění, které bylo 19. ledna 1918 rozehnáno Navzdory názvu byli původně menševici ve straně ve většině a bolševici v menšině (kromě zmíněného 2. sjezdu). Bolševici se v roce 1912 jako strana osamostatnili.[1] V roce 1917 však bolševici ve volbách a podobně začínali získávat vliv a říjnovou revolucí proti Kerenského vládě v listopadu 1917 se násilnou revolucí (tedy přesně podle svého učení) dostali v Rusku k moci a získali absolutní moc. Ve volbách do Všeruského ústavodárného shromáždění, které se konaly 25. listopadu 1917, získali bolševici pouze 23,9 % hlasů. Lenin nechal 19. ledna 1918 Ústavodárné shromáždění rozehnat a tím zahájil vládu jedné strany.[2] V roce 1918 se jejich frakce / strana přejmenovala na „Velká Komunistická strana Ruska (bolševiků)" od roku 1925 „Všesvazová komunistická strana (bolševiků)", od roku 1952 Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu. V roce 1921 bolševici zakázali v Rusku (pozdějším Sovětském svazu) všechny ostatní politické strany včetně menševiků.[1] Bolševizace Kolem roku 1930 proběhla v zahraničí tzv. bolševizace neboli změna politické orientace komunistických stran pod vlivem Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu (tedy bolševiků). Spustil ji 5. kongres Komunistické internacionály v roce 1924. V Československu bolševické křídlo vedené Klementem Gottwaldem zvítězilo v roce 1929 na 5. sjezdu KSČ.

Brežněvova zemědělská politika

Brezhnev's agricultural policy reinforced the conventional methods for organising the collective farms. Output quotas continued to be imposed centrally.[52] Khrushchev's policy of amalgamating farms was continued by Brezhnev, because he shared Khrushchev's belief that bigger kolkhozes would increase productivity. Brezhnev pushed for an increase in state investments in farming, which mounted to an all-time high in the 1970s of 27% of all state investment - this figure did not include investments in farm equipment. In 1981 alone, 33 billion U.S. dollars (by contemporary exchange rate) was invested into agriculture.[53] Agricultural output in 1980 was 21% higher than the average production rate between 1966 and 1970. Cereal crop output increased by 18%. These improved results were not encouraging. In the Soviet Union the criterion for assessing agricultural output was the grain harvest. The import of cereal, which began under Khrushchev, had in fact become a normal phenomenon by Soviet standards. When Brezhnev had difficulties sealing commercial trade agreements with the United States, he went elsewhere, such as to Argentina. Trade was necessary because the Soviet Union's domestic production of fodder crops was severely deficient. Another sector that was hitting the wall was the sugar beet harvest, which had declined by 2% in the 1970s. Brezhnev's way of resolving these issues was to increase state investment. Politburo member Gennady Voronov advocated for the division of each farm's work-force into what he called "links".[53] These "links" would be entrusted with specific functions, such as to run a farm's dairy unit. His argument was that the larger the work force, the less responsible they felt.[53] This program had been proposed to Joseph Stalin by Andrey Andreyev in the 1940s, and had been opposed by Khrushchev before and after Stalin's death. Voronov was also unsuccessful; Brezhnev turned him down, and in 1973 he was removed from the Politburo.[54] Experimentation with "links" was not disallowed on a local basis, with Mikhail Gorbachev, the then First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, experimenting with links in his region. In the meantime, the Soviet government's involvement in agriculture was, according to Robert Service, otherwise "unimaginative" and "incompetent".[54] Facing mounting problems with agriculture, the Politburo issued a resolution titled, "On the Further Development of Specialisation and Concentration of Agricultural Production on the Basis of Inter-Farm Co-operation and Agro-Industrial Integration".[54] The resolution ordered kolkhozes close to each other to collaborate in their efforts to increase production. In the meantime, the state's subsidies to the food-and-agriculture sector did not prevent bankrupt farms from operating: rises in the price of produce were offset by rises in the cost of oil and other resources. By 1977, oil cost 84% more than it did in the late 1960s. The cost of other resources had also climbed by the late 1970s.[54] Brezhnev's answer to these problems was to issue two decrees, one in 1977 and one in 1981, which called for an increase in the maximum size of privately owned plots within the Soviet Union to half a hectare. These measures removed important obstacles for the expansion of agricultural output, but did not solve the problem. Under Brezhnev, private plots yielded 30% of the national agricultural production when they only cultivated 4% of the land. This was seen by some as proof that de-collectivisation was necessary to prevent Soviet agriculture from collapsing, but leading Soviet politicians shrank from supporting such drastic measures due to ideological and political interests.[54] The underlying problems were the growing shortage of skilled workers, a wrecked rural culture, the payment of workers in proportion to the quantity rather than the quality of their work, and too large farm machinery for the small collective farms and the roadless countryside. In the face of this, Brezhnev's only options were schemes such as large land reclamation and irrigation projects, or of course, radical reform

Brežněvova doktrína

Brežněvova doktrína omezené suverenity řídila sovětskou zahraniční politiku od roku 1968 do Perestrojky. Generální tajemník Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu Leonid Iljič Brežněv považoval hrozbu, že by se některá socialistická země odvrátila od socialismu ke kapitalismu, za problém nejen této země, ale i všech ostatních socialistických států. Sovětský svaz si tím vlastně vyhradil právo intervenovat v libovolné zemi východního bloku, ve které by existovalo takové nebezpečí. Brežněvova doktrína byla aplikována pro ospravedlnění okupace Československa v roce 1968 a Afghánistánu v roce 1979. The Brezhnev Doctrine was a Soviet foreign policy, first and most clearly outlined by Sergei Kovalev in a September 26, 1968 Pravda article entitled Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries.[1] Leonid Brezhnev reiterated it in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 13, 1968,[2] which stated: When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries. This doctrine was announced to retroactively justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that ended the Prague Spring, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as the invasion of Hungary in 1956. These interventions were meant to put an end to liberalization efforts and uprisings that had the potential to compromise Soviet hegemony inside the Eastern Bloc, which was considered by the Soviet Union to be an essential defensive and strategic buffer in case hostilities with NATO were to break out. In practice, the policy meant that only limited independence of the satellite states' communist parties was allowed and that no socialist country would be allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc in any way. That is, no country could leave the Warsaw Pact or disturb a ruling communist party's monopoly on power. Implicit in this doctrine was that the leadership of the Soviet Union reserved, for itself, the power to define "socialism" and "capitalism". Following the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine, numerous treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and its satellite states to reassert these points and to further ensure inter-state cooperation. The principles of the doctrine were so broad that the Soviets even used it to justify their military intervention in the non-Warsaw Pact nation of Afghanistan in 1979. The Brezhnev Doctrine stayed in effect until it was ended with the Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980-1981.[3] Mikhail Gorbachev refused to use military force when Poland held free elections in 1989 and Solidarity defeated the Polish United Workers' Party.[4] It was superseded by the facetiously named Sinatra Doctrine in 1989, alluding to the Frank Sinatra song "My Way".[5]

Chruščovovské tání

Chruščovovské tání, období tání nebo jen tání označuje období v dějinách Sovětského svazu po Stalinové smrti, které trvalo od poloviny padesátých let do poloviny let šedesátých 20. století. Ve vnitropolitickém životě Sovětského svazu došlo k určitému uvolnění a oslabení totalitní moci. Pojmenování souvisí s Nikitou Sergejevičem Chruščovem, který v letech 1953—1964 zastával funkci prvního tajemníka ÚV KSSS. Tání (rusky оттепель) je název povídky Ilji Erenburga vydané v roce 1954. The Khrushchev Thaw (or Khrushchev's Thaw; Russian: хрущёвская о́ттепель, tr. khrushchovskaya ottepel, IPA: [xrʊˈɕːɵfskəjə ˈotʲ:ɪpʲɪlʲ] or simply ottepel)[1] refers to the period from the early 1950s to the early 1960s when repression and censorship in the Soviet Union were relaxed, and millions of Soviet political prisoners were released from Gulag labor camps due to Nikita Khrushchev's policies of de-Stalinization[2] and peaceful coexistence with other nations. The Thaw became possible after the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953. First Secretary Khrushchev denounced former General Secretary Stalin[3] in "The Secret Speech" at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party,[4][5] then ousted the pro-Stalinists during his power struggle in the Kremlin. The term was coined after Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954 novel The Thaw ("Оттепель"),[6] sensational for its time. The Khrushchev Thaw was highlighted by Khrushchev's 1954 visit to Beijing, People's Republic of China, his 1955 visit to Belgrade, Yugoslavia (with whom relations had soured since the Tito-Stalin Split in 1948), and his subsequent meeting with Dwight Eisenhower later that year, culminating in Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States. The Thaw initiated irreversible transformation of the entire Soviet society by opening up for some economic reforms and international trade, educational and cultural contacts, festivals, books by foreign authors, foreign movies, art shows, popular music, dances and new fashions, and massive involvement in international sport competitions. Although the power struggle between pro-Khrushchev and pro-Stalinists never stopped, it eventually weakened the Soviet Communist Party. Such Thaw allowed some freedom of information in the media, arts, and culture; international festivals; foreign films; uncensored books; and new forms of entertainment on the emerging national TV, ranging from massive parades and celebrations to popular music and variety shows, satire and comedies, and all-star shows[7] like Goluboy Ogonyok. Such political and cultural updates all together helped liberate the minds of millions and changed public consciousness of several generations of people in the Soviet Union.[8][9] The Thaw was reverted shortly after Khrushchev was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev, as he reversed the liberalization of the union, albeit going against his endorsement of the Thaw during the Khrushchev era.

vztahy s Čínou za Brežněva

China Main article: Sino-Soviet relations Alexei Kosygin was the most optimistic members of the Soviet leadership regarding the Soviet rapprochement with the PRC[87] In the aftermath of Khrushchev's removal and the Sino-Soviet split, Alexei Kosygin was the most optimistic member of the Soviet leadership for a future rapprochement with China, while Yuri Andropov remained skeptical and Brezhnev did not even voice his opinion. In many ways, Kosygin even had problems understanding why the two countries were quarreling with each other in the first place.[87] The collective leadership; Anastas Mikoyan, Brezhnev and Kosygin were considered by the PRC to retain the revisionist attitudes of their predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev.[88] At first, the new Soviet leadership blamed the Sino-Soviet split not on the PRC, but on policy errors made by Khrushchev. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin were enthusiastic for rapprochement with the PRC. When Kosygin met his counterpart, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in 1964, Kosygin found him to be in an "excellent mood".[89] The early hints of rapprochement collapsed, however, when Zhou accused Kosygin of Khrushchev-like behavior after Rodion Malinovsky's anti-imperialistic speech against the First World.[90] When Kosygin told Brezhnev that it was time to reconcile with China, Brezhnev replied: "If you think this is necessary, then you go by yourself".[91] Kosygin was afraid that China would turn down his proposal for a visit, so he decided to stop off in Beijing on his way to Vietnamese Communist leaders in Hanoi on 5 February 1965; there he met with Zhou. The two were able to solve smaller issues, agreeing to increase trade between the countries, as well as celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance.[92] Kosygin was told that a reconciliation between the two countries might take years, and that rapprochement could occur only gradually.[93] In his report to the Soviet leadership, Kosygin noted Zhou's moderate stance against the Soviet Union, and believed he was open for serious talks about Sino-Soviet relations.[91] After his visit to Hanoi, Kosygin returned to Beijing on 10 February, this time to meet Mao Zedong personally. At first Mao refused to meet Kosygin, but eventually agreed and the two met on 11 February.[94] His meeting with Mao was in an entirely different tone to the previous meeting with Zhou. Mao criticized Kosygin, and the Soviet leadership, of revisionist behavior. He also continued to criticize Khrushchev's earlier policies.[94] This meeting was to become Mao's last meeting with any Soviet leader.[95] The Cultural Revolution caused a complete meltdown of Sino-Soviet relations, inasmuch as Moscow (along with every communist state save for Albania) considered that event to be simple-minded insanity. Red Guards denounced the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern Bloc as revisionists who pursued a false socialism and of being in collusion with the forces of imperialism. Brezhnev was referred to as "the new Hitler" and the Soviets as warmongers who neglected their people's living standards in favor of military spending. In 1968 Lin Biao, the Chinese Defence Minister, claimed that the Soviet Union was preparing itself for a war against China. Moscow shot back by accusing China of false socialism and plotting with the US as well as promoting a guns-over-butter economic policy. This tension escalated into small skirmishes alongside the Sino-Soviet border,[96] and both Khrushchev and Brezhnev were derided as "betrayers of [Vladimir] Lenin" by the Chinese.[97] To counter the accusations made by the Chinese Central Government, Brezhnev condemned the PRC's "frenzied anti-Sovietism", and asked Zhou Enlai to follow up on his word to normalize Sino-Soviet relations. In another speech, this time in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR in 1982, Brezhnev warned First World powers of using the Sino-Soviet split against the Soviet Union, saying it would spark "tension and mistrust".[98] Brezhnev had offered a non-aggression pact to China, but its terms included a renunciation of China's territorial claims, and would have left China defenseless against threats from the USSR.[98] In 1972, US president Richard Nixon visited Beijing to restore relations with the PRC, which only seemed to confirm Soviet fears of Sino-US collusion. Relations between Moscow and Beijing remained extremely hostile through the entire decade of the 1970s, the latter deciding that "social" imperialism presented a greater danger than capitalist imperialism, and even after Mao Zedong's death showed no sign of a chill. The Soviet Union had by this time championed an Asian collective security treaty in which they would defend any country against a possible attack from China, but when the latter engaged Vietnam in a border war during early 1979, Moscow contented itself with verbal protests.[99] The Soviet leadership after Brezhnev's death actively pursued a more friendly foreign policy to China, and the normalization of relations which had begun under Brezhnev, continued under his successors.[

kolektivní vedení SSSR

Collective leadership (Russian: коллективное руководство, kollektivnoye rukovodstvo) or Collectivity of leadership (Russian: коллективность руководства, kollektivnost rukovodstva), was considered an ideal form of governance in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and other socialist states espousing communism. Its main task was to distribute powers and functions among the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Council of Ministers to hinder any attempts to create a one-man dominance over the Soviet political system by a Soviet leader, such as that seen under Joseph Stalin's rule. On the national level, the heart of the collective leadership was officially the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Collective leadership is characterised by limiting the powers of the General Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers as related to other offices by enhancing the powers of collective bodies, such as the Politburo. Vladimir Lenin was, according to Soviet literature, the perfect example of a leader ruling in favour of the collective. Stalin's rule was characterised by one-man dominance, which was a deep breach of inner-party democracy and collective leadership; this made his leadership highly controversial in the Soviet Union following his death in 1953. At the 20th Party Congress, Stalin's reign was criticised as the "cult of the individual". Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, supported the ideal of collective leadership but only ruled in a collective fashion when it suited him. In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted due to his disregard of collective leadership and was replaced in his posts by Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and by Alexei Kosygin as Premier. Collective leadership was strengthened during the Brezhnev years and the later reigns of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms helped spawn factionalism within the Soviet leadership, and members of Gorbachev's faction openly disagreed with him on key issues. The factions usually disagreed on how little or how much reform was needed to rejuvenate the Soviet system. Early years Georgy Malenkov, the Premier of the Soviet Union, emerged as one of the major contenders for the Soviet leadership in 1953, but lost to Khrushchev in 1955.[1] Soviet ideologists believed[when?] that Vladimir Lenin, the first Soviet leader, thought that only collective leadership could protect the Party from serious mistakes. Joseph Stalin, who consolidated his power after the death of Lenin in 1924, promoted these values; however, instead of creating a new collective leadership, he built up an autocratic leadership centered around himself.[2] After Stalin's death (5 March 1953), his successors, while vying for control over the Soviet leadership, promoted the values of collective leadership.[3] Georgy Malenkov, Lavrentiy Beria and Vyacheslav Molotov[4] formed a collective leadership immediately after Stalin's death, but it collapsed when Malenkov and Molotov deceived Beria.[5] After the arrest of Beria (26 June 1953), Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed collective leadership as the "supreme principle of our Party". He further stated that only decisions approved by the Central Committee (CC) could ensure good leadership for the party and the country.[3] In reality, however, Khrushchev promoted these ideas so that he could win enough support to remove his opponents from power, most notably Premier Malenkov, who resigned in February 1955.[1] Khrushchev criticised Stalin's rule during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a "cult of the individual". He accused Stalin of reducing the Party's activities and putting an end to Party democracy among others. In the three years following Stalin's death, the Central Committee and the Presidium (Politburo) worked consistently to uphold the collective leadership lost under Stalin.[6] Khrushchev's rule as First Secretary remained highly controversial throughout his rule in the Party leadership. The first attempt to depose Khrushchev came in 1957, when the Anti-Party Group accused him of individualistic leadership. The coup failed, but Khrushchev's position weakened drastically. However, Khrushchev continued to portray his regime as a "rule of the collective" even after becoming Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier of the Soviet Union), replacing Nikolai Bulganin.[7] Official order of precedence (according to 5 March 1953 amendment) Collectivity of leadership An official portrait of Leonid Brezhnev from 1977 Brezhnev (center with Nikolai Podgorny) among the members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Most Western observers believed that Khrushchev had become the supreme leader of the Soviet Union by the early 1960s, even if this was far from the truth. The Presidium, which had grown to resent Khrushchev's leadership style and feared Mao Zedong's one-man dominance and the growing cult of personality in the People's Republic of China, began an aggressive campaign against Khrushchev in 1963. This campaign culminated in 1964[7] with the replacement of Khrushchev in his offices of First Secretary by Leonid Brezhnev and of Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Alexei Kosygin. Brezhnev and Kosygin, along with Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Kirilenko and Anastas Mikoyan (replaced in 1965 by Nikolai Podgorny), were elected to their respective offices to form and lead a functioning collective leadership.[8] One of the reasons for Khrushchev's ousting, as Suslov told him, was his violation of collective leadership.[9] With Khrushchev's removal, collective leadership was again praised by the Soviet media, and it was claimed to be a return to "Leninist norms of Party life".[10] At the plenum which ousted Khrushchev, the Central Committee forbade any single individual to hold the office of General Secretary and Premier simultaneously.[11] The leadership was usually referred to as the "Brezhnev-Kosygin" leadership, instead of the collective leadership, by First World medias. At first, there was no clear leader of the collective leadership, and Kosygin was the chief economic administrator, whereas Brezhnev was primarily responsible for the day-to-day management of the party and internal affairs. Kosygin's position was later weakened when he introduced a reform in 1965 that attempted to decentralise the Soviet economy. The reform led to a backlash, with Kosygin losing supporters because many top officials took an increasingly anti-reformist stance due to the Prague Spring of 1968.[12] As the years passed, Brezhnev was given more and more prominence, and by the 1970s he had even created a "Secretariat of the General Secretary" to strengthen his position within the Party. At the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev was, according to an anonymous historian, praised in a way that exceeded the praise accorded to Khrushchev before his removal.[10] Brezhnev was able to retain the Politburo's support by not introducing the same sweeping reform measures as seen during Khrushchev's rule. As noted by foreign officials, Brezhnev felt "obliged" to discuss unanticipated proposals with the Politburo before responding to them.[13] Later years As Brezhnev's health worsened during the late 1970s, the collective leadership became even more "collective". Brezhnev's death did not alter the balance of power in any radical fashion, and Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were obliged by protocol to rule the country in the very same fashion as Brezhnev.[10] When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to the position of General Secretary in March 1985, some observers wondered if he could be the leader to overcome the restraints of the collective leadership. Gorbachev's reform agenda had succeeded in altering the Soviet political system for good; however, this change made him some enemies. Many of Gorbachev's closest allies disagreed with him on what reforms were needed, or how radical they should be.[14] Analysis Soviet assessments According to Soviet literature, the Central Committee and not the Politburo was the heart of collective leadership at the national level. At a sub-national level, all Party and Government organs were to work together to ensure collective leadership instead of only the Central Committee. However, as with many other ideological theses, the definition of collective leadership was applied "flexibly to a variety of situations".[15] Making Vladimir Lenin the example of a ruler ruling in favour of a collective can be seen as proof of this "flexibility".[15] In some Soviet ideological drafts, collective leadership can be compared to collegial leadership instead of a leadership of the collective. In accordance with a Soviet textbook, collective leadership was:[15] The regular convocations of Party congresses and plenary sessions of the Central Committee, regular meetings of all electoral organs of the party, general public discussion of the major issues of state, economic and party development, extensive consultation with persons employed in various branches of the economy and cultural life...."[15] In contrast to fascism, which advocates one-man dominance, Leninism advocates inner-Party democratic collective leadership. Hence, the ideological justification of collective leadership in the Soviet Union was easy to justify. The physical insecurity of the political leadership under Stalin, and the political insecurity that existed during Khrushchev's reign, strengthened the political leadership's will to ensure a rule of the collective, and not that of the individual.[16] Collective leadership was a value that was highly esteemed during Stalin and Khrushchev's reigns, but it was violated in practice

vztahy s Východním Blokem za Brežněva

Eastern Bloc Władysław Gomułka (left), the leader of Poland, in East Germany with Brezhnev. The Soviet leadership's policy towards the Eastern Bloc did not change much with Khrushchev's replacement, as the states of Eastern Europe were seen as a buffer zone essential to placing distance between NATO and the Soviet Union's borders. The Brezhnev regime inherited a skeptical attitude towards reform policies which became more radical in tone following the Prague Spring in 1968.[101] János Kádár, the leader of Hungary, initiated a couple of reforms similar to Alexei Kosygin's 1965 economic reform. The reform measures, named the New Economic Mechanism, were introduced in Hungary during Khrushchev's rule, and were protected by Kosygin in the post-Khrushchev era.[102] Polish leader Władysław Gomułka, who was removed from all of his posts in 1970, was succeeded by Edward Gierek who tried to revitalize the economy of Poland by borrowing money from the First World. The Soviet leadership approved both countries' respective economic experiments, since it was trying to reduce its large Eastern Bloc subsidy program in the form of cheap oil and gas exports.[103] Alexei Kosygin (right) shaking hands with Romanian communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu on 22 August 1974. Ceauşescu was one of the communist leaders who opposed the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine. Not all reforms were supported by the Soviet leadership, however. Alexander Dubček's political and economic liberalisation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic led to a Soviet-led invasion of the country by Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968.[103] Not all in the Soviet leadership were as enthusiastic for a military intervention; Brezhnev remained wary of any sort of intervention and Kosygin reminded leaders of the consequences of the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. In the aftermath of the invasion the Brezhnev Doctrine was introduced; it stated that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in any socialist country on the road to communism which was deviating from the communist norm of development.[104] The doctrine was condemned by Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia. As a result, the worldwide communist movement became poly-centric, meaning that the Soviet Union lost its role as 'leader' of the world communist movement.[105] In the aftermath of the invasion, Brezhnev reiterated this doctrine in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) on 13 November 1968:[106] When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries. — Brezhnev, Speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in November 1968[106] A stamp showing Brezhnev and Erich Honecker, the leader of East Germany, shaking hands. Honecker was supportive of Soviet policy in Poland. On 25 August 1980 the Soviet Politburo established a commission chaired by Mikhail Suslov to examine the political crisis in Poland that was beginning to gain speed. The importance of the commission was demonstrated by its composition: Dmitriy Ustinov (Minister of Defence), Andrei Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Yuri Andropov (KGB Chairman) and Konstantin Chernenko, the Head of the General Department of the Central Committee and Brezhnev's closest associate. After just three days, the commission proposed the possibility of a Soviet military intervention, among other concrete measures. Troops and tank divisions were moved to the Soviet-Polish border. Later, however, the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that they should not intervene in Poland.[107] Stanisław Kania, the First Secretary of the PUWP, mooted the Soviet proposal for introducing martial law in Poland.[107] Erich Honecker, the First Secretary of the East German Socialist Unity Party, supported the decision of the Soviet leadership, and sent a letter to Brezhnev and called for a meeting of the Eastern Bloc leaders to discuss the situation in Poland.[108] When the leaders met at the Kremlin later that year, Brezhnev had concluded that it would be better to leave the domestic matters of Poland alone for the time being, reassuring the Polish delegation, headed by Kania, that the USSR would intervene only if asked to.[108] As Archie Brown notes in his book The Rise and Fall of Communism, "Poland was a special case".[109] The Soviet Union had intervened in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the previous year, and the increasingly hard-line policies of the Reagan administration along with the vast organisational network of the opposition, were among the major reasons why the Politburo Commission pushed for martial law instead of an intervention.[109] When Wojciech Jaruzelski became Prime Minister of Poland in February 1980, the Soviet leadership, but also Poles in general, supported his appointment. As time went by, however, Jaruzelski tried, and failed, according to Archie Brown, "to walk a tightrope" between the demands made by the USSR and the Poles.[110] Martial law was initiated on 13 December 1981 by the Jaruzelski Government.[111] During the final years of Brezhnev's rule, and in the aftermath of his death, the Soviet leadership was forced by domestic difficulties to allow the Eastern Bloc governments to introduce more nationalistic communist policies to head off similar unrest to the turmoil in Poland and hence preventing it spreading to other communist countries. In a similar vein, Yuri Andropov, Brezhnev's successor, claimed in a report to the Politburo that maintaining good relations with the Eastern Bloc "took precedence in Soviet foreign polic

ekonomický růst do roku 1973

Economic growth until 1973 Period Annual GNP growth (according to the CIA) Annual NMP growth (according to Grigorii Khanin) Annual NMP growth (according to the USSR) 1960-1965 4.8[35] 4.4[35] 6.5[35] 1965-1970 4.9[35] 4.1[35] 7.7[35] 1970-1975 3.0[35] 3.2[35] 5.7[35] 1975-1980 1.9[35] 1.0[35] 4.2[35] 1980-1985 1.8[35] 0.6[35] 3.5[35] [note 1] Between 1960 and 1970, Soviet agriculture output increased by 3% annually. Industry also improved: during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), the output of factories and mines increased by 138% compared to 1960. While the Politburo became aggressively anti-reformist, Kosygin was able to convince both Brezhnev and the politburo to leave the reformist communist leader János Kádár of the People's Republic of Hungary alone because of an economic reform entitled New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which granted limited permission for the establishment of retail markets.[45] In the People's Republic of Poland, another approach was taken in 1970 under the leadership of Edward Gierek; he believed that the government needed Western loans to facilitate the rapid growth of heavy industry. The Soviet leadership gave its approval for this, as the Soviet Union could not afford to maintain its massive subsidy for the Eastern Bloc in the form of cheap oil and gas exports. The Soviet Union did not accept all kinds of reforms, an example being the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in response to Alexander Dubček's reforms.[46] Under Brezhnev, the Politburo abandoned Khrushchev's decentralisation experiments. By 1966, two years after taking power, Brezhnev abolished the Regional Economic Councils, which were organized to manage the regional economies of the Soviet Union.[47] The Ninth Five-Year Plan delivered a change: for the first time industrial consumer products out-produced industrial capital goods. Consumer goods such as watches, furniture and radios were produced in abundance. The plan still left the bulk of the state's investment in industrial capital-goods production. This outcome was not seen as a positive sign for the future of the Soviet state by the majority of top party functionaries within the government; by 1975 consumer goods were expanding 9% slower than industrial capital-goods. The policy continued despite Brezhnev's commitment to make a rapid shift of investment to satisfy Soviet consumers and lead to an even higher standard of living. This did not happen.[48] During 1928-1973, the Soviet Union was growing economically at a pace that would eventually catch up with the United States and Western Europe. However, objective comparisons are difficult. The USSR was hampered by the effects of World War II, which had left most of Western USSR in ruins, however Western aid and Soviet espionage in the period 1941-1945 (culminating in cash, material and equipment deliveries for military and industrial purposes) had allowed the Russians to leapfrog many Western economies in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in the fields of nuclear technology, radio communications, agriculture and heavy manufacturing. In 1973, the process of catching up with the rest of the West came to an abrupt end, and 1973 was seen by some scholars as the start of the Era of Stagnation. The beginning of the stagnation coincided with a financial crisis in Western Europe and the U.S.[49] By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had the world's second largest industrial capacity, and produced more steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and tractors than any other country.[50] Before 1973, the Soviet economy was expanding at a faster rate than that of the American economy (albeit by a very small margin). The USSR also kept a steady pace with the economies of Western Europe. Between 1964 and 1973, the Soviet economy stood at roughly half the output per head of Western Europe and a little more than one third that of the U.S.[51]

volby v sssr

Elections in the Soviet Union From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The electoral system of the Soviet Union was based upon Chapter XI of the Constitution of the Soviet Union and by the Electoral Laws enacted in conformity with it. The Constitution and laws applied to elections in all Soviets, from the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, the Union republics and autonomous republics, through to regions, districts and towns. Voting was theoretically secret and direct with universal suffrage.[1] However, in practice, until 1989 voters could vote against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union candidate, but could only do so by using polling booths, whereas votes for the party could be cast simply by submitting a blank ballot [2]. A 1945 decree allowed for members of the Red Army stationed outside the Soviet Union to vote for both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities) in special 100,000-member districts. These were first enacted in the 1946 legislative elections and continued through the next decades as the Red Army continued its presence in the Eastern Bloc.[3]

11. pětiletka

Eleventh five-year plan (Soviet Union) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The Eleventh Five-Year Plan, or the 11th Five-Year Plan, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a set of goals designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1981 and 1985. The plan was presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Tikhonov at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[1] Contents 1 The 26th Congress 2 Fulfillment 3 See also 4 References The 26th Congress Main article: 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union A Soviet stamp devoted to the 26th Party Congress In his speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev told the delegates that the main goal of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan was to transition the Soviet economy from extensive to intensive growth, and to further improve the standard of living by 18-20 percent by 1985.[2] He also told the Congress that the 1979 economic reform, initiated by Alexei Kosygin, would be of major importance to the five-year plan's success.[3] Other goals were halting migration from East to West and South to North as well as ensuring economic growth. By 1981 the majority of Soviet economic centers were located in underdeveloped areas, such as Siberia and Central Asia. According to the Soviet government, the solution was to reduce social differences in the republics, oblasts and sub-regional units—in Brezhnev's words to establish an "effective demographic policy".[4] However, according to the Soviet government, the socioeconomic development of the Soviet Republics had been evened out due to the altruism of the Russian people, such that developmental differences between republics were no longer a problem.[5] Nikolai Tikhonov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, told the Congress that industrial output would grow by an estimated 26-28 percent during the five-year plan and capital investment by between 12-15 percent over the preceding plan. Tikhonov criticised what he saw as inefficiencies within the planned economy, placing most of the blame on low labour productivity, which as a result was targeted to grow by 23-25 percent, an increase of 6-8 percent over the preceding plan.[6] "The basic guidelines for the USSR's economic and social development in 1981-85 and the period up to 1990", an economic plan proposed by Tikhonov, was adopted by the Congress. The five key points of Tikhonov's economic plan were:[7] Growth in the eastern regions to be accelerated. Labour reserves of Central Asia to be better utilised, with training of a well-educated workforce improved. Modernisation of enterprises in Soviet Europe and existing resources put to better use. Territorial production complexes put to better use. An increase in the Soviet's role in oversight of the planned economy. In his presentation to the congress, Tikhonov admitted that Soviet agriculture had failed to produce enough grain. He called for improvements in Soviet-US relations, but dismissed all speculation that the Soviet economy was in any sort of crisis.[8] However, he went on to admit that there were economic "shortcomings" and acknowledged the ongoing "food problem". Other topics for discussion were the need to save energy resources and to improve the quality of Soviet produced goods.[9] Fulfillment By the 1980s the Soviet economy had stagnated, with the natural gas industry the only Soviet fuel industry to surpass the five-year plan's indicators.[10] Although 40,000 robots were produced during the plan,[11] advances in computer technology decreased, due to growing disillusionment with the Soviet system.[12] At the end of his life, former Premier Alexei Kosygin feared the complete failure of this five-year plan, claiming that the incumbent leadership were reluctant to reform the stagnant Soviet economy.[13] None of the Soviet Far East oblasts fulfilled the five-year plan's housing targets.[14] By the 1960s, the goal of increasing the labour surplus had become a major obstacle, caused by factors including the declining birth rate. Labour growth had also stagnated with working population growth remaining at 18 percent between 1971 and 1980. The table below uses the planner's targets as a base for comparison with actual increases in industrial growth due to labour productivity.[15] Year % growth achieved 11th Five-Year Plan 90 1981 62 1982 61 1983 80 1984 93

konec čistek

End of The Great Purge In this famous image, Nikolai Yezhov is shown with Voroshilov, Molotov, and Stalin inspecting the White Sea Canal. The image was later altered to remove Yezhov completely. In the summer of 1938 Yezhov was relieved from his post as head of the NKVD and was eventually tried and executed. Lavrentiy Beria, a fellow Georgian and Stalin confidant, succeeded him as head of NKVD. On 17 November 1938 a joint decree of Sovnarkom USSR and Central Committee of VKP(b) (Decree about Arrests, Prosecutor Supervision and Course of Investigation) and the subsequent order of NKVD undersigned by Beria, cancelled most of the NKVD orders of systematic repression and suspended implementation of death sentences. The decree signaled the end of massive Soviet purges.[citation needed] Nevertheless, the practice of mass arrest and exile continued until Stalin's death in 1953. Political executions also continued, but, with the exception of Katyn and other NKVD massacres during World War II, on a vastly smaller scale. One notorious example is the "Night of the Murdered Poets", in which at least thirteen prominent Yiddish writers were executed on 12 August 1952. Historians such as Michael Parrish have argued that while the Great Terror ended in 1938, a lesser terror continued in the 1940s.[72] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (a Soviet Army officer who became a prisoner for a decade in the Gulag system) presents in The Gulag Archipelago the most holistic view of the timeline of all the Leninist and Stalinist purges (1918-1956), in which the 1936-38 purge may have been simply the one that got the most attention from people in a position to record its magnitude for posterity—the intelligentsia—by directly targeting them, whereas several other waves of the ongoing flow of purges, such as the 1928-33 collectivization and dekulakization, were just as huge and just as devoid of justice but were more successfully swallowed into oblivion in the popular memory of the (surviving) Soviet public.[73] For example, in one such passage Solzhenitsyn mentions 1938 and says that 1948 was in some ways hardly better. In some cases, high military command arrested under Yezhov were later executed under Beria. Some examples include Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Yegorov, arrested in April 1938 and shot (or died from torture) in February 1939 (his wife, G. A. Yegorova, was shot in August 1938); Army Commander Ivan Fedko, arrested July 1938 and shot February 1939; Flagman Konstantin Dushenov [ru], arrested May 1938 and shot February 1940; Komkor G. I. Bondar, arrested August 1938 and shot March 1939. All the aforementioned have been posthumously rehabilitated.[74] When the relatives of those who had been executed in 1937-38 inquired about their fate, they were told by NKVD that their arrested relatives had been sentenced to "ten years without the right of correspondence" (десять лет без права переписки). When these ten-year periods elapsed in 1947-48 but the arrested did not appear, the relatives asked MGB about their fate again and this time were told that the arrested died in imprisonment.[75]

Berija po smrti Stalina

First Deputy Premier and Soviet triumvir After Stalin's death, Beria was appointed First Deputy Premier and reappointed head of the MVD, which he merged with the MGB. His close ally Malenkov was the new Prime Minister and initially the most powerful man in the post-Stalin leadership. Beria was second most powerful, and given Malenkov's personal weakness, was poised to become the power behind the throne and ultimately leader himself. Khrushchev became Party Secretary. Voroshilov became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (i.e., the head of state). Given his record, it is not surprising that the other Party leaders were suspicious of Beria's motives. Khrushchev opposed the alliance between Beria and Malenkov, but he was initially unable to challenge them. His opportunity came in June 1953 when a spontaneous uprising against the East German Communist regime broke out in East Berlin. Based on Beria's own statements, other leaders suspected that in the wake of the uprising, he might be willing to trade the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War for massive aid from the United States, as had been received in World War II. The cost of the war still weighed heavily on the Soviet economy. Beria craved the vast financial resources that another (more sustained) relationship with the United States could provide. For example, Beria gave Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania serious prospects of national autonomy, possibly similarly to other Soviet satellite states in Europe.[43][44][45] Regarding East Germany Beria said, "It's not even a real state but one kept in being only by Soviet troops."[46] The East German uprising convinced Molotov, Malenkov, and Nikolai Bulganin that Beria's policies were dangerous and destabilizing to Soviet power. Within days of the events in Germany, Khrushchev persuaded the other leaders to support a Party coup against Beria; Beria's principal ally Malenkov abandoned him. Arrest, trial and execution On 26 June 1953, Beria was arrested and held in an undisclosed location near Moscow. Accounts of Beria's fall vary considerably. By the most likely account, Khrushchev prepared an elaborate ambush, convening a meeting of the Presidium on 26 June, where he suddenly launched a scathing attack on Beria, accusing him of being a traitor and spy in the pay of British intelligence. Beria was taken completely by surprise. He asked, "What's going on, Nikita Sergeyevich? Why are you picking fleas in my trousers?" Molotov and others quickly spoke against Beria one after the other, followed by a motion by Khrushchev for his instant dismissal. When Beria finally realized what was happening and plaintively appealed to Malenkov to speak for him, his old friend and crony silently hung his head and refused to meet his gaze. Malenkov pressed a button on his desk as the pre-arranged signal to Marshal Georgy Zhukov and a group of armed officers in a nearby room who burst in and arrested Beria.[47] Beria was taken first to the Moscow guardhouse and then to the bunker of the headquarters of Moscow Military District. Defence Minister Nikolai Bulganin ordered the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division to move into Moscow to prevent security forces loyal to Beria from rescuing him. Many of Beria's subordinates, proteges and associates were also arrested, among them Vsevolod Merkulov, Bogdan Kobulov, Sergey Goglidze, Vladimir Dekanozov, Pavel Meshik, and Lev Vlodzimirskiy. Pravda did not announce Beria's arrest until 10 July, crediting it to Malenkov and referring to Beria's "criminal activities against the Party and the State." Beria and the others were tried by a special session (spetsialnoye sudebnoye prisutstvie специальное судебное присутствие) of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union on 23 December 1953 with no defense counsel and no right of appeal. Marshal Ivan Konev was the chairman of the court. Beria was found guilty of: Treason. It was alleged that he had maintained secret connections with foreign intelligence services. In particular, attempts to initiate peace talks with Hitler in 1941 through the ambassador of the Kingdom of Bulgaria were classified as treason, though Beria had been acting on the orders of Stalin and Molotov. It was also alleged that Beria, who in 1942 helped organize the defense of the North Caucasus, tried to let the Germans occupy the Caucasus. Beria's suggestion to his assistants that to improve foreign relations it was reasonable to transfer the Kaliningrad Oblast to Germany, part of Karelia to Finland, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic to Romania and the Kuril Islands to Japan also formed part of the allegations against him. Terrorism. Beria's participation in the Purge of the Red Army in 1941 was classified as an act of terrorism. Counter-revolutionary activity during the Russian Civil War. In 1919 Beria worked in the security service of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Beria maintained that he was assigned to that work by the Hummet party, which subsequently merged with the Adalat Party, the Ahrar Party, and the Baku Bolsheviks to establish the Azerbaijan Communist Party. Beria and all the other defendants were sentenced to death on 23 December 1953. When the death sentence was carried out, Beria pleaded on his knees for mercy before collapsing to the floor and wailing and crying, but to no avail.[48] The other six defendants were executed by firing squad on the same day the trial ended.[49] Beria was executed separately. He was shot through the forehead by General Pavel Batitsky who had to stuff a rag into Beria's mouth to silence him. His final moments bore great similarity to those of his own predecessor, NKVD Chief Nikolai Yezhov, who begged for his life before his execution in 1940.[50] His body was subsequently cremated and the remains buried in a forest near Moscow.

Moscow trials

First and Second Moscow Trials Bolshevik revolutionaries Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev Between 1936 and 1938, three very large Moscow Trials of former senior Communist Party leaders were held, in which they were accused of conspiring with fascist and capitalist powers to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders, dismember the Soviet Union and restore capitalism. These trials were highly publicized and extensively covered by the outside world, which was mesmerized by the spectacle of Lenin's closest associates confessing to most outrageous crimes and begging for death sentences. The first trial was of 16 members of the so-called "Trotskyite-Kamenevite-Zinovievite-Leftist-Counter-Revolutionary Bloc",[citation needed] held in August 1936,[17] at which the chief defendants were Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, two of the most prominent former party leaders. Among other accusations, they were incriminated with the assassination of Kirov and plotting to kill Stalin.[citation needed] After confessing to the charges, all were sentenced to death and executed.[18] The second trial in January 1937 involved 17 lesser figures known as the "anti-Soviet Trotskyite-centre" which included Karl Radek, Yuri Piatakov and Grigory Sokolnikov, and were accused of plotting with Trotsky, who was said to be conspiring with Germany. Thirteen of the defendants were eventually executed by shooting. The rest received sentences in labor camps where they soon died. There was also a secret trial before a military tribunal of a group of Red Army commanders, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky, in June 1937. Prosecutor General Andrey Vyshinsky (centre), reading the 1937 indictment against Karl Radek during the 2nd Moscow Trial Some Western observers who attended the trials said that they were fair and that the guilt of the accused had been established. They based this assessment on the confessions of the accused, which were freely given in open court, without any apparent evidence that they had been extracted by torture or drugging. The British lawyer and Member of Parliament D.N. Pritt, for example, wrote: "Once again the more faint-hearted socialists are beset with doubts and anxieties", but "once again we can feel confident that when the smoke has rolled away from the battlefield of controversy it will be realized that the charge was true, the confessions correct and the prosecution fairly conducted". It is now known that the confessions were given only after great psychological pressure and torture had been applied to the defendants. From the accounts of former OGPU officer Alexander Orlov and others, the methods used to extract the confessions are known: such tortures as repeated beatings, simulated drownings, making prisoners stand or go without sleep for days on end, and threats to arrest and execute the prisoners' families. For example, Kamenev's teenage son was arrested and charged with terrorism. After months of such interrogation, the defendants were driven to despair and exhaustion. Zinoviev and Kamenev demanded, as a condition for "confessing", a direct guarantee from the Politburo that their lives and that of their families and followers would be spared. This offer was accepted, but when they were taken to the alleged Politburo meeting, only Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Yezhov were present. Stalin claimed that they were the "commission" authorized by the Politburo and gave assurances that death sentences would not be carried out. After the trial, Stalin not only broke his promise to spare the defendants, he had most of their relatives arrested and shot Dewey Commission The chief executioner of the NKVD, Vasili Blokhin, carried out some of the high-profile executions during the purges.[20] In May 1937, the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, commonly known as the Dewey Commission, was set up in the United States by supporters of Trotsky, to establish the truth about the trials. The commission was headed by the noted American philosopher and educator John Dewey. Although the hearings were obviously conducted with a view to proving Trotsky's innocence, they brought to light evidence which established that some of the specific charges made at the trials could not be true.[21] For example, Georgy Pyatakov testified that he had flown to Oslo in December 1935 to "receive terrorist instructions" from Trotsky. The Dewey Commission established that no such flight had taken place.[22] Another defendant, Ivan Smirnov, confessed to taking part in the assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934, at a time when he had already been in prison for a year. The Dewey Commission later published its findings in a 422-page book titled Not Guilty. Its conclusions asserted the innocence of all those condemned in the Moscow Trials. In its summary, the commission wrote: "Independent of extrinsic evidence, the Commission finds: That the conduct of the Moscow Trials was such as to convince any unprejudiced person that no attempt was made to ascertain the truth. That while confessions are necessarily entitled to the most serious consideration, the confessions themselves contain such inherent improbabilities as to convince the Commission that they do not represent the truth, irrespective of any means used to obtain them. That Trotsky never instructed any of the accused or witnesses in the Moscow trials to enter into agreements with foreign powers against the Soviet Union [and] that Trotsky never recommended, plotted, or attempted the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. The commission concluded: "We therefore find the Moscow Trials to be frame-ups." Implication of the Rightists In the second trial, Karl Radek provided (or more accurately was forced to provide)[citation needed] the pretext for greater purge to come on a massive scale with his testimony that there was a "third organization separate from the cadres which had passed through [Trotsky's] school"[23] as well as "semi-Trotskyites, quarter-Trotskyites, one-eighth-Trotskyites, people who helped us, not knowing of the terrorist organization but sympathizing with us, people who from liberalism, from a Fronde against the Party, gave us this help."[24] By the "third organization", he meant the last remaining former opposition group called the Rightists, led by Bukharin, whom he implicated by saying:

Brežněvovi zahraniční vztahy s 1.světem

First World Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin (in front) next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (behind) at the Glassboro Summit Conference Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, tried to challenge Brezhnev on the rights of the General Secretary to represent the country abroad, a function Kosygin believed should fall into the hands of the Premier, as was common in non-communist countries. This was actually implemented for a short period.[76] Later, however, Kosygin, who had been the chief negotiator with the First World during the 1960s, was hardly to be seen outside the Second World[77] after Brezhnev strengthened his position within the Politburo.[76] Kosygin did head the Soviet Glassboro Summit Conference delegation in 1967 with Lyndon B. Johnson, the then-current President of the United States. The summit was dominated by three issues: the Vietnam War, the Six-Day War and the Soviet-American arms race. Immediately following the summit at Glassboro, Kosygin headed the Soviet delegation to Cuba, where he met an angry Fidel Castro who accused the Soviet Union of "capitulationism".[78] Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister from 1957 to 1985, as seen in 1978 during a visit to the United States Détente, literally the easing of strained relations, or in Russian "unloading", characterized the early part of the era. It meant "ideological co-existence" in the context of Soviet foreign policy, but it did not, however, entail an end to competition between capitalist and communist societies.[79] The Soviet leadership's policy did, however, help to ease the Soviet Union's strained relations with the United States. Several arms control and trade agreements were signed and ratified in this time period.[80] One such success of diplomacy came with Willy Brandt's ascension to the West German chancellorship in 1969, as West German-Soviet tension started to ease. Brandt's Ostpolitik policy, along with Brezhnev's détente, contributed to the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in which West Germany recognized the state borders established following World War II, which included West German recognition of East Germany as an independent state. The foreign relations of the two countries continued to improve during Brezhnev's rule, and in the Soviet Union, where the memory of German brutality during World War II was still remembered, these developments contributed to greatly reducing the animosity the Soviet people felt towards Germany, and Germans in general.[80] Not all efforts were so successful, however. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, a Soviet-led initiative which was hailed as a success for Soviet diplomacy, "backfired", in the words of historian Archie Brown.[81] The U.S. Government retained little interest through the whole process, and Richard Nixon once told a senior British official that the United States "had never wanted the conference".[82] Other notables, such as Nixon's successor President Gerald Ford, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were also unenthusiastic.[82] It was Western European negotiators who played a crucial role in creating the treaty.[82] The Soviet Union sought an official acceptance of the state borders drawn up in post-war Europe by the United States and Western Europe. The Soviets were largely successful; some small differences were that state borders were "inviolable" rather than "immutable", meaning that borders could be changed only without military interference, or interference from another country.[82] Both Brezhnev, Gromyko and the rest of the Soviet leadership were strongly committed to the creation of such a treaty, even if it meant concessions on such topics as human rights and transparency. Mikhail Suslov and Gromyko, among others, were worried about some of the concessions. Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman, believed the greater transparency was weakening the prestige of the KGB, and strengthening the prestige of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[83] Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty on 18 June 1979 in Vienna. Another blow to Soviet communism in the First World came with the establishment of eurocommunism. Eurocommunists espoused and supported the ideals of Soviet communism while at the same time supporting rights of the individual.[84] The largest obstacle was that it was the largest communist parties, those with highest electoral turnout, which became eurocommunists. Originating with the Prague Spring, this new thinking made the First World more skeptical of Soviet communism in general.[85] The Italian Communist Party notably declared that should war break out in Europe, they would rally to the defense of Italy and resist any Soviet incursion on their nation's soil. In particular, Soviet-First World relations deteriorated when the US President Jimmy Carter, following the advice of his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, denounced the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (see Soviet-Afghan relations) and described it as the "most serious danger to peace since 1945".[86] The United States stopped all grain export to the Soviet Union and persuaded US athletes not to enter the 1980 Summer Olympics held in Moscow. The Soviet Union responded by boycotting the next Summer Olympics held in Los Angeles.[86] The détente policy collapsed.[80] When Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter as US president in 1981, he promised a sharp increase in US defense spending and a more aggressively anti-Soviet foreign policy. This caused alarm in Moscow, with the Soviet media accusing him of "warmongering" and "mistakenly believing that stepping up the arms race will bring peace to the world". General Nikolai Ogarkov also commented that too many Soviet citizens had begun believing that any war was bad and peace at any price was good, and that better political education was necessary to inculcate a "class" point of view in world affairs. An event of grave embarrassment to the Soviet Union came in October 1981 when one of its submarines ran aground near the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. As this was a militarily sensitive location, Sweden took an aggressive stance on the incident, detaining the Whiskey-class sub for two weeks as they awaited an official explanation from Moscow. Eventually it was released, but Stockholm refused to accept Soviet claims that this was merely an accident, especially since numerous unidentified submarines had been spotted near the Swedish coast. Sweden also announced that radiation had been detected emanating from the submarine and they believed it to be carrying nuclear missiles. Moscow would neither confirm nor deny this and instead merely accused the Swedes of espionage.

1. pětiletka

First plan, 1928-1932 Main article: first five-year plan This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Five-year plans for the national economy of the Soviet Union" - news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (July 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) From 1928 to 1940, the number of Soviet workers in industry, construction, and transport grew from 4.6 million to 12.6 million and factory output soared.[6] Stalin's first five-year plan helped make the USSR a leading industrial nation. During this period, the first purges were initiated targeting many people working for Gosplan. These included Vladimir Bazarov, the 1931 Menshevik Trial (centered around Vladimir Groman). Stalin announced the start of the first five-year plan for industrialization on October 1, 1928, and it lasted until December 31, 1932. Stalin described it as a new revolution from above.[7] When this plan began, the USSR was fifth in industrialization, and with the great success of the first five-year plan moved up to second, with only the United States in first.[8] This plan was achieved with great success in less time than had been predicted. When the plan was initially proposed it was instantly rejected as being too modest. The target goals were then increased by a reported 50%.[9] Much of the emphasis was placed on heavy industry. In fact, 86% of all industrial investments during this time went directly to heavy industry. Officially the first five-year plan for industry was fulfilled to the extent of 93.7% in just four years and three months.[8] The means of production in regards to heavy industry exceeded the quota, registering 103.4%. The light, or Consumer goods, industry reached up to 84.9% of its assigned quota.[8] However, there is some speculation regarding the legitimacy of these numbers as the nature of Soviet statistics are notoriously misleading or exaggerated. Another issue was that quality was sacrificed in order to achieve quantity and because of this production results generated wildly varied items. This great industrial push created a lack in consumer goods and shortages in rationing.[8] Propaganda used before, during and after the first five-year plan compared industry to battle. This was highly successful. They used terms such as "fronts," "campaigns," and "breakthroughs," while at the same time workers were forced to be working harder than ever before and were organized into "shock troops," and those who rebelled or failed to keep up with their work were treated as traitors as if they were in wartime.[8] The posters and flyers used to promote and advertise the plan were also reminiscent of wartime propaganda. A popular military metaphor emerged from the economic success of the first five-year plan: "There are no fortresses Bolsheviks cannot storm." Stalin especially liked this.[8] The first five-year plan was not just about economics. This plan was a revolution that intended to transform all aspects of society. The way of life for the majority of the people changed drastically during this revolutionary time. The plan was also referred to as the "Great Turn".[8] Individual peasant farming gave way to a more efficient system of collective farming. Peasant property and entire villages were incorporated into the state economy which had its own market forces.[9] There was however, a strong resistance to this at first. The peasants led an all-out attack to protect individual farming; however, Stalin rightly did not see the peasants as a threat. Despite being the largest segment of the population they had no real strength, and thus could pose no serious threat to the state. By the time this was done, the collectivization plan resembled a very bloody military campaign against the peasant's traditional lifestyle.[9] This great social transformation along with the incredible economic boom occurred at the same time that the entire Soviet system we know today, developed its definitive form in the decade of 1930.[8] Many scholars believe that a few other important factors, such as foreign policy and internal security, went into the execution of the five-year plan. While ideology and economics were a major part, preparation for the upcoming war also affected all of the major parts of the five-year plan. The war effort really picked up in 1933 when Hitler came to power in Germany. The stress this caused on internal security and control in the five-year plan is difficult to document.[8] Stalin was very creative when it came time to announcing the results of the first Five Year-Plan. Due to his complete unquestioned authority, he never had to cite or give a single statistic, fact or figure.[citation needed] While most of the figures were overstated, Stalin was able to announce truthfully that the plan had been achieved ahead of schedule, however the many investments made to the west were excluded. While many factories were built and industrial production did increase exponentially, they were not close to reaching their target numbers.[9] While there was great success, there were also many problems with not just the plan itself, but how quickly it was completed. Its approach to industrialization was very inefficient and extreme amounts of resources were put into construction that, in many cases, was never completed. These resources were also put into equipment that was never used, or not even needed in the first place.[9] Many of the consumer goods produced during this time were of such low quality that they could never be used and were wasted. A major event during the first Five Year-Plan was the Great Famine. The famine peaked during the winter of 1932-1933 claiming the lives of an estimated five to seven million people, while millions more were permanently disabled.[9] The famine was the direct result of the industrialization and collectivization implemented by the first Five Year-Plan.[10] Many of the peasants who were suffering from the famine began to sabotage the fulfillment of their obligations to the state and would, as often as they could, stash away stores of food. Although Stalin was aware of this, he placed the blame of the hostility onto the peasants, saying that they had declared war against the Soviet government.[9]

zahraniční politika za Brežněva

Foreign and defence policies Soviet-U.S. relations During his eighteen years as Leader of the USSR, Brezhnev's signature foreign policy innovation was the promotion of détente. While sharing some similarities with approaches pursued during the Khrushchev Thaw, Brezhnev's policy significantly differed from Khrushchev's precedent in two ways. The first was that it was more comprehensive and wide-ranging in its aims, and included signing agreements on arms control, crisis prevention, East-West trade, European security and human rights. The second part of the policy was based on the importance of equalising the military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union.[according to whom?] Defence spending under Brezhnev between 1965 and 1970 increased by 40%, and annual increases continued thereafter. In the year of Brezhnev's death in 1982, 15% of GNP was spent on the military.[74] Brezhnev and Ford signing joint communiqué on the SALT treaty in Vladivostok. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached the peak of its political and strategic power in relation to the United States. The first SALT Treaty effectively established parity in nuclear weapons between the two superpowers,[75] the Helsinki Treaty legitimized Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe,[76] and the United States defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal weakened the prestige of the United States. Brezhnev and Nixon also agreed to pass the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which banned both countries from designing systems that would intercept incoming missiles so that neither the U.S. or the Soviet Union would be tempted to strike the other without the fear of retaliation.[77] The Soviet Union extended its diplomatic and political influence in the Middle East and Africa.[78] During the mid-1970s, it became clear that Henry Kissinger's policy of détente towards the Soviet Union was failing.[according to whom?] The détente had rested on the assumption that a "linkage" of some type could be found between the two countries, with the U.S. hoping that the signing of SALT I and an increase in Soviet-U.S. trade would stop the aggressive growth of communism in the third world.[citation needed] This did not happen,[why?] and the Soviet Union started funding the communist guerillas who fought actively against the U.S. during the Vietnam War. The U.S. ended the Vietnam War in a stalemate and lost Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to communism.[79] After Gerald Ford lost the presidential election to Jimmy Carter,[80] American foreign policies became more overtly aggressive in vocabulary towards the Soviet Union and the communist world, attempts were also made to stop funding for repressive anti-communist governments and organizations the United States supported.[81] While at first standing for a decrease in all defense initiatives, the later years of Carter's presidency would increase spending on the U.S. military.[80] The Vietnam War US President Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev talking outside at Camp David, the official retreat of US Presidents, in 1973 Nikita Khrushchev had initially supported North Vietnam out of "fraternal solidarity", but as the war escalated he had urged the North Vietnamese leadership to give up the quest of liberating South Vietnam. He continued by rejecting an offer of assistance made by the North Vietnamese government, and instead told them to enter negotiations in the United Nations Security Council.[82] After Khrushchev's ousting, Brezhnev resumed aiding the communist resistance in Vietnam. In February 1965, Kosygin travelled to Hanoi with a dozen Soviet air force generals and economic experts. During the Soviet visit, President Lyndon B. Johnson had authorised U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnamese soil in retaliation for a recent attack by the Viet Cong.[83] US First Lady Pat Nixon with Leonid Brezhnev at the White House, 1973 Johnson privately suggested to Brezhnev that he would guarantee an end to South Vietnamese hostility if Brezhnev would guarantee a North Vietnamese one. Brezhnev was interested in this offer initially, but after being told by Andrei Gromyko that the North Vietnamese government was not interested in a diplomatic solution to the war, Brezhnev rejected the offer. The Johnson administration responded to this rejection by expanding the American presence in Vietnam, but later invited the USSR to negotiate a treaty concerning arms control. The USSR simply did not respond, initially because Brezhnev and Kosygin were fighting over which of them had the right to represent the USSR abroad, but later because of the escalation of the "dirty war" in Vietnam.[83] In early 1967, Johnson offered to make a deal with Ho Chi Minh, and said he was prepared to end U.S. bombing raids in North Vietnam if Ho ended his infiltration of South Vietnam. The U.S. bombing raids halted for a few days and Kosygin publicly announced his support for this offer. The North Vietnamese government failed to respond, and because of this, the U.S. continued its raids in North Vietnam. The Brezhnev leadership concluded from this event that seeking diplomatic solutions to the ongoing war in Vietnam was hopeless. Later in 1968, Johnson invited Kosygin to the United States to discuss ongoing problems in Vietnam and the arms race. The summit was marked by a friendly atmosphere, but there were no concrete breakthroughs by either side.[84] In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet border conflict, the Chinese continued to aid the North Vietnamese regime, but with the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, China's strongest link to Vietnam was gone. In the meantime, Richard Nixon had been elected President of the United States. While having been known for his anti-communist rhetoric, Nixon said in 1971 that the U.S. "must have relations with Communist China".[85] His plan was for a slow withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, while still retaining the government of South Vietnam. The only way he thought this was possible was by improving relations with both Communist China and the USSR. He later made a visit to Moscow to negotiate a treaty on arms control and the Vietnam war, but on Vietnam nothing could be agreed.[85] On his visit to Moscow, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT I, marking the beginning of the "détente" era, which would be proclaimed a "new era of peaceful coexistence" that would replace the hostility that existed during the Cold War.[77][86] Sino-Soviet relations Deng Xiaoping and Brezhnev with Nicolae Ceausescu in Bucharest, 1965 Soviet foreign relations with the People's Republic of China quickly deteriorated after Nikita Khrushchev's attempts to reach a rapprochement with more liberal Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia and the west.[87] When Brezhnev consolidated his power base in the 1960s, China was descending into crisis because of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution, which led to the decimation of the Communist Party of China and other ruling offices. The Brezhnev leadership who promoted the idea of "stabilisation", could not comprehend why Mao would start such a "self-destructive" drive to finish the socialist revolution, according to himself.[88] At the same time, Brezhnev had problems of his own, the Czechoslovakian leadership were also deviating from the Soviet model. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership proclaimed the Brezhnev doctrine, which said the USSR had the right to intervene in any fraternal communist state that did not follow the Soviet model.[88] This doctrine increased tension not only with the Eastern Bloc, but also the Asian communist states. By 1969 relations with other communist countries had deteriorated to a level where Brezhnev was not even able to gather five of the fourteen ruling communist parties to attend an international conference in Moscow. In the aftermath of the failed conference, the Soviets concluded, "there were no leading center of the international communist movement."[89] Later in 1969, Chinese forces started the Sino-Soviet border conflict.[89] The Sino-Soviet split had chagrined Premier Alexei Kosygin a great deal, and for a while he refused to accept its irrevocability; he briefly visited Beijing in 1969 due to the increase of tension between the USSR and China.[90] By the early 1980s, both the Chinese and the Soviets were issuing statements calling for a normalisation of relations between the two states. The conditions given to the Soviets by the Chinese were the reduction of Soviet military presence in the Sino-Soviet border and the withdrawal of Soviets troops in Afghanistan and the Mongolian People's Republic and to end their support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Brezhnev responded in his March 1982 speech in Tashkent where he called for the normalisation of relations. Full Sino-Soviet normalisations of relations would prove to take years, until the last Soviet ruler, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.[91] Intervention in Afghanistan Main article: Soviet-Afghan War Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty, 18 June 1979, in Vienna After the communist revolution in Afghanistan in 1978, authoritarian actions forced upon the populace by the Communist regime led to the Afghan civil war, with the mujahideen leading the popular backlash against the regime.[92] The Soviet Union was worried that they were losing their influence in Central Asia, so after a KGB report claimed that Afghanistan could be taken in a matter of weeks, Brezhnev and several top party officials agreed to a full intervention.[81] Contemporary researchers tend to believe that Brezhnev had been misinformed on the situation in Afghanistan. His health had decayed, and proponents of direct military intervention took over the majority group in the Politburo by cheating and using falsified evidence. They advocated a relatively moderate scenario, maintaining a cadre of 1,500 to 2,500-men Soviet military advisers and technicians in the country (which had already been there in large numbers since the 1950s),[93] but they disagreed on sending regular army units in hundreds of thousands of troops. Some believe that Brezhnev's signature on the decree was obtained without telling him the full story, otherwise he would have never approved such a decision. Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin believed that the real mastermind behind the invasion, who misinformed Brezhnev, was Mikhail Suslov.[94] Brezhnev's personal physician Mikhail Kosarev later recalled that Brezhnev, when he was in his right mind, in fact resisted the full-scale intervention.[95] Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated officially that despite the military solution being supported by some, hardline Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov was the only Politburo member who insisted on sending regular army units.[96] Parts of the Soviet military establishment were opposed to any sort of active Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, believing that the Soviet Union should leave Afghan politics alone. President Carter, following the advice of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, denounced the intervention, describing it as the "most serious danger to peace since 1945".[81] The U.S. stopped all grain exports to the Soviet Union and boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics held in Moscow. The Soviet Union responded by boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympics held in Los Angeles.[81] Eastern Europe Further information: Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 A Soviet T-55 tank catches fire while battling Czech protesters during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The first crisis for Brezhnev's regime came in 1968, with the attempt by the Communist leadership in Czechoslovakia, under Alexander Dubček, to liberalise the Communist system (Prague Spring).[97] In July, Brezhnev publicly denounced the Czechoslovak leadership as "revisionist" and "anti-Soviet" before ordering the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Dubček's removal in August. The invasion led to public protests by dissidents in various Eastern Bloc countries. Brezhnev's subsequent announcement that the Soviet Union had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of its satellites to "safeguard socialism" became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine,[98] although it was really a restatement of existing Soviet policy, as enacted by Khrushchev in Hungary in 1956. In the aftermath of the invasion, Brezhnev reiterated it in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on 13 November 1968:[97] When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries. — Brezhnev, Speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in November 1968 When the situation in Czechoslovakia was discussed with the Politburo, Brezhnev was not the one pushing hardest for the use of military force.[99] Brezhnev was aware of the dire situation he was in, and if he had abstained or voted against Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia he may have been faced with growing turmoil — domestically and in the Eastern Bloc.[100] Archival evidence suggests that Brezhnev[99] was one of the few who was looking for a temporary compromise with the reform-friendly Czechoslovak government when their relationship was at the brink. Significant voices in the Soviet leadership demanded the re-installation of a so-called 'revolutionary government'. After the military intervention in 1968, Brezhnev met with Czechoslovak reformer Bohumil Simon, then a member of the Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and said, "If I had not voted for Soviet armed assistance to Czechoslovakia you would not be sitting here today, but quite possibly I wouldn't either."[99] Brezhnev at a Party congress in East Berlin in 1967 In 1980 a political crisis emerged in Poland with the emergence of the Solidarity mass movement. By the end of October, Solidarity had 3 million members, and by December, had 9 million. In a public opinion poll organised by the Polish government, 89% of the respondents supported Solidarity.[101] With the Polish leadership split on what to do, the majority did not want to impose martial law, as suggested by Wojciech Jaruzelski. The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc was unsure how to handle the situation, but Erich Honecker of East Germany pressed for military action. In a formal letter to Brezhnev, Honecker proposed a joint military measure to control the escalating problems in Poland. A CIA report suggested the Soviet military were mobilising for an invasion.[102] In 1980-81 representatives from the Eastern Bloc nations met at the Kremlin to discuss the Polish situation. Brezhnev eventually concluded on 10 December 1981 that it would be better to leave the domestic matters of Poland alone, reassuring the Polish delegates that the USSR would intervene only if asked to.[103] This effectively marked the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. With domestic matters escalating out of control in Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed a state of war, the Polish version of martial law, on 12 December 1981

Georgij Konstantinovič Žukov

Georgij Konstantinovič Žukov (rusky: Георгий Константинович Жуков, 19. listopadujul./ 1. prosince 1896greg. Strelkovka, Kalužská gubernie, dnes Kalužská oblast - 18. června 1974 Moskva) byl sovětský vojevůdce a politik, maršál SSSR (od ledna 1943), který od srpna 1942 až do roku 1945 v době Velké vlastenecké války působil i ve funkci zástupce Vrchního velitele Rudé armády J. V. Stalina a náměstka lidového komisaře obrany. Je považován za jednoho z nejlepších sovětských velitelů druhé světové války. Zvítězil například v bitvách u Stalingradu, před Moskvou nebo o Berlín. Byl také považován za velmi tvrdého a zcela nekompromisního velitele. V 50. letech po Stalinově smrti krátce působil také ve funkci náměstka ministra obrany a poté i ministra obrany SSSR. Po bolševické Říjnové revoluci bojoval v Rudé armádě a v březnu 1921 vstoupil ruské bolševické strany (pozdější KSSS). Bojoval v ruské občanské válce (1917 až 1921) a zde obdržel Řád rudého praporu za potlačení povstání Rolníků. Roku 1923 byl již velitelem pluku a v roce 1930 velel brigádě. Období Velkého teroru a čistek v armádě přežil díky tomu, že se zachoval zcela jinak než ostatní velitelé - začal si stěžovat na všechny strany včetně samotnému Stalinovi, což mu zřejmě zachránilo život (po vyznamenání v úspěšné bitvě u Chalchyn Golu si jej Stalin velmi oblíbil, takže případné zatčení již nadále nepřicházelo tolik do úvahy). V 30. letech působil ve funkci velitele jezdecké brigády, v letech 1931 až 1933 krátce pracoval v Generálním štábu Rudé armády. Od roku 1933 velel jezdecké divizi, za vynikající výsledky této divize obdržel v roce 1935 Leninův řád. Ve druhé polovině 30. let působil nejprve ve funkci velitele jezdeckého sboru, posléze jako zástupce velitele jízdy Běloruského vojenského okruhu. V závěru 30. let také krátce sloužil na Dálném Východě. Zde v letech 1939 až 1940 velel 1. sovětsko-mongolské armádní skupině, která bojovala proti japonské Kuantungské armádě na mongolské hranici v letech 1938 až 1939. Vše začalo jako běžná šarvátka na hranicích a rychle vyústilo v opravdovou válku. Japonci zaútočili s 80 000 muži, 180 tanky a 450 letouny. Tento útok vyústil do rozhodující bitvy u Chalchyn Golu. Zde napodobil Hannibalovu taktiku a během několika dnů byli Japonci poraženi. Za tuto operaci získal své první vyznamenání titulem Hrdina Sovětského svazu. V roce 1940 se stal armádním generálem a velitelem Kyjevského vojenského okruhu, v lednu 1941 byl jmenován náčelníkem generálního štábu Rudé armády a zástupcem lidového komisaře obrany (zástupce ministra obrany). Na jaře 1941 varoval Stalina před hrozbou německého útoku a spolu s maršálem Semjonem Timošenkem vypracoval plán předběžných opatření včetně návrhu preventivního protiúderu, který však nebyl schválen. Účast v 2. světové válce V době napadení Sovětského svazu dne 22. června 1941 vojsky nacistického Německa, kdy sloužil ve funkci náčelníka Generálního štábu Rudé armády, byl odeslán k Jihozápadnímu frontu, kde zorganizoval první sovětský protiútok proti útočníkům z německé skupiny armád Jih. Od 23. června 1941 (tedy den po přepadení Sovětského svazu nacistickým Německem) až do konce 2. světové války byl stálým členem Hlavního stanu vrchního velení. Dne 30. července 1941 byl ustanoven velitelem Záložního frontu a uvolněn z funkce náčelníka Generálního štábu Rudé armády. V srpnu organizoval za cenu obrovských ztrát protiútoky na znovudobytí města Jelňa východně od Smolenska během Smolenské operace, které nakonec padlo 6. září 1941. Od 9. září organizoval jakožto vrchní velitel obranu Leningradu, kde vystřídal maršála Vorošilova, na nějž útočila německá skupina armád Sever, ale již 12. září OKH na příkaz Hitlera útok na Leningrad zastavila a přešla k obléhání. V říjnu 1941 nahradil Ivana Koněva ve funkci velitele Západního frontu, který bránil hlavní město Moskvu. Koněva tehdy uchránil tragického osudu předešlého velitele Západního frontu generála Dmitrije Pavlova, který byl 22. července 1941 zastřelen. Okamžitě se snažil obnovit souvislou obranu, která byla v předešlých dnech zcela rozvrácena velkým obklíčením sovětských vojsk u Vjazmy. Nařídil též popravy dezertérů a zbabělců. Řídil také přesun jednotek z Dálného Východu. Při protiútoku Rudé armády, zahájeném 5. prosince 1941, zahnala Rudá armáda německé jednotky skupiny armád Střed (po skončení německé operace Tajfun) o 125-150 kilometrů zpět na západ od Moskvy. Roku 1942 byl jmenován zástupcem náčelníka generálního štábu, v srpnu téhož roku byl posléze jmenován zástupcem Vrchního velitele J. V. Stalina a 1. náměstkem lidového komisaře obrany (náměstek ministra). Z titulu své funkce představitele Hlavního stanu vrchního velení společně s A. Vasilevským koordinoval činnost Jihozápadního, Donského, Stalingradského a Voroněžského frontu během bitvy u Stalingradu, kde se začátkem září neúspěšně pokusil ohrozit levé křídlo 6. armády a probojovat se ze severu do Stalingradu. Později se spolupodílel na plánování Operace Uran a Mars, i když jeho úloha v operaci Uran je dosud sporná[zdroj?]. Na podzim 1942 byl jmenován do funkce velitele Kalininského frontu,[zdroj?] kde vedl neúspěšnou operaci Mars, jejímž cílem bylo obklíčení a zničení vojsk v oblasti Rževu, kromě dílčích územních úspěchu však operace vázala německé jednotky, které nemohly být nasazeny na jiných ohrožených úsecích fronty. V lednu 1943 zorganizoval operaci Jiskra, šlo o proražení německé blokády Leningradu. Po úspěšném částečném prolomení leningradské blokády byl povýšen do hodnosti maršála SSSR jako vůbec první armádní generál během Velké vlastenecké války. Poté naplánoval a koordinoval průběh bitvy v Kurském oblouku a na ni navazující operaci Kutuzov. Organizoval součinnost a velel frontu při osvobozování Ukrajiny (Korsuň-ševčenkovská operace) a jejího hlavního města Kyjeva. Dále pak naplánoval a posléze velel největší sovětské ofenzivě 2. světové války v Bělorusku v létě 1944, šlo o operaci Bagration. V závěrečném období války byl jmenován velitelem 1. běloruského frontu, se kterým naplánoval a provedl Viselsko-oderskou operaci a dále dne 2. května 1945 obsadil hlavní město Třetí říše Berlín. S maršálem Ivanem Stěpanovičem Koněvem dne 8. května 1945, jakožto pověřený zástupce Vrchního velitele Rudé armády J. V. Stalina, přijal německou kapitulaci, po 2. světové válce se stal prvním vrchním velitelem sovětské skupiny vojsk během poválečné okupace Německa. Poválečné období Německo květen 1945 - Montgomery, Eisenhower, Žukov a maršál letectva Tedder. Stalin jej po válce nejprve jmenoval vrchním velitelem pozemních vojsk, záhy se však jeho popularity začal obávat a v roce 1946 jej sesadil na funkci velitele Oděského vojenského okruhu. Po Stalinově smrti se stal náměstkem ministra obrany. V roce 1955 se stal ministrem obrany SSSR a za podpory Nikity Chruščova, v červnu 1957 na čtyři měsíce i členem ústředního výboru KSSS. Pak byl Chruščovem vyloučen a bylo mu nařízeno přísné domácí vězení. Po Chruščovově sesazení z čela strany i státu roku 1964 se nakrátko objevil na veřejné scéně, ale mnohé zákazy ohledně vystupování na veřejnosti zůstaly. Přispíval tak alespoň do různých časopisů a novin. Zemřel 18. června 1974 v Moskvě. Ačkoliv ve své poslední vůli výslovně požadoval, aby byl pohřben do země a s pravoslavnými obřady a rodina si přála jeho přání splnit, komunistická vláda to znemožnila a uspořádala pro něj sekulární státní pohřeb a kremaci. Jeho popel byl s vojenskými poctami uložen u Kremelské zdi. Byla po něm pojmenována Vojenská velitelská akademie protivzdušné obrany v Kalininu. V roce 1996 byl vytvořen řád G. K. Žukova.

Georgi Dimitrov

Georgi Dimitrov Mikhaylov (/dɪˈmiːtrɒf/;[1] Bulgarian: Гео̀рги Димитро̀в Миха̀йлов), also known as Georgi Mikhaylovich Dimitrov (Russian: Гео́ргий Миха́йлович Дими́тров; 18 June 1882 - 2 July 1949), was a Bulgarian communist politician. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party In office 27 December 1948 - 2 July 1949 Succeeded by Valko Chervenkov 32nd Prime Minister of Bulgaria 2nd Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria In office 23 November 1946 - 2 July 1949 Preceded by Kimon Georgiev Succeeded by Vasil Kolarov Head of the International Policy Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union In office 27 December 1943 - 29 December 1945 Preceded by Post established Succeeded by Mikhail Suslov General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International In office 1935-1943 Preceded by Vyacheslav Molotov Succeeded by Office abolished Personal details Born Georgi Dimitrov Mikhaylov (Bulgarian: Георги Димитров Михайлов) (Russian: Георгий Михайлович Димитров) 18 June 1882 Kovachevtsi, Principality of Bulgaria Died 2 July 1949 (aged 67) Barvikha Sanatorium, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Political party Bulgarian Communist Party Spouse(s) Ljubica Ivošević (1906-1933) Roza Yulievna (until 1949) Profession compositor, revolutionary, politician He was the first communist leader of Bulgaria, from 1946 to 1949. Dimitrov led the Communist International from 1934 to 1943. He was a theorist of capitalism who expanded Lenin's ideas by arguing that fascism was the dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of financial capitalism Georgi Michajlovič Dimitrov (bulharsky Георги Димитров Михайлов, v češtině též jako Jiří), 18. června 1882 vesnice Kovačevci nedaleko Perniku - 2. července 1949 sanatorium Barvicha u Moskvy) byl bulharský komunistický politik, revolucionář a bojovník komunistického hnutí. Známý je také díky aféře požáru budovy Říšského sněmu v Berlíně v roce 1933, kdy byl ze zapálení budovy parlamentu obviněn a sám se před lipským tribunálem obratně hájil. Dimitrov se již v dobách první světové války zapojil do socialistické opozice v tehdy jen několik desetiletí starém Bulharsku, zmítaném politickými extrémy, nedemokratickými režimy a totalitou. Dimitrov později přesídlil do Sovětského svazu, získal jeho občanství a působil v mezinárodním komunistickém hnutí - již roku 1929 byl zvolen za člena středoevropské sekce Kominterny. Jako oběť tehdejšího nacistického režimu byl jeho proces za údajné zapálení budovy Reichstagu ostře sledován. V následujícím období (mezi lety 1935-1943) zastával Dimitrov také funkci generálního tajemníka komunistické internacionály (Kominterny). Jednalo se o posledního tajemníka, neboť posléze byla tato organizace Stalinem zrušena. Dimitrov patřil k politikům, kteří iniciovali komunistický režim v Bulharsku. Jako vůdce protifašistického hnutí odporu získal jistou popularitu, neboť veřejnost byla s postupným oslabováním Německa, ke kterému se vláda i car přidali, nespokojena. Mnozí totiž stále pamatovali na první světovou válku, která skončila pro Bulharsko - spojence Německa a Rakousko-Uherska - porážkou. Původní koalice antifašistických sil, známá jako Vlastenecká fronta, kde byly zastoupeny mnohé proudy, se postupně transformovala ve prospěch Bulharské komunistické strany a země začala přebírat sovětské praktiky. Během Dimitrovovy vlády v Bulharsku na konci 40. let byly zahájeny rozsáhlé procesy, ve kterých byly odsouzeny desítky až stovky lidí, združstevněno zemědělství a zestátněny podniky a banky..

