Family Law Cases

Hanrahan v. Bakker (Pa. 2018) TWEN

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-Awarding high income child support without considering children's reasonable needs erred because Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-3.1 (2013) was not based on such needs, requiring their analysis with income and expense statements; [2]-Appellant father's voluntary children's trust contribution did not entitle him to a downward child support deviation because this was a unilateral act, and money available for child support was to be made available for the children's immediate needs; [3]-Appellee mother was not entitled to attorney's fees under the parties' property settlement agreement because the father's objection to a child support calculation was not a breach, as he did not decline to pay guidelines support, and the mother was no longer the "successful" party when it was held the children's reasonable needs had to considered in applying Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-3.1 (2013). Outcome: Judgment reversed.

Brown v. Buhman (Utah 2013) - pp. 181-92

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In a case challenging the constitutionality of Utah's bigamy statute, assuming the plaintiffs had standing initially to file suit, the case became moot when the county attorney announced a policy that it would prosecute the crime of bigamy only if a victim was induced to marry through fraud or when there was also some type of abuse, violence, or fraud; [2]-The policy eliminated any credible threat that the plaintiffs would be prosecuted, and thus, the threat of a prosecution was so speculative that a live controversy no longer existed for U.S. Const. art. III jurisdiction; [3]-The voluntary cessation exception to mootness did not apply because the county attorney's policy declaration was made under penalty of perjury, and thus, the risk that the county attorney would revoke or ignore the policy was insufficient to sustain a live case or controversy. Outcome: Remanded with instructions to vacate judgment and dismiss action.

Dawn M. v. Michael M. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2017) - TWEN

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In a tri-custody case, it was in the child's best interests under Domestic Relations Law § 70 to grant shared custody to plaintiff, the non-biological, non-adoptive mother, because during the first 18 months of the child's life the three parents had all lived together and the child was taught that he had two mothers; the child needed a continuing relationship with the non-biological, non-adoptive mother, and that relationship could not be left to depend on the consent or whim of either defendant father (plaintiff's ex-husband) or the biological mother. The evidence showed that the father and the non-biological mother had raised the child in a loving environment and were not so embattled and embittered that they will not work together; [2]-Parenting time was granted to the non-biological mother. Outcome: Petition granted.

Obergefell v. Hodges (U.S. 2015) - pp. 158-76

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. Laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held invalid to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples; [2]-Because same-sex couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states, it follows that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character. Outcome: Judgment reversed. 5-4 decision; 4 dissents.

Wolfe v. Wolfe (Or. Ct. App. 2012) - pp. 594-601

Overview: In the marital dissolution proceeding, the trial court erred in awarding the husband his interest in a family trust and two investment accounts as his separate property. Despite the fact that the disputed property was separately held by the husband, he intended, at least until the marriage deteriorated, for the property to be available to the family when necessary. In light of the husband's limited commingling of the property and the long-term nature of the marriage, it was just and proper under Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(f) (2007) for wife to receive a portion of the assets. Outcome: The judgment was modified to award the wife an equalizing judgment of $ 2 million. The order denying the wife's request for attorney fees was vacated and the issue was remanded for reconsideration. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed.

Campbell v. Robinson (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) - pp. 116

Overview: When the parties' engagement was broken, the parties disputed ownership of the ring that plaintiff had given defendant. A jury determined that plaintiff was responsible for the termination of the engagement, but that defendant was not entitled to damages. On appeal, the court found that denial of plaintiff's motions for, inter alia, directed verdict on his declaratory judgment claims was proper, as ownership of the ring was a jury issue. Although there was evidence that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage, there was also evidence that the ring was converted into an absolute gift. Outcome: Judgment affirmed as noted.

Rivkin v. Postal (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) - pp. 110

Procedural Posture Plaintiff married man filed suit seeking a partition of property he jointly owned with defendant girlfriend and the return of his personal property that was still in her possession. The girlfriend responded with a counterclaim seeking damages for breach of promise to marry. The Chancery Court for Williamson County, Tennessee, awarded the girlfriend damages on her claim and divided the jointly-owned property. Both parties appealed. Overview: When the parties met, the man was a successful, award-winning music producer. The girlfriend was a young divorcee living with her parents. She knew the man was married with children. The parties began living together. The girlfriend became pregnant with the man's child. The man was the parties' sole source of support, and he was able to provide an exceptionally affluent lifestyle for the girlfriend and their child despite his continuing obligations to his wife and children. The girlfriend did not work outside the home. The parties never discussed wedding plans. Though the man finally divorced his wife, he ended his relationship with the girlfriend. The appeals court found the girlfriend failed to meet her burden of proof on her breach of promise claim, because she presented neither written evidence of a contract or promise to marry, nor the testimony of at least two disinterested witnesses. She failed to present any evidence regarding the sorts of injuries that would have entitled her to $ 150,000 in damages. The trial court also erred by awarding the girlfriend a cedar chest that had belonged to the man's grandmother, as the chest was clearly the man's separate property. Outcome: The appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the damages awarded to the girlfriend on her breach of promise claim, and with respect to the award of the man's cedar chest to the girlfriend. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed.