Grigorij Jevsejevič Zinovjev

Grigorij Jevsejevič Zinovjev Narození 11.jul. / 23. září 1883greg. Kropyvnyckyj = ukrajina Úmrtí 25. srpna 1936 (ve věku 52 let) Moskva Příčina úmrtí poprava zastřelením Místo pohřbení Donský hřbitov Alma mater Bernská univerzita Zaměstnavatel Kazaňská univerzita Politická strana Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu Manžel(ka) Zlata Lilina Funkce Member of the Russian Constituent Assembly Některá data mohou pocházet z datové položky. Grigorij Jevsejevič Zinovjev (někdy i Zinověv, rusky Григорий Евсеевич Зиновьев; 23. září 1883 jako Hirsch Apfelbaum (Гирш Апфельбаум), známý také pod jménem Ovsej-Geršon Aronovič Radomyslskij (Овсей-Гершон Аронович Радомысльский)[1] v Jelizavetgradu, Ruské impérium - 25. srpna 1936, Moskva, SSSR) byl bolševický revolucionář, sovětský politik a jedna z obětí Stalinových čistek. Revolucionářská činnost Řečnící Zinovjev Grigorij Zinovjev se narodil chudým židovským zemědělcům. Studoval filosofii, literaturu a historii. Zajímal se o politiku, a připojil se k Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické straně (RSDDS) v roce 1901. Po jejím rozdělení v roce 1903 přilnul k bolševikům. Mezi roky 1903 a pádem Ruského impéria v únoru 1917 byl významným bolševikem a jedním z Leninových nejbližších lidí. V roce 1907 byl zvolen do ústředního výboru. Zinovjev zůstal Leninovým stálým pobočníkem a představitelem v různých socialistických organizacích až do roku 1917. Revoluce Zinovjev strávil první tři roky první světové války ve Švýcarsku. Do Ruska se vrátil v dubnu 1917 v zapečetěném vlaku s Leninem a dalšími revolucionáři. Ačkoli Zinovjev a jeho blízký přidružený Kameněv odmítali boj proti Prozatímní vládě a vytvoření čistě bolševické vlády a krátce měli dokonce podporu většiny v ústředním výboru, rychlé zhroucení prozatímní vlády 4. listopadu 1917 v Petrohradě dovolilo Leninovi zmocnit se moci. Lenin pak Zinovjeva a Kameněva označil za "zrádce" a dezertéry". Oba uznali své "omyly" a Zinovjev se mohl stát předsedou Petrohradského sovětu, 1919 kandidátem politbyra a později předsedou Výkonného výboru Kominterny. Toto byl důležitý bod obratu v Zinovjevově kariéře. Mnohem významnější postavou se stal Lev Trockij. Zinovjev nechtěl přijmout svou degradaci a dělal vše pro to, aby podkopával Trockého pozici uvnitř strany mezi léty 1918 a 1925. Politika Během Leninovy nemoci vytvořili Zinovjev, Kameněv a Josif Stalin vládnoucí triumvirát, který umenšil vliv Trockého. Po smrti Lenina roku 1925 však vystoupil Zinovjev proti Stalinovi a přidal se k "opozici" Trockého, ten byl však Stalinem vyhnán do exilu. Po nástupu Stalina k moci Zinovjev a Kameněv byli v roce 1928 vyloučeni ze strany a zůstali politicky nečinní do října 1932, kdy se do politiky opět vrátili. Poprava Po vraždě Sergeje Kirova 1. prosince 1934 začal stalinský teror. Stalin začal likvidovat své nejbližší přátele a soudruhy, kteří mu dopomohli k moci. Zinovjev a Kameněv věděli, že nebudou ušetřeni. Stalin je obvinil z vraždy Kirova. Zinovjev v roce 1935 dostal 10 let vězení. Poté však byl spolu s Kameněvem obviněn z vytvoření teroristické organizace, která měla zavraždit Stalina. Ačkoli žádnou takovou organizaci ovšem nezaložil, byl odsouzen k trestu smrti a popraven ve sklepech Lubjanky 25. srpna 1936. Těsně před svojí smrtí ještě na popravčí vykřikl: „Tohle je fašistický převrat! V Rusku proběhl fašistický převrat!" Zinovjev byl v roce 1988 rehabilitován Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev[a] (September 23 [O.S. September 11] 1883 - August 25, 1936), born Hirsch Apfelbaum, known also under the name Ovsei-Gershon Aronovich Radomyslsky, was a Bolshevik revolutionary and a Soviet Communist politician. Zinoviev was one of the seven members of the first Politburo, founded in 1917 in order to manage the Bolshevik Revolution: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.[1] Zinoviev is best remembered as the longtime head of the Communist International and the architect of several failed attempts to transform Germany into a communist country during the early 1920s. He was in competition against Joseph Stalin who eliminated him from the Soviet political leadership in 1926. Zinoviev was a chief defendant in a 1936 show trial, the Trial of the Sixteen, that marked the start of the so-called Great Terror in the USSR and resulted in his execution the day after his conviction in August 1936. Zinoviev was the alleged author of the Zinoviev letter to British communists, urging revolution, and published just before the 1924 general election, apparently to provoke a right-wing reaction. The letter is widely dismissed as a forgery.[2]

nemoc a smrt Brez

Health problems Brezhnev's personality cult was growing outrageously at a time when his health was in rapid decline. His physical condition was deteriorating; he had been a heavy smoker until the 1970s,[113] had become addicted to sleeping pills, and had begun drinking to excess. Over the years he had become overweight. From 1973 until his death, Brezhnev's central nervous system underwent chronic deterioration and he had several minor strokes as well as insomnia. In 1975 he suffered his first heart attack.[114] When receiving the Order of Lenin, Brezhnev walked shakily and fumbled his words. According to one American intelligence expert, United States officials knew for several years that Brezhnev had suffered from severe arteriosclerosis and believed he had suffered from other unspecified ailments as well. In 1977 American intelligence officials publicly suggested that Brezhnev had also been suffering from gout, leukemia and emphysema from decades of heavy smoking,[115] as well as chronic bronchitis.[113] He was reported to have been fitted with a pacemaker to control his heart rhythm abnormalities. On occasion, he was known to have suffered from memory loss, speaking problems and had difficulties with co-ordination.[116] According to the Washington Post, "All of this is also reported to be taking its toll on Brezhnev's mood. He is said to be depressed, despondent over his own failing health and discouraged by the death of many of his long-time colleagues. To help, he has turned to regular counseling and hypnosis by an Assyrian woman, a sort of modern-day Rasputin."[113] Yevgeniy Chazov, the Chief of the Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health, had to keep doctors by Brezhnev's side at all times, and Brezhnev was brought back from near-death on several occasions. At this time, most senior officers of the CPSU wanted to keep Brezhnev alive, even if such men as Mikhail Suslov, Dmitriy Ustinov and Andrei Gromyko, among others, were growing increasingly frustrated with his policies. They did not want to risk a new period of domestic turmoil that might be caused by his death.[117] At about this time First World commentators started guessing Brezhnev's heirs apparent. The most notable candidates were Suslov and Andrei Kirilenko, who were both older than Brezhnev, and Fyodor Kulakov and Konstantin Chernenko, who were younger; Kulakov died of natural causes in 1978.[118] Last years and death Main article: Death and funeral of Leonid Brezhnev Photo of an ailing Brezhnev (second from left) on 1 June 1981, a year before his death Brezhnev's health worsened in the winter of 1981-82. In the meantime, the country was governed by Andrei Gromyko, Dmitriy Ustinov, Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov while crucial Politburo decisions were made in his absence.[citation needed] While the Politburo was pondering the question of who would succeed, all signs indicated that the ailing leader was dying. The choice of the successor would have been influenced by Suslov, but he died at the age of 79 in January 1982. Andropov took Suslov's seat in the Central Committee Secretariat; by May, it became obvious that Andropov would try to make a bid for the office of the General Secretary. He, with the help of fellow KGB associates, started circulating rumours that political corruption had become worse during Brezhnev's tenure as leader, in an attempt to create an environment hostile to Brezhnev in the Politburo. Andropov's actions showed that he was not afraid of Brezhnev's wrath.[119] Brezhnev rarely appeared in public during 1982. The Soviet government claimed that Brezhnev was not seriously ill, but admitted that he was surrounded by doctors. He suffered a severe stroke in May 1982, but refused to relinquish office.[citation needed] On 7 November 1982, despite his failing health, Brezhnev was present standing on Lenin's Mausoleum during the annual military parade and demonstration of workers commemorating the anniversary of the October Revolution. The event would also mark Brezhnev's final public appearance before dying three days later after suffering a heart attack.[119] He was honoured with a state funeral, which was followed with a five-day period of nationwide mourning. He was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis in Red Square.[120] National and international statesmen from around the globe attended his funeral. His wife and family attended; his daughter Galina Brezhneva outraged spectators by not appearing in sombre garb. Brezhnev was dressed for burial in his Marshal uniform, along with all his medals

příčiny ukrajinského hladomoru 1932-33

History Scope and duration The famine had been predicted as far back as 1930 by academics and advisers to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic government, but little to no preventive action was taken.[40] The famine affected the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (a part of the Ukrainian SSR at the time) in the spring of 1932[41] and from February to July 1933,[42] with the greatest number of victims recorded in the spring of 1933. Between 1926 and 1939, the Ukrainian population increased by 6.6%, whereas Russia and Belarus grew by 16.9% and 11.7%, respectively.[43][44] From the 1932 harvest, Soviet authorities were able to procure only 4.3 million tons as compared with 7.2 million tons obtained from the 1931 harvest.[45] Rations in town were drastically cut back, and in the winter of 1932-33 and spring of 1933 people in many urban areas were starved.[46] The urban workers were supplied by a rationing system (and therefore could occasionally assist their starving relatives of the countryside), but rations were gradually cut; and by the spring of 1933, the urban residents also faced starvation. At the same time, workers were shown agitprop movies, where all peasants were portrayed as counterrevolutionaries hiding grain and potatoes at a time when workers, who were constructing the "bright future" of socialism, were starving.[47] The first reports of mass malnutrition and deaths from starvation emerged from two urban areas of the city of Uman, reported in January 1933 by Vinnytsia and Kiev oblasts. By mid-January 1933, there were reports about mass "difficulties" with food in urban areas, which had been undersupplied through the rationing system, and deaths from starvation among people who were withdrawn from the rationing supply. The withdrawal was to comply with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Decree of December 1932. By the beginning of February 1933, according to reports from local authorities and Ukrainian GPU, the most affected area was Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which also suffered from epidemics of typhus and malaria. Odessa and Kiev oblasts were second and third, respectively. By mid-March, most of the reports of starvation originated from Kiev Oblast.[citation needed] By mid-April 1933, Kharkiv Oblast reached the top of the most affected list, while Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsia, and Donetsk oblasts, and Moldavian SSR were next on the list. Reports about mass deaths from starvation, dated mid-May through the beginning of June 1933, originated from raions in Kiev and Kharkiv oblasts. The "less affected" list noted Chernihiv Oblast and northern parts of Kiev and Vinnytsia oblasts. The Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine Decree of 8 February 1933 said no hunger cases should have remained untreated. Local authorities had to submit reports about the numbers suffering from hunger, the reasons for hunger, number of deaths from hunger, food aid provided from local sources, and centrally provided food aid required. The GPU managed parallel reporting and food assistance in the Ukrainian SSR. (Many regional reports and most of the central summary reports are available from present-day central and regional Ukrainian archives.)[48] The Ukrainian Weekly, which was tracking the situation in 1933, reported the difficulties in communications and the appalling situation in Ukraine.[citation needed] Evidence of widespread cannibalism was documented during the Holodomor.[25][49] Survival was a moral as well as a physical struggle. A woman doctor wrote to a friend in June 1933 that she had not yet become a cannibal, but was "not sure that I shall not be one by the time my letter reaches you." The good people died first. Those who refused to steal or to prostitute themselves died. Those who gave food to others died. Those who refused to eat corpses died. Those who refused to kill their fellow man died. Parents who resisted cannibalism died before their children did.[50] The Soviet regime printed posters declaring: "To eat your own children is a barbarian act."[51]:225 More than 2,500 people were convicted of cannibalism during the Holodomor.[52] Causes Main articles: Causes of the Holodomor and Soviet famine of 1932-33 Soviet famine of 1932-33: Areas of most disastrous famine shaded black The reasons for the famine are a subject of scholarly and political debate. Some scholars suggest that the man-made famine was a consequence of the economic problems associated with changes implemented during the period of Soviet industrialisation.[53][29][54] There are also those[who?] who blame a systematic set of policies perpetrated by the Soviet government under Stalin designed to exterminate the Ukrainians.[citation needed] The collectivisation policy was enforced, entailing extreme crisis and contributing to the famine. In 1929-30, peasants were induced to transfer land and livestock to state-owned farms, on which they would work as day-labourers for payment in kind.[55] Collectivization in the Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian SSR, was not popular among the peasantry and forced collectivisation led to numerous peasant revolts. The first five-year plan changed the output expected from Ukrainian farms, from the familiar crop of grain to unfamiliar crops like sugar beets and cotton. In addition, the situation was exacerbated by poor administration of the plan and the lack of relevant general management. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested, and - even when harvested - a significant percentage was lost during processing, transportation, or storage.[citation needed] In the summer of 1930, the government instituted a program of food requisitioning, ostensibly to increase grain exports. Subsequently, in 1932, food theft was made punishable by death or 10 years imprisonment.[55] It has been proposed that the Soviet leadership used the man-made famine to attack Ukrainian nationalism, and thus it could fall under the legal definition of genocide.[56][57][53][58][25][59] For example, special and particularly lethal policies were adopted in and largely limited to Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1932 and 1933. According to Snyder: "[E]ach of them may seem like an anodyne administrative measure, and each of them was certainly presented as such at the time, and yet each had to kill."[60][61] Under the collectivism policy, for example, farmers were not only deprived of their properties but a large swath of these were also exiled in Siberia with no means of survival.[62] Those who were left behind and attempted to escape the zones of famine were ordered shot. There were foreign individuals who witnessed this atrocity or its effects. For example, there was the account of Arthur Koestler, a Hungarian-British journalist, which described the peak years of Holodomor in these words: At every [train] station there was a crowd of peasants in rags, offering ikons and linen in exchange against a loaf of bread. The women were lifting up their infants to the compartment windows - infants pitiful and terrifying with limbs like sticks, puffed bellies, big cadaverous heads lolling on thin neck

Berija

In 1924, he led the repression of a Georgian nationalist uprising, after which up to 10,000 people were executed. For this display of "Bolshevik ruthlessness," Beria was appointed head of the "secret-political division" of the Transcaucasian OGPU and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1926, Beria became head of the Georgian OGPU; Sergo Ordzhonikidze, head of the Transcaucasian party, introduced him to fellow-Georgian Iosef Dzhughashvili, later known as Joseph Stalin. As a result, Beria became an ally in Stalin's rise to power. During his years at the helm of the Georgian OGPU, Beria effectively destroyed the intelligence networks that Turkey and Iran had developed in the Soviet Caucasus, while successfully penetrating the governments of these countries with his agents. He also took over Stalin's holiday security. Beria on Caucasian Party caucus, 1935. Left to right: Filipp Makharadze, Mir Jafar Baghirov, Beria. Beria was appointed Secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia in 1931, and for the whole Transcaucasian region in 1932. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1934. During this time, he began to attack fellow members of the Georgian Communist Party, particularly Gaioz Devdariani, who served as Minister of Education of the Georgian SSR. Beria ordered the executions of Devdariani's brothers George and Shalva, who held important positions in the Cheka and the Communist Party respectively. He reportedly won Stalin's favour in the early 1930s, after faking a conspiracy to assassinate the Soviet leader that he then claimed to have foiled. By 1935, Beria had become one of Stalin's most trusted subordinates. He cemented his place in Stalin's entourage with a lengthy oration titled, "On the History of the Bolshevik Organisations in Transcaucasia" (later published as a book), which emphasized Stalin's role.[11] When Stalin's purge of the Communist Party and government began in 1934 after the assassination of Leningrad party boss Sergei Kirov (1 December 1934), Beria ran the purges in Transcaucasia. He used the opportunity to settle many old scores in the politically turbulent Transcaucasian republics. In June 1937, he said in a speech, "Let our enemies know that anyone who attempts to raise a hand against the will of our people, against the will of the party of Lenin and Stalin, will be mercilessly crushed and destroyed."[12] Head of the NKVD The first page of Beria's notice (oversigned by Stalin), to kill approximately 15,000 Polish officers and some 10,000 more intellectuals in the Katyn Forest and other places in the Soviet Union Nestor Lakoba, Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria and Aghasi Khanjian during the opening of the Moscow Metro in 1936. The same year Lakoba and Khanjian were killed by Beria. In August 1938, Stalin brought Beria to Moscow as deputy head of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the ministry which oversaw the state security and police forces. Under Nikolai Yezhov, the NKVD carried out the Great Purge: the imprisonment or execution of millions of people throughout the Soviet Union as alleged "enemies of the people." By 1938, however, the oppression had become so extensive that it was damaging the infrastructure, economy and even the armed forces of the Soviet state, prompting Stalin to wind the purge down. Stalin had voted to appoint Georgy Malenkov as head of the NKVD, but he was overruled.[citation needed] In September, Beria was appointed head of the Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD, and in November he succeeded Yezhov as NKVD head. Yezhov was executed in 1940 and one account says he was personally strangled by Beria.[13] The NKVD was purged next, with half of its personnel replaced by Beria loyalists, many of them from the Caucasus. Although Beria's name is closely identified with the Great Purge because of his activities while deputy head of the NKVD, his leadership of the organisation marked an easing of the repression begun under Yezhov. Over 100,000 people were released from the labour camps. The government officially admitted that there had been some injustice and "excesses" during the purges, which were blamed entirely on Yezhov. The liberalisation was only relative: arrests and executions continued, and in 1940, as war approached, the pace of the purges again accelerated. During this period, Beria supervised deportations of people identified as political enemies from Poland and the Baltic states after Soviet occupation of those regions. In March 1939, Beria became a candidate member of the Communist Party's Politburo. Although he did not become a full member until 1946, he was already one of the senior leaders of the Soviet state. In 1941, Beria was made a Commissar General of State Security, the highest quasi-military rank within the Soviet police system of that time, effectively comparable to a Marshal of the Soviet Union. On 5 March 1940, after the Gestapo-NKVD Third Conference was held in Zakopane, Beria sent a note (no. 794/B) to Stalin in which he stated that the Polish prisoners of war kept at camps and prisons in western Belarus and Ukraine were enemies of the Soviet Union, and recommended their execution.[14] Most of them were military officers, but there were also intelligentsia, doctors, priests, and others in a total of more than 22,000 people. With Stalin's approval, Beria's NKVD executed them in what became known as the Katyn massacre.[citation needed] From October 1940 to February 1942, the NKVD under Beria carried out a new purge of the Red Army and related industries. In February 1941, Beria became Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and in June, following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, he became a member of the State Defense Committee (GKO). During World War II, he took on major domestic responsibilities and mobilized the millions of people imprisoned in NKVD Gulag camps into wartime production. He took control of the manufacture of armaments, and (with Georgy Malenkov) aircraft and aircraft engines. This was the beginning of Beria's alliance with Malenkov, which later became of central importance. In 1944, as the Germans were driven from Soviet soil, Beria was in charge of dealing with the various ethnic minorities accused of anti-sovietism and/or collaboration with the invaders, including the Balkars, the Karachays, the Chechens, the Ingush, the Crimean Tatars, the Pontic Greeks[15] and the Volga Germans. All these groups were deported to Soviet Central Asia (see "Population transfer in the Soviet Union.") In December 1944, Beria's NKVD was assigned to supervise the Soviet atomic bomb project ("Task No. 1"), which built and tested a bomb by 29 August 1949. The project was extremely labour-intensive. At least 330,000 people, including 10,000 technicians, were involved. The Gulag system provided tens of thousands of people for work in uranium mines and for the construction and operation of uranium processing plants. They also constructed test facilities, such as those at Semipalatinsk and in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. The NKVD also ensured the necessary security for the project. In July 1945, as Soviet police ranks were converted to a military uniform system, Beria's rank was officially converted to that of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Although he had never held a traditional military command, Beria made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II through his organization of wartime production and his use of partisans. Stalin personally never thought much of it, and neither commented publicly on his performance nor awarded him recognition (i.e. Order of Victory), as he did for most other Soviet Marshals. Abroad, Beria had met with Kim Il-sung, the future leader of North Korea, several times when the Soviet troops had declared war on Japan and occupied the northern half of Korea from August 1945. Beria recommended that Stalin install a communist leader in the occupied territories.[16][17] Post-war politics Beria with Stalin (in background), Stalin's daughter Svetlana, and Nestor Lakoba (obscured)[18] With Stalin nearing 70, a concealed struggle for succession amongst his entourage dominated Kremlin politics in the post-war years. At the end of the war, Andrei Zhdanov seemed the most likely candidate. Zhdanov had served as the Communist Party leader in Leningrad during the war, and by 1946 had charge of all cultural matters. After 1946, Beria formed an alliance with Malenkov to counter Zhdanov's rise.[19] In January 1946, Beria resigned as chief of the NKVD while retaining general control over national security matters as Deputy Prime Minister and Curator of the Organs of State Security under Stalin. However, the new NKVD chief, Sergei Kruglov, was not a Beria man. Also, by the summer of 1946, Beria's man Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov was replaced as head of the Ministry for State Security (MGB) by Viktor Abakumov. Abakumov had headed SMERSH from 1943 to 1946; his relationship with Beria involved close collaboration (since Abakumov owed his rise to Beria's support and esteem), but also rivalry. Stalin had begun to encourage Abakumov to form his own network inside the MGB to counter Beria's dominance of the power ministries.[20] Kruglov and Abakumov moved expeditiously to replace Beria's men in the security apparatus leadership with new people. Very soon, Deputy Minister Stepan Mamulov of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs was the only close Beria ally left outside foreign intelligence, on which Beria kept a grip. In the following months, Abakumov started carrying out important operations without consulting Beria, often working in tandem with Zhdanov, and on Stalin's direct orders. These operations were aimed by Stalin—initially tangentially, but with time more directly-at Beria.[citation needed] One of the first such moves involved the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee affair, which commenced in October 1946 and eventually led to the murder of Solomon Mikhoels and the arrest of many other members. This affair damaged Beria; not only had he championed the creation of the committee in 1942, but his own entourage included a substantial number of Jews.[citation needed] After Zhdanov died suddenly in August 1948, Beria and Malenkov consolidated their power by means of a purge of Zhdanov's associates in the so-called "Leningrad Affair". Those executed included Zhdanov's deputy, Alexey Kuznetsov; the economic chief, Nikolai Voznesensky; the Party head in Leningrad, Pyotr Popkov; and the Prime Minister of the Russian Republic, Mikhail Rodionov.[21] During the postwar years, Beria supervised installation of Communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe and hand-picked the Soviet-backed leaders.[22] Starting in 1948, Abakumov initiated several investigations against these leaders, which culminated with the arrest in November 1951 of Rudolf Slánský, Bedřich Geminder, and others in Czechoslovakia. These men were frequently accused of Zionism, "rootless cosmopolitanism", and providing weapons to Israel. Such charges deeply disturbed Beria, as he had directly ordered the sale of large amounts of Czech arms to Israel. Altogether, 14 Czechoslovak Communist leaders, 11 of them Jewish, were tried, convicted, and executed (see Slánský trial). Similar investigations in Poland and other Soviet satellite countries occurred at the same time. In 1951, Abakumov was replaced by Semyon Ignatyev, who further intensified the anti-Semitic campaign. On 13 January 1953, the biggest anti-semitic affair in the Soviet Union started with an article in Pravda - it began what became known as the Doctors' plot, in which a number of the country's prominent Jewish physicians were accused of poisoning top Soviet leaders and arrested. Concurrently, the Soviet press began an anti-semitic propaganda campaign, euphemistically termed the "struggle against rootless cosmopolitanism". Initially, 37 men were arrested, but the number quickly grew into hundreds. Scores of Soviet Jews were dismissed from their jobs, arrested, sent to the Gulag, or executed. The "Doctors' plot" was presumably invented by Stalin as an excuse to dismiss Beria and replace him with Ignatiev or some other MGB functionary. A few days after Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, Beria freed all the arrested doctors, announced that the entire matter was fabricated, and arrested the MGB functionaries directly involved. In other international issues, Beria (along with Mikoyan) correctly foresaw the victory (1949-1950) of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War and greatly helped the Chinese Communists by letting them use Soviet-occupied Manchuria as a staging area and arranging large weapons shipments to the People's Liberation Army, mainly from the recently captured equipment of the Japanese Kwantung Army.[23][page needed] Sexual predator At Beria's trial in 1953, it became known that he had committed numerous rapes during the years he was NKVD chief.[24] Simon Sebag-Montefiore, a biographer of Stalin, concluded the information "reveals a sexual predator who used his power to indulge himself in obsessive depravity.

východní fronta a konference spojenců

In June 1941, Germany broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by invading the Soviet Union. From the time of this invasion to 1944, the areas annexed by the Soviet Union were part of Germany's Ostland (except for the Moldavian SSR). Thereafter, the Soviet Union began to push German forces westward through a series of battles on the Eastern Front. In the aftermath of World War II on the Soviet-Finnish border, the parties signed another peace treaty ceding to the Soviet Union in 1944, followed by a Soviet annexation of roughly the same eastern Finnish territories as those of the prior interim peace treaty as part of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic.[citation needed] From 1943 to 1945, several conferences regarding Post-War Europe occurred that, in part, addressed the potential Soviet annexation and control of countries in Central Europe. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's Soviet policy regarding Central Europe differed vastly from that of American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, with the former believing Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to be a "devil"-like tyrant leading a vile system.[53] When warned of potential domination by a Stalin dictatorship over part of Europe, Roosevelt responded with a statement summarizing his rationale for relations with Stalin: "I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. . . . I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."[54] While meeting with Stalin and Roosevelt in Tehran in 1943, Churchill stated that Britain was vitally interested in restoring Poland as an independent country.[55] Britain did not press the matter for fear that it would become a source of inter-allied friction.[55] In February 1945, at the conference at Yalta, Stalin demanded a Soviet sphere of political influence in Central Europe.[56] Stalin eventually was convinced by Churchill and Roosevelt not to dismember Germany.[56] Stalin stated that the Soviet Union would keep the territory of eastern Poland they had already taken via invasion in 1939, and wanted a pro-Soviet Polish government in power in what would remain of Poland.[56] After resistance by Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin promised a re-organization of the current pro-Soviet government on a broader democratic basis in Poland.[56] He stated that the new government's primary task would be to prepare elections.[57] The parties at Yalta further agreed that the countries of liberated Europe and former Axis satellites would be allowed to "create democratic institutions of their own choice", pursuant to "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."[58] The parties also agreed to help those countries form interim governments "pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections" and "facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections."[58] At the beginning of the July-August 1945 Potsdam Conference after Germany's unconditional surrender, Stalin repeated previous promises to Churchill that he would refrain from a "sovietization" of Central Europe.[59] In addition to reparations, Stalin pushed for "war booty", which would permit the Soviet Union to directly seize property from conquered nations without quantitative or qualitative limitation.[60] A clause was added permitting this to occur with some limitations.

ukrajinský hladomor 1946-47

In Ukraine This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. The specific problem is: Very difficult to read/navigate, lack of sources, non-neutral wording. Please help improve this section if you can. (May 2018) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) From 1938 to 1949 Nikita Khrushchev was the head of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CP[b]U), which means that he played the role of a governor for Joseph Stalin in Moscow, who was head of state of the Soviet Union and who held absolute dictatorial authority. During a brief period between February and December 1947 Lazar Kaganovich stood in for Khrushchev due to what was claimed to be an illness. Khrushchev had been a long time close associate of Lazar Kaganovich who was the head of the CP(b)U from 1925 to 1928. During that time Kaganovich had been responsible for implementing collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine and was involved with the aggressive repression of the so-called kulaks (Russian term) and kurkuli (Ukrainian term) - who were private farmers who were not members of collective farms that were labelled by the communists as being wealthy. They were deemed exploiters of the people for hiring labour, which became a monopoly right claimed by the communist state. By bringing in Kaganovich in 1947 it is an indication that Stalin wanted someone who was a hard liner against the kurkuli that was already experienced in collectivization and repressive measures against farmers that were being imposed at the time and was willing to implement them ruthlessly. This makes Stalin, Khrushchev and Kaganovich the main communist leaders responsible for the famine in Ukraine in 1946-47. During the 1920s in Ukraine Khrushchev had been rapidly promoted by Kaganovich through various senior posts and had been his protégé. In 1929, Khrushchev moved to Moscow to continue his education, which he never completed. After the end of Kaganovich's first governorship of Ukraine in 1928, he was recalled to Moscow and replaced by Stanislav Kosior. Khruschev later replaced Kosior as head of the CP(b)U and governor of Ukraine in 1938. Kaganovich and Kosior are considered to be the key people responsible for implementing the policies which led to the earlier Holodomor famine-genocide in Ukraine, which was the most severe in 1932-33. As the absolute dictator at the time, Joseph Stalin held ultimate responsibility, since he set the overall policy for the Soviet Union and his governors had to carry out his orders in Ukraine. Joseph Stalin admitted to Winston Churchill in Yalta that his collectivization policies during that period cost the lives of 10 million people over 4 years. He would have not exaggerated such a figure, since the official Soviet policy was to conceal and downplay those issues. Kosior was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1935 for "remarkable success in the field of agriculture."[8][9] After WW2 when Soviet rule extended to western Ukraine the similar collectivization policies which had earlier taken place in Ukraine and Russia during the 1920s and 1930s were imposed there as well. Similar to eastern Ukraine during collectivization, there was strong resistance to those and other Soviet policies from the local population which was largely suppressed by 1952. In Ukraine and Russia collectivization coincided with repression and mass famines due to excessive grain requisitions, which is recognized as the main direct policy that caused the famines. That was a policy which was developed originally by Alexander Tsiurupa in 1917-1918, which became a standard repressive policy of using food as a weapon in many communist countries afterwards associated with collectivization and mass famines. Despite poor harvests due to drought, in 1946 Khrushchev set excessive grain collection quotas for Ukraine which resulted in a massive famine.[10] Collective farms were required to hand over 52% of their harvests to the communist government.[11] Although it has been claimed that he tried to reduce the quotas in late 1946, this was not allowed by Stalin. Khrushchev was closely associated with Kaganovich who along with Kosior were found by a court in Kiyiv in 2010 to have been the some of the main persons responsible for the Holodomor of 1932-33. Since Kaganovich was brought in to replace Khrushchev temporarily in 1947 as communist governor in Ukraine, it strongly suggests that the famine of 1946-47 was also a deliberate policy like the previous famine in 1932-33 which Khrushchev would have certainly known about since he had been part of leadership of the CP(b)U and of the Soviet Union. Stalin who was ultimately responsible for the famine of 1946-1947 was well-aware that excessive grain requisitions would cause a mass famine, similar to what he had deliberately done in 1932-33. In the spring of 1946 Khrushchev had told Stalin about the famine. Stalin who glorified himself with the title of "father of all peoples" called it a lie and did not allow it to be officially recognized or remedied, similar to the famine of 1932-33. This was in contrast to the first major Soviet famine of 1921-23 which was officially recognized and several foreign relief missions were allowed. The official death toll was 5 million persons for that famine, which was recognized in the Volga Basin. The more severe famine at the time in southern Ukraine and in the Don region was not recognized and was still subject to continued grain requisitions.[12] The 1946-47 famine in Ukraine affected most of the country except for an areas in few western provinces where the resistance to the forced food requisitions helped to save the people from starvation. Information about the famine in 1946-47 was similarly concealed by the Soviet government as was the famine in 1932-33. Until 1988, it was forbidden for academics in the Soviet union to research those issues.[13] In the post WW2 famine of 1946-47 there were approximately 400,000 - 500,000 children and teenagers that died, who made up a third of the victims.[14] There were many recorded cases of cannibalism. It also resulted in a significant increase in various types of illnesses because of a lack of food. As in the 1930s there were groups of people who would be sent around to collect dead bodies that were put into mass graves. Similarly to 1932-33, it was mostly a rural famine. Soviet policies such as unrealistic food production and excessive requisition quotas, forced grain collections and confiscations, low or no pay for collective farm workers and excessive taxes pushed the rural population to famine. The amount of food that was confiscated and taken out of Ukraine would have been enough to feed the population and avoid the famine. Although there was a drought and a reduced harvest, it was an artificial famine caused by the communist government in Ukraine due to its policies. Traditionally farmers were used to periodic droughts and set aside reserves for such times. Once the communist government collectivized agriculture, the land and harvest belonged to it and farmers were reduced to the status of being employees working on collective farms and were unable to set aside reserves from what they produced. Between 1946-48 in the Soviet Union an estimated 1 million tons of grain was wasted and spoiled in storage which could have also been used instead for famine relief and saved many lives. During the famine although it was not the majority of the harvest, considerable amounts of grain were still exported abroad. In most places the post WW2 famine in Ukraine started in 1945 with the imposition of excessive grain collection policies by the Soviets. It became more severe during 1946 and peaked in the winter and spring of 1947. By the fall of 1947 it began to subside, but continued in many areas until the late 1940s. There was still malnutrition and inadequate food in the early 1950s. It affected all of Ukraine, but the mortality was most severe in the southern parts of the country. The famine was severe in central Ukraine as well. It was not as severe in western Ukraine due to a better harvest there and the fact that collectivization was only being implemented there, which had not deprived families from an independent food production source. This made full confiscation of food more difficult for the Soviet authorities because of many more point sources of food availability and production than in a collective farm system where they had much more control. Because many parts of western Ukraine are a forested mountainous region and a high level of active resistance where the geography favoured them, the population was able to hide away some food and prevent it from being taken away, which allowed more people to survive and avoid starvation. In western Ukraine the population suffered proportionally more from repression than from famine during those years compared to other parts of the country. Between 1945-1953 there were severe repressions in Ukraine including mass arrests of tens of thousands of people and mass deportations. This included the deportation into exile of an estimated 500,000 people from western Ukraine between 1946-49.

Ivan Stěpanovič Koněv

Ivan Stěpanovič Koněv (rusky Иван Степанович Конев; 28. prosince 1897 - 21. května 1973) byl významný sovětský vojevůdce, Maršál Sovětského svazu, Hrdina SSSR a Hrdina ČSSR. V průběhu II. světové války velel vojskům Rudé armády na východní frontě a osvobodil od okupace nacisty velkou část východní Evropy, včetně Prahy. Ivan Koněv se také přímo podílel na dobytí Berlína. V roce 1956 velel Sovětské armádě při potlačení Maďarského povstání. Boje v Sovětském svazu Ivan Koněv, Pavel Rotmistrov V květnu 1941 byl jmenován velitelem záložní 19. armády na Ukrajině, po napadení země nacistickým Německem se však v jejím čele musel přemístit do Běloruska, kde se zapojila do bojů o Smolensk. V září 1941 byl jmenován velitelem Západního frontu, jenž byl v následujícím měsíci naprosto zničen německými útoky při katastrofě u Vjazmy a jeho od trestu smrti zachránil později maršál Sovětského svazu Georgij Konstantinovič Žukov, který odvolaného Koněva odmítl zatknout a místo toho jej přijal do svého štábu, přestože až do bitvy u Kurska Žukov jeho velitelské schopnosti nehodnotil příliš vysoko.[2] Od poloviny října 1941 velel Koněv vojskům Kalininského frontu, podařilo se mu zastavit německý postup, stabilizovat frontovou linii a v prosinci 1941 se jeho vojska zapojila do protiofenzivy u Moskvy. V průběhu jara a léta 1942 se marně pokoušel o prolomení německé obrany v oblasti Rževa, v srpnu 1942 se stal velitelem Západního frontu, jehož vojska ztroskotala při snaze o průlom nepřátelské fronty během operace Mars v oblasti Syčovky. Po krachu dalšího pokusu o ofenzívu počátkem roku 1943 byl v březnu 1943 jmenován velitelem Severozápadního frontu, koncem června 1943 se stal velitelem Stepního frontu, který vedl bojové akce v jižním oblouku kurského výběžku a následně se podílel na osvobozování levobřežní Ukrajiny. Od října 1943 velel 2. ukrajinskému frontu, během zimní ofenzívy 1943-1944 se podílel na osvobozování pravobřežní Ukrajiny, v únoru 1944 byl povýšen na maršála Sovětského svazu. Osvobozování a poválečná činnost Pražané vítají Koněva při osvobození Prahy 1945, foto: Karel Hájek Od května 1944 velel Ivan Koněv vojskům 1. ukrajinského frontu, velel karpatsko-dukelské operaci sovětských a československých vojsk, která měla pomoci Slovenskému národnímu povstání, podílel se na osvobození jižního Polska, dobytí Slezska a Saska. Maršál Koněv při vojenské přehlídce na Rudém náměstí po vítězství ve Velké vlastenecké válce (1945) 27. ledna 1945 osvobodil koncentrační tábor Osvětim. Jeho vojska se účastnila závěrečného útoku na Berlín (útočila jako první a tvořila jižní křídlo sovětského úderného uskupení). S maršálem G. K. Žukovem dne 8. května 1945 přijal německou bezpodmínečnou kapitulaci. Koněvova vojska poté vyrazila na pomoc Pražskému povstání, v průběhu pražské ofenzívy osvobodila severní, střední a východní Čechy a jako první se dostala v květnu 1945 do Prahy. Při bojích v Praze a v nejbližším okolí s německými jednotkami, především s Waffen-SS, včetně tankové divize SS „Das Reich", které pokračovaly v odporu a v masakrech civilistů, padlo 692 sovětských vojáků.[3] Poté držel řeč k Pražanům na Staroměstském náměstí.[4] Krátce po osvobození se maršál Koněv a maršál Malinovskij na Pražském hradě setkali s prezidentem Edvardem Benešem, kde od něj získali nejvyšší státní vyznamenání. 6. června byl Koněvovi udělen titul čestného občana Prahy. S Koněvovým tichým souhlasem sovětská kontrarozvědka Směrš v květnu 1945 z Prahy a okolí odvlekla stovky československých občanů ruské národnosti, kteří odešli do exilu po bolševické revoluci v roce 1917, mezi nimi i bývalého carského důstojníka a československého generála ruského původu Sergeje Vojcechovského. S Koněvovým výslovným souhlasem byl zatčen generál Vlasov. Za osvobození Prahy získal Koněv 1. června svou druhou Zlatou hvězdu hrdiny SSSR. V červnu 1945 byl jmenován velitelem Střední skupiny sovětských vojsk v Rakousku, od června 1946 zastával funkci hlavního velitele pozemního vojska místo maršála Žukova, který se pro svou oblíbenost ocitl ve Stalinově nemilosti. V roce 1950 Stalin Koněva sesadil z pozice vrchního velitele pozemních vojsk a do vrcholných armádních funkcí se Koněv vrátil teprve po Stalinově smrti. Po smrti Stalina také vyšlo najevo, že Koněv již od roku 1937 v atmosféře Stalinských čistek (při nichž zahynul Koněvův mentor Jeronim Uborevič, jehož si Koněv nesmírně vážil) donášel Stalinovi na jiné velitele Rudé armády, včetně Žukova a Vasilevského. Koněv nesouhlasil s rozhodnutím Nikity Chruščova kritizovat Stalinovy zločiny a odsoudit kult jeho osobnosti.[1] Maršál Koněv V květnu 1955 byl postaven do čela Hlavního velitelství spojených ozbrojených sil členských států Varšavské smlouvy. Na podzim 1956 vedl brutální potlačení Maďarského povstání sovětskou armádou, které si vyžádalo přes dva a půl tisíce obětí. Také měl potlačit obrodné choutky Władysłava Gomułky v PLR, z této mise ho ale nakonec Chruščov odvolal. V letech 1961-62 byl velitelem Skupiny sovětských vojsk v Berlíně; v této funkci se podílel na řešení tzv. Druhé berlínské krize výstavbou tzv. Berlínské zdi. Roku 1963 byl jmenován na spíše ceremoniální funkci do Skupiny generálních inspektorů Ministerstva obrany SSSR. V květnu 1968 přijel navštívit nově zvoleného prezidenta Ludvíka Svobodu a podle některých zdrojů část jeho delegace začala mapovat terén pro případnou invazi vojsk Varšavské smlouvy.[2] Tvrzení, že by v roce 1968 osobně zaštítil zpravodajský průzkum před vpádem vojsk odmítlo ruské velvyslanectví i Koněvova dcera Natalja.[5][6] Podle českého historika Povolného byl Koněv od roku 1963 v důchodu (mimo službu) a jeho role při invazi byla tedy nulová.[7] Koněvova reakce na vpád do Československa nebyla příliš nadšená.[2] V roce 1970 si nepřijel do Československa pro titul hrdiny ČSSR, který mu udělila Husákova normalizační vláda. Podle českého historika Jiřího Fidlera „možná šlo o šok z okupace Československa. Rozčarování z intervence přiznávali i další penzionovaní maršálové a generálové."[1] Osobní život Maršál Ivan Stěpanovič Koněv Dvakrát ženatý, tři děti. Dcera Natalja je profesorkou Vojenské univerzity Ministerstva obrany Ruské federace. Ivan Koněv byl v soukromí asketický, tvrdý ke svému okolí, podřízeným i rodině a nelítostný ke svým nepřátelům. Podle potomků byl sice tvrdý ale spravedlivý. Podle amerických svědectví měl smysl pro humor. Nesnášel alkohol a netoleroval jeho požívání ani ve své blízkosti. Věnoval se myslivosti a relaxoval při ice fishingu. Zemřel na rakovinu. Legendární vojevůdce Rudé armády a jedna z nejvýznamnějších osobností II. světové války, dvojnásobný Hrdina Sovětského svazu a držitel Řádu Vítězství maršál Ivan Stěpanovič Koněv je pochován u Kremelské zdi v Moskvě

Andropov Jurij Vladimirovič

Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov (rusky Юрий Владимирович Андропов 1914 - 1984 byl sovětský politik a nejvyšší představitel Sovětského svazu a předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu od 12. listopadu 1982 až do své smrti o patnáct měsíců později. Život Šlo o významného stranického a státního činitele KSSS a SSSR od konce 40. let do své smrti v únoru 1984. Působil ve významných funkcích v Komsomolu a stranickém aparátu v Karelo-finské republice a ÚV KSSS. Po Stalinově smrti odešel do diplomatických služeb a působil jako velvyslanec v Maďarsku, kde pracoval i v období protikomunistického povstání v roce 1956. V letech 1957-1967 vedl oddělení ÚV KSSS pro dohled nad sovětským blokem. V následujících patnácti letech stál v čele všemocné KGB. Na sklonku Brežněvovy éry se stal hlavním ideologem KSSS a po smrti L. I. Brežněva se stal jeho nástupcem. Funkci generálního tajemníka KSSS vykonával nedlouhých 15 měsíců (listopad 1982 - únor 1984). Počátky kariéry Jurij Andropov pocházel z židovské rodiny.[1] V mládí se stal aktivním komsomolcem. Během velkého teroru (1937/1938) vystoupal na přední příčky mládežnické organizace. V roce 1939 byl po ukončení velké čistky přijat do strany. V té době již vedl oblastní komsomolskou organizaci v Jaroslavli (1938-1940). Poté byl přesunut do nově zřízené Karelo-finské svazové republiky, kde se stal prvním tajemníkem republikového komsomolu. Během velké vlastenecké války se podílel na organizaci tamního frontu, partyzánského hnutí a spolupráci týlu a armády. V roce 1944 přešel na práci ve stranických orgánech. Nejprve působil jako druhý tajemník hlavního města republiky (Petrozavodsk) a později se stal tajemníkem republikového ÚV. V této době si doplňoval své vysokoškolské vzdělání mimo jiné na Vysoké škole stranické při ÚV VKS(b). Jeho kariéru nepříjemně poznamenala leningradská aféra, která smetla celé vedení republiky. Andropov jen zázrakem vyklouzl díky aktivní spoluúčasti během kampaně. Po pádu svého dlouholetého ochránce a prvního tajemníka Karelofinské republiky nenastoupil na jeho místo, ale byl převeden do ústředního aparátu v Moskvě. Stal se inspektorem a dohlížel na pobaltské svazové republiky. Jeho přímým nadřízeným se stal druhý muž strany Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov a jeho favorit Averkij B. Aristov. Po Stalinově smrti odešel do diplomatických služeb a působil jako velvyslanec v Maďarsku, kde pracoval i v období protikomunistického povstání v roce 1956. Jeho aktivita a vystupování během krize mu v očích Nikity Sergejeviče Chruščova přinesly ovoce. Brzy se dostavilo povýšení do funkce vedoucího oddělení ÚV KSSS pro dohled a spolupráci s ostatními sovětskými satelity. V roce 1962 byl vyzvednut mezi tajemníky ÚV a zařadil se mezi nové perspektivní Chruščovovy aparátčíky. Získal renomé znalce mezinárodních vztahů a ideologických otázek. V jeho oddělení ÚV se soustředil mozkový trust poradců, kteří si udrželi vliv na dění v SSSR až do dob M. S. Gorbačova. Nástup Leonida Iljiče Brežněva - Michaila Andrejeviče Suslova (říjen 1964) byl pro něj ranou a zdálo se, že s jeho setrváním ve funkcích je konec. Až přespříliš byl spojen s Nikitou Sergejevičem Chruščovem. Nicméně složité vztahy a rivality uvnitř kremelské věrchušky (elita, politická špička) vedly ke sblížení s Leonidem Iljičem Brežněvem, který hledal spojence proti svým soupeřům (Šeljepin - Podgornyj - Kosygin). V čele KGB (1967-1982) V roce 1967 se podařilo Brežněvovi zbavit se nepohodlného šéfa KGB Semičasného. Novou hlavou KGB se stal Andropov, který zůstal v této funkci až do jara 1982, kdy se znovu vrátil do funkce tajemníka ÚV KSSS. Pod jeho vedením upevnila státní bezpečnost svůj dohled nad obyvatelstvem. Pod její kontrolu se dostaly všechny sféry života státu i společnosti. Jedním z jejích úkolů byl boj s disentem, s projevy místního nacionálního separatismu a s náboženstvím. Z jeho iniciativy začalo vysídlování disidentů za hranice. V roce 1974 nebyl umožněn návrat Alexandra I. Solženicyna do země a později byl zbaven občanství. Lidé s odlišným názorem byli posíláni do psychiatrických léčeben, aby se předešlo jejich zavírání do věznic. KGB sledovala i život za hranicemi SSSR a spolupodílela se na určování linie zahraniční politiky. Andropov byl hlavním aktérem při vpádu sovětských vojsk do Československa v roce 1968 i do Afghánistánu v roce 1979. V letech 1980-1981 však jako ředitel KGB vystupoval proti návrhům řešit vojenskou okupací krizi v Polsku, která nakonec vyústila ve vnitřní státní převrat. Ve stejné době začal rovněž podporovat reformní kruhy v Sovětském svazu. Na vrcholu moci Úpadek Brežněvovy osobnosti mu otevřel možnost ucházet se o následnictví. Brežněv původně vyzvedával své favority A. P. Kirilenka (spolupracovník z Dněpropetrovska od třicátých let) a K. U. Černěnka (spolupracovník a asistent od padesátých let z Moldávie). Reálné šance se pro Andropova otevřely na jaře 1982. Po smrti M. A. Suslova zaujal post druhého tajemníka ÚV, převzal dohled nad ideologií a řízení sekretariátu ÚV. Generálním tajemníkem ÚV KSSS byl zvolen na plenárním zasedání 14. listopadu 1982 na návrh svého rivala Konstantina Ustinoviče Černěnka. Dělba moci však proběhla již dříve na jednání politbyra. Zdravotní stav nového sovětského vůdce byl již velmi špatný, přesto se vrhl do práce a zahájil sérii reforem, které měly obnovit hospodářský růst, zvýšit produktivitu práce a vyřešit ekonomické potíže kolabujícího impéria. Pozornost věnoval boji s korupcí a zneužívání postavení uvnitř stranické nomenklatury. Do vedoucích funkcí vyzvedával mladší funkcionáře. Kolem něj se vytvořilo nové perspektivní vedení KSSS (Andropov, Romanov, Gorbačov, Alijev, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ryžkov, Ligačov, Solomencev a Vorotnikov), které však muselo stále počítat se silnými pozicemi konzervativců, kteří nechtěli narušovat status quo Brežněvovy epochy (Černěnko, Tichonov, Pelše, Grišin, Kunajev, Ščerbyckij, Zimjanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov). Výrazným úspěchem, kterého jako generální tajemník dosáhl, bylo rozkrytí tzv. Bavlníkové aféry. Šlo o masivní korupční skandál, při němž vyšlo najevo, že představitelé středoasijských svazových republik, zejména uzbecké a tádžické po celou dobu Brežněvovy éry falšovali údaje o dodávkách bavlny s účastí některých Brežněvových blízkých spolupracovníků, včetně jeho zetě Jurije Čurbanova. V rámci skandálu byly zatčeny a vyšetřovány řádově tisíce osob a rozpracovány změny ve správních strukturách jednotlivých svazových republik. Dokončit je však už Andropov nestihl, stejně jako se nedočkal výsledků vyšetřování. V únoru 1984 zemřel ve věku 69 let. Jeho nástupcem se stal stářím a nemocemi zcela sešlý konzervativní stoupenec brežněvovského křídla Konstantin Ustinovič Černěnko. Ten zemřel o 13 měsíců později a na přerušené reformy, které Andropovov rozpracoval, navázal Černěnkův nástupce Gorbačov. Seznam funkcí Vedoucí mezinárodního oddělení ÚV (dohled nad komunistickými stranami socialistického tábora) 1957-1967 Tajemník ÚV - 1962-1967, 1982 Předseda Výboru státní bezpečnosti (KGB) - 1967-1982 Generální tajemník ÚV KSSS - listopad 1982 - únor 1984 Předseda prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR - 1983-1984 Kandidát politbyra 1967-1973, člen politbyra 1973-1984;

berija kariéra

Kariéra Beria (vpravo) se Stalinovou dcerou Světlanou na klíně, sám Stalin sedí vzadu. První strana Beriova oznámení (podepsané Stalinem) k vraždě cca 15 000 polských důstojníků a asi 10 000 dalších intelektuálů v Katyňském lese a dalších místech v Sovětském svazu. V ázerbájdžánské Čece se rychle vypracoval na jednoho z nejspolehlivějších terénních pracovníků a brzy se stal šéfem operačního oddělení. Koncem roku 1921 byl přeložen z téže funkce do významnější v Gruzii. V roce 1924 zde, pod jeho vedením, Čeka, policie a armáda potlačily protibolševické povstání, načež zorganizoval pro výstrahu veřejné popravy cca 10 000 lidí. V Moskvě se ovšem objevil názor, že zásah byl až nepřiměřeně brutální a že povstání samo bylo koneckonců vyvoláno nepřiměřenou brutalitou (zejména ze strany Čeky) a do Gruzie byl vyslán Stalinův blízký spolupracovník Grigorij Konstantinovič Ordžonikidze. On sám si ovšem dal velký pozor, aby bylo tomuto muži jasné, že jej obdivuje a plně podporuje, a zároveň velmi horlivě podlézal Stalinovi (pro toho postavil vilu a dával mu najevo svoji absolutní věrnost). Není tedy překvapující, že Ordžonikidze nakonec dospěl k závěru, že vše bylo v naprostém pořádku. Roku 1926 se stal šéfem gruzínské OGPU. V této funkci se projevoval krutostí a brutalitou v neobvyklé míře dokonce i na tehdejší SSSR. Intrikami a falešnými udáními proti místním politikům, kteří měli sabotovat jeho práci a štvát lid proti Moskvě, dosáhl odstranění mnoha z nich. Zároveň začal sbírat všechny možné kompromitující materiály na ostatní funkcionáře - jak pro pracovní použití (měl-li být funkcionář odstraněn, přidaly se do spisu), tak pro osobní potřebu (aby mohl dotyčné vydírat a ovládat). Postupem času se stal prakticky neomezeným pánem Gruzie, neboť 2/3 teoreticky nadřízených nebo nezávislých funkcionářů strany mělo strach, že je může poslat na popraviště prostě proto, že je to Stalinův přítel, a zbylá věděla, že je může poslat na popraviště, protože na ně má k dispozici kompromitující materiály.[zdroj?] V roce 1931 se mu podařilo za pomoci intrik zkompromitovat svého přímého nadřízeného, šéfa zakavkazské OGPU a Stalin jej promptně jmenoval na jeho místo. Krátce poté jej nechal jmenovat prvním tajemníkem ÚV gruzínské komunistické strany a druhým tajemníkem ÚV zakavkazské komunistické strany, obé přes zoufalé protesty drtivé většiny obou uskupení. Krátce poté se stal šéfem strany pro celé Zakavkazsko. V roce 1935 vydal knihu O dějinách bolševických organizací v Zakavkazsku, jejímž hlavním přínosem bylo, že tyto dějiny zcela přepsala, když monstrózně navýšila roli Stalina a některé výrazné osobnosti vůbec nejmenovala. Kniha se stala bestsellerem a její „autor" Berija prorazil do nejvyšší politiky (skutečného autora, Jermolaje Alexejeviče Nediju, nechal později zastřelit). V době začínající Velké čistky byl jejím hlavním vykonavatelem pro oblast Zakavkazska. Jeho a Stalinovi nepřátelé začali umírat na nečekané infarkty, nešťastné nehody a sebevraždy zastřelením. Dostalo se i na historiky, kteří zpochybňovali serióznost a pravdivost jeho „historické práce". Existují reálná podezření,[zdroj?] že některé oběti zlikvidoval z ryze soukromých potřeb, aniž by se někoho ptal. Dodatečně to pak vždy odůvodnil jejich „podvratnou činností". Často své oběti popravoval osobně, prý[zdroj?] s velkým potěšením. V roce 1937 bylo v Gruzii nejvíce zatčených na obyvatele z celého SSSR a byl zde i jeden z nejvyšších poměrů popravený - zatčený (ve prospěch popravených). V srpnu 1938 jej Stalin jmenoval mužem číslo 2 v NKVD a 25. listopadu 1938 postoupil ještě výš: stal se lidovým komisařem vnitra, poté, co pomohl poslat na popraviště bývalého šéfa NKVD Ježova. Berija navrhl Stalinovi a poté zorganizoval Katyňský masakr polských zajatců v roce 1940.[1] Po druhé světové válce se stal předsedou komise pro atomový výzkum a zásadním způsobem přispěl v roce 1949 k úspěšné výrobě první sovětské jaderné zbraně.[zdroj?] Po Stalinově smrti Po Stalinově smrti začal usilovat o získání absolutní moci v SSSR. K dosažení tohoto cíle neváhal zásadně změnit své politické postoje; zasazoval se o odsouzení Stalinových zločinů a rehabilitaci jejich obětí, ba dokonce začal prosazovat soukromé podnikání a tržní principy v socialistickém hospodářství. Jeho političtí oponenti si byli dobře vědomi nebezpečí, které by pro ně vyplývalo z jeho setrvání u moci; i díky tomu byl v kremelském boji o moc nakonec úspěšnější Chruščov, který posléze nechal Beriju na jaře 1953 zatknout[2] a odsoudit k trestu smrti; obvinění bylo založeno jak na některých skutečných Berijových zločinech (podíl na čistkách v důstojnickém sboru koncem třicátých let), tak i na účelových smyšlenkách (údajná špionáž pro nepřítele).[3] Berija byl popraven zastřelením 23. prosince 1953.

chruščov a stalin

Khrushchev's Thaw had its genesis in the concealed power struggle among Stalin's lieutenants.[1] Several major leaders among the Red Army commanders, such as Marshal Georgy Zhukov and his loyal officers, had some serious tensions with Stalin's secret service.[1][10] On the surface, the Red Army and the Soviet leadership seemed united after their victory in World War II. However, the hidden ambitions of the top people around Stalin, as well as Stalin's own suspicions, had prompted Khrushchev that he could rely only on those few; they would stay with him through the entire political power struggle.[10][11] That power struggle was surreptitiously prepared by Khrushchev while Stalin was alive,[1][10] and came to surface after Stalin's death in March 1953.[10] By that time, Khrushchev's people were planted everywhere in the Soviet hierarchy, which allowed Khrushchev to execute, or remove his main opponents, and then introduce some changes in the rigid Soviet ideology and hierarchy.[1] Stalin's leadership had reached new extremes in ruling people at all levels,[12] such as the deportations of nationalities, the Leningrad Affair, the Doctors' plot, and official criticisms of writers and other intellectuals. At the same time, millions of soldiers and officers had seen Europe after World War II, and had become aware of different ways of life which existed outside the Soviet Union. Upon Stalin's orders many were arrested and punished again,[12] including the attacks on the popular Marshal Georgy Zhukov and other top generals, who had exceeded the limits on taking trophies when they looted the defeated nation of Germany. The loot was confiscated by Stalin's security apparatus, and Marshal Zhukov was demoted, humiliated and exiled; he became a staunch anti-Stalinist.[13] Zhukov waited until the death of Stalin, which allowed Khrushchev to bring Zhukov back for a new political battle.[1][14] The temporary union between Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal Georgy Zhukov was founded on their similar backgrounds, interests and weaknesses:[1] both were peasants, both were ambitious, both were abused by Stalin, both feared the Stalinists, and both wanted to change these things. Khrushchev and Zhukov needed one another to eliminate their mutual enemies in the Soviet political elite.[14][15] In 1953, Zhukov helped Khrushchev to eliminate Lavrenty Beria,[1] then a First Vice-Premier, who was promptly executed in Moscow, as well as several other figures of Stalin's circle. Soon Khrushchev ordered the release of millions of political prisoners from the Gulag camps. Under Khrushchev's rule the number of prisoners in the Soviet Union was decreased, according to some writers, from 13 million to 5 million people.[12] Khrushchev also promoted and groomed Leonid Brezhnev,[14] whom he brought to the Kremlin and introduced to Stalin in 1952.[1] Then Khrushchev promoted Brezhnev to Presidium (Politburo) and made him the Head of Political Directorate of the Red Army and Navy, and moved him up to several other powerful positions. Brezhnev in return helped Khrushchev by tipping the balance of power during several critical confrontations with the conservative hard-liners, including the ouster of pro-Stalinists headed by Molotov and Malenkov.[14][16]

Komsomol

Komsomol Main article: Komsomol The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League, commonly referred to as Komsomol, was the party's youth wing.[119] The Komsomol acted under the direction of the CPSU Central Committee.[119] It was responsible for indoctrinating youths in communist ideology and organizing social events.[120] It was closely modeled on the CPSU; nominally the highest body was the Congress, followed by the Central Committee, Secretariat and the Politburo.[119] The Komsomol participated in nationwide policy-making by appointing members to the collegiums of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, the Ministry of Education and the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports.[119] The organization's newspaper was the Komsomolskaya Pravda.[121] The First Secretary and the Second Secretary were commonly members of the Central Committee but were never elected to the Politburo.[121] However, at the republican level several Komsomol first secretaries were appointed to the Politburo

Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu

Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Znak KPSS Sociálně demokratická dělnická strana Ruska (bolševiků) [SDDSR(b)], 1917-1918), Komunistická strana Ruska (bolševiků) [KSR(b)], 1918-1925), Všesvazová komunistická strana (bolševiků) [VKS(b)] - 1925-1952) a od XIX. sjezdu KSSS Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu (KSSS, 1952-1991), byla sovětská komunistická strana - (Коммунистическая партия Советского союза (КПСС). Nejdříve, od roku 1903 existovala jako frakce uvnitř Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické strany, po říjnové revoluci 1917 se stala nejsilnější politickou mocí v Sovětském svazu, kterou byla až do jeho zániku v roce 1991. Obsah 1 Historie strany 1.1 Frakce bolševiků 1.2 Říjnová revoluce 2 Vedení a hlavní orgány 2.1 Generální tajemník 3 Odkazy 3.1 Reference 3.2 Literatura 3.3 Související články Historie strany Frakce bolševiků Bolševici vznikli jako neformální menšinová frakce levicové strany SDDSR na jejím II. sjezdu v roce 1903. Jednalo se o skupinu radikálních revolucionářů uvnitř marxistické sociální demokracie Ruska. Na pražském sjezdu v lednu 1912 se organizačně osamostatnili, přijali název Sociálně demokratická dělnická strana bolševiků, ale stále zůstávali formálně součástí jednotné Sociálně demokratické dělnické strany Ruska. Až po únorové revoluci v roce 1917 Leninovi stoupenci v srpnu 1917 formálně odešli ze strany a na slučovacím sjezdu s Trockého frakcí založili samostatnou stranu. Měla 23 600 členů. (Rusko v té době mělo 100 milionů obyvatel.) Členové této frakce byli později neoficiálně nazýváni „starou gardou". Tato část článku je příliš stručná nebo postrádá důležité informace. Pomozte Wikipedii tím, že ji vhodně rozšíříte. Říjnová revoluce Podrobnější informace naleznete v článku Říjnová revoluce. V den Trockého narozenin (7. listopadu 1917) bolševici provedli v Petrohradu revoluci a získali moc v centrálním Rusku. Lenin vyzval rolníky, nejpočetnější část obyvatel Ruska, aby si sami zabrali půdu. Ti přestali volit SR a až do kolektivizace (19. února 1918 byl přijat zákon o socializaci půdy) podporovali SDDSR(b). Lenin byl nucen vytvořit koaliční vládu SDDSR(b) a levých eserů. Dne 12. listopadu 1917 se konaly svobodné volby. Ze 707 mandátů získali SR (eseři, socialističtí agrárníci) 410, SDDSR(b) (komunisté) 175, KD (liberálové) 17, SDDSR (sociální demokraté) 16. Po prohraných volbách Lenin zamezil fungování parlamentu a prosadil vůdčí roli komunistické strany shora. Dne 3. března 1918 uzavřela ruská vláda s Ústředními mocnostmi brestlitevský mír. Protože levicoví eseři s ním nesouhlasili, museli vládu opustit. V roce 1922 měla KSR(b) půl milionu členů. Vedení a hlavní orgány V prvních letech existence ruské komunistické strany, předchůdkyně pozdější KSSS, stál v čele její první předseda a zároveň i její hlavní ideový vůdce Vladimir Iljič Lenin. Svou autokratickou moc zakládal především na své obrovské autoritě. V bolševickém Rusku však vystupoval z pozice předsedy rady lidových komisařů. Skutečným nejvyšším stranickým vedením se staly dva výbory: Politické byro (bolševiků) neboli politbyro, které ve svých rukou soustřeďovalo nejvyšší moc (zabývalo se řízením ekonomiky, zahraniční politiky, otázkami obrany a politickým řízením země. V letech 1952-1966 bylo nazýváno předsednictvo ÚV. Organizační byro neboli orgbyro, které se zabývalo organizačními otázkami vedení strany, rozmísťování kádrů a obsazování klíčových funkcí. V roce 1952 bylo zrušeno a jeho pravomoci přešly na sekretariát ÚV. Od počátku dvacátých let začal stále větší úlohu hrát sekretariát ÚV, který se skládal z tajemníků ÚV. Ti řídili samotný aparát ÚV (jednotlivá oddělení a správy). Aparát strany měl realizovat usnesení politbyra a orgbyra. Nejvýznamnějšími částmi stranického aparátu byly: agitačně-propagační oddělení, administrativní oddělení (řídilo KGB a armádu), oddělení stranických orgánů či oddělení s hospodářským zaměřením atd. Generální tajemník Od roku 1922 stál v čele stranického aparátu generální tajemník, který stanul na špici mocenského uspořádání sovětského stranicko-státního systému. V ideálním případě se dařilo generálním tajemníkům získat do svých rukou i funkci ze státní správy. Josif Vissarionovič Stalin - od roku 1922 generální tajemník KSR(b) - VKS(b), po roce 1941 zakládal J. V. Stalin svou mocenskou pozici především na funkci předsedy rady lidových komisařů či od roku 1946 rady ministrů a ve stranickém aparátě se řadil mezi ostatní tajemníky až do své smrti v březnu 1953. Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov - Stalinův designovaný nástupce, zprvu řídil stranu jako její tajemník, ale od 14. března 1953 vykonával pouze funkci předsedy rady ministrů; ještě několik měsíců předsedal zasedáním předsednictva strany a byl pokládán za hlavního Stalinova dědice a nástupce; Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov - po Stalinově smrti se stal jediným ze členů politbyra, který kromě předsednictva ÚV zasedal i v sekretariátu ÚV a tím pádem do svých rukou převzal řízení stranického aparátu. Ostatní přesunuli svou pozornost do resortů v sovětské vládě. V mocenském boji o nástupnictví se tak Chruščov v letech 1953-1957 prosadil jako nový vůdce strany a tím i státu. Od září 1953 do října 1964 vykonával funkci prvního tajemníka ÚV, vedle toho v letech 1958-1964 zároveň řídil i sovětský kabinet neboli radu ministrů. Leonid Iljič Brežněv - v říjnovém převratu v roce 1964 společně se svými spojenci sesadil Chruščova. Předsednictvo ÚV se znovu přihlásilo k politice kolektivního vedení a rozdělení funkcí, prvním tajemníkem ÚV se stal L. I. Brežněv. Ten stál v čele strany následujících 18 let, kterých využil k upevňování svých pozic. V roce 1966 se nechal zvolit generálním tajemníkem ÚV. V roce 1977 převzal i on post ve státních orgánech - byl zvolen předsedou prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR. Tuto praktiku spojení funkce generálního tajemníka a oficiální hlavy státu praktikovali i jeho nástupci - Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov (1982-1984) a Konstantin Ustinovič Černěnko (1984-1985). Michail Sergejevič Gorbačov - 1985-1991 nejprve byl zvolen generálním tajemníkem a v roce 1988 převzal i funkci předsedy prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu, kterou o rok později vyměnil za nově zavedený úřad prezidenta SSSR.

Leonid Brežněv

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (/ˈbrɛʒnɛf/;[1] Russian: Леони́д Ильи́ч Бре́жнев, IPA: [lʲɪɐˈnʲit ɪˈlʲjidʑ ˈbrʲeʐnʲɪf] (listen); Ukrainian: Леоні́д Іллі́ч Бре́жнєв, 19 December 1906 (O.S. 6 December) - 10 November 1982)[2] was a Soviet politician of Ukrainian descent, who led the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death in 1982 as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). His eighteen-year term as General Secretary was second only to that of Joseph Stalin in duration. During Brezhnev's rule, the global influence of the Soviet Union grew dramatically, in part because of the expansion of its military during this time. His tenure as leader was also marked by the beginning of an era of economic and social stagnation in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev was born in Kamenskoye in the Russian Empire (now Kamianske, Ukraine), into a Russian worker's family in 1906. After graduating from the Kamenskoye Metallurgical Technicum, he became a metallurgical engineer in the iron and steel industry, in Ukraine. He joined the Komsomol in 1923 and became an active member of the CPSU by 1929. With the onset of World War II, he was drafted into immediate military service and left the army in 1946 with the rank of major general. In 1952 Brezhnev was promoted to the Central Committee and in 1957 to full member of the Politburo. In 1964, he succeeded Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU. As the leader of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev's conservatism and carefulness to reach decisions by consensus within the Politburo resulted in sustained political stability within the party and the country. However, his hostility towards reform and tolerance of corruption ushered in a period of socioeconomic decline that came to be known as the Brezhnev Stagnation. On the world stage, Brezhnev pushed hard for the adoption of détente to relax tensions and foster economic cooperation between the two Cold War superpowers. Despite such diplomatic gestures, Brezhnev's regime presided over widespread military interventionism and a massive arms buildup that ultimately grew to comprise 12.5% of the nation's GNP. After years of declining health, Brezhnev died on 10 November 1982 and was quickly succeeded as General Secretary by Yuri Andropov. Upon coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev denounced his regime's pervasive inefficiency and inflexibility before overseeing steps to liberalize the Soviet Union Leonid Iljič Brežněv (rusky: Леонид Ильич Брежнев, ukrajinsky: Леонід Ілліч Брежнєв; 19. prosince 1906, Kamenskoje (Каменское), Ruské impérium - 10. listopadu 1982, Moskva) byl sovětským politikem, nejvyšším představitelem Sovětského svazu (SSSR) v období let 1964-1982. Brežněv vykonával od roku 1947 funkci prvního tajemníka ÚV KS v ukrajinské Dněpropetrovské oblasti, od roku 1950 v Moldávii a od roku 1955 v Kazachstánu. Jeho kariéra v Komunistické straně Sovětského svazu (KSSS) jej v roce 1960 přivedla do funkce předsedy Nejvyššího sovětu, nominální hlavy státu. Po vnitrostranickém puči proti Nikitovi Chruščovovi se Brežněv v roce 1964 stal skutečným vůdcem Sovětského svazu, a to nejprve prvním tajemníkem a od roku 1966 generálním tajemníkem Ústředního výboru KSSS.[1] Působil téměř tři desítky let na vrcholných pozicích mocenské pyramidy Sovětského svazu a tzv. satelitních států a téměř dvě desetiletí byl jejím nejvyšším představitelem. Kritici poznamenávají, že v době Brežněvovy vlády byl v SSSR nastolen tzv. „neostalinismus" a došlo k dalšímu stupňování zbrojních závodů se Západem, hlavně se Spojenými státy americkými. Přičítají mu zodpovědnost za invazi vojsk Varšavské smlouvy do Československa v roce 1968 a za sovětskou intervenci v Afghánistánu od roku 1979. V mezinárodní politice však v období studené války uplatňoval politiku tzv. détente - uvolňování napětí mezi SSSR a USA