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (U.S. 2005) - pp. 334-42

Procedural Posture: A writ of certiorari issued to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which found a protected property interest in the enforcement of a restraining order and reversed a dismissal of plaintiff mother's 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim that defendant city violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when police officers failed to act on repeated reports that the father took their children, resulting in the children's murders. Overview: The court refused to defer to the Tenth Circuit's determination that Colorado law gave the mother a right to police enforcement of the restraining order. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(2)(a), (3), (5) (1999), did not make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. A true mandate required a stronger indication than the statute's direction to use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order or even to arrest or seek a warrant. The police had discretion in the apparently mandatory statute. Although § 18-6-803.5 spoke of "protected persons" such as the mother, it did so in connection with matters other than a right to enforcement, such as initiating contempt proceedings under § 18-6-803.5(7), which contrasted dramatically with the complete silence about any power to "request" (much less demand) that an arrest be made. The creation of a personal entitlement to something as vague and novel as enforcement of restraining orders could not simply go without saying. Section 18-6-803.5 had not created such an entitlement. The right to enforce a restraining order did not have ascertainable monetary value. The mother had no property interest in police enforcement of the order. Outcome: The decision of the Tenth Circuit was reversed.

Marvin v. Marvin (Cal. 1976) - pp. 392-97 & 400-04

Procedural Posture: After hearing arguments, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint seeking declaratory relief and imposition of a constructive trust upon half the property acquired during parties' relationship and denied plaintiff's motions to set aside the judgment and leave to amend complaint. Overview: After party cohabitants ended relationship, plaintiff averred an oral agreement to combine efforts and earnings and share equally any and all property accumulated as result. The parties held themselves out as husband and wife, with plaintiff giving up her career to render services as companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook in exchange for defendant's financial promise to support her for life. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to defendant. The court reversed and remanded, holding plaintiff's complaint properly stated a breach of express contract claim, and could be amended to assert an implied contract or equity rights. The court essentially held that the Family Law Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 4000 et seq., did not govern nonmarital distribution of property; that express contracts between nonmarital partners should be enforced except to extent they were explicitly founded on meretricious sexual services; that courts should examine parties' conduct to determine whether an implied contract existed; and that quantum meruit or equitable remedies were available. Outcome: The court reversed the judgment and remanded.

Bethany v. Jones (Ark. 2011) - pp. 748-55

Procedural Posture: Appellant biological mother (mother) sought review of the decision of the Perry County Circuit Court (Arkansas), which found in favor of appellee, the mother's former same-sex partner (partner), in the mother's action arguing that the partner had no recognizable right entitling her to visitation with the child. Overview: The action involved a dispute over child visitation. The mother argued on appeal that the partner had no recognizable right entitling her to visitation with the child, but the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's order that, in part, granted the partner visitation under a theory of in loco parentis or equitable estoppel. Considering the ample evidence about the relationship between the partner and the child, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that she stood in loco parentis to the child. It was undisputed that she was the stay-at-home mom for over three years who took care of the child and the child called her mommy. The child thought of the partner's parents as her grandparents and spent holidays with the partner's family. The parties' intentions were always to co-parent, until the mother unilaterally determined that she no longer wanted the partner to have visitation. Taking all of that into consideration, the circuit court correctly determined that the partner was a parent figure to the child. Outcome: The judgment was affirmed.

Caldwell v. Holland of Tex., Inc. (8th Cir. 2000) - pp. 273-75

Procedural Posture: Appellant employee challenged the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in appellee employer's favor on appellant's claim that appellee terminated her employment in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 2611-2612. Overview: Appellant sued appellee, alleging that her employment was terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 2611-2612, after she requested and took time off work in order to care for her three-year-old son who suffered from a serious ear infection. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, holding that appellant's son's did not suffer a "serious health condition" under the FMLA. The court reversed, holding that appellant presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether her son's ear infection incapacitated him for more than three days and whether he then received subsequent treatment for his condition. Appellant's son fell ill on June 7, 1997 and required constant care for more than three days. Surgery was performed on July 17, 1997. He was also incapacitated for more than three days following his surgery, and required two post-operative doctor visits. Outcome: Judgment reversed. Appellant's evidence showing that her son sustained a sudden onset of an ear infection which required immediate attention by a physician, a series of antibiotic treatments, and surgery was sufficient to present a question of fact regarding whether the illness and disability qualified as a "serious health condition."