Nikolaj Bucharin

Nikolaj Ivanovič Bucharin (rusky Николай Иванович Бухарин, 9. října 1888, Moskva - 15. března 1938, Moskva) byl bolševický revolucionář, sovětský politik, filosof, žurnalista a spisovatel. Byl členem politbyra (1924-1929) ústředního výboru (1917-1937), předsedou kominterny (1926-1929) a šéfredaktorem stranických novin Pravda. Napsal knihy Imperialismus a světové hospodářství (1918), ABC komunismu (1919), Ekonomika z přechodného období (1920), Historický materialismus (1921) a další. Zpočátku velký přítel Stalina se stal nejznámější obětí Stalinových čistek V roce 1906 vstoupil do Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické strany, konkrétně do bolševické frakce. S Grigorijem Sokolnikovem svolal Bucharin v roce 1907 národní mládežnickou konferenci v Moskvě, která později byla považována za předchůdce Komsomolu. V té době, byl úzce spjat s Vladimirem Smirnovovem a setkal se se svou budoucí manželkou, Naděždou Lukinovou, sestrou Nikolaje Lukina. Vzali se brzo před jeho odchodem do exilu. V roce 1911, po krátkém vězení, byl Bucharin deportován do Archangelsku, ale brzy utekl do Hannoveru, kde zůstal na rok. V roce 1912 se odstěhoval do Krakova, kde se poprvé setkal s Leninem. Během exilu pokračoval ve svém vzdělání a napsal několik knih, které mu vynesly označení „významný bolševik". Jeho kniha Imperialismus a světové hospodářství během první světové války ovlivnila Lenina, který z ní volně čerpal ve své větší a lépe známější práci, Imperialismus jako nejvyšší stadium kapitalismu. Lenin měl nicméně s Bucharinem často horké spory o teoretických problémech a Bucharinově spojenectví s evropskou levicí. Bucharin vyvinul zájem o práci rakouských marxistů a marxističtí ekonomičtí teoretici, jako Alexandr Bogdanov, se od Leninových pozic raději odchýlili. V roce 1913 ve Vídni se poprvé seznámil s rodákem z Gruzie a bolševikem Josifem Stalinem, kterého si ihned oblíbil a kterému pomohl napsat článek "Marxismus a národní otázka", a to na Leninovu žádost. Stalin a Bucharin se rychle spřátelili a říkali si „Koba" a „Kolja". Bucharin byl také jediný, kdo mohl později Stalinovi tykat. V říjnu 1916, odešel Bucharin do New Yorku, kde editoval noviny Novyj Mir (Nový svět) se Lvem Trockým, který pobýval v Evropě, a Alexandrou Kollontajovou. Revoluce 1917 Když se Bucharin v roce 1917 dozvěděl, že v Rusku probíhá revoluce, která svrhla cara, vrátil se přes Japonsko do Ruska a stal se jedním z vedoucích bolševiků v Moskvě. Během říjnové revoluce uvedl, že bránil revoluční výnosy moskevského sovětu a že přispěl k vyhnání menševiků a prozatímní vlády v čele s Kerenským do vyhnanství. Bucharin poté reprezentoval moskevskou společnost v revoluční vládě v Petrohradě po revoluci a stal se editorem stranických novin Pravdy. V roce 1918, kdy první světová válka skončila, neskrýval Bucharin opovržení vůči Brestlitevské smlouvě a Leninovu podpisu pod ní. Bucharin smlouvu viděl jako zradu německého proletariátu. Naopak podporoval Komunistickou stranu Německa (KPD) za německé revoluce, tehdy se inspiroval celosvětovou proletářskou revolucí. V té době se Bucharinův pohled na Rusko a na jeho novou dosud nepřipravenou politiku v jejím politicko-ekonomickém stupni odlišoval. Zápas o moc Po Leninově smrti v roce 1924 se stal Bucharin členem Kominterny a politbyra. V roce 1925 změnil svou pozici a přijal Leninův důraz na přežití a zesilování sovětského státu jako bašty budoucí světové revoluce. Bucharin se stal hlavním propagátorem Nové ekonomické politiky (NEP), nikoli jako ústupku, jako dočasné fáze, ale jako modelu dlouhodobého období soužití s rolnickým hospodařením, volným obchodem se zemědělskými produkty a tolerováním drobného soukromého podnikání. To znamenalo soustředit se na zemědělství s dvaceti pěti miliony rolnických hospodářství a dodávat podnikavějším rolníkům odvahu k práci s výhledem prosperity. „Enrichissez - vous", heslo, které Bucharin propagoval: „Obohať se, rozvíjej své hospodářství a neboj se, že budeš předmětem restrikce". V následujícím zápasu o moc mezi Trockým, Zinovjevem, Kameněvem a Stalinem se spojil Bucharin se Stalinem, i přesto, že Stalin chtěl rychle industrializovat zemi, vystupňovat třídní boj proti kulakům a neusiloval o světovou revoluci. Bucharin, který byl zásadně proti násilné kolektivizaci a združstevňování, vydal knihu Socialismus v jedné zemi, která argumentovala, že socialismus by mohl být vyvinutý v jediné zemi, dokonce i v tak zaostalé jako je Rusko. Tato nová teorie přestala potřebovat celosvětovou revoluci, nebyla již déle povzbuzována v kapitalistických zemích, Rusko mohlo a mělo by dosáhnout socialismu samo. Trockij, největší Stalinův nepřítel, byl poražen triumvirátem Stalin, Zinovjev a Kameněv, s podporou Bucharina a byl poslán do vyhnanství v Kazachstánu a později do Mexika, kde zemřel roku 1940, dostižen nájemnými vrahy. Zinovjev a Kameněv byli v roce 1928 vyhozeni ze strany, a Bucharin se těšil ze stále větší Stalinovy podpory. Byl dosazen do významných funkcí, a to i na úkor jiných členů strany, kteří museli své funkce chtě nechtě opustit. Například Alexej Rykov, Leninův následník jako předseda rady lidových komisařů, a Michail Tomskij, hlava odborů a předseda Kominterny. Tyto funkce převzal Bucharin. Nedostatek obilí v roce 1928 pobídl Stalina zrychlit industrializaci a přitvrdit v kolektivizaci, protože věřil, že NEP nefungovala. Stalin náhle přijal politiku od svých poražených nepřátel - Trockého, Zinovjeva, a Kameněva. Pád Bucharin Bucharinův pád začal již konfrontací mezi Leninovými dědici. Konfrontace se rozdělila na čtyři fáze. První začala již v roce 1923, kdy byl Lenin ještě stále naživu, ale byl ochrnutý, a skončila roku 1925. V ní stál triumvirát Zinovjev, Kameněv a Stalin proti Trockému. Ve druhé fázi, 1925 až 1926, soupeřili Stalin a Bucharin s Kameněvem a Zinovjevem. V období 1926 až 1927 čelili Stalin s Bucharinem spojené opozici Zinovjeva, Kameněva a Trockého. Posledním dějstvím konfrontace, 1928-1929, byla již opozice Zinovjeva, Kameněva a Trockého poražena. Stalin se však poté obrátil proti svým spojencům. V den svých 50. narozenin v roce 1929 Stalin vyhnal z politbyra Zinovjeva, Kameněva, Bucharina, Trockého a Tomského, s nimiž začal soupeřit. Šestý, Rykov, zůstal v politbyru trpěn z milosti. Bucharin a ostatní byli politicky nečinní až do roku 1932, kdy se do politiky vrátili. Bucharin poté Stalinovi odpustil. Soudní proces Bucharin roku 1928 V roce 1934 byl zastřelen leningradský vůdce komunistů Sergej Kirov. To byla záminka k odstartování tzv. Velkých čistek. 1. prosince 1936 vtrhli agenti NKVD do Bucharinova bytu v Kremlu s rozkazem, aby se vystěhoval. Když se s nimi dohadoval, zazvonil telefon. Byl to Stalin. „Nazdar, jak se máš, Nikolaji?" zeptal se. Když mu Bucharin řekl, že jej právě vystěhovávají, Stalin do telefonu zařval: „K čertu, vyžeň je ven!" Brzy poté svolal Stalin tajnou schůzku ústředního výboru, na níž velitel NKVD Nikolaj Ježov navrhl obvinit Bucharina a Rykova, že jsou vůdci toho vůbec nejvážnějšího spiknutí proti Stalinovi. To byla generální zkouška na zasedání pléna v únoru a březnu 1937. Konalo se ve stínu odsouzení a popravy obviněných v Pjatakově procesu koncem ledna a Ordžonikidzeho sebevraždy. Když Bucharin obdržel pořad jednání a viděl, že hlavním bodem bylo rozhodnutí o něm a o Rykovovi, vyhlásil na protest hladovku. Když přišel na schůzi ústředního výboru, Stalin k němu přišel a otázal se: „Proti komu je namířena tvoje hladovka? Proti ústřednímu výboru strany? Podívej se na sebe, Nikolaji, vypadáš strašně vyhuble. Požádej plénum, aby ti tvou hladovku odpustilo." „Proč bych to dělal?" odpověděl Bucharin. „Stejně se mne v každém případě chystáte vyloučit ze strany." „Nikdo tě ze strany nevyloučí," odpověděl Stalin. Když prohlásil: „Já nejsem Zinovjev nebo Kameněv, já nebudu lhát proti sobě samotnému", Vjačeslav Molotov mu řekl: „Jestliže se nepřiznáte, pak to bude důkaz, že jste se zaprodal fašistům. Jejich noviny tvrdí, že naše procesy jsou provokace. My vás zatkneme a vy se doznáte". Když padl návrh na Bucharinovo a Rykovovo zatčení, došlo k další bouřlivé scéně. V doprovodu stráží byli předvedeni Karl Radek a Grigorij Sokolnikov a ti podali důkaz o tom, že oba byli do spiknutí zapleteni. Ale Bucharin s Rykovem odmítli všechna obvinění. Ti však sklidili výsměch. Později byla jmenována komise, která měla rozhodnout o Bucharinově a Rykovově osudu. Nikdo neprotestoval proti jejich vyloučení a postavení před soud. Vyvrcholení procesu byl jejich výslech. Bucharinovi byla vymezena role úhlavního nepřítele, který stál v pozadí všech zločinů a měl prsty v každém spiknutí. Každý z vězňů, když očerňoval sám sebe, si dal pozor, aby zároveň očerňoval i Bucharina. Bucharin tyto obvinění odmítl, ale nakonec se k nim musel doznat, když mu hrozili, že zabijí jeho ženu a právě narozeného syna. Na rozdíl od Rykova se Bucharin nenechal zastrašit tyranskými pokusy prokurátora Andreje Vyšinského, naopak v celé řadě názorů zvítězil a provokoval Vyšinského tak, až se chvílemi přestal ovládat. Vyšinskij: „Obžalovaný Bucharine, přiznáváte se, že jste prováděl špionáž?" Bucharin: „Nepřiznávám." Vyšinskij: „Poté, co prohlašují Rykov a Šaragonovič?" Bucharin: „Nepřiznávám se." Vyšinskij: „Když byla v Bělorusku vytvořena organizace pravičáků, byl jste v samém jejím srdci. Přiznáváte to?" Bucharin: „Už jsem vám odpověděl." Vyšinskij: „Já se vás ptám, zdali to přiznáváte nebo ne?" Bucharin: „O běloruské záležitosti jsem se vůbec nezajímal." Vyšinskij: „Zajímal jste se o záležitosti špionáže?" Bucharin: „Ne." Vyšinskij: „A kdo se o ně zajímal?" Bucharin: „Ohledně činnosti tohoto druhu jsem nedostával žádné informace." Vyšinskij: „Obžalovaný Rykove, dostával Bucharin nějaké informace ohledně činnosti takového druhu?" Rykov: „O tom jsem s ním nikdy nehovořil." Vyšinskij, obraceje se k Bucharinovi: „Na základě svědectví, které zde proti vám zaznělo, se vás ptám ještě jednou: rozhodnete se, a přiznáte před sovětským soudem, která zpravodajská služba vás naverbovala - britská, německá, nebo japonská?" Bucharin: „Žádná." Na základě Bucharinovy těsné spolupráce s Leninem připojil Stalin obvinění, že v roce 1918 zavraždil Bucharin bolševického předáka Sverdlova a později chtěl zabít samotného Stalina. Bucharin to tvrdě popřel, a když byl konfrontován se svědky, odmítl jejich svědectví jako nepravdivá. Vyšinskij: „Jak vysvětlíte skutečnost, že nevypovídají pravdu?" Bucharin: „Na to byste se měl zeptat raději jich." Stalin se soudního přelíčení nezúčastnil, ale stejně jako při předchozích procesech vedl ze soudní síně telefonický kabel, takže mohl v soukromí naslouchat soudnímu jednání. V závěrečné řeči Vyšinskij prohlásil: „Historický význam tohoto procesu spočívá především ve skutečnosti, že bylo s výjimečnou svědomitostí a precizností ukázáno, prokázáno a zjištěno, že pravicové síly, trockisté, menševici, socialističtí revolucionáři a buržoazní nacionalisté nejsou ničím jiným než bandou vrahů, špionů a sabotérů bez jakýchkoli principů či ideálů... nejsou politickou stranou, politickou tendencí, ale tlupou zákeřných zločinců, kteří se zaprodali nepřátelským zpravodajským službám." Vyšinského přiváděla k zuřivosti zejména Bucharinova taktika - „toho proklatého křížence lišky a svině" - a stejně tak Rykovova taktika, Rykov se totiž Vyšinskému také začal vzpírat. Oba se totiž odmítali přiznat ke Kirovově vraždě či k jakémukoli jinému konkrétnímu zločinu, ale přijímali obecnou politickou odpovědnost za veškerou činnost pohromadě. Na samém konci procesu však Bucharin začal ustupovat a přiznal, že rozsudek, který očekává, je spravedlivý, a prohlásil, že zasluhuje smrt několikrát, neboť, jak sám řekl, zdegeneroval do nepřítele socialismu: „Během pobytu ve vězení jsem přehodnotil svou vlastní minulost. Neboť když si položíte otázku: „Když už musíš zemřít, pro co umíráš?", náhle se před vámi rozestře naprostá černá prázdnota. Není pro co umírat, jestliže člověk chce zemřít zatvrzelý. A naopak vše, co se v Sovětském svazu třpytí, dostává v lidské mysli nový rozměr. To mne nakonec naprosto odzbrojilo a vedlo mne, abych před stranou a zemí padl na kolena... Výsledkem je naprosté vnitřní morální vítězství Sovětského svazu nad jeho klečícími odpůrci." Poprava Bucharin Není možné říci, do jaké míry bylo Bucharinovo podrobení ovlivněno zjištěním, že pokud nedodrží smlouvu se Stalinem, jeho žena a dítě budou trpět. Nebo jak hodně pociťoval, že pouze oběť pro stranu dá smysl jeho životu a dovolí mu zemřít s nadějí v lepší budoucnost. Stalina motivy nezajímaly. Říkal, že pokud se Bucharin a ostatní přiznají, může vše ostatní vyřešit smrt. Obvinění byli shledáni vinnými ve všech bodech obžaloby a s výjimkou tří odsouzeni k smrti. Mezi odsouzenými k smrti byl Bucharin a také Rykov. V předvečer popravy požádal Bucharin o tužku a kus papíru a napsal Stalinovi krátký vzkaz. „Kobo, proč potřebuješ, abych zemřel?" Žádné odpovědi se již nedočkal, ale tento vzkaz byl po Stalinově smrti nalezen mezi jinými dokumenty v zásuvce jeho psacího stolu. Rozsudek smrti byl vykonán 15. března 1938 a pro jistotu byly přepsány i dějiny Sovětského svazu: Bucharin z nich byl vymazán. Ale z dlouhodobého hlediska Bucharin spor vyhrál. Výzva k budoucí generaci, k níž se obrátil v dopise nadiktovaném své ženě, nebyla marná. V osmdesátých letech začaly jeho ideje přitahovat stále větší pozornost těch, kteří se snažili o „socialismus s lidskou tváří" a v roce 1988, přesně padesát let po jeho procesu, „budoucí generace stranických vůdců" Sovětského svazu Bucharinovo jméno rehabilitovala a odsoudila Stalina Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin[a] (9 October [O.S. 27 September] 1888 - 15 March 1938) was a Bolshevik revolutionary, Soviet Union politician and prolific author on revolutionary theory. As a young man he spent six years in exile, working closely with fellow exiles Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. After the revolution of February 1917 he returned to Moscow, where his Bolshevik credentials earned him a high rank in the Bolshevik party, and after the October Revolution, he became editor of the party newspaper Pravda. Within the Bolshevik Party, Bukharin was initially a Left Communist but gradually moved from the left to the right from 1921. His strong support for and defence of the New Economic Policy (NEP) eventually saw him lead the Right Opposition. By late 1924, this stance had positioned Bukharin favourably as Joseph Stalin's chief ally, with Bukharin soon elaborating Stalin's new theory and policy of Socialism in One Country. Together, Bukharin and Stalin ousted Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev from the Party at the XVth Communist Party Congress in December 1927. From 1926 to 1929 Bukharin enjoyed great power as General Secretary of the Comintern's executive committee. However, Stalin's decision to proceed with collectivisation drove the two men apart, and Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo in 1929. When the Great Purge began in 1936, Stalin looked for any pretext to liquidate his former allies and rivals for power, and some of Bukharin's letters, conversations and tapped phone-calls indicated disloyalty. Arrested in February 1937, he was charged with conspiring to overthrow the Soviet state. After a show trial that alienated many Western communist sympathisers he was executed in March 1938. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin 9 October 1888 Moscow, Russian Empire Died 15 March 1938 (aged 49) Communarka shooting ground, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Cause of death Execution Nationality Russian Political party Bolshevik, Communist Party Spouse(s) Anna Larina

Michail Pavlovič Tomskij

Michail Pavlovič Tomskij (rusky Михаил Павлович Томский, rodným jménem Michail Pavlovič Jefremov (Ефремов), 31. října 1880, Kolpino, Ruská říše - 22. srpna 1936, Bolševo, SSSR) byl tovární dělník, odborář a bolševický vůdce. Životopis Před revolucí Michail Tomskij se narodil v Kolpinu blízko Petrohradu. Jako učeň pracoval v továrnách. Roku 1904 vstoupil do Ruské sociálně demokratické dělnické strany, do bolševické frakce. Tomskij zakládal odborářské organizace. Tomskij se po čase přesunul do Estonska a byl zapojen do revoluce roku 1905. Po jejím potlačení byl Tomskij zatčen a deportován na Sibiř. Podařilo se mu však uniknout a stát se prezidentem Unie kovodělníků. Tomskij však byl roku 1908 chycen, zatčen a potom deportován do Francie, ale o rok později se vrátil do Ruska, kde byl opět chycen a odsouzen na dvacet let těžkých prací. Po únorové revoluci v roce 1917 byl propuštěn a přesunul se do Petrohradu, kde se účastnil říjnové revoluce. Působení v politice V roce 1920 se stal Tomskij všeobecnou hlavou odborů. O rok dřív, roku 1919, byl zvolen do ústředního výboru a roku 1927 do politbyra. Tomskij byl spojenec Nikolaje Bucharina a Alexeje Rykova, kteří vedli mírné křídlo strany. Tomskij s nimi byl ve spojení s Josifem Stalinem, a pomohl mu rozdrtit opozici vedenou Lvem Trockým, Lvem Kameněvem, a Grigorijem Zinovjevem, kteří se chtěli po Leninově smrti zmocnit vlády. Po letech však začal Tomskij ztrácet svůj vliv, a v roce 1929 byl donucen se svými spojenci odstoupit. Tomskij se tehdy začal starat o sovětský chemický průmysl. V roce 1932 se vrátil a byl opět zvolen do ústředního výboru, nikoli však do politbyra. Pád Během prvního moskevského procesu v roce 1936 byli Zinovjev a Kameněv obžalováni z Kirovovy vraždy. Během výslechů jmenovali další údajné spiklence - Bucharina, Rykova, Ulganova, Radka, Pjatakova, Serebjakova, Sokolnikova - a v neposlední řadě i Tomského. Soudce Andrej Vyšinskij se jejich případů ujal, aby je vyšetřil, a aby je postavil před soud. Vyšinského oznámení bylo vytištěno s usnesením, které urychleně přijali dělníci z Dynama a které prohlašovalo, aby byla jejich vina nemilosrdně prošetřena. Tomskij nečekal, a jakmile si přečetl Vyšinského projev, spáchal sebevraždu. Při čtvrtém moskevském procesu roku 1938 byl Tomskij posmrtně obviněn z velezrady a pokusu o atentát na Stalina. Roku 1988 byl Tomskij rehabilitován. He was elected to the Central Committee in March 1919, to its Orgburo in 1921 and to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in April 1922. Tomsky was an ally of Nikolai Bukharin and Alexey Rykov, who led the moderate (or right) wing of the Communist Party in the 1920s. Together, they were allied with Joseph Stalin's faction and helped him purge the United Opposition - led by Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Grigory Zinoviev - from the Party during the struggle that followed Lenin's death in 1924. Demise (1928-1936) In 1928 Stalin moved against his former allies, defeating Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky at the April 1929 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and forcing Tomsky to resign from his position as leader of the trade union movement in May 1929. Tomsky was put in charge of the Soviet chemical industry, a position which he occupied until 1930. He was not re-elected to the Politburo after the 16th Communist Party Congress in July 1930, but remained a full member of the Central Committee until the next Congress in January 1934, when he was demoted to candidate (non-voting) member. Tomsky headed the State Publishing House from May 1932 until August 1936, when he was accused of terrorist connections during the First Moscow Trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Rather than face arrest by the NKVD, Tomsky committed suicide by gunshot in his dacha in Bolshevo, near Moscow.[1] He was posthumously accused of high treason and other crimes during the third (March 1938) show trial of Bukharin, Rykov and others. The Soviet government cleared Tomsky of all charges during perestroika in 1988

Stalinské procesy

Moskevské procesy Moskevské procesy (neboli Stalinské procesy) byly vykonstruované politické procesy v Sovětském svazu, konané v dobách Stalinovy takzvané Velké čistky koncem 30. let 20. století, v nichž byli odsouzeni lidé za trestné činy, které nikdy nespáchali. Obsah 1 Situace v SSSR 2 1. proces (souzeno 16 osob) 3 2. proces (souzeno 17 osob) 4 3. proces 5 4. proces (souzeno 21 osob) 6 Politické procesy v zahraničí 7 Odkazy 7.1 Reference 7.2 Literatura Situace v SSSR Josef Stalin, generální tajemník SSSR Pro periodu sovětského nejhrubšího teroru mezi lety 1936-1938, druhou etapu Velké čistky, se používá označení termín ježovština podle tehdejšího lidového komisaře vnitra (tj. ministra vnitra) a zároveň šéfa tajné policie NKVD Nikolaje Ježova. Teror a politické procesy byly nejdříve zaměřeny na potenciální konkurenty z řad Stalinových spolustraníků v komunistické straně a armádě. Následovala fáze rozšíření teroru na celou sovětskou společnost. Dnes je odhadováno, že bylo postiženo celkově 4,5 až 5,5 milionů lidí. Oběti tyranie byly ve všech vrstvách obyvatelstva, mezi jinými se jednalo o deset blízkých spolupracovníků Lenina, tři maršály, šest členů politického byra Ústředního výboru komunistické strany a více než polovinu všech generálů Rudé armády. Dále pak teror postihl členy Komunistické internacionály a předáky zahraničních komunistických stran, pobývajících v sovětském exilu. Tím, že došlo k zavraždění až 60 % všech vyšších důstojníků armády, byla její bojeschopnost silně oslabena před začínající druhou světovou válkou. Po jejím skončení v roce 1945 došlo k nastolení druhé fáze procesů se silným antisemitským zaměřením, které ukončila až Stalinova smrt v roce 1953. Celkový odhad obětí stalinského teroru v letech 1929-1953 je 22 miliónů lidí, z nichž nejméně jedna třetina byla zastřelena nebo zahynula v táborech Gulagu.[1] Největší síly dosáhl teror během tzv. Moskevských procesů. Ty představovaly 4 velké procesy s prominenty KSSS, státu a Rudé armády, které byly již předem připravené ministrem Ježovem a Jagodou z vedení tajné policie GPU. Shodou okolností byli později oba dva také pohlceni stalinskou mašinérií. 1. proces (souzeno 16 osob) 15.-16. ledna 1935 byl zahájen proces s tzv. „Moskevským centrem", který byl jakousi předehrou v celém dějství. V něm byli obžalováni Grigorij Zinověv, Lev Kameněv a další z podílu na osnování kontrarevoluční organizace, přípravy teroristických akcí proti sovětské vládě a podílu na zavraždění Sergeje Kirova. Všichni byli shledáni vinnými a odsouzeni k mnohaletým trestům žaláře. Pak následoval první velký proces s tzv. „Trockisticko-zinověským centrem" (19.-22. srpna 1936), kdy Zinověv, Kameněv a další byli nařčeni z antisovětské činnosti, plánování vraždy vedoucích politických představitelů KSSS a špionáže. Tentokrát zněl rozsudek přísně, všichni obžalovaní dostali trest smrti. Seznam obžalovaných: Grigorij Zinovjev Lev Kameněv Grigorij Jevdokimov Ivan Bakajev Sergej Mračkovskij Vagaršak Ter-Vaganjan, tajemník Arménské KSS Ivan Nikitič Smirnov, lidový komisař Jefim Dreitzer Izák Reingold Richard Pickel Eduard Holtzman Fritz David Valentin Olberg Konon Berman-Jurin Moissei Lurye Nathan Lurye 2. proces (souzeno 17 osob) Mezi 23.-30. lednem 1937 se konal druhý proces s tzv. „Paralelním antisovětským trockistickým centrem". Hlavním obžalovaným byl Karl Radek, dřívější aktivní soudruh v Komunistické internacionále a s ním i další, např. Georgij Pjatakov, Leonid Serebrjakov nebo Grigorij Sokolnikov. Většina odsouzených byla zastřelena. Seznam obžalovaných: Georgij Pjatakov Karl Radek Grigorij Sokolnikov Nikolaj Muralov Michajl Boguslavskij Andrej Kolegajev Leonid Serebrjakov V.V. Arnold I.Y. Hrasche I. Livchitz I. Kňazev Y. Turok S. Rataičak B. Norkine A. Čestov M. Strojlov P. Pouchine Y. N. Drobnis 3. proces Třetí proces proběhl 11. června 1937 a byl specifický svým utajením. Důvodem k tomu byli obžalovaní, neboť se jednalo o hlavní příslušníky Rudé armády, včetně náčelníka generálního štábu Michaila Tuchačevského. Ve vykonstruovaném obvinění jim byl přisuzován fakt, že v dohodě s fašistickými mocnostmi se chystali svrhnout sovětské zřízení. 12. června 1937 byli popraveni. Seznam obžalovaných: Michail Tuchačevskij Jona Jakir Jeronim Uborevič Robert Petrovič Eideman Avgust Ivanovič Kork Vitovt Kazimirovič Putna Boris Mironovič Feldman Vitalij Markovič Primakov Jan Borisovič Gamarnik (před obviněním spáchal 31. května 1937 sebevraždu) 4. proces (souzeno 21 osob) První a druhý proces směřoval vůči členům trockistické a tzv. nové opozice, třetí proti potenciálním oponentům v armádě. Čtvrtý byl namířen proti tzv. pravici („Pravicově trockistickému antisovětskému bloku") a proběhl mezi 2.-12. březnem 1938. Na lavici obžalovaných seděli Nikolaj Bucharin, Christian Rakovskij a bývalý předseda vlády Alexej Rykov. Prokuratura je vinila z toho, že po celou dobu od Říjnové revoluce byli protisovětskými spiklenci, kteří osnovali plány na zavraždění Lenina i Stalina, cizím státům pak chtěli vydat části sovětského území. Odsouzeni byli taktéž k trestům smrti. Seznam obžalovaných: Alexej Rykov Nikolaj Bucharin Nikolaj Krestinskij Christian Rakovskij Genrich Jagoda Martin Lacis Arkadij Rosengoltz Vladimir Ivanov Michajl Černov Grigorij Grinko Isaac Zelenskij Akmal Ikramov Fajzulla Chodjajev Vasilij Šarangovič Prokopij Zubarev Pavel Bulanov Lev Levin Ignatij Kazakov Vejamin Maximov-Dikovskj Pjotr Krjučkov Sergej Bessonov Dimitrij Pletněv Politické procesy v zahraničí Celý průběh procesů byl postaven na absurdních přiznáních obžalovaných, které byly vynuceny brutálním násilím a psychickým nátlakem. Rozsudky nevznikaly klasickým soudním procesem, ale byly již předem napsány politickými činiteli. Sehrané politické procesy, podobné Moskevským, se odehrály i ve všech státech sovětského bloku ve 40. a 50. letech. V Československu například proces s tzv. „Protistátním spikleneckým centrem" v čele s bývalým 1. tajemníkem komunistické strany Rudolfem Slánským v listopadu 1952.

organizační struktura strany

Organization Sjezd KSSS - hlavní rozhodovací orgán KS sovět svazu - Its meetings served as convention of all party delegates and their predecessors. Between the congresses the party was ruled by the Central Committee. Over the course of the party's history, the name was changed in accordance with the current name of the party at the time. The frequency of party congresses varied with the meetings being annual events in the 1920s while no congress was held at all between 1939 and 1952. After the death of Joseph Stalin, the congresses were held every five years. Central Committee Main article: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Central Committee was a collective body elected at the annual party congress.[60] It was mandated to meet at least twice a year to act as the party's supreme governing body.[60] Membership of the Central Committee increased from 71 full members in 1934 to 287 in 1976.[61] Central Committee members were elected to the seats because of the offices they held, not on their personal merit.[62] Because of this, the Central Committee was commonly considered an indicator for Sovietologists to study the strength of the different institutions.[62] The Politburo was elected by and reported to the Central Committee.[63] Besides the Politburo, the Central Committee also elected the Secretariat and the General Secretary—the de facto leader of the Soviet Union.[63] In 1919-1952, the Orgburo was also elected in the same manner as the Politburo and the Secretariat by the plenums of the Central Committee.[63] In between Central Committee plenums, the Politburo and the Secretariat were legally empowered to make decisions on its behalf.[63] The Central Committee or the Politburo and/or Secretariat on its behalf could issue nationwide decisions; decisions on behalf of the party were transmitted from the top to the bottom.[64] Under Lenin, the Central Committee functioned much like the Politburo did during the post-Stalin era, serving as the party's governing body.[65] However, as the membership in the Central Committee increased, its role was eclipsed by the Politburo.[65] Between Congresses, the Central Committee functioned as the Soviet leadership's source of legitimacy.[65] The decline in the Central Committee's standing began in the 1920s; it was reduced to a compliant body of the Party leadership during the Great Purge.[65] According to party rules, the Central Committee was to convene at least twice a year to discuss political matters—but not matters relating to military policy.[66] The body remained largely symbolic after Stalin's consolidation; leading party officials rarely attended meetings of the Central Committee.[67] Central Auditing Commission Main article: Central Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Central Auditing Commission (CAC) was elected by the party Congresses and reported only to the party Congress.[68] It had about as many members as the Central Committee.[68] It was responsible for supervising the expeditious and proper handling of affairs by the central bodies of the Party; it audited the accounts of the Treasury and the enterprises of the Central Committee.[68] It was also responsible for supervising the Central Committee apparatus, making sure that its directives were implemented and that Central Committee directives complied with the party Statute.[68] Statute The Statute (also referred to as the Rules, Charter and Constitution) was the party's by-laws and controlled life within the CPSU.[69] The 1st Statute was adopted at the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party—the forerunner of the CPSU.[69] How the Statute was to be structured and organized led to a schism within the party, leading to the establishment of two competing factions; Bolsheviks (literally majority) and Mensheviks (literally minority).[69] The 1st Statute was based upon Lenin's idea of a centralized vanguard party.[69] The 4th Congress, despite a majority of Menshevik delegates, added the concept of democratic centralism to Article 2 of the Statute.[70] The 1st Statute lasted until 1919, when the 8th Congress adopted the 2nd Statute.[71] It was nearly five times as long as the 1st Statute and contained 66 articles.[71] It was amended at the 9th Congress. At the 11th Congress, the 3rd Statute was adopted with only minor amendments being made.[72] New statutes were approved at the 17th and 18th Congresses respectively.[73] The last party statute, which existed until the dissolution of the CPSU, was adopted at the 22nd Congress.[74] Central Committee apparatus Main article: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Further information: General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary of the Central Committee was the title given to the overall leader of the party. The office was synonymous with leader of the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin's consolidation of power in the 1920s. Stalin used the office of General Secretary to create a strong power base for himself. The office was formally titled First Secretary between 1952 and 1966. Politburo Main article: Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union A Politburo resolution to execute 346 "enemies of the CPSU and Soviet Power" who led "counter-revolutionary, right-trotskyite, plotting and spying activities" (signed by Stalin) The Political Bureau (Politburo), known as the Presidium from 1952 to 1966, was the highest party organ when the Congress and the Central Committee were not in session.[75] Until the 19th Conference in 1988, the Politburo alongside the Secretariat controlled appointments and dismissals nationwide.[76] In the post-Stalin period, the Politburo controlled the Central Committee apparatus through two channels; the General Department distributed the Politburo's orders to the Central Committee departments and through the personnel overlap which existed within the Politburo and the Secretariat.[76] This personnel overlap gave the CPSU General Secretary a way of strengthening his position within the Politburo through the Secretariat.[77] Kirill Mazurov, Politburo member from 1965 to 1978, accused Brezhnev of turning the Politburo into a "second echelon" of power.[77] He accomplished this by discussing policies before Politburo meetings with Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Kirilenko, Fyodor Kulakov and Dmitriy Ustinov among others, who held seats both in the Politburo and the Secretariat.[77] Mazurov's claim was later verified by Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers under Gorbachev. Ryzhkov said that Politburo meetings lasted only 15 minutes because the people close to Brezhnev had already decided what was to be approved.[77] The Politburo was abolished and replaced by a Presidium in 1952 at the 19th Congress.[78] In the aftermath the 19th Congress and the 1st Plenum of the 19th Central Committee, Stalin ordered the creation of the Bureau of the Presidium, which acted as the standing committee of the Presidium.[79] On 6 March 1953, one day after Stalin's death, a new and smaller Presidium was elected and the Bureau of the Presidium was abolished in a joint session with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers.[80] Until 1990, the CPSU General Secretary acted as the informal chairman of the Politburo.[81] During the first decades of the CPSU's existence, the Politburo was officially chaired by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; first by Lenin, then by Aleksey Rykov, Molotov, Stalin and Malenkov.[81] After 1922, when Lenin was incapacitated, Lev Kamenev as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars chaired the Politburo's meetings.[81] This tradition lasted until Khrushchev's consolidation of power.[81] In the first post-Stalin years, when Malenkov chaired Politburo meetings, Khrushchev as First Secretary signed all Central Committee documents into force.[81] From 1954 until 1958, Khrushchev chaired the Politburo as First Secretary but in 1958 he dismissed and succeeded Nikolai Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[82] During this period, the informal position of Second Secretary—later formalized as Deputy General Secretary—was established.[82] The Second Secretary became responsible for chairing the Secretariat in place of the General Secretary. When the General Secretary could not chair the meetings of the Politburo, the Second Secretary would take his place.[82] This system survived until the dissolution of the CPSU in 1991.[82] To be elected to the Politburo, a member had to serve in the Central Committee.[83] The Central Committee elected the Politburo in the aftermath of a party Congress.[83] Members of the Central Committee were given a predetermined list of candidates for the Politburo having only one candidate for each seat; for this reason the election of the Politburo was usually passed unanimously.[83] The greater the power held by the sitting CPSU General Secretary, the higher the chance that the Politburo membership would be approved.[83] Secretariat Main article: Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Secretariat headed the CPSU's central apparatus and was solely responsible for the development and implementation of party policies.[84] It was legally empowered to take over the duties and functions of the Central Committee when it was not in plenum (did not hold a meeting).[84] Many members of the Secretariat concurrently held a seat in the Politburo.[85] According to a Soviet textbook on party procedures, the Secretariat's role was that of "leadership of current work, chiefly in the realm of personnel selection and in the organization of the verification of fulfilment of party-state decisions".[85] "Selections of personnel" (Russian: podbor kadrov) in this instance meant the maintenance of general standards and the criteria for selecting various personnel. "Verification of fulfillment" (Russian: proverka ispolneniia) of party and state decisions meant that the Secretariat instructed other bodies.[86] The powers of the Secretariat were weakened under Mikhail Gorbachev and the Central Committee Commissions took over the functions of the Secretariat in 1988.[87] Yegor Ligachev, a Secretariat member, said that the changes completely destroyed the Secretariat's hold on power and made the body almost superfluous.[87] Because of this, the Secretariat rarely met during the next two years.[87] It was revitalized at the 28th Party Congress in 1990 and the Deputy General Secretary became the official Head of the Secretariat.[88] Orgburo Main article: Orgburo The Organizational Bureau, or Orgburo, existed from 1919 to 1952 and was one of three leading bodies of the party when the Central Committee was not in session.[75] It was responsible for "organizational questions, the recruitment and allocation of personnel, the coordination of activities of party, government and social organizations (e.g. trade unions and youth organizations), improvement to the party's structure, the distribution of information and reports within the party".[83] The 19th Congress abolished the Orgburo and its duties and responsibilities were taken over by the Secretariat.[83] At the beginning, the Orgburo held three meetings a week and reported to the Central Committee every second week.[89] Lenin described the relation between the Politburo and the Orgburo as "the Orgburo allocates forces, while the Politburo decides policy".[90] A decision of the Orgburo was implemented by the Secretariat.[90] However, the Secretariat could make decisions in the Orgburo's name without consulting its members but if one Orgburo member objected to a Secretariat resolution, the resolution would not be implemented.[90] In the 1920s, if the Central Committee could not convene the Politburo and the Orgburo would hold a joint session in its place.[90] Control Commission Main article: Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Central Control Commission (CCC) functioned as the party's supreme court.[91] The CCC was established at the 9th All-Russian Conference in September 1920, but rules organizing its procedure were not enacted before the 10th Congress.[92] The 10th Congress formally established the CCC on all party levels and stated that it could only be elected at a party congress or a party conference.[92] The CCC and the CCs were formally independent but had to make decisions through the party committees at their level, which led them in practice to lose their administrative independence.[92] At first, the primary responsibility of the CCs was to respond to party complaints, focusing mostly on party complaints of factionalism and bureaucratism.[93] At the 11th Congress, the brief of the CCs was expanded; it become responsible for overseeing party discipline.[94] In a bid to further centralize the powers of the CCC, a Presidium of the CCC, which functioned in a similar manner to the Politburo in relation to the Central Committee, was established in 1923.[95] At the 18th Congress, party rules regarding the CCC were changed; it was now elected by the Central Committee and was subordinate to the Central Committee.[96] CCC members could not concurrently be members of the Central Committee.[97] To create an organizational link between the CCC and other central-level organs, the 9th All-Russian Conference created the joint CC-CCC plenums.[97] The CCC was a powerful organ; the 10th Congress allowed it to expel full and candidate Central Committee members and members of their subordinate organs if two thirds of attendants at a CC-CCC plenum voted for such.[97] At its first such session in 1921, Lenin tried to persuade the joint plenum to expel Alexander Shliapnikov from the party; instead of expelling him, Shliapnikov was given a severe reprimand.[97] Departments Main article: Departments of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The leader of a department was usually given the title "head" (Russian: zaveduiuschchii).[98] In practice, the Secretariat had a major say in the running of the departments; for example, five of eleven secretaries headed their own departments in 1978.[99] Normally, specific secretaries were given supervising duties over one or more departments.[99] Each department established its own cells—called sections—which specialized in one or more fields.[100] During the Gorbachev era, a variety of departments made up the Central Committee apparatus.[101] The Party Building and Cadre Work Department assigned party personnel in the nomenklatura system.[101] The State and Legal Department supervised the armed forces, KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the trade unions, and the Procuracy.[101] Before 1989, the Central Committee had several departments but some were abolished that year.[101] Among these departments was the Economics Department that was responsible for the economy as a whole, one for machine building, one for the chemical industry, etc.[101] The party abolished these departments to remove itself from the day-to-day management of the economy in favour of government bodies and a greater role for the market, as a part of the perestroika process.[101] In their place, Gorbachev called for the creations of commissions with the same responsibilities as departments, but giving more independence from the state apparatus. This change was approved at the 19th Conference, which was held in 1988.[102] Six commissions were established by late 1988.[102] Pravda Main article: Pravda Pravda (The Truth) was the leading newspaper in the Soviet Union.[103] The Organizational Department of the Central Committee was the only organ empowered to dismiss Pravda editors.[104] In 1905, Pravda began as a project by members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party.[105] Leon Trotsky was approached about the possibility of running the new paper because of his previous work on Ukrainian newspaper Kievan Thought.[105] The first issue of Pravda was published on 3 October 1908[105] in Lvov, where it continued until the publication of the sixth issue in November 1909, when the operation was moved to Vienna, Austria-Hungary.[105] During the Russian Civil War, sales of Pravda were curtailed by Izvestia, the government run newspaper.[106] At the time, the average reading figure for Pravda was 130,000.[106] This Vienna-based newspaper published its last issue in 1912 and was succeeded the same year by a new newspaper dominated by the Bolsheviks, also called Pravda, which was headquartered in St. Petersburg.[107] The paper's main goal was to promote Marxist-Leninist philosophy and expose the lies of the bourgeoisie.[108] In 1975, the paper reached a circulation of 10.6 million.[108] It's currently owned by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Higher Party School Main article: Education system under the CPSU Central Committee The Higher Party School (HPS) was the organ responsible for teaching cadres in the Soviet Union.[109] It was the successor of the Communist Academy, which was established in 1918.[109] The HPS was established in 1939 as the Moscow Higher Party School and it offered its students a two-year training course for becoming a CPSU official.[110] It was reorganized in 1956 to that it could offer more specialized ideological training.[110] In 1956, the school in Moscow was opened for students from socialist countries outside the Soviet Union.[110] The Moscow Higher Party School was the party school with the highest standing.[110] The school itself had eleven faculties until a 1972 Central Committee resolution demanded a reorganization of the curriculum.[111] The first regional HPS outside Moscow was established in 1946[111] and by the early 1950s there were 70 Higher Party Schools.[111] During the reorganization drive of 1956, Khrushchev closed 13 of them and reclassified 29 as inter-republican and inter-oblast schools.[111]

organizace KSSS

Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Organization of the Communist Party of the USSR) Jump to navigationJump to search The organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was nominally based on the principles of democratic centralism. The governing body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the Party Congress, which initially met annually but whose meetings became less frequent, particularly under Joseph Stalin (dominant from the late 1920s to 1953). Party Congresses would elect a Central Committee which, in turn, would elect a Politburo. Under Stalin, the most powerful position in the party became the General Secretary, who was elected by the Politburo. In 1952 the title of General Secretary became First Secretary and the Politburo became the Presidium; the names reverted to their former forms under Leonid Brezhnev in 1966. In theory, supreme power in the party was invested in the Party Congress. However, in practice the power structure became reversed and, particularly after the death of Lenin in January 1924, supreme power became the domain of the General Secretary. Contents 1 Higher levels 2 Lower levels 3 Main offices 4 See also 5 References 6 External links Higher levels In the late Soviet Union the CPSU incorporated the communist parties of the 15 constituent republics (the communist branch of the Russian SFSR was established in 1990). Before 1990 the communist party organization in Russian oblasts, autonomous republics and some other major administrative units were subordinated directly to the CPSU Central Committee.[1] Lower levels At lower levels, the organizational hierarchy was managed by Party Committees, or partkoms (партком). A partkom was headed by the elected "partkom bureau secretary" ("partkom secretary", секретарь парткома). At enterprises, institutions, kolkhozes, etc., they were called as such, i.e., "partkoms". At higher levels the Committees were abbreviated accordingly: obkoms (обком) at oblast (zone) levels (known earlier as gubkoms (губком) for guberniyas), raikoms (райком) at raion (district) levels (known earlier as ukoms (уком) for uyezds), gorkom (горком) at city levels, etc. The same terminology ("raikom", etc.) was used in the organizational structure of Komsomol. The bottom level of the Party was the primary party organization (первичная партийная организация) or party cell (партийная ячейка). It was created within any organizational entity of any kind where there were at least three communists. The management of a cell was called party bureau/partbureau (партийное бюро, партбюро). A partbureau was headed by the elected bureau secretary (секретарь партбюро). At smaller party cells, secretaries were regular employees of the corresponding plant/hospital/school/etc. Sufficiently large party organizations were usually headed by an exempt secretary, who drew his salary from the Party money. Main offices General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - became synonymous with leader of the Party under Joseph Stalin (General Secretary from 1922 to 1952) Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee - leading body within the Central Committee. Headed by the General Secretary or by the First Secretary. Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - The political bureau of the Central Committee; in practice, the ruling body of both the Communist Party and the Soviet Union Central Committee of the Communist Party - the governing body of the Party between each Congress. Conducted the day-to-day business of the Party and the government. Congress of the CPSU - the gathering of Party delegates every five years. It was the oversight body of the entire Party, in theory. Organizational Bureau of the Party Central Committee, or Orgburo - fulfilled Party human-resources management CPSU Party Control Committee CPSU Central Auditing Commission (sometimes translated as a calque: Central Revision Commission, from "Центральная ревизионная комиссия") Party Conference - the oversight body of the Party in between Party Congresses. Usually gathered once a year.

perestrojka

Perestrojka ( перестро́йка, česky: přestavba) byla skupina ekonomických reformních kroků zahájených v 80. letech 20. století v SSSR tehdejším generálním tajemníkem KSSS Michailem Gorbačovem. Úkolem perestrojky byla především restrukturalizace sovětské ekonomiky. Na ekonomické reformy perestrojky navazovaly také širší změny k demokratizaci společnosti, soustředěné v procesu tzv. glasnosti, politiky otevřenosti. Obsah 1 Politické změny 2 Hospodářské změny 3 Společenské změny 4 Odraz perestrojky v zemích východního bloku 5 Související články 6 Externí odkazy Politické změny Sovětská známka s tematikou perestrojky Veškeré změny ale měly být prováděny tak, aby zůstala zachována vedoucí úloha komunistické strany a socialistického systému. Proto se také hovořilo o demokratizaci, nikoli demokracii, a o glasnosti, avšak nikoli svobodě slova. Přistoupilo se k volbám mezi více kandidáty, a to jak v rámci KSSS, tak v rámci sovětů, nikoliv však, že by byly povoleny strany nové. Perestrojka skončila po šesti letech nezdarem a rozpadem státu. V konečném důsledku (opuštění Brežněvovy doktríny) vedl její nezdar k pádu všech komunistických režimů v Evropě a k ukončení studené války. V jistých ohledech je perestrojka podobná demokratizačnímu procesu v průběhu pražského jara 1968.[zdroj?] To zase umožnila doba Chruščovova tání, započatá koncem 50. let. Hospodářské změny Ani v ekonomické oblasti nebyla perestrojka dostatečně radikální k tomu, aby nastartovala chřadnoucí sovětskou ekonomiku.[zdroj?] Neuvěřitelná zastaralost sovětských podniků znamenala, že domácí výrobky tradičních firem byly na zahraničních trzích jen stěží uplatnitelné, což omezilo možnost získat pro režim potřebné valuty. Tento problém bylo nezbytné řešit a odpovědí měly být právě změny, které připravila perestrojka. Michail Gorbačov Gorbačov dosáhl jistých úspěchů v decentralizaci a zvýšení samostatnosti podniků. V letech 1987 a 1988 byly přijaty nové zákony, které redefinovaly úlohu státních podniků, vymezily jejich samosprávu a zajistily jim samostatné financování. Stát tak nyní již nemohl zachraňovat ty podniky, které vinou vlastní neefektivity byly silně nerentabilní a ždímaly sovětskou pokladnu. Dalším významným krokem byl družstevní zákon, který povolil - byť v omezené míře - soukromé podnikání. Bylo nyní možné zakládat i společné podniky se zahraniční účastí (kontrolovány musely být ovšem - alespoň formálně - sovětskými občany), takže se brzy v Moskvě i jiných městech tehdejšího státu objevily zcela nové firmy. Beze změny ale zůstaly jiné atributy centrálně řízeného komunistického hospodářství, které systémově změnit možné nebylo, nebo to nebylo vhodné. Jednalo se o kontrolu cen, které byly stanoveny pevně, nemožnost volné směnitelnosti rublu, socialistická struktura vlastnictví (tj. neexistence, či velmi omezené vlastnictví soukromé a silný státní a družstevní sektor) a pokračující státní dozor nad ekonomikou. I přesto byly změny provedené tehdejší politickou garniturou pro sovětskou společnost značně radikální. Konzervativní křídlo komunistické strany však příliš spokojeno nebylo a reformní kroky chtělo zastavit, naopak liberálové požadovali jejich urychlení. Společenské změny Vyšší otevřenost v médiích, kdy se začalo diskutovat o mnohých problémech, které byly do té doby tabu, jako například kritická místa sovětských dějin, drogová problematika nebo národnostní rozpory, dokázaly systém nahlodávat natolik úspěšně, že se Sovětský svaz nakonec na konci roku 1991 rozpadl. Odraz perestrojky v zemích východního bloku Satelitní státy SSSR se ve druhé polovině 80. let rozdělily na příznivce a odpůrce perestrojky. Zejména v Polsku a Maďarsku se komunisté pokoušeli o podobné reformy jako Gorbačov. V Polsku byla komunistická vláda vyčerpána dlouhodobou krizí a soubojem s opozičním hnutím Solidarita.[zdroj?] V Maďarsku zase postupně docházelo ke generační obměně vedení komunistické strany, se kterou souviselo přehodnocení událostí z roku 1956 (krvavé potlačení Maďarského povstání).[zdroj?] Méně nadšeni byli z perestrojky vedoucí představitelé komunistických stran v Československu, Bulharsku a Mongolsku.[zdroj?] Tyto režimy však zároveň byly natolik existenčně závislé na Moskvě, že si nemohly dovolit přestavbu zcela ignorovat. Oficiálně se tedy připojily ke Gorbačovovu reformnímu úsilí, avšak reformy zaváděly spíše méně důsledně a pomaleji.[zdroj?] Skutečný odpor pak Gorbačovova politika vzbudila u konzervativních komunistických režimů v NDR a Rumunsku.[zdroj?] Místní komunističtí vůdci (E. Honecker a N. Ceausescu) otevřeně kritizovali Moskvu za politiku přestavby, kterou od začátku považovali za ohrožení stability celého komunistického bloku.[zdroj?] K přestavbě se nepřipojily ani Kuba a Severní Korea.[zdroj?] Specifickou podobu měla přestavba v Číně, Vietnamu a Laosu. Reformy čínského vůdce Teng Siao-pchinga, vietnamské reformy "Doi moi" a laoské "tin tanakán maj" ("nové myšlení") kladly důraz především na ekonomickou transformaci, zatímco v politické a kulturní rovině měla zůstat zachována absolutní moc komunistické strany nad společností.[

sovětský blok

Political situation in Europe during the Cold War The "three worlds" of the Cold War era, between April — August 1975. 1st World: Western Bloc led by the USA and its allies. 2nd World: Eastern Bloc led by the USSR, China, and their allies. 3rd World: Non-Aligned and neutral countries. Eastern Bloc Soviet Socialist Republics[hide] Armenia Azerbaijan Byelorussia Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kirghizia Latvia Lithuania Moldavia Russian SFSR Tajikistan Turkmenia Ukraine Uzbekistan Allied states[hide] Hungarian People's Republic Polish People's Republic Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Socialist Republic of Romania German Democratic Republic People's Republic of Bulgaria Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to 1948) People's Socialist Republic of Albania (to 1961) Republic of Cuba People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada People's Republic of Benin People's Republic of the Congo People's Republic of Angola People's Republic of Mozambique People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Somali Democratic Republic (to 1977) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Mongolian People's Republic People's Republic of China (to 1961) Democratic People's Republic of Korea Socialist Republic of Vietnam Lao People's Democratic Republic People's Republic of Kampuchea Related organizations[hide] Cominform COMECON Warsaw Pact World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Dissent and opposition[hide] Forest Brothers in Lithuaniain Latviain Estonia Operation "Jungle" Ukrainian Insurgent Army Goryani movement (Bulgaria) Romanian anti-communism Polish cursed soldiers 1953 uprisings in Plzeňin East Germany 1956 protests in Georgiain Poznań Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Novocherkassk massacre (Russia) 1968 events Prague SpringInvasion of CzechoslovakiaRed Square demonstration Charter 77 (Czechoslovakia) Solidarity (Poland) Jeltoqsan (Kazakhstan) Braşov rebellion (Romania) January Events (Lithuania) The Barricades (Latvia) April 9 tragedy (Georgia) Black January (Azerbaijan) Cold War events[hide] Marshall Plan 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état Tito-Stalin Split Berlin Blockade Korean War 1956 "Secret Speech" Sino-Soviet Split 1961 Berlin Wall crisis 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Vietnam War Cuban intervention in Angola Afghan War 1980 Moscow Olympics Gulf War Decline[hide] Singing Revolution Polish Round Table Agreement Revolutions of 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall January 1991 in Lithuaniain Latvia Breakup of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Wars End of the Soviet Union Fall of communism in Albania Dissolution of Czechoslovakia vte The Eastern Bloc (also the Socialist Bloc, the Communist Bloc, and the Soviet Bloc) was the group of Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Asia under the hegemony of the USSR during the Cold War (1947-91), in opposition to the non-communist Western Bloc. Generally, in Western Europe, the term Eastern bloc comprised the USSR and its East European satellite-states, in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon); in Asia, the Socialist bloc comprised the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China (before the Sino-Soviet split in 1961);[1][2][3][4][5] and in the Americas, the Communist bloc included the Caribbean Republic of Cuba, since 1961.[6] Joseph Stalin's control of the Eastern Bloc was tested by the 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état and the Tito-Stalin Split for control of Socialist Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communist Revolution (1949), and the PRC's participation in the Korean War. In 1953, after Stalin's death, the Korean War ceased with the 1954 Geneva Conference, and, in Europe, anti-Soviet sentiment provoked the Uprising of 1953 in East Germany. The break-up of the Eastern Bloc began in 1956, with Nikita Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist speech On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences denouncing Stalin, which facilitated the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which the Soviet Union suppressed, and the Sino-Soviet Split with the PRC, which gave North Korea and North Vietnam more independence from both, and facilitated the Soviet-Albanian split. The Cuban Missile Crisis preserved the Cuban Revolution from rollback by the U.S., but Fidel Castro became increasingly independent of Soviet rule afterwards, most notably in its 1975 intervention in Angola.[6] That year, the fall of former French Indochina to communism following the end of the Vietnam War gave the Eastern Bloc renewed confidence which had been frayed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to suppress the Prague Spring, which had led to Albania withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, briefly aligning with Mao Zedong's China until the Sino-Albanian split. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union reserved the right to intervene in other Communist countries. In response, China moved towards the United States following a 1969 border war which almost became a nuclear war, and later reformed and liberalized its economy, while the Eastern Bloc stagnated economically behind the capitalist First World. Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan nominally expanded the Eastern Bloc, but the war proved unwinnable and too costly for the Soviets, challenged in Eastern Europe by civil resistance in Poland. In the late 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pursued policies of glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring") to reform the Eastern Bloc and end the Cold War, which brought forth unrest throughout the bloc. Unlike previous Soviet leaders in 1953, 1956, and 1968, Gorbachev refused to use force to end the 1989 Revolutions against Marxist-Leninist rule in Eastern Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Warsaw Pact spread nationalist and liberal ideals throughout the Soviet Union, which would soon fall itself at the end of 1991. Conservative communist elites attempted to turn back liberal reforms and movements, which hastened the end of Marxist-Leninist rule in Eastern Europe but preserved it in China. Though the Soviet Union and its rival the United States considered Europe the most important front of the Cold War, during the Cold War, the term Eastern Bloc was often used interchangeably with the term Second World. This broadest usage of the term would include not only Maoist China and Cambodia, but short-lived Soviet satellites such as East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949), the People's Republic of Azerbaijan and Republic of Mahabad (1946), as well as the Marxist-Leninist states straddling the Second and Third Worlds before the end of the Cold War: the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (from 1967), the People's Republic of the Congo (from 1969), the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of Angola and People's Republic of Mozambique from 1975, the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada from 1979 to 1983, the Derg/People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1974, and the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 until the Ogaden War in 1977.[7][8][9][10] Many states were also accused by the Western Bloc of being in the Eastern Bloc when they were more Non-Aligned. The most limited definition of the Eastern Bloc would only include the Warsaw Pact states and Mongolia, as former satellite states most dominated by the USSR. However, North Korea was similarly subordinate before the Korean War, and Soviet aid during the Vietnam War enabled Vietnam to dominate Laos and Cambodia until the end of the Cold War.[11][12] Cuba's defiance of complete Soviet control was noteworthy enough that Cuba was sometimes excluded as a satellite state altogether, as Fidel Castro intervened in other Third World countries to spread communism without orders from Moscow, despite its alliance with the Soviets.[6] The only Communist states surviving from the Cold War intact are China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and Laos. Their state socialist experience was more in line with decolonization from the Global North and anti-imperialism towards the West instead of the Red Army occupation of the former East Bloc. The five surviving socialist states all adopted economic reforms to varying degrees; China and Vietnam are usually described as more state capitalist than the more traditionalist Cuba and Stalinist North Korea. Cambodia and Kazakhstan are still led by the same Eastern Bloc leaders as during the Cold War, though they are not officially Marxist-Leninist states. This was previously the case in Kazakhstan's fellow post-Soviet states of Uzbekistan until 2016, Turkmenistan until 2006, Kyrgyzstan until 2005, and Azerbaijan and Georgia until 2003. All presidents of post-Soviet Russia were members of the CPSU (Boris Yeltsin before 1990, Putin and Medvedev before 1991). Azerbaijan is an authoritarian dominant-party state and North Korea is a totalitarian one-party state led by the heirs of their Eastern Bloc leaders, yet both have officially eliminated mentions of communism from their constitutions.

zhukov

Pre-war military exercises Zhukov and Semyon Timoshenko in 1940 In autumn 1940, G. K. Zhukov started preparing the plans for the military exercise concerning the defence of the Western border of the Soviet Union, which at this time was pushed further to the west due to the annexation of Eastern Poland.[17] In his memoirs Zhukov reports that in this exercise he commanded the "Western" or "Blue" forces (the supposed invasion troops) and his opponent was Colonel General D. G. Pavlov, the commander of the "Eastern" or "Red" forces (the supposed Soviet troops). He noted that the "Blue" had 60 divisions, while the "Red" had 50 divisions. Zhukov in his memoirs describes the events of exercise as similar to actual events during the German invasion.[18] As historian Bobylev reports in his article in "Military History Journal", the actual details of the exercises were reported differently in different memoirs of their participants.[19] He reported that there were two exercises, one on 2-6 January 1941 (for the North-West direction), another on 8-11 January 1941 (for the South-West direction).[19] In the first one "Western" forces attacked "Eastern" forces on 15 July, but "Eastern" forces counterattacked and by 1 August reached the original border.[19] At that time (start of the exercise), "Eastern" forces had a numerical advantage (for example, 51 infantry division against 41, 8811 tanks against 3512), with the exception of anti-tank guns.[19] Bobylev describes how by the end of the exercise the "Eastern" forces did not manage to surround and destroy the "Western" forces, which, in their turn, threatened to surround the "Eastern" forces themselves.[19] The same historian reported that the second game was won by the "Easterners", meaning that on the whole, both games were won by the side commanded by Zhukov.[19] However, he noted that the games had a serious disadvantage since they did not consider the initial attack by "Western" forces, but only a (later) attack by "Eastern" forces from the initial border.[19] According to Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the war-game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not known widely, but the victory of Zhukov's Red Troops against Kulik was widely propagandized, which created a popular illusion of easy success for a preemptive offensive.[20] On 1 February 1941, Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's General Staff.[21] Controversy about a plan for war with Germany See also: Soviet offensive plans controversy From 2 February 1941, as the Chief of the General Staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Zhukov took part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies."[22] The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941. Some researchers (for example, Victor Suvorov) allege that, on 14 May, Soviet People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Zhukov suggested to Joseph Stalin a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland. Soviet forces would occupy the Vistula Border and continue to Katowice or even Berlin (should the main German armies retreat), or the Baltic coast (should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and East Prussia). The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach Siedlce, Deblin, and then capture Warsaw before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at Lublin.[23] Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, or whether Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov stated that Stalin did not approve the plan. However, Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. As of 1999, no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found.[24] Eastern front of World War II See also: Eastern Front (World War II) General Georgy Zhukov speaking on 1 September 1941. On 22 June 1941, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, an invasion of the Soviet Union. On the same day, Zhukov responded by signing the "Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3", which ordered an all-out counteroffensive by Red Army forces: he commanded the troops "to encircle and destroy [the] enemy grouping near Suwałki and to seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 24 June" and "to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in [the] Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction" and even "to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24 June".[25] Despite numerical superiority, this manoeuvre failed and disorganized Red Army units were destroyed by the Wehrmacht. Zhukov subsequently claimed that he was forced to sign the document by Joseph Stalin, despite the reservations that he raised.[26] This document was supposedly written by Aleksandr Vasilevsky.[27] Zhukov on the cover of Life magazine (31 July 1944) On 29 July 1941 Zhukov was removed from his post of Chief of the General Staff. In his memoirs he gives his suggested abandoning of Kiev to avoid an encirclement as a reason for it.[28] On the next day the decision was made official and he was appointed the commander of the Reserve Front.[28] There he oversaw the Yelnya Offensive. On 10 September 1941 Zhukov was made the commander of the Leningrad Front.[29] There he oversaw the defence of the city. On 6 October 1941 Zhukov was appointed the representative of Stavka for the Reserve and Western Fronts.[30] On 10 October 1941 those fronts were merged into the Western Front under Zhukov's command.[31] This front then participated in the Battle of Moscow and several Battles of Rzhev. In late August 1942 Zhukov was made Deputy Commander-in-Chief and sent to the southwestern front to take charge of the defence of Stalingrad.[32] He and Vasilevsky later planned the Stalingrad counteroffensive.[33] In November Zhukov was sent to coordinate the Western Front and the Kalinin Front during Operation Mars. In January 1943 he (together with Kliment Voroshilov), coordinated the actions of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and the Baltic Fleet in Operation Iskra.[34] The Supreme Commanders in Berlin on 5 June 1945; from left to right: Bernard Montgomery (Great Britain), Dwight D. Eisenhower (US), Zhukov and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (France) Zhukov was a Stavka coordinator at the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. According to his memoirs, he played a central role in the planning of the battle and the hugely successful offensive that followed. Commander of the Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky, said, however, that the planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon afterwards, and that Zhukov exaggerated his role.[35] From 12 February 1944 Zhukov coordinated the actions of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.[36] On 1 March 1944 Zhukov was appointed the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front[37] until early May.[38] During the Soviet offensive Operation Bagration, Zhukov coordinated the 1st Belorussian and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, later the 1st Ukrainian Front as well.[39] On 23 August Zhukov was sent to the 3rd Ukrainian Front to prepare for the advance into Bulgaria.[40] On 16 November he became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front[41] which took part in the Vistula-Oder Offensive and the battle for Berlin. He called on his troops to "remember our brothers and sisters, our mothers and fathers, our wives and children tortured to death by [the] Germans...We shall exact a brutal revenge for everything." More than 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians died as a result of the war. In a reprise of atrocities committed by German soldiers against Soviet civilians in the eastward advance into Soviet territory during Operation Barbarossa, the westward march by Soviet forces was marked by brutality towards German civilians, which included looting, burning and rapes.[42] Zhukov was present when German officials signed the Instrument of Surrender in Berlin.[43] Post-war service under Stalin After the German capitulation, Zhukov became the first commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany. On 10 June, Zhukov returned to Moscow to prepare for the Moscow Victory Parade of 1945 in Red Square. On 24 June, Stalin appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the Parade. After the ceremony, on the night of 24 June, Zhukov went to Berlin to resume his command.[44] During May 1945, Zhukov signed three resolutions regarding the maintenance of an adequate standard of living for the German people living in the Soviet occupation zone: Resolution 063 (11 May 1945): dealt with the provision of food for the people living in Berlin Resolution 064 (12 May 1945): allowed for the restoration and maintenance of the normal activities of the public service sector of Berlin Resolution 080 (31 May 1945): dealt with providing milk supplies for the children living in Berlin. Zhukov requested the Soviet Government to transport urgently to Berlin 96,000 tons of grain, 60,000 tons of potatoes, 50,000 cattle, and thousands of tons of other foodstuffs, such as sugar and animal fat. He issued strict orders that his subordinates were to "Hate Nazism but respect the German people", and to make all possible efforts to restore and maintain a stable living standard for the German population.[45] Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky with General Sokolovsky leave the Brandenburg Gate after being decorated by Montgomery From 16 July to 2 August, Zhukov participated in the Potsdam Conference with the other Allied governments. As one of the four commanders-in-chief of Allied forces in Germany, Zhukov established good relationships with the other commanders-in-chief, US General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and French Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. These four generals exchanged views about matters such as judging war criminals, rebuilding Germany, relationships between the Allies and defeating the Japanese Empire. Eisenhower seemed to be especially satisfied with, and respectful of, his relationship with Zhukov. Eisenhower's successor, General Lucius Clay, also praised the Zhukov-Eisenhower friendship, and commented: The Soviet-America relationship should have developed well if Eisenhower and Zhukov had continued to work together.[46] Eisenhower, Zhukov and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, June 1945 Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied commander in the West, was a great admirer of Zhukov,[47][specify] and the two toured the Soviet Union together in the immediate aftermath of the victory over Germany.[48] Zhukov was not only the supreme Military Commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany, but became its Military Governor on 10 June 1945. A war hero, hugely popular with the military, Zhukov was viewed by Stalin as a potential threat to his leadership.[citation needed] He replaced Zhukov with Vasily Sokolovsky on 10 April 1946. After an unpleasant session of the Main Military Council—in which Zhukov was bitterly attacked and accused of political unreliability and hostility to the Party Central Committee—he was stripped of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.[49] He was assigned command of the Odessa Military District, far from Moscow and lacking in strategic significance and troops. He arrived there on 13 June. Zhukov suffered a heart attack in January 1948, spending a month in hospital. In February 1948, he was given another secondary posting, this time command of the Urals Military District. Tsouras described the move from Odessa to the Urals as a relegation from a 'second-rate' to a 'fifth-rate' assignment.[50] Throughout this time, security chief Lavrentiy Beria was apparently trying to topple Zhukov. Two of Zhukov's subordinates, Marshal of Aviation Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov and Lieutenant-General Konstantin Fyodorovitch Telegin (Member of the Military Council of 1st Belorussian Front) were arrested and tortured in Lefortovo Prison at the end of 1945. In a conference, all generals except Director of the Main Intelligence Directorate Filipp Ivanovich Golikov defended Zhukov against accusation of misspending of war booty and exaggeration of Nazi Germany's strength. During this time, Zhukov was accused of Bonapartism.[51] In 1946, seven rail carriages with furniture that Zhukov was taking to the Soviet Union from Germany were impounded. In 1948, his apartments and house in Moscow were searched and many valuables looted from Germany were found.[52] In his investigation Beria concluded that Zhukov had in his possessions 17 golden rings, three gemstones, the faces of 15 golden necklaces, more than 4,000 meters of cloth, 323 pieces of fur, 44 carpets taken from German palaces, 55 paintings and 20 guns".[53] Zhukov admitted in a memorandum to Zhdanov: I felt very guilty. I shouldn't have collected those useless junks and put them into some warehouse, assuming nobody needs them any more. I swear as a Bolshevik that I would avoid such errors and follies thereafter. Surely I still and will wholeheartedly serve the Motherland, the Party, and the Great Comrade Stalin.[54] These incidents were ironically called the "Trophy Affair" in the Soviet Union. When learning of Zhukov's "misfortunes"—and despite not understanding all the problems—Eisenhower expressed his sympathy for his "comrade-in-arms".[55] On February 1953, Stalin ordered Zhukov to leave the post of commander of the Urals Military District, and then recalled him to Moscow. Several opinions suggested Zhukov was needed for Korean War service; but, in fact, during one month at Moscow, Stalin did not give Zhukov any tasks. At 9:50 a.m. on 5 March 1953, Stalin suddenly died. After this event, Zhukov's life entered a new phase.[46] Reasons for Zhukov's rises and falls under Stalin During World War II, Zhukov was one of only a few people who understood Stalin's personality. As the Chief of Staff and later Deputy Supreme Commander, Zhukov had hundreds of meetings with Stalin, both private and during Stavka conferences. Consequently, Zhukov understood Stalin's personality and methods well. According to Zhukov, Stalin was a strong and secretive person, but he was also hot-tempered and skeptical. Zhukov was able to gauge Stalin's mood: for example, when Stalin drew deeply on his tobacco pipe, it was a sign of a good mood. Conversely, if Stalin failed to light his pipe once it was out of tobacco, it was a sign of an imminent rage.[56] His outstanding knowledge of Stalin's personality was an asset, and it allowed him to deal with Stalin's rages in a way other Soviet generals could not.[57] Both Zhukov and Stalin were hot-tempered, but both of them made concessions in order to sustain their relationship. While Zhukov viewed his relationship with Stalin as one of a subordinate-senior, Stalin was in awe and possibly jealous of Zhukov. Both were military commanders, but Stalin's experience was restricted to a previous generation of non-mechanized warfare. By contrast, Zhukov was highly influential in the development of contemporary combined operations of highly mechanized armies. The differences in these outlooks were the cause of many tempestuous disagreements between the two of them at Soviet Stavka meetings. Nonetheless, Zhukov was less competent than Stalin as a politician, an inadequacy which accounted for Zhukov's many failures in Soviet politics. In fact, Stalin's unwillingness to value Zhukov beyond the marshal's military talents was one of the reasons why Stalin recalled Zhukov from Berlin.[2] Another significant element of their relationship was Zhukov's straightforwardness towards Stalin. Stalin was dismissive of the fawning of many of his entourage and openly criticized it.[58] Many people around Stalin, including Beria, Yezhov, Mekhlis, and others, felt the need to flatter Stalin to remain on his good side.[59] Zhukov, on the other hand, was stubbornly willing to express his views, often going openly against Stalin's opinion even to the point of risking his career and life. His heated argument with Stalin on the subject of abandoning Kiev in June 1941 was a typical example of Zhukov's approach.[60] This independence in Zhukov's thinking gained Stalin's respect. It caused Zhukov considerable difficulties with Stalin on several occasions but was the main reason the decision-making of Stavka became more objective and effective. Rise and fall after Stalin After Stalin's death, Zhukov returned to favour, becoming Deputy Defence Minister in 1953. He then had an opportunity to avenge himself on Beria. Arresting Beria With Stalin's sudden death, the Soviet Union fell into a leadership crisis. Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov temporarily became First Secretary. Malenkov and his allies attempted to purge Stalin's influence and personality cult; however, Malenkov himself did not have the courage to do this alone. Moreover, Lavrentiy Beria remained dangerous. The politicians sought reinforcement from the powerful and prestigious military men. In this matter, Nikita Khrushchev chose Zhukov because the two had forged a good relationship, and, in addition, during World War II, Zhukov had twice saved Khrushchev from false accusations.[61][62] On 26 June 1953, a special meeting of the Soviet Politburo was held by Malenkov. Beria came to the meeting with an uneasy feeling because it was called hastily—indeed, Zhukov had ordered General Kirill Moskalenko to secretly prepare a special force and permitted the force to use two of Zhukov's and Bulganin's special cars (which had black glass) in order to safely infiltrate the Kremlin. Zhukov also ordered him to replace the MVD Guard with the guard of the Moscow Military District. In this meeting, Khrushchev, Malenkov and their allies denounced "the imperialist element Beria" for his "anti-Party", "anti-socialist" activities, "sowing division", and "acting as a spy of England", together with many other crimes. Finally, Khrushchev suggested expelling Beria from the Communist Party and bringing him before a military court. Immediately, the prepared special force rushed in. Zhukov himself went up to Beria and shouted: "Hands up! Follow me!". Beria replied, in a panic, "Oh Comrades, what's the matter? Just sit down." Zhukov shouted again, "Shut up, you are not the commander here! Comrades, arrest this traitor!". Moskalenko's special forces obeyed.[63][64] Zhukov was a member of the military tribunal during the Beria trial, which was headed by Marshal Ivan Konev.[65] On 18 December 1953, the Military Court sentenced Beria to death. During the burial of Beria, Konev commented: "The day this man was born deserves to be damned!". Then Zhukov said: "I considered it as my duty to contribute my little part in this matter (arresting and executing Beria)."[63][64] Minister of Defence and Politburo candidate membership When Nikolai Bulganin became premier in 1955, he appointed Zhukov Defence Minister.[65] Zhukov participated in many political activities. He successfully opposed the re-establishment of the Commissar system, because the Party and political leaders were not professional military, and thus the highest power should fall to the army commanders. Until 1955, Zhukov had both sent and received letters from Eisenhower. Both leaders agreed that the two superpowers should coexist peacefully.[66] In July 1955, Zhukov—together with Khrushchev, Bulganin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Gromyko—participated in a Summit Conference at Geneva after the USSR signed a peace treaty with Austria and withdrew its army from that country. Zhukov followed orders from the then Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov and Communist Party leader Khrushchev during the invasion of Hungary following the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.[67] Along with the majority of members of the Presidium, he urged Khrushchev to send troops to support the Hungarian authorities and to secure the Austrian border. Zhukov and most of the Presidium were not, however, eager to see a full-scale intervention in Hungary. Zhukov even recommended the withdrawal of Soviet troops when it seemed that they might have to take extreme measures to suppress the revolution. The mood in the Presidium changed again when Hungary's new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, began to talk about Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. That led the Soviets to attack the revolutionaries and to replace Nagy with János Kádár. In the same years, when the UK, France, and Israel invaded Egypt during the Suez crisis, Zhukov expressed support for Egypt's right of self-defence. In October 1957, Zhukov visited Yugoslavia and Albania aboard the Chapayev-class cruiser Kuibyshev, attempting to repair the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.[68] During the voyage, Kuibyshev encountered units of the United States Sixth Fleet—"passing honours" were exchanged between the vessels. Defeating the "Anti-Party Group" and subsequent fall from power On his 60th birthday (in 1956), Zhukov received his fourth Hero of the Soviet Union title - making him the first person to receive the honor four times. (The only other four time recipient was Leonid Brezhnev). He became the highest-ranking military professional who was also a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He further became a symbol of national strength. Zhukov's prestige was even higher than the police and security agencies of the USSR, and thus rekindled concerns among political leaders. For example, going even further than Khrushchev, Zhukov demanded that the political agencies in the Red Army report to him before the Party. He demanded an official condemnation of Stalin's crimes during the Great Purge.[citation needed] He also supported the political vindication and rehabilitation for M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Yegorov and many others. In response his opponents accused him of being a Reformist and Bonapartist. Such enviousness and hostility proved to be the key factor that led to his later downfall.[69] The relationship between Zhukov and Khrushchev reached its peak during the XX Congress of the Communist Party (1956). After becoming the First Secretary of the Party, Khrushchev moved against Stalin's legacy and criticised his "personality cult". To complete such startling acts, Khrushchev needed the approval—or at least the acquiescence—of the military, headed by Minister of Defense Zhukov. At the plenary session of Central Committee of CPSU held in June 1957 Zhukov supported Khrushchev against the "Anti-Party Group", that had a majority in the Presidium and voted to replace Khrushchev as First Secretary with Bulganin. At that plenum, Zhukov stated: The Army is against this resolution and not even a tank will leave its position without my order![70] In the same session the "Anti-Party Group" was condemned and Zhukov was made a member of Presidium. But, in that same year, he was removed from the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense, entering forced retirement at age 62. These things happened behind his back, when he was on a trip to Albania at the invitation of Gen. Col. Beqir Balluku.[71] The same issue of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) that announced Zhukov's return also reported that he had been relieved of his duties.[72] According to many researchers, Soviet politicians (including Khrushchev himself) had a deep-seated fear of "powerful people

protistranická skupina

Protistranická skupina, rusky Антипартийная группа je označení konzervativní politické skupiny kolem Vjačeslava Molotova v 50. letech 20. století v Sovětském svazu. Členy uskupení byli Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov, Lazar Mojsejevič Kaganovič, Vjačeslav Michajlovič Molotov a s nimi sympatizující Dmitrij Trofimovič Šepilov. Úplný název, tak jak ji označil Chruščov, zněl Антипартийная группа Маленкова, Кагановича, Молотова и «примкнувшего к ним Шепилова» (Protistranická skupina Malenkova, Kaganoviče, Molotova a s „nimi sympatizujícího Šepilova") Hlavním cílem skupiny byly snahy o vypuzení Nikity Chruščova z pozice prvního tajemníka KSSS skupinou někdejších Stalinových spolupracovníků v červnu 1957. Akce, která byla zároveň posledním pokusem stoupenců stalinské linie o uchopení moci, ztroskotala. Výraz „protistranická skupina" byl použit Chruščovem k označení autorů pokusu, při příležitosti jejich vyloučení z politbyra. Důsledky Aféra spustila proces úplné destalinizace v sovětském Rusku a jeho satelitech. he Anti-Party Group (Russian: Антипартийная группа, tr. Antipartiynaya gruppa) was a group within the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that unsuccessfully attempted to depose Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Party in June 1957. The group, given that epithet by Khrushchev, was led by former Premiers Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov. The group rejected both Khrushchev's liberalization of Soviet society and his denunciation of Joseph Stalin. Contents 1 Motives 2 Attempted take-over 3 Aftermath 4 See also 5 References 6 External links Motives The members of the group regarded Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin, most famously in the Secret Speech delivered at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 as wrong and hypocritical, given Khrushchev's complicity in the Great Purge and similar events as one of Stalin's favourites. They believed that Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence would jeopardize struggle against capitalist powers internationally. Attempted take-over The leaders of the group - Malenkov, Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich - were joined at the last minute by Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov, whom Kaganovich had convinced that the group had a majority. In fact, in the Presidium the group's proposal to replace Khrushchev as First Secretary with Premier Nikolai Bulganin won with 7 to 4 votes in which Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin and Saburov supported and Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov and Kirichenko opposed, but Khrushchev argued that only the plenum of the Central Committee could remove him from office. At an extraordinary session of the Central Committee held in late June, Khrushchev argued that his opponents were an "anti-party group". He was backed by Defense Minister Georgy Zhukov, who gave a forceful speech, and was reaffirmed in his position as First Secretary even using the military to bring in supporters of Khrushchev to convince people to support him.[1] Aftermath During the stormy meeting of the Central Committee, Zhukov - a man of immense prestige given his role in the war and his reputation of fearlessness even in the face of Stalin's anger - delivered a bitter denunciation of the plotters, accusing them of having blood on their hands over Stalin's atrocities. He went further still saying that he had the military power to crush them even if they did win the vote and implied he would be able to have them all killed, but the triumphant Khrushchev rejected any such move. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov - the only four names made public - were vilified in the press and deposed from their positions in party and government. They were given relatively unimportant positions: Molotov was sent as ambassador to Mongolia Malenkov became director of a hydroelectric plant in Kazakhstan Kaganovich became director of a small potash works in the Urals Shepilov became head of the Economics Institute of the local Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan In 1961, in the wake of further de-Stalinisation, they were expelled from the Communist Party altogether and all lived mostly quiet lives from then on. Shepilov was allowed to rejoin the party by Khrushchev's successor Leonid Brezhnev in 1976 but remained on the sidelines. Khrushchev became increasingly distrusting and in the same year also deposed Defense Minister Zhukov, who had assisted him against the anti-party group but with whom he increasingly had political differences, alleging Bonapartism. In 1958, Premier Bulganin, the intended beneficiary of the anti-party group's move, was forced to retire and Khrushchev became Premier as well. Khrushchev's treatment of his opponents, in that they were vilified and humiliated but not physically oppressed, marked a departure from earlier practice in Soviet politics (as last seen in 1953 during the purge of Lavrenti Beria) - a development that was followed during later power struggles, such as Khrushchev's own deposition by Brezhnev in 1964 and the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991.[citation needed] Zhukov's subsequent partial rehabilitation under Brezhnev, after Khrushchev's 1964 ouster, was paradoxically seen as a gesture of peace towards the older guard in the party, as it honoured a hero of the war (and by implication Stalin as supreme commander).

lidská práva v sssr

Soviet concept of human rights and legal system According to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights are the "basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled.",[1] including the right to life and liberty, freedom of expression, and equality before the law; and social, cultural and economic rights, including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, the right to work, and the right to education. The Soviet conception of human rights was very different from conceptions prevalent in the West. According to the Soviet legal theory, "it is the government who is the beneficiary of human rights which are to be asserted against the individual", whereas Western law claimed the opposite.[2] The Soviet state was considered as the source of human rights.[3] Therefore, the Soviet legal system regarded law as an arm of politics and courts as agencies of the government.[4] Extensive extra-judiciary powers were given to the Soviet secret police agencies. The regime abolished Western rule of law, civil liberties, protection of law and guarantees of property[5][6] which were considered as examples of "bourgeois morality" by the Soviet law theorists such as Andrey Vyshinsky.[7] According to Vladimir Lenin, the purpose of socialist courts was "not to eliminate terror ... but to substantiate it and legitimize in principle".[4] Historian Robert Conquest described the Soviet electoral system as "a set of institutions run by the peasants and workers for the peasants and workers: a model constitution adopted in a worst period of terror and guaranteeing human rights, elections in which there was only one candidate, and in which 99 percent voted; a parliament at which no hand was ever raised in opposition or abstention."[8] Sergei Kovalev recalled "the famous article 125 of Constitution which enumerated all main citizen and political rights" in Soviet Union. But when he and other prisoners attempted to use this as a legal base for their abuse complaints, their prosecutor's argument was that "the Constitution was written not for you, but for American Negros, so that they know how happy lives Soviet citizens have".[9] Crime was determined not as the infraction of law, but as any action which could threaten the Soviet state and society. For example, a desire to make a profit could be interpreted as a counter-revolutionary activity punishable by death.[4] The liquidation and deportation of millions of peasants in 1928-31 was carried out within the terms of Soviet Civil Code.[4] Some Soviet legal scholars even asserted that "criminal repression" may be applied in the absence of guilt.".[4] Martin Latsis, chief of the Ukrainian Cheka explained: "Do not look in the file of incriminating evidence to see whether or not the accused rose up against the Soviets with arms or words. Ask him instead to which class he belongs, what is his background, his education, his profession. These are the questions that will determine the fate of the accused. That is the meaning and essence of the Red Terror."[10] The purpose of public trials was "not to demonstrate the existence or absence of a crime - that was predetermined by the appropriate party authorities - but to provide yet another forum for political agitation and propaganda for the instruction of the citizenry (see Moscow Trials for example). Defense lawyers, who had to be party members, were required to take their client's guilt for granted..."[4] Freedom of political expression Main article: Soviet political repressions In the 1930s and 1940s, political repression was practiced by the Soviet secret police services, OGPU and NKVD.[11] An extensive network of civilian informants - either volunteers, or those forcibly recruited - was used to collect intelligence for the government and report cases of suspected dissent.[12] Soviet political repression was a de facto and de jure system of persecution and prosecution of people who were or perceived to be enemies of the Soviet system.[citation needed] Its theoretical basis was the theory of Marxism concerning class struggle. The terms "repression", "terror", and other strong words were official working terms, since the dictatorship of the proletariat was supposed to suppress the resistance of other social classes, which Marxism considered antagonistic to the class of the proletariat. The legal basis of the repression was formalized into Article 58 in the code of the RSFSR and similar articles for other Soviet republics. Aggravation of class struggle under socialism was proclaimed during the Stalinist terror. Freedom of literary and scientific expression Main articles: Suppressed research in the Soviet Union and Socialist Realism Censorship in the Soviet Union was pervasive and strictly enforced.[13] This gave rise to Samizdat, a clandestine copying and distribution of government-suppressed literature. Art, literature, education, and science were placed under strict ideological scrutiny, since they were supposed to serve the interests of the victorious proletariat. Socialist realism is an example of such teleologically-oriented art that promoted socialism and communism. All humanities and social sciences were tested for strict accordance with historical materialism. All natural sciences were to be founded on the philosophical base of dialectical materialism. Many scientific disciplines, such as genetics, cybernetics, and comparative linguistics, were suppressed in the Soviet Union during some periods, condemned as "bourgeois pseudoscience". At one point Lysenkoism, which many consider a pseudoscience, was favored in agriculture and biology. In the 1930s and 1940s, many prominent scientists were declared to be "wreckers" or enemies of the people and imprisoned. Some scientists worked as prisoners in "Sharashkas" (research and development laboratories within the Gulag labor camp system). Every large enterprise and institution of the Soviet Union had a First Department that reported to the KGB; the First Department was responsible for secrecy and political security in the workplace.[citation needed] According to the Soviet Criminal Code, agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of weakening Soviet authority, or circulating materials or literature that defamed the Soviet State and social system were punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2-5 years; for a second offense, punishable for a term of 3-10 years.[14] Right to vote Main article: Soviet democracy According to communist ideologists, the Soviet political system was a true democracy, where workers' councils ("soviets") represented the will of the working class. In particular, the Soviet Constitution of 1936 guaranteed direct universal suffrage with the secret ballot.[15] Practice, however, departed from principle. For example, all candidates had been selected by Communist Party organizations before democratization and the March 1989 elections. Economic rights Personal property was allowed, with certain limitations. Real property mostly belonged to the State.[16] Health, housing, education, and nutrition were guaranteed through the provision of full employment and economic welfare structures implemented in the workplace.[16] However, these guarantees were not always met in practice. For instance, over five million people lacked adequate nutrition and starved to death during the Soviet famine of 1932-1933, one of several Soviet famines.[17] The 1932-33 famine was caused primarily by Soviet-mandated collectivization.[18] Economic protection was also extended to the elderly and the disabled through the payment of pensions and benefits.[19] Freedoms of assembly and association Freedom of assembly and of association were limited.[citation needed] Workers were not allowed to organize free trade unions. All existing trade unions were organized and controlled by the state.[20] All political youth organizations, such as Pioneer movement and Komsomol served to enforce the policies of the Communist Party. Participation in non-authorized political organizations could result in imprisonment.[14] Organizing in camps could bring the death penalty.[14][need quotation to verify] Freedom of religion St. Vladimir's Cathedral in Astrakhan, which served as a bus station in Soviet times. Main article: Religion in the Soviet Union The Soviet Union promoted Marxist-Leninist atheism. Toward that end, the Communist regime confiscated church property, ridiculed religion, harassed believers, and propagated atheism in the schools. Actions toward particular religions, however, were determined by State interests, and most organized religions were never outlawed outright. Some actions against Orthodox priests and believers included torture; being sent to prison camps, labour camps, or mental hospitals; and execution.[21][22][23][24] Many Orthodox (along with peoples of other faiths) were also subjected to psychological punishment or torture and mind control experimentation in an attempt to force them give up their religious convictions (see Punitive psychiatry in the Soviet Union).[22][23][25][26] Practicing Orthodox Christians were restricted from prominent careers and membership in communist organizations (e.g. the party and the Komsomol). Anti-religious propaganda was openly sponsored and encouraged by the government, to which the Church was not given an opportunity to publicly respond. Seminaries were closed down, and the church was restricted from publishing materials. Atheism was propagated through schools, communist organizations, and the media. Organizations such as the Society of the Godless were created. Freedom of movement January 10, 1973. Jewish refuseniks demonstrate in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the right to emigrate to Israel. Main article: Passport system in the Soviet Union Emigration and any travel abroad were not allowed without an explicit permission from the government. People who were not allowed to leave the country and campaigned for their right to leave in the 1970s were known as "refuseniks". According to the Soviet Criminal Code, a refusal to return from abroad was treason, punishable by imprisonment for a term of 10-15 years, or death with confiscation of property.[14] The passport system in the Soviet Union restricted migration of citizens within the country through the "propiska" (residential permit/registration system) and the use of internal passports. For a long period of Soviet history, peasants did not have internal passports, and could not move into towns without permission. Many former inmates received "wolf tickets" and were only allowed to live a minimum of 101 km away from city borders. Travel to closed cities and to the regions near USSR state borders was strongly restricted. An attempt to illegally escape abroad was punishable by imprisonment for 1-3 years.[14] Human rights movement Main article: Human rights movement in the Soviet Union Human rights activists in the Soviet Union were regularly subjected to harassment, repressions and arrests. In several cases, only the public profile of individual human rights campaigners such as Andrei Sakharov helped prevent a complete shutdown of the movement's activities. The USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc had abstained from voting on the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, citing its "overly juridical" character as well as the infringements on national sovereignty that it might enable.[27]:167-169 Although the USSR and some of its allies did sign the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these documents were neither well-known to people living under Communist rule nor taken seriously by the Communist authorities. Western governments did not emphasize human rights ideas in the early détente period.[28]:117 Nevertheless, a more organized human rights movement grew out of the current of dissent known as "defenders of rights" (pravozashchitniki) of the late 1960s and 1970s.[29] One of its most important samizdat publications, the Chronicle of Current Events,[30] began circulation in 1968, after the United Nations declared the year as the International Year for Human Rights. The following years saw the emergence of several dedicated human rights groups: The Initiative (or Action) Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR (1969); the Committee on Human Rights in the USSR (1970); and the USSR's section of Amnesty International in 1973.[31] They wrote appeals, collected signatures for petitions, and attended trials. The eight member countries of the Warsaw Pact signed the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. The "third basket" of the Final Act included extensive human rights clauses.[32]:99-100 In the years 1976-77, several "Helsinki Watch Groups" were formed in different cities to monitor the Soviet Union's compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, based in Moscow, Kiev, Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Erevan.[33]:159-194 They succeeded in unifying different branches of the human rights movement.[32]:159-166 Similar initiatives began in Soviet satellite states, such as Charter 77 in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

soviet democracy

Soviet democracy From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search For the Soviet republics of the Soviet Union, see Republics of the Soviet Union. This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (October 2017) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Part of the Politics series Democracy History Theory Types Anticipatory Athenian Cellular Consensus Cosmopolitan Defensive Delegative Deliberative Direct Economic Electronic Empowered Ethnic Grassroots Guided Inclusive Industrial Interactive Jacksonian Jeffersonian Liberal / Illiberal Media Multiparty New Non-partisan Participatory People's Pluralist Popular Procedural Radical Representative Religious Christian Islamic Jewish Mormon Sectarian Semi Semi-direct Social Socialist Sociocracy Sovereign Soviet Substantive Totalitarian Workplace Related topics Anarchism Kleroterion Democratic capitalism Democratic centralism Democratic confederalism Democratic republic Democratic socialism Democratization Democracy and economic growth Democracy in Marxism Democracy promotion Liberalism Libertarianism Majoritarianism Motion Ochlocracy People's democratic dictatorship Polyarchy Populism Sortition Tyranny of the majority Voting Wars between democracies Wave of democracy Politics portal vte Soviet democracy (sometimes council democracy) is a political system in which the rule of the population by directly elected soviets (Russian for "council") is exercised. The councils are directly responsible to their electors and are bound by their instructions. Such an imperative mandate is in contrast to a free mandate, in which the elected delegates are only responsible to their conscience. Delegates may accordingly be dismissed from their post at any time or be voted out (recall). Part of a series on Left communism Concepts[show] Movements[show] People[show] Organizations[show] Related topics[show] Socialism portal Communism portal Politics portal vte In a Soviet democracy, voters are organized in basic units, for example the workers of a company, the inhabitants of a district, or the soldiers of a barracks. They directly send the delegates as public functionaries, which act as legislators, government and courts in one. In contrast to earlier democracy models according to Locke and Montesquieu, there is no separation of powers. The councils are elected on several levels: At the residential and business level, delegates are sent to the local councils in plenary assemblies. These, in turn, can delegate members to the next level. The system of delegation continues to the Congress of Soviets at state level. The electoral processes thus take place from the bottom upwards. The levels are usually tied to administrative levels. Contents 1 Concept 2 History in Russia and the Soviet Union 3 History in Germany and the Weimar Republic 4 See also 5 References 6 External links 6.1 Anti-Soviet works on Soviet democracy 6.2 Soviet and pro-Soviet works on Soviet democracy Concept The process begins when the workers of a city elect their local soviet. Each workplace, district, or barracks elect delegates to represent them, who convene in a local assembly. This body holds both legislative and executive power for that city. Local soviets may also elect delegates for a higher-level council. These soviets can continue to elect councils above itself for each administrative district. Each soviet has legislative-executive power over the territory it governs. Each soviet then elects and forms the Congress of Soviets, which is the supreme governing body of the nation. This may also be called the "supreme soviet" or the "national soviet". The Congress of Soviets is formed up by delegates elected by each soviet, who all convene in a general assembly to govern. The Congress of Soviets can make laws, manage the economy, and run public utilities. It is not just an economic body, and acts as the nation's government. Each soviet can elect a small executive committee. This committee deals with the day-to-day affairs of the territory that its soviet governs. The executive committee is subservient to its soviet, its actions must be in accordance with the soviet's legislation, and it only operates during times when the soviet is not in session.[1] This method is likely borrowed from Athenian democracy. Proponents argue that this form of government is a method through which the dictatorship of the proletariat can be exercised in large populations. Soviet democracy is democracy by proxy.[2] The theory is that members of the soviets, being close to those workers or lower soviet members that they represent, can thereby accurately translate the people's decisions into legislation, and be more responsive than a centralized parliamentary democracy. Ultimately soviet democracy is based on direct democracy, especially with its advocacy of recallable delegates.[3] According to council communists, the soviets are the natural form of working class organization during a proletarian revolution.[4] Workers naturally create soviets by forming a strike committee, made up of workplace delegates, which coordinates labor actions in the region when trade unions become ineffective.[5] The strike committee then assumes the functions of the now paralyzed state and becomes the soviet.[6] Workers' councils are also viewed to run the economy based on production for use and common ownership in a lower-stage communist society.[6] History in Russia and the Soviet Union The first soviets, also called workers' councils, were formed after the Russian Revolution of 1905. Lenin and the Bolsheviks saw the soviet as the basic organizing unit of society in a socialist system and supported this form of democracy. The soviets also played a considerable role in the February and October Revolutions. At that time, they represented a variety of socialist parties in addition to Bolsheviks. According to the official historiography of the Soviet Union, the first soviet was formed in May 1905 in Ivanovo (north-east of Moscow) during the 1905 Russian Revolution (Ivanovsky Soviet). However, in his memoirs, the Russian Anarchist Volin claims that he witnessed the beginnings of the St Petersburg Soviet in January 1905. The Russian workers were largely organized at the turn of the 20th century, leading to a government-sponsored trade union leadership. In 1905, as the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) increased the strain on Russian industrial production, the workers began to strike and rebel. The soviets represented an autonomous workers' movement, one that broke free from the government's oversight of workers' unions. Soviets sprang up throughout the industrial centers of Russia, usually organized at the factory level. The soviets disappeared after the Revolution of 1905, but re-emerged under socialist leadership during the revolutions of 1917. In post-revolutionary Russia local workers' soviets would elect representatives that go on to form regional soviets, which in turn elect representatives that form higher soviets, and so on up to the Congress of Soviets. Later the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union would become the highest legislative body of the entire country. After Lenin's party, the Bolsheviks, only got a minority of the votes in the election to the Russian Constituent Assembly, he disbanded it by force after its first meeting, citing the refusal of the Right SRs and Mensheviks to honor the sovereignty of soviet democracy, arguing that a system in which parliamentary democracy was sovereign could not fairly represent the workers since it was in practice dominated by the bourgeoisie, that the proportional representation did not take into account the SR split, and that the Soviets (where the Bolsheviks did get a majority) more accurately represented the opinion of the people, which had changed as shown in the elections to the Soviets between the time of the elections to the Assembly and the first meeting of the Assembly. He also explicitly stated that democracy did not include those considered bourgeois.[7] After the revolution, the Bolsheviks had to defend the newly formed government in World War I and the Russian Civil War. According to some critics, many of the effects of the wars on the new Soviet government may be part of what led to the decline of soviet democracy in Russia (due to the authority the state took on in war time) and to the emergence of the bureaucratic structure that maintained much control throughout the history of the Soviet Union.[8] Some believe that one key blow against soviet democracy occurred as early as March 1918, when all nineteen city soviets that were elected during the spring were disbanded in a series of Bolshevik coups d'etat because workers returned Menshevik-SR majorities, or non-Bolshevik socialist majorities.[9][not in citation given] Not addressing these events directly, Lenin argued that the Soviets and the principle of democratic centralism within the Bolshevik party still assured democracy. However, Lenin also issued a "temporary" ban on factions in the Russian Communist Party. This ban remained until the revolutions of 1989 and, according to critics, made the democratic procedures within the party an empty formality, and helped Stalin to consolidate much more authority under the party. Soviets were transformed into the bureaucratic structure that existed for the rest of the history of the Soviet Union and were completely under the control of party officials and the politburo.[10]

berija a stalinova smrt

Stalin's death Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that Beria had, immediately after Stalin's stroke, gone about "spewing hatred against [Stalin] and mocking him." When Stalin showed signs of consciousness, Beria dropped to his knees and kissed his hand. When Stalin fell unconscious again, Beria immediately stood and spat.[33] Stalin's aide Vasili Lozgachev reported that Beria and Malenkov were the first members of the Politburo to see Stalin's condition when he was found unconscious. They arrived at Stalin's dacha at Kuntsevo at 03:00 on 2 March, after being called by Khrushchev and Bulganin. The latter two did not want to risk Stalin's wrath by checking themselves.[34] Lozgachev tried in futility to explain to Beria that the then-unconscious Stalin (still in his soiled clothing) was "sick and needed medical attention." Beria angrily dismissed his claims as panic-mongering and quickly left, ordering him, "Don't bother us, don't cause a panic and don't disturb Comrade Stalin!"[35] Calling a doctor was deferred for a full 12 hours after Stalin was rendered paralyzed, incontinent, and unable to speak. This decision is noted as "extraordinary" by the historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore, but also consistent with the standard Stalinist policy of deferring all decision-making (no matter how necessary or obvious) without official orders from higher authority.[36] Beria's decision to avoid immediately calling a doctor was tacitly supported (or at least not opposed) by the rest of the Politburo, which was rudderless without Stalin's micromanagement and paralyzed by a legitimate fear he would suddenly recover and wreak violent reprisal on anyone who had dared to act without his orders.[37] Stalin's suspicion of doctors in the wake of the Doctors' Plot was well known. At the time of his sickness, his private physician was already being tortured in the basement of the Lubyanka for suggesting the leader required more bed rest.[38] After Stalin's death, Beria claimed to have killed him. This aborted a final purge of Old Bolsheviks Mikoyan and Molotov, for which Stalin had been laying the groundwork in the year prior to his death. Shortly after Stalin's death, Beria announced triumphantly to the Politburo that he had "done [Stalin] in" and "saved [us] all", according to Molotov's memoirs. The assertion that Stalin was poisoned[39] by Beria's associates has been supported by Edvard Radzinsky and other authors.[40][41][38] After Stalin's death, Beria's ambitions sprang into full force. In the uneasy silence following the cessation of Stalin's last agonies, Beria was the first to dart forward to kiss his lifeless form (a move likened by Sebag-Montefiore to "wrenching a dead King's ring off his finger"[42]). While the rest of Stalin's inner circle (even Molotov, saved from certain liquidation) stood sobbing unashamedly over the body, Beria reportedly appeared "radiant", "regenerated", and "glistening with ill-concealed relish."[42] When Beria left the room, he broke the somber atmosphere by shouting loudly for his driver, his voice echoing with what Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva called "the ring of triumph unconcealed."[35] Alliluyeva noticed how the Politburo seemed openly frightened of Beria and unnerved by his bold display of ambition. "He's off to take power," Mikoyan recalled muttering to Khrushchev. That prompted a "frantic" dash for their own limousines to intercept him at the Kremlin.[35]

Samizdat

Samizdat Russian самиздат Romanization samizdat Literal meaning self-publishing Samizdat was a form of dissident activity across the Eastern Bloc in which individuals reproduced censored and underground publications by hand and passed the documents from reader to reader. This grassroots practice to evade official Soviet censorship was fraught with danger, as harsh punishments were meted out to people caught possessing or copying censored materials. Vladimir Bukovsky summarized it as follows: "Samizdat: I write it myself, edit it myself, censor it myself, publish it myself, distribute it myself, and spend jail time for it myself."[1] Name origin and variations Etymologically, the word samizdat derives from sam (Russian: сам, "self, by oneself") and izdat (Russian: издат, an abbreviation of издательство, izdatel'stvo, "publishing house"), and thus means "self-published". The Ukrainian language has a similar term: samvydav (самвидав), from sam, "self", and vydavnytstvo, "publishing house".[2] The Russian poet Nikolai Glazkov coined a version of the term as a pun in the 1940s when he typed copies of his poems and included the note Samsebyaizdat (Самсебяиздат, "Myself by Myself Publishers") on the front page.[3] Tamizdat refers to literature published abroad (там, tam, "there"), often from smuggled manuscripts. Techniques Samizdat copies of texts, such as Mikhail Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita or Václav Havel's essay The Power of the Powerless were passed around among trusted friends. The techniques used to reproduce these forbidden texts varied. Several copies might be made using carbon paper, either by hand or on a typewriter; at the other end of the scale mainframe printers were used during night shifts to make multiple copies, and books were at times printed on semiprofessional printing presses in much larger quantities. Before glasnost, the practice was dangerous, because copy machines, printing presses, and even typewriters in offices were under control of the organisation's First Department, i.e., the KGB: reference printouts for all of these machines were stored for subsequent identification purposes, if samizdat output was found. amizdat (samo-vydáváno, rusky самиздат) je způsob, jakým občanští aktivisté obcházejí cenzuru v represivních režimech, zejména v zemích východního bloku v době studené války. Komunistické a podobné represivní systémy obvykle samizdat tvrdě potlačují a vydávající disidenty soudí a vězní. Obsah 1 Vznik samizdatu 2 Český samizdat 3 Literatura 4 Externí odkazy Vznik samizdatu Myšlenkou samizdatu bylo vydávat alespoň malé množství výtisků, obvykle psaných přes průklepový papír na psacím stroji, případně použitím jakýchkoli rozmnožovacích prostředků, které byly k dispozici. Každý čtenář byl povzbuzován, aby tiskovinu opsal, nebo jakýmkoli způsobem rozmnožil a poskytl dále. Jedním z projevů cenzury totiž bylo odepření přístupu k rozmnožovací technice. Například v Československu (do poloviny šedesátých let) nebo v Rumunsku (až do pádu komunistického režimu) podléhalo povolení i pouhé vlastnictví psacího stroje. Ve všech komunistických zemích byl přísně kontrolován přístup k cyklostylům, kopírkám i další podobné technice. V době kdy se začal projevovat nástup informačních technologií, došlo k pádu komunistických režimů a uvolnění cenzury. V listopadu 1989 se už počítače hojně používaly k tisku plakátů atd. Přesto i na sklonku existence ČSSR bylo nutné se při kopírování libovolného tisku na tzv. xeroxech legitimovat občanským průkazem a sdělovat (zapisovalo se), co bude kopírováno (kniha, noty atd...). Od 70. let samizdatová komunita občas využívala šíření magnetofonových pásek a kazet (méně častý ruský výraz „magnit-izdat" „магнитиздат"), protože magnetofony už v té době představovaly reprodukční zařízení se schopností kopírování, jehož vlastnění bylo režimem tolerováno. Tuto metodu v jiném kontextu hojně využíval ajatolláh Chomejní při přípravě islámské revoluce v Íránu, kde přínosem byla možnost oslovit i negramotné obyvatelstvo. Český samizdat Česká samizdatová produkce z období normalizace čerpala především z disidentů a okruhu jeho sympatizantů. Její vznik a prudký rozvoj byl podmíněn vědomím autorů, že období perzekuce nebude krátké, a je tedy třeba snažit se o zachování literární kontinuity. Kvůli úsilí normalizátorů se po roce 1970 dostala prakticky veškerá kvalitní literatura za hranice oficiality a většina autorů odešla do tzv. vnitřní emigrace (Ludvík Vaculík, Ivan Klíma, Egon Bondy, Jiří Gruša, ...). Mnohým byla zapovězena publikační činnost po celých dvacet let, někteří byli později „připuštěni" - například Bohumil Hrabal po rozhovoru v Tvorbě, uveřejněném v roce 1975. Přesto byla jeho díla dále cenzurována a některá z nich vycházela i v samizdatu. Kromě tvorby československých autorů v samizdatu vycházely i překlady např. díla Alexandra Solženicyna, George Orwella a j. První edice začaly vznikat už na samém počátku 70. let 20. století. Mezi nejvýznamnější patřila Petlice Ludvíka Vaculíka, vynikající edičním programem i vzornou redakční úpravou. Svá díla zde zveřejňovali víceméně všichni členové disentu, vycházela poezie, práce prozaické, dramatické i filozofické. Důležitá byla i edice Expedice manželů Havlových, Česká expedice nebo Pražská imaginace. Celkový počet edicí lze odhadovat na desítky. Od osmdesátých let se k samizdatové literatuře přidaly literární časopisy, věnující prostor spřízněným autorům i odborné kritice. Mezi nejdůležitější patřil Kritický sborník, Obsah, Host, Akord, Vokno a ke konci osmdesátých let Revolver Revue. Kromě literární tvorby se metodou samizdatu vydávaly i odborné publikace z oborů, které byly režimu nepřijatelné, a to zejména náboženství (např. Teologické texty), v menší míře např. ekologie a ekonomie. Vydavatelé Samizdatu často spolupracovali s exilovými vydavateli tak, že po prvním samizdatovém vydání bylo dílo vydáno a vytisknuto profesionálně v zahraničí a za železnou oponu pašováno. Pro tuto formu se používal méně častý výraz „tam-izdat" (тамиздат).

Sekretariát KSSS

Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" - news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (January 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Секретариат ЦК КПСС Emblem of the CPSU Information General Secretary Elena Stasova (first) Joseph Stalin Mikhail Gorbachev (last) Elected by Central Committee Parent Central Committee Seats Varied Meeting place Staraya Square, Moscow, Russian SFSR[1] The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), often referred to as the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, had responsibility for the central administration of the party as opposed to drafting government policy (which was usually handled by the Politburo). Overview The members of the Secretariat were elected by the Communist Party's Central Committee, although in all but the first years of its existence the elections were a formality since decisions were made by the senior leadership before the voting.[citation needed] The General Secretary of the CPSU, who was also a Politburo member, was the leader of the Secretariat and of the Party. Dual membership in the Secretariat and the Politburo was in practice reserved for two or three very senior members of the Soviet leadership, and in the post- Stalin era (after March 1953) was a stepping-stone to ultimate power. The last five Soviet leaders (Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko and Mikhail Gorbachev) were all senior Secretaries before becoming First or General Secretaries. Additionally, Georgy Malenkov was briefly reckoned[by whom?] as the leader of the Party for a week after Stalin's death by virtue of being the top member of the Secretariat. The Central Committee established the Secretariat on 6 August 1917; it initially comprised Felix Dzerzhinsky, Matvei Muranov and Yakov Sverdlov as full members and Adolph Joffe and Elena Stasova as candidate members (or alternates). Following the October Revolution of November 1917, Sverdlov and Stasova in effect handled the work of the Secretariat as the other members of the body assumed other duties. At the time, the Secretariat was[2] responsible for technical issues such as coordination of the activities of regional Party organizations and handling routine administrative affairs of the Party. Its staff increased from just 30 in 1919 to 600 in 1921 and to 767 by 1925. By 1922 the body had transformed from a technical committee to become one of the most important components of the Party, and from that point on it was responsible for day-to-day operations of the Communist Party. Also in 1922, the position of General Secretary was created, the General Secretary became the head of the Secretariat and, in the years following Lenin's death in 1924, became the most important figure in the Party and in the Soviet Union.

brežněv a žití

Society Brezhnev (seated second from left) attending celebrations for the holiday of International Women's Day, 1973 Over the eighteen years that Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union, average income per head increased by half; three-quarters of this growth came in the 1960s and early 1970s. During the second half of Brezhnev's reign, average income per head grew by one-quarter.[49] In the first half of the Brezhnev period, income per head increased by 3.5% per annum; slightly less growth than what it had been the previous years. This can be explained by Brezhnev's reversal of most of Khrushchev's policies.[51] Consumption per head rose by an estimated 70% under Brezhnev, but with three-quarters of this growth happening before 1973 and only one-quarter in the second half of his rule.[64] Most of the increase in consumer production in the early Brezhnev era can be attributed to the Kosygin reform.[65] When the USSR's economic growth stalled in the 1970s, the standard of living and housing quality improved significantly.[66] Instead of paying more attention to the economy, the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev tried to improve the living standard in the Soviet Union by extending social benefits. This led to an increase, though a minor one, in public support.[59] The standard of living in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had fallen behind that of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR) and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) under Brezhnev; this led many Russians to believe that the policies of the Soviet Government were hurting the Russian population.[67] The state usually moved workers from one job to another, which ultimately became an ineradicable feature in Soviet industry.[68] Government industries such as factories, mines and offices were staffed by undisciplined personnel who put a great effort into not doing their jobs; this ultimately led, according to Robert Service, to a "work-shy workforce".[69] The Soviet Government had no effective counter-measure; it was extremely difficult, if not impossible to replace ineffective workers because of the country's lack of unemployment. While some areas improved during the Brezhnev era, the majority of civilian services deteriorated and living conditions for Soviet citizens fell rapidly. Diseases were on the rise[69] because of the decaying healthcare system. The living space remained rather small by First World standards, with the average Soviet person living on 13.4 square metres. Thousands of Moscow inhabitants became homeless, most of them living in shacks, doorways and parked trams. Nutrition ceased to improve in the late 1970s, while rationing of staple food products returned to Sverdlovsk for instance.[70] The state provided recreation facilities and annual holidays for hard-working citizens. Soviet trade unions rewarded hard-working members and their families with beach vacations in Crimea and Georgia.[71] Social rigidification became a common feature of Soviet society. During the Stalin era in the 1930s and 1940s, a common labourer could expect promotion to a white-collar job if he studied and obeyed Soviet authorities. In Brezhnev's Soviet Union this was not the case. Holders of attractive positions clung to them as long as possible; mere incompetence was not seen as a good reason to dismiss anyone.[72] In this way, too, the Soviet society Brezhnev passed on had become static

Brežněv a společnost

Society Brezhnev (seated second from left) attending celebrations for the holiday of International Women's Day, 1973 Over the eighteen years that Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union, average income per head increased by half; three-quarters of this growth came in the 1960s and early 1970s. During the second half of Brezhnev's reign, average income per head grew by one-quarter.[49] In the first half of the Brezhnev period, income per head increased by 3.5% per annum; slightly less growth than what it had been the previous years. This can be explained by Brezhnev's reversal of most of Khrushchev's policies.[51] Consumption per head rose by an estimated 70% under Brezhnev, but with three-quarters of this growth happening before 1973 and only one-quarter in the second half of his rule.[64] Most of the increase in consumer production in the early Brezhnev era can be attributed to the Kosygin reform.[65] When the USSR's economic growth stalled in the 1970s, the standard of living and housing quality improved significantly.[66] Instead of paying more attention to the economy, the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev tried to improve the living standard in the Soviet Union by extending social benefits. This led to an increase, though a minor one, in public support.[59] The standard of living in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had fallen behind that of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR) and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) under Brezhnev; this led many Russians to believe that the policies of the Soviet Government were hurting the Russian population.[67] The state usually moved workers from one job to another, which ultimately became an ineradicable feature in Soviet industry.[68] Government industries such as factories, mines and offices were staffed by undisciplined personnel who put a great effort into not doing their jobs; this ultimately led, according to Robert Service, to a "work-shy workforce".[69] The Soviet Government had no effective counter-measure; it was extremely difficult, if not impossible to replace ineffective workers because of the country's lack of unemployment. While some areas improved during the Brezhnev era, the majority of civilian services deteriorated and living conditions for Soviet citizens fell rapidly. Diseases were on the rise[69] because of the decaying healthcare system. The living space remained rather small by First World standards, with the average Soviet person living on 13.4 square metres. Thousands of Moscow inhabitants became homeless, most of them living in shacks, doorways and parked trams. Nutrition ceased to improve in the late 1970s, while rationing of staple food products returned to Sverdlovsk for instance.[70] The state provided recreation facilities and annual holidays for hard-working citizens. Soviet trade unions rewarded hard-working members and their families with beach vacations in Crimea and Georgia.[71] Social rigidification became a common feature of Soviet society. During the Stalin era in the 1930s and 1940s, a common labourer could expect promotion to a white-collar job if he studied and obeyed Soviet authorities. In Brezhnev's Soviet Union this was not the case. Holders of attractive positions clung to them as long as possible; mere incompetence was not seen as a good reason to dismiss anyone.[72] In this way, too, the Soviet society Brezhnev passed on had become static

Sovětská válka v Afghánistánu

Sovětská válka v Afghánistánu byl významný konflikt studené války probíhající v letech 1979-1989 mezi sovětskými intervenčními jednotkami spolu s afghánskou komunistickou vládou a mezinárodními povstaleckými skupinami mudžáhedínů usilujícími o svržení komunistické vlády a vyhnání Sovětů. Povstalci byli trénováni v sousedním Pákistánu a Číně, zároveň byli podporováni pomocí v hodnotě miliard dolarů ze Spojených států amerických, Saúdské Arábie, Spojeného království a dalších zemí. Desetiletí trvající konflikt způsobil exodus jednoho milionu Afghánců do Pákistánu a Íránu. V důsledku konfliktu byly zabity statisíce afghánských civilistů. Vzhledem k vysokým lidským i materiálním nákladům, které nakonec nevedly k úspěšnému konci z hlediska Sovětského svazu, je také označována jako sovětský Vietnam. Tento vojenský neúspěch je někdy zmiňován jako jeden z podstatných faktorů v rozpadu sovětské moci a následného kolapsu SSSR v roce 1991. Občanská válka v Afghánistánu pokračovala i po stažení sovětských vojsk, v roce 1992 vedla ke svržení komunistické vlády a nastolení islámského státu, který byl roku 1996 vystřídán vládou hnutí Tálibán. The Soviet-Afghan War lasted over nine years, from December 1979 to February 1989. Insurgent groups known collectively as the mujahideen, as well as smaller Maoist groups, fought a guerrilla war against the Soviet Army and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan government, mostly in the rural countryside. The mujahideen groups were backed primarily by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, making it a Cold War proxy war. Between 562,000[32] and 2,000,000 civilians were killed and millions of Afghans fled the country as refugees,[33][34][36][37] mostly to Pakistan and Iran. Prior to the arrival of Soviet troops, Afghanistan's communist party took power after a 1978 coup, installing Nur Mohammad Taraki as president. The party initiated a series of radical modernization reforms throughout the country that were deeply unpopular, particularly among the more traditional rural population and the established traditional power structures.[38] The regime's nature[39] of vigorously suppressing opposition, executing thousands of political prisoners and ordering massacres against unarmed civilians, led to the rise of anti-government armed groups, and by April 1979 large parts of the country were in open rebellion.[40] The government itself experienced in-party rivalry, and in September 1979 Taraki was murdered under orders of his rival and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hafizullah Amin, which soured relations with the Soviet Union. Eventually the Soviet government, under leader Leonid Brezhnev, decided to deploy the 40th Army on December 24, 1979.[41] Arriving in the capital Kabul, they staged a coup,[42] killing president Amin and installing Soviet loyalist Babrak Karmal from a rival faction.[40] The deployment had been variously called an "invasion" (by Western media and the rebels) or a legitimate supporting intervention (by the Soviet Union and the Afghan government)[43][44] on the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In January 1980, foreign ministers from 34 nations of the Islamic Conference adopted a resolution demanding "the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops" from Afghanistan.[45] The UN General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervention by a vote of 104 (for) to 18 (against), with 18 abstentions and 12 members of the 152-nation Assembly absent or not participating in the vote;[45][46] only Soviet allies Angola, East Germany and Vietnam, along with India, supported the intervention.[47] Afghan insurgents began to receive massive amounts of aid and military training in neighboring Pakistan and China,[16] paid for primarily by the United States and Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf.[8][9][16][12][48][49][50][51] As documented by the National Security Archive, "the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a significant role in asserting U.S. influence in Afghanistan by funding military operations designed to frustrate the Soviet invasion of that country. CIA covert action worked through Pakistani intelligence services to reach Afghan rebel groups."[52] Soviet troops occupied the cities and main arteries of communication, while the mujahideen waged guerrilla war in small groups operating in the almost 80 percent of the country that was outside government and Soviet control, almost exclusively being the rural countryside.[53] The Soviets used their air power to deal harshly with both rebels and civilians, levelling villages to deny safe haven to the mujahideen, destroying vital irrigation ditches, and laying millions of land mines.[54][55][56][57] The international community imposed numerous sanctions and embargoes against the Soviet Union, and the U.S. led a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics held in Moscow. The boycott and sanctions exacerbated Cold War tensions and enraged the Soviet government, which later led a revenge boycott of the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles.[58] The Soviets initially planned to secure towns and roads, stabilize the government under new leader Karmal, and withdraw within six months or a year. But they were met with fierce resistance from the guerillas,[59] and were stuck in a bloody war that lasted nine years.[60] By the mid-1980s, the Soviet contingent was increased to 108,800 and fighting increased, but the military and diplomatic cost of the war to the USSR was high.[10] By mid-1987 the Soviet Union, now under reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev, announced it would start withdrawing its forces after meetings with the Afghan government.[6][7] The final troop withdrawal started on May 15, 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989, leaving the government forces alone in the battle against the insurgents, which continued until 1992 when the former Soviet-backed government collapsed. Due to its length, it has sometimes been referred to as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam War" or the "Bear Trap" by the Western media.[61][62][63] The Soviets' failure in the war[64] is thought to be a contributing factor to the fall of the Soviet Union.[65]

Stará Garda

Stará garda bolševiků (Старая гвapдия большевиков) nebo Staří bolševici = neformální označení pro bolševiky, kteří k této frakci přistoupili ještě před říjnovou revolucí roku 1917. Mnoho z nich bylo za moskevských procesů popraveno. - Přísně vzato, starým bolševikem se mohl označovat pouze člen strany, který se přiklonil k bolševickému táboru ještě před revolucí v roce 1905 - to co byli příslušníky staré leninské strany 1903-04 - a přesto nejsem ze staré leninské strany let 1903-1904. Ale mám k nim blízko, hodně blízko. Josif Stalin odstranil mnoho starých bolševiků během Velkého teroru. Nejčastěji byli popraveni za zradu po politických procesech. Mnozí byli také posláni do gulagů, ale několik z nich, jako Alexandra Kollontajová, bylo posláno do ciziny jako velvyslanci. Někteří místo toho, aby čekali na ponižující rozsudek, vyřešili tento problém sebevraždou (jako např. Michail Tomskij). - stará garda byla naživu skoro až do pádu SS - 7/1991 (pár měsíců před pádem) zemřel její poslední příslušník Lazar Kaganovič. Všesvazové sdružení starých bolševiků Při Istpartu (Komisi pro historii Říjnové revoluce a VKS(b); Комиссия по истории Октябрьской революции и РКП(б) vzniklo v roce 1922 Všesvazové sdružení starých bolševiků; základním předpokladem vstupu bylo nepřerušené členství ve straně trvající osmnáct let (vztaženo k datu vzniku Sdružení, tedy od roku 1904). Později se kritéria členství poněkud uvolnila, tím je vysvětlen nárůst členů ze 64 při založení na přibližně dva tisíce v roce 1934, kdy bylo Všesvazové sdružení rozpuštěno. Přísně vzato, starým bolševikem se mohl označovat pouze člen strany, který se přiklonil k bolševickému táboru ještě před revolucí v roce 1905. Především takto chápal pojem V. M. Molotov, který na otázku Felixe Čujeva, cítí-li se být starým bolševikem, odpověděl: ...Tihle staří bolševici... mimochodem, nikdy jsem se nepovažoval za starého bolševika - až do nedávné doby. Proč taky, že? Staří bolševici byli v roce 1905, bolševici se formovali před pátým rokem. - A vy jste byl v šestém roce mladíkem. V šestnácti letech jste byl členem strany. - A co. Jaký jsem starý bolševik? - V roce 1912 jste začali vydávat Pravdu. - No, sám bych se mohl už v době revoluce a po revoluci považovat za starého bolševika, ale vedle seděli staří vousáči, kteří v roce 1905 veleli, řídili... Klidně mohli být našimi otci. Naslouchal jsem jim, to je pravda, přestože jsem stál docela vysoko; už před Únorovou revolucí jsem byl v byru ústředního výboru, jedním ze tří členů, a aktivně se účastnil revoluce - a přesto nejsem ze staré leninské strany let 1903-1904. Ale mám k nim blízko, hodně blízko.

výzkum v sssr

Suppressed research in the Soviet Union refers to scientific fields which were banned in the Soviet Union. All humanities and social sciences were additionally tested for strict accordance with historical materialism. These tests were alleged to serve as a cover for political suppression of scientists who engaged in research labeled as "idealistic" or "bourgeois".[1] In several cases the consequences of ideological influences were dramatic. The suppression of research began during the Stalin era and continued after his regime.[2] Certain scientific fields in the Soviet Union were suppressed primarily after being labeled as ideologically suspec Biology Main articles: Lysenkoism and Pavlovian session In the mid-1930s, the agronomist Trofim Lysenko started a campaign against genetics[4] and was supported by Stalin. If the field of genetics' connection to Nazis wasn't enough, Mendelian genetics particularly enraged Stalin due to its founder Gregor Mendel's being a Catholic Christian priest, a fact that flew in the face of the Soviet Union's official atheism and antitheism.[5][6][7][8][9] In 1950, the Soviet government organized the Joint Scientific Session of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, the "Pavlovian session". Several prominent Soviet physiologists (L.A. Orbeli, P.K. Anokhin, A.D. Speransky, I.S. Beritashvily) were attacked for deviating from Pavlov's teaching.[citation needed] As a consequence of the Pavlovian session, Soviet physiologists were forced to accept a dogmatic ideology; the quality of physiological research deteriorated and Soviet physiology excluded itself from the international scientific community.[10] Later Soviet biologists heavily criticised Lysenko's theories and pseudo-scientific methods. Cybernetics Cybernetics was also outlawed as bourgeois pseudoscience during Stalin's reign. Norbert Wiener's 1948 book Cybernetics was condemned and translated only in 1958. A 1954 edition of the Brief Philosophical Dictionary condemned cybernetics for "mechanistically equating processes in live nature, society and in technical systems, and thus standing against materialistic dialectics and modern scientific physiology developed by Ivan Pavlov".[11] (However this article was removed from the 1955 reprint of the dictionary.) After an initial period of doubts, Soviet cybernetics took root, but this early attitude hampered the development of computer science and engineering in the Soviet Union. History Main article: Soviet historiography Soviet historiography (the way in which history was and is written by scholars of the Soviet Union[12]) was significantly influenced by the strict control by the authorities aimed at propaganda of communist ideology and Soviet power. Since the late 1930s, Soviet historiography treated the party line and reality as one and the same.[13] As such, if it was a science, it was a science in service of a specific political and ideological agenda, commonly employing historical revisionism.[14] In the 1930s, historic archives were closed and original research was severely restricted. Historians were required to pepper their works with references - appropriate or not - to Stalin and other "Marxist-Leninist classics", and to pass judgment - as prescribed by the Party - on pre-revolution historic Russian figures.[15] Many works of Western historians were forbidden or censored, many areas of history were also forbidden for research as, officially, they never happened.[16] Translations of foreign historiography were often produced in a truncated form, accompanied with extensive censorship and corrective footnotes.[citation needed] For example, in the Russian 1976 translation of Basil Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War pre-war purges of Red Army officers, the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, many details of the Winter War, the occupation of the Baltic states, the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Western Allied assistance to the Soviet Union during the war, many other Western Allies' efforts, the Soviet leadership's mistakes and failures, criticism of the Soviet Union and other content were censored out.[17] The Katyn massacre was formally assigned to Nazi Germany but the subject was frequently concealed. Soviet famines were taboo.[citation needed] Linguistics At the beginning of Stalin's rule, the dominant figure in Soviet linguistics was Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr, who argued that language is a class construction and that language structure is determined by the economic structure of society.[citation needed] Stalin, who had previously written about language policy as People's Commissar for Nationalities, read a letter by Arnold Chikobava criticizing the theory. He "summoned Chikobava to a dinner that lasted from 9 p.m. to 7 a.m. taking notes diligently."[18] In this way he grasped enough of the underlying issues to oppose this simplistic Marxist formalism, ending Marr's ideological dominance over Soviet linguistics. Stalin's principal work in the field was a small essay, "Marxism and Linguistic Questions."[19] Pedology Pedology was a popular area of research on the basis of numerous orphanages created after the Russian Civil War. Soviet pedology was a combination of pedagogy and psychology of human development, that heavily relied on various tests. It was officially banned in 1936 after a special decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "On Pedolodical Perversions in the Narkompros System" on July 4, 1936. Physics In the late 1940s, some areas of physics, especially quantum mechanics but also special and general relativity, were also criticized on grounds of "idealism". Soviet physicists, such as K. V. Nikolskij and D. Blokhintzev, developed a version of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics, which was seen as more adhering to the principles of dialectical materialism.[20][21] However, although initially planned,[22] this process did not go as far as defining an "ideologically correct" version of physics and purging those scientists who refused to conform to it, because this was recognized as potentially too harmful to the Soviet nuclear program.[citation needed] Sociology After the Russian Revolution, sociology was gradually "politicized, Bolshevisized and eventually, Stalinized".[23] From 1930s to 1950s, the discipline virtually ceased to exist in the Soviet Union.[23] Even in the era where it was allowed to be practiced, and not replaced by Marxist philosophy, it was always dominated by Marxist thought; hence sociology in the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern Bloc represented, to a significant extent, only one branch of sociology: Marxist sociology.[23] With the death of Joseph Stalin and the 20th Party Congress in 1956, restrictions on sociological research were somewhat eased, and finally, after the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, sociology in Soviet Union was once again officially recognized as an acceptable branch of science.[24] Statistics This is the translation of a widely cited article ("Lukavaya Tsifra") by journalist Vasily Selyunin and economist Grigorii Khanin, in Novy Mir, February 1987, #2: 181-202[25] The quality (accuracy and reliability) of data published in the Soviet Union and used in historical research is another issue raised by various Sovietologists.[26][27][28][29] The Marxist theoreticians of the Party considered statistics as a social science; hence many applications of statistical mathematics were curtailed, particularly during the Stalin era.[30] Under central planning, nothing could occur by accident.[30] Law of large numbers or the idea of random deviation were decreed as "false theories".[30] Statistical journals and university departments were closed; world-renowned statisticians like Andrey Kolmogorov or Eugen Slutsky abandoned statistical research.[30] As with all Soviet historiography, reliability of Soviet statistical data varied from period to period.[29] The first revolutionary decade and the period of Stalin's dictatorship both appear highly problematic with regards to statistical reliability; very little statistical data were published from 1936 to 1956 (see Soviet Census (1937)).[29] The reliability of data has improved after 1956 when some missing data was published and Soviet experts themselves published some adjusted data for the Stalin's era;[29] however the quality of documentation has deteriorated.[28] While on occasion statistical data useful in historical research might have been completely invented by the Soviet authorities,[27] there is little evidence that most statistics were significantly affected by falsification or insertion of false data with the intent to confound the West.[28] Data was however falsified both during collection - by local authorities who would be judged by the central authorities based on whether their figures reflected the central economy prescriptions - and by internal propaganda, with its goal to portray the Soviet state in most positive light to its very citizens.[26][29] Nonetheless the policy of not publishing, or simply not collecting, data that was deemed unsuitable for various reasons was much more common than simple falsification; hence there are many gaps in Soviet statistical data.[28] Inadequate or lacking documentation for much of Soviet statistical data is also a significant problem.[26][28][29]

reforma 1973

The 1973 Soviet economic reform was an economic reform initiated by Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. During Leonid Brezhnev's rule of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) the Soviet economy began to stagnate; this period is referred to by some historians as the Era of Stagnation. After the failed 1965 reform Kosygin initiated another reform in 1973 to enhance the powers and functions of the regional planners by establishing associations. The reform was never fully implemented, and members of the Soviet leadership complained that the reform had not even been fully implemented by the time of the 1979 reform.

20. sjezd

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held during the period 14-25 February 1956. It is known especially for First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", which denounced the personality cult and dictatorship of Joseph Stalin.[1] Delegates at this Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were given no advance warning of what to expect. Indeed, proceedings were opened by First Secretary Khruschev's call for all to stand in memory of the Communist leaders who had died since the previous Congress, in which he mentioned Stalin in the same breath as Klement Gottwald. Hints of a new direction only came out gradually over the next ten days, which had the effect of leaving those present highly perplexed. The Polish communist leader Bolesław Bierut died in Moscow under mysterious circumstances shortly after attending the 20th Congress. The congress elected the 20th Central Committee. Contents 1 Secret speech 2 See also 3 References 4 External links Secret speech Main article: On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences On 25 February, the very last day of the Congress, it was announced that an unscheduled session had been called for the Soviet delegates. First Secretary Khrushchev's morning speech began with vague references to the harmful consequences of elevating a single individual so high that he took on the "supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god." Khrushchev went on to say that such a mistake had been made about Stalin. He himself had been guilty of what was, in essence, a distortion of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The attention of the audience was then drawn to Lenin's Testament, copies of which had been distributed, criticising Stalin's "rudeness". Further accusations, and hints of accusations, followed, including the suggestion that the murder of Sergey Kirov in 1934, the event that sparked the Great Terror, could be included in the list of Stalin's crimes. While denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev carefully praised the Communist Party, which had the strength to withstand all the negative effects of imaginary crimes and false accusations. The Party, in other words, had been a victim of Stalin, not an accessory to his crimes. He finished by calling on the Party to eradicate the cult of personality and return to "the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society." The speech shocked delegates to the Congress, as it flew in the face of years of Soviet propaganda, which had claimed that Stalin was a wise, peaceful, and fair leader. After long deliberations, in a month the speech was reported to the general public, but the full text was published only in 1989. Not everyone was ready to accept Khrushchev's new line. Albanian Communist leader Enver Hoxha, for instance, strongly condemned Khrushchev as revisionist.[2] The speech was also seen as a catalyst for 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary, and was seen as a "major stimulus" to the Sino-Soviet split.[3]

28 sjezd KSSS

The 28th Congress of the CPSU (July 2, 1990 - July 13, 1990) was held in Moscow. It was held a year ahead of the traditional schedule and turned out to be the last Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) congress in the history of the party. Notably, this congress displayed open factionalism: opposing views were championed by the centrist "CPSU Central Committee platform" (supported by Gorbachev), the liberal "Democratic Platform" (which included Boris Yeltsin) and the conservative "Marxist Platform".[1] Mikhail Gorbachev was reelected General Secretary with a 3411 to 1116 vote. Gorbachev's challenger, Teimuraz Avaliani, received 501 votes with 4020 opposing.[2][3] Vladimir Ivashko was elected deputy general secretary, defeating Yegor Ligachyov.[3] A new Party Statute was passed, which formalized the end of the monopoly of power of the CPSU announced at the previous Party Congress. The New Union Treaty project was proposed by Gorbachev. Boris Yeltsin and some others resigned from the party after the "Democratic Platform" group failed to advance the transition to a parliamentary structure of the organization, while the "Marxist Platform" failed to oppose Gorbachev's reforms of "healing socialism by capitalism". The congress failed to issue the next Program, and issued only a Program Declaration. The first Plenum of the new 28th Central Committee was held July 13-14, and with the exception of Gorbachev, a completely new 28th Politburo was elected. Various organizations claiming to be the successor of the CPSU have held congresses continuing the numbering established by the CPSU and its predecessors. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1992) held its so-called XXIXth Restorative CPSU Congress in 1992 declaring the CPSU reinstated. Similarly, the Union of Communist Parties — Communist Party of the Soviet Union, established in 1993, has also held congresses starting from XXIX, the most recent being the XXXIIIrd Congress.[4] XXVIII. sjezd KSSS se konal mezi 2. a 13. červencem 1990 v Moskvě. Jednalo se o mimořádný sjezd strany; důvodem pro narušení obvyklého pětiletého intervalu (řádný sjezd by se konal roku 1991) byla krizová situace ve vztazích v zemi. XXVIII. sjezd byl posledním v historii celé strany i SSSR. Během tohoto sjedu byl znovuzvolen Michail Gorbačov za generálního tajemníka strany, jeho zástupcem se stal Vladimir Ivaško. Též byl schválen nový status strany, který tak formálně a de facto ukončil její monopolní postavení na politické scéně v SSSR. Z KSSS v době sjezdu také vystoupil například Boris Jelcin. Důvodem byl rozkol ve straně; demokratické křídlo usilovalo o pokračování demokratizace a perestrojky, konzervativní však bylo ostře proti a Gorbačovovo počínání označilo za „léčbu komunismu kapitalismem". Nebyl proto schválen nový program strany, vzniklo pouze programové prohlášení.

legacy of Leonid B

The full understanding of the history of the late Soviet Union and of its successor, the Russian Federation, requires the assessment of the legacy of Leonid Brezhnev, the third General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and twice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Leonid Brezhnev was the leader of the CPSU from 1964 until his death in 1982, whose eighteen-year reign was recognised as the time of social and economic stagnation in the late Soviet Union. Despite his failures in domestic reforms, his foreign affairs and defence policies consolidated the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a superpower. His popularity among the citizenry waned during his last years, and the Soviet people's belief in communism and Marxism-Leninism slowly withered away but support still continued to be evident, even on the eve of his death. Following his death, political wrangling led to harsh criticism of both him and his family. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, drew support from communists and the Soviet population by criticising Brezhnev's rule, and referred to his rule as the "Era of Stagnation". Aside from the socio-economic stagnation Brezhnev left to the nation, there was also a heritage of political and personal values. When Brezhnev died he left behind a gerontocracy, a group of leaders who were significantly older than most of the adult population. Historians have largely agreed that Brezhnev's reign was one primarily of stagnation. However, in a poll taken in 2006, 61 percent of the people polled viewed the Brezhnev era as good for Russia. Contents 1 Immediate legacy 2 Historical assessments 3 Opinion polls 4 Footnotes 5 Bibliography Immediate legacy A Brezhnev plaque mounted on the wall of the University of Dneprodzerzhinsk Further information: Death and funeral of Leonid Brezhnev and Era of Stagnation When Leonid Brezhnev died on 10 November 1982 Yuri Andropov was elected chairman of the committee in charge of managing his funeral. According to Time magazine Brezhnev's death was mourned by the majority of Soviet citizens.[1] First World commentators saw this as proof that Andropov would become Brezhnev's successor as general secretary.[2] The political corruption which had grown considerably during Brezhnev's tenure had become a major problem to the Soviet Union's economic development by the 1980s. In response Andropov initiated a nationwide anti-corruption campaign. Andropov believed that the Soviet economy would possibly recover if the Soviet Government was able to increase social discipline amongst workers.[3] Brezhnev's regime was also criticised for ideological laxness and self-indulgence. [4] The gerontocracy established by Brezhnev was slowly phased out by Andropov, and new recruits were appointed to the Party "centre", such as future Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov and Chief Ideologue Yegor Ligachev.[5] Soviet foreign policy had also gone awry during Brezhnev's last years, and by June 1982, just before his death, Ronald Reagan classified the Soviet Union as an "Evil Empire". This hardline diplomatic stance did not wither away before Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the "New Thinking".[6] Support for Marxism-Leninism continued to be evident amongst the Soviet people, however, its base of support slowly withered during the Brezhnev Era. The Soviet people still remained wary of such concepts as liberal democracy and multi-party systems, and because of it, Marxism-Leninism remained the leading belief in the country.[7] Due to the large military buildup of the 1960s the Soviet Union was able to consolidate itself as a superpower during Brezhnev's rule.[8] Brezhnev's family, Yuri, Galina and Yuri Churbanov, were investigated and all, with the exception of Galina, were arrested on charges of political corruption during Mikhail Gorbachev's administration.[9] Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in-law, was sentenced to twelve years in prison on charges of large-scale embezzlement and corruption. By December 1988 Churbanov had been stripped of all state honours, and sent to a labour camp. Galina, along with the rest of Brezhnev's family, lost all their state privileges. The city of Brezhnev reverted to its old name Naberezhnye Chelny, and a group within the Soviet leadership wanted to rename all towns, street, factories and institutions bearing Brezhnev's name.[10] This was actually carried through by the authorities in December 1988 when the Soviet Government issued a decree which stated all town, streets, factories, institutions and the like bearing Brezhnev's and Konstantin Chernenko's were to revert to their former name.[11] According to his grandson Andrei Brezhnev, the very name Brezhnev had become a curse for the family, and several family members had been forced out of their jobs and their friends had deserted them.[10] Brezhnev, who had inflated his role in World War II, was rescinded the Order of Victory on 21 September 1989 in a Supreme Soviet convocation.[12] During the Gorbachev Era, Brezhnev's rule was considered less successful than that of Joseph Stalin; in an opinion measurement poll only 7 percent chose the Brezhnev Era as good, while 10 percent picked the Stalin Era as good.[13] Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin's subsequent market reforms, many Russians viewed the Brezhnev era with nostalgia; they missed the stability of that era which had subsequently been lost during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras.[14] Historical assessments Historians have expressed criticism for Brezhnev and his rule. The scholarly literature dealing with him is scarce and, with the exception of the period immediately after his death, overwhelmingly negative. Very little has been written about Brezhnev in English, and even Russian. According to Mark Sandle and Edwin Bacon, the authors behind Brezhnev Reconsidered, Brezhnev attracted little attention from the media due to a consensus that came shortly after his death, namely that his rule was primarily one of stagnation. When Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, initiated perestroika he blamed the degradation of the Soviet economic and political system on Brezhnev, and called his rule the "Era of Stagnation".[15] Gorbachev claimed that Brezhnev followed "a fierce neo-Stalinist line",[16] although in a later statement Gorbachev made assurances that Brezhnev was not as bad as he was made out to be, saying, "Brezhnev was nothing like the cartoon figure that is made of him now".[17] British historian Robert Service wrote in his book, Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century, that "When he [Brezhnev] succeeded Khrushchev, he was still a vigorous politician who expected to make the Party and government work more effectively. He had not been inactive; he had not been entirely inflexible. But his General Secretaryship had turned into a ceremonial reign that had brought communism into its deepest contempt since 1917." He added that it was "hard to feel very sorry for Brezhnev"; his socio-economic policies had sent the country into an Era of Stagnation from which his successors were never able to fully recover.[18] Talal Nizameddin states in his book Russia and the Middle East: Towards A New Foreign Policy that "Brezhnev's legacy, generally unaffected by his weak successors (Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko), was entanglement in Afghanistan, tension with China and Japan, as well as the prospect of a new dimension to the arms race with the United States in the form of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars)."[19] According to historian David Dyker in his book The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform "Brezhnev left his successors a Soviet Union suffering from a host of domestic and foreign problems". The biggest obstacle, according to Dyker, was the weakness of the economy which had undermined Soviet influence outside its borders considerably during the late Brezhnev due to its relative technological backwardness.[20] The author of The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline Seweryn Bialer has a more mixed assessment of Brezhnev's reign. Bialer notes that the era was a time of "lost opportunities", but admits that the economic growth during Brezhnev's first years weakened "the rationale for radical reform". However, as Bialer notes in his book, even the gerontocracy which Brezhnev himself had created were disillusioned with Brezhnev's leadership when he died in 1982.[21] In his book Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System Robert Vincent Daniels argues that Brezhnev "gave the country stability, if nothing else, even though it was the stability of the police state", and that his domestic and external policies tried to ensure the "status quo".[22] Daniels believes that Brezhnev's reign can be separated into two parts, the first, starting in 1964 and ending in 1975 conforms to a "status quo leadership, building the economy, pursuing détente, and maintaining political equilibrium at home". The second phase, which began in 1975, was exactly the opposite; the economy stopped growing, the collective leadership ended with Nikolai Podgorny's removal, Brezhnev developed a cult of personality and the Soviet Union itself started to stagnate.[23] Historians Jiří Valenta and Frank Cibulka noted in their book Gorbachev's New Thinking and Third World Conflicts that Brezhnev's legacy was a "mixture of achievements and failures in both domestic and foreign policy". However, they argue that by the time of his death his failures had become severe chronic systematic problems. Brezhnev's main achievements, according to Valenta and Cibulka, was his foreign and defense policies, however, with the economy in decline these achievements were not durable in the long-run. They also note that the Soviet Union was able to consolidate itself as a superpower, which in turn increased their influence in non-communist Third World countries.[24] On a positive note, Ian Thatcher argues that "[r]ather than deserving a reputation as the most vilified of all Soviet leaders, Brezhnev should be praised as one of the most successful exponents of the art of Soviet politics." He argues that Brezhnev was a good politician within the framework of the Soviet political system.[25] Dmitry Peskov said "Brezhnev wasn't a minus for the history of our country, he was a huge plus, he laid a foundation for the country's economics and agriculture."[26] Archie Brown wrote in his book, The Rise & Fall of Communism, that "From the point of view of Communist rulers, the Brezhnev era was in many ways successful." Brown adds that the Soviet Union reached "rough parity with the United States" militarily by the early 1970s, and became a superpower in the military sense of the world.[27] According to Brown "The Brezhnev era was a time when tens of millions of Soviet citizens lived a peaceful and predictable life than hitherto" and where "Most people did not live in fear of the KGB."[28] Opinion polls Brezhnev commemorative plaque donated to the Haus am Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin, Germany Brezhnev has fared well in Russian opinion polls when compared to his successors and predecessors. However, in the West he is most commonly remembered for starting the economic stagnation which triggered the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[29] A 2000 poll by VTsIOM asked various Russians the question "Was a given period more positive or more negative for the country?". 36 percent of the people polled viewed Brezhnev's tenure as more positive than negative. His predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev trailed close behind him, earning 33 percent.[30] A poll by the Public Opinion Fund (VTsIOM) in September 1999 similarly chose the Brezhnev period as the time in the 20th century when "ordinary people lived best", having a clear majority of 51 to 10. In a similar poll done in 1994, Brezhnev garnered a majority of only 36 to 16.[31] According to a 2006 Public Opinion Fund poll, 61 percent of the Russian people viewed the Brezhnev era as good for the country.[32] A poll by the VTsIOM in 2007 showed that the majority of Russians would choose to live during the Brezhnev era over any other period of 20th-century Russian history.[33] Researchers have noted a surge in Brezhnev's popularity, along with other communist rulers, during and in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis of 1998, which is well remembered by many Russians for plunging many into poverty. When comparing these two periods, Brezhnev's USSR is best remembered for stability in prices and income by the Russians and not the socio-economic stagnation for which he is remembered in the West.[29]

Prezidium Nejvyššího Sovětu

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Russian: Президиум Верховного Совета or Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta) was a Soviet governmental institution - a permanent body of the Supreme Soviets (parliaments). 37 seats This body was of the all-Union level (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union), as well as in all Soviet republics (e.g., Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR) and autonomous republics. Structure and functions of the presidiums in these republics were virtually identical.[1] The presidiums were elected by the Supreme Soviet to act on its behalf while the Supreme Soviet was not in session. By the 1936 and 1977 Soviet Constitution the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet served as the collective head of state of the USSR.[2] Structure Its building, situated inside the Moscow Kremlin, was appropriately named the Kremlin Presidium. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a joint session of both chambers at the first session of each after convocation. The deputies of the Presidium were appointed for the duration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR consisted of a premier, a first vice-premier (since 1977), his 15 deputies (one from each republic), a secretary, and 20 members. The Presidium was accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities. rezídium Najvyššieho sovietu Zväzu sovietskych socialistických republík (po rusky: Президиум Верховного Совета СССР) bol orgán štátnej moci v Sovietskom zväze, ktorý sa skladal s predsedu a jeho 15 podpredsedov (jeden z každej zväzovej republiky), sekretára a 20 členov. Jeho členovia sa volili na základe voľby Najvyššieho sovietu ZSSR (za ktorého chod aj počas celej svojej činnosti zodpovedal) na prvom spoločnom zhromaždení a zasadaní oboch komôr parlamentu každého pravidelného funkčného obdobia z počtu zhromaždených poslancov. Takéto prezídiá boli aj v jednotlivých zväzových republíkách ZSSR, kde ich právomoci určovala miestna ústava platná v každej zväzovej republike ZSSR. Podľa Ústavy Zväzu sovietskych socialistických republík mal plnú moc vo/v: vydávaní rozhodnutí; rozbore platných zákonov ZSSR; rozpustení Najvyššieho sovietu ZSSR na základe článku 47 Ústavy ZSSR; vytýčení termínu nových predčasných volieb; organizovaní celonárodného referenda alebo referenda v ktorejkoľvek zväzovej republike; zrušení ustanovení a nariadení Rady ministrov ZSSR a Rady ministrov zväzových republík v prípade ich nesúladu so zákonom; menovaní ministov; vymenovávaní a odovzdávaní radov a medailí ZSSR občanom ZSSR; ustanovení čestných titulov ZSSR a ich osvojenie; ustanovení vojenských, diplomatických a iných špeciálnych titulov; udelení amnestie a milosti; vymenovaní a odvolávaní najvyššieho veliteľa ozbrojených síl ZSSR; vyhlásení plnej a čiastočnej mobilizácie; vyhlásení vojny v prípade vojenského napadnutia ZSSR iným štátom alebo v prípade potreby splnení medzinárodných zmlúv a dohôd s inými štátmi o vzájomnej obrane pred agresorom; ratifikácii medzinárodných zmlúv ZSSR; vymenovaní a odvolávaní veľvyslancov ZSSR do/v iných krajín; prijímaní vyznamenaní iných štátov a diplomatov zahraničných krajín; vyhlásení vojny v jednotlivých oblastiach ZSSR alebo v celej krajine v záujme obrany sovietskeho štátu alebo spoločenského poriadku a štátnej bezpečnosti; rozhodnutí udeliť uchádzačom sovietske občianstvo; rozhodnutí vziať občanom ZSSR sovietske občianstvo v prípade dobrovoľného odchodu z krajiny. 37 seats

10. pětiletka

The Tenth Five-Year Plan, or the 10th Five-Year Plan of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was a set of goals designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1976 and 1980. The plan was presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Officially the plan was normally referred to as "The Plan of Quality and Efficiency". Contents 1 The 25th Congress and development 2 Fulfillment 3 See also 4 References The 25th Congress and development Further information: 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers presented the plan at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1976. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev told the Central Committee (CC) in an annual address in October 1976 that "Efficiency and quality" was to become the plan's official motto.[1] Brezhnev claimed that the Soviet economy faced declining growth due to slow technological progress at home hence the plan emphasised the need to buy foreign technology.[2] Soviet agriculture was given top priority in the plan, with Brezhnev stating that investment in agriculture (at 27 percent during the Tenth Five-Year Plan) must stay close to at least the same level during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan as it did during tenth.[3] Investment in chemical and petrochemical industry doubled in the Tenth Five-Year plan in comparison with its predecessor.[4] It was reported that the Political Bureau (Politburo) rejected the draft of the Tenth Five-Year Plan twice because it demanded too little growth in the consumer goods sector of the economy.[5] Republic Growth in industrial output in percent (according to the USSR) Outcome 9th Plan Planned 10th Plan Outcome 10th Plan Soviet Union 43% 36% 24% Armenia 45% 46% 46% Azerbaijan 50% 39% 47% Byelorussia 64% 43% 42% Estonia 41% 26% 24% Georgia 39% 41% 40% Kazakhstan 42% 40% 18% Kirghizia 52% 37% 30% Latvia 36% 27% 20% Lithuania 49% 32% 26% Moldavia 55% 47% 32% Russian SFSR 42% 36% 22% Tajikistan 39% 39% 30% Turkmenistan 54% 30% 12% Ukraine 41% 33% 21% Uzbekistan 39% 39% 30% Brezhnev had proposed in March 1974 that the two major projects in the plan would be (1) construction of the Baikal Amur Mainline railway in Siberia, and (2) rural development of the backward non-chernozem zone of European Russia.[6] Fulfillment During the term of the plan, renovation of enterprises in the oil refining industry made up two thirds of national capital investment.[7] Due to the Soviet government's emphasis on technological innovation, 10-12 percent of the total investment in machinery and equipment was spent on foreign imported technology. Licensed purchases from the West increased dramatically, with the number of import of licenses issued quadrupling during the Tenth Five-Year Plan compared to the previous five-year plan.[2] According to a report entitled Oil Supplementary by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the USSR would not fulfill its annual output target of 640 million tons of oil.[8] Planned increases in labour productivity also failed to materialise.[9] Contemporary Soviet statistics show that plan fulfillment was higher in the European part of the USSR and the Caucasus than in Central Asia. In fact, all Central Asian republics fell short of plan targets. For example, in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic's (TSSR) the planned industrial growth was 30 percent, while it grew only by 12 percent in the five-year period.[10] As seen in the adjacent table, only the(Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR) out of the fifteen republics fulfilled planned industrial output, while only two republics increased theirs (the Armenian SSR and the Georgian SSR).[11] Semion Grossu, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova, blamed "fundamental flaws in economic activity" which made it close to impossible to fulfill the plan's criteria.[12] The Baikal Amur Mainline railway in Siberia was officially finished in 1984, but was not fully completed until 1991. The 1979 Soviet economic reform, or "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", was an economic reform initiated by Alexei Kosygin. In contrast with many of his earlier reform initiatives, such as the 1965 economic reform, which successfully centralised the economy by enhancing the powers of the ministries, this reform failed to fulfill the rest of the Tenth Five-Year Plan

Velký teror

Velká čistka (rusky Большая чистка, Bal'šaja čistka), někdy označovaná i jako Velký teror, je označení několika souvisejících kampaní politické represe a perzekuce v Sovětském svazu 30. let 20. století, které Josif Stalin spustil s cílem odstranit zbývající opozici a získat neomezenou moc.[1] Čistka se týkala většiny vrstev sovětské společnosti: samotné komunistické strany, úřednictva, důstojnického sboru, inteligence, rolnictva (takzvaných „kulaků"), etnických minorit a náboženských skupin. Záminkou k jejímu rozpoutání byla vražda Sergeje Kirova, hlavy leningradské stranické organizace, v roce 1934. Nejviditelnějším projevem čistky byly takzvané Moskevské procesy, veřejná, předem secvičená a rozhodnutá soudní přelíčení proti vedoucím funkcionářům komunistické strany, končící drakonickými rozsudky. Obsah 1 Průběh 2 Hlavní události 3 Reference 4 Literatura 5 Externí odkazy Průběh Raketový konstruktér Sergej Koroljov krátce po svém zatčení v roce 1938 Velká čistka byla zahájena pod šéfem NKVD Genrichem Jagodou, na jejím vrcholu od září 1936 do srpna 1938 ji řídil Nikolaj Ježov - tato perioda je proto někdy nazývána „ježovština"; Jagoda i Ježov ovšem stalinským čistkám zanedlouho padli za oběť sami, první byl popraven roku 1938, druhý o necelé dva roky později. Oba dva ovšem jen vykonávali přání a vůli Stalina. Ježova ve funkci šéfa NKVD nahradil Stalinův chráněnec Lavrentij Berija. Oběti čistek byly často popravovány či vězněny bez řádného soudu, jak jej předepisoval i tehdejší sovětský právní řád, pouze na základně rozhodnutí takzvaných „trojek" složených z důstojníků tajné policie NKVD, tajemníka krajského výboru a krajského státního zástupce. Pokud k soudům docházelo, šlo o zinscenované a předem rozhodnuté politické procesy, při nichž bylo doznání vynuceno pod nátlakem, často mučením obžalovaných. Oběti byly obviňovány z různých smyšlených, zpravidla politických, zločinů, například sabotáže, špionáže nebo protisovětské agitace. Podle odtajněných sovětských archivů NKVD během let 1937 a 1938 zatkla 1 548 367 osob, z nichž bylo pak 681 692 zastřeleno, což v průměru znamená asi 1000 poprav denně.[2] Celkový počet obětí ježovštiny se někdy odhaduje na 950 tisíc až 1,2 milionu,[3] vzhledem k neúplné dokumentaci může být i podstatně vyšší.[2][4][5][6][7] Hlavní události Generální prokurátor Andrej Vyšinskij čte obžalobu proti Karl Radkovi během Moskevských procesů roku 1937 K periodizaci období Velké čistky se někdy používají tyto události: První moskevský proces (srpen 1936) byl první ze série tří velkých „divadelních" procesů. Proces proti 16 členům údajného „trockisticko-zinovjevovského teroristického centra", kteří byli všichni poté popraveni; hlavními obžalovanými byli prominentní komunističtí vůdci Grigorij Zinovjev a Lev Kameněv. Druhý moskevský proces nad 17 předními funkcionáři (leden 1937), mezi jehož obžalovanými byl například Karl Radek. 13 obžalovaných bylo zastřeleno, zbytek brzy pomřel v pracovních táborech. Nový paragraf 58-14 trestního zákona o „kontrarevoluční sabotáži", který umožňoval takovou sabotáž trestat zastřelením a konfiskací majetku (6. červen 1937) Tajný proces proti vysokým důstojníkům armády (červen 1937). Osm obžalovaných včetně maršála Tuchačevského bylo popraveno, jeden unikl sebevraždou. Po procesu následovala vlna masivních čistek v celém důstojnickém sboru Rudé armády.[8] Zavedení „trojek" NKVD pro urychlení „revoluční spravedlnosti" (Ježovův rozkaz 00447 platný k 30. červenci 1937) Třetí moskevský proces nad 21 zčásti vysoce postavenými stranickými vůdci (březen 1938) v čele s bývalým předsedou Kominterny Nikolajem Bucharinem, bývalým premiérem Alexejem Rykovem a nedávnou hlavou tajné policie NKVD Genrichem Jagodou, opět ústící v popravu všech hlavních obžalovaných. Dekret Sovnarkomu (pozdější Rady ministrů SSSR) a Ústředního výboru strany rušící mimořádná bezpečnostní opatření (17. listopadu 1938) ukončil období čistky. Neznamenal skončení stalinských represí, ale útlak již poté obvykle nebyl tak intenzivní a krvavý.

Zhou Enlai

Zhou Enlai (čou en-laj českej přepis) (Chinese: 周恩来; Wade-Giles: Chou1 Ên1-lai2; 5 March 1898 - 8 January 1976) was the first Premier of the People's Republic of China, serving from October 1949 until his death in January 1976. Zhou served along with Chairman Mao Zedong and was instrumental in the Communist Party's rise to power, and later in consolidating its control, forming foreign policy, and developing the Chinese economy. A skilled and able diplomat, Zhou served as the Chinese foreign minister from 1949 to 1958. Advocating peaceful coexistence with the West after the stalemated Korean War, he participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference, and helped orchestrate Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China. He helped devise policies regarding the bitter disputes with the United States, Taiwan, the Soviet Union (after 1960), India and Vietnam. Zhou survived the purges of other top officials during the Cultural Revolution. While Mao dedicated most of his later years to political struggle and ideological work, Zhou was the main driving force behind the affairs of state during much of the Cultural Revolution. His attempts at mitigating the Red Guards' damage and his efforts to protect others from their wrath made him immensely popular in the Cultural Revolution's later stages. As Mao's health began to decline in 1971 and 1972 and following the death of disgraced Lin Biao, Zhou was elected First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party by the 10th Central Committee in 1973 and thereby designated as Mao's successor, but still struggled against the Gang of Four internally over leadership of China. His last major public appearance was at the first meeting of the 4th National People's Congress on 13 January 1975, where he presented the government work report. He then fell out of the public eye for medical treatment and died one year later. The massive public outpouring of grief in Beijing turned to anger at the Gang of Four, leading to the Tiananmen Incident. Although Zhou was succeeded by Hua Guofeng, Zhou's ally Deng Xiaoping was able to outmaneuver the Gang of Four politically and took Hua's place as paramount leader by 1978.

Ligačov Jegor Kuzmič

Yegor Kuzmich Ligachyov (also transliterated as Ligachev; Russian: Его́р Кузьми́ч Лигачёв; born 29 November 1920) is a Soviet politician who was a high-ranking official in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Originally an ally of Mikhail Gorbachev, Ligachyov became a challenger to his leadership. Contents 1 Early life 2 Political career 2.1 In the USSR 2.2 Russian Federation 3 Significance 4 Notes and references 5 Sources Early life Ligachyov was born on 29 November 1920 in a village called Dubinkino (now the Chulymsky District) in the Novosibirsk Oblast. Between 1938 and 1943 he attended the Ordzhonikidze Institute for Aviation in Moscow and attained a technical engineering degree. Ligachyov joined the Communist Party at the age of 24 in 1944, later studying at the Higher Party School in 1951. Political career Ligachyov's career began in his native Siberia and took him to some of the highest functions of the Party. He was often regarded as Gorbachev's second man, holding important posts such as Secretary for Ideology. However, Ligachyov lost his posts in 1990, a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, resigning from his political career at the 28th Party Congress. Ligachyov was critical of Yeltsin and Gorbachev to an extent, although he is often held as most remarkable for being Gorbachev's primary critic. In the USSR Ligachyov (right) meets with German farmers in Neuzelle during a visit to East Germany in 1989. Ligachyov was First Secretary of the Novosibirsk Komsomol, before becoming Deputy Chairman of the Novosibirsk Soviet, and then Secretary of the Novosibirsk Obkom between 1959 and 1961. Ligachyov's first major post was attained in 1961, when he began working in the CPSU Central Committee. In 1965, he became First Secretary of the Party in Tomsk, Siberia. During his time there he led the cover-up of the Stalin-era mass grave at Kolpashevo.[1] He was to hold this position until 1983, when he was discovered by Yuri Andropov and made head of the Party Organization Department and a Secretary of the Central Committee. In 1966, Ligachyov was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee, and ten years later in 1976 he was promoted to a full member. When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, Ligachyov was promoted to become a Secretary of higher status, and was generally viewed as one of Gorbachev's primary allies: he had helped organize a pro-Gorbachev faction in hope of having Gorbachev succeed Andropov in 1984, although this attempt failed (instead, Konstantin Chernenko was chosen as a stop-gap candidate). Ligachyov was made head of the Secretariat. Ligachyov supported reform of the Soviet Union and initially supported Gorbachev; however, as Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost began to resemble social democratic policies he distanced himself from Gorbachev, and by 1988 he was recognized as the leader of the more conservative, anti-Gorbachev faction of Soviet politicians.[2] During this period Ligachyov uttered his famous catch phrase "Boris, you are wrong", targeting Boris Yeltsin in a political discourse. Ligachyov served in the Politburo between 1985 and 1990. Ligachyov, having made some speeches criticising Gorbachev, was demoted from his more prestigious position as Secretary for Ideology to Secretary for Agriculture on 30 September 1988.[3] Perhaps the highlight of Ligachyov's career was the 28th Congress of the CPSU in 1990. He criticized Gorbachev for circumventing the Party via Soviet Presidency, and he argued Glasnost had gone too far. During the Party Congress, Ligachyov challenged Gorbachev for the office of General Secretary, standing as the "Leninist" candidate. Having been defeated, Ligachyov left the Politburo and went into temporary retirement. Russian Federation After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ligachyov became a notable communist politician in the Russian Federation. Ligachyov was elected three times to the Russian State Duma as a member for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, a position he currently holds, and became the Duma's oldest member. Ligachyov remains an active politician in the Communist Party and has been a member of its Central Committee since co-founding the party in 1993.[4] However, he lost his seat in the Duma in 2003, when he polled 23.5 percent of the vote against United Russia candidate Vladimir Zhidkikh's 53 percent.[5] Ligachyov released his memoirs, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, in 1996. The memoirs reveal Gorbachev's role in the USSR's dissolution, from a personal, up-close perspective. Serge Schmemann of The New York Times wrote that the author was driven "to seek explanations for what went wrong, to understand his own role" and while the reviewer wished for more intrigue (in the form of detailed accounts of events other than the dissolution of the USSR), he believed the book was an interesting and detailed account of that period from the perspective of an "honest Bolshevik".[6][7] Significance Ligachyov became one of Gorbachev's primary critics, accused of leading a conservative faction.[8][9] Although publicly endorsing perestroika, Ligachyov was opposed to Gorbachev's attempts to expand Soviet authority and limit the responsibilities of party officials. Ligachyov did not support the decision to end the CPSU's monopoly of political power in 1990, nor did he support Gorbachev's response to the gradual withdrawal of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, saying, for example, that "We should not overlook the impending danger of the accelerated reunification of Germany".[10] However, in 1988, Ligachyov denied that he was leading a conservative faction, saying that the Party leadership were united behind Gorbachev.[8] He also rejected suggestions after the fall of the Soviet Union that he had been opposed to Gorbachev in his memoirs and in speeches.[11] Ligachyov clearly demonstrated conservative ideas in his opposition of Yeltsin's political ideas, on the other hand, opposing the principles of glasnost.[12] He later repudiated his opposition to Gorbachev's policies, saying it was "only too late [he] discerned a social democrat in Gorbachev".[11] Ligachyov denied time and again that he was opposed to Gorbachev in sources including his memoirs.[8][11][13] Ligachyov's economically hard-line views were upheld in speeches he made to the CPSU's Congress in 1990. The following deplored privatization of the economy: " Public ownership unites, but private ownership disunites people's interests and indisputably causes social stratification of society.... For what purpose was perestroika started? For the purpose of most fully using the potential of socialism. Then does the sale of enterprises into private hands really promote the revealing of the possibilities inherent in the socialist system? No, it does not.... Lately people have begun saying, "Perestroika will develop, with the party or without it". I think otherwise. With the party, and only with the vanguard party, can we move forward on the way of socialist renewal. Without the party of Communists, perestroika is a lost cause.... " — Yegor Ligachyov[10] However, in this speech he also rejected the idea he was a conservative, saying he was a realist.[10] Ligachyov also stated earlier that "the slackening of state discipline" was "among the reasons for the troubled state of the economy".[14] Furthermore, together with KGB head Viktor Chebrikov, Ligachyov took several opportunities before he was demoted to Secretary for Agriculture in 1988 to warn against rapid reform.[15] Although not mentioned in his memoirs to any notable extent, Ligachyov played a notable role in dismissing Yeltsin, arguing with him for long periods of time in 1987. Ligachyov opposed Yeltsin's idea that Party officials enjoyed greater privilege.[15] He became well known after the phrase "Boris, you are not right!", that was quoted widely in 1990s. Ligachyov was considered "Second Secretary" of the Central Committee (and thus the Soviet Union) for most of his time in the Politburo.[9] Ligachyov appears in the videogame Crisis in the Kremlin.

holodomor

derived from морити голодом, "to kill by starvation" - čl vytvořený hladomor na sovětské Ukrajině 1932-33 - zabil miliony ukrajinců - součástí širšího sovětského hladomuru 1932-33 - zasáhl nejvíc územi kde produkce obilí a obilovin - od r 2006 oficiální stanovisko: Ukr + 15 dalších - že to byla genocida vykonaná Sovět svazem - odhady úmrtí se liší: až 12 milionů etnických Uk zemřelo na hladomor -> vědci odhadují 3.3 - 7.5 million - někteří vědci: hladomor naplánován Stalinem -> měl zničít ukr hnutí za nezávislost Příčina vzniku hladomoru Nařízením sovětské vlády, lidově zvaným „ruský zákon pěti klásků", se zakazoval jakýkoliv obchod v rolnických oblastech, pozastavilo se zásobení vesnic potravinami, pronásledovalo se a trestalo pobytem v gulagu, 10 roky vězení nebo smrtí zastřelením jakékoliv použití obilí i pro zaplacení práce v oblastech, které nesplnily plány odvodu obilí. Fungoval systém naturálních pokut, zbožových represí. Podíl ukrajinského obilí na sovětské produkci činil více než třetinu a v jednotlivých oblastech převyšoval plánované objemy pro Severní Kavkaz, Centrální-Černozemní region, Kazachstán a Moskevskou oblast dohromady. Političtí komisaři dohlíželi na omezení přístupu ukrajinských rolníků k potravinám, rolníkům byly odepřeny jejich přebytky a nakonec museli odevzdat všechny své potraviny ve prospěch jiných sovětských regionů.[9] Podle některých historiků byl hladomor na Ukrajině cíleně způsobený politikou sovětského diktátora Josefa Stalina. Historik Jan Rychlík uvádí, že velký hladomor v Ukrajinské republice patří k nejhorším zločinům, jichž se komunistický režim v letech Stalinovy éry dopustil.[10] Sovětským režimem a Stalinem vyvolaný umělý hladomor zasáhl i další oblasti Sovětského svazu, zejména regiony jižního Ruska a Kazachstánu, kde zemřelo hlady miliony lidí.[11][12] Hladomor v jižním Rusku postihl i rodinu Michaila Gorbačova, který později napsal: „V tom strašlivém roce 1933 zemřela hlady skoro polovina obyvatel mé rodné vesnice Privolnoje, včetně otcových dvou sester a bratra".[13] Některé ruské zdroje za spolupůvodce hladomoru označují „zlatou blokádu". Od roku 1925 totiž západní země odmítaly platbu Sovětského svazu zlatem, a tomu tak nezbývalo než platit dovoz západních strojů zásobami ropy, dřeva a obilí jako obchodní „měnou".[14] V dubnu 1933 vyhlásila Velká Británie zákaz dovozu sovětského zboží a zakázala dovoz dřeva, ropy, másla, pšenice a ječmene.[15] V roce 1934 byl tento zákaz plateb zlatem zrušen. Jiné ukrajinské hladomory 20. století Další dva hladomory zažila Ukrajina jednak v letech 1921-1923 v době anarchie a banditismu, kdy se zde bojovalo o sovětskou moc, a jednak v letech 1946-1947, kdy Stalin nechal vyvézt z Ukrajiny obilí do satelitních zemí (včetně Československa), které chtěl odradit od Marshallova plánu a podpořit tamní komunisty. Ve všech třech případech hladomorům zároveň předcházelo dlouhotrvající sucho a nižší úroda.[zdroj?] Postoj sovětské vlády Oblasti SSSR nejvíce postižené hladomorem v roce 1933 Sovětská vláda se veškeré zprávy o hladomoru snažila popírat a bagatelizovat. Při této činnosti nacházela účinnou pomoc u evropských komunistů, ale i u představitelů kultury (např. Lion Feuchtwanger, Henri Barbusse, Romain Rolland a G. B. Shaw) a politiky (bývalý francouzský premiér Édouard Herriot).[16] V srpnu 1942 Stalin při rozhovoru s britským premiérem Churchillem odhadl, že v celém Sovětském svazu zahynulo nebo bylo deportováno asi 10 milionů "kulaků", kteří vzdorovali kolektivizaci zemědělství.[17] Vliv hladomoru na postoj Ukrajinců v druhé světové válce Genocida na Ukrajině byla také aktem stalinského teroru na obyvatelstvu, což vyvolalo nenávist a odpor vůči sovětskému zřízení. Když v roce 1941 Adolf Hitler zahájil útok na Sovětský svaz pod názvem Operace Barbarossa a dobyl dnešní území Ukrajiny, tak německé jednotky byly mnoha lidmi s nadšením uvítány jako osvoboditelé od sovětské tyranie. Ukrajinský hladomor let 1932-1933 lze považovat za jeden z důvodů, proč se mnozí Ukrajinci stali spojenci nacistického Německa v boji proti Sovětskému svazu, včetně Ukrajinců sloužících v ukrajinské divizi SS. Miliony Ukrajinců však zároveň bojovaly v Rudé armádě proti nacistickému Německu a ukrajinského původu byli někteří sovětští velitelé jako Timošenko, Grečko, Malinovskij nebo Jeremenko. Dnešní postoj Ruska Ruský prezident Medvěděv a prezident Ukrajiny Janukovyč uctívají v Kyjevě památku obětí ukrajinského hladomoru, květen 2010 Státy, které prohlásily hladomor na Ukrajině za akt genocidy Odhalení amerických depeší (Wikileaks) Rusko považuje hladomor na Ukrajině za tragédii způsobenou politikou násilné kolektivizace ze strany stalinského režimu, která kromě Ukrajiny zasáhla také některé oblasti jižního Ruska a severní Kazachstán,[18] ale aktivně se brání tomu, aby na mezinárodním poli byl hladomor šířeji uznán za akt sovětské genocidy vůči Ukrajincům. Z depeší amerických velvyslanectví zveřejněných serverem WikiLeaks např. vyplývá, že tehdejší prezident Dmitrij Medveděv upozornil ázerbájdžánského prezidenta Ilhama Alijeva, že když prohlásí tyto události za genocidu, zpochybní Rusko nároky Ázerbájdžánu na Náhorní Karabach.[19]

Lev Kameněv

ev Kameněv Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Možná hledáte: Sergej Sergejevič Kameněv. Lev Borisovič Kameněv Stranická příslušnost Členství Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu Bolševik Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (bolshevik) Narození 6.jul. / 18. července 1883greg. Moskva Úmrtí 25. srpna 1936 (ve věku 53 let) Moskva Choť Olga Davidovna Kameněva Děti Alexandr Lvovič Kameněv Alma mater Lomonosovova univerzita Profese politik a spisovatel Commons Lev Kamenev Některá data mohou pocházet z datové položky. Lev Borisovič Kameněv (rusky Лев Борисович Каменев, vlastním jménem Leo Rosenfeld rusky Лeo Розенфельд; 18. července 1883 Moskva, Ruské impérium - 25. srpna 1936 Moskva, SSSR) byl přední sovětský politik a spisovatel. Obsah 1 Mládí 2 Politika 3 Literatura 4 Externí odkazy Mládí Kameněv s Leninem roku 1922 Studoval na technologickém ústavě moskevské univerzity, odkud byl roku 1902 vyloučen pro účast na demonstracích sociální demokratické strany. Po propuštění z vězení odjel do Paříže. Po rozpadu strany se přimkl k bolševikům a vrátiv se do Ruska, účastnil se revoluční práce v Tbilisi, Moskvě a Petrohradě, kde rozvinul agitační propagandu slovem i písmem. Byl proto roku 1908 uvězněn, načež odešel za hranice, kde působil jako obratný publicista strany. Politika Počátkem roku 1914 se vrátil do Petrohradu a vedl revoluční činnost strany v Rusku. V listopadu 1914 zatčen a poslán doživotně na Sibiř. Vrátil se po únorové revoluci roku 1917 a obnovil svou činnost v Petrohradě jako člen ústředního výboru strany, kde ne vždy souhlasil s Leninem. Po červencovém puči bolševiků byl nakrátko uvězněn. Po listopadové revoluci 1917, proti níž se stavěl, se na čas rozešel se stranou, a posléze se spojil s ostatními socialistickými stranami. Zastával řadu funkcí. Stal se členem mírové delegace v Brestu a vedl jednání s Finskem. Též se účastnil jednání o navázání styků s Anglií. Spolu se Zinověvem bojoval - po dohodě se Stalinem - proti opozici Trockého, ale roku 1925 sám do opozice vstoupil. Byl proto koncem roku 1926 zbaven funkcí a poslán do Itálie jako zástupce SSSR. V prosinci 1927 byl vyloučen ze strany a přijat teprve po veřejném doznání omylů. Svěřen mu pak byl úřad předsedy hlavního koncesionářského komisariátu. V roce 1936 byl obviněn z vytvoření teroristické organizace pro zavraždění Josifa Stalina a jiných účastníků vlády, byl shledán vinným a popraven v Moskvě 25. srpna 1936. Lev Borisovich Kamenev[a] (born Leo Rosenfeld or Lev Borisovich Rozenfeld;[b] 18 July [O.S. 6 July] 1883 - 25 August 1936) was a Bolshevik revolutionary and a prominent Soviet politician. He was one of the seven members of the first Politburo, founded in 1917 to manage the Bolshevik Revolution: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.[1] Kamenev was the brother-in-law of Leon Trotsky. He served briefly as the equivalent of the first head of state of Soviet Russia in 1917, and from 1923-24 as acting Premier in the last year of Vladimir Lenin's life. Joseph Stalin viewed him as a source of discontent and a source of opposition to his own leadership. After Kamenev fell out of favour, Stalin had him executed on 25 August 1936, aged 53, after a brief show trial during the period of the Great Purges. Opposition to Trotsky In 1918, Kamenev became chairman of the Moscow Soviet, and soon thereafter Lenin's Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (government) and the Council of Labour and Defence. In March 1919, Kamenev was elected as a full member of the first Politburo. His personal relationship with his brother-in-law Trotsky, which was good in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution and during the Russian Civil War, lessened after 1920. For the next 15 years, Kamenev was a friend and close ally of Grigory Zinoviev, who exceeded him in ambition. During Lenin's illness, Kamenev was appointed as the acting Council of People's Commissars and Politburo chairman. Together with Zinoviev and Joseph Stalin, he formed a ruling 'triumvirate' (or 'troika') in the Communist Party, and played a key role in the marginalization of Trotsky. The triumvirate carefully managed the intra-party debate and delegate selection process in the fall of 1923 during the run-up to the XIIIth Party Conference, securing a vast majority of the seats. The Conference, held in January 1924 immediately prior to Lenin's death, denounced Trotsky and "Trotskyism." In the spring of 1924, while the triumvirate was criticizing the policies of Trotsky and the Left Opposition as "anti-Leninist", the tensions between the volatile Zinoviev and his close ally Kamenev on one hand, and the cautious Stalin on the other, became more pronounced and threatened to end their fragile alliance. However, Zinoviev and Kamenev helped Stalin retain his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee at the XIIIth Party Congress in May-June 1924 during the first Lenin's Testament controversy, ensuring that the triumvirate gained more political advantage at Trotsky's expense. Lev Kamenev, Director of the Lenin Institute of the Central Committee 1923 In October 1924, Stalin proposed his new theory of Socialism in One Country in opposition to Trotsky's theory of Permanent revolution, while Trotsky published "Lessons of October,"[10] an extensive summary of the events of 1917. In the article, Trotsky described Zinoviev and Kamenev's opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, something that the two would have preferred left unmentioned. This started a new round of intra-party struggle, with Zinoviev and Kamenev once again allied with Stalin against Trotsky. They and their supporters accused Trotsky of various mistakes and worse during the Russian Civil War. Trotsky was ill and unable to respond much to the criticism, and the triumvirate damaged Trotsky's military reputation so much that he was forced out of his ministerial post as People's Commissar of Army and Fleet Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council in January 1925. Zinoviev demanded Trotsky's expulsion from the Communist Party, but Stalin refused to go along with this and skillfully played the role of a moderate. At the XIVth Conference of the Communist Party in April 1925, Zinoviev and Kamenev found themselves in a minority when their motion to specify that socialism could only be achieved internationally was rejected, resulting in the triumvirate of recent years breaking up. At this time, Stalin was moving more and more into a political alliance with Nikolai Bukharin and the Right Opposition, with Bukharin having elaborated on Stalin's Socialism in One Country policy, giving it a theoretical justification. Break with Stalin (1925) Lev Kamenev, acting Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) Soviet Union, greeted on the military parade to celebrate 6th anniversary of the October revolution, 7 November 1923 With Trotsky mostly on the sidelines through a persistent illness, the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate collapsed in April 1925, although the political situation was hanging in the balance for the rest of the year. All sides spent most of 1925 lining up support behind the scenes for the December Communist Party Congress. Stalin struck an alliance with Nikolai Bukharin, a Communist Party theoretician and Pravda editor, and the Soviet prime minister Alexei Rykov. Zinoviev and Kamenev strengthened their alliance with Lenin's widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and also aligned with Grigori Sokolnikov, the People's Commissar for Finance and a candidate Politburo member. Their alliance became known as the New Opposition. The struggle became more open at the September 1925 meeting of the Central Committee, and came to a head at the XIVth Party Congress in December 1925, when Kamenev publicly demanded the removal of Stalin from the position of the General Secretary. With only the Leningrad delegation (controlled by Zinoviev) behind them, Zinoviev and Kamenev found themselves in a tiny minority and were soundly defeated. Trotsky remained silent during the Congress. Zinoviev was re-elected to the Politburo, but Kamenev was demoted from a full member to a non-voting member, and Sokolnikov was dropped altogether. Stalin succeeded in having more of his allies elected to the Politburo. Opposition to Stalin (1926-1927) The photo shows the leadership of the USSR: Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party; Alexei Rykov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Prime Minister); Lev Kamenev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Deputy Prime Minister); Grigory Zinoviev, Chairman of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Apr 1925. In early 1926, Zinoviev, Kamenev and their supporters gravitated closer to Trotsky's supporters; with the two groups forming an alliance, which became known as the United Opposition. During a new period of intra-Party fighting between the July 1926 meeting of the Central Committee and the XVth Party Conference in October 1926, the United Opposition was defeated and Kamenev lost his Politburo seat at the Conference. Kamenev continued to oppose Stalin throughout 1926 and 1927, resulting in his expulsion from the Central Committee in October 1927. After the expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky from the Communist Party on 12 November 1927, Kamenev was the United Opposition's chief spokesman within the Party, representing its position at the XVth Party Congress in December 1927. Kamenev used the occasion to appeal for reconciliation among the groups. His speech was interrupted 24 times by his opponents - Bukharin, Ryutin, and Kaganovich, making it clear that Kamenev's attempts were futile.[11] The Congress declared United Opposition views incompatible with Communist Party membership; it expelled Kamenev and dozens of leading Oppositionists from the Party. This paved the way for mass expulsions in 1928 of rank-and-file Oppositionists, as well as sending prominent Left Oppositionists into internal exile. Kamenev's first marriage, which had begun to disintegrate in 1920, as a result of his reputed affair with the British sculptress Clare Sheridan, ended in divorce in 1928 when he left Olga Kameneva and married Tatiana Glebova.[12][13] They had a son together, Vladimir Glebov (1929-1994).[14] Submission to Stalin and execution While Trotsky remained firm in his opposition to Stalin after his expulsion from the Party and subsequent exile, Zinoviev and Kamenev capitulated almost immediately, and called on their supporters to follow suit. They wrote open letters acknowledging their mistakes and were readmitted to the Communist Party after a six-month cooling-off period. They never regained their Central Committee seats, but they were given mid-level positions within the Soviet bureaucracy. Kamenev and, indirectly, Zinoviev, were courted by Bukharin, then at the beginning of his short and ill-fated struggle with Stalin, in the summer of 1928. This activity was soon reported to Joseph Stalin and used against Bukharin as proof of his factionalism. Zinoviev and Kamenev remained politically inactive until October 1932, when they were expelled from the Communist Party for failure to inform on oppositionist party members during the Ryutin Affair. After again admitting their alleged errors, they were readmitted in December 1933. They were forced to make self-flagellating speeches at the XVIIth Party Congress in January 1934, where Stalin paraded his erstwhile political opponents, showing them to be defeated and outwardly contrite. The murder of Sergei Kirov on 1 December 1934 was a catalyst for what are called Stalin's Great Purges, as he initiated wide-sweeping show trials and executions of opponents. Grigory Zinoviev, Kamenev and their closest associates were again expelled from the Communist Party and were arrested in December 1934. During this time Kamenev wrote a letter to Stalin, saying: Bust of Kamenev by Clare Sheridan At a time when my soul is filled with nothing but love for the party and its leadership, when, having lived through hesitations and doubts, I can boldly say that I learned to highly trust the Central Committee's every step and every decision you, Comrade Stalin, make," Kamenev wrote. "I have been arrested for my ties to people that are strange and disgusting to me. The men were tried in January 1935 and were forced to admit "moral complicity" in Kirov's assassination. Zinoviev was sentenced to ten years in prison and Kamenev to five. Kamenev was charged separately in early 1935 in connection with the Kremlin Case and, although he refused to confess, was sentenced to ten years in prison. In August 1936, after months of careful preparations and rehearsals in Soviet secret police prisons, Zinoviev, Kamenev and 14 others, mostly Old Bolsheviks, were put on trial again. This time the charges including forming a terrorist organization that allegedly killed Kirov and tried to kill Stalin and other leaders of the Soviet government. This Trial of the Sixteen (or the trial of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center") was one of the Moscow Show Trials, and it set the stage for subsequent show trials. Old Bolsheviks were forced to confess increasingly elaborate and monstrous crimes, including espionage, poisoning, sabotage, and so on. Like other defendants, Kamenev was found guilty and executed by firing squad on 25 August 1936. In 1988, during perestroika, Kamenev, Zinoviev and his co-defendants were formally cleared of all charges by the Soviet government. Fate of the family After Kamenev's execution, his relatives suffered similar fates. Kamenev's second son, Yu. L. Kamenev, was executed on 30 January 1938, at the age of 17. His eldest son, air force officer A.L. Kamenev, was executed on 15 July 1939, at the age of 33. His first wife, Olga, was executed on 11 September 1941, in the Medvedev forest outside Oryol, together with Christian Rakovsky, Maria Spiridonova, and 160 other prominent political prisoners.[14] Only his youngest son, Vladimir Glebov, survived Stalin's prisons and labor camps, living until 1994.[1

Kosyginova reforma

he 1965 Soviet economic reform, sometimes called the Kosygin reform (Russian: Косыгинская реформа) or Liberman reform, were a set of planned changes in the economy of the Soviet Union (USSR). A centerpiece of these changes was the introduction of profitability and sales as the two key indicators of enterprise success. Some of an enterprise's profits would go to three funds, used to reward workers and expand operations; most would go to the central budget. The reforms were introduced politically by Alexei Kosygin—who had just become Premier of the Soviet Union following the removal of Nikita Khrushchev—and ratified by the Central Committee in September 1965. They reflected some long-simmering wishes of the USSR's mathematically oriented economic planners, and initiated the shift towards a more decentralized economic planning process. Contents 1 Background 1.1 Rise of the optimal planners 1.2 Kosygin and Brezhnev replace Khrushchev 2 Rationale 3 Design 3.1 Profits, bonuses. and wages 3.2 Enterprise accounting 3.3 More enterprise control over investment decisions 3.4 Political reorganization 3.5 Refinement of central planning 4 Implementation 5 Results 6 References 6.1 Sources Background Under Lenin, the New Economic Policy had allowed and used the concepts of profit and incentives for regulation of the Soviet economy. Stalin transformed this policy rapidly with the collectivization of farms and nationalization of industry the acceleration of central planning—as exemplified by "Five-Year Plans".[1] Since about 1930, the Soviet Union had used a centralized system to manage its economy. In this system, a single bureaucracy created economic plans, which assigned workers to jobs, set wages, dictated resource allocation, established the levels of trade with other countries, and planned the course of technological progress. Retail prices for consumer goods were fixed at levels intended to clear the market. The prices of wholesale goods were fixed, also, but these served an accounting function more than a market mechanism. Collective farms also paid centrally determined prices for the supplies they needed, and unlike other sectors their workers received wages directly dependent on the profitability of the operation.[2] Although Soviet enterprises were theoretically governed by the principle of khozraschet ("accountability")—which required them to meet planners' expectations within the system of set prices for their inputs and outputs—they had little control over the biggest decisions affecting their operations.[3] Managers did have a responsibility to plan future gross output, which they chronically underestimated in order to later exceed the prediction.[4] The managers then received bonuses (premia) for surplus product regardless of whether it was produced in a cost-effective manner or whether their enterprise was profitable overall. The bonuses for output came in amounts sometimes equal to the managers' basic salaries. The system also incentivized pointless increases in the size, weight, and cost of production outputs, simply because 'more' had been produced.[5] Rise of the optimal planners The economic reforms emerged during a period of great ideological debate over economic planning. More mathematical, "cybernetic", viewpoints were at first considered deviant from orthodox Marxist economics, which considered the value of good to derive strictly from labor.[6] This doctrine, elaborated in such works as Stalin's 1952 book, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, described the price system as a capitalist relic which would eventually disappear from communist society.[7] Nevertheless, computerized economics gained an important role for top planners, even while conventional Marxist-Leninist political economy was taught in most schools and promoted for public consumption.[8][9] The rising influence of statistical planning in the Soviet economy was reflected in the creation of the Central Economic Mathematical Institute Центральный экономико-математический институт; TSEMI), led by Vasily Sergeevich Nemchinov.[10] Nemchinov, along with linear programming inventor Leonid Kantorovich and investment analyst Viktor Valentinovich Novozhilov, received the Lenin Prize in 1965.[11] The battle between "optimal" planning and convention planning raged throughout the 1960s.[12] Another tendency in economic planning emphasized "normative value of processing", or the importance of needs and wants in evaluating the value of production.[13] Kosygin and Brezhnev replace Khrushchev Major changes throughout the Soviet world became possible in 1964 with the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and the rise of Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev.[14] Economic policy was a significant area of retrospective anti-Khrushchev criticism in the Soviet press.[15][16] This 'reformist' economic tendency in the Soviet Union had corollaries and some mutual reinforcement in Eastern Europe.[17] Kosygin criticized the inefficiency and inertia of economic policy under the previous administration.[18] He presented a plan, including the ideas expressed by Liberman and Nemchinov, to the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in September 1965.[19] The Central Committee's acceptance of the reform plan represents an important milestone in the transition of these ideas from theory to action.[20] Rationale Day-to-day operations in 1967 at the economically reformed Bolshevichka clothing factory in Moscow—a pioneer of the new economic policy According to official rationale for the reform, the increasing complexity of economic relations reduced the efficacy of economic planning and therefore reduced economic growth. It was recognized that the existing system of planning did not motivate enterprises to reach high targets or to introduce organizational or technical innovations.[21] Given more freedom to deviate publicly from party orthodoxy, newspapers offered new proposals for the Soviet economy. Aircraft engineer O. Antonov published an article in Izvestia on November 22, 1961, with the title "For All and For Oneself"—advocating more power for enterprise directors.[22] A widely-publicized economic rationale for reform came from Evsei Liberman of the Kharkiv Institute of Engineering and Economics. An article by Liberman on this topic, titled "Plans, Profits, and Bonuses" appeared in Pravda in September 1962.[14] Liberman, influenced by the economic "optimizers",[23][24] argued for the (re)introduction of profitability as a core economic indicator.[22][25] Liberman advanced the idea that the social interest could be advanced through careful setting of microeconomic parameters: "What is profitable for society should be profitable for every enterprise."[26] These proposals were controversial, and criticized especially as regressions towards a capitalist economic system. Critics also argued that reliance on profitability would skew the proportions in which different goods were produced.[27][28] V. Trapeznikov advocated a position similar to Liberman's, in Pravda, August 1964, writing that the time has come to discard the obsolete forms of economic management based on directive norms, and to pass over to a simpler, cheaper and more efficient type of control of the activities of enterprises. This control must be patterned so that the personnel of an enterprise find it economically profitable to organize that work along lines that are profitable to the national economy as well.[29] Unlike Liberman in 1962, Trapeznikov suggested that the need for reform had been embraced by party decisionmakers and would soon become a reality. In the following month, Pravda published six more articles from academicians, planners, and managers advocating reform. The last of these came from Liberman. This time, criticism was muted.[29] Several economic experiments were initiated to test Liberman's proposals. These began in 1964 with new policies for two garment factories: the Bolshevichka (Moscow) and the Mayak in Gorky.[19][30] When operations at the garment factories proved tolerably successful, the experiment was expanded to about 400 other enterprises, mostly in large cities.[31][32] One experiment in Lvov involved a coal mine and factories producing clothing, shoes, and heavy lifting equipment.[33] The coal mine, in particular, reportedly became more profitable after shifting to a system using bonuses and more independent decisionmaking.[34] Some of the experimental plants ran into problems, however, due to the unreliability of suppliers continuing to operate on the old system.[32] The Mayak plant faced a dilemma in trying to implement the centrally mandated experimental reforms, while simultaneously receiving contradictory orders from the local sovnarkhoz (regional council).[35] Design The reform was administered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers. It consisted of five "groups of activities": The enterprises became main economic units. The number of policy targets was reduced from 30 to 9. (The rest remained indicators.)[36] The big nine were: total output at current wholesale prices, the most important products in physical units, the total payroll, total profits and profitability, expressed as the ratio of profit to fixed assets and working capital normalized; payments to the budget and appropriations from the budget; total capital investment targets for the introduction of new technology; and the volume of supply of raw materials and equipment. Economic independence of enterprises. Enterprises were required to determine the detailed range and variety of products, using their own funds to invest in production, establish long-term contractual arrangements with suppliers and customers and to determine the number of personnel. Key importance was attached to the integral indicators of economic efficiency of production — profits and profitability. There was the opportunity to create a number of funds based on the expense of profits — funds for the development of production, material incentives, housing, etc. The enterprise was allowed to use the funds at its discretion. Pricing: Wholesale sales prices would be recalibrated to reflect costs and encourage economic efficiency.[37] Profits, bonuses. and wages The most important changes resulting from the Liberman/Kosygin reforms involved the role of profit in the Soviet economic system. Rentabelnost' ("profitability", Russian: рентабельность) and realizatsiya ("sales", Russian: реализация) became the twin success indicators for enterprises. Rentabelnost' was defined in terms of the ratio between profits and capital, while realizatsiya (also meaning "implementation") depended on the total volume of sales.[38][39] Success by these measurements led to the allocation of money to a fund, which could be disbursed according to a pre-defined sequence. The funds first went to pay for capital—including interest paid to Gosbank, the State Bank. Then, they went to the new incentive funds. Finally, they could be used by an enterprise to expand its capital for operations. Any profit extending above the maximum for spending would go to the central budget.[40] The three "incentive" funds were:[41][42] The material incentive fund (MIF): money for cash bonuses to workers of profitable enterprises; The socio-cultural and housing fund (SCF): A fund for social and cultural programming; and The production development fund (PDF): A 'development' fund for the overall organization. Formerly, bonuses had come from the same fund as wages.[43] Now, enterprise managers had slightly more discretion over how to allocate them.[44] They could move some amounts of money between the bonus fund and the social welfare fund.[45] They also had more power to influence wages by classifying different workers.[44] In practice, the bonuses had the greatest impact on the payment of elite personnel (technicians and "employees" as opposed to "workers"), thereby counteracting the effect of Khrushchev-era wage reforms.[46][47] An experimental system introduced at some enterprises offered extra bonuses for specific achievements—not just as a portion of total profits. For example, engineers using fuel more efficiently (during a shortage) could receive large premia calculated as a percentage of the money they saved.[48] Along with more direct responsibility for the wage fund, enterprises also gained the power to fire workers. In fact, the reform gave new incentive for layoffs, which in some cases could increase profitability. (When these occurred, the workers did not have a 'social safety net' in place in the form of unemployment insurance and career assistance).[49] Enterprise accounting To encourage accurate planning, enterprises now would be punished for performing below or above their planned goals.[50][51] Enterprises would also pay rent for land and natural resources. The rationale for this practice was economic optimization. For example, land of differing quality required different inputs of manpower to achieve the same outputs, and thus should factor differently into the budget of an enterprise.[52] Bank loans, to be repaid later with interest, would be used to fund more investment projects—to incentive the careful use of funds and the speedy creation of profit.[53] Five different interest rates would be set, ranging from preferential to normal to punitive.[54] An additional capital charge—i.e., tax—would be assessed for each enterprise based on the capital it retained: working capital, equipment, and surplus stocks.[55] More enterprise control over investment decisions Enterprises were to submit annual plans, called tekhpromfinplans (from Russian: техпромфинплан (ru:Техпрофинплан) - technical and financial production plan), stipulating production plans by quarter and month. Higher-ups would then approve these plans (or not) and allocate supplies and money.[56] The enterprise then sells its products, within the constraints of the plan. It is empowered to reject or return (within ten days) unneeded inputs to the supplier.[57] The key change which represented "decentralization" was the delegation of responsibility over modernization investments. However, modernization plans remained subject to central approval, as well as approval from the bank which lent the money.[58] The amount of development expected under these auspices fell far short of expectations, as the necessary labour and materials were simply undersupllied.[59] One response to this problem in 1969 was to shift more incentives to the contractors.[60] For the "optimal planners" this limited decentralization was inadequate, and the new importance assigned to "profit" was incomplete because enterprises did not control enough of the factors which might have an effect on it. As a deputy director of TSEMI commented in 1966: We say: comrades, if you want to introduce profit, then it is necessary to reconstruct the whole system of prices, the system of incentives, in short to alter a great deal in the existing forms and methods of economic management. If this is not done, then the introduction of profit will bring about no effect whatsoever.[61] The plan also called for the cultivation of a new breed of managers;[62] As Kosygin in Pravda (September 28, 1965): ...initiative based on know-how, efficiency, a businesslike approach, a feeling for the new, and the ability to use production resources in each specific circumstance with maximum effectiveness, herein is the essence of the new demands. Political reorganization In previous eras, an important layer of administrative control over production had been sovnarkhozy (совнархо́зы, a contraction of words meaning "Council of National Economy"), the regional economic councils created on December 1, 1917, under the control of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (VSNKh, Vesenkha, a similar contraction). These councils spelled the end of a short-lived phase of worker control over production, which the Bolsheviks regarded as inefficient.[63] Under the New Economic Policy beginning in 1921, enterprises were classified based on their relative interdependence (and necessity to war production) or autonomy (i.e. those "endowed with complete financial and commercial independence"). The many enterprises in the latter category were not nationalized, but instead placed under the guidance of the VSNKh, with the plan to group them into "trusts" based on production chains or geographic proximity.[64] This model underwent various reorganizations, including the strengthening of edinonachalie, control of production units by a single manager. These single managers at times controlled a wide range of production activities within a single area.[65] The economic reform of 1957 reintroduced the sovnarkhozy, 104 in number, to govern production by region. Where applicable, these corresponded closely with the boundaries of the oblasty (political jurisdictions).[66] Complaints immediately arose that these councils did not optimize overall production chains, due to their regional focus, and that they conflicted with the authority of Gosplan.[67] In 1962, the 104 sovnarkhozy were consolidated into 47 larger jurisdictions (one of which controlled all of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirgizia). However, by 1962-1963, the sovnarkhozy were becoming subordinate to numerous other agencies and organizations. Gosplan was to be stripped of its planning authority in favor of a revitalized VSNKh.[68] Kosygin took aim at these "outdated forms of management" and included in his 1965 speech a return to ministries as core administrators. His plan resembled the ministry system under Stalin, but with a smaller number: nine all-Union ministries organized by industry (e.g., Ministry of Light Industry, Ministry of the Radio Industry, Ministry of the Chemical Industry) and eleven supervising operations within each union-republic. The latter regional agencies reported both to the local council and to the central ministry with jurisdiction over their production type. Gosplan had the responsibility for creating annual and long-term plans, and for guiding development and resource management. Gossnab became the primary coordinator of material-technical supply, and was charged with large-scale analysis (possibly using computers) to increase supply chain efficiency.[69] The 1965 reforms somewhat altered the role of the Party in economic administration.[70] Local officials were to oversee operations from a distance to ensure compliance with the spirit of the reforms.[71] Refinement of central planning The plan called for more detailed and scientific central planning, including annual targets.[72][73] These plans would be calculated using computer systems.[72] Distribution of supplies and products would take place in different ways. Central planners would allocate certain scarce and vital goods. For others, enterprises could form "direct ties" within which they developed a contractual exchange relationship.[74] Implementation The authors of the reforms knew from the outset that changes would take effect gradually, based on the careful writing of plans through the years 1966 and 1967.[75] The first 43 enterprises, along with several "experiments" for which planning began before the September 1965 Plenum, shifted to the new model at the beginning of 1966.[76][77] Transfer of another 180-200 was accomplished in early 1966.[78] These were already profitable, well-positioned businesses, and reflected well on the reform in early evaluations.[79] On July 1, 1966, 430 more enterprises were transferred; these included some large operations and themselves constituted 12% of total production. By the end of 1966, more than 704 enterprises had switched.[80][81] The Eighth Five-Year Plan would have instantiated some of the proposed reforms.[82] (The Five-Year Plan dealt with a broad range of issues, with more of a focus on people's overall living conditions. It was expected to be implemented within the Party.)[83] Most light industry was to transfer at the beginning of 1967. The remaining enterprises to switch over in two stages, taking effect on July 1, 1967, and January 1, 1968.[78] The complete transfer of all enterprises proceeded steadily, if not exactly on schedule. By April 1, 1967, 2,500 enterprises, responsible for 20% of output, had switched. By the end of the year, 7,000 industrial enterprises (out of 45,000), 1,500 trucking firms (out of 4,100), and all 25 railroad systems had transferred. Together these made up the backbone of Soviet industry.[80] They were followed by smaller enterprises: 11,000 more in 1968.[84] The plan met with considerable initial confusion from enterprise managers who, throughout their careers, had underestimated their potential output in order to later exceed their quota.[4] Also difficult was the requirement to comply with the new directives before all aspects of the economy (i.e., prices, resource availability) had shifted over.[85] And the reluctance of certain bureaucrats to comply with the new policies was the subject of sustained criticism in the press, including multiple editorials by Liberman himself. In April 1966, for example, Liberman recommended creating a "brain trust of the reconstruction" which could veto counter-reformist policies in the bureaucracy.[86] Officials the higher administrative levels (i.e., the ministries), continued to issue orders at odds with the profitability plans of the enterprise managers.[87] Some traditional problems—such as the accumulation, contra profitability, of surplus valuable supplies, lest they be needed later in a time of shortage—persisted.[88] Gossnab and the ministries were blamed for failing to make the appropriate inputs available to the enterprises.[89] A price revision, the first since 1955, was announced in mid-1966, apparently following some non-trivial internal disputes.[90] The revision called for moderate re-alignment of prices, to conform more with production costs, and went into effect in July 1967.[91] Wholesale fuel and ore prices increased substantially.[92] Prices on consumer goods did not officially increase at all; yet consumers paid higher prices for things they wanted and needed, since newer, more expensive goods were introduced to the market, and the old versions withdrawn.[93] Results Working on a vehicle in 1969 at the new AvtoVAZ plant in Tolyatti The economy grew more in 1966-1970 than it did in 1961-1965.[94] Many enterprises were encouraged to sell or give away excess equipment, since all available capital was factored into the calculation of productivity. Certain measurements of efficiency improved. These included rising sales per rouble worth of capital and falling wages per rouble of sales.[95][96] The enterprises rendered large portions of their profits, sometimes 80%, to the central budget. These payments of "free" remaining profits substantially exceeded capital charges.[97] However, central planners were not satisfied with the impact of the reform. In particular, they observed that wages had increased without a commensurate rise in productivity.[94] Many of the specific changes were revised or reversed in 1969-1971.[98] The reforms somewhat reduced the rule of the Party in micromanaging economic operations.[70] The backlash against economic reformism joined with opposition to political liberalization to trigger the full-blown invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.[99] Soviet officials and press nevertheless continued to advance the idea of the 1965 reform. Kosygin commented on June 10, 1970: The essence of the reform is, while perfecting centralized planning, to raise the initiative and interest of enterprises in the fullest use of production resources and to raise the efficiency of production in order to unify the interests of workers, enterprises, and society as a whole by means of the system of economic stimuli.

ekonomika a zem za brežněva

mezi 1960 -1970 -sovět zemědělství nárůst ve výnosu o 3% -průmysl taky nárůst - během 8. pětiletého plánu (1966-1970), výnos továren a dolů vrostl o 138 v porovnání s rokem 1960 - Politburo začalo být agresivně proti-reformní - Kosygin převědčil Brežněva i politbyro nechat napokoji maď ref komunistu János Kádár (zavedl NEM = New Economic Mechanism (NEM) - umožnoval omezené zavedení maloochodního trhu) - Polsko jiný přístup 1970 pod vedením Edward Gierek - he believed that the gover nment needed Western loans to facilitate the rapid growth of heavy industry. The Soviet leadership gave its approval for this, as the Soviet Union could not afford to maintain its massive subsidy for the Eastern Bloc in the form of cheap oil and gas exports. - The Soviet Union did not accept all kinds of reforms, an example being the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in response to Alexander Dubček's reforms.[46] Under Brezhnev, the Politburo abandoned Khrushchev's decentralisation experiments. By 1966, two years after taking power, Brezhnev abolished the Regional Economic Councils, which were organized to manage the regional economies of the Soviet Union.[47] The Ninth Five-Year Plan delivered a change: for the first time industrial consumer products out-produced industrial capital goods. Consumer goods such as watches, furniture and radios were produced in abundance. The plan still left the bulk of the state's investment in industrial capital-goods production. This outcome was not seen as a positive sign for the future of the Soviet state by the majority of top party functionaries within the government; by 1975 consumer goods were expanding 9% slower than industrial capital-goods. The policy continued despite Brezhnev's commitment to make a rapid shift of investment to satisfy Soviet consumers and lead to an even higher standard of living. This did not happen.[48] During 1928-1973, the Soviet Union was growing economically at a pace that would eventually catch up with the United States and Western Europe. However, objective comparisons are difficult. The USSR was hampered by the effects of World War II, which had left most of Western USSR in ruins, however Western aid and Soviet espionage in the period 1941-1945 (culminating in cash, material and equipment deliveries for military and industrial purposes) had allowed the Russians to leapfrog many Western economies in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in the fields of nuclear technology, radio communications, agriculture and heavy manufacturing. In 1973, the process of catching up with the rest of the West came to an abrupt end, and 1973 was seen by some scholars as the start of the Era of Stagnation. The beginning of the stagnation coincided with a financial crisis in Western Europe and the U.S.[49] By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had the world's second largest industrial capacity, and produced more steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and tractors than any other country.[50] Before 1973, the Soviet economy was expanding at a faster rate than that of the American economy (albeit by a very small margin). The USSR also kept a steady pace with the economies of Western Europe. Between 1964 and 1973, the Soviet economy stood at roughly half the output per head of Western Europe and a little more than one third that of the U.S.[51] Agricultural policy USSR postage stamp of 1979, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Virgin Lands Campaign Brezhnev's agricultural policy reinforced the conventional methods for organising the collective farms. Output quotas continued to be imposed centrally.[52] Khrushchev's policy of amalgamating farms was continued by Brezhnev, because he shared Khrushchev's belief that bigger kolkhozes would increase productivity. Brezhnev pushed for an increase in state investments in farming, which mounted to an all-time high in the 1970s of 27% of all state investment - this figure did not include investments in farm equipment. In 1981 alone, 33 billion U.S. dollars (by contemporary exchange rate) was invested into agriculture.[53] Agricultural output in 1980 was 21% higher than the average production rate between 1966 and 1970. Cereal crop output increased by 18%. These improved results were not encouraging. In the Soviet Union the criterion for assessing agricultural output was the grain harvest. The import of cereal, which began under Khrushchev, had in fact become a normal phenomenon by Soviet standards. When Brezhnev had difficulties sealing commercial trade agreements with the United States, he went elsewhere, such as to Argentina. Trade was necessary because the Soviet Union's domestic production of fodder crops was severely deficient. Another sector that was hitting the wall was the sugar beet harvest, which had declined by 2% in the 1970s. Brezhnev's way of resolving these issues was to increase state investment. Politburo member Gennady Voronov advocated for the division of each farm's work-force into what he called "links".[53] These "links" would be entrusted with specific functions, such as to run a farm's dairy unit. His argument was that the larger the work force, the less responsible they felt.[53] This program had been proposed to Joseph Stalin by Andrey Andreyev in the 1940s, and had been opposed by Khrushchev before and after Stalin's death. Voronov was also unsuccessful; Brezhnev turned him down, and in 1973 he was removed from the Politburo.[54] Experimentation with "links" was not disallowed on a local basis, with Mikhail Gorbachev, the then First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, experimenting with links in his region. In the meantime, the Soviet government's involvement in agriculture was, according to Robert Service, otherwise "unimaginative" and "incompetent".[54] Facing mounting problems with agriculture, the Politburo issued a resolution titled, "On the Further Development of Specialisation and Concentration of Agricultural Production on the Basis of Inter-Farm Co-operation and Agro-Industrial Integration".[54] The resolution ordered kolkhozes close to each other to collaborate in their efforts to increase production. In the meantime, the state's subsidies to the food-and-agriculture sector did not prevent bankrupt farms from operating: rises in the price of produce were offset by rises in the cost of oil and other resources. By 1977, oil cost 84% more than it did in the late 1960s. The cost of other resources had also climbed by the late 1970s.[54] Brezhnev's answer to these problems was to issue two decrees, one in 1977 and one in 1981, which called for an increase in the maximum size of privately owned plots within the Soviet Union to half a hectare. These measures removed important obstacles for the expansion of agricultural output, but did not solve the problem. Under Brezhnev, private plots yielded 30% of the national agricultural production when they only cultivated 4% of the land. This was seen by some as proof that de-collectivisation was necessary to prevent Soviet agriculture from collapsing, but leading Soviet politicians shrank from supporting such drastic measures due to ideological and political interests.[54] The underlying problems were the growing shortage of skilled workers, a wrecked rural culture, the payment of workers in proportion to the quantity rather than the quality of their work, and too large farm machinery for the small collective farms and the roadless countryside. In the face of this, Brezhnev's only options were schemes such as large land reclamation and irrigation projects, or of course, radical reform.[55] Economic stagnation The Era of Stagnation, a term coined by Mikhail Gorbachev, was seen as the result of a compilation of factors, including the ongoing "arms race" between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States; the decision of the Soviet Union to participate in international trade (thus abandoning the idea of economic isolation) while ignoring the changes occurring in Western societies; the increasing harshness of its policies, such as sending Soviet tanks to crush the Prague Spring in 1968; the intervention in Afghanistan; the stifling domestic bureaucracy overseen by a cadre of elderly men; the lack of economic reform; the political corruption, supply bottlenecks, and other unaddressed structural problems with the economy under Brezhnev's rule.[56] Social stagnation domestically was stimulated by the growing demands of unskilled workers, labour shortages and a decline in productivity and labour discipline. While Brezhnev, albeit "sporadically",[32] through Alexei Kosygin, attempted to reform the economy in the late 1960s and 1970s, he ultimately failed to produce any positive results. One of these reforms was the economic reform of 1965, initiated by Kosygin, though its origins are often traced back to the Khrushchev Era. The reform was cancelled by the Central Committee, though the Committee admitted that economic problems did exist.[57] The K1810VM86 microprocessor, a Soviet clone of the Intel 8086 CPU. As its technology continued to fall behind the U.S., the Soviet Union increasingly resorted to pirating Western designs during the Brezhnev Stagnation. [58] In 1973, the Soviet economy slowed, and began to lag behind that of the West due to the high level of expenditure on the armed forces and too little spending on light industry and consumer goods. Soviet agriculture could not feed the urban population, let alone provide for the rising standard of living, which the government promised as the fruits of "mature socialism", and on which industrial productivity depended. One of the most prominent critics of Brezhnev's economical policies was Mikhail Gorbachev who, when leader, called the economy under Brezhnev's rule "the lowest stage of socialism".[59] Soviet GNP growth rates began to decrease in the 1970s from the level it held in the 1950s and 1960s; its growth rates began to lag behind Western Europe and the United States. The GNP growth rate was slowing to 1% to 2% per year, and with Soviet technology falling ever farther behind that of the West, the Soviet Union was facing economic stagnation by the early 1980s.[60] During Brezhnev's last years in power, the CIA monitored the Soviet Union's economic growth, and reported that the Soviet economy peaked in the 1970s, calculating that it had then reached 57% of the American GNP. The development gap between the two nations widened, with the United States growing an average of 1% per year above the growth rate of the Soviet Union.[61] The last significant reform undertaken by the Kosygin government, and some believe the pre-perestroika era, was a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers named "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the 1979 reform. The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, sought to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. With Kosygin's death in 1980, and due to his successor Nikolai Tikhonov's conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually carried out.[62] The Eleventh Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union delivered a disappointing result: a change in growth from 5 to 4%. During the earlier Tenth Five-Year Plan, they had tried to meet the target of 6.1% growth, but failed. Brezhnev was able to defer economic collapse by trading with Western Europe and the Arab World.[61] The Soviet Union still out-produced the United States in the heavy industry sector during the Brezhnev era. Another dramatic result of Brezhnev's rule was that certain Eastern Bloc countries became more economically advanced than the Soviet Union.[63]

Kliment Jefremovič Vorošilov

rusky: Климент Ефремович Ворошилов), známý jako Rudý maršál (23. lednajul./ 4. února 1881greg. Verchněje, Jekatěrinoslavská gubernie, Ruské impérium, dnes Luhanská oblast, Ukrajina - 2. prosince 1969 Moskva) byl sovětský státník, politik a maršál SSSR. Jako velitel nebyl příliš kompetentní a za svou kariéru vděčil především blízkému osobnímu vztahu se Stalinem. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov (Russian: Климе́нт Ефре́мович Вороши́лов​ (help·info), Kliment Jefremovič Vorošilov; Ukrainian: Климент Охрімович Ворошилов, Klyment Okhrimovyč Vorošylov), popularly known as Klim Voroshilov (Russian: Клим Вороши́лов, Klim Vorošilov) (4 February 1881[1] - 2 December 1969), was a prominent Soviet military officer and politician during the Stalin era. He was one of the original five Marshals of the Soviet Union (the highest military rank of the Soviet Union), along with Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Alexander Yegorov, and three senior commanders, Vasily Blyukher, Semyon Budyonny, and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Životopis Absolvoval pouze dva roky školní docházky, v mládí se živil jako dělník, pracoval v dolech aj. V roce 1899 se zapojil do dělnického hnutí a 1913 (podle jiných už 1905) se stal členem Ruské sociálně demokratické strany, ve které se přiklonil k bolševickému křídlu. V roce 1905 opustil zaměstnání a stal se profesionálním revolucionářem, jedním z vůdců sociálních demokratů v Lugansku. Organizoval stávky na různých místech včetně hlavního města a za revoluční činnost byl vězněn (1905) a ve vyhnanství. Od roku 1906 se znal se Stalinem a Leninem, kteří si jej časem oblíbili. V březnu - listopadu 1917 působil v Luhansku (předseda sovětu), stal se členem všeruského výboru sovětů, od ledna do března 1918 řídil petrohradskou organizaci Čeky. Během občanské války se nakonec celkem úspěšně podílel na vedení operací Rudé armády mezi Donem a Volhou. Zde je ale nutno poznamenat, že poměr sil na frontách, kde velel, prakticky vylučoval možnost neúspěchu. Organizoval také vyvraždění bývalých carských důstojníků. Některými vojáky z povolání byl kritizován, že při bojích o Caricyn jeho nekompetence a ignorování rozkazů nadřízených značně zkomplikovalo situaci a prodloužilo boje. V březnu 1918 převzal velení 5. armády ustupující před Němci od Kyjeva, úspěšně protáhl až k Caricynu a zaútočil z týlu na tamní Děnikinovy bílé jednotky, čímž zachránil město před dobytím (červenec 1918). Poté velel úspěšné obraně Caricynu (červenec - září 1918), kde působil zároveň i Stalin jako představitel sovětské vlády. V oblasti zůstal do konce roku (pomocník velitele Jižního frontu, velitel 10. armády), přičemž se Vorošilov a Stalin ostře střetli s velitelem Jižního frontu Sytinem a Trockým. Caricynská obrana jej proslavila po celé zemi. Po válce značně zveličoval své a Stalinovy zásluhy. Přineslo mu to nejen velkou proslulost, ale též přízeň Josefa Stalina, jehož se stal naprosto oddaným stoupencem. Od ledna 1919 působil v Charkově v ukrajinské vládě ve funkci lidového komisaře vnitra, od května i velitele Charkovského vojenského okruhu. Při ústupu před Děnikinovou armádou krátce velel 14. armádě (červen - červenec 1919), do listopadu 1919 vystřídal ještě několik funkcí. V listopadu 1919 byl jmenován komisařem 1. jízdní armády (velitel - S. M. Buďonnyj, další komisař - J. A. Ščaděnko), hlavní úderné síly Rudé armády na jihu. S 1. jízdní bojoval na Kubáni (do dubna 1920), poté s Poláky na západní Ukrajině (květen - říjen 1920). Patřil k delegátům X. sjezdu KSR(b), kteří se účastnili potlačení Kronštadtského povstání. Mezi válkami Stalin a Vorošilov Po válce zůstal na jihu jako velitel Severokavkazského vojenského okruhu. Během období bojů o nástupnictví po Leninovi plně podporoval Stalina. V květnu 1924 nahradil odvolaného velitele Moskevského vojenského okruhu N. I. Muralova, stoupence Trockého. V lednu 1925 získal funkci náměstka lidového komisaře (= ministra) armády a námořnictva, po náhlé smrti svého nadřízeného Michaila Frunzeho zaujal jeho místo (od roku 1934 přejmenované na lidového komisaře obrany), na kterém zůstal až do svého odvolání v květnu 1940. Jeho 15 let výkonu funkce ministra obrany nikdo v sovětské historii nepřekonal. Přiměřeně stoupal i ve stranických funkcích, od června 1924 byl členem orgbyra, od ledna 1926 člen politbyra. Při zavedení vojenských hodností v roce 1935 se stal maršálem SSSR. V roce 1937 zasedl v Nejvyšším sovětu. V polovině 20. let vedl reorganizaci Rudé armády, řídil všestranný rozvoj ozbrojených sil. Během jeho působení byla vypracována nová ofenzívní doktrína Rudé armády (štáb RA - B. M. Šapošnikov, V. K. Triandafillov) a výrazně modernizována výzbroj (náčelník vyzbrojování RA - M. N. Tuchačevskij). Jako věrný Stalinův stoupenec organizoval ve třicátých letech čistky v armádě, během nichž byla na základě vykonstruovaných soudních procesů vyvražděna většina jejího důstojnického sboru. Zároveň s tím společně s maršálem G. I. Kulikem zrevidoval bojové doktríny a uspořádání armády, které výše zmínění důstojníci vytvořili. Krom naprosto nekompetentních zásahů do zbrojních programů (záměrné opomíjení vývoje protitankového dělostřelectva, raketometů, zastaralá doktrína o použití tanků pouze k přímé podpoře pěchoty) oba maršálové zejména zanedbali logistické zajištění a výcvik armády, z kterýchžto nedostatků se Rudá armáda vzpamatovávala ještě dlouho po vypuknutí druhé světové války. Neuspokojivý stav Rudé armády, jenž byl v plné míře odhalen speciální vojenskou komisí vrchního velení Rudé armády (v jejímž čele paradoxně zasedal on sám), byl právem připisován na vrub právě jemu. A jeho nástupce, mnohem schopnější velitel maršál Semjon Timošenko, dle svých slov potřeboval na obnovu plné bojeschopnosti Rudé armády nejméně pět let. Dostal však jen jeden rok. Druhá světová válka Kaganovič, Stalin, Postyšev a Vorošilov v přátelském objetí v lednu 1934 Druhá světová válka přinesla prověření jeho osobních schopností v tvrdém boji, což mu rychle přineslo pád. Byl u plánování invaze do Polska, během které na jeho vrub padaly značné nedostatky v zásobování a řízení vojsk. Tuto neslavnou kapitolu svého vojenského působení ještě politicky přežil. Vzápětí poté se podílel na plánování vpádu do Finska a měl hlavní zásluhu na zdrcujících porážkách, které Finové Rudé armádě uštědřili v prvních dvou měsících zimní války. Všechny své neúspěchy svedl na své podřízené. Nicméně jeho selhání bylo příliš okaté, a tak byl z postu komisaře obrany odvolán a nahrazen Timošenkem, který válku vítězně ukončil. V letech 1939-1940 organizoval zřizování táborů smrti pro nepohodlné polské válečné zajatce a obyvatele části Sovětským svazem obsazeného Běloruska a Ukrajiny. Později byl jmenován do funkce náměstka předsedy rady lidových komisařů pro vojenské záležitosti. Nebylo to navždy, Stalin hodlal dát svému oblíbenci ještě šanci. Nakonec mu jich dal za Velké vlastenecké války hned několik, ale výsledkem bylo jen Stalinovo vystřízlivění. Po vypuknutí války Stalin již více než šedesátiletého maršála jmenoval členem Státního výboru obrany a Stavky (obě funkce do listopadu 1944), velitelem Severozápadního směru a po zrušení tří velitelských směrů na podzim 1941 na místo toho zástupcem Stavky a velitelem Leningradského frontu. V obou funkcích ale katastrofálně selhal. Jeho chaotické velení mělo pro obranu města neblahé důsledky (např. nechal vytvářet a posílat na frontu oddíly domobrany ze zcela nevycvičených dělníků, vyzbrojených pouze brokovnicemi a revolvery). Počátkem února byl jmenován zástupcem Stavky u Volchovského frontu, který měl ulehčit Leningradu. Výsledkem byl neúspěch, z nějž obvinil velitele frontu. Stalin jej veřejně vybídl, aby převzal velení osobně a ukázal, jak se to má dělat. On však tuto nabídku odmítl a znechucený Stalin vydal prohlášení, ve kterém shrnul veškeré výsledky jeho působení v armádě, konstatoval jeho neschopnost plnit vojenské povinnosti na frontě a rozhodl, že příště bude pracovat jen v méně důležitých funkcích. V září 1942 se stal velitelem partyzánského hnutí (poslední významná funkce v jeho vojenské kariéře), zde svou autoritou vymohl více prostředků i lidí, ale snahou o zavedení vojenských standardů si znepřátelil stranické funkcionáře působící ve štábech partyzánského hnutí a v květnu 1943 byl odvolán.[1] Poté působil jako představitel Stavky na frontách a v různých vládních komisích: od května do září 1943 ve Výboru pro trofeje (válečnou kořist), od září 1943 do června 1944 v Komisi pro otázky příměří. Poválečné období Vorošilov s Chruščovem a Urho Kekkonenem v roce 1960 Po druhé světové válce zůstal nadále členem nejužšího stranického vedení země - politbyra VKS(b), ale přestal být vnímán jako představitel armády. V letech 1944-1947 byl předsedou sovětské kontrolní komise v Maďarsku. Zůstal Stalinovým náměstkem v radě ministrů, kde zodpovídal za kulturní resorty. Na konci 40. let se ocitl ve Stalinově nemilosti a přestal být zván na zasedání politbyra (když už byl pozván, občas tam nebyl dlouho). Své místo v oficiální hierarchii si však zachoval (zpravidla na pátém místě za Stalinem, Malenkovem, Berijou a Molotovem). Po Stalinově smrti v březnu 1953 se stal předsedou prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR - oficiální hlavou státu. Odvolán byl teprve v roce 1960, kdy na jeho místo nastoupil Leonid Iljič Brežněv. Spolupachatel Katyňského masakru Political career The red banner from the Commune, brought to Moscow by French communists. On the photo: Kliment Voroshilov first on the right, Grigory Zinoviev third from the right, Avel Enukidze fourth from the right and Nikolay Antipov fifth from the right. 1924 Voroshilov served as a member of the Central Committee from his election in 1921 until 1961. In 1925, after the death of Mikhail Frunze, Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a post he held until 1934. His main accomplishment in this period was to move key Soviet war industries east of the Urals, so that the Soviet Union could strategically retreat, while keeping its manufacturing capability intact.[6] Frunze's political position adhered to that of the Troika (Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Stalin), but Stalin preferred to have a close, personal ally in charge (as opposed to Frunze, a "Zinovievite"). Frunze was urged by a group of Stalin's hand-picked doctors to have surgery to treat an old stomach ulcer, despite previous doctors recommendations to avoid surgery and Frunze's own unwillingness.[7] He died on the operating table of a massive overdose of chloroform, an anesthetic.[7] Voroshilov became a full member of the newly formed Politburo in 1926, remaining a member until 1960. Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar (Minister) for Defence in 1934 and a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935. He played a central role in Stalin's Great Purge of the 1930s, denouncing many of his own military colleagues and subordinates when asked to do so by Stalin. He wrote personal letters to exiled former Soviet officers and diplomats such as commissar Mikhail Ostrovsky, asking them to return voluntarily to the Soviet Union and falsely reassuring them that they would not face retribution from authorities.[8] Voroshilov personally signed 185 documented execution lists, fourth among the Soviet leadership after Molotov, Stalin and Kaganovich.[9] During World War II, Voroshilov was a member (1941-1944) of the State Defense Committee. Voroshilov commanded Soviet troops during the Winter War from November 1939 to January 1940 but, due to poor Soviet planning and Voroshilov's incompetence as a general,[10] the Red Army suffered about 185,000 casualties. When the leadership gathered at Stalin's dacha at Kuntsevo, Stalin shouted at Voroshilov for the losses; Voroshilov replied in kind, blaming the failure on Stalin for eliminating the Red Army's best generals in his purges. Voroshilov followed this retort by smashing a platter of roast suckling pig on the table. Nikita Khrushchev said it was the only time he ever witnessed such an outburst.[11] Voroshilov was nonetheless made the scapegoat for the initial failures in Finland. He was later replaced as Defense Commissar by Semyon Timoshenko. Voroshilov was then made Deputy Premier responsible for cultural matters.[12] From left to right Kaganovich, Stalin, Postyshev, Voroshilov (1934) Voroshilov initially argued that thousands of Polish army officers captured in September 1939 should be released, but he later signed the order for their execution in the Katyn massacre of 1940.[13] After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Voroshilov became commander of the short-lived Northwestern Direction (July to August 1941), controlling several fronts. In September 1941 he commanded the Leningrad Front. Working alongside military commander Andrei Zhdanov as German advances threatened to cut off Leningrad, he displayed considerable personal bravery in defiance of heavy shelling at Ivanovskoye; at one point he rallied retreating troops and personally led a counter-attack against German tanks armed only with a pistol.[14] However, the style of counterattack he launched had long since been abandoned by strategists and drew mostly contempt from his military colleagues;[10] he failed to prevent the Germans from surrounding Leningrad and he was dismissed from his post and replaced by the far abler Georgy Zhukov on 8 September 1941.[15] Stalin had a political need for popular wartime leaders, however, and Voroshilov remained as an important figurehead.[10] In an embarrassing incident at the 1943 Tehran Conference, during a ceremony to receive the "Sword of Stalingrad" from Winston Churchill, he took the sword from Stalin but then allowed the sword to fall from its scabbard onto his toes in the presence of the Big Three wartime leaders.[16] Between 1945 and 1947, Voroshilov supervised the establishment of the communist regime in postwar Hungary.[10] He attributed the poor showing of the Hungarian Communist Party in the October 1945 Budapest municipal elections to the number of Jews in leadership positions, arguing that it was 'detrimental to the party that its leaders are not of Hungarian origin'.[17] The first 5 Marshals of the USSR, clockwise from top left: Budyonny, Blyukher, Yegorov, Voroshilov and Tukhachevsky. Only Voroshilov and Budyonny would survive Stalin's Great Purge. In 1952, Voroshilov was appointed a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 prompted major changes in the Soviet leadership. On 15 March 1953, Voroshilov was approved as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (i.e., the head of state) with Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Communist Party and Georgy Malenkov as Premier of the Soviet Union. Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Khrushchev brought about the 26 June 1953 arrest of Lavrenty Beria after Stalin's death. Retirement After Khrushchev removed most of the old Stalinists like Molotov and Malenkov from the party, Voroshilov's career began to fade. On 7 May 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union granted Voroshilov's request for retirement and elected Leonid Brezhnev chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council (the head of state). The Central Committee also relieved him of duties as a member of the Party Presidium (as the Politburo had been called since 1952) on 16 July 1960.[citation needed] In October 1961, his political defeat was complete at the 22nd party congress when he was excluded from election to the Central Committee.[citation needed] Voroshilov with J.K. Paasikivi in Helsinki Following Khrushchev's fall from power, Soviet leader Brezhnev brought Voroshilov out of retirement into a figurehead political post. Voroshilov was again re-elected to the Central Committee in 1966. Voroshilov was awarded a second medal of Hero of the Soviet Union 1968. He died in 1969 in Moscow and was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis. The KV series of tanks, used in World War II, was named after Voroshilov. Two towns were also named after him: Voroshilovgrad in Ukraine (now changed back to the historical Luhansk) and Voroshilov in the Soviet Far East (now renamed Ussuriysk after the Ussuri river), as well as the General Staff Academy in Moscow. Stavropol was called Voroshilovsk from 1935 to 1943. Voroshilov was nominated as an honorary citizen of the Turkish town of Izmir in November 1933;[18] in Izmir a street was also named after him.[19] In 1951, it was renamed "Plevne Bulvarı".

Ústřední výbor Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu

Ústřední výbor Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu (ÚV KSSS, rusky Центральный комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза, ЦК КПСС) byl nejvyšší orgán Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu mezi dvěma po sobě následujícími sjezdy strany. Scházel se nejméně jednou za šest měsíců, měl několik set členů (nejvíce - 412 jich bylo zvoleno na XXVIII. sjezdu roku 1990). Ústřední výbor řídil veškeré stranické aktivity a jeho členové byli voleni právě na sjezdech. Ústřední výbor pak volil nejužší vedení strany - politbyro (v letech 1952-1966 předsednictvo) - a sekretariát. Central Committee Main article: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Central Committee was a collective body elected at the annual party congress.[60] It was mandated to meet at least twice a year to act as the party's supreme governing body.[60] Membership of the Central Committee increased from 71 full members in 1934 to 287 in 1976.[61] Central Committee members were elected to the seats because of the offices they held, not on their personal merit.[62] Because of this, the Central Committee was commonly considered an indicator for Sovietologists to study the strength of the different institutions.[62] The Politburo was elected by and reported to the Central Committee.[63] Besides the Politburo, the Central Committee also elected the Secretariat and the General Secretary—the de facto leader of the Soviet Union.[63] In 1919-1952, the Orgburo was also elected in the same manner as the Politburo and the Secretariat by the plenums of the Central Committee.[63] In between Central Committee plenums, the Politburo and the Secretariat were legally empowered to make decisions on its behalf.[63] The Central Committee or the Politburo and/or Secretariat on its behalf could issue nationwide decisions; decisions on behalf of the party were transmitted from the top to the bottom.[64] Under Lenin, the Central Committee functioned much like the Politburo did during the post-Stalin era, serving as the party's governing body.[65] However, as the membership in the Central Committee increased, its role was eclipsed by the Politburo.[65] Between Congresses, the Central Committee functioned as the Soviet leadership's source of legitimacy.[65] The decline in the Central Committee's standing began in the 1920s; it was reduced to a compliant body of the Party leadership during the Great Purge.[65] According to party rules, the Central Committee was to convene at least twice a year to discuss political matters—but not matters relating to military policy.[66] The body remained largely symbolic after Stalin's consolidation; leading party officials rarely attended meetings of the Central Committee.[67] he Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[a] was the executive leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acting between sessions of Congress. According to own party statutes, the committee directed all party and governmental activities. Its members were elected by the Party Congress. During Vladimir Lenin's leadership of the Communist Party, the Central Committee functioned as the highest party authority between Congresses. However, the 8th Party Congress (held in 1919) established the Political Bureau (Politburo) to respond to questions needing immediate responses. Some delegates objected to the establishment of the Politburo, and in response, the Politburo became responsible to the Central Committee, and Central Committee members could participate in Politburo sessions with a consultative voice, but could not vote unless they were members. Following Lenin's death in January 1924, Joseph Stalin gradually increased his power in the Communist Party through the office of General Secretary of the Central Committee, the leading Secretary of the Secretariat. With Stalin's takeover, the role of the Central Committee was eclipsed by the Politburo, which consisted of a small clique of loyal Stalinists. By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the Central Committee had become largely a symbolic organ that was responsible to the Politburo, and not the other way around. The death of Stalin revitalised the Central Committee, and it became an important institution during the power struggle to succeed Stalin. Following Nikita Khrushchev's accession to power, the Central Committee still played a leading role; it overturned the Politburo's decision to remove Khrushchev from office in 1957. In 1964 the Central Committee ousted Khrushchev from power and elected Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary. The Central Committee was an important organ in the beginning of Brezhnev's rule, but lost effective power to the Politburo. From then on, until the era of Mikhail Gorbachev (General Secretary from 1985 to 1991), the Central Committee played a minor role in the running of the party and state - the Politburo operated as the highest political organ in the Soviet Union

ekonomická stagnace za Brežněva

začala 1973 za vlády Brežněva (1964-1982) , pokračovala Juri Andropova (1982-1984) a za Černěnka (1984-1985) éra stagnace = pojem od Michaila Sergejevič Gorbačova ( in order to describe the negative way in which he viewed the economic, political, and social policies of the period.) - = éra stagnace dle několika ekonomů nejhorší finanční krizí Svazu - spuštěno přílišnou centralizací, konzervativní státní byrokracií Nixnovým šokem (série eko opatření Nixona - nejdůležitější konec přímé směnosti dolaru za zlato) - jak ekonomika rostla plánovačům v Moskvě přibývalo množství nutných rozhodnutí -> následkem bylo celonár snížení produktivity probléme taky nedisciplinovanost a nemotivovanost nekvalifikované prac síly - kombinace faktorů - závody ve zbrojení mezi supervelmocemi - rozhodnutí SSSR se účastnit mezinár obchodu ( = opuštění idei ekonomické izolace a přitom ignor změn které nastaly v západních spol) - zvyšující se tvrdost politiky Svazu - např tanky do Prahy 68 - intervence v Afghanistánu, - sevřená burokracie, hlídaná kádrem starších mužů - nedostatek eko reformy; - politická korupce; - obtížné zásobování - plus další neřešené strukturální problémy ekonomiky - sociální stragnace doma - stimulovaná zvýšenou poptávkou po nekvalif prac díle, nedostatkem pracovních sil, poklesem produktivity a pracovní disciplíny - Brežněv sporadické pokusy o reformu eko skrz Kosygina během pozdních 60s a 70s -> bez výsledků - reforma 1965 - iniciovaná Kosyg (ale původ už za doby Chruščova) - zrušena UV ikdyž UV přiznalo že ekonomické problémy existují - zaostávání ve vývoji technologie -> stále více kopírování ze Z za Brežněva - 1973 spomalení sovětské ekonomiky -> zaostávání za Z - kvůli velkým nákladům na zbrojení a moc malým investicím do lehkého průmyslu - sovětské zemědělství neodstatečné aby uživilo města natož aby utáhla požadavky zvyšujícího se živ standartu který byl slíben jako plod dospělého soc, a na ktrerém závisela průmyslová produktivita - jeden z nejdůležitějších kritiků Br eko pol Gorbačov ->."the lowest stage of socialism" - HDP začalo klesat během 70s z úrovně na které v 50s a 60s + zaostávání za Z - zpomalování na 1% - 2% ročně + per year, and with Soviet technology falling ever farther behind that of the West, the Soviet Union was facing economic stagnation by the early 1980s.[60] During Brezhnev's last years in power, the CIA monitored the Soviet Union's economic growth, and reported that the Soviet economy peaked in the 1970s, calculating that it had then reached 57% of the American GNP. The development gap between the two nations widened, with the United States growing an average of 1% per year above the growth rate of the Soviet Union.[61] The last significant reform undertaken by the Kosygin government, and some believe the pre-perestroika era, was a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers named "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the 1979 reform. The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, sought to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. With Kosygin's death in 1980, and due to his successor Nikolai Tikhonov's conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually carried out.[62] The Eleventh Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union delivered a disappointing result: a change in growth from 5 to 4%. During the earlier Tenth Five-Year Plan, they had tried to meet the target of 6.1% growth, but failed. Brezhnev was able to defer economic collapse by trading with Western Europe and the Arab World.[61] The Soviet Union still out-produced the United States in the heavy industry sector during the Brezhnev era. Another dramatic result of Brezhnev's rule was that certain Eastern Bloc countries became more economically advanced than the Soviet Union = éra stagnace dle několika ekonomů nejhorší finanční krizí Svazu - spuštěno přílišnou centralizací, konzervativní státní byrokracií Nixnovým šokem (série eko opatření Nixona - nejdůležitější konec přímé směnosti dolaru za zlato) - jak ekonomika rostla plánovačům v Moskvě přibývalo množství nutných rozhodnutí -> následkem bylo celonár snížení produktivity - těžkopádnost byrokrat sytému nedovolila volnou komunikaci a flexibilní odpověd nutnou na podnikové úrovní nutnou k řešení problému s odcizením pracovníkům inovacemi, zákazníky a dodáváním - pozdější B éra - nárůst politické korupce - falsifikace dat se stala běžnou - aby naplněny vládou požadované cíle a kvóty -> další prohloubení krize plánování - špatná pracovní morálka nekvalifikovaných - kvalifik větší platy než bylo pův zamýšleno a nekvalifik. často pozdě v práci nebo nebyli ani svědomití nebo aspoň střízlivý - stát přesunoval dělníky z jednoho místa na dalši -> nevratná vlastnost sovětského průmyslu Th -> vláda neměla protiopatření k nedostatku prac sil - vládní prumysly jako továrny, doly a kanceláře byly plné nedisciplinovaných zaměstnanců, ktreří se ze všeho nejvíc snažili nedělat jejich práci - > Robert Service: a "work-shy workforce" among Soviet workers and administrators.

berija

vedoucí NKVD, Stalinův přítel a vykonavatel jeho čistek, od 1940 ministr vnitra, neustál boj s Chruščovem, popraven za své čistky (1953)

Anastáz Ivanovič Mikojan

(arménsky: Անաստաս Հովհաննէսի Միկոյան; rusky: Анаста́с Ива́нович Микоя́н) (25. listopadu 1895 Sanahin - 21. října 1978 Moskva) byl sovětský státník arménského původu, který byl politicky činný za éry Stalina a Chruščova. Mikojan se stal roku 1910 členem bolševické strany a jakožto její člen se v Baku mezi lety 1910-1920 účastnil bojů proti odpůrcům bolševismu. Po smrti Vladimira Iljiče Lenina se ve vzniklém mocenském vakuu postavil na stranu Josifa Stalina. Mikojan s pionýry v Berlíně v roce 1954 V roce 1941 se stal předsedou Výboru pro zásobování Rudé armády potravinami a oblečením, členem Výboru pro evakuace a Státního výboru pro obnovu hospodářství osvobozených oblastí, od roku 1942 byl členem Státního výboru obrany. Po Stalinově smrti podporoval Nikitu Chruščova v jeho destalinizující politice. Za éry Chruščova podnikl v letech 1955-1964, jakožto první náměstek předsedy Rady ministrů SSSR, mnoho významných oficiálních návštěv jak castrovské Kuby, tak i Spojených států amerických. V roce 1964 byl přinucen k ústupku, který Leonidu Brežněvovi umožnil převzít otěže moci v tehdejším Sovětském svazu. Hierarchicky poté Mikojan spadal právě pod Brežněva, který jej roku 1964 jmenoval předsedou Prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu, přičemž na tomto postu setrval až do rezignace roku 1965. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (Armenian: Անաստաս Հովհաննեսի Միկոյան; Russian: Анаста́с Ива́нович Микоя́н)(English: /miːkoʊˈjɑːn/; 25 November 1895 - 21 October 1978) was a Soviet revolutionary, Old Bolshevik and statesman during the mandates of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. He was the only Soviet politician who managed to remain at the highest levels of power within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as that power oscillated between the Central Committee and the Politburo, from the latter days of Lenin's rule, throughout the eras of Stalin and Khrushchev, until his peaceful retirement after the first months of Brezhnev's rule. Mikoyan became an early convert to the Bolshevik cause. He was a strong supporter of Stalin during the immediate post-Lenin years. During Stalin's rule, Mikoyan held several high governmental posts, including that of Minister of Foreign Trade. By the end of Stalin's rule, Mikoyan began to lose favour with him, and in 1949, Mikoyan lost his long-standing post of minister of foreign trade. In October 1952 at the 19th Party Congress Stalin even attacked Mikoyan viciously. When Stalin died in 1953, Mikoyan again took a leading role in policy-making. He backed Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization policy and became First Deputy Premier under Khrushchev. Mikoyan's position under Khrushchev made him the second most powerful figure in the Soviet Union at the time. Mikoyan made several key trips to communist Cuba and to the United States, acquiring an important stature on the international diplomatic scene, especially with his skill in exercising soft power to further Soviet interests. In 1964 Khrushchev was forced to step down in a coup that brought Brezhnev to power. Mikoyan served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the nominal Head of State, from 1964 until his forced retirement in 1965 Politburo member A. Badayev, Mikoyan, and Sergei Kirov at a bread factory in Leningrad in 1927 Mikoyan supported Stalin, whom he had first met in 1919, in the power struggle that followed Lenin's death in 1924;[8] he had become a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee in 1923. As People's Commissar for External and Internal Trade from 1926, he imported ideas from the West, such as the manufacture of canned goods.[2] In 1935 he was elected to the Politburo and was among one of the first Soviet leaders to pay goodwill trips to the United States in order to boost economic cooperation. Mikoyan spent three months in the United States, where he not only learned more about its food industry but also met and spoke with Henry Ford and inspected Macy's in New York. When he returned, Mikoyan introduced a number of popular American consumer products to the Soviet Union, including American hamburgers, ice cream, corn flakes, popcorn, tomato juice, grapefruit and corn on the cob.[9] Mikoyan spearheaded a project to produce a home cookbook, which would encourage a return to the domestic kitchen. The result, The Book of Tasty and Healthy Food (Книга о вкусной и здоровой пище, Kniga o vkusnoi i zdorovoi pishche), was published in 1939, and the 1952 edition sold 2.5 million copies.[10] Mikoyan helped initiate the production of ice cream in the USSR and kept the quality of ice cream under his own personal control until he was dismissed. Stalin made a joke about this, stating, "You, Anastas, care more about ice cream, than about communism."[11] Mikoyan also contributed to the development of meat production in the USSR (particularly, the so-called Mikoyan cutlet), and one of the Soviet-era sausage factories was named after him.[12] In the late 1930s Stalin embarked upon the Great Purge, a series of campaigns of political repression and persecution in the Soviet Union orchestrated against members of the Communist Party, as well as the peasantry and unaffiliated persons. In assessing Mikoyan's role in the purges, historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore states that he "enjoyed the reputation of one of the more decent leaders: he certainly helped the victims later and worked hard to undo Stalin's rule after the Leader's death." Mikoyan tried to save some close-knit companions from being executed. However, in 1936 he enthusiastically supported the execution of Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, claiming it to be a "just verdict." As with other leading officials in 1937, Mikoyan signed death-lists given to him by the NKVD.[13] The purges were often accomplished by officials close to Stalin, giving them the assignment largely as a way to test their loyalty to the regime. In September 1937 Stalin dispatched Mikoyan, along with Georgy Malenkov and Lavrentiy Beria, with a list of 300 names to Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), to oversee the liquidation of the Communist Party of Armenia (CPA), which was largely made up of Old Bolsheviks. Mikoyan tried, but failed, to save one from being executed during his trip to Armenia. That person was arrested during one of his speeches to the CPA by Beria. Over a thousand people were arrested and seven of nine members of the Armenian Politburo were sacked from office.[14] In several instances, he intervened on behalf of his colleagues; this leniency towards the persecuted may have been one reason why he was selected by Stalin to oversee the purges in the ASSR.[13] World War II and de-Stalinization Anastas Mikoyan with Nikita Khrushchev (sitting left) in Berlin, 1957 In September 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union each carved out their own spheres of influence in Poland and Eastern Europe via the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviets arrested 26,000 Polish officers in the eastern portion of Poland and in March 1940, after some deliberation, Stalin and five other members of the Politburo, Mikoyan included, signed an order for their execution as "nationalists and counterrevolutionaries".[15] When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Mikoyan was placed in charge of organizing the transportation of food and supplies. His son Vladimir, a pilot in the Red Air Force, died in combat when his plane was shot down over Stalingrad.[16] Mikoyan's main assignment throughout the war was supplying the Red Army with materials, food and other necessities.[17] Mikoyan is also credited for his large role in the 1941 relocation of Soviet industry from the threatened western cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, eastward to the Urals, Western Siberia, the Volga region, and other safer zones.[18] Mikoyan became a Special Representative of the State Defense Committee in 1941 by Stalin's orders; he was until that point not a member because Beria believed he would be of better use in government administration.[19] Mikoyan was decorated with a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1943 for his efforts. In 1946 he became the Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers.[20] Shortly before his death in 1953, Stalin considered launching a new purge against Mikoyan, Vyacheslav Molotov, and several other Party leaders. Mikoyan and others gradually began to fall out of favor and, in one instance, were accused of plotting against Stalin.[21] Stalin's plans never came to fruition, however, as he died before he could put them into motion.[5] Mikoyan originally argued in favor of keeping Stalin's right-hand man Beria from punishment but later gave in to popular support among Party members for his arrest. Mikoyan remained in the government after Stalin's death, in the post of Minister of Trade, under Malenkov.[22] He supported Nikita Khrushchev in the power struggle to succeed Stalin, and became First Deputy Premier in recognition of his services.[23] In 1956 Mikoyan helped Khrushchev organize the Secret Speech, which Khrushchev delivered to the 20th Party Congress, that denounced Stalin's personality cult.[24] It was he, and not Khrushchev, who made the first anti-Stalinist speech at the 20th Congress.[25] Along with Khrushchev, he helped roll back some of the stifling restrictions on nationalism and culture imposed during Stalin's time. In 1954, he visited his native Armenia and gave a speech in Yerevan, where he encouraged Armenians to republish the works of Raffi and the purged writer Yeghishe Charents.[26] In 1957 Mikoyan refused to back an attempt by Malenkov and Molotov to remove Khrushchev from power; he thus secured his position as one of Khrushchev's closest allies. He backed Khrushchev because of his strong support for de-Stalinization and his belief that a triumph by the plotters might have given way to purges similar to the ones in the 1930s.[27] In recognition of his support and his economic talents, Khrushchev appointed Mikoyan First Deputy Premier and liked to playfully describe him as "My rug merchant." Foreign diplomacy Mikoyan talking to Wilhelm Pieck in East Berlin, East Germany, 1954. China Mikoyan was the first Politburo member to make direct contact with the Chinese communist party chairman, Mao Zedong. He arrived at Mao's headquarters on 30 January 1949, one day before the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek was forced to abandon Nanjing, which was then China's capital, and move to Canton. Mikoyan reported that Mao was proclaiming Josif Stalin to be the supreme leader of world communism and 'teacher of the Chinese people' - but in his report he added shrewdly that Mao did not genuinely believe what he was saying.[28] It was at Mikoyan's insistence that the Chinese communists arrested the US journalist Sidney Rittenberg[29] Czechoslovakia On 11 November 1951, Mikoyan made a sudden visit to Prague to deliver a message from Stalin to President Klement Gottwald insisting that the Rudolf Slansky, former Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak communist party, should be arrested. When Gottwald demurred, Mikoyan broke of the interview to ring Stalin, before repeating the demand, after which Gottwald capitulated. This was the biggest single step towards the preparation of the Slansky Trial.[30] Mikoyan's role in the repression in Czechoslovakia was kept secret until the Prague Spring of 1968. Hungary In October 1956 Mikoyan was sent to the People's Republic of Hungary to gather information on the developing crisis caused by the revolution against the communist government there. Together with Mikhail Suslov, Mikoyan traveled to Budapest in an armored personnel carrier, in view of the shooting in the streets. He sent a telegram to Moscow reporting his impressions of the situation. "We had the impression that Ernő Gerő especially, but the other comrades as well, are exaggerating the strength of the opponent and underestimating their own strength," he and Suslov wrote.[31] Mikoyan strongly opposed the decision by Khrushchev and the Politburo to use Soviet troops, believing it would destroy the Soviet Union's international reputation, instead arguing for the application of "military intimidation" and economic pressure.[32] The crushing of the revolution by Soviet forces nearly led to Mikoyan's resignation.[33] United States Khrushchev's liberalization of hard-line policies led to an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States during the late 1950s. As Khrushchev's primary emissary, Mikoyan visited the United States several times. Despite the volatility of the Cold War between the two superpowers, many Americans received Mikoyan amiably, including Minnesota Democrat Hubert Humphrey, who characterized him as someone who showed a "flexibility of attitude" and New York governor Averell Harriman, who described him as a "less rigid" Soviet politician.[34] During November 1958 Khrushchev made an unsuccessful attempt to turn all of Berlin into an independent, demilitarized "free city", giving the United States, Great Britain, and France a six-month ultimatum to withdraw their troops from the sectors they still occupied in West Berlin, or he would transfer control of Western access rights to the East Germans. Mikoyan disapproved of Khrushchev's actions, claiming they violated "Party principle." Khrushchev had proposed the ultimatum to the West before discussing it with the Central Committee. Ruud van Djik, a historian, believed Mikoyan was angry because Khrushchev didn't consult him about the proposal. When asked by Khrushchev to ease tension with the United States, Mikoyan responded, "You started it, so you go!"[35] However, Mikoyan eventually left for Washington, which was the first time a senior governing member of the USSR's Council of Ministers visited the United States on a diplomatic mission to its leadership. Furthermore, Mikoyan approached the mission with an unprecedented informality, beginning with phrasing his visa request to US Embassy as "a fortnight's holiday" to visit his friend, Mikhail Menshikov, the then Soviet Ambassador to the United States. While the White House was taken off guard by this seemingly impromptu diplomatic mission, Mikoyan was invited to speak to numerous elite American organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Detroit Club in which he professed his hopes for the USSR to have a more peaceful relationship with the US. In addition to such well received engagements, Mikoyan indulged in more informal opportunities to meet the public such as having breakfast at a Howard Johnson's restaurant on the New Jersey Turnpike, visiting Macy's Department Store in New York City and meeting celebrities in Hollywood like Jerry Lewis and Sophia Loren before having an audience with President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.[36] Although Mikoyan failed to alter the US's Berlin policy,[37] he was hailed in the US for easing international tensions with an innovative emphasis on soft diplomacy that largely went over well with the American public.[38] Mikoyan disapproved of Khrushchev's walkout from the 1960 Paris Summit over the U-2 Crisis of 1960, which he believed kept tension in the Cold War high for another fifteen years. However, throughout this time, he remained Khrushchev's closest ally in the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership. As Mikoyan later noted, Khrushchev "engaged [in] inexcusable hysterics".[39] In November 1963 Mikoyan was asked by Khrushchev to represent the USSR at President John F. Kennedy's funeral.[40] At the funeral ceremony, Mikoyan appeared visibly shaken by the president's death and was approached by Jacqueline Kennedy, who took his hand and conveyed to him the following message: "Please tell Mr. Chairman [Khrushchev] that I know he and my husband worked together for a peaceful world, and now he and you must carry on my husband's work."[41] Cuba and the Missile Crisis The Soviet government welcomed the overthrow of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista by Fidel Castro's pro-socialist rebels in 1959. Khrushchev realized the potential of a Soviet ally in the Caribbean and dispatched Mikoyan as one of the top diplomats in Latin America. He was the first Soviet official (discounting Soviet intelligence officers) to visit Cuba after the revolution, and secured important trade agreements with the new government.[37] He left Cuba with a very positive impression, saying that the atmosphere there made him feel "as though I had returned to my childhood."[42] Khrushchev told Mikoyan of his idea of shipping Soviet missiles to Cuba. Mikoyan was opposed to the idea, and was even more opposed to giving the Cubans control over the Soviet missiles.[37] In early November 1962, after the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a framework to remove Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, Khrushchev dispatched Mikoyan to Havana to help persuade Castro to cooperate in the withdrawal.[43][44] Just prior to beginning negotiations with Castro, Mikoyan was informed about the death of his wife, Ashkhen, in Moscow; rather than return there for the funeral, Mikoyan opted to stay and sent his son Sergo there instead.[45] Castro was adamant that the missiles remain but Mikoyan, seeking to avoid a full-fledged confrontation with the United States, attempted to convince him otherwise. He told Castro, "You know that not only in these letters but today also, we hold to the position that you will keep all the weapons and all the military specialists with the exception of the 'offensive' weapons and associated service personnel, which were promised to be withdrawn in Khrushchev's letter [of October 27]."[46] Castro balked at the idea of further concessions, namely the removal of the Il-28 bombers and tactical nuclear weapons still left in Cuba. But after several tense and grueling weeks of negotiations, he finally relented and the missiles and the bombers were removed in December of that year.[47] Head of state and coup involvement On 15 July 1964, Mikoyan was appointed as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, replacing Leonid Brezhnev, who received a promotion within the Party. Mikoyan's new position was largely ceremonial; it was noted that his declining health and old age were being considered.[48] Some historians are convinced that by 1964 Mikoyan believed that Khrushchev had turned into a liability to the Party, and that he was involved in the October 1964 coup that brought Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin to power.[49] However, William Taubman disputes this, as Mikoyan was the only member of the Presidium (the name for the Politburo at this time) to defend Khrushchev. Mikoyan, however, did vote to force Khrushchev's retirement (so as, in traditional Soviet style, to make the vote unanimous). Alone among Khrushchev's colleagues, Mikoyan wished the former leader well in his retirement, and he, alone, visited Khrushchev at his dacha a few years later. Mikoyan laid a wreath and sent a letter of condolence at Khrushchev's funeral in 1971.[50] Due to his partial defense of Khrushchev during his ouster, Mikoyan lost his high standing with the new Soviet leadership. The Politburo forced Mikoyan to retire from his seat in the Politburo due to old age. Mikoyan quickly also lost his post as head of state and was succeeded in this post by Nikolai Podgorny on 9 December 1965.[51] Brezhnev officialised Mikoyan's retirement by awarding him an Order of Lenin.[52] Death, personality, and legacy As with Khrushchev and other companions, Mikoyan in his last days wrote a frank but selective memoirs from his political career during Stalin's rule.[53] Mikoyan died on 21 October 1978, at the age of 82, from natural causes and was buried at Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow. He received six commendations of the Order of Lenin.[2] Mikoyan, in a description by Simon Sebag-Montefiore, was "slim, circumspect, wily and industrious". He has been described as an intelligent man, understanding English, having learned German on his own by translating the German version of Karl Marx's Das Kapital into Russian. Unlike many others, Mikoyan was not afraid to get into a heated argument with Stalin. "One was never bored with Mikoyan", Artyom Sergeev notes, while Khrushchev called him a true cavalier. However, Khrushchev warned of trusting "that shrewd fox from the east."[54] In a close conversation with Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bukharin, Stalin referred to Mikoyan as a "duckling in politics"; he noted, however, that if Mikoyan ever took a serious shot he would improve.[55] Mikoyan had so many children, five boys and the two sons of the late Bolshevik leader Stepan Shahumyan, that he and his wife faced economic problems. His wife Ashkhen would borrow money from Politburo wives who had fewer children. If Mikoyan had discovered this he would, according to his children, have become furious.[56] Mikoyan was defiantly proud of his Armenian identity, pointing out: "I am not a Russian. Stalin is not a Russian." He and Stalin were said to share a toast: "To hell with all these Russians!"[4] However, in post-Soviet Armenia he is a divisive and controversial figure like some other Soviet-era Armenian officials.[57] His critics argue that he, as a loyal servant to Stalin, is responsible for the deaths of thousands during the 1930s purges when many Armenian intellectuals were assassinated.[58] According to academician Hayk Demoyan, he "symbolizes evil, mass murders, and an atmosphere of fear."[59] His supporters argue that he was a major figure on global political stage and usually point to his role in the Cuban missile crisis.[58] Dubbed the Vicar of Bray of politics and known as the "Survivor" during his time, Mikoyan was one of the few Old Bolsheviks who was spared from Stalin's purges and was able to retire comfortably from political life. This was highlighted in a number of popular sayings in Russian, including "From Ilyich [Lenin] to Ilyich [Brezhnev] ... without heart attack or stroke!"(Ot Ilyicha do Ilyicha bez infarkta i paralicha).[54] One veteran Soviet official described his political career in the following manner: "The rascal was able to walk through Red Square on a rainy day without an umbrella [and] without getting wet. He could dodge the raindrops."[54]

Vjačeslav Michajlovič Molotov

(rusky Вячеслав Михайлович Молотов, 25.jul./ 9. března 1890greg. - 8. listopadu 1986) byl dlouholetý přední činitel KSSS a SSSR, stal se blízkým spolupracovníkem V. I. Lenina i J. V. Stalina. Díky svému příjmení (Молот = kladivo) a pro svoji tvrdost měl přezdívku „Stalinovo kladivo rus Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union In office 19 December 1930 - 6 May 1941 Preceded by Alexei Rykov Succeeded by Joseph Stalin First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union In office 16 August 1942 - 29 June 1957 Premier Joseph Stalin Georgy Malenkov Nikolai Bulganin Preceded by Nikolai Voznesensky Succeeded by Nikolai Bulganin Minister of Foreign Affairs In office 3 May 1939 - 4 March 1949 Premier Joseph Stalin Preceded by Maxim Litvinov Succeeded by Andrey Vyshinsky In office 5 March 1953 - 1 June 1956 Premier Georgy Malenkov Nikolai Bulganin Preceded by Andrey Vyshinsky Succeeded by Dmitri Shepilov Roku 1917 se podílel na říjnové revoluci, v letech 1920-1921 byl tajemníkem ÚV KS(b) Ukrajiny. V letech 1921-1930 působil jako tajemník ÚV, od roku 1926 člen politbyra a v letech 1930-1941 předseda rady lidových komisařů, poté byl v letech 1941-1957 náměstkem předsedy rady lidových komisařů či ministrů; zároveň v letech 1939-1949 a 1953-1956 působil jako lidový komisař (ministr) zahraničí. 23. srpna 1939 v Moskvě podepsal s Joachimem von Ribbentropem smlouvu o neútočení a rozdělení sfér vlivu mezi Německem a SSSR, tzv. Pakt Molotov-Ribbentrop. Patřil k hlavním strůjcům masového teroru a represí, vynikal krutostí a zároveň se Stalina tak bál, že se neodvážil ozvat ani proti zatčení své ženy v roce 1949. V roce 1957 vystoupil proti N. S. Chruščovovi, byl vyloučen z vedení a nařčen z příslušnosti k protistranické skupině. Stal se velvyslancem v Mongolsku a později pracoval i jako představitel SSSR ve Vídni. Po XXII. sjezdu KSSS byl vyloučen ze strany pro „aktivní účast na masových represích", roku 1984 byl však znovu přijat s přímým souhlasem tehdejšího generálního tajemníka K. U. Černěnka. Citát: „Svůj úkol jsem jako ministr zahraničí viděl v co možná největším rozšíření hranic naší vlasti. A zdá se, že jsme se společně se Stalinem s tímto úkolem nevypořádali špatně."[1] V letech 1938-1957 neslo město Severodvinsk na jeho počest jméno „Molotovsk Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov[a] (/ˈmɒləˌtɒf, ˈmoʊ-/;[1] né Skryabin;[b] 9 March 1890 - 8 November 1986)[2] was a Soviet politician and diplomat, an Old Bolshevik, and a leading figure in the Soviet government from the 1920s, when he rose to power as a protégé of Joseph Stalin. Molotov served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) from 1930 to 1941, and as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1939 to 1949 and from 1953 to 1956. He served as First Deputy Premier from 1942 to 1957, when he was dismissed from the Presidium of the Central Committee by Nikita Khrushchev. Molotov was removed from all positions in 1961 after several years of obscurity. Molotov was the principal Soviet signatory of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939 (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), whose most important provisions were added in the form of a secret protocol that stipulated an invasion of Poland and partition of its territory between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. He was aware of the Katyn massacre committed by the Soviet authorities during this period. After World War II (Great Patriotic War), Molotov was involved in negotiations with the Western allies, in which he became noted for his diplomatic skills. He retained his place as a leading Soviet diplomat and politician until March 1949, when he fell out of Stalin's favour and lost the foreign affairs ministry leadership to Andrei Vyshinsky. Molotov's relationship with Stalin deteriorated further, with Stalin criticising Molotov in a speech to the 19th Party Congress. However, after Stalin's death in 1953, Molotov was staunchly opposed to Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation policy. Molotov defended Stalin's policies and legacy until his death in 1986, and harshly criticised Stalin's successors, especially Khrushchev.

Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov

(rusky Гео́ргий Максимилиа́нович Маленко́в, 26. prosince 1901jul./ 8. ledna 1902greg., Orenburg - 14. ledna 1988, Moskva) byl sovětský komunistický politik, blízký spolupracovník Josefa Stalina (jeho dlouholetý osobní tajemník) a po Stalinově smrti v letech 1953-1955 předseda rady ministrů SSSR (premiér). Jeho politický vzestup začal ve třicátých letech a souvisel s prohlubující se byrokratizací komunistické strany. Šlo o výkonného úředníka, přesně plnícího Stalinova nařízení a direktivy, nikdy nebyl členem opozice proti Stalinovi. Kvůli svému postavení je spoluzodpovědný za řadu komunistických zločinů ve třicátých a čtyřicátých letech. Po Stalinově smrti se stal nakrátko nejvlivnějším členem sekretariátu strany, musel však na funkci v sekretariátu pod tlakem Nikity Sergejeviče Chruščova a dalších rezignovat a spokojit se s funkcí předsedy rady ministrů. V průběhu mocenského zápasu ve vedení strany se mu nepodařilo udržet se v čele státu a 8. února 1955 rezignoval i na funkci šéfa vlády. Na jeho místo nastoupil dočasný Chruščovův spojenec Nikolaj Bulganin. V roce 1957 se spolu s několika dalšími stalinisty (např. s Molotovem) pokusili o svržení Nikity Chruščova, za což byli vyloučeni z politbyra a zbaveni všech politických funkcí. Později Malenkov odešel do vyhnanství a působil v Kazachstánu na druhořadém místě vedoucího elektrárny. Až jako penzista se směl vrátit do Moskvy, kde také ve svých 86 letech zemřel. Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov[a] (8 January 1902 [O.S. 26 December 1901] - 14 January 1988)[1] was a Soviet politician who briefly succeeded Joseph Stalin as the absolute leader of the Soviet Union. However, at the insistence of the rest of the Presidium, he relinquished control over the party in exchange for remaining first among equals as the country's Premier. Subsequently, Malenkov became embroiled in a power struggle ultimately culminating in his removal from the premiership in 1955 and the Presidium in 1957. Throughout his political career, Georgy Malenkov's personal connections with Vladimir Lenin significantly facilitated his ascent within the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By 1925, he was entrusted with overseeing the party's records. This brought him into contact with Stalin who had by then successfully consolidated power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to become the de facto leader of the Soviet Union. As a result of this association, Malenkov became heavily involved in Stalin's purges before later being given sole responsibility over the Soviet missile program during World War II. From 1946 to 1947, he chaired the Council of Ministers Special Committee on rocket technology [ru]. In order to secure his position as Stalin's favorite, he successfully discredited Marshal Georgy Zhukov and suppressed all glory associated with Leningrad during World War II so that Moscow maintained its image as the Soviet Union's sole cultural and political capital.[2] Following Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, Malenkov temporarily emerged as the Soviet dictator's undisputed successor by replacing him as both Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or Premier) and the highest-ranking member of the party's Secretariat. However, only nine days later, the Politburo (then known as the Presidium) forced him to give up his membership in the party apparatus while allowing him to retain the premiership. Henceforth, Malenkov presided over a collective leadership until being removed as Premier in 1955 by the party's First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. After later organizing a failed coup against Khrushchev in 1957, he was expelled from the Presidium and exiled to Kazakhstan in 1957, before ultimately being expelled from the Party altogether in November 1961. He officially retired from politics shortly afterwards. After a short sojourn in Kazakhstan, he returned to Moscow and kept a low profile for the remainder of his life. Career in the Communist Party After the Russian civil war, Malenkov quickly built himself a reputation of a tough communist Bolshevik. He was promoted in the Communist party ranks and was appointed Communist secretary at the military-based Moscow Higher Technical School in the 1920s.[9] Russian sources state that, rather than continuing with his studies, Malenkov took a career of a Soviet politician - his university degree was never completed, and his records have been indefinitely classified. Around this time, Malenkov forged a close friendship with Vyacheslav Malyshev, who later became chief of the Soviet nuclear program alongside Kurchatov. In 1924, Stalin noticed Malenkov and assigned him to Orgburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.[10] In 1925, Malenkov worked in the staff of the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the Central Committee of the CPSU.[9] Malenkov was in charge of keeping records on the members of the Soviet communist party - two million files were made under his supervision during the next ten years.[10] In this work Malenkov became closely associated with Stalin and was later heavily involved in the treason trials during the purging of the party.[9][10] In 1938, he was one of the key figures in bringing about the downfall of Yezhov, the head of the NKVD. In 1939, Malenkov became the head of the Communist party's Cadres Directorate, which gave him control over personnel matters of party bureaucracy.[9] During the same year, he also became a member and a Secretary of the Central Committee and rose from his previous staff position to full member of the Orgburo.[9] In February 1941, Malenkov became a candidate member of the Politburo.[9] Career during World War II After the German invasion of June 1941, Malenkov was promoted to the State Defense Committee (SDC), along with NKVD chief Beria, Voroshilov and Molotov with Stalin as the committee's head.[9] This small group held total control over all political and economic life in the country and Malenkov's membership thus made him one of the top five most powerful men in the Soviet Union during World War II. Between 1941 and 1943, Malenkov's primary responsibility in the GKO was supervising military aircraft production as well as supervising the development of nuclear weapons. In 1943, he also became chairman of a committee that oversaw the post-war economic rehabilitation of some liberated areas with the exception of Leningrad.[9] Building Soviet nuclear missiles and rocket launch sites Stalin gave Malenkov the most important task - building nuclear missiles in collaboration with Beria. Malenkov was appointed Chief of the Soviet Missile program, his first deputy was Dmitri Ustinov, a 33-year-old rocket scientist who later became one of the most powerful Soviet Defense Ministers. During World War II, Malenkov, Ustinov and Mikhail Khrunichev started the Soviet missile and rocket program that soon absorbed the German missile industry. Malenkov supervised the takeover of German V2 missile industry that was moved from Peenemünde to Moscow for further development that resulted in building Vostok missiles and orbiting Sputnik a few years later. At the same time, Malenkov followed Stalin's orders of building several space centers, such as Kapustin Yar near the Volga river and Khrunichev missile center in Moscow.[10][11] Attack on Georgy Zhukov Georgy Zhukov was the most prominent Soviet military commander during World War II, winning several critical battles, such as the Siege of Leningrad, the Battle of Stalingrad, and Battle of Berlin. Stalin, Beria and Malenkov grew suspicious of Zhukov, worrying he possessed capitalistic tendencies, because Zhukov established a friendship with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, invited the future American president to Leningrad and Moscow, and endorsed collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of World War II and shortly thereafter, Malenkov sided against several who were considered Soviet war heroes, among them Zhukov, Rokossovsky and several other popular generals. Malenkov's accusations against Zhukov were mostly based upon allegations of counter-revolutionary behavior and selfish "Bonapartism." Soon Zhukov was demoted in rank and moved to a lower position in Odessa where his only foes were local Party forces. Zhukov had his first heart attack not long after, and Malenkov's concerns of him had largely faded.[10][11] After the ruthless attack on Zhukov, Malenkov gained strength and became closer with Stalin and several other top communists. In 1946 Malenkov was named a candidate member of the Politburo. Although Malenkov was temporarily trailing behind his rivals Andrei Zhdanov and Lavrentiy Beria, he soon came back into Joseph Stalin's favour, especially after Zhdanov's mysterious death in 1948. That same year, Malenkov became a Secretary of the Central Committee. Executions of competitors and Leningrad affair During the late 1940s and early 1950s Malenkov gained more favor with Stalin than any other top Soviet communist. Malenkov's main competition were the leaders of Leningrad whose glory had been earned in resistance to Hitler's attacks during World War II. After the Siege of Leningrad the Mayor Kuznetsov and his deputies earned much fame and support all over the USSR. Malenkov followed Stalin's policy of suppressing that glory in order to maintain Moscow's image as the USSR's only center of power. In 1949, Malenkov personally came to Leningrad leading a regiment of armed men from Moscow MGB special forces and swiftly removed and arrested the city leaders. After a series of secret trials, 23 men, including the Mayor and deputies, were executed and buried in unmarked pit on the outskirts of the city. At the same time, over two thousand top managers and intellectuals were uprooted and exiled from Leningrad to Siberia, their property was confiscated, and their positions were filled by communists loyal to Stalin.[12] During the same years, Malenkov also exterminated the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Many members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were killed in the Night of the Murdered Poets. On August 12, 1952, thirteen Jewish writers were executed by gunshots in the basement of Lubyanka Prison.[13] The antisemitic pogrom was approved by Stalin and supervised by Malenkov.[14] Malenkov's loyalty to Stalin was proven by executions of political competition and the Leningrad affair and catapulted Malenkov to become the only successor of Stalin. 1952 and 1953 Time magazine covers indicate that Malenkov was generally considered to be Stalin's apprentice and successor.[15] Premiership and duumvirate Malenkov among Soviet leadership speaking with Konrad Adenauer in 1955 Malenkov's ambitions and crafty politics bore fruit upon Stalin's death on 5 March 1953. Four days later Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrentiy Beria and Nikita Khrushchev gave the eulogy at Stalin's funeral. On 6 March, the day after Stalin died, Malenkov succeeded him as Premier of the Soviet Union. His name was also listed first on the newly named Presidium of the Central Committee (as the Politburo had been called since 1952). Although there had been no title identifying the leader of the party for almost a year, this indicated that Malenkov had succeeded Stalin as party leader as well.[16] On 7 March, Malenkov's name appeared atop the list of secretaries of the Secretariat, confirming that he had succeeded Stalin as the most powerful man in the Soviet Union. However, after only a week, Malenkov was forced to resign from the Secretariat; the new leadership wanted to avoid having one person have nearly the power that Stalin had. For all intents and purposes, Khrushchev replaced him as party leader; Khrushchev's name appeared atop a revised list of secretaries on 14 March, though he was not formally named First Secretary of the CPSU until September 1953. Malenkov remained as premier, in a period of a Malenkov-Khrushchev duumvirate.[17] Malenkov retained the office of premier for two years. During this time his political activities were mixed with a power struggle within the Kremlin. Although he remained a staunch Stalinist, Malenkov expressed his opposition to research and development of nuclear armament, declaring "a nuclear war could lead to global destruction." Malenkov also opposed promotions of younger generations of politicians which soon led to his decline. He advocated refocusing the economy on the production of consumer goods and pushed away from diversity by subsidizing only a narrow list of goods and bread. Downfall and final years Malenkov in 1964 Malenkov was forced to resign in February 1955 after he came under attack for abuse of power and his close connection to Beria (who had been executed as a traitor in December 1953). He was held responsible for the slow pace of reforms, particularly when it came to rehabilitating political prisoners. For two more years, Malenkov remained a regular member of the Presidium. Together with Khrushchev, he flew to the island of Brioni (Yugoslavia) on the night of 1-2 November 1956 to inform Josip Broz Tito of the impending Soviet invasion of Hungary scheduled for 4 November.[18] However, in 1957, Malenkov organized an attempt at a coup against Khrushchev. In a dramatic standoff in the Kremlin, Malenkov was turned on by both Khrushchev and Zhukov, who had the support of the Soviet armed forces. Malenkov's attempt failed and he, together with co-conspirators Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, who were characterised by Khrushchev at an extraordinary session of the Party Central Committee as the 'Anti-Party Group', were swiftly fired from the Politburo. In 1961, Malenkov was expelled from the Communist Party and exiled to a remote province of the Soviet Union. He became a manager of a hydroelectric plant in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan.[19] After his exile from the Party, Malenkov fell into obscurity and suffered from depression due to loss of power and the quality of life in a poor province. However, some researchers say that later Malenkov found this demotion and exile a relief from the pressures of the Kremlin power struggle. Malenkov in his later years converted to Russian Orthodoxy, as did his daughter, who has since spent part of her personal wealth building two churches in rural locations. Orthodox Church publications at the time of Malenkov's death said he had been a reader (the lowest level of Russian Orthodox clergy) and a choir singer in his final years. He died on 14 January 1988 at age 86.[20] Personal life In 1920, Malenkov married Valeriya A. Golubtsova (15 May 1901 - 1 October 1987)[21] and had two sons and one daughter, Volya Shamberg (9 September 1924 - 2010), Andrei (born 29 May 1937) and Georgiy (born 20 October 1938

brežněvova represe

- Brežněvova politika stabilizace zahrnovala ukončení chruščovových liberalizujících reforem a omezení kultur svobod - během doby vlády CH Bežněv podpořil zamítnutí Stalinovi neomezené vlády, rehabilitaci mnoha obětí stalin čistek a opatrnou liberalizaci sovětské intelektuální a kult politiky - nicméně jakmile do čela začal otáčet směr reforem, přijal stále více represivní a totalitární přístup - státní bezpečnostní služba pod vedením Juri Yuri Andropova (= ve formě KGB) znovunabyla některé pravomoci z doby stalinovy vlády (nicméně stalin už zdiskreditovaný) - do polovina 70s cca 1,000 - 10,000 politických a ná věznů ve svazu - mnoho hospitalizováno v psychiatrických léčebnách - pod Brežněvem KGB infiltrovala drtivou většinu protivládních org -> little to no opposition against him or his power base. However, Brezhnev refrained from the all-out violence seen under Stalin's rule

Stalinova doba

- po smrti Lenina boj o moc mezi Stalinem (tajemníkem strany) a Leonem Tróckym (ministr obrany) - odlišné vize dalšího směřování svazu - T: chtěl implementovat politiku pernamentní revoluce - založeno na představě, že Svaz nebude schopen prežít v socialistické podobě , oáč obkopen nepřátelskými vládami ->nutné podporovat podobné revoluce ve vyspělých kapitalistických státech - Stalin: tato zahr politika není slučitelná s -> vedlo by poničení země páč by to vedlo k ozbrojenýmu konfliktu -> Svaz by se měl snažit o mírumilovnou koexist se Svazem a přilákat zahraniční investice aby se vyvinula eko země a budovat socialismust v jednom státě -> nakonec Stalin získal větší podporu a vůdcem strany 1924 - 53 (smrt) - Trotsky nakonec izolován (dojem že spolupracoval s vnějškem aby sesadil Stalina) -> nakonec vyloučen ze str a poslán do exilu 1928 - Stalin's policies henceforth would later become collectively known as Stalinism. In 1925, the name of the party was changed to the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), reflecting that the republics outside of Russia proper were no longer part of an all-encompassing Russian state. The acronym was usually transliterated as VKP(b), or sometimes VCP(b). Stalin sought to formalize the party's ideological outlook into a philosophical hybrid of the original ideas of Lenin with classical Marxism into what would be called Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's position as General Secretary became the top executive position within the party, giving Stalin significant authority over party and state policy. By the end of the 1920s, diplomatic relations with western countries were deteriorating to the point that there was growing fear of another allied attack on the Soviet Union. Within the country, the conditions of the NEP had enabled growing inequalities between increasingly wealthy strata and the remaining poor. The combination of these tensions led the party leadership to conclude that it was necessary for the government's survival to pursue a new policy that would centralize economic activity and accelerate industrialization. To do this, the first five-year plan was implemented in 1928. The plan doubled the industrial workforce, proletarianizing many of the peasants by removing them from their land and assembling them into urban centers. Peasants who remained in agricultural work were also made to have a similarly proletarian relationship to their labor through the policies of collectivization, which turned feudal-style farms into collective farms which would be in a cooperative nature under the direction of the state. These two shifts changed the base of Soviet society towards a more working class alignment. The plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule in 1932. The success of industrialization in the Soviet Union led western countries, such as the United States, to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet government. In 1933, after years of unsuccessful workers' revolutions (including a short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic) and spiraling economic calamity, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, violently suppressing the revolutionary organizers and posing a direct threat to the Soviet Union that ideologically supported them. The threat of fascist sabotage and immanent attack greatly exacerbating the already existing tensions within the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. A wave of paranoia overtook Stalin and the party leadership and spread through Soviet society. Seeing potential enemies everywhere, leaders of the government security apparatuses began severe crackdowns known as the Great Purge. In total, hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom were posthumously recognized as innocent, were arrested and either sent to prison camps or executed. Also during this time, a campaign against religion was waged in which the Russian Orthodox Church, which had long been a political arm of tsarism before the revolution, was targeted for repression and organized religion was generally removed from public life and made into a completely private matter, with many churches, mosques and other shrines being repurposed or demolished. The Soviet Union was the first to warn of impending danger of invasion from Nazi Germany to the international community. The western powers, however, remained committed to maintaining peace and avoiding another war breaking out, many considering the Soviet Union's warnings to be an unwanted provocation. While the western governments were mostly committed to neutrality, many western capitalists, notably including the Rockefellers, secured lucrative business deals with the fascist regimes and had direct interests in maintaining them. After many unsuccessful attempts to create an anti-fascist alliance among the western countries, including trying to rally international support for the Spanish Republic in its struggle against a fascist military dictatorship supported by Germany and Italy, in 1939 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany which would be broken in June 1941 when the German military invading the Soviet Union in the largest land invasion in history, beginning the Great Patriotic War. he Communist International was dissolved in 1943 after it was concluded that such an organization had failed to prevent the rise of fascism and the global war necessary to defeat it. After the 1945 Allied victory of World War II, the Party held to a doctrine of establishing socialist governments in the post-war occupied territories that would be administered by Communists loyal to Stalin's administration. The party also sought to expand its sphere of influence beyond the occupied territories, using proxy wars and espionage and providing training and funding to promote Communist elements abroad, leading to the establishment of the Cominform in 1947. In 1949, the Communists emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War, causing an extreme shift in the global balance of forces and greatly escalating tensions between the Communists and the western powers, fueling the Cold War. In Europe, Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, acquired the territory of Trieste, causing conflict both with the western powers and with the Stalin administration who opposed such a provocative move. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Communists actively supported the Greek Communists during their civil war, further frustrating the Soviet government. These tensions led to a Tito-Stalin Split which marked the beginning of international sectarian division within the world communist movement.

Nikolaj Ivanovič Ježov

1895 - 1940 (ve věku 44 let) Příčina úmrtí poprava zastřelením sovětský politik. V letech 1936-1938 byl šéfem všemocné sovětské policie NKVD během tzv. Velkého teroru - někdy nazývaného „ježovština". Nakonec byl však i on, jako nepohodlný, zbaven funkce a zastřelen.

Smlouva o částečném zákazu jaderných zkoušek.

1963 podepsal Gromyko mezi SSSR, UK a USA 5.8. Podepsána první dohoda týkající se jaderných pokusů - Smlouva o částečném zákazu jaderných zkoušek. Týkala se zákazu zkoušek jaderných zbraní v atmosféře, ve vesmíru a pod vodou. Jaderné zkoušky tak mohly být prováděny pouze pod zemí. Smlouva vstoupila v platnost 11. října 1963.

19. sjezd

19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held from 5 to 14 October 1952. It was the first party congress after World War II and the last under Joseph Stalin's leadership. It was attended by many dignitaries from foreign Communist parties, including Liu Shaoqi from China. At this Congress, Stalin gave the last public speech of his life.[1] The 19th Central Committee was elected at the congress. Contents 1 Changes 2 See also 3 References 4 External links Changes The All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) was renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin's request to be relieved of his duties in the party secretariat due to his age was rejected by the party congress, as delegates were unsure about Stalin's intentions.[2][3] The Politburo of the Central Committee became the Presidium of the Central Committee and was greatly expanded (to 15 members) in preparation for the purge scheduled the next year. The Secretariat and Central Committee were doubled in size (to ten and 133 members, respectively). The Orgburo was abolished, and its duties were transferred to the Secretariat. Full members (voting) elected to the 19th Presidium: Vasily Andrianov; Averky Aristov; Lavrentiy Beria; Nikolai Bulganin; Kliment Voroshilov; Semyon Ignatyev; Lazar Kaganovich; Demyan Korotchenko; Vasily Kuznetsov; Otto Kuusinen; Georgy Malenkov; Vyacheslav Malyshev; Leonid G. Melnikov; Anastas Mikoyan; Nikolai Mikhaylov; Vyacheslav Molotov; Mikhail Pervukhin; Panteleimon Ponomarenko; Maksim Saburov; Joseph Stalin; Mikhail Suslov; Nikita Khrushchev; Dmitry Chesnokov; Nikolay Shvernik; Matvei Shkiryatov Candidate (non-voting) members elected to the Presidium: Leonid Brezhnev; Andrei Vyshinsky; Arseni Zverev; Nikolai Ignatov; Ivan Kabanov; Alexei Kosygin; Nikolai Patolichev; Nikolai Pegov; Alexander Puzanov; Ivan Tevosian; Pavel Yudin An unofficial "inner circle" of Stalin's closest associates included Lavrentiy Beria, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Georgy Malenkov, Mikhail Pervukhin, Maksim Saburov, and Nikita Khrushchev.

expanze sssr

39-1940 Expansion of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1940 Main articles: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Soviet invasion of Poland, Territories of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union, Occupation of the Baltic states, Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Winter War, and Moscow Armistice In 1939, the USSR entered into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany[27] that contained a secret protocol that divided Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland into German and Soviet spheres of influence.[27][28] Eastern Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia in northern Romania were recognized as parts of the Soviet sphere of influence.[28] Lithuania was added in a second secret protocol in September 1939.[29] The Soviet Union had invaded the portions of eastern Poland assigned to it by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact two weeks after the German invasion of western Poland, followed by co-ordination with German forces in Poland.[30][31] During the Occupation of East Poland by the Soviet Union, the Soviets liquidated the Polish state, and a German-Soviet meeting addressed the future structure of the "Polish region."[32] Soviet authorities immediately started a campaign of sovietization[33][34] of the newly Soviet-annexed areas.[35][36][37] Soviet authorities collectivized agriculture,[38] and nationalized and redistributed private and state-owned Polish property.[39][40][41] Initial Soviet occupations of the Baltic countries had occurred in mid-June 1940, when Soviet NKVD troops raided border posts in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia,[42][43] followed by the liquidation of state administrations and replacement by Soviet cadres.[42][44] Elections for parliament and other offices were held with single candidates listed and the official results fabricated, purporting pro-Soviet candidates' approval by 92.8 percent of the voters in Estonia, 97.6 percent in Latvia, and 99.2 percent in Lithuania.[45][46] The fraudulently installed peoples assemblies immediately requested admission into the USSR, which was granted by the Soviet Union, with the annexations resulting in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.[45] The international community condemned this initial annexation of the Baltic states and deemed it illegal.[47][48] In 1939, the Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted an invasion of Finland,[49] subsequent to which the parties entered into an interim peace treaty granting the Soviet Union the eastern region of Karelia (10% of Finnish territory),[49] and the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic was established by merging the ceded territories with the KASSR. After a June 1940 Soviet Ultimatum demanding Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Hertza region from Romania,[50][51] the Soviets entered these areas, Romania caved to Soviet demands and the Soviets occupied the territories.[50][52]

500 Days Program

500 Days Program (Russian: программа "500 дней") was an ambitious program to overcome the economic crisis in the Soviet Union by means of transition into market economy. The program was proposed by Grigory Yavlinsky and further developed by a work group under the direction of Stanislav Shatalin (an economic advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev). Before beginning work on the project, Shatalin had been assured by Gorbachev that he was serious about radically reforming the Soviet economy. Therefore, in August 1990, the group issued a 400-page report titled "Transition to the Market". It was based on the earlier "400 Days Project" prepared by Yavlinsky and became known colloquially as the "500 Days Program" as it intended to create the groundwork for a modern market economy in 500 days. The report called for creation of a competitive market economy, mass privatization, prices determined by the market, integration with the world economic system, a large transfer of power from the Union government to the Republics, and many other radical reforms. The 500 Days Program immediately gained the complete support of Boris Yeltsin and a more skeptical support from Mikhail Gorbachev; soon after, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, openly repudiated it. The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union delayed in adopting the program, eventually accepting a more moderate program for economic reform, titled: "Basic Guidelines for Stabilization of the Economy and Transition to a Market Economy". The new program contained many measures from the 500-Days Program, but most notably lacked a timetable and did not mention the division of economic power between the Union and Republics.

9. sjezd

9th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1920 nedůležitý Agenda The agenda included: The report of the Central Committee; A report on the immediate tasks of economic construction; A report on the trade union movement; A report on organizational questions; A report on the tasks of the Communist International; The subject of cooperatives; The transition to a militia system; The final item on the agenda was elections to the Central Committee of the party.

stalin tito roztžka

After disagreements between Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and the Soviet Union regarding Greece and Albania, a Tito-Stalin split occurred, followed by Yugoslavia being expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 and a brief failed Soviet putsch in Belgrade.[82] The split created two separate communist forces in Europe.[82] A vehement campaign against Titoism was immediately started in the Eastern Bloc, describing agents of both the West and Tito in all places as engaging in subversive activity.[82] Stalin ordered the conversion of the Cominform into an instrument to monitor and control the internal affairs of other Eastern Bloc parties.[82] He also briefly considered converting the Cominform into an instrument for sentencing high-ranking deviators, but dropped the idea as impractical.[82] Instead, a move to weaken communist party leaders through conflict was started.[82] Soviet cadres in communist party and state positions in the Bloc were instructed to foster intra-leadership conflict and to transmit information against each other.[82] This accompanied a continuous stream of accusations of "nationalistic deviations", "insufficient appreciation of the USSR's role", links with Tito and "espionage for Yugoslavia."[83] This resulted in the persecution of many major party cadres, including those in East Germany.[83] The first country to experience this approach was Albania, where leader Enver Hoxha immediately changed course from favoring Yugoslavia to opposing it.[83] In Poland, leader Władysław Gomułka, who had previously made pro-Yugoslav statements, was deposed as party secretary-general in early September 1948 and subsequently jailed.[83] In Bulgaria, when it appeared that Traicho Kostov, who was not a Moscow cadre, was next in line for leadership, in June 1949, Stalin ordered Kostov's arrest, followed soon thereafter by a death sentence and execution.[83] A number of other high ranking Bulgarian officials were also jailed.[83] Stalin and Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi met in Moscow to orchestrate a show trial of Rákosi opponent László Rajk, who was thereafter executed.

rus Alexandr Michajlovič Vasilevskij (18. záříjul./ 30. září 1895greg., Novaja Golčicha — 5. prosince 1977, Moskva) byl sovětský voják a vojevůdce, maršál Sovětského svazu. Od května 1942 byl také náčelníkem generálního štábu a podílel se na plánování téměř všech velkých operací Rudé armády. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky (30 September 1895 - 5 December 1977) was a Russian career officer in the Red Army who was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1943. He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense during World War II, as well as Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1953. As the Chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky was responsible for planning and coordinating almost all decisive Soviet offensives in World War II, from the Stalingrad counteroffensive to the assault on East Prussia and Königsberg. Vasilevsky began his military career during World War I, earning the rank of captain by 1917. At the start of the October Revolution and the Civil War he was conscripted into the Red Army, taking part in the Polish-Soviet War. After the war, he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a regimental commander by 1930. In this position, he showed great skill in organizing and training his troops. Vasilevsky's talent was noticed, and in 1931 he was appointed a member of the Directorate of Military Training. In 1937, following Stalin's Great Purge, he was promoted to General Staff officer. At the start of the 1943 Soviet counteroffensive of World War II, Vasilevsky coordinated and executed the Red Army's offensive on the upper Don, in the Donbass, Crimea, Belarus and Baltic states, ending the war with the capture of Königsberg in April 1945. In July 1945, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East, executing the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation and subsequently accepting Japan's surrender. After the war, he became the Soviet Defense Minister, a position he held until Stalin's death in 1953. With Nikita Khrushchev's rise, Vasilevsky began losing power and was eventually pensioned off. After his death, he was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis in recognition of his past service and contributions to his nation.

Alexandr Michajlovič Vasilevski

rus Alexandr Michajlovič Vasilevskij (18. záříjul./ 30. září 1895greg., Novaja Golčicha — 5. prosince 1977, Moskva) byl sovětský voják a vojevůdce, maršál Sovětského svazu. Od května 1942 byl také náčelníkem generálního štábu a podílel se na plánování téměř všech velkých operací Rudé armády. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky (30 September 1895 - 5 December 1977) was a Russian career officer in the Red Army who was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1943. He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense during World War II, as well as Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1953. As the Chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky was responsible for planning and coordinating almost all decisive Soviet offensives in World War II, from the Stalingrad counteroffensive to the assault on East Prussia and Königsberg. Vasilevsky began his military career during World War I, earning the rank of captain by 1917. At the start of the October Revolution and the Civil War he was conscripted into the Red Army, taking part in the Polish-Soviet War. After the war, he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a regimental commander by 1930. In this position, he showed great skill in organizing and training his troops. Vasilevsky's talent was noticed, and in 1931 he was appointed a member of the Directorate of Military Training. In 1937, following Stalin's Great Purge, he was promoted to General Staff officer. At the start of the 1943 Soviet counteroffensive of World War II, Vasilevsky coordinated and executed the Red Army's offensive on the upper Don, in the Donbass, Crimea, Belarus and Baltic states, ending the war with the capture of Königsberg in April 1945. In July 1945, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East, executing the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation and subsequently accepting Japan's surrender. After the war, he became the Soviet Defense Minister, a position he held until Stalin's death in 1953. With Nikita Khrushchev's rise, Vasilevsky began losing power and was eventually pensioned off. After his death, he was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis in recognition of his past service and contributions to his nation.

Alexandr Michajlovič Vasilevskij

Andrej Pavlovič Kirilenko

Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko (Russian: Андре́й Па́влович Кириле́нко, IPA: [ɐnˈdrʲej ˈpavləvʲɪtɕ kʲɪrʲɪˈlʲɛnkə]; 8 September [O.S. 26 August] 1906 - 12 May 1990) was a Soviet statesman from the start to the end of the Cold War. In 1906, Kirilenko was born at Alexeyevka in Belgorod Oblast to a Ukrainian working-class family. He graduated in the 1920s from a local vocational school, and again in the mid-to-late 1930s from the Rybinsk Aviation Technology Institute. He became a member of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) in 1930. As many like him, Kirilenko climbed up the Soviet hierarchy through the "industrial ladder"; by the 1960s, he was Vice-Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). After Nikita Khrushchev's forced resignation, Kirilenko became Leonid Brezhnev's "chief lieutenant" within the Central Committee. His main objective was to ensure Brezhnev's power base and, if possible, to strengthen Brezhnev's position within the Party. In order to accomplish this task, he emerged as one of the leading figures in the Secretariat under Brezhnev's rule. In this position, Kirilenko was responsible for personnel selection and supervision of economic planning throughout most of the Brezhnev Era. In 1976, Brezhnev appointed Konstantin Chernenko to be his "counterweight" in the Central Committee (CC). He became a member of the Political Bureau (Politburo) in 1965. He was forced to resign from active politics due to health reasons and because Yuri Andropov was appointed to the General Secretaryship. When Andropov became General Secretary in 1982, Kirilenko was pushed aside. He died on 12 May 1990 in Moscow.

článek 6 sovětské ustavy

Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution placed limitations on the political rights of Soviet citizens. While the rest of the constitution theoretically assured the public freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of press these rights were rendered less meaningful by the reservation of article 6 that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the "leading and guiding force of the Soviet society". The text of the article follows in English translation. The leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism. All party organisations shall function within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR. This provision was used to justify the banning of opposition parties, as well as harsh measures against opposition of any sort. The theory was that since the CPSU was the vanguard of the state, its right to rule could not be legitimately questioned. The "leading role" of the CPSU was first enshrined in Article 126 of the Stalin Constitution, which described the Party as "the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." On March 14, 1990 Article 6 was amended by the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR,[1]to read as follows: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, other political parties as well as labor, youth and other public organisations and mass movements, through their representatives elected to the Councils of People's Deputies and in other forms participate in the policy-making of the Soviet state, in the management of state and public affairs. This move was introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in tandem with the creation of the office of the president of the USSR (which he viewed largely as an office for himself), and as a means to formalize the transition to a multi-party political system.[2] After the amending of Article 6 of the Constitution, the CPSU effectively lost its right to rule the Soviet Union's government apparatus; paving the way towards a Multi-party democracy.

blokáda berlína

Berlin blockade and airlift Germans watching Western supply planes at Berlin Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift. In the former German capital Berlin, surrounded by Soviet-occupied Germany, Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade on June 24, 1948, preventing food, materials and supplies from arriving in West Berlin.[75] The blockade was caused, in part, by early local elections of October 1946 in which the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) was rejected in favor of the Social Democratic Party, which had gained two and a half times more votes than the SED.[76] The United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and several other countries began a massive "Berlin airlift", supplying West Berlin with food and other supplies.[77] The Soviets mounted a public relations campaign against the western policy change and communists attempted to disrupt the elections of 1948 preceding large losses therein,[78] while 300,000 Berliners demonstrated and urged the international airlift to continue.[79] In May 1949, Stalin lifted the blockade, permitting the resumption of Western shipments to Berlin

armáda - trockisti - čistka

Case of Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Military Organization From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Case of Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Military Organization" - news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (January 2013) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) The Case of Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Military Organization, also known as the "Military Case" or the "Tukhachevsky Case"), was a 1937 secret trial of the high command of the Red Army, a part of the Great Purge. Contents 1 Defendants 2 Background 3 Evidence, arrest and secret trial 4 Unresolved issues 4.1 Reasons and motives 4.2 Speedy inquest 5 See also 6 Notes 7 Sources Defendants Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky Corps Commander V. M. Primakov The Case of Military was a secret trial, unlike the Moscow Show Trials. It is traditionally considered one of the key trials of the Great Purge. Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the senior military officers Iona Yakir, Ieronim Uborevich, Robert Eideman, August Kork, Vitovt Putna, Boris Feldman and Vitaly Primakov (as well as Yakov Gamarnik, who committed suicide before the investigations began) were accused of anti-Soviet conspiracy and sentenced to death; they were executed on the night of June 11 to 12, 1937, immediately after the verdict delivered by a Special Session (специальное судебное присутствие) of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The Tribunal was presided over by Vasili Ulrikh and included marshals Vasily Blyukher, Semyon Budyonny; Army Commanders Yakov Alksnis, Boris Shaposhnikov, Ivan Panfilovich Belov, Pavel Dybenko, and Nikolai Kashirin; and Corps Commander Yelisey Goryachev. Only Ulrikh, Budyonny and Shaposhnikov would survive the purges that followed. The trial triggered a massive subsequent purge of the Red Army. In September 1938, the People's Commissar for Defense, Kliment Voroshilov, reported that a total of 37,761 officers and commissars were dismissed from the army, 10,868 were arrested and 7,211 were condemned for anti-Soviet crimes. Background The trial was preceded by several purges of the Red Army. In the mid-1920s, Leon Trotsky was removed as Commissar of War, and his known supporters were expunged from the military. Former tsarist officers had been purged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The latter purge was accompanied by the "exposure" of the "Former Officers Plot". The next wave of arrests of military commanders started in the second half of 1936 and increased in scope after the February-March 1937 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), where Vyacheslav Molotov called for more thorough exposure of "wreckers" within the Red Army since they "had already been found in all segments of the Soviet economy". he purge of the Red Army and Military Maritime Fleet removed three of five marshals (then equivalent to four-star generals), 13 of 15 army commanders (then equivalent to three-star generals),[32] eight of nine admirals (the purge fell heavily on the Navy, who were suspected of exploiting their opportunities for foreign contacts),[33] 50 of 57 army corps commanders, 154 out of 186 division commanders, 16 of 16 army commissars, and 25 of 28 army corps commissars.[34] At first it was thought 25-50% of Red Army officers had been purged; the true figure is now known to be in the area of 3.7-7.7%. This discrepancy was the result of a systematic underestimation of the true size of the Red Army officer corps, and it was overlooked that most of those purged were merely expelled from the Party. Thirty percent of officers purged in 1937-39 were allowed to return to service.[35] The purge of the army was claimed to be supported by German-forged documents (said to have been correspondence between Marshal Tukhachevsky and members of the German high command).[36] The claim is unsupported by facts, as by the time the documents were supposedly created, two people from the eight in the Tukhachevsky group were already imprisoned, and by the time the document was said to reach Stalin the purging process was already underway. However the actual evidence introduced at trial was obtained from forced confessions

Suslov za Chruščova

Chruščov: 1953 -64 Suslov znovuzískal pozici 55 -> zvolen do křesla v Prezidiu (Prezídium Nejvyšího sovětu SSSR) - překročil obvyklé kandidátské členství - 20sjezd KS 1956 Ch: slavnou tajnou řeč -> In Suslov's ideological report on 16 February, he updated his criticism of Stalin and his personality cult - Maďarská revoluce 1956 - Suslov a Mikojan směřovali sovět jednotky na pomoc novému maď vedení - oba na jednání maď Politbyra - zvolilo Kadára do fce gen tajemníka -> spokojení s odstavením Ernő Gerő - prezidium nejvyššího sovětu je pak kritzovalo za ústupky nové maď rev vládě - ikdyž první proti nakonec hlasoval pro vojenskou intervenci v Maď aby nahradila counterrevolutionary government's leadership - 1957 červen Suslov podpořil Ch během jeho potyčky s Anti-Party Group led by Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Dmitry Shepilov - v říjnu 57 nařkl Žukova (min obrany) z "Bonapartismu" na plenu UV-> sebrali mu všechny stranické i vládní fce - odstraněním Žukova -> pevné podřízení vojska Stranické kontrole

kolektivní vedení státu

Collectivity of leadership Main article: Collective leadership Alexei Kosygin, a member of the collective leadership, with Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, at the 1967 Glassboro Summit Conference After a prolonged power struggle,[1] Khrushchev was finally ousted from his post as First Secretary in October 1964, charged with the failure of his reforms, his obsessive re-organizations of the Party and Government apparatus, his disregard for Party and Government institutions, and his one-man domineering leadership style.[2] The Presidium (Politburo), the Central Committee and other important Party-Government bodies had grown tired of Khrushchev's repeated violations of established Party principles. The Soviet leadership also believed that his individualistic leadership style ran contrary to the ideal collective leadership.[1] Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin succeeded Khrushchev in his posts as First Secretary and Premier respectively, and Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Kirilenko, and Anastas Mikoyan (replaced in 1965 by Nikolai Podgorny), were also given prominence in the new leadership. Together they formed a functional collective leadership.[3] The collective leadership was, in its early stages, usually referred to as the "Brezhnev-Kosygin" leadership[4] and the pair began their respective periods in office on a relatively equal footing. After Kosygin initiated the economic reform of 1965, however, his prestige within the Soviet leadership withered and his subsequent loss of power strengthened Brezhnev's position within the Soviet hierarchy.[5] Kosygin's influence was further weakened when Podgorny took his post as the second-most powerful figure in the Soviet Union.[6] Brezhnev conspired to oust Podgorny from the collective leadership as early as 1970. The reason was simple: Brezhnev was third, while Podgorny was first in the ranking of Soviet diplomatic protocol; Podgorny's removal would have made Brezhnev head of state, and his political power would have increased significantly. For much of the period, however, Brezhnev was unable to have Podgorny removed, because he could not count on enough votes in the Politburo, since the removal of Podgorny would have meant weakening of the power and the prestige of the collective leadership itself. Indeed, Podgorny continued to acquire greater power as the head of state throughout the early 1970s, due to Brezhnev's liberal stance on Yugoslavia and his disarmament talks with some Western powers, policies which many Soviet officials saw as contrary to common communist principles.[7] This did not remain the case, however. Brezhnev strengthened his position considerably during the early to mid-1970s within the Party leadership and by a further weakening of the "Kosygin faction"; by 1977 he had enough support in the Politburo to oust Podgorny from office and active politics in general.[8] Podgorny's eventual removal in 1977 had the effect of reducing Kosygin's role in day-to-day management of government activities by strengthening the powers of the government apparatus led by Brezhnev.[9] After Podgorny's removal rumours started circulating Soviet society that Kosygin was about to retire due to his deteriorating health condition.[10] Nikolai Tikhonov, a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers under Kosygin, succeeded the later as premier in 1980 (see Kosygin's resignation).[10] Podgorny's fall was not seen as the end of the collective leadership, and Suslov continued to write several ideological documents about it. In 1978, one year after Podgorny's retirement, Suslov made several references to the collective leadership in his ideological works. It was around this time that Kirilenko's power and prestige within the Soviet leadership started to wane.[11] Indeed, towards the end of the period, Brezhnev was regarded as too old to simultaneously exercise all of the functions of head of state by his colleagues. With this in mind, the Supreme Soviet, on Brezhnev's orders, established the new post of First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a post akin to a "vice president". The Supreme Soviet unanimously approved Vasili Kuznetsov, at the age of 76, to be First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium in late 1977.[12] As Brezhnev's health worsened, the collective leadership took an even more important role in everyday decision-making. For this reason, Brezhnev's death did not alter the balance of power in any radical fashion, and Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were obliged by protocol to rule the country in the same fashion as Brezhnev left it.[

Brežněvův kult osobnosti

Cult of personality Further information: Awards and decorations received by Leonid Brezhnev Brezhnev's official portrait, taken in 1977 The last years of Brezhnev's rule were marked by a growing personality cult. His love of medals (he received over 100) was well known, so in December 1966, on his 60th birthday, he was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev received the award, which came with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star, three more times in celebration of his birthdays.[105] On his 70th birthday he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union - the highest military honour in the Soviet Union. After being awarded the medal, he attended an 18th Army Veterans meeting, dressed in a long coat and saying; "Attention, the Marshal is coming!" He also conferred upon himself the rare Order of Victory in 1978—the only time the decoration was ever awarded outside of World War II. (This medal was posthumously revoked in 1989 for not meeting the criteria for citation.)[106] Brezhnev's weakness for undeserved medals was proven by his poorly written memoirs recalling his military service during World War II, which treated the little-known and minor Battle of Novorossiysk as the decisive military theatre.[55] Despite the apparent weaknesses of his memoirs, they were awarded the Lenin Prize for Literature and were met with critical acclaim by the Soviet press.[106] The book was followed by two other books, one on the Virgin Lands Campaign.[107] Brezhnev's vanity made him the victim of many political jokes.[106] Nikolai Podgorny warned him of this, but Brezhnev replied, "If they are poking fun at me, it means they like me."[108] In keeping with traditional socialist greetings, Brezhnev kissed many politicians during his career, the most memorable instance being the Erich Honecker kiss.[109][110][111][112]

Brežněvova konsolidace moci

Consolidation of power Further information: Collective leadership in the Soviet Union Brezhnev after speaking at the Komsomol Central Committee plenary session (1968) Upon replacing Khrushchev as the party's First Secretary, Brezhnev became the de jure supreme authority in the Soviet Union. However, he was initially forced to govern as part of a troika alongside the country's Premier, Alexei Kosygin, as well as the party's Second Secretary and later Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Podgorny. Due to Khrushchev's disregard for the rest of the Politburo upon combining his leadership of the party with that of the Soviet government, a plenum of the Central Committee in October 1964 forbade any single individual from holding both the offices of General Secretary and Premier.[22] This arrangement would persist until the 1970s when Brezhnev consolidated his grip on power to become the dominant figure in the Soviet Union. Former Chairman of the State Committee for State Security (KGB) Alexander Shelepin disliked the new collective leadership and its reforms. He made a bid for the supreme leadership in 1965 by calling for the restoration of "obedience and order". Shelepin failed to gather support in the Presidium and Brezhnev's position was fairly secure; he was able to remove Shelepin from office in 1967.[25] Brezhnev meets U.S. President Gerald Ford at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974 after securing his position as leader of the USSR. T.H. Rigby argued that by the end of the 1960s, a stable oligarchic system had emerged in the Soviet Union, with most power vested around Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny. While the assessment was true at the time, it coincided with Brezhnev's strengthening of power by means of an apparent clash with Central Committee Secretariat Mikhail Suslov.[26] American Henry A. Kissinger, in the 1960s, mistakenly believed Kosygin to be the dominant leader of Soviet foreign policy in the Politburo. During this period, Brezhnev was gathering enough support to strengthen his position within Soviet politics. In the meantime, Kosygin was in charge of economic administration in his role as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Kosygin's position was weakened when he proposed an economic reform in 1965, which was widely referred to as the "Kosygin reform" within the Communist Party. The reform led to a backlash, and party old guard continued to oppose Kosygin after witnessing the results of reforms leading up to the Prague Spring. His opponents then flocked to Brezhnev, and they helped him in his task of strengthening his position within the Soviet system.[27] Brezhnev was adept at politics within the Soviet power structure. He was a team player and never acted rashly or hastily; unlike Khrushchev, he did not make decisions without substantial consultation from his colleagues, and was always willing to hear their opinions.[28] During the early 1970s, Brezhnev consolidated his domestic position. In 1977, he forced the retirement of Podgorny and became once again Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, making this position equivalent to that of an executive president. While Kosygin remained Premier until shortly before his death in 1980 (replaced by Nikolai Tikhonov as Premier), Brezhnev was the dominant driving force of the Soviet Union from the mid-1970s[29] to his death in 1982.[

břežněvova domácí

Domestic policies Repression Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB who presided over the pervasive crackdown on dissent during Brezhnev's leadership. Brezhnev's stabilisation policy included ending the liberalising reforms of Khrushchev, and clamping down on cultural freedom.[30] During the Khrushchev years, Brezhnev had supported the leader's denunciations of Stalin's arbitrary rule, the rehabilitation of many of the victims of Stalin's purges, and the cautious liberalisation of Soviet intellectual and cultural policy. But as soon as he became leader, Brezhnev began to reverse this process, and developed an increasingly totalitarian and regressive attitude.[31][32] The trial of the writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky in 1966—the first such public trials since Stalin's day—marked the reversion to a repressive cultural policy.[31] Under Yuri Andropov the state security service (in the form of the KGB) regained some of the powers it had enjoyed under Stalin, although there was no return to the purges of the 1930s and 1940s, and Stalin's legacy remained largely discredited among the Soviet intelligentsia.[33] By the mid-1970s, there were an estimated 1,000 [34] to 10,000 political and religious prisoners across the Soviet Union, living in grievous conditions and suffering from malnutrition. Many of these prisoners were considered by the Soviet state to be mentally unfit and were hospitalised in mental asylums across the Soviet Union. Under Brezhnev's rule, the KGB infiltrated most, if not all, anti-government organisations, which ensured that there was little to no opposition against him or his power base. However, Brezhnev refrained from the all-out violence seen under Stalin's rul

Obraná politika za Brežněva

Defense policy Dmitriy Ustinov, the Minister of Defense from 1976 until his death in 1984, was one of the most influential figures in Soviet security policy-making along with Andrei Gromyko, Yuri Andropov and Brezhnev[15] The Soviet Union launched a large military build-up in 1965 by expanding both nuclear and conventional arsenals. The Soviet leadership believed a strong military would be useful leverage in negotiating with foreign powers, and increase the Eastern Bloc's security from attacks. In the 1970s, the Soviet leadership concluded that a war with the capitalist countries might not necessarily become nuclear, and therefore they initiated a rapid expansion of the country's conventional forces. Due to the country's weaker infrastructure compared to the United States, the Soviet leadership believed that the only way to beat the First World was by a rapid military conquest of Western Europe, relying on sheer numbers alone. The Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States by the early 1970s, after which the country consolidated itself as a superpower.[16] The apparent success of the military build-up led the Soviet leadership to believe that the military, and the military alone, according to Willard Frank, "bought the Soviet Union security and influence".[17] Brezhnev had, according to some of his closest advisers, been concerned for a very long time about the growing military expenditure in the 1960s. Advisers have recounted how Brezhnev came into conflict with several top-level military industrialists, the most notable being Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Minister of Defense. In the early 1970s, according to Anatoly Aleksandrov-Agentov, one of Brezhnev's closest advisers, Brezhnev attended a five-hour meeting to try to convince the Soviet military establishment to reduce military spending.[18] In the meeting an irritated Brezhnev asked why the Soviet Union should, in the words of Matthew Evangelista, "continue to exhaust" the economy if the country could not be promised a military parity with the West; the question was left unanswered.[19] When Grechko died in 1976, Dmitriy Ustinov took his place as Defense Minister. Ustinov, although a close associate and friend of Brezhnev, hindered any attempt made by Brezhnev to reduce national military expenditure. In his later years, Brezhnev lacked the will to reduce defense expenditure, due to his declining health.[20] According to the Soviet diplomat Georgy Arbatov, the military-industrial complex functioned as Brezhnev's power base within the Soviet hierarchy even if he tried to scale-down investments.[21] At the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, Brezhnev told the delegates that the Soviet military had reached a level fully sufficient to defend the country. The Soviet Union reached ICBM parity with the United States that year.[22] In early 1977, Brezhnev told the world that the Soviet Union did not seek to become superior to the United States in nuclear weapons, nor to be militarily superior in any sense of the word.[23] In the later years of Brezhnev's reign, it became official defense policy to only invest enough to maintain military deterrence, and by the 1980s, Soviet defense officials were told again that investment would not exceed the level to retain national security.[24] In his last meeting with Soviet military leaders in October 1982, Brezhnev stressed the importance of not over-investing in the Soviet military sector. This policy was retained during the rules of Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko and Mikhail Gorbachev.[25] He also said that the time was opportune to increase the readiness of the armed forces even further. At the anniversary of the 1917 Revolution a few weeks later (Brezhnev's final public appearance), Western observers noted that the annual military parade featured only two new weapons and most of the equipment displayed was obsolete. Two days before his death, Brezhnev stated that any aggression against the Soviet Union "would result in a crushing retaliatory blow

brežněvovy pětiletky v číslech

Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) Gross national product (GNP): 5.2% [39] or 5.3% [40] Gross national income (GNI): 7.1% [41] Capital investments in agriculture: 24% [42] Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) GNP: 3.7% [39] GNI: 5.1% [41] Labour productivity: 6% [43] Capital investments in agriculture: 27% [42] Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) GNP: 2.7% [39] GNP: 3% [40] Labour productivity: 3.2% [44] Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985)

emigrace

Emigration restrictions and defectors Main article: Eastern Bloc emigration and defection Further information: List of Eastern Bloc defectors, Berlin Wall, Republikflucht, Iron Curtain, Soviet Border Troops, Refusenik, Passport system in the Soviet Union, Grepo, and Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic In 1917, Russia restricted emigration by instituting passport controls and forbidding the exit of belligerent nationals.[111] In 1922, after the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR, both the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR issued general rules for travel that foreclosed virtually all departures, making legal emigration impossible.[112] Border controls thereafter strengthened such that, by 1928, even illegal departure was effectively impossible.[112] This later included internal passport controls, which when combined with individual city Propiska ("place of residence") permits, and internal freedom of movement restrictions often called the 101st kilometre, greatly restricted mobility within even small areas of the Soviet Union.[113] Berlin Wall, 1975 After the creation of the Eastern Bloc, emigration out of the newly occupied countries, except under limited circumstances, was effectively halted in the early 1950s, with the Soviet approach to controlling national movement emulated by most of the rest of the Eastern Bloc.[114] However, in East Germany, taking advantage of the Inner German border between occupied zones, hundreds of thousands fled to West Germany, with figures totaling 197,000 in 1950, 165,000 in 1951, 182,000 in 1952 and 331,000 in 1953.[115][116] One reason for the sharp 1953 increase was fear of potential further Sovietization with the increasingly paranoid[dubious - discuss] actions of Joseph Stalin in late 1952 and early 1953.[117] 226,000 had fled in the just the first six months of 1953.[118] With the closing of the Inner German border officially in 1952,[119] the Berlin city sector borders remained considerably more accessible than the rest of the border because of their administration by all four occupying powers.[120] Accordingly, it effectively comprised a "loophole" through which Eastern Bloc citizens could still move west.[119] The 3.5 million East Germans that had left by 1961, called Republikflucht, totaled approximately 20% of the entire East German population.[121] In August 1961, East Germany erected a barbed-wire barrier that would eventually be expanded through construction into the Berlin Wall, effectively closing the loophole.[122] With virtually non-existent conventional emigration, more than 75% of those emigrating from Eastern Bloc countries between 1950 and 1990 did so under bilateral agreements for "ethnic migration."[123] About 10% were refugee migrants under the Geneva Convention of 1951.[123] Most Soviets allowed to leave during this time period were ethnic Jews permitted to emigrate to Israel after a series of embarrassing defections in 1970 caused the Soviets to open very limited ethnic emigrations.[124] The fall of the Iron Curtain was accompanied by a massive rise in European East-West migration.[123] Famous Eastern Bloc defectors included Joseph Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva, who denounced Stalin after her 1967 defection.[125]

Political and civil restrictions

In addition to emigration restrictions, civil society, defined as a domain of political action outside the party's state control, was not allowed to firmly take root, with the possible exception of Poland in the 1980s.[91] While the institutional design on the communist systems were based on the rejection of rule of law, the legal infrastructure was not immune to change reflecting decaying ideology and the substitution of autonomous law.[91] Initially, communist parties were small in all countries except Czechoslovakia, such that there existed an acute shortage of politically "trustworthy" persons for administration, police, and other professions.[92] Thus, "politically unreliable" non-communists initially had to fill such roles.[92] Those not obedient to communist authorities were ousted, while Moscow cadres started a large-scale party programs to train personnel who would meet political requirements.[92] Communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc viewed marginal groups of opposition intellectuals as a potential threat because of the bases underlying Communist power therein.[93] The suppression of dissidence and opposition was considered a central prerequisite to retain power, though the enormous expense at which the population in certain countries were kept under secret surveillance may not have been rational.[93] Following a totalitarian initial phase, a post-totalitarian period followed the death of Stalin in which the primary method of Communist rule shifted from mass terror to selective repression, along with ideological and sociopolitical strategies of legitimation and the securing of loyalty.[94] Juries were replaced by a tribunal of a professional judges and two lay assessors that were dependable party actors.[95] The police deterred and contained opposition to party directives.[95] The political police served as the core of the system, with their names becoming synonymous with raw power and the threat of violent retribution should an individual become active against the State.[95] Several state police and secret police organizations enforced communist party rule, including the following: East Germany - Stasi, Volkspolizei, and KdA Soviet Union/Ukraine/Byelorussia - NKVD, KGB, and GRU Czechoslovakia - STB and LM Bulgaria - KDS Albania - Sigurimi Hungary - ÁVH and Munkásőrség Romania - Securitate and GP Poland - Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, Służba Bezpieczeństwa, and ZOMO

marxismus - leninismus

In political science, Marxism-Leninism was the official state ideology of the Soviet Union (USSR), the political parties of the Communist International, and of contemporary Stalinist political parties.[1] Combining Leninist political praxis and Marxist socio-economics, the purpose of Marxism-Leninism is the two-stage revolutionary development of a capitalist state into a socialist state, guided by the leadership of a vanguard party of professional revolutionaries from the working class and the proletariat. The socialist state is instituted and governed by way of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which determines policy with democratic centralism.[2][3] Politically, the Marxist-Leninist communist party is the political vanguard for the organisation of society into a socialist state, which is the lower stage of socio-economic development and progress towards the upper-stage communist society, which is stateless and classless; yet features organised public ownership of the means of production and accelerated industrialisation, pro-active development of the productive forces of society[4] and nationalised natural resources.[5] In the late 1920s, after the death of Lenin, Stalin established universal ideologic orthodoxy in the Communist Party, the USSR, and the Communist International, with his coinage Marxism-Leninism, a term which redefined theories of Lenin and Marx to establish universal Marxist-Leninist praxis for the exclusive, geopolitical benefit of the USSR.[6][7] In the late 1930s, Stalin's official textbook The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (1938), made the term Marxism-Leninism common, political-science usage among communists and non-communists.[8] Critical of the Stalinist models of socialism and government in the Soviet Union, the American Marxist Raya Dunayevskaya and the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga dismissed Marxism-Leninism as a type of state capitalism,[9] because: (i) state ownership of the means of production is a form of state capitalism;[10] (ii) the dictatorship of the proletariat is a form of democracy, therefore, single-party rule is undemocratic;[11] and (iii) Marxism-Leninism is neither Marxism nor Leninism nor a philosophic synthesis, but a personal artifice that Stalin used to determine what is communism and what is not communism among the Eastern bloc.[12]

mezinárodním oddělení ÚV KSSS

International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union = oddělení UV KSSS - dohlížela na vztahy strany s ostatíma kom stranama a s mezinárodníma kom orga - zdělila složky a zaměstnance z Komunistické Internacionály (skončila 1943) oddělení založeno 1943 -> okolo rozputění Kominterny Leadership 1943, 27 December - 1945, 29 December: Georgi Dimitrov 1946, 13 April - 1949, 12 March :Mikhail Suslov 1949 - 1953: Vagan Grigorievich Grigoryan 1953-1954:Mikhail Suslov 1954-1955: Vasily Pavlovich Stepanov 1955-1986 Boris Ponomarev (the first deputy director from 1938-1955, deputy director of the Cominform from 1947-1948

Jekatěrina Semjonovna "Kato" Svanidzeová

Jekatěrina Semjonovna "Kato" Svanidzeová (gruzínsky ეკატერინე სვანიძე, rusky Екатерина Сeмëнoвнa Cвaнидзe, 2. dubna 1885, Tiflis, Ruské impérium - 5. prosince 1907 tamtéž) byla první manželka Josifa Stalina (tehdy Džugašviliho) a matka jeho syna Jakova. Životopis Narodila se do rodiny zchudlého šlechtice, který pracoval jako železničář. Ona sama později pracovala jako pradlena i švadlena. V roce 1904 potkala revolucionáře Josefa Džugašviliho (rodné jméno Josifa Stalina), kterého si tentýž rok vzala. Svatba proběhla v tbiliském chrámu sv. Davida. Oddávajícím byl pozdější bolševik Michail Cchakaja. Roku 1907 porodila syna Jakova, ale tentýž rok 5. prosince zemřela na tuberkulózu (jiné zdroje uvádějí za příčinu smrti břišní tyfus[1]). Byla pohřbena podle pravoslavného ritu. Ve třicátých letech 20. století byli její bratr Alexandr a sestra Marie zastřeleni.

Kirill Semjonovič Moskalenko

Kirill Moskalenko Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko 1902 (ukrajina) - 1985 Years of service 1920-1985 Rank Marshal of the Soviet Union Battles/wars Russian Civil War World War II Awards Hero of the Soviet Union (twice) Other work Commander of Strategic Rocket was a Marshal of the Soviet Union. A member of the Soviet Army who fought in both the Russian Civil War and World War II, he later served as Commander in Chief of Strategic Missile Forces and Inspector General for the Ministry of Defense. - Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine), in a family of Ukrainian peasants. He attended a number of military academies and joined the Red Army in 1920 and fought on various fronts during the Russian Civil War. During the Soviet-Finnish War, he was the commander of artillery for the 51st Rifle Division. World War II When Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, Moskalenko was the commander of an anti-tank brigade. Between June, 1941, and March, 1942, Moskalenko first held command of the 1st Anti-Tank Brigade, 15th Rifle Corps, 6th Army, and later of the 6th Cavalry Corps. He was the commander of the newly reformed 38th Army from March to July, 1942. He was then appointed commander of the 1st Tank Army (July-August 1942) and the 1st Guards Army (August-October 1942) before finally receiving command of the 40th Army, which was separate from the Voronezh Front, a position he held until October, 1943. Moskalenko led his troops during the winter counteroffensive and during the Battle of Kursk. Because of his contributions to a large number of key battles, such as Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, Moskalenko was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. From October 1943 until the end of the war, Moskalenko was the commander of the 38th Army. He led his troops as they helped drive the Germans from the Ukraine, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Post-World War II One of the last photos of the marshal After the war, Moskalenko served in various capacities in the Moscow Military District, before being appointed its Commanding General in 1953. On July 25, 1953, the CPSU Secretary Khrushchev along with Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Kirill Moskalenko secretly arrested First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR Beria during a joint CSPU Presidium and Cabinet meeting. While Zhukov could not carry a gun into the Kremlin, Moskalenko sneaked into the Kremlin with a gun to arrest Beria. During the next six months, he and Rudenko investigated the "Beria Case". In December, 1953, the Soviet Supreme Court found Beria guilty after a five-day proceeding. On December 23, Beria was shot. Another version states that Beria was shot by machine gun during the military assault on his residential compound in Moscow. As a result of this operation, on March 11, 1955, Moskalenko, along with five other commanders, was given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Moskalenko remained in the Moscow Military District until 1960, when he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. In 1962, he was made an Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense. He died on June 17, 1985. His body was buried in Novodevichy Cemetery.

Lavrentij Pavlovič Berija

Lavrentij Pavlovič Berija (gruzínsky ლავრენტი პავლეს ძე ბერია, Lavrenti Pavles dze Beria; rusky Лавре́нтий Па́влович Бе́рия; 17. březnajul./ 29. března 1899greg. - 23. prosince 1953) byl sovětský politik, jeden z vykonavatelů Stalinových čistek ve 30. letech, od roku 1940 je jako šéf lidového komisariátu vnitra (ministerstvo vnitra) řídil. Po Stalinově smrti neustál souboj s Chruščovem o moc a byl odsouzen k smrti a popraven. Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria (/ˈbɛriə/; Russian: Лавре́нтий Па́влович Бе́рия, IPA: [ˈbʲerʲiə]; Georgian: ლავრენტი პავლეს ძე ბერია, translit.: lavrent'i p'avles dze beria, IPA: [bɛriɑ]; 29 March [17 March old style] 1899 - 23 December 1953) was a Soviet politician, Marshal of the Soviet Union and state security administrator, chief of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus (NKVD) under Joseph Stalin during World War II, and promoted to deputy premier under Stalin from 1941. He later officially joined the Politburo in 1946. Beria was the longest-lived and most influential of Stalin's secret police chiefs, wielding his most substantial influence during and after World War II. Following the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 he was responsible for organizing the Katyn massacre.[1] He simultaneously administered vast sections of the Soviet state and acted as the de facto Marshal of the Soviet Union in command of NKVD field units responsible for barrier troops and Soviet partisan intelligence and sabotage operations on the Eastern Front during World War II. Beria administered the vast expansion of the Gulag labor camps and was primarily responsible for overseeing the secret detention facilities for scientists and engineers known as sharashkas. He attended the Yalta Conference with Stalin, who introduced him to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt as "our Himmler".[2] After the war, he organized the Communist takeover of the state institutions in Central Europe and Eastern Europe and political repressions in these countries. Beria's uncompromising ruthlessness in his duties and skill at producing results culminated in his success in overseeing the Soviet atomic bomb project. Stalin gave it absolute priority and the project was completed in under five years, having been accelerated by Soviet espionage against the West.[3] After Stalin's death in March 1953, Lavrentiy Beria became First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union and head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this dual capacity, he formed a troika alongside Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov that briefly led the country in Stalin's place. However, in a coup d'état launched by Nikita Khrushchev on June 1953, Beria was ultimately removed from power and subsequently arrested on charges of treason. He was sentenced to death and was executed by Pavel Batitsky on December 23, 1953.[4]

Smlouva o nešíření jaderných zbraní.

Má zamezit šíření zbraní do třetích zemí 1968

NKVD

NKVD, zkráceno z ruských slov Narodnyj komissariat vnutrennich děl, Народный комиссариат внутренних дел, (česky Lidový komisariát vnitřních záležitostí) byl centrální státní orgán Sovětského svazu zabývající se vnitřní bezpečností, požární ochranou, střežením hranic a evidencí obyvatel, spravující věznice a pracovní tábory, zabývající se rozvědkou a kontrarozvědkou, který vznikl reorganizací Sjednocené státní politické správy (OGPU), existoval v letech 1934-1946 a posléze byl přejmenován na Ministerstvo vnitřních záležitostí (MVD) Historie Mrtvoly obětí zavražděných sovětskou NKVD v posledních červnových dnech roku 1941 ve Lvově, těsně po vypuknutí německo-sovětské války Lidový komisariát vnitřních záležitostí vznikl reorganizací Sjednocené státní politické správy (OGPU) v červenci 1934.[pozn. 1] Lidovým komisařem vnitra byl jmenován Genrich Jagoda, dosud náměstek předsedy OGPU. Lidový komisariát měl za úkol zabezpečit pořádek ve společnosti a bezpečnost státu, ochranu socialistického vlastnictví, evidenci obyvatel, ochranu hranic, provoz nápravně-pracovních táborů. Hlavní směry činnosti komisariátu řídilo pět hlavních správ: Hlavní správa státní bezpečnosti (GUGB), Hlavní správa dělnicko-rolnické milice (GURKM), Hlavní správa pohraniční a vnitřní ochrany (GUPVO), Hlavní správa požární ochrany (GUPO), Hlavní správa nápravně-pracovních táborů, pracovních kolonií a věznic (GULAG).[1] Dále v NKVD existovalo oddělení pro evidenci obyvatel a různé administrativní a hospodářské útvary.[1] Dočasně mu podléhaly také správy pro geodézii a kartografii, pro míry a váhy, trvale od roku 1938 státní archívy. Organizační struktura NKVD se postupně měnila a vyvíjela, zejména správy pro pohraniční a vnitřní vojska (GUPVO), ale i pro tábory (GULAG) se po roce 1939 rozdělily na řadu samostatných útvarů, přibyla správa pro válečné zajatce a správa místní protivzdušné obrany. Po jmenování Nikolaje Ježova lidovým komisařem v září 1936 represe nabyly obrovských rozměrů, v letech 1937-1938 bylo zatčeno jedenapůl miliónu lidí a z nich bylo na 800 tisíc zastřeleno.[2] V listopadu 1938 se lidovým komisařem vnitra stal Lavrentij Berija. Od 3. února 1941 byla státní bezpečnost z NKVD vyčleněna do samostatného Lidového komisariátu státní bezpečnosti (NKGB). Měsíc po vypuknutí sovětsko-německé války byla státní bezpečnost od 20. července 1941 vrácena do NKVD. Samostatný NKGB opět vznikl 14. dubna 1943. V březnu 1946, v souvislosti s přejmenováním Rady lidových komisařů SSSR na Radu ministrů SSSR, byly přejmenovány i všechny lidové komisariáty na ministerstva. Z lidového komisariátu vnitřních záležitostí (NKVD) se stalo ministerstvo vnitřních záležitostí (MVD). Lidoví komisaři Genrich Grigorjevič Jagoda (10. července 1934 - 26. září 1936) Nikolaj Ivanovič Ježov (26. září 1936 - 25. listopadu 1938) Lavrentij Pavlovič Berija (25. listopadu 1938- 29. prosince 1945) Sergej Nikiforovič Kruglov (29. prosince 1945 - 15. března 1946) Související články Čeka GPU - Státní politická správa (Государственное политическое управление, Gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravlenie) OGPU - Sjednocená státní politická správa (Объединённое государственное политическое управление, Obyedinyonnoye gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravleniye) KGB Tajná policie GULAG

New political thinking

New political thinking New political thinking (or simply "new thinking") was the doctrine put forth by Mikhail Gorbachev as part of his reforms of the Soviet Union. Its major elements were deideologization of international politics, abandoning the concept of class struggle, priority of universal human interests over the interests of any class, increasing interdependence of the world, mutual security based on political rather than military instruments, which constituted a significant shift from the previous principles of the Soviet foreign politics.[1][2] [3] In 1987 Gorbachev published the book Perestroika and New Political Thinking[4] and in December 1988 he presented the doctrine of new thinking in his speech to the United Nations.[1][5] The "new thinking" was of vital necessity for the Soviet Union to shut down the costly Cold War competition in order to continue internal economic reforms of perestroika.[2] Notable steps in this direction included Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, stopped support of communist movements around the world and loosened grip over the Eastern Europe by replacing the Brezhnev Doctrine with Sinatra Doctrine.[2] In 1990 Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace "for his leading role in the peace process". The overall effect of these developments was the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of the Soviet Empire and ultimately of the Soviet Union itself

Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev[a] (15 April 1894 - 11 September 1971)[1][2] was a Soviet statesman who led the Soviet Union during part of the Cold War as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964, and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or Premier, from 1958 to 1964. Khrushchev was responsible for the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union, for backing the progress of the early Soviet space program, and for several relatively liberal reforms in areas of domestic policy. Khrushchev's party colleagues removed him from power in 1964, replacing him with Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Premier. Khrushchev was born in 1894 in the village of Kalinovka, which is close to the present-day border between Russia and Ukraine. He was employed as a metal worker during his youth, and he was a political commissar during the Russian Civil War. With the help of Lazar Kaganovich, he worked his way up the Soviet hierarchy. He supported Joseph Stalin's purges, and approved thousands of arrests. In 1938, Stalin sent him to govern Ukraine, and he continued the purges there. During what was known in the Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic War (Eastern Front of World War II), Khrushchev was again a commissar, serving as an intermediary between Stalin and his generals. Khrushchev was present at the bloody defense of Stalingrad, a fact he took great pride in throughout his life. After the war, he returned to Ukraine before being recalled to Moscow as one of Stalin's close advisers. On 5 March 1953, the death of Stalin triggered a power struggle in which Khrushchev emerged victorious after consolidating his leadership of the party with that of the Council of Ministers. On 25 February 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, he delivered the "Secret Speech", which denounced Stalin's purges and ushered in a less repressive era in the Soviet Union. His domestic policies, aimed at bettering the lives of ordinary citizens, were often ineffective, especially in agriculture. Hoping eventually to rely on missiles for national defense, Khrushchev ordered major cuts in conventional forces. Despite the cuts, Khrushchev's rule saw the most tense years of the Cold War, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev's popularity was eroded by flaws in his policies. This emboldened his potential opponents, who quietly rose in strength and deposed the Premier in October 1964. However, he did not suffer the deadly fate of previous Soviet power struggles, and was pensioned off with an apartment in Moscow and a dacha in the countryside. His lengthy memoirs were smuggled to the West and published in part in 1970. Khrushchev died in 1971 of a heart attack.

Nikolaj Alexandrovič Bulganin

Nikolaj Alexandrovič Bulganin (rusky Николай Александрович Булганин, 30. květnajul./ 11. června 1895greg., Nižnyj Novgorod, Rusko - 24. února 1975, Moskva, SSSR) byl prominentní sovětský politik, který působil jako ministr obrany (1953-1955) a předseda rady ministrů SSSR (1955-1958). K bolševické straně se připojil v roce 1917 a v roce 1918 vstoupil do Čeky, bolševické politické policie, kde sloužil až do roku 1922. Po ruské občanské válce se stal průmyslovým manažerem, pracoval až do roku 1927 v různých odborech jako administrátor a poté jako ředitel zodpovídal za dodávky elektrického proudu do Moskvy (1927-1931). Do roku 1937 byl předsedou výkonného výboru moskevských sovětů. V roce 1934 byl zvolen kandidátem členství v ústředním výboru Komunistické strany SSSR. Za velkého teroru těsně unikl smrti tím, že na čas odjel na dovolenou do Polska pod záminkou léčení. V roce 1937 byl jmenován předsedou rady lidových komisařů RSFSR a získal plnoprávné členství v ústředním výboru; v září roku 1938 ho ustanovili náměstkem předsedy rady lidových komisařů SSSR. Během druhé světové války hrál významnou úlohu ve vládě a také v Rudé armádě, ačkoli nebyl nikdy hlavní velitel. V roce 1944 byl jmenován náměstkem lidového komisaře obrany a sloužil jako Stalinův hlavní agent v armádních strukturách. V roce 1947 se stal ministrem ozbrojených sil SSSR a byl povýšen na maršála. Stal se také kandidátem na členství v politbyru a v letech 1947-1950 i náměstkem předsedy rady ministrů. V roce 1948 dosáhl plného členství v politbyru, tedy s hlasovacím právem. Vrchol a pád Po Stalinově smrti v březnu roku 1953 se stal jedním z kandidátů na příštího vůdce SSSR, nakonec se však v roce 1955 stal „pouhým" předsedou rady ministrů. Šlo o velkého spojence Nikity Chruščova a jeho programu reforem a destalinizace. Společně s Chruščovem cestoval do Indie, Jugoslávie a Spojeného království, kde byli oba známi v tisku jako "B a K". Roku 1957 však začal, ovlivněn konzervativní skupinou vedenou Vjačeslavem Molotovem, sdílet pochyby o Chruščovově reformní politice. Když byli konzervativci poraženi a odstraněni, nutil jej Chruščov, aby podal rezignaci na všechny politické funkce. Byl sice jmenován předsedou sovětské státní banky, ale v roce 1958 ho odstranili z Ústředního výboru KSSS a připravili o titul maršála. Byl poslán do Stavropolu jako předseda regionální ekonomické rady a v únoru 1960 odešel do penze. Bulganin was born in Nizhny Novgorod, the son of an office worker. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917 and was recruited in 1918 into the Cheka, the Bolshevik regime's political police, where he served until 1922. After the Russian Civil War, he became an industrial manager and worked in the electricity administration until 1927. He was director of the Moscow electricity supply in 1927-1931. In 1931-1937, Bulganin was chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow City Soviet. In 1934, the 17th Congress of the Communist Party elected Bulganin a candidate member of the Central Committee. A loyal Stalinist, he was promoted rapidly as other leaders fell victim to Joseph Stalin's Great Purge of 1937-38. In July 1937, he was appointed Prime Minister of the Russian Republic (RSFSR). He became a full member of the Central Committee later that year and, in September 1938, became Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and head of the State Bank of the USSR. World War II During World War II, Bulganin played a leading role in the government and Red Army, although he was never a front-line commander. He was given the rank of Colonel-General and was a member of the State Defense Committee. He was appointed Deputy Commissar for Defence in 1944 and served as Stalin's principal agent in the High Command of the Red Army. In 1947, he became Minister for the Armed Forces and was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He also became a candidate member of the Politburo of the Communist Party. He was again Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, under Stalin, from 1947 to 1950. In 1948, he became a full member of the Politburo. Premiership This section possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. (July 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) After Stalin's death in March 1953, Bulganin moved into the first rank of the Soviet leadership, being appointed to the key post of Defense Minister. He was an ally of Nikita Khrushchev during his power struggle with Georgy Malenkov, and in February 1955 he succeeded Malenkov as Premier of the Soviet Union.[2] He was generally seen as a supporter of Khrushchev's reforms and destalinization. He and Khrushchev travelled together to India, Yugoslavia and Britain, where they were known in the press as "the B and K show."[3] In his memoirs, however, Khrushchev recounted that he believed that he "couldn't rely on [Bulganin] fully."[4] Bulganin and Khrushchev in India During the Suez Crisis of October-November 1956, Bulganin sent letters to the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Israel threatening rocket attacks on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv if they did not withdraw their forces from Egypt. In a letter to Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, Bulganin wrote, "Israel is playing with the fate of peace, with the fate of its own people, in a criminal and irresponsible manner; [...] which will place a question [mark] upon the very existence of Israel as a State."[5] Khrushchev, in his memoirs, admitted the threat was designed simply to divide Western opinion, especially since at the time he did not have enough ICBMs to launch the rockets, and in any case he had no intention of going to war in 1956. Bulganin with Khrushchev, Peng Dehuai, and Ye Jianying By 1957, however, Bulganin had come to share the doubts held about Khrushchev's policies by the opposition group (which Khrushchev and his supporters labeled the "Anti-Party Group") led by Vyacheslav Molotov. In June, when the dissenters tried to remove Khrushchev from power at a meeting of the Politburo, Bulganin vacillated between the two camps. When the dissenters were defeated and removed from power, Bulganin held on to his position for a while, but in March 1958, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev forced his resignation.[2] He was appointed Chairman of the Soviet State Bank, a job he had held two decades before, but in September Bulganin was removed from the Central Committee and deprived of the title of Marshal. He was dispatched to Stavropol as Chairman of the Regional Economic Council, a token position, and in February 1960 he was retired on a pension.

9. pětiletka

Ninth five-year plan (Soviet Union) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The Ninth Five-Year Plan of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a set of economic goals designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1971 and 1975. The plan was presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1971. Contents 1 The 24th Congress and development 2 Fulfillment 3 See also 4 References The 24th Congress and development Further information: 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Ninth Five-Year Plan was presented to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1971 by Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The plan's main focus was to increase the growth of industrial produced consumer goods. It was the first five-year plan to call for a higher increase for industrial consumer goods than in capital goods.[1] Brezhnev told the Congress that increasing the standard of living was more important than economic development.[2] The plan proposed an increase in gross national income (GNP) by 37 to 40 percent.[3] Fulfillment The goals set by the 24th Party Congress were not fulfilled, and for the first time, the Soviet economy was facing stagnating growth.[4] While the planned target in consumer goods was higher than in previous plans, the actual growth was far from that planned. Historian Robert Service notes in his book History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century that the economic ministries, in collaboration with the Soviet party-police-military-industrial complex, purposely prevented the targets from being fulfilled.[5] During the plan, investment in the truck industry increased, but the inefficiencies and relative backwardness of blueprints and technology innovation, as noted by Kosygin, were not solved.[6] During the period covered by the plan, Soviet agriculture was hit by chronic drought and bad weather, which led grain production to be 70 million tons short of the planned target.[7] The plan called for the capacity of the Coal Handling and Preparation Plants (CHPP) to increase from 47,000 Megawatt (MW) to 65,000 by 1975; CHPP capacity only reached 59,800 MW.[8] By the end of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, there was a marked slowdown in nearly all sectors of the Soviet economy.[9] Not everything was a failure, as investment in computer technology increased by 420 percent over the previous plan.[10] It was estimated by the Soviet government that 200,000 workers were involved in improving and introducing modern computer technology in the country. These computer technicians were developing the Automated System for Management (ASU) in an attempt to improve factory and labour productivity.[11] Average real income increased by 4.5 percent per annum.

Generální tajemník

Od roku 1922 stál v čele stranického aparátu generální tajemník, který stanul na špici mocenského uspořádání sovětského stranicko-státního systému. V ideálním případě se dařilo generálním tajemníkům získat do svých rukou i funkci ze státní správy. Josif Vissarionovič Stalin - od roku 1922 generální tajemník KSR(b) - VKS(b), po roce 1941 zakládal J. V. Stalin svou mocenskou pozici především na funkci předsedy rady lidových komisařů či od roku 1946 rady ministrů a ve stranickém aparátě se řadil mezi ostatní tajemníky až do své smrti v březnu 1953. Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov - Stalinův designovaný nástupce, zprvu řídil stranu jako její tajemník, ale od 14. března 1953 vykonával pouze funkci předsedy rady ministrů; ještě několik měsíců předsedal zasedáním předsednictva strany a byl pokládán za hlavního Stalinova dědice a nástupce; Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov - po Stalinově smrti se stal jediným ze členů politbyra, který kromě předsednictva ÚV zasedal i v sekretariátu ÚV a tím pádem do svých rukou převzal řízení stranického aparátu. Ostatní přesunuli svou pozornost do resortů v sovětské vládě. V mocenském boji o nástupnictví se tak Chruščov v letech 1953-1957 prosadil jako nový vůdce strany a tím i státu. Od září 1953 do října 1964 vykonával funkci prvního tajemníka ÚV, vedle toho v letech 1958-1964 zároveň řídil i sovětský kabinet neboli radu ministrů. Leonid Iljič Brežněv - v říjnovém převratu v roce 1964 společně se svými spojenci sesadil Chruščova. Předsednictvo ÚV se znovu přihlásilo k politice kolektivního vedení a rozdělení funkcí, prvním tajemníkem ÚV se stal L. I. Brežněv. Ten stál v čele strany následujících 18 let, kterých využil k upevňování svých pozic. V roce 1966 se nechal zvolit generálním tajemníkem ÚV. V roce 1977 převzal i on post ve státních orgánech - byl zvolen předsedou prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR. Tuto praktiku spojení funkce generálního tajemníka a oficiální hlavy státu praktikovali i jeho nástupci - Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov (1982-1984) a Konstantin Ustinovič Černěnko (1984-1985). Michail Sergejevič Gorbačov - 1985-1991 nejprve byl zvolen generálním tajemníkem a v roce 1988 převzal i funkci předsedy prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu, kterou o rok později vyměnil za nově zavedený úřad prezidenta SSSR.

organizace v bloku

Organizations Main articles: Cominform, Comecon, and Warsaw Pact In 1949, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania founded the Comecon in accordance with Stalin's desire to enforce Soviet domination of the lesser states of Central Europe and to mollify some states that had expressed interest in the Marshall Plan,[102][103] and which were now, increasingly, cut off from their traditional markets and suppliers in Western Europe.[71] The Comecon's role became ambiguous because Stalin preferred more direct links with other party chiefs than the Comecon's indirect sophistication; it played no significant role in the 1950s in economic planning.[104] Initially, the Comecon served as cover for the Soviet taking of materials and equipment from the rest of the Eastern Bloc, but the balance changed when the Soviets became net subsidizers of the rest of the Bloc by the 1970s via an exchange of low cost raw materials in return for shoddily manufactured finished goods.[105] In 1955, the Warsaw Pact was formed partly in response to NATO's inclusion of West Germany and partly because the Soviets needed an excuse to retain Red Army units in Hungary.[103] For 35 years, the Pact perpetuated the Stalinist concept of Soviet national security based on imperial expansion and control over satellite regimes in Eastern Europe.[106] This Soviet formalization of their security relationships in the Eastern Bloc reflected Moscow's basic security policy principle that continued presence in East Central Europe was a foundation of its defense against the West.[106] Through its institutional structures, the Pact also compensated in part for the absence of Joseph Stalin's personal leadership since his death in 1953.[106] The Pact consolidated the other Bloc members' armies in which Soviet officers and security agents served under a unified Soviet command structure.[107] Beginning in 1964, Romania took a more independent course.[108] While it did not repudiate either Comecon or the Warsaw Pact, it ceased to play a significant role in either.[108] Nicolae Ceaușescu's assumption of leadership one year later pushed Romania even further in the direction of separateness.[108] Albania, which had become increasingly isolated under Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha following de-Stalinization, undergoing a Soviet-Albanian split in 1961, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968[109] following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.[110

čistky, stalinova role, rehabilitace a počet obětí

Rehabilitation Main article: Rehabilitation (Soviet) Posthumously rehabilitated, Tukhachevsky on a 1963 postage stamp of the Soviet Union The Great Purge was denounced by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev following Stalin's death. In his secret speech to the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956 (which was made public a month later), Khrushchev referred to the purges as an "abuse of power" by Stalin which resulted in enormous harm to the country. In the same speech, he recognized that many of the victims were innocent and were convicted on the basis of false confessions extracted by torture. To take that position was politically useful to Khrushchev, as he was at that time engaged in a power struggle with rivals who had been associated with the Purge, the so-called Anti-Party Group. The new line on the Great Purges undermined their power, and helped propel him to the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. Starting from 1954, some of the convictions were overturned. Mikhail Tukhachevsky and other generals convicted in the Trial of Red Army Generals were declared innocent ("rehabilitated") in 1957. The former Politburo members Yan Rudzutak and Stanislav Kosior and many lower-level victims were also declared innocent in the 1950s. Nikolai Bukharin and others convicted in the Moscow Trials were not rehabilitated until as late as 1988. Leon Trotsky, considered a major player in the Russian Revolution and a major contributor to Marxist Theory was never rehabilitated by the USSR. The book Rehabilitation: The Political Processes of the 1930s-50s (Реабилитация. Политические процессы 30-50-х годов) (1991) contains a large amount of newly presented original archive material: transcripts of interrogations, letters of convicts, and photos. The material demonstrates in detail how numerous show trials were fabricated. Number of people executed Official figures put the total number of documentable executions during the years 1937 and 1938 at 681,692,[1][84] whereas the total estimate of deaths brought about by Soviet repression during the Great Purge ranges from 950,000 to 1.2 million, which includes executions, deaths in detention and those who died shortly after being released from the Gulag, as a result of their treatment therein.[2] This estimate summarises results of comparative analysis of various archival documents and, therefore, takes into account earlier arguments that official Soviet archival data may understate the actual number of deaths, be incomplete or unreliable.[85][86][87][88] A common practice of falsification for lowering the execution numbers was disguising executions with the sentence ten years without the right of correspondence. All of the bodies identified from the mass graves at Vinnitsa and Kuropaty were of individuals who had received this sentence.[89] The lower figure did roughly confirm Conquest's original 1968 estimate of 700,000 "legal" executions and in the preface to the 40th anniversary edition of The Great Terror, Conquest claimed that he had been "correct on the vital matter—the numbers put to death: about one million."[90] Stalin's role A list from the Great Purge signed by Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Zhdanov Historians with archival access have confirmed that Stalin was intimately involved in the terror. Russian historian Oleg V. Khlevniuk states "...theories about the elemental, spontaneous nature of the terror, about a loss of central control over the course of mass repression, and about the role of regional leaders in initiating the terror are simply not supported by the historical record."[91] Stalin personally directed Yezhov to torture those who were not making proper confessions. In one instance, he told Yezhov "Isn't it time to squeeze this gentleman and force him to report on his dirty little business? Where is he: in a prison or a hotel?" In another, while reviewing one of Yezhov's lists, he added to M. I. Baranov's name, "beat, beat!"[92] According to Stalin biographer Simon Sebag Montefiore, he never attended torture sessions or executions.[93] In addition to authorizing enhanced interrogation techniques, Stalin also signed 357 lists in 1937 and 1938 authorizing executions of some 40,000 people, and about 90% of these are confirmed to have been shot.[94] While reviewing one such list, Stalin reportedly muttered to no one in particular: "Who's going to remember all this riff-raff in ten or twenty years time? No one. Who remembers the names now of the boyars Ivan the Terrible got rid of? No one."[95] Stalin's alleged remark may be compared with Hitler's famous admonition to his generals in 1939: "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?"[96] Stephen G. Wheatcroft posits that while the 'purposive deaths' caused by Hitler constitute 'murder', those caused by Stalin fall into the category of 'execution'. He elaborates: Stalin undoubtedly caused many innocent people to be executed, but it seems likely that he thought many of them guilty of crimes against the state and felt that the execution of others would act as a deterent to the guilty. He signed the papers and insisted on documentation. Hitler, by contrast, wanted to be rid of the Jews and communists simply because they were Jews and communists. He was not concerned about making any pretence at legality. He was careful not to sign anything on this matter and was equally insistent on no documentation.[97]

Polina Molotova

Polina Semjonovna Žemčužina Polina Semyonovna Zhemchuzhina[a] (born Perl Semyonovna Karpovskaya;[b] 27 February 1897 - 1 April 1970) was a Soviet politician and the wife of the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Zhemchuzhina was the director of the Soviet national cosmetics trust from 1932 to 1936, Minister of Fisheries in 1939, and head of textiles production in the Ministry of Light Industry from 1939 to 1948. In 1949, Zhemchuzhina was arrested by the Soviet secret police, charged with treason, and sent into internal exile, where she remained until after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. In 1921, she married Vyacheslav Molotov, by then a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). She also made a successful career in the Soviet hierarchy, serving in the Narkomat of Food Industry under Anastas Mikoyan, to become in 1939 the first female councillor of Narkom (of Fishing Industry) in the government of the Soviet Union, and was elected as a candidate to the Central Committee that year. During the 1920s, her sister emigrated to the British Mandate of Palestine. According to historian Zhores Medvedev, Stalin was highly suspicious of Zhemchuzhina. He thought that she negatively influenced Molotov, and he recommended Molotov divorce her.[1] Her brother, Sam Carp, was a successful businessman in the United States.[2] The Molotovs shared an apartment with the Stalins. Zhemchuzhina and Stalin's wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva became close friends. In November 1932, Zhemchuzhina followed Alliluyeva out of a dining room after Stalin had publicly chastised his wife in the company of friends. The next morning Alliluyeva was found dead of an apparent suicide. This event is believed to have fueled a secret hatred of Zhemchuzhina by Stalin.[3] In a secret meeting of the Politburo on August 10, 1939, the agenda item number 33, "Regarding Comrade Zhemchuzhina" and her alleged "connections to spies", led to a request to verify that information by the NKVD. As it was customary during the Great Purges, many of her coworkers were arrested and questioned, but the "evidence" (frequently acquired by force) against her was so contradictory that on October 24, the Politburo concluded the "allegations against comrade Zhemchuzhina's participation in sabotage and spying... to be considered slanderous." However, she was severely reprimanded and demoted for unknowingly keeping contacts with "enemy elements thereby facilitating their spying missions." In February 1941, she was taken off the list of the candidates to the Central Committee. In the Eastern Front of World War II, Zhemchuzhina actively supported the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC) and befriended many of its leading members, most notably Solomon Mikhoels. She frequently attended performances by the Moscow State Jewish Theatre. Polina Zhemchuzhina befriended Golda Meir, who arrived in Moscow in November 1948 as the first Israeli envoy to the USSR.[4] Fluent in Yiddish, Zhemchuzhina acted as translator for a diplomatic meeting between Meir and her husband, the Soviet foreign minister. She was arrested for treason in December 1948, as she openly supported the idea of granting the region of Crimea to the Jewish community,[5] consequently being forced into an unwanted divorce from Μolotov.[6] She was convicted and sentenced to five years in a labour camp.[7] After the death of Stalin in March 1953, she was released from captivity by Lavrentiy Beria and reunited with her husband. Her first question upon her release was "How's Stalin?" Upon being told he had died only days before, she fainted.[8] Happily and lovingly reunited, Polina Zhemchuzhina and her husband lived as unrepentant Communists in the Granovsky apartment block near the Kremlin. She died of natural causes in 1970.

Politbyro

Politické byro (bolševiků) neboli politbyro, které ve svých rukou soustřeďovalo nejvyšší moc (zabývalo se řízením ekonomiky, zahraniční politiky, otázkami obrany a politickým řízením země. V letech 1952-1966 bylo nazýváno předsednictvo ÚV. Politické byro (bolševiků) neboli politbyro, které ve svých rukou soustřeďovalo nejvyšší moc (zabývalo se řízením ekonomiky, zahraniční politiky, otázkami obrany a politickým řízením země. V letech 1952-1966 bylo nazýváno předsednictvo ÚV. Tento orgán čítá okolo deseti členů a přijímá nejdůležitější politická rozhodnutí, která jsou poté v mnoha případech předána ke kontrole Ústřednímu výboru strany. Jeho schválení má již převážně jen formální charakter. Ústřední výbor je na politbyru de facto závislý, protože je svoláván jen z jeho rozhodnutí. V komunistické straně Sovětského svazu se například Ústřední výbor scházel v některých periodách až po několika letech. Pokud jsou dané strany ve vládě a drží moc státu, pak členové politbyra současně zastávají i hlavní úřady ve státním a veřejném životě (prezident, předseda vlády, ministr, předseda odborů atd.) V Komunistické straně Československa fungovalo politbyro mezi lety 1924-1945 a 1954-1962, jindy mělo název předsednictvo. Výsledky hlasování musely být jednomyslné.

období stagnace za Br

Period GNP (according to the CIA) NMP (according to Grigorii Khanin) NMP (according to the USSR) 1960-1965[54] 4.8 4.4 6.5 1965-1970[54] 4.9 4.1 7.7 1970-1975[54] 3.0 3.2 5.7 1975-1980[54] 1.9 1.0 4.2 1980-1985[54] 1.8 0.6 3.5 [note 1] The value of all consumer goods manufactured in 1972 in retail prices was about 118 billion rubles ($530 billion).[63] The Era of Stagnation, a term coined by Mikhail Gorbachev, is considered by several economists to be the worst financial crisis in the Soviet Union. It was triggered by the Nixon Shock, over-centralisation and a conservative state bureaucracy. As the economy grew, the volume of decisions facing planners in Moscow became overwhelming. As a result, labour productivity decreased nationwide. The cumbersome procedures of bureaucratic administration did not allow for the free communication and flexible response required at the enterprise level to deal with worker alienation, innovation, customers and suppliers.[64] The late Brezhnev Era also saw an increase in political corruption. Data falsification became common practice among bureaucrats to report satisfied targets and quotas to the government, and this further aggravated the crisis in planning.[65] With the mounting economic problems, skilled workers were usually paid more than had been intended in the first place, while unskilled labourers tended to turn up late, and were neither conscientious nor, in a number of cases, entirely sober. The state usually moved workers from one job to another which ultimately became an ineradicable feature in Soviet industry;[66] the Government had no effective counter-measure because of the country's lack of unemployment. Government industries such as factories, mines and offices were staffed by undisciplined personnel who put a great effort into not doing their jobs. This ultimately led to, according to Robert Service, a "work-shy workforce" among Soviet workers and administrators

Svaz komunistických stran - Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu

Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Svaz komunistických stran - Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu (zkratka: SKS - KSSS, rusky: Союз коммунистических партий — Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза, СКП - КПСС) je federace komunistických stran z postsovětských republik. Historie Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu byla politickou stranou, která měla v jednotlivých svazových republikách kromě Ruské SFSR své územní organizace (KS Ukrajiny, KS Běloruska, KS Kazašské SSR, ...). Nejednalo se o samostatné politické strany, i když tak navenek vystupovaly. Měly podobný statut jako Komunistická strana Slovenska v rámci KSČ v letech 1948 až 1990. Pod vlivem Gorbačovovy perestrojky se KSSS na svém 28. sjezdu v roce 1990 transformovala z politické strany na svaz komunistických stran jednotlivých svazových republik. Zároveň se utvořila KS Ruské SFSR, protože v rámci KSSS do té doby neexistovala ruská republiková strana. V listopadu 1991 prezident Boris Jelcin zakázal na území Ruské SFSR činnost KSSS. V roce 1993 se v Moskvě uskutečnil 29. sjezd KSSS, na kterém se strana transformovala do Svazu komunistických stran - Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu. V čele organizace stojí Rada SKS - KSSS.

XXVIII. sjezd KSSS

Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání XXVIII. sjezd KSSS se konal mezi 2. a 13. červencem 1990 v Moskvě. Jednalo se o mimořádný sjezd strany; důvodem pro narušení obvyklého pětiletého intervalu (řádný sjezd by se konal roku 1991) byla krizová situace ve vztazích v zemi. XXVIII. sjezd byl posledním v historii celé strany i SSSR. Během tohoto sjedu byl znovuzvolen Michail Gorbačov za generálního tajemníka strany, jeho zástupcem se stal Vladimir Ivaško. Též byl schválen nový status strany, který tak formálně a de facto ukončil její monopolní postavení na politické scéně v SSSR. Z KSSS v době sjezdu také vystoupil například Boris Jelcin. Důvodem byl rozkol ve straně; demokratické křídlo usilovalo o pokračování demokratizace a perestrojky, konzervativní však bylo ostře proti a Gorbačovovo počínání označilo za „léčbu komunismu kapitalismem". Nebyl proto schválen nový program strany, vzniklo pouze programové prohlášení.

sovětský svaz

Sovětský svaz (rusky Советский Союз, Sovětskij Sojuz), oficiálním názvem Svaz sovětských socialistických republik, zkráceně SSSR (rusky Сою́з Сове́тских Социалисти́ческих Респу́блик, СССР, Sojuz Sovětskich Socialističeskich Respublik), byl eurasijský stát se socialistickým zřízením, který existoval v rozmezí let 1922 až 1991 na většině území dřívějšího Ruského impéria. Sovětský svaz měl ve své ústavě zakotvenou vedoucí roli komunistické strany, která byla dominantní politickou silou do roku 1991. Ačkoliv byl Sovětský svaz nominálně unií svazových republik s hlavním městem v Moskvě, ve skutečnosti šlo o silně centralizovaný stát. Říjnová revoluce v listopadu 1917 vedla k pádu Ruského impéria a odstranění prozatímní vlády. Poté, co bolševici zvítězili v občanské válce, byl v prosinci 1922 založen Sovětský svaz sdružující Ruskou sovětskou federativní socialistickou republiku, Ukrajinskou, Běloruskou sovětskou socialistickou republiku a Zakavkazskou federativní socialistickou republiku. V následujících letech byly vytvořeny další sovětské republiky ve Střední Asii. Po smrti prvního sovětského vůdce Vladimira Iljiče Lenina v roce 1924 se dalším vůdcem země stal Josif Vissarionovič Stalin, který zahájil rozsáhlou industrializaci spojenou s plánovanou ekonomikou a politickým útlakem; v tzv. gulazích tehdy zahynulo několik milionů lidí. Během druhé světové války v roce 1941 nacistické Německo a jeho spojenci napadli Sovětský svaz, přestože s ním dříve podepsali dohodu o neútočení. Z následujících čtyř let těžkých bojů Sovětský svaz vyšel jako jedna ze dvou světových supervelmocí; tou druhou se staly Spojené státy. Zároveň získal (staro)nová území ve východní Evropě, obzvláště v Pobaltí, a počet svazových republik stoupl na 16 (od roku 1956 se ustálil na 15). Sovětský svaz se spolu se satelitními zeměmi východního bloku podílel na studené válce, dlouhém ideologickém a politickém boji se Spojenými státy a jejich spojenci, v němž nakonec neuspěl kvůli ekonomickým problémům a také zahraničním a domácím nepokojům. Na konci 80. let se poslední sovětský vůdce Michail Gorbačov pokusil reformovat stát politikou perestrojky a glasnosti, avšak Sovětský svaz se zhroutil a byl rozpuštěn. Práva a povinnosti Sovětského svazu převzala Ruská federace.

Svetlana Alliluyeva

Svetlana Iosifovna Alliluyeva (Russian: Светла́на Ио́сифовна Аллилу́ева; née Stalina; Russian: Сталина; 28 February 1926 - 22 November 2011), later known as Lana Peters, was the youngest child and only daughter of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Stalin's second wife. In 1967, she caused an international furore when she defected to, and later became a naturalised citizen of, the United States. In 1984, she returned to the Soviet Union and had her Soviet citizenship returned. She later went back to the United States and also spent time in France, before settling in the United Kingdom and becoming a British citizen in 1992. She was Stalin's last surviving child

phone tapping

Telephone tapping in the Eastern Bloc From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search KGB telephone tapping room in Vilnius KGB Museum, Lithuania Telephone tapping in the countries of the Eastern Bloc was a widespread method of the mass surveillance of the population by the secret police.[citation needed] Contents 1 History 2 Fiction 3 References 4 See also History In some countries, this was an open and legal practice. During martial law in Poland, official censorship was introduced, including open phone tapping. In fact, the Polish secret police did not have resources to monitor all conversations, despite the introduction of the new censorship division.[1] In Romania, telephone tapping was conducted by the General Directorate for Technical Operations of the Securitate. Created with Soviet assistance in 1954, the outfit monitored all voice and electronic communications in and out of Romania. They bugged telephones and intercepted all telegraphs and telex messages, as well as placing microphones in both public and private buildings.[citation needed] Fiction The 2006 film The Lives of Others concerns a Stasi man who is listening to the conversations of a suspected dissident writer in a bugged appartment with equipment similar to that used in telephone-tapping. The 1991 Polish comedy film Rozmowy kontrolowane (Monitored Conversations)[2] capitalizes on this fact. The title alludes to the pre-recorded phrase "Rozmowa kontrolowana" ("The talk is being monitored") a person repeatedly hears during a phone conversation.

Suslov do opozice Chruščovovi

Suslov was becoming progressively more critical of Khrushchev's policies,[19] his political intransigence, and his campaign to eliminate what was left of the old Stalinist guard.[20] There were also deep-seated divergences in foreign and domestic policy between Suslov and Khrushchev. Suslov opposed the idea of improving Soviet Union-United States relations,[19] and was against Khrushchev's attempts at rapprochement with Yugoslavia.[21] Domestically, Suslov opposed Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinisation and his economic decentralisation scheme.[22] Suslov visited the United Kingdom in 1959 as a parliamentarian for the Supreme Soviet. The visit was a success, and Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of the Labour Party, travelled to the Soviet Union later that year as a guest.[23] Sino-Soviet relations had long been strained, and as Suslov told the Central Committee in one of his reports, "The crux of the matter is that the Leadership of the CCP has recently developed tendencies to exaggerate the degree of maturity of socialist relations in China... There are elements of conceit and haughtiness. [These shortcomings] are largely explained by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of comrade Mao Zedong... who, by all accounts, himself has come to believe in his own infallibility."[24] Suslov compared Mao's growing personality cult with that seen under Joseph Stalin.[25] In the years following the failure of the Anti-Party Group, Suslov became the leader of the opposition faction in the Central Committee, known as the "Moscow faction", to Khrushchev's leadership.[26] Khrushchev was able to hold on to power by conceding to various opposition demands in times of crisis, such as during the 1960 U-2 incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the aftermath of the U-2 Crisis Suslov was able to remove, and replace, several of Khrushchev's appointees in the Politburo with new anti-Khrushchevist members. Khrushchev's position was greatly weakened after the failure of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Suslov's power greatly increased. A campaign to oust Khrushchev from office was initiated in 1964. Although leader of the opposition, Suslov had fallen seriously ill during his trip to the People's Republic of China the previous year; instead, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin led the opposition.[27]

KS

The CPSU was a Communist party, organized on the basis of democratic centralism. This principle, conceived by Lenin, entails democratic and open discussion of policy issues within the party followed by the requirement of total unity in upholding the agreed policies. The highest body within the CPSU was the Party Congress, which convened every five years. When the Congress was not in session, the Central Committee was the highest body. Because the Central Committee met twice a year, most day-to-day duties and responsibilities were vested in the Politburo, (previously the Presidium), the Secretariat and the Orgburo (until 1952). The party leader was the head of government and held the office of either General Secretary, Premier or head of state, or some of the three offices concurrently—but never all three at the same time. The party leader was the de facto chairman of the CPSU Politburo and chief executive of the Soviet Union. The tension between the party and the state (Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union) for the shifting focus of power was never formally resolved, but in reality the party dominated and a paramount leader always existed (first Lenin and thereafter the General Secretary).

sjezd KSSS

The Congress, nominally the highest organ of the party, was convened every five years.[54] Leading up to the October Revolution and until Stalin's consolidation of power, the Congress was the party's main decision-making body.[55] However, after Stalin's ascension the Congresses became largely symbolic.[55] CPSU leaders used Congresses as a propaganda and control tool.[55] The most noteworthy Congress since the 1930s was the 20th Congress, in which Khrushchev denounced Stalin in a speech titled "The Personality Cult and its Consequences".[55] Despite delegates to Congresses losing their powers to criticize or remove party leadership, the Congresses functioned as a form of elite-mass communication.[56] They were occasions for the party leadership to express the party line over the next five years to ordinary CPSU members and the general public.[56] The information provided was general, ensuring that party leadership retained the ability to make specific policy changes as they saw fit.[56] The Congresses also provided the party leadership with formal legitimacy by providing a mechanism for the election of new members and the retirement of old members who had lost favour.[57] The elections at Congresses were all predetermined and the candidates who stood for seats to the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission were approved beforehand by the Politburo and the Secretariat.[57] A Congress could also provide a platform for the announcement of new ideological concepts.[57] For instance, at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would see "communism in twenty years"—[58] a position later retracted. A Conference, officially referred to as an All-Union Conference, was convened between Congresses by the Central Committee to discuss party policy and to make personnel changes within the Central Committee.[59] 19 conferences were convened during the CPSU's existence.[59] The 19th Congress held in 1952 removed the clause in the party's statute which stipulated that a party Conference could be convened.[59] The clause was reinstated at the 23rd Congress, which was held in 1966.[59]

Velký teror

The Great Purge or the Great Terror was a campaign of political repression in the Soviet Union which occurred from 1936 to 1938.[5] It involved a large-scale purge of the Communist Party and government officials, repression of wealthy landlords and the Red Army leadership, widespread police surveillance, suspicion of saboteurs, counter-revolutionaries, imprisonment, and arbitrary executions.[6] In Russian historiography, the period of the most intense purge, 1937-1938, is called Yezhovshchina (literally, "Yezhov phenomenon",[note 1] commonly translated as "times of Yezhov" or "doings of Yezhov"), after Nikolai Yezhov, the head of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, who was executed a year after the purge. Modern historical studies estimate the total number of deaths due to Stalinist repression in 1937-38 to be between 681,692-1,200,000.[2] In the Western world, Robert Conquest's 1968 book The Great Terror popularized that phrase. Conquest's title was in turn an allusion to the period called the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution (French: la Terreur, and, from June to July 1794, la Grande Terreur, the Great Terror).

1940s

The Soviet Union was the first to warn of impending danger of invasion from Nazi Germany to the international community. The western powers, however, remained committed to maintaining peace and avoiding another war breaking out, many considering the Soviet Union's warnings to be an unwanted provocation. While the western governments were mostly committed to neutrality, many western capitalists, notably including the Rockefellers, secured lucrative business deals with the fascist regimes and had direct interests in maintaining them. After many unsuccessful attempts to create an anti-fascist alliance among the western countries, including trying to rally international support for the Spanish Republic in its struggle against a fascist military dictatorship supported by Germany and Italy, in 1939 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany which would be broken in June 1941 when the German military invading the Soviet Union in the largest land invasion in history, beginning the Great Patriotic War. The Communist International was dissolved in 1943 after it was concluded that such an organization had failed to prevent the rise of fascism and the global war necessary to defeat it. After the 1945 Allied victory of World War II, the Party held to a doctrine of establishing socialist governments in the post-war occupied territories that would be administered by Communists loyal to Stalin's administration. The party also sought to expand its sphere of influence beyond the occupied territories, using proxy wars and espionage and providing training and funding to promote Communist elements abroad, leading to the establishment of the Cominform in 1947. In 1949, the Communists emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War, causing an extreme shift in the global balance of forces and greatly escalating tensions between the Communists and the western powers, fueling the Cold War. In Europe, Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, acquired the territory of Trieste, causing conflict both with the western powers and with the Stalin administration who opposed such a provocative move. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Communists actively supported the Greek Communists during their civil war, further frustrating the Soviet government. These tensions led to a Tito-Stalin Split which marked the beginning of international sectarian division within the world communist movement.

třetí moskevský proces

Third Moscow Trial NKVD chiefs responsible for conducting mass repressions: From l. to r.: Yakov Agranov; Genrikh Yagoda; unknown; Stanislav Redens. All three were themselves eventually arrested and executed. The third and final trial, in March 1938, known as The Trial of the Twenty-One, is the most famous of the Soviet show trials, because of persons involved and the scope of charges which tied together all loose threads from earlier trials. Meant to be the culmination of previous trials, it included 21 defendants alleged to belong to the so-called "Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites", led by Nikolai Bukharin, the former chairman of the Communist International, former premier Alexei Rykov, Christian Rakovsky, Nikolai Krestinsky and Genrikh Yagoda, recently disgraced head of the NKVD. The fact that Yagoda was one of the accused showed the speed at which the purges were consuming their own. It was now alleged that Bukharin and others sought to assassinate Lenin and Stalin from 1918, murder Maxim Gorky by poison, partition the U.S.S.R and hand her territories to Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, and other preposterous charges. Even previously sympathetic observers who had stomached the earlier trials found it harder to swallow these new allegations as they became ever more absurd, and the purge expanded to include almost every living Old Bolshevik leader except Stalin. No other crime of the Stalin years so captivated Western intellectuals as the trial and execution of Bukharin, who was a Marxist theorist of international standing.[25] For some prominent communists such as Bertram Wolfe, Jay Lovestone, Arthur Koestler, and Heinrich Brandler, the Bukharin trial marked their final break with communism, and even turned the first three into fervent anti-Communists eventually.[26][27] To them, Bukharin's confession symbolized the depredations of communism, which not only destroyed its sons but also conscripted them in self-destruction and individual abnegation.[25] The preparation for this trial, which took over a year, was delayed in its early stages due to the reluctance of some party members to denounce their comrades. It was at this time that Stalin personally intervened to speed up the process and replaced Yagoda with Yezhov. Bukharin's confession Nikolai Bukharin, Russian Bolshevik revolutionary executed in 1938 On the first day of trial, Krestinsky caused a sensation when he repudiated his written confession and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. However, he changed his plea the next day after "special measures", which dislocated his left shoulder among other things.[28] Anastas Mikoyan and Vyacheslav Molotov later claimed that Bukharin was never tortured, but it is now known that his interrogators were given the order, "beating permitted," and were under great pressure to extract confession out of the "star" defendant. Bukharin initially held out for three months, but threats to his young wife and infant son, combined with "methods of physical influence" wore him down. But when he read his confession amended and corrected personally by Stalin, he withdrew his whole confession. The examination started all over again, with a double team of interrogators.[29] Bukharin's confession in particular became subject of much debate among Western observers, inspiring Koestler's acclaimed novel Darkness at Noon and philosophical essay by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Humanism and Terror. His confessions were somewhat different from others in that while he pleaded guilty to "sum total of crimes", he denied knowledge when it came to specific crimes. Some astute observers noted that he would allow only what was in written confession and refuse to go any further. The result was a curious mix of fulsome confessions (of being a "degenerate fascist" working for "restoration of capitalism") and subtle criticisms of the trial. After disproving several charges against him, one observer noted that Bukharin "proceeded to demolish or rather showed he could very easily demolish the whole case."[30] He continued by saying that "the confession of the accused is not essential. The confession of the accused is a medieval principle of jurisprudence" in a trial that was solely based on confessions, he finished his last plea with the words: "the monstrousness of my crime is immeasurable especially in the new stage of struggle of the U.S.S.R. May this trial be the last severe lesson, and may the great might of the U.S.S.R. become clear to all."[31] Romain Rolland and others wrote to Stalin seeking clemency for Bukharin, but all the leading defendants were executed except Rakovsky and two others (who were killed in NKVD prisoner massacres in 1941). Despite the promise to spare his family, Bukharin's wife, Anna Larina, was sent to a labor camp, but she survived to see her husband rehabilitated by the Soviet state under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988.

eko plány

Third plan, 1938-1941 The third five-year plan ran for only 3½ years, up to June 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union during the Second World War. As war approached, more resources were put into developing armaments, tanks and weapons, as well as constructing additional military factories east of the Ural mountains. The first two years of the third five-year plan proved to be even more of a disappointment in terms of proclaimed production goals. Still, a reported 12% to 13% rate of annual industrial growth was attained in the Soviet Union during the 1930s.[citation needed] The plan had intended to focus on consumer goods. The Soviet Union mainly contributed resources to the development of weapons, and constructed additional military factories as needed. By 1952, industrial production was nearly double the 1941 level ("Five-Year Plans"). Stalin's Five-Year Plans helped transform the Soviet Union from an untrained society of peasants to an advanced industrial economy. Fourth and fifth plans, 1945-1955 Stalin in 1945 promised that the USSR would be the leading industrial power by 1960. The USSR at this stage had been devastated by the war. Officially, 98,000 collective farms had been ransacked and ruined, with the loss of 137,000 tractors, 49,000 combine harvesters, 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep; 25% of all capital equipment had been destroyed in 35,000 plants and factories; 6 million buildings, including 40,000 hospitals, in 70,666 villages and 4,710 towns (40% urban housing) were destroyed, leaving 25 million homeless; about 40% of railway tracks had been destroyed; officially 7.5 million servicemen died, plus 6 million civilians, but perhaps 20 million in all died. In 1945, mining and metallurgy were at 40% of the 1940 levels, electric power was down to 52%, pig-iron 26% and steel 45%; food production was 60% of the 1940 level. After Poland, the USSR had been the hardest hit by the war. Reconstruction was impeded by a chronic labor shortage due to the enormous number of Soviet casualties in the war (between 20-30 million). Moreover, 1946 was the driest year since 1891, and the harvest was poor. The USA and USSR were unable to agree on the terms of a US loan to aid reconstruction, and this was a contributing factor in the rapid escalation of the Cold War. However, the USSR did gain reparations from Germany, and made Eastern European countries make payments in return for the Soviets having liberated them from the Nazis. In 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was set up, linking the Eastern bloc countries economically. One-third of the fourth plan's capital expenditure was spent on Ukraine, which was important agriculturally and industrially, and which had been one of the areas most devastated by war. Sixth plan, 1956-1958 The Sixth Five-Year Plan was launched in 1956 during a period of dual leadership under Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, but it was abandoned after two years due to over-optimistic targets.[13] Seventh plan, 1959-1965 Unlike other planning periods, 1959 saw the announcement of a seven-year plan (Russian: семилетка, semiletka), approved by the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1959. This was merged into a Seventh Five-Year Plan in 1961, which was launched with the slogan "catch up and overtake the USA by 1970." The plan saw a slight shift away from heavy industry into chemicals, consumer goods, and natural resources.[14] Eighth plan, 1966-1970 Main article: Eighth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union) The eighth plan led to the amount of grain exported being doubled. Ninth plan, 1971-1975 Main article: Ninth five-year plan (Soviet Union) About 14.5 million tonnes of grain were imported by the USSR. Détente and improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United States allowed for more trade. The plan's focus was primarily on increasing the amount of consumer goods in the economy so as to improve Soviet standards of living. While largely failing at that objective[15] it managed to significantly improve Soviet computer technology.[16] Tenth plan, 1976-1981 Main article: Tenth five-year plan (Soviet Union) Leonid Brezhnev declared the slogan "Plan of quality and efficiency" for this period. Eleventh plan, 1981-1985 Main article: Eleventh five-year plan (Soviet Union) During the eleventh five-year plan, the country imported some 42 million tons of grain annually, almost twice as much as during the tenth five-year plan and three times as much as during the ninth five-year plan (1971-1975). The bulk of this grain was sold by the West; in 1985, for example, 94% of Soviet grain imports were from the non-socialist world, with the United States selling 14.1 million tons. However, total Soviet export to the West was always almost as high as import: for example, in 1984 total export to the West was 21.3 billion rubles, while total import was 19.6 billion rubles. Twelfth plan, 1986-1990 See also: Perestroika The last, 12th plan started with the slogan of uskoreniye, the acceleration of economic development (quickly forgotten in favor of a more vague motto perestroika) ended in a profound economic crisis in virtually all areas of Soviet economy and a drop in production. The 1987 Law on State Enterprise and the follow-up decrees about khozraschyot and self-financing in various areas of the Soviet economy were aimed at the decentralization to overcome the problems of the planned economy. Thirteenth plan, 1991 This plan, which would have run until 1995, only lasted about one year due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

timeline čistek

Timeline of the Great Purge Main article: Timeline of the Great Purge The Great Purge of 1936-1938 can be roughly divided into four periods:[71] October 1936 - February 1937 Reforming the security organizations, adopting official plans on purging the elites. March 1937 - June 1937 Purging the elites; adopting plans for the mass repressions against the "social base" of the potential aggressors, starting of purging the "elites" from opposition. July 1937 - October 1938 Mass repressions against "kulaks", "dangerous" ethnic minorities, family members of oppositionists, military officers, saboteurs in agriculture and industry. November 1938 - 1939 Stopping of mass operations, abolishing of many organs of extrajudicial executions, repressions against some organizers of mass repressions.

Uskoreniye

Uskoreniye (Russian: ускоре́ние, IPA: [ʊskɐˈrʲenʲɪɪ]; literally meaning acceleration) was a slogan and a policy announced by Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 20 April 1985 at a Soviet Party Plenum, aimed at the acceleration of political, social and economic development of the Soviet Union. It was the first slogan of a set of reforms that also included perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (transparency), new political thinking, and democratisation. In May 1985, Gorbachev gave a speech in Leningrad, during which he admitted the slowing down of the economic development and inadequacy of living standards. This was the first time in history that a Soviet leader had done so. The program was furthered at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in Gorbachev's report to the congress, in which he spoke about "perestroika", "uskoreniye", "human factor", "glasnost", and "expansion of the khozraschyot" (commercialization). The acceleration was planned to be based on technical and scientific progress, revamping of heavy industry (in accordance with the Marxian economics postulate about the primacy in development of heavy industry over light industry), taking the "human factor" into account, and increasing the labour discipline and responsibility of apparatchiks.[1] In practice it was implemented with the help of massive monetary emission infused into heavy industry, which further destabilised the economy and in particular brought an enormous disparity between actual cash money and virtual money used in cashless clearings (безналичный расчёт) between enterprises and state and among enterprises. The politics of mere "acceleration" eventually failed, which was de facto admitted in June 1987 at a Party Plenum, and the "uskoreniye" slogan was phased out in favor of the more ambitious "Perestroika" (restructuring of the whole economy)

východní blok

Východní blok (přesměrováno z Sovětský blok) Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Státy východního bloku Východní blok (zkráceně Východ) bylo během Studené války označení Sovětského svazu (SSSR) a jeho politických satelitů; jako protiklad byl zaveden pojem Západní blok (zkr. Západ). Vojenskou organizací východního bloku byla Varšavská smlouva, hospodářskou pak Rada vzájemné hospodářské pomoci (RVHP), obě měly sídlo v Moskvě. Přestože země, které do tohoto uspořádání patřily, byly formálně nezávislé, fakticky byly z velké části závislé na politice SSSR. To se prokázalo, když sovětská vojska potlačila občanské nepokoje v NDR (1953), Maďarsku (1956) a při sovětské invazi do Československa (1968). Albánie byla součástí východního bloku pouze do roku 1956, kdy se albánská politická scéna přeorientovala na Čínu. Byl to důsledek roztržky mezi SSSR a Čínou. Následně vládnoucí strana, Albánská strana prace, PPSH označila Chruščovovy reformy za revizionismus. Přestože Jugoslávie byla od roku 1946 oficiálně socialistickou zemí, nikdy se hospodářsky ani kulturně neorientovala na SSSR. Spolupracovala také se západní Evropou, nikoli pouze s východní. Země byla oficiálně neutrální, odmítala dělení světa na dva bloky supervelmocí a pomáhala založit Hnutí nezúčastněných zemí. Obsah 1 Seznam zemí 2 Střední a východní Evropa 3 Odkazy 3.1 Související články 3.2 Externí odkazy Seznam zemí Albánie (Albánská lidová republika); do roku 1956 Bulharsko (Bulharská lidová republika) Československo (Československá republika (1948-1960) a Československá socialistická republika) Maďarsko (Maďarská lidová republika) Polsko (Polská lidová republika) Rumunsko (Rumunská lidová republika a Rumunská socialistická republika) Sovětský svaz (Svaz sovětských socialistických republik) Východní Německo (Německá demokratická republika) Střední a východní Evropa Za studené války se evropské satelity SSSR nazývaly ne zcela geograficky přesně východní Evropa, rusky Восточная Европа, anglicky Eastern Europe. Po rozpadu východního bloku, jenž nastal v období let 1989 až 90, se začal používat pojem střední a východní Evropa (používá se zkratka CEE, z anglického Central and Eastern Europe)[1][2]- od spolupráce vlád a jejich organizací, neziskových organizací, od ekonomické spolupráce po obchodní společnosti.

západ a rce na čistky

Western reactions Although the trials of former Soviet leaders were widely publicized, the hundreds of thousands of other arrests and executions were not. These became known in the West only as a few former gulag inmates reached the West with their stories.[76] Not only did foreign correspondents from the West fail to report on the purges, but in many Western nations (especially France), attempts were made to silence or discredit these witnesses; according to Robert Conquest, Jean-Paul Sartre took the position that evidence of the camps should be ignored so the French proletariat would not be discouraged.[77] A series of legal actions ensued at which definitive evidence was presented that established the validity of the former labor camp inmates' testimony.[78] According to Robert Conquest in his 1968 book The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, with respect to the trials of former leaders, some Western observers were unable to see through the fraudulent nature of the charges and evidence, notably Walter Duranty of The New York Times, a Russian speaker; the American Ambassador, Joseph E. Davies, who reported, "proof...beyond reasonable doubt to justify the verdict of treason"[79] and Beatrice and Sidney Webb, authors of Soviet Communism: A New Civilization.[80] While "Communist Parties everywhere simply transmitted the Soviet line", some of the most critical reporting also came from the left, notably The Manchester Guardian.[81] The American journalist H. R. Knickerbocker also reported on the executions. He called them in 1941 "the great purges", and described how over four years they affected "the top fourth or fifth, to estimate it conservatively, of the Party itself, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders and then of the new Bolshevik intelligentsia, the foremost technicians, managers, supervisors, scientists". Knickerbocker also wrote about dekulakization: "It is a conservative estimate to say that some 5,000,000 [kulaks] ... died at once, or within a few years."[82] Evidence and the results of research began to appear after Stalin's death. This revealed the full enormity of the Purges. The first of these sources were the revelations of Nikita Khrushchev, which particularly affected the American editors of the Communist Party USA newspaper, the Daily Worker, who, following the lead of The New York Times, published the Secret Speech in full.[

XIX. sjezd KSSS

XIX. sjezd KSSS se konal od 5. do 14. října 1952. Šlo o poslední sjezd KSSS za přítomnosti J. V. Stalina. Cílem sjezdu bylo obnovit vedení strany, nastínit další vývoj sovětské politiky a zhodnotit předcházející období uplynulé od XVIII. sjezdu (březen 1939). Průběh sjezdu Samotné sjezdové jednání otevřel starý bolševik Vjačeslav Michajlovič Molotov. S hlavním referátem vystoupil nově Stalinův nejbližší spolupracovník a tím pádem i designovaný nástupce Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov. Už tento fakt přinášel o proti předcházejícím sjezdům od počátku dvacátých let porušení zvyklosti. S dalšími významnými projevy vystoupili další Stalinovi spolupracovníci - Lazar Kaganovič, Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov a M. Z. Saburov. Sjezdové jednání uzavřel krátkým projevem Kliment Jefremovič Vorošilov. Mezitím zazněly méně významné projevy oblastních a republikových funkcionářů a především pozdravy ostatních komunistických stran. Stalin se samotného sjezdového jednání příliš neúčastnil, vystoupil jen krátce před jeho uzavřením s pozdravným projevem. Na závěr proběhlo zvolení nového Ústředního výboru a Komise stranické kontroly. Na sjezdu neprobíhala žádná debata či skutečná politická diskuse. Od roku 1930 se staly sjezdy pouze slavnostním zasedáním elity režimu a manifestací semknutosti stranické masy kolem svého vedení. Jediným zásadním bodem sjezdu byla změna jména strany z VKS(b) - Všesvazová komunistická strana (bolševiků) na KSSS (Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu). O to větší představoval šok, když se sešlo první posjezdnové plénum ÚV, na kterém vystoupil J. V. Stalin se zdrcující kritikou některých dlouholetých představitelů strany. Posjezdové plénum a nové vedení strany Stalinův projev byl překvapením pro celé osazenstvo zasedání. Nejprve zazněla prosba o uvolnění z funkcí. Pak následovala kritika V. M. Molotova a A. I. Mikojana. Oba patřili mezi dlouholeté Stalinovy spolupracovníky. Molotov byl jeho pravou rukou od revoluce 1917 a Mikojana vyzvedl do politbyra a rady lidových komisařů už v roce 1926. Hlavním cílem Stalinovy snahy bylo omladit stranické vedení a připravit půdu na likvidaci starých „nespolehlivých" soudruhů - Molotova, Mikojana a Vorošilova. Na závěr Stalin předložil plénu seznam nových členů nejvyššího vedení, který přinášel řadu změn proti dřívějším zvyklostem i existujícím stanovám strany. Dosavadní politbyro ÚV KSSS bylo nahrazeno rozšířeným prezidiem ÚV, které mělo celkem 25 členů a 12 kandidátů. Ze starého politbyra nebyl zvolen pouze nemocný A. A. Andrejev a Alexej Nikolajevič Kosygin byl vyloučen z nejužšího vedení a posunut mezi kandidáty prezidia. Členy prezidia ÚV byli zvoleni: V. M. Andrijanov (první tajemník leningradské oblasti), A. B. Aristov (tajemník ÚV), L. P. Berija (náměstek předsedy RM SSSR), N. A. Bulganin (první náměstek RM SSSR), K. J. Vorošilov (náměstek RM SSSR), S. D. Ignatěv (ministr státní bezpečnosti), L. M. Kaganovič (náměstek RM SSSR), D. S. Korotčenko (předseda RM Ukrajiny), V. V. Kuzněcov (šéf odborů), O. V. Kuusinen, G. M. Malenkov (tajemník ÚV a náměstek RM SSSR), V. A. Malyšev (náměstek RM SSSR), L. G. Melnikov (první tajemník Ukrajiny), A. I. Mikojan (náměstek RM SSSR), N. A. Michajlov (tajemník ÚV pro otázky ideologie), V. M. Molotov (nám. RM SSSR), M. G. Pervuchin (nám. RM SSSR), P. K. Ponomarenko (nám. RM SSSR, tajemník ÚV), M. Z. Saburov (nám. RM SSSR), J. V. Stalin (taj. ÚV, předseda RM SSSR), M. A. Suslov (taj. ÚV), N. S. Chruščov (taj. ÚV, první tajemník v Moskvě), D. I. Česnokov, N. M. Švernik (předseda prezidia NS SSSR), M. F. Škirjatov (předseda Komise stranické kontroly); Kandidáty prezidia ÚV byli zvoleni: Brežněv L. I.(tajemník ÚV), Vyšinskij A. J. (ministr zahraničí), Zverev A. G., Ignatov N. G., Kabanov I. G., Kosygin A. N., Patoličev N. S., Pegov N. M., Puzanov A. M., Tevosjan I. F. a Judin P. F.; Byro prezidia ÚV: Stalin, Malenkov, Berija, Bulganin, Chruščov, Vorošilov, Kaganovič, Pervuchin a Saburov. Sekretariát ÚV: Stalin, Malenkov, Chruščov, Ponomarenko, Suslov, Aristov, Michajlov, Pegov, Brežněv a Ignatov.

20 sjezd

XX. sjezd KSSS Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání XX. sjezd Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu se konal od 14. do 26. února 1956. Známým a průlomovým se stal především vystoupením Nikity Chruščova, který pronesl projev Kult osobnosti a jeho důsledky na uzavřeném jednání. V něm Chruščov poodhalil a odsoudil diktátorské praktiky svého předchůdce Stalina. Sjezd se tak považuje za bod obratu, jímž stalinismus přestal být oficiální politikou KSSS a potažmo celého sovětského bloku, třebaže opatrná destalinizace probíhala v různých oblastech života a různých zemích nestejnou měrou a Albánie dokonce sovětský postoj označila za revizionistický. Odhalení nezákonných praktik ze stalinského období vyvolalo zpočátku mezi členy Politbyra projevy nesouhlasu a pohoršení. Tyto praktiky totiž byly drženy za diktátorovy vlády v tajnosti a proto se členům Politbyra i veřejnosti zdály neuvěřitelné. Některé hlasy žádaly dokonce odvolání 1. tajemníka KSSS Chruščova. Samotný projev se přes snahu o utajení dostal na veřejnost. Jednu z jeho kopií se totiž podařilo získat polskému novináři židovského původu Viktoru Grajevskému. Ten si ji náhodou všiml na stole šéfa polských komunistů. Aniž byl odhalen, podařilo se mu tuto předat na izraelské velvyslanectví ve Varšavě. Poté, co si ji důstojník Mosadu ofotografoval, vrátil ji zpět. Přes Izrael se zpráva dostala do USA a poté do tisku.[1]

XXVIII. sjezd

XXVIII. sjezd KSSS se konal mezi 2. a 13. červencem 1990 v Moskvě. Jednalo se o mimořádný sjezd strany; důvodem pro narušení obvyklého pětiletého intervalu (řádný sjezd by se konal roku 1991) byla krizová situace ve vztazích v zemi. XXVIII. sjezd byl posledním v historii celé strany i SSSR. Během tohoto sjedu byl znovuzvolen Michail Gorbačov za generálního tajemníka strany, jeho zástupcem se stal Vladimir Ivaško. Též byl schválen nový status strany, který tak formálně a de facto ukončil její monopolní postavení na politické scéně v SSSR. Z KSSS v době sjezdu také vystoupil například Boris Jelcin. Důvodem byl rozkol ve straně; demokratické křídlo usilovalo o pokračování demokratizace a perestrojky, konzervativní však bylo ostře proti a Gorbačovovo počínání označilo za „léčbu komunismu kapitalismem". Nebyl proto schválen nový program strany, vzniklo pouze programové prohlášení.

Andropov

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov (/ænˈdroʊpɔːf, -pɒf/;[1] Russian: Ю́рий Влади́мирович Андро́пов, tr. Júrij Vladímirovič Andrópov, IPA: [ˈjʉrʲɪj vlɐˈdʲimʲɪrəvʲɪtɕ ɐnˈdropəf]; 15 June [O.S. 2 June] 1914 - 9 February 1984)[2] was a Soviet politician and the fourth General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Following the 18-year rule of Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov served in the post from November 1982 until his death in February 1984. Earlier in his career, Andropov served as the Soviet ambassador to Hungary from 1954 to 1957, during which time he was involved in the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, he was named Chairman of the KGB on May 10, 1967. In this position, he oversaw a massive crackdown on dissent that was carried out via mass arrests and the wholesale application of involuntary commitments to those deemed "socially undesirable". As Brezhnev's health declined during the latter years of his leadership, Andropov formed a troika alongside Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov that ultimately came to dominate Soviet policymaking. Upon Brezhnev's death on November 12, 1982, Yuri Andropov succeeded him as General Secretary and (by extension) leader of the Soviet Union. During his tenure, Andropov sought to eliminate corruption and inefficiency within the Soviet system by investigating longtime officials for violations of party discipline and criminalizing truancy in the workplace. However, upon suffering total renal failure in February 1983, Andropov's health began to deteriorate rapidly. On February 9, 1984, he died after leading the country for only 15 months.

pozdější léta Brežněva

ater years A Soviet stamp from 1981 devoted to the 26th Party Congress In his later years, Brezhnev developed his own cult of personality, and awarded himself the highest military decorations of the Soviet Union. The media extolled Brezhnev "as a dynamic leader and intellectual colossus".[41] Brezhnev was awarded a Lenin Prize for Literature for Brezhnev's trilogy, three auto-biographical novels.[42] These awards were given to Brezhnev to bolster his position within the Party and the Politburo.[43] When Alexei Kosygin died on 18 December 1980, one day before Brezhnev's birthday, Pravda and other media outlets postponed the reporting of his death until after Brezhnev's birthday celebration.[41] In reality, however, Brezhnev's physical and intellectual capacities had started to decline in the 1970s from bad health.[44] Brezhnev approved the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (see also Soviet-Afghan relations) just as he had previously approved the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In both cases, Brezhnev was not the one pushing hardest for a possible armed intervention.[44] Several leading members of the Soviet leadership decided to retain Brezhnev as General Secretary so that their careers would not suffer by a possible leadership reshuffling by his successor. Other members, who disliked Brezhnev, among them Dmitriy Ustinov (Minister of Defence), Andrei Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Mikhail Suslov (Central Committee Secretary), feared that Brezhnev's removal would spark a succession crisis, and so they helped to maintain the status quo.[45] Brezhnev stayed in office under pressure from some of his Politburo associates, though in practice the country was not governed by Brezhnev, but instead by a collective leadership led by Suslov, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Yuri Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko, due to his close relationship with Brezhnev, had also acquired influence. While the Politburo was pondering who would take Brezhnev's place, his health continued to worsen. The choice of a successor would have been influenced by Suslov, but since he died in January 1982, before Brezhnev, Andropov took Suslov's place in the Central Committee Secretariat. With Brezhnev's health worsening, Andropov showed his Politburo colleagues that he was not afraid of Brezhnev's reprisals any more, and launched a major anti-corruption campaign. On 10 November 1982, Brezhnev died and was honored with major state funeral and buried 5 days later at the Kremlin Wall Necropolis.[

leninova závět

enin's Testament (zaveshchanie) is the name given to a document purportedly dictated by Vladimir Lenin in the last weeks of 1922 and the first week of 1923. The authenticity of the document has not been validly proven. There is much scholarship that reports it to have been dictated by Lenin himself although this has been contested by other credible sources as well. In the testament, Lenin proposed changes to the structure of the Soviet governing bodies. Sensing his impending death, he also gave criticism of Bolshevik leaders Zinoviev, Kamanev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Pyatakov and Stalin. He warned of the possibility of a split developing in the party leadership between Trotsky and Stalin if proper measures were not taken to prevent it. In a post-script he also suggested Joseph Stalin be removed from his position as General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee. Trotskyist historian Isaac Deutscher, claims "The whole testament breathed uncertainty" [1].

čistka v armádě

he purge of the Red Army and Military Maritime Fleet removed three of five marshals (then equivalent to four-star generals), 13 of 15 army commanders (then equivalent to three-star generals),[32] eight of nine admirals (the purge fell heavily on the Navy, who were suspected of exploiting their opportunities for foreign contacts),[33] 50 of 57 army corps commanders, 154 out of 186 division commanders, 16 of 16 army commissars, and 25 of 28 army corps commissars.[34] At first it was thought 25-50% of Red Army officers had been purged; the true figure is now known to be in the area of 3.7-7.7%. This discrepancy was the result of a systematic underestimation of the true size of the Red Army officer corps, and it was overlooked that most of those purged were merely expelled from the Party. Thirty percent of officers purged in 1937-39 were allowed to return to service.[35] The purge of the army was claimed to be supported by German-forged documents (said to have been correspondence between Marshal Tukhachevsky and members of the German high command).[36] The claim is unsupported by facts, as by the time the documents were supposedly created, two people from the eight in the Tukhachevsky group were already imprisoned, and by the time the document was said to reach Stalin the purging process was already underway. However the actual evidence introduced at trial was obtained from forced confessions

sssr a expanze 2www

in 1922, the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian SFSR approved the Treaty of Creation of the USSR and the Declaration of the Creation of the USSR, forming the Soviet Union.[25] Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who viewed the Soviet Union as a "socialist island", stated that the Soviet Union must see that "the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement".[26]

odmítnutí Marshallova plánu

n June 1947, after the Soviets had refused to negotiate a potential lightening of restrictions on German development, the United States announced the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive program of American assistance to all European countries wanting to participate, including the Soviet Union and those of Eastern Europe.[67] The Soviets rejected the Plan and took a hard line position against the United States and non-communist European nations.[68] However, Czechoslovakia was eager to accept the US aid; the Polish government had a similar attitude, and this was of great concern to the Soviets.[69] In one of the clearest signs of Soviet control over the region up to that point, the Czechoslovakian foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, was summoned to Moscow and berated by Stalin for considering joining the Marshall Plan. Polish Prime minister Józef Cyrankiewicz was rewarded for the Polish rejection of the Plan with a huge 5 year trade agreement, including $450 million in credit, 200,000 tons of grain, heavy machinery and factories.[70] In July 1947, Stalin ordered these countries to pull out of the Paris Conference on the European Recovery Programme, which has been described as "the moment of truth" in the post-World War II division of Europe.[71] Thereafter, Stalin sought stronger control over other Eastern Bloc countries, abandoning the prior appearance of democratic institutions.[72] When it appeared that, in spite of heavy pressure, non-communist parties might receive in excess of 40% of the vote in the August 1947 Hungarian elections, repressions were instituted to liquidate any independent political forces.[72] In that same month, annihilation of the opposition in Bulgaria began on the basis of continuing instructions by Soviet cadres.[72][73] At a late September 1947 meeting of all communist parties in Szklarska Poręba,[74] Eastern Bloc communist parties were blamed for permitting even minor influence by non-communists in their respective countries during the run up to the Marshall Plan.[7i

- Stalin implementoval komunistický instituční systém do Východního bloku x přesto každá země různý vývoj - satelity: uzavření mírových smluv, opozice zlikvidována a kroky k socialismu vytvořeny -> odtud jen snaha posíli kontrolu - hned od začátku stalin řídil systémy kt odmítli záp instituční chrakter tržní eko, , kapitalistickou parlamentní demokracii, vládu práva - umožnující stát intervence - výsledk: státy s centrální rolí Marxis-leninistické teorie - cílem totální kontrola politiky, podpořené rozsáhlým represivním sytémem - nicméně stále zbytky demo institucí - např parlamenty (sice jen podpisovací mašiny ale byly) a ústavy (ignor) - parl volby - ale zasedali jen několik dní v roce -> only to legitimize politburo decisions (strašně malý význam) - nejdůležitější generální tajemník ústředního výboru ks daného státu - politbyro nad KS - KS v leninistické tradici menší výběrová strana (3-14% populace)

politika v bloku

Nina Chruščovová

s chruščovem 1923-1971, ovdověla) Nina Petrovna Khrushcheva (Russian: Нина Петровна Хрущёва; - poté co Chruščov vůdcem Svazu 1953 - zastávala roli 1. dámy (pozice v Ru před ní neexistovala) - doporvázela CH na jeho zahr cestách, účastnila se oficiálních událostí and was de facto manager of Khrushchev's private life - mluvila 5 jazyky: Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, French and English - mnoho let studia n a kom školách - vzali se až 1965, když CH odešel z úřadu

ČEKA

Čeka Skočit na navigaciSkočit na vyhledávání Emblém Čeky Členové kolegia VČK v roce 1921, zleva: Jakov Peters, Józef Unszlicht, Abram Belenkij (stojí), Felix Edmundovič Dzeržinskij a Vjačeslav Menžinskij. Čeka (zkratka z Čerezvyčajnaja komissija, Mimořádná komise. Rusky: ЧК, ВЧК СНК РСФСР; celým názvem Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия по борьбе с контрреволюцией и саботажем при Совете народных комиссаров РСФСР, transkripcí Vsěrossijskaja črezvyčajnaja komissija po bor'be s kontrrevoljucijej i sabotažem pri Sovětě narodnych komissarov RSFSR, česky Všeruská mimořádná komise pro boj s kontrarevolucí a sabotáží při Radě lidových komisařů RSFSR) byla první ze série tajných policií v Sovětském Rusku. Byla založena Felixem Dzeržinskim na Leninův popud 20. prosince 1917. V roce 1922 byla přetvořena v GRU (Hlavní správu rozvědky). Její pětiletá existence stála život odhadem 200 až 500 tisíc lidí.[1] Její štáb se nacházel v Moskvě, v ulici Bolšaja Lubjanka, v domě č. 11, kde dříve sídlila pojišťovna Jakor a londýnská společnost Lloyds. Později se Čeka přestěhovala do domu č. 2, kde se nacházela ruská pojišťovací společnost Rossija. Ulice byla později přejmenována po prvním předsedovi - ulice Dzeržinského/Dzeržinská.

Leonid Iljič Brežněv

Леони́д Ильи́ч Бре́жнев, Ukrainian: Леоні́д Іллі́ч Бре́жнєв, 19 December 1906 (O.S. 6 December) - 10 November 1982)[2] - ukrajinský původ - vedl SSSR od 1964 do jeho smrti 1982 = generální tajemník ÚV KSSS - délka vládnutí = 18 let - druhá nejdelší po Stalinovi - během jeho období prudký nárust globálního vlivu SSSR, částečně kvůli dobovému zvětšení armády - jeho období bylo začátek éry ekonomické a sociální stagnace Svazu - 2ww povolán do armády -> 1946 skončila jako major general. - 1952 Brezhnev povýšen do UV KSSS -> 1957 plnohodnotným členem Politburo - 1964 nahradil Nikitu Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU. - Brežněvova konzervativnost a opartnost dosáhnout rozhodnutí konsezem v Politburu měla za následek politickou stabilitu v zemi straně x nepřátelskost k reformám a tolerance korupce -> období socioek poklesu = Břežněvovská stagnace - v zahraniční poitice: B usiloval o detante, zmírnění napětí a pěstování hospodářské spolupráce s USA - přes diplomatická gesta B režim vedl rozsáhle vojenské intervence + obrovské nahromadění zbraní -> nakonec narostlo tak moc že tvořilo 12.5% národního HDP - po letch zhoršujícího zdraví B zemřel 1982 a nahrazen Juri Andropovem roli gen tajemníka Removal and replacement of Khrushchev as Soviet leader Until about 1962, Khrushchev's position as Party leader was secure; but as the leader aged, he grew more erratic and his performance undermined the confidence of his fellow leaders. The Soviet Union's mounting economic problems also increased the pressure on Khrushchev's leadership. Outwardly, Brezhnev remained loyal to Khrushchev, but became involved in a 1963 plot to remove the leader from power, possibly playing a leading role. Also in 1963, Brezhnev succeeded Frol Kozlov, another Khrushchev protégé, as Secretary of the Central Committee, positioning him as Khrushchev's likely successor.[17] Khrushchev made him Second Secretary, literally deputy party leader, in 1964 After returning from Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia in October 1964, Khrushchev, unaware of the plot, went on holiday in Pitsunda resort on the Black Sea. Upon his return, his Presidium officers congratulated him for his work in office. Anastas Mikoyan visited Khrushchev, hinting that he should not be too complacent about his present situation. Vladimir Semichastny, head of the KGB,[19] was a crucial part of the conspiracy, as it was his duty to inform Khrushchev if anyone was plotting against his leadership. Nikolay Ignatov, who had been sacked by Khrushchev, discreetly requested the opinion of several Central Committee members. After some false starts, fellow conspirator Mikhail Suslov phoned Khrushchev on 12 October and requested that he return to Moscow to discuss the state of Soviet agriculture. Finally Khrushchev understood what was happening, and said to Mikoyan, "If it's me who is the question, I will not make a fight of it."[20] While a minority headed by Mikoyan wanted to remove Khrushchev from the office of First Secretary but retain him as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the majority, headed by Brezhnev, wanted to remove him from active politics altogether.[20] Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny appealed to the Central Committee, blaming Khrushchev for economic failures, and accusing him of voluntarism and immodest behavior. Influenced by Brezhnev's allies, Politburo members voted on 14 October to remove Khrushchev from office.[21] In addition, some members of the Central Committee wanted him to undergo punishment of some kind. But Brezhnev, who had already been assured the office of the General Secretary, saw little reason to punish his old mentor further.[22] Brezhnev was appointed First Secretary on the same day, but at the time was believed to be a transition leader of sorts, who would only "keep the shop" until another leader was appointed.[23] Alexei Kosygin was appointed head of government, and Mikoyan was retained as head of state.[24] Brezhnev and his companions supported the general party line taken after Joseph Stalin's death, but felt that Khrushchev's reforms had removed much of the Soviet Union's stability. One reason for Khrushchev's ousting was that he continually overruled other party members, and was, according to the plotters, "in contempt of the party's collective ideals". Pravda, a newspaper in the Soviet Union, wrote of new enduring themes such as collective leadership, scientific planning, consultation with experts, organisational regularity and the ending of schemes. When Khrushchev left the public spotlight, there was no popular commotion, as most Soviet citizens, including the intelligentsia, anticipated a period of stabilisation, steady development of Soviet society and continuing economic growth in the years ahead

Gerontokracie

za brežněva Gerontocracy Mikhail Gorbachev, as seen in 1985. Along with Grigory Romanov he was, in contrast to the norm, one of the young members elected to top positions during the Brezhnev Era[31] After the reshuffling process of the Politburo ended in the mid-to-late 1970, the Soviet leadership evolved into a gerontocracy, a form of rule in which the rulers are significantly older than most of the adult population.[27] The Brezhnev generation — the people who lived and worked during the Brezhnev Era — owed their rise to prominence to Joseph Stalin's Great Purge in the late 1930s. In the purge, Stalin ordered the execution or exile of nearly all Soviet bureaucrats over the age of 35, thereby opening up posts and offices for a younger generation of Soviets. This generation would rule the country from the aftermath of Stalin's purge up to Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. The majority of these appointees were of either peasant or working class origin. Mikhail Suslov, Alexei Kosygin, and Brezhnev are prime examples of men appointed in the aftermath of Stalin's Great Purge.[32] The average age of the Politburo's members was 58 years in 1961, and 71 in 1981. A similar greying also took place in the Central Committee, the median age rising from 53 in 1961 to 62 in 1981, with the proportion of members older than 65 increasing from 3 percent in 1961 to 39 percent in 1981. The difference in the median age between Politburo and Central Committee members can be explained by the fact that the Central Committee was consistently enlarged during Brezhnev's leadership; this made it possible to appoint new and younger members to the Central Committee without retiring some of its oldest members. Of the 319-member Central Committee in 1981, 130 were younger than 30 when Stalin died in 1953.[33] Young politicians, such as Fyodor Kulakov and Grigory Romanov, were seen as potential successors to Brezhnev, but none of them came close. For example, Kulakov, one of the youngest members in the Politburo, was ranked seventh in the prestige order voted by the Supreme Soviet, far behind such notables as Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov, and Kirilenko.[34] As Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle note in their book, Brezhnev Reconsidered, the Soviet leadership at Brezhnev's deathbed had evolved into "a gerontocracy increasingly lacking of physical and intellectual vigou

Andrej Andrejevič Gromyko

Андрей Aндрeeвич Громыко z Běloruska - 10. předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR 1985 - 1988 Předchůdce: Černěnko, Nástupce: Gorbačov 5. (7.) ministr zahraničních věcí SSSR 1957 - 1985 1. stálý zástupce SSSR při OSN 1946 - 1948 žil: 1909- 1989 byl sovětský politik a diplomat - od roku 1939 působil v diplomatických službách SSSR - vyslanec v USA 1943-1946 podílel se na vzniku OSN - po odvolání Molotova trochu spadl -> min Vyšinsky - 1952-53 v Londýně jako sovětský velvyslanec - po smrti Stalin na zamini Molotov, pak kvůli Ch odvolán - za něj Šepilov a po něm Gromyko - Gromyko min zahr - za Chruščova min vliv na zahr pol -> až při nástupu Brežněva zvětšení pravomocí (říjen 1964) - Br ani Kosygin něměli moc zkušeností se zahr pol -> vice prostoru -> růst Gromykovy úlohy uvnitř sovětského vedení -> členství v politbyru (1967 kandidát, 1973-1988 plnoprávný člen). - 2.pol 70s úpadek Brežněvova vlivu -> pro zahr pol důležitý triumvirát Andropov (KGB) Dmitrij Ustinova (vojensko-prům komplex, min. obrany, gen. štáb) a Gromyka (zamini) -> rozhodl bez angažovanosti stranického aparátu o invazi do Afghánistánu v roce 1979. - podpořil Andropova a Černěnka při volbě gen tajemníka, pak na straně Gorbačova - nová stran garnitura - 1985 odešel ze ZAMINI a stal se oficiální hlavou státu - předsedou prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR, kterou vykonával až do roku 1988, kdy byl penzionován. - novým ministrem zahraničí se stal Eduard Ševardnadze (1985-1990). - min zahraničí a předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR - díky Stalinským čistkám se otevřely dveře do diplomacie - jaro 1939 - Stalin pověřil Beriju (NKVD) provést očistu narkomindělu (NKID, lidový komisariát zahraničních věcí) = příprava pro jiny kurz zahr pol SSSR -> Většina diplomatů zmizela + lidový kom Litvinov do dom vezení - do čela diplomacie Molotov (tehdejší premiér), pravou ruko -> původně pracovník NKVD Děkanozov ->spolu vytváří nový dipl sbor - povolali i Gromyka -> do vedení Oddělení amerických států NKID a stal se poradcem velvyslanectví SSSR v USA. -> 1943-1946 ve Washingtonu - sovětský velvyslanec v USA. -> spolupodílel se na zřizování OSN, ve kterém se stal prvním představitelem SSSR (1946-1948) - > náměstkem ministra zahraničí SSSR (1946-1949). - Po odvolání Molotova -> Andrej Vyšinsky - se Gromyko 1. náměstkem ministra (1949-1952). - 1952-53 v Londýně jako sovětský velvyslanec. -> Změny v Kremlu -> Gromyko opět fce 1. náměstka ministra (1953-1957), v jehož křesle se vystřídali V. M. Molotov (do r. 1956) a D. T. Šepilov (1956-1957). - po smrti Stalina 1953 - zahr pol zase Vjačeslav Molotov - měl zkušenosti a ve světě značné renomé - mocenský střet s Nikitou - musel mu ustoupit a Chruščov jako šéf strany hl. slovo ve formulování zahr pol - z iniciativy Ch odvolán Molotov -> za něj str. ideolog Dmitrij Šepilov a pak zkušený diplomat Andrej Gromyko - vliv Gromyka na tvorbu zahr pol min - stále hl Chruščov - změna po nástupu nového Brežněvova stranického vedení v říjnu 1964. - Brežněv ani Kosygin neměli dostatek zkušeností z oblasti mezinárodních vztahů a tak Gromyko měl více možností zasahovat do formulování zahraniční politiky, byť nadále si zachovalo hlavní slovo politbyro ÚV KSSS. - Vztahy mezi ním a generálním tajemníkem byly v přátelské rovině už od konce padesátých let, když Brežněv zastával funkci hlavy státu a musel podnikat řadu oficiálních návštěv. - Růst Gromykovy úlohy uvnitř sovětského vedení mu přinesl i členství v politbyru (1967 kandidát, 1973-1988 plnoprávný člen). - 2 pol. 70s pozvolný úpadek Brežněvovy osobnosti + jeho vliv na pol klesal - mocenské vakuum vyplnili jeho nejbližší důvěrníci - hl. slovo na tvorbu besp zahr pol: triumvirát - Jurije Andropova (KGB), Dmitrije Ustinova (vojensko-průmyslový komplex, ministerstvo obrany, generální štáb) a Gromyka (ministerstvo zahraničí) -> rozhodl bez angažovanosti stranického aparátu o invazi do Afghánistánu v roce 1979. - Andropov gen tajemníkem díky podpoře Ustinova i Gromyka -> Gromyko statutární povýšení na post 1. náměstka předsedy rady mini + stále min zahr - Po smrti Andropova (únor 1984) Gromyko (75) podržel vládnoucí gerontokracii při volbě Konstantina Černěnka generálním tajemníkem - o rok později už na str progresivní skup okolo Michaila Gorbačova. - nová stran garnitura - odešel ze ZAMINI a stal se oficiální hlavou státu - předsedou prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR, kterou vykonával až do roku 1988, kdy byl penzionován. - Novým ministrem zahraničí se stal Eduard Ševardnadze (1985-1990).

Michail Andrejevič Suslov

Михаил Андреевич Суслов 1902 - 1982 sovětský politik, člen ÚV KSSS 1941 - 1982 člen politického byra ÚV KSSS (1952 - 1953, 1955 - 1982) - považován za šedou eminenci politiky 60s, 70s i začátku 80s - rudý kardinál, strážce ideologické čistoty režimu - Byl velmi vlivný komunistický politik od dob pozdního stalinismu až do konce Brežněvovy éry. - Druhý tajemník KS od 1965 - 1982 (smrt) - neoficiální hlavní ideolog KS do 1982. - zodpovědný za demokracii ve str a rozdělení mocu v KS - hardline attitude toward change made him one of the foremost orthodox communist Soviet leaders. - 1946 členem organizačního výboru ÚV (Orgburo) - 1950 zvolen do Prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu - od 1952 plnohodnotný člen Presidia KSSS - ztratil dost vlivu po Stalinově smrti, ale nakonci 50s Suslov povstal - lídr hardline opozice k Chruščovovu revizinistickému vedení - po odstranění Ch 1964 - Suslov podpořil vytvoření kolektivního vedení státu - taky podpořil vnitrostarnickou demokracii a byl proti znovu zřízení vlády jednoho muže jako během Stalinovy a Chruščovovy éry - během éry Brežněva byl považován za hl ideologa strany a druhým ve vedení - His death on 25 January 1982 is viewed as starting the battle to succeed Leonid Brezhnev in the post of General Secretary - za stalinismu se stal 2. tajemníkem ÚV - Původně vystupoval jako fanatický stoupenec a obdivovatel J. V. Stalina. - aktivní v kampaních proti sionismu (Stalinovo tažení proti Židům) - na počátku 50s řídil sovětský tisk a kontroloval mezinárodní komunistické hnutí. - Své postavení upevnil na XIX. sjezdu KSSS, kdy byl zvolen tajemníkem ÚV i členem prezidia ÚV KSSS. (1952) - Své postavení uchránil i v období chruščovovských experimentů. - Významnou úlohu sehrál během vojenského potlačení maďarských událostí v roce 1956. - V otázkách destalinizace si počínal velmi opatrně, daleko lépe se cítil v klidných vodách tichého neostalinismu. To již pevně zakotvil v brežněvovských strukturách KSSS, kdy se stal hlavní ideologickou oporou generálního tajemníka L. I. Brežněva a zosobněním legitimity tehdejší stranické elity. Od konce 40. let byl považován za experta na ideologické otázky a mezinárodní komunistické hnutí. V období 1964 - 1982 zastával neformální úlohu druhého tajemníka ÚV. Arbitra uvnitř politbyra, jehož úsudku a hodnocení si vážil i samotný generální tajemník. Představoval nedostižnou etickou normu pro většinu aparátčíků.

sovětská roztržka s Čínou

(1956-1966) = přerušení politických vztahů mezi PRC (Čín lid rep/People's Rep of CH) a USSR (Svaz sovět soc rep/ Union of Sov Soc Rep) - číně se nelíbila destalinizace a mírumilovnost SSSR vůči Z - příčinou neschody ohledně Marxisticko-Lenininistické doktríny - vzešly z rozdílných aplikací a interpretací terorie Marxism-Leninismu + ovlivněno geopol Studené války (1945-1991) - konec 50s a začátek 60s - čínsko sovětské debaty o interpretaci Ortodoxního Marxismu -> přerostly v diskuze o nár destalinizaci a ve vztazích se zahraničímv mírumilovné koexistenci se Západem - vztahy PRC se světem - bojovnost ku Z + odmítnutí mírumilovnosti SSSR - Mao řekl že to je ruský komunisti prováděj marxistický revizionismus - začátek 56 - Chruščov odmítl Stalinismus v řeči: On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences (25 February 1956) - the PRC and the USSR had progressively divergent interpretations of Marxist ideology; by 1961, their intractable differences of ideologic interpretation and praxis provoked the PRC's formal denunciation of Soviet communism as the work of "revisionist traitors" in the USSR. Among the Eastern bloc countries, the Sino-Soviet split was about who would lead the revolution for world communism, to whom — to China or to Russia — would the vanguard parties of the world turn for political advice, financial aid, and military assistance?[3] In that vein, the USSR and the PRC competed for ideological leadership through the communist parties native to the countries in their spheres of influence.[4] In the Western world, the Sino-Soviet split transformed the geopolitics of the bi-polar cold war into a tri-polar cold war; as important as the erection of the Berlin Wall (1961), the defusing of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the end of the Vietnam War (1945-1975), because the rivalry, between Chinese Stalinism and Russian coexistence, facilitated and realised Mao's Sino-American rapprochement, by way of the 1972 Nixon visit to China. Ideologically, the Sino-Soviet split voided the political myth that "monolithic communism" (the Eastern bloc) was a unitary actor in geopolitics, especially during the 1947-1950 period in Viet Nam, which led to US military intervention.[5] Historically, the ideological Sino-Soviet split facilitated the Marxist-Leninist Realpolitik by which Mao established the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC-USA-USSR) of the late-period Cold Wa

13. sjezd

1924 This congress was the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)' first to take place after the death of Vladimir Lenin, and represents a transition between the Lenin and Joseph Stalin regimes. It was also the first confrontation between the Left Opposition (led by Leon Trotsky) and the "troika" (led by Stalin, Grigory Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev).

ABM

1972 Smlouva o omezení systému protiraketové obrany (proti balistickým střelám) Smlouva ABM". Omezuje rozmístění amerických a sovětských protiraketových systémů.

Nikolaj Ignatěv

Nikolay Ignatov

Ryžkov Nikolaj Ivanovič

Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov (Ukrainian: Микола Іванович Рижков; Russian: Николай Иванович Рыжков, translit. Nikolaj Ivanovič Ryžkov'; born 28 September 1929)[1] is a former Soviet official who became a Russian politician following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He served as the last Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the post was abolished and replaced by that of Prime Minister in 1991). Responsible for the cultural and economic administration of the Soviet Union during the late Gorbachev Era, Ryzhkov was succeeded as premier by Valentin Pavlov in 1991. The same year, he lost his seat on the Presidential Council, going on to become Boris Yeltsin's leading opponent in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) 1991 presidential election. Ryzhkov was born in the city of Dzerzhynsk, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (now Toretsk, Ukraine) in 1929. After graduating in the 1950s he started work in the 1970s and began his political career in local industry, working his way up through the hierarchy of Soviet industrial ministries. In 1979 Ryzhkov was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Following Nikolai Tikhonov's resignation as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov was voted into office in his place. During his tenure, he supported Mikhail Gorbachev's 1980s reform of the Soviet economy. Elected to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in December 1995 as an independent, Ryzhkov subsequently led the Power to the People block, later becoming the formal leader of the People's Patriotic Union of Russia alongside Gennady Zyuganov, who was an unofficial leader. On 17 September 2003, he resigned his seat in the Duma and became a member of the Federation Council. Due to the Crimean crisis, he was sanctioned by Canada and the United States on March 17, 2014. Senator from Belgorod Oblast Incumbent Assumed office 17 September 2003 Member of the State Duma In office 17 December 1995 - 17 September 2003 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the People's Patriotic Union In office 7 August 1996 - 1998 Preceded by None—post established Succeeded by Viktor Ilyich Zorkaltsev Chairman of the Council of Ministers In office 27 September 1985 - 14 January 1991 President Mikhail Gorbachev (1990-1991) Deputy First Deputy Premiers[show] Preceded by Nikolai Tikhonov Succeeded by Valentin Pavlov (as Prime Minister) Head of the Economic Department of the Central Committee In office 1982 - August 1985 Preceded by Boris Gostev Succeeded by Boris Gostev Full member of the 26th, 27th Politburo In office 23 April 1985 - 13 July 1990 Member of the 25th Secretariat In office 22 November 1982 - 15 October 1985 Full member of the 26th, 27th, 28th of the Central Committee In office 3 March 1981 - 29 August 1991 Political events Following the Chernobyl disaster, along with Yegor Ligachev, Ryzhkov visited the crippled plant between 2-3 May 1986. On Ryzhkov's orders the government evacuated everyone within a 30 kilometres (19 mi) radius of the plant.[14] The 30 km radius was a purely random guess and it was later shown that several areas contaminated with radioactive material were left untouched by government evacuation agencies.[15] In the aftermath of the 1988 earthquake in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ryzhkov promised to rebuild the city of Spitak within two years.[16] A Politburo commission was established to provide guidance for the local ASSR Government with Ryzhkov elected its chairman.[17] The commission then travelled to the ASSR to assess damage caused by the earthquake.[18] During Gorbachev's subsequent visit to the ASSR, and aware of local feelings following the disaster, Ryzhkov persuaded the less sensitive Gorbachev to forgo use of his limousine in favor of public transport.[19] When Gorbachev left the ASSR, Ryzhkov remained to coordinate the rescue operation and made several television appearances which increased his standing amongst the Soviet leadership and the people in general.[20] With his standing thus boosted, on 19 July 1988, at the Central Committee Plenum, Ryzhkov criticised nearly every one of Gorbachev's policies, further complaining that as Party Secretary he should devote more time to the Party.[21] In the end, Ryzhkov failed in his promise to rebuild Spitak, partly due to the Soviet Union's mounting economic problems, and partly because many of the city's Soviet era buildings had not been designed with adequate earthquake protection, making their reconstruction more difficult.[16] Economic policy Historian Jerry F. Hough notes that Gorbachev treated Ryzhkov and his reform attempts just as badly as Leonid Brezhnev treated Alexei Kosygin, one-time Chairman of the Council of Ministers, during the Brezhnev Era. Brezhnev's most notable snub was over the 1965 Soviet economic reform.[9] Ryzhkov was an early supporter of the Gorbachev policy calling for an increase in the quantity and quality of goods planned for production during the period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). To achieve these goals, the government pumped money into the machine-building sector but as time went by, Gorbachev increasingly diverged from his original stance. He now wanted to increase overall investment in nearly all industrial sectors; a move which Ryzhkov knew was a budgetary impossibility. However, Ryzhkov's economic policies were not much better as he continued to advocate an unreasonable increase in the production of consumer goods.[22] Gorbachev and Ligachev's anti-alcohol campaign was opposed by Ryzhkov, who agreed with the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Trade that such a drive would deprive from the state billions of rubles in income.[23] Nevertheless, the campaign went ahead, losing the Soviet Government millions in revenues.[24] Ryzhkov's opposition to the campaign was strengthened by his belief that both Gorbachev and Ligachev placed ideology before practical considerations, and he instead advocated an alternative long-term program rather than one designed to have immediate effect.[25] Ryzhkov and Gorbachev continued their work on economic reform and in 1987 began drafting the Law on the State Enterprise, which restricted the authority of central planners.[26] This would later come into effect and give workers an unrealistically high level of power.[27] Nikolai Talyzin, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, became the scapegoat for the failure of this reform and on the orders of Ryzhkov he was replaced by Yuri Maslyukov.[28] While supporting the transition away from a planned economy, Ryzhkov understood that privatisation would weaken the government's power. As changes occurred, skepticism over perestroika and privatisation was not limited to high-level government officialdom. Several middle and low-ranking officials, who owed their rise in the hierarchy to government-owned enterprises, wanted to retain the existing system. Gorbachev also blamed Ryzhkov and the Council of Ministers for the economic difficulties which arose during perestroika, a move which fostered resentment for both Gorbachev and perestroika.[29] Nevertheless, in 1986, Ryzhkov stated that he, along with the rest of the Soviet leadership, were already discussing the possibility of creating a market economy in the Soviet Union.[30] Ryzhkov supported the creation of a "regulated market economy" where the government sector occupied the "commanding heights" of the economy as well as the creation of semi private-public companies.[31] His second cabinet, several high-standing members of the KGB and the military establishment all supported Ryzhkov's opposition to the 500 Days Programme, which espoused a quick transition to a market economy.[32] Matters did not improve when at the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union, Ryzhkov proposed postponing the transition to a market economy until 1992, further suggesting that in the period between 1990-1992, recentralisation of government activities would ensure a period of stabilisation.[33] Ryzhkov's economic reform plan was a hybrid of Leonid Abalkin's and one created by himself in conjunction with the Maslyukov chaired State Planning Committee along with several other government institutions.[34] On 5 July 1989 the State Commission of the Council of Ministers on Economic Reforms was established, which replaced Maslyukov's reform commission. The new commission was chaired by Abalkin, who had also been appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[35] With strong support from Ryzhkov, Gorbachev abolished the Central Committee economic department, thereby strengthening the authority of central government over economic matters. From then on, the government could not be blamed for economic policies initiated by the Party leadership. The establishment of the post of President of the Soviet Union by Gorbachev in 1990 weakened the power of the government apparatus; a move Ryzhkov and his second cabinet opposed.[36] Price reform According to Swedish economist Anders Åslund, Ryzhkov differed little from Gorbachev when it came to price reform.[34] There were, however, subtle differences between the two men's views, with Ryzhkov supporting an administratively controlled price increase while Gorbachev, as a radical economist who supported market reform, opposed such measures. As Hough noted, Ryzhkov supported "the need for greater fiscal responsibility", while Gorbachev advocated the need for more rational prices which, according to Hough, would have brought inflation under control.[37] Ryzhkov proposed price reform measures to Gorbachev several times but was turned down on each occasions, even though Gorbachev had argued strongly on the need for price reform in his speeches. Gorbachev strengthened his public image by accusing the Soviet leadership's conservative faction together with Ryzhkov, of delaying implementation of the necessary price reform. Ryzhkov had the backing of several high-standing institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance and the State Committee on Prices, chaired by the future Soviet Premier Valentin Pavlov.[38] In contrast to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov actually had, according to Hough, a plan for a transition to a market economy. Gorbachev on the other hand was never able to turn words into deeds.[39] By 1988 Ryzhkov increasingly sided with Leonid Abalkin, one of the few economists who advocated fiscal responsibility. At the 19th Conference of the Central Committee, Abalkin was severely criticised by Gorbachev, and accused of "economic determinism". Several conference delegates agreed with Gorbachev, but Ryzhkov's support remained solid. Abalkin was ordered to deliver a report to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers by December, which as things turned out, put financial stability at the top of its agenda.[40] Gorbachev disliked Abalkin's report and rejected Ryzhkov's requests that he support it. Ryzhkov was then forced to create an even more conservative reform plan for 1989 in which price reform was to be postponed until 1991.[41] When the Abalkin report was proposed at the Central Committee plenum, the majority of delegates indirectly attacked Gorbachev for his indecisiveness when it came to the implementation of price reform.[42] In April 1990, after submitting a draft to the Presidential Council and the Federation Council[clarification needed], Ryzhkov's price reform was initiated. However, a short while later it was once more put on hold following severe criticism from Boris Yeltsin and several pro-Gorbachev intellectuals. The economic turmoil which hit the Soviet Union in 1990 was blamed on Ryzhkov, even though it was Gorbachev who had delayed Ryzhkov's proposed reform.[43] In his memoirs, Gorbachev vaguely asserts that a single price increase would be better than several.[44] Things did not improve for Ryzhkov when, at the 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev claimed it would be "absurd" to begin serious economic reform with price increases.[45] Fall from power In August 1990 several leading officials tried to persuade Gorbachev to force Ryzhkov to resign from his post. Gorbachev did not bow to this pressure, fearing that Ryzhkov's removal would lead to increased activity by many of his pro-republican first secretaries and Politburo members. Ryzhkov's numerous supporters were not concerned about policy issues; they backed him simply because he opposed some of Gorbachev's economic and political reforms.[46] In July 1990, as the Politburo underwent restructuring at the 28th Party Congress, all government officials except Gorbachev and Vladimir Ivashko, the Deputy General Secretary, were excluded with Ryzhkov losing his Politburo seat by default. Nevertheless, Ryzhkov, along with many others, was elected a member of the Presidential Council.[47] On 19 October 1990 the Russian Supreme Soviet, by a vote of 164 to 1 with 16 abstentions, forced the resignation of Ryzhkov and his cabinet and the implementation of the 500 Days Programme. In stark contrast, Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union support for Ryzhkov's economic reform plan increased.[48] Ryzhkov's economic reform plan was passed by an overwhelming majority, with 1,532 deputies in favour, 419 against and 44 deputies abstaining. The parliamentary Interregional Group's vote of no confidence in Ryzhkov's government also failed, with 199 members in favour of Ryzhkov and his cabinet's resignation, 1,685 against and 99 abstaining.[49] As the result of a propaganda war launched against Ryzhkov by Gorbachev supporters, several leading members of the Council of Ministers and its Presidium urged Ryzhkov to resign so that the Soviet Government could reach a compromise with the Russian Government.[50] To make matters worse, the Russian Government which was headed by Ivan Silayev, stopped following Ryzhkov's orders,[51] and Silayev refused to visit the Moscow Kremlin.[52] Ryzhkov's Plan and The 500 Days Programme were broadly similar, with both supporting price liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation.[53] The main difference between the two was Ryzhkov's desire to retain much of the social security system, free education for all and the continuance of a strong central government apparatus. The 500 Days Programme did not mention political union with the other Soviet republics, but instead weakened the authority of the central government by establishing a market economy. In other words, they left the question of continuing or dissolving the Soviet Union open.[54] On 17 September in a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev openly supported the 500 Days Programme, claiming it would not lead to the reestablishment of capitalism, but instead to a mixed economy where private enterprise played an important role.[55] In December 1990 Ryzhkov suffered a heart attack. During his recovery, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union dissolved the Council of Ministers and replaced it with the Cabinet of Ministers headed by Valentin Pavlov, Ryzhkov's former Minister of Finance. The law enacting the change was passed on 26 December 1990, but the new structure was not implemented until 14 January 1991 when Pavlov took over as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.[56] Between Ryzhkov's hospitalisation and Pavlov's election as Prime Minister, Lev Voronin acted as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[57] The reorganisation of the government made it subordinate to the Presidency, weakening the head of government's hold on economic policy. In contrast to Hough's view that Gorbachev had little reason to remove Ryzhkov, Gordon M. Hahn argues that there were good reasons to replace him given that with Ryzhkov's Politburo support much reduced, the reformist opposition saw him as a conservative.[56] 1991 Presidential campaign Main article: Nikolai Ryzhkov presidential campaign, 1991 1991 election. Blue indicates a win by Yeltsin, red a win by Ryzhkov, grey a win by Tuleyev. After recovering from his heart attack, in early 1991 Ryzhkov stood as the Communist candidate in the first election of the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).[58] Ryzhkov's vice presidential candidate was Boris Gromov, a Soviet war veteran who led the Soviet military during the final stages of the war in Afghanistan.[59] Running as the Communist Party nominee, Ryzhkov placed second in the election. He received a total of 13,395,335 votes, equal to 16.9% of the total vote. He placed more than forty points behind Boris Yeltsin, who won the election.[58]

sovětský hladomor 1932-33

The Soviet famine of 1932-33 was a major famine that killed millions of people in the major grain-producing areas of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Volga Region and Kazakhstan,[2] the South Urals, and West Siberia.[3][4] The Holodomor in Ukraine and Kazakh famine of 1932-33 have been seen as genocide committed by Joseph Stalin's government[citation needed]; it is estimated between 3.3[5] and 7.5[6] million died in Ukraine and ~2,000,000 (40% of all Kazakhs) died in Kazakhstan.[7][8][9] Between 2.4[10] and 4[6] million ethnic Ukrainians are estimated to have perished as a result of the famine. The exact number of deaths is hard to determine due to a lack of records,[11][12] but the number increases significantly when the deaths in the heavily Ukrainian-populated Kuban region are included.[13] Older estimates are still often cited in political commentary.[14] According to the findings of the Court of Appeal of Kiev in 2010, the demographic losses due to the famine amounted to 10 million, with 3.9 million direct famine deaths, and a further 6.1 million birth deficit.[11] Stalin and other party members had ordered that kulaks were "to be liquidated as a class" [15] and so they became a target for the state. The richer, land-owning peasants were labeled 'kulaks" and were portrayed by the Bolsheviks as class enemies, which culminated Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of large numbers of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The forced collectivization of agriculture as a part of the Soviet first five-year plan, forced grain procurement, combined with rapid industrialisation, a decreasing agricultural workforce, and several bad droughts, were the main reasons for the famine. The famine is sometimes seen by historians as a deliberate act of genocide against ethnic Ukrainians and Kazakhs, though some disagree, citing the fact that land-owning peasants (Kulaks) were in favor of private property, which is diametrically opposed to the Communist Party's fundamental tenets.[16]:507 Gareth Jones was the first Western journalist to report the devastation.[17][18][a] In addition to the Kazakh famine of 1919-1922, in 10-15 years Kazakhstan lost more than half of its population due to the actions of the Soviet power. The famine made Kazakhs a minority in their own republic. Before the famine, around 60% of the republic's population were Kazakhs, but after the famine, only around 38% of the population were Kazakhs.[19][20]

roztržka s Jugoslávií

the Tito-Stalin Split, or Yugoslav-Soviet Split = konflikt mezi socialistickou federativní republikou Jugoslávie a Sovět svazem -> 1948 Jugoslavie vyloučena z Kominformy (Inf. byro komunistických a dělnických stran) = začátek Informbiro period - období špatných vztahů se SSSR - končí 1955 - sověti: roztržka způsobena jugoslávskou neloajáIností - Jug a Západ: příčinou národní hrdost Josipa Brože Tita -tj neochota poddat se Stalinovu přáání udělat z Jugoslávie satelitní stát - během 2www Jugo okupována Osou x v odboji několik skupin, hl komunisti v čele s Titem - 1945 převzali kontrolu nad státem za minimálních sovět zásahů (Tito tehdy stále loajální Moskvě) - role Tita v osvobození země posílila jeho pozici ve straně i mezi lidem + podpořila jeho názor že by Jugoslávie měla dostat víc prostoru pro vlastní vývoj než státy Bloku které potřebovali více pomoci při osvobozování = třecí plocha ještě před koncem 2ww - přestože Tito spojenec Stalina, sověti umístili špiony do strany už roku 1945 -> uneasy alliance - po skončení 2ww Jugo ještě ozbrojené střety - získali istrii, Zadar a Rijeku (města součástí IT (během 1920S) - toto prospěšné pro slovany v dobytých regionech (hl Chorv a Slovince) + Jugo snaha připojit i Ters ale x Západ a Stalin proti - Tito otevřeně pro kom stranu v Řecké občan válce (Stalin si držel odstup, páč se dohod s Churchillem že nebude podporovat KS v Gr kvůli the Percentages agreement - Tito plánval pohltit Albánii a Řecko za spolupráce Bulharska -> založit mocný východní blok mimo kontrolu Moskvy - Stalin could not tolerate that threat. první konforma - nicméně svět viděl Jugo a Ru jako blízké spojence - 1. setkání Kominformy 1947 - Jugoslávci nejtvrdší kritici národních KS - nedostatečně oddané společnému cíly - zvlášt It S Fr strany účast na koaliční politice - Jugo essentially arguing Soviet positions - středisko kominformy stanoveno na Bělehrad -The friction that led to the ultimate split had many causes, many of which can ultimately be linked to Tito's regional focus and his refusal to accept Moscow as the supreme Communist authority. Second Cominform Tito did not even attend the second meeting of the Cominform, fearing that Yugoslavia was to be openly attacked. On June 28, the other member countries expelled Yugoslavia, citing "nationalist elements" that had "managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership" of the CPY. The resolution warned Yugoslavia that it was on the path back to bourgeois capitalism due to its nationalist, independence-minded positions. Results Main article: Informbiro period The expulsion effectively banished Yugoslavia from the international association of socialist states. After the expulsion, Tito suppressed those who supported the resolution, calling them "Cominformists".[8] Many were sent to a gulag-like prison camp at Goli otok ("Barren Island").[9] Between 1948 and 1952, the Soviet Union encouraged its allies to rebuild their military forces—especially Hungary, which was to be the leading force in a possible war against Yugoslavia. Titoism was denounced by Moscow as a heresy that said Communist countries should take a nationalist road to socialism different from that of the Soviet Union. Across Eastern Europe, Communist leaders suspected of Tito-like tendencies were purged by pro-Moscow elements. After Stalin's death and the repudiation of his policies by Nikita Khrushchev, peace was made with Tito and Yugoslavia re-admitted into the international brotherhood of socialist states. However, relations between the two countries were never completely rebuilt; Yugoslavia would continue to take an independent course in world politics, shunning the influence of both west and east. The Yugoslav Army maintained two official defense plans, one against a NATO invasion and one against a Warsaw Pact invasion. Tito used the estrangement from the USSR to obtain US aid via the Marshall Plan, as well as to found the Non-Aligned Movement, in which Yugoslavia was a leading force.

Gromyko jako hlava státu

- Gromyko ve funkci předsedy Prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu 1985-88 - věřil že perestroika was about working for the construction of a socialist society - saw glasnost and perestroika as an attempt at making the USSR more democratic - rezignoval 1988, po něm ve funkci Gorbačov - sjezd strany 1988 Vladimir Melnikov called for Gromyko's resignation - blamed Brezhnev for the economic and political stagnation that had hit the Soviet Union and, seeing that Gromyko was a prominent member of the Brezhnev leadership, Gromyko was one of the men which had led the USSR into the crisis. - Gromyko dostal podporu - ale after discussing it with his wife Gromyko decided to leave Soviet politics for good. - told Gorbachev that he wished to resign before he made it official. Gorbachev succeeded Gromyko in office as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.[61] After his resignation Gorbachev praised Gromyko for his half-century of service to USSR. Critics, such as Alexander Belonogov the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, claimed Gromyko's foreign policy was permeated with "a spirit of intolerance and confrontation".

Gromyko a Zamini

- ministr zahraničí 1957 - 1985 (28! let) - úspěchy: podpis 1963 Smlouva o částečném zákazu jaderných zkoušek (domlouvána od 58) + 1966, Gromyko a A. Kosygin převědčili Pakistan i Indii aby podepsali Taškentskou deklaraci = mírová smlouva po konciIndo-Pakistan war of 1965. - 1966 hovory s papežem Pavlem VI -> součást papežovi ostpolitik ->větší otevřenost kat církve ve VE (v SSSR pořát silná perzekuce křest) - další úspěch: Smlouva o nešíření jaderných zbraní, 1972 ABM and SALT I, + Dohoda o prevenci jaderné války z roku 1973 - zprvu řešil problémy mezi zamini a International Department (ID) KSSS (mezinárodním oddělení ÚV KSSS)- vedl Boris Ponomarev, který chtěl více moci pro ID x Gromyko (+ vadil mu Ponomarev i dělení moci s ID) - 1958 Mao Zedong snaha získat podporu v sovět vedení pro plánovanou válku Republic of China (Taiwan) - ohromil Gromyka: he was willing to sacrifice the lives of "300 million people" just for the sake of annexing the Republic of China into the People's Republic of China - Gromyko: neprůchozí - když se vedení dozvědělo - ukončili Soviet-Chinese nuclear program + hodně inustrializačních projektů v PRC - Kubánská raketová Krize Gromyo setkání s JFK (prez USA)jednal dle instrukcí Chr - podporoval politiku odzbrojení - 1978 setkání s Jimmy Carterem - během svého působení na zamini podporoval myšlenku že žádná důl mezinár dohoda nemůže být dosažena bez zapojení SSSR - úspěchy: podpis 1963 Smlouva o částečném zákazu jaderných zkoušek (domlouvána od 58) + 1966, Gromyko a A. Kosygin převědčili Pakistan i Indii aby podepsali Taškentskou deklaraci = mírová smlouva po konciIndo-Pakistan war of 1965. - 1966 hovory s papežem Pavlem VI -> součást papežovi ostpolitik ->větší otevřenost kat církve ve VE (v SSSR pořát silná perzekuce křest) - další úspěch: Smlouva o nešíření jaderných zbraní, 1972 ABM and SALT I, + Dohoda o prevenci jaderné války z roku 1973 - po přijetí do Politbura 1973 během Břežněvova období získal konečněkontrolu nad zahr pol SSSR - vrchol kariéry: přístup k diplomacii -problémem že jeho vyjímečná pamět a seběvědomí v jeho zkušenosti způsobili že byl neflexibilní, bez představavivosti a chyběla mu dlouhodobá vize pro zemi unimaginative and devoid of a long-term vision for hi - když Černěnko a Andropov gen taj často tvrdší postoje než oni - po Brežněvově mrtvici 1975 - vytvořil triumvirát s Andropovem, Ustinovem

boj o moc po smrti Lenina

- po smrti Lenina boj o moc mezi Stalinem (tajemníkem strany) a Leonem Tróckym (ministr obrany) - odlišné vize dalšího směřování svazu - T: chtěl implementovat politiku pernamentní revoluce - založeno na představě, že Svaz nebude schopen prežít v socialistické podobě , oáč obkopen nepřátelskými vládami ->nutné podporovat podobné revoluce ve vyspělých kapitalistických státech - Stalin: tato zahr politika není slučitelná s -> vedlo by poničení země páč by to vedlo k ozbrojenýmu konfliktu -> Svaz by se měl snažit o mírumilovnou koexist se Svazem a přilákat zahraniční investice aby se vyvinula eko země a budovat socialismust v jednom státě -> nakonec Stalin získal větší podporu a vůdcem strany 1924 - 53 (smrt) - Trotsky nakonec izolován (dojem že spolupracoval s vnějškem aby sesadil Stalina) -> nakonec vyloučen ze str a poslán do exilu 1928

10. sjezd

1921 The 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held during March 8-16, 1921 in Moscow. Halfway through the Congress, the Kronstadt uprising started. The Congress was attended by 694 voting delegates and 296 non-voting delegates.[1] The Agenda consisted of: ) Report of the Central Committee; ) Report of the Control Commission; ) The trade unions' economic role; ) The Socialist Republic in a capitalist encirclement foreign trade, concessions, etc.; ) Food supply, surplus-food appropriation, tax in kind and fuel crisis, ) Problems of Party organisation; ) The Party's current tasks in the nationalities question; ) Reorganisation of the army and the militia question; ) The Chief Administration for Political Education and the Party's propaganda and agitation work; ) Report of the R.C.P.'s representative in the Comintern, and its current tasks; ) Report of the R.C.P.'s representatives in the International Trade Union Council; ) Elections to the Central Committee, the Control Commission and the Auditing Commission. Major decisions included: A ban on internal factions in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (Resolution No. 12: "On Party Unity"). These factions included Workers' Opposition (who supported syndicalism), and Democratic Centralists, who wanted more Soviet autonomy.[2] The New Economic Policy was decided. Foreign trade, banks and heavy industry would stay in state hands, the rest was privatized. Trade unions The result of the debate on the trade unions was a rejection by the congress of the views of Trotsky, who was supported by the 9th Secretariat, the Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralists. The resolution On the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions,[3] which incorporated Lenin's definition of the role of the trade unions as educational organizations and schools of administration, economic management, and communism, was adopted by a majority vote.[4

12. sjezd

1923 The 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held during 17-25 April 1923 in Moscow. The congress elected the 12th Central Committee. It was attended by 408 delegates with deciding votes and 417 with consultative votes, representing 386,000 party members.[1] This was the last congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RCP(b) during Vladimir Lenin's leadership, though Lenin was unable to attend due to illness.[1] Much of this Congress was taken up with Joseph Stalin's struggle against the Georgian Bolshevists. Stalin dominated the Congress with Grigoriy Ordzhonikidze and Mamia Orakhelashvili, moving against the Old Bolsheviks Budu Mdivani and Filipp Makharadze. Stalin accused the latter of the following: Meeting hall during the last day of the Congress "Violation of party discipline", namely contact Lenin directly not through party channels "Disobeying decisions of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)" "Demanding special economic concessions for Georgia" "local chauvinism" and "imperialism" as they were accused of oppressing smaller nations such as the Ossetians and Abkhazians "The desire to obtain privileged positions for Georgians" Ordzhonikidze went further: Collaboration with Mensheviks during 1918-1920 Retaining class enemies (landlords) in the Georgian Communist Party Granting political amnesty to Mensheviks As well as "leftism" and "adventurism" Aftermath Mirsäyet Soltanğäliev attended this Congress, but he was subject to attack immediately afterwards in the Tartar newspaper Eshche and arrested during May 1923. He was roundly condemned by Stalin at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (b) with the Workers of the National Republics of the Regions, held 9-12 June 1923. At this Congress, the RCP(b) redefined the problems of nationalism identifying local chauvinism as the main problem rather than Great Russian chauvinism. The Congress was the beginning of the so-called policy of Korenizatsiya. The main idea was to grow national cadres for every nationality so that the party line could be pursued everywhere by representatives of the local nationality and the national proletariat could be raised against its own exploiters.[2]

14. sjezd

1925 The 14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held during 18-31 December 1925 in Moscow. The congress elected the 14th Central Committee. The agenda of the congress included: the political report of the Central Committee, delivered by Josef Stalin; the organizational report of the Central Committee, read by Vyacheslav Molotov; the report of the Auditing Commission, given by Dmitry Kursky; the report of the Central Control Commission, presented by Valerian Kuybyshev; the report of the RCP(B) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, read by Grigory Zinoviev Moreover, Mikhail Tomsky gave an account of the work of the trade unions, Nikolai Bukharin reported on the efforts of the Komsomol, and A. A. Andreev discussed changes of the party rules. In another session the congress heard Georgy Chicherin's report on the international situation and Soviet foreign policy. This congress was marked by the struggle between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky for control of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Agenda of the Congress Political report of the Central Committee (Stalin) Organisational report of the Central Committee (Molotov) Report of the Central Revision Committee (Kursky) Report of the Central Control Committee (Kuybyshev) Report of the Representation of the Russian Communist Party at the Executive Committee of the International (Zinoviev) Issues related to the economic edification (Kamenev) On the activity of the trade unions (Tomsky) On the activity of the Komsomol (Bukharin) On some changes of the Party Statutes (Andreyev) Elections to the Central Institutions of the Party

15. sjezd

1927 The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held during 2-19 December 1927 in Moscow. It was attended by 898 delegates with a casting vote and 771 with a consultative vote.[1] Contents 1 History 1.1 Background 1.2 Repudiation of the United Opposition 1.3 Theses on Industrialization 1.4 Election of a new Central Committee 2 Footnotes 3 Further reading 4 External links History Background In October 1927, the last Left Opposition members were expelled from the Central Committee elected by the 14th Congress, and in November 1927 Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev were expelled from the Party itself. Repudiation of the United Opposition The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was convened in Moscow on 2 December 1927. This marked the first Soviet Communist Party Congress in two years, this despite the fact that party regulations called for annual meetings.[2] The gathering was retrospectively remembered as the "Congress of the Collectivization of Agriculture and of the Socialist Offensive on All Fronts" in the celebratory official party history of 1962, although in actual fact a major part of time spent by the gathering related to internal party politics and the final ritualistic repudiation of the United Opposition of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and their supporters, effectively ending a two-year factional war.[2] Oppositionists Christian Rakovsky and Lev Kamenev held brief speeches in front of the Congress.[3] Rakovsky's speech[4] was interrupted fifty-seven times by his opponents, including Nikolai Bukharin, Martemyan Ryutin, and Lazar Kaganovich.[3] Although, unlike Rakovsky, Kamenev used the occasion to appeal for reconciliation, he was nevertheless interrupted twenty-four times by the same group.[3] Theses on Industrialization The Central Committee adopted a set of theses regarding industrialization which had been prepared in October 1927 by the Central Committee.[5] Election of a new Central Committee Main article: Central Committee elected by the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) The 15th Congress elected a new Central Committee to govern activities of the Communist Party during the period in between Congresses. Central Committee: 71 members, 50 candidates to Central Committee membership Central Revision Commission: 9 members Central Control Commission: 195 members

22 sjezd KSSS

1961 The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Russian: XXII съезд КПСС) was held from 17 to 31 October 1961. In fourteen days of sessions (22 October was a day off), 4,413 delegates, in addition to delegates from 83 foreign Communist parties, listened to Nikita Khrushchev and others review policy issues.[1] At the Congress, the Sino-Soviet split hardened, especially due to Soviet de-Stalinization efforts,[2] and it was the last Congress to be attended by the Chinese Communist Party. The Congress elected the 22nd Central Committee. Speeches, splits and plans Other than Sino-Soviet disputes, matters dealt with at the Congress included accepting the CPSU's Third Program and statute, and the opening of the Volgograd Hydroelectric Plant, the largest in Europe or Russia at the time. The Soviets also tested the world's most powerful thermonuclear bomb ("Tsar Bomba") in Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Circle, creating the largest man-made explosion in history.[3][4] They also accepted the removal of Stalin's remains from the Lenin Mausoleum,[5] the renaming of several cities named after Stalin and other Stalin-era politicians,[6] and Khrushchev's declaration and plans to build communism in 20 years. Historian Archie Brown wrote that the program was "the last authoritative document produced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to take entirely seriously the building of a communist society."[7] Nikita Khrushchev also proposed to revise CPSU's statutes and implement a "systematic renewal of cadres" that would limit terms of individuals in elected party posts and rules for turnover in other Party bodies, worrying that "a gradual freezing of personnel policy would block up the system, and stagnation would occur." However, the proposal was opposed by other Party members. It is believed that Khrushchev's proposal contributed to his later oust from power

SALT 1

1972 Podepsána Prozatímní dohoda o omezení strategických jaderných zbraních (SALT I)

Nikolaj Viktorovič Podgornyj

6. Předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR 1965 - 77 Předchůdce: Anastáz Ivanovič Mikojan - Nástupce: Brežněv - ukrajinské národnosti - za Brežněva, coby šéfa strany, zastával 65 - 77 fci hl státu = předsedy Prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR - 57 -63 předseda ÚV Ukrajinské KS - After Premier Alexei Kosygin's fall from favour Podgorny became behind Brezhnev the second most powerful figure in the Soviet Union until his removal as head of state in 1977. - 1964 spolu s Brežněvem iniciovali odstranění Chruščova -> obvinovali Ch z eko nezdarů a voluntarismu a neskoromného chování -> politburo ovlivněno odhlasovalo sesazení -> vznik kolektivního vedení státu: vedeno Br (1. tajemník), premiérem Kosyginem (hl vlády) a Mikojanem (hlava státu) - než Podgorny hlavou státu byl 2. gen tajemníkem -> vedl Organisational Division -> hrozil Brežněvově pozici 1. gen tajemníka páč pokud by chtěl mohl přetvořit Org divizi v power base within the party -> risk pro Brežněva -> Br se spojil s A Šelepinem (předseda KGB) proti Podgornymu a Kosyginovi - za Brežněva se nakonec postavil Suslov -> ztratil místo v sekretariátu a v prosicni 65 nahrazen Mikojanem ve Funkci předsedy prezidia Nejvyššího sovětu - The majority of Politburo members under Brezhnev were conservative communists. Even so, Podgorny remained one of the most liberal-minded members in the Era of Stagnation.[attribution needed] Other liberal-minded Politburo members included Kosygin and Andrei Kirilenko

7. sjezd

7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The 7th (extraordinary) Congress of the RSDLP(b) (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party), also known as the Extraordinary 7th Congress of the RCP(b) (Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)), was held between 6-8 March 1918. During this congress the Bolsheviks changed the name of the party to include the word "Communist". It was the first congress of the Bolsheviks after their gaining of power in the October Revolution. It was held in the Taurida Palace in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) in extraordinary session to consider the peace treaty with Germany to end World War I, concluded by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk earlier in March. The 47 plenipotentiary and 59 consultative delegates represented about 17,000 Party members. The actual Party head count was about 300,000, but many delegates could not arrive on such short notice, partially because of the German occupation of significant territory. The agenda was: Report of the 6th Central Committee (delivered by Vladimir Lenin) War and peace Revision of the Party Programme, including the change of the name of the Party Miscellanea Elections of the 7th Central Committee Contents 1 Brest Peace 1.1 List of elected members to the Central Committee 2 External links 3 References Brest Peace The Brest Peace was an issue of fierce controversy within the Party. The Brest Peace was opposed by the faction of the Left Communists, who were led by Nickolay Bukharin and were influential in the major party organizations: in Moscow, Petrograd, and the Urals . There was little unity among the supporters of the Brest Peace. After Lenin's report, Bukharin presented a second report, demanding that the war with Germany continue. After heated discussions, Lenin's version of the Resolution On War And Peace was approved at the morning session of March 8 by a signed vote: 30 in favor, 12 against, 4 abstained. Lenin's proposal, was not made public at that time and was first published in the January 1, 1919 Kommunar, a daily newspaper issued by the Central Committee for workers in Moscow. The Brest Peace was ratified by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (March 14-16). List of elected members to the Central Committee The Contress elected the following members to the Central Committee (by number of received votes): Elected Members 1Lenin (Ul'ianov) Vladimir Il'ich Trotskii Lev Davidovich Sverdlov Iakov Mikhailovich Zinov'ev Grigorii Evseevich Bukharin Nikolai Ivanovich Stalin Iosif Vissarionovich Sokol'nikov Grigorii Iakovlevich Krestinskii Nikolai Nikolaevich Smilga Ivar Tenisovich Stasova Elena Dmitrievna Lashevich Mikhail Mikhailovich Shmidt Vasilii Vladimirovich Dzerzhinskii Feliks Edmundovich Vladimirskii Mikhail Fedorovich Artem (Sergeev Fedor Andreevich)

Brežněvovo dědictví

Despite Brezhnev's failures in domestic reforms, his foreign affairs and defense policies turned the Soviet Union into a superpower.[64] His popularity among citizens lessened during his last years, and support for the ideals of communism and Marxism-Leninism waned, even if the majority of Soviet citizens remained wary of liberal democracy and multi-party systems in general.[164] The political corruption which had grown considerably during Brezhnev's tenure had become a major problem to the Soviet Union's economic development by the 1980s. In response, Andropov initiated a nationwide anti-corruption campaign. Andropov believed that the Soviet economy could possibly recover if the government were able to increase social discipline amongst workers.[165] Brezhnev was seen as very vain and self-obsessed,[165] but was praised for leading the Soviet Union into an unprecedented age of stability and domestic calm.[163] Following Andropov's death, political wrangling led to harsh criticism of Brezhnev and his family. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, drew support from hard-line communists and the Soviet population by criticizing Brezhnev's rule, and referred to his rule as the "Era of Stagnation".[166] Despite these attacks, in a poll taken in 2006, 61 percent of the people responded that they viewed the Brezhnev era as good for Russia

nejvyšší představitelé KSSS

Nejvyšší představitelé komunistické strany V letech 1922-1952 funkce generálního tajemníka komunistické strany (nezaujímal ji V. I. Lenin, ale od počátku J. V. Stalin). V letech 1953-1966 funkce prvního tajemníka. Od roku 1966 znovu funkce generálního tajemníka. Vladimir Iljič Lenin (1917 - 1924) Josif Vissarionovič Stalin (1922 - 1952) Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov (1953) (pouze de facto) Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov (1953 - 1964) Leonid Iljič Brežněv (1964 - 1982) Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov (1982 - 1984) Konstantin Ustinovič Černěnko (1984 - 1985) Michail Sergejevič Gorbačov (1985 - 1991)

Brežnevovská ústava

New constitution Main article: 1977 Soviet Constitution A souvenir sheet commemorating the 1977 Soviet Constitution, Brezhnev is depicted in the middle During the era, Brezhnev was also the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet, which worked for the creation of a new constitution. The Commission had 97 members, with Konstantin Chernenko among the more prominent. Brezhnev was not driven by a wish to leave a mark on history, but rather to even further weaken Premier Alexei Kosygin's prestige.[35] The formulation of the constitution kept with Brezhnev's political style and was neither anti-Stalinist nor neo-Stalinist, but stuck to a middle path, following most of the same principles and ideas as the previous constitutions.[36] The most notable difference was that it codified the developmental changes which the Soviet Union had passed through since the formulation of the 1936 Constitution. It described the Soviet Union, for example, as an "advanced industrial society".[37] In this sense, the resulting document can be seen as proof of the achievements, as well as the limits, of de-Stalinization. It enhanced the status of the individual in all matters of life, while at the same time solidifying the Party's hold on power.[38] During the drafting process, a debate within the Soviet leadership took place between the two factions on whether to call Soviet law "State law" or "Constitutional law." Those who supported the thesis of state law believed that the Constitution was of low importance, and that it could be changed whenever the socio-economic system changed. Those who supported Constitutional law believed that the Constitution should "conceptualise" and incorporate some of the Party's future ideological goals. They also wanted to include information on the status of the Soviet citizen, which had changed drastically in the post-Stalin years.[39] Constitutional thought prevailed to an extent, and the 1977 Soviet Constitution had a greater effect on conceptualising the Soviet system.[40

Sovětsko čínské vztahy po Maově smrti

Post-Mao era and stabilizing relations In 1976, Mao died, and in 1978, the Gang of Four were overthrown by Deng Xiaoping, who was to soon implement pro-market economic reform. With the PRC no longer espousing the anti-revisionist notion of the antagonistic contradiction between classes, relations between the two countries became gradually normalized. In 1979, however, the PRC launched the Sino-Vietnamese War, a failed invasion of Vietnam (which had, after a period of ambivalence, sided with the Soviet Union) in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia which overthrew the China-backed Khmer Rouge from power. During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in strained relations between China and the pro-Soviet Afghan communist regime. China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the rule of King Zahir Shah. When the pro-Soviet Afghan communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported the Vietnamese during the Sino-Vietnamese War and blamed China for supporting Afghan anti-communist militants. China responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan Mujahideen and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attack.[9] China moved its training camps for the Mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself. Hundreds of millions worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisors and army troops were present with the Mujahideen during training.[10] Even though Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev went on to criticize the post-Maoist CCP when it allowed for PRC millionaires as having lost the socialist path, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet Union itself turned to privatization. Dissolution of the Soviet Union Unlike that of the PRC, this was a much more extreme, highly unregulated form of privatization which resulted in massive losses to foreign speculators, near-anarchical conditions and economic collapse. Thus, in the post-Cold War period, while the Soviet Union remained vastly more developed (economically and militarily), in a systemic and deep way (i.e., the PRC in 1949 was less industrialized than Russia in 1914), the PRC emerged in a far more favourable and stable financial position. While the severe Soviet shortage of capital was new, Chinese economic and military underdevelopment was not. Nor was the PRC's desperate and ever-growing need for mineral resources, especially petroleum fuel, which the Soviet Union held in abundance in such Asiatic regions as western Siberia.

Pravda

Pravda (Russian: Правда, IPA: [ˈpravdə] (listen), "Truth") is a Russian broadsheet newspaper, formerly the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when it was one of the most influential papers in the country with a circulation of 11 million.[1] The newspaper began publication on 5 May 1912 in the Russian Empire, but was already extant abroad in January 1911.[2] It emerged as a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. The newspaper was an organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU between 1912 and 1991.[3] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pravda was sold off by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to a Greek business family, and the paper came under the control of their private company Pravda International.[1][4] In 1996, there was an internal dispute between the owners of Pravda International and some of the Pravda journalists which led to Pravda splitting into different entities. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation acquired the Pravda paper, while some of the original Pravda journalists separated to form Russia's first online paper (and the first online English paper) Pravda.ru, which is not connected to the Communist Party.[4][5] After a legal dispute between the rival parties, the Russian court of arbitration stipulated that both entities would be allowed to continue using the Pravda name.[6] The Pravda paper is today run by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, whereas the online Pravda.ru is privately owned and has international editions published in Russian, English, French and Portuguese.

předsedeové vlády /rady ministrů

Předsedové Rady lidových komisařů: Vladimir Iljič Lenin, 6. července 1923 - 24. ledna 1924 Alexej Ivanovič Rykov, 2. února 1924 - 19. prosince 1930 Vjačeslav Michajlovič Molotov, 19. prosince 1930 - 6. května 1941 Josif Vissarionovič Stalin, 6. května 1941 - 15. března 1946 Předsedové Rady ministrů SSSR: Josif Vissarionovič Stalin, 19. března 1946 - 5. března 1953 Georgij Maximilianovič Malenkov, 5. března 1953 - 8. února 1955 Nikolaj Alexandrovič Bulganin, 8. února 1955 - 27. března 1958 Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov, 27. března 1958 - 14. října 1964 Alexej Nikolajevič Kosygin, 14. října 1964 - 23. října 1980 Nikolaj Alexandrovič Tichonov, 23. října 1980 - 27. září 1985 Nikolaj Ivanovič Ryžkov, 27. září 1985 - 19. ledna 1991 Premiér-ministr SSSR: Valentin Sergejevič Pavlov, 19. ledna 1991 - 22. srpna 1991

představitelé SSSR

Představitelé Svazu sovětských socialistických republik (SSSR) Vladimir Iljič Lenin (Uljanov) předseda rady lidových komisařů (Sovnarkom) a neformálně vůdce bolševiků od samého počátku 26.10.1917 - 21.1.1924 Josif Vissarionovič Stalin (Džugašvili) generální tajemník Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu předseda rady ministrů SSSR 3.4.1922 - 16.10.1952 6.5.1941 - 5.3.1953 Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov první tajemník Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu předseda rady ministrů SSSR 7.9.1953 - 14.10.1964 27.3.1958 - 14.10.1964 Leonid Iljič Brežněv první tajemník Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu generální tajemník předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR 14.10.1964 - 8.4.1966 8.4.1966 - 10.11.1982 květen 1960 - 14.10.1964 a 16.6.1977 - 10.11.1982 Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov generální tajemník předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR 12.11.1982 - 9.2.1984 16.6.1983 - 9.2.1984 Konstantin Ustinovič Černěnko generální tajemník předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR 13.2.1984 - 10.3.1985 11.4.1984 - 10.3.1985 Michail Sergejevič Gorbačov generální tajemník předseda prezídia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR prezident Sovětského svazu 11.3.1985 - 24.8.1991 (mezi 24. a 29. 8 vládl Vladimir Ivaško) 25.5.1989 - 15.3.1990 14.3.1990 - 25.12.1991

2. plán (eko)

Second plan, 1933-1937 Further information: Soviet anti-religious legislation and USSR anti-religious campaign (1928-1941) Because of the successes made by the first plan, Stalin did not hesitate with going ahead with the second five-year plan in 1932, although the official start-date for the plan was 1933. The second five-year plan gave heavy industry top priority, putting the Soviet Union not far behind Germany as one of the major steel-producing countries of the world. Further improvements were made in communications, especially railways, which became faster and more reliable. As was the case with the other five-year plans, the second was not as successful, failing to reach the recommended production levels in such areas as the coal and oil industries. The second plan employed incentives as well as punishments and the targets were eased as a reward for the first plan being finished ahead of schedule in only four years. With the introduction of childcare, mothers were encouraged to work to aid in the plan's success. By 1937 the tolkachi emerged occupying a key position mediating between the enterprises and the commissariat.[11] This five year plan from 1932 to 1937 also included the liquidation of houses of worship, with the goals of closing churches between 1932-1933 and the elimination of clergy by 1935-1936

hladomor 1946 -47

Soviet famine of 1946-47 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The last major famine to hit the USSR began in July 1946, reached its peak in February-August 1947 and then quickly diminished in intensity, although there were still some famine deaths in 1948.[1] The situation spanned most of the grain-producing regions of the country: Ukraine, Moldova and parts of central Russia. The conditions were caused by drought, the effects of which were exacerbated by the devastation caused by World War II. The grain harvest in 1946 totaled 39.6 million tons - barely 40% of 1940s yield. With the war, there was a significant decrease in the number of able-bodied men in the rural population, retreating to 1931 levels. There was a shortage of agricultural machinery and horses. The Soviet government with its grain reserves provided relief to rural areas and appealed to the United Nations for relief. Assistance also came from the Ukrainian (mainly Ruthenian diaspora) and Russians from eastern Ukraine and from North America, which minimized mortality.[2][3] Economist Michael Ellman claims that the hands of the state could have fed all those who died of starvation.[1] He argues that had the policies of the Soviet regime been different, there might have been no famine at all or a much smaller one.[1][1] Ellman claims that the famine resulted in an estimated 1 to 1.5 million lives lost in addition to secondary population losses due to reduced fertility.[1] Economist Steven Rosefielde claims that the Soviet government bore responsibility for the conditions.[4] Robert Service argues that Stalin thought in the first instance that any reports of rural hardship were the result of peasants tricking urban authorities into indulging them.[5] During the crisis, the USSR continued to export grain,[1] with the majority of it going to the Soviet zone of occupied Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to consolidate the new Eastern Bloc.[6] Partly as a result of this famine, unlike many countries in Europe and North America, the Soviet Union did not experience a post-war baby boom. Prompted by the drought and famine of 1946-47, the so-called "Great Plan for the Transformation of Nature" was put forth which consisted in a number of ambitious projects in land improvement.

Ideologie za Brežněva

Soviet society is generally regarded as having reached maturity under Brezhnev's rule. As noted by Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle in their book Brezhnev Reconsidered, "a social revolution" was taking place in the Soviet Union during his 18-year-long reign.[144] The increasingly modernized Soviet society was becoming more urban, and people became better educated and more professionalized. In contrast to previous periods dominated by "terrors, cataclysms and conflicts", the Brezhnev Era constituted a period of continuous development without interruption.[144] There was a fourfold growth in higher education between the 1950s and 1980s; this development was referred to as the "scientific-technological revolution".[144] In addition, women came to make up half of the country's educated specialists.[144] Following Khrushchev's controversial claim that (pure) communism could be reached "within 20 years", the new Soviet leadership responded by fostering the concept of developed socialism.[145] Brezhnev declared the onset of the era developed socialism in 1971 at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Developed socialism was described as socialism "attaining developed conditions", the result of "perfecting" the socialist society which had been created. In short, it would be just another stage in the development of communism. Developed socialism evolved into the Brezhnev regime's ideological cornerstone, and helped it to explain the situation of the Soviet Union.[146] However, the theory of developed socialism theory also held that the Soviet Union had reached a state in development where it was crisis-free, and this proved to be incorrect. As a result, Yuri Andropov, Brezhnev's successor, initiated the de-Brezhnevisation of the Soviet Union during his short time in office, and introduced more realistic ideological theses. He did retain developed socialism as a part of the state ideology, however

Stalinismus

Stalinism is the means of governing and related policies implemented from around 1927 to 1953 by Joseph Stalin (1878-1953). Stalinist policies and ideas as developed in the Soviet Union included rapid industrialization, the theory of socialism in one country, a totalitarian state, collectivization of agriculture, a cult of personality[1][2] and subordination of the interests of foreign communist parties to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, deemed by Stalinism to be the leading vanguard party of communist revolution at the time.[3] Stalinism promoted the escalation of class conflict, utilizing state violence to forcibly purge society of the bourgeoisie, whom Stalinist doctrine regarded as threats to the pursuit of the communist revolution. This policy resulted in substantial political violence and persecution of such people.[4] "Enemies" included not only bourgeois people, but also working-class people with counter-revolutionary sympathies.[5] Stalinist industrialization was officially designed to accelerate the development towards communism, stressing the need for such rapid industrialization on the grounds that the Soviet Union was previously economically backward in comparison with other countries and asserting that socialist society needed industry in order to face the challenges posed by internal and external enemies of communism.[6] Rapid industrialization was accompanied by mass collectivization of agriculture and by rapid urbanization.[7] Rapid urbanization converted many small villages into industrial cities.[7] To accelerate the development of industrialization, Stalin imported materials, ideas, expertise and workers from Western Europe and from the United States[8] and pragmatically set up joint-venture contracts with major American private enterprises, such as the Ford Motor Company, which under state supervision assisted in developing the basis of the industry of the Soviet economy from the late 1920s to the 1930s.[9] After the American private enterprises had completed their tasks, Soviet state enterprises took over.[9]

ekonomická reforma 1965

The 1965 Soviet economic reform, often referred to as the "Kosygin reform", of economic management and planning was carried out between 1965 and 1971. Announced in September 1965, it contained three main measures: the re-centralization of the Soviet economy by re-establishing several central ministries, a decentralizing overhaul of the enterprise incentive system (including wider usage of capitalist-style material incentives for good performance), and thirdly, a major price reform.[47][48] The reform was initiated by Alexei Kosygin's First Government[49] and implemented during the Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1968-1970. Though these measures were established to counter many of the irrationalities in the Soviet economic system, the reform did not try to change the existing system radically; it instead tried to improve it gradually.[50] Success was ultimately mixed, and Soviet analyses on why the reform failed to reach its full potential have never given any definitive answers. The key factors are agreed upon, however, with blame being put on the combination of the recentralisation of the economy with the decentralisation of enterprise autonomy, creating several administrative obstacles. Additionally, instead of creating a market which in turn would establish a pricing system, administrators were given the responsibility for overhauling the pricing system themselves. Because of this, the market-like system failed to materialise. To make matters worse, the reform was contradictory at best.[51] In retrospect, however, the Eighth Five-Year Plan as a whole is considered to be one of the most successful periods for the Soviet economy, and the most successful for consumer production.[52] The marketization of the economy, in which Kosygin supported, was considered too radical in the light of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. Nikolai Ryzhkov, the future Chairman of the Council of Ministers, referred in a 1987 speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to the "sad experiences of the 1965 reform", and claimed that everything went from bad to worse following the reform's

reforma 1975

The 1979 Soviet economic reform, or "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", was an economic reform initiated by Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. During Leonid Brezhnev's rule of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) the Soviet economy began to stagnate; this period is referred to by historians as the Era of Stagnation. Even after several reform attempts by Kosygin and his protégés, the economic situation in the country continued to deteriorate. In contrast to his earlier reform initiative, the 26th Congress that his government would implement the reform during the (1981-1985). This never happened, and even Brezhnev complained that implementation of the reform had been slow. This unfinished reform is seen by some as the last major pre-perestroika reform initiative put forward by the Soviet government.

25 sjezd KSSS

The 25th congress of the Communist party of the USSR met in Moscow from February 24 to March 5, 1976. The general secretary of the party Leonid Brezhnev greeted 4,998 Soviet delegates and representatives from 96 foreign countries. Among Communist-ruled nations, only the People's Republic of China and Albania did not send representatives.[1] The congress itself produced few surprises, with the main emphasis placed on the stability of the political and economic situation and the prospects of continued success in the future. Brezhnev declared that the USSR would not invade or fight other countries, but also stated that he would support national liberation movements, despite détente. Little mention was made of fundamental problems facing the Soviet Union— the slowdown of the rate of economic growth, the low output of agriculture despite heavy investment. The only critical voices raised were those of foreign Communists. French Communist leader Georges Marchais boycotted the congress after criticizing the Soviet Union's suppression of dissidents. A major problem that faced Soviet leaders, and one that was continually evaded, was the need to rejuvenate the Politburo, which was elected at the 1st Plenary Session of the 25th Central Committee. The membership of the 25th Politburo remained virtually unchanged from the 24th Politburo, as did the members' average age of 66. Brezhnev himself was 69. Two new members were elevated to the Politburo, Dmitriy Ustinov and Gregory Romanov, bringing its total number to 16.

27. sjezd KSSS

The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held from 25 February to 6 March 1986 in Moscow. This was the first congress presided over by Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In accordance with the pattern set 20 years earlier by Leonid Brezhnev, the congress occurred five years after the previous CPSU Congress. Much had changed in those five years. Key figures of Soviet politics, Mikhail Suslov, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Dmitriy Ustinov, and Konstantin Chernenko had died, and Mikhail Gorbachev had become General Secretary of the Party. For this reason the congress was widely anticipated, both at home and abroad, as an indicator of Gorbachev's new policies and directions. The congress was attended by 4993 delegates. It elected the 27th Central Committee. The agenda of the congress: CC CPSU Report and the Party objectives (Given by Mikhail Gorbachev) New Party Statute release Political report of CC CPSU CPSU Central Revisional Commission report Report About the economic and social development of the USSR on 1986-1990 and in 2000 perspective Elections of the central Party organs This Congress became the penultimate in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

18. sjezd

This is the first Congress to be dominated by the "purified" leadership of the Soviet Union after the Great Purge. This would be the last one held for over a decade. In the report on the work of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party Stalin outlined important aspects of the foreign policy of the USSR, particularly its disappointment with the western democracies and their failure to adopt the policy of collective security[1] advocated by Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov. Shortly after this, Stalin dismissed Litvinov and appointed Vyacheslav Molotov, a move that led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and a temporary understanding with Nazi Germany. Contents 1 Agenda of the Congress 2 Decisions of the Congress 2.1 Elected during the Congress 3 References 4 External links Agenda of the Congress Stalin: Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)[2] Mikhail Fedorovich Vladimirski: Report of the Central Revision Committee Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilski: Report of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Delegation to the Executive Committee of the Communist International Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov: Report on the Third Five-Years Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR [3] Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov: Changes in the Statutes of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Election of the Commission in Charge of Changes in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Program Election to the Central Organs of the Party Decisions of the Congress The report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) consisted of an analysis of the internal and international situation of the country, as well as its future development perspectives. The Congress took note of the now prevailing socialist mode of production and considered socialism in the USSR to be largely built, while in its view the country was already sailing towards a new step of development, i.e. the completion of the socialist society. A new goal was set: to catch and get ahead of the most developed capitalistic States. The report also tackled theoretical questions regarding the stages of development and functions of the socialist State, and viewed as erroneous the idea that the State would be soon extinct. The Congress sanctioned the new Party's statute which was supposed to reflect changes in the class structure of the Soviet society. A unified set of conditions for entry in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was implemented, as well as a one-year probation period. An exception was made for former members of other parties, to which these conditions would not apply. The division into separate categories depending on each individual's social class origin was abolished. Articles defining new rights for the Party's members were also added. The Congress also confirmed the third five-years plan for the development of the Soviet economy.

Orgbyro

he Orgburo (Russian: Оргбюро́), also known as the Organisational Bureau (Russian: организационное бюро), of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union existed from 1919 to 1952, until it was abolished at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party and its functions were transferred to the enlarged Secretariat.[1] Contents 1 Role 2 Election and chronology 3 See also 4 References Role The Orgburo was established[by whom?] to make important decisions about organisational work in the Soviet Union. It oversaw the work of local Party committees and had the power to select and place Communist Party members in positions as it saw fit.[1] The functions of the Orgburo and the Politburo were often interconnected, but the latter was ultimately the final decision-maker. While the Politburo mostly focused on strategic planning and monitoring of the people and status of the country, the Orgburo was tasked with overseeing the Party cadre and its assignment to various positions and duties, presumably in furtherance of the Party's strategic agenda.[1] Election and chronology In the same manner as the Politburo and the Secretariat, the Orgburo was elected at plenary sessions of the Central Committee.[1] One of the Central Committee secretaries supervised the work of the Orgburo. The first Orgburo of three members ( Vladimirsky, Krestinsky and Sverdlov) was elected on January 16, 1919, at the Central Committee meeting.[1][2] The 8th party congress (March 8, 1919 - March 23, 1919) amended the party charter and set up provisions for election of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat.[1][2] The Central Committee plenum elected the new Orgburo of five members and of one candidate member on March 25, 1919. Some key Communist politicians (such as Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich and others) served as members both of the Orgburo and of the Politburo, but most of the Orgburo members were less important figures than those elected to the Politburo and the Secretariat.[1][2]

23. sjezd KSSS

nedůležity 1966 The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) took place in Moscow, RSFSR between 29 March and 8 April 1966. It was the first Congress during Leonid Brezhnev's leadership of the Party and state. The position of First Secretary (held by Brezhnev) was renamed back to General Secretary, which had been its name from 1922 to 1952. The congress elected the 23rd Central Committee. Leonid Brezhnev, Gennady Voronov, Andrei Kirilenko, Alexei Kosygin, Kirill Mazurov, Arvid Pelshe, Nikolai Podgorny, Dmitry Polyansky, Mikhail Suslov, Alexander Shelepin and Petro Shelest were elected full members of the 23rd Politburo, while Viktor Grishin, Pyotr Demichev, Dinmukhamed Konayev, Pyotr Masherov, Vasil Mzhavanadze, Sharof Rashidov, Dmitriy Ustinov and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky were elected candidate members. On 4 April, the Soviet probe Luna 10, the first spacecraft to orbit the Moon, broadcast the notes of The Internationale to the Congress.

26 sjezd KSSS

opened on February 23, 1981, with a five-hour address by the General Secretary of the party and the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (president) Leonid Brezhnev. This was the last Congress of Brezhnev, who died in 1982. Soviet television viewers saw only the beginning and end of the ailing leader's delivery; excerpts from the rest of the speech were read from the studio by an announcer. Brezhnev proposed another round of arms control talks. At a time when an aging Soviet leadership faced a decline in economic growth, severe food problems at home, grave uncertainties about its future relationship with the United States, and unsettling events in Poland, the congress ended its week of speeches by unanimously confirming the existing leadership. The congress elected the 26th Central Committee. The 1st Plenary Session of the 26th Central Committee elected the 26th Politburo. The members of the 28th Politburo were all members of the 26th Politburo. The 14 voting members, whose average age was 69, and eight non-voting members (average age 65) were all reelected. None of the present members of the Politburo was a likely long term successor to General Secretary Brezhnev, who was 74. After ousting Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, Brezhnev did not repeat Khrushchev's mistake of placing a younger rival in a commanding position from which he could attain supreme power.[1]

Suslov za Brežněva

říjen 1964 Chruščov odvolán - významnou roli Suslov - byl jedním z nejvýznamnějších sovětských politiku 60s spolu s premiérem A. Kosyginem a 1. tajemníkem Brežněvem - vedl mnoho let opozici x Ch -> získal dost moci v UV po Brež nástupu - nechtěl být lídr SS - stačilo mu být v zákulisí - během většiny jeho období byl 1 z 4 kdo měli oboje křeslo v Sekretariátu i v Politbyru (zbylí 3: Brežněv, Andrej Kirilenko a Fjodor Kulakov) - kolektivní vedení vzniklo hned po pádu Chru -> sestávalo se z Brežněva (1. tajemník), Kosygina (premíéra, lídr vlády) a Anastáze Mikojana (a později Nikolaje Podgorneho) jako hlavy státu - od začátku hlasitý kritik vlády jednoho muže (jako Stalin a Ch) - i kritik individualistické asertivity CH destalinizační pol - pro demokratický centralismus -> zamezil Br aby převzal Kosyginovu pozici premiéra 1970 - Kirilenko, Brezhnev, Suslov - členi neoficiálního triumvirátu v KS -> - Suslov 4. ve stranické hierarchii, za Br, Podgornym a Kosyginem, před Kirilenkem - Během éry Br stále větší hardliner, proti jakýmkoliv protisovětským pol lídru V bloku ale volil proti sovět zásahu v Maď 1956 a Praze 68 - viděn jako papež pro ortodoxní komunisty V bloku - během své kariéry čím dál větší obavy že Svaz ztratí svojí vůdčí úlohu v communist movement - Häuer, in his book Gorbachev: The Path to Power, argues that Suslov "was a Russian nationalist" who believed "Russia was the centre of the universe". - během Br éry dostal neofiko titul vůdčí Ideolog KS