Simeone v. Simeone (Pa. 1990) - pp. 120-23

Procedural Posture: Appellant wife challenged the order of the Superior Court, Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), affirming the order of the lower court, which dismissed her exceptions to a master's report upholding the validity of a prenuptial agreement and denied her claim for alimony pendente lite against appellee husband. She claimed the agreement was unreasonable and that she was not informed of the nature of alimony pendente lite when she relinquished it. Overview: The superior court affirmed an order of the lower court dismissing appellant wife's exceptions to a master's report that upheld the validity of a prenuptial agreement and denied her claim for alimony pendente lite from appellee husband. She sought review. Appellant asserted that the agreement was not reasonable and that she had not understood the nature of alimony pendente lite when she relinquished it in the agreement. The court affirmed, ruling the agreement was valid and enforceable and that appellant could not receive alimony pendente lite. The court discarded an earlier approach that permitted evaluating the reasonableness of prenuptial agreements and held that such agreements should be interpreted using the same criteria as applied to other contracts. Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, the spouses were bound to their agreement. It rejected appellant's suggestion that the agreement should be voided because she had not consulted with an attorney and ruled that the reasonableness of the agreement was not a proper subject for judicial review. Ample evidence supported the findings of full disclosure of assets and the absence of duress. Outcome: The court affirmed the order of the superior court sustaining the order dismissing her exceptions to a master's report. Applying the same criteria as governed other contracts, the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Thus, appellant wife, who gave up the right to alimony pendente lite by the terms of the agreement, was barred from receiving it now.

Spriggs v. Carson (Pa. 1977) - TWEN

Procedural Posture: Appellant father challenged the order of the Superior Court (Pennsylvania), which reversed a prior award of custody of the parties' minor son and placed the child in the custody of appellee mother. Overview: Appellant father brought suit against appellee mother after she removed the parties' minor son from his Florida residence with appellant, who was the custodial parent. The trial court's order awarded custody to appellant, but the intermediate appellate court reversed the order and awarded custody to appellee. Appellant challenged that decision. Because the court believed that the intermediate appellate court exceeded its proper scope of review, it reversed and reinstated the trial court's order in favor of appellant. The court acknowledged the broad scope of review in child custody cases, but stated that the trial judge's determination should be accorded great weight and disturbed only upon a finding of a gross abuse of discretion. Because the trial judge had the opportunity to directly observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the court was persuaded by his finding that appellant was more credible than appellee. Outcome:The court reversed the order of the intermediate appellate court, which awarded custody of the parties' minor son to appellee mother, and reinstated the trial court's order, which awarded custody to appellant father, because the intermediate appellate court exceeded its proper scope of review by intruding on the fact-finding function of the trial judge.

Olmstead v. Ziegler (Alaska 2002) - pp. 649-52

Procedural Posture: Appellant father filed a motion for an order modifying child support payable to appellee mother under Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau, determined that a modification of child support was not warranted, as the father, an attorney, was voluntarily underemployed and his earning capacity had not changed. The father appealed. Overview: The parties were both attorneys, and at the time of the divorce they entered into a settlement agreement whereby neither party would pay child support, but the father would pay for the child's education expenses. Two years later, the father was failing in his attempt to be a solo practitioner and was earning just over $ 10,000 a year. He then decided to become a teacher. The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the father's career change constituted voluntary underemployment, which did not necessarily justify a modification in child support, even if the career change was taken in good faith. Here the trial court established that the father took many steps, including closing his office and failing to keep regular business hours, that demonstrated his intent to downsize his practice. While the father repeatedly stated that he was simply a failure at law and was not capable of earning the average lawyer's salary, that claim was undermined by the fact that at one time he made over $ 53,000 a year. Thus, the trial court properly determined the father was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed and that he was not working at his full capacity based upon his past earnings. Outcome: The decision of the superior court was affirmed.

Kulko v. Super. Ct. (U.S. 1978) - pp. 667-72

Procedural Posture: Appellant father sought review of a decision from the Supreme Court of California, which affirmed the denial of his motion to quash service of the summons on the grounds that by consenting to his children living in California, appellant had caused an effect in that state warranting its exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Overview: The Supreme Court reversed a decision that denied appellant father's motion to quash service of the summons in a judicial action filed by appellee mother in California to modify a child support award entered in New York. The Court determined that California state courts were constitutionally unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over appellant as a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within California, because appellant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. By merely consenting to his children's living with appellee in contradiction of the parties' separation agreement, appellant did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California law. Particularly, because the action was domestic in nature, appellant did not derive any commercial or financial benefit from his children's presence in California. Therefore, appellant's actions were not such that it was fair, just, or reasonable to require him to conduct his defense to the child support modification in California. Outcome: The Court reversed a decision denying appellant's motion to quash service of the summons in appellee's action in California to modify a child support order because California state courts did not have personal jurisdiction over appellant. By consenting to his children's living in California, appellant did not purposely avail himself of any benefits of California laws.

Pohlmann v. Pohlmann (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) - pp. 644-48

Procedural Posture: Appellant former husband challenged the final judgment of the Circuit Court for Seminole County (Florida) denying modification of his child support obligations. Overview: Appellant former husband's and appellee former wife's final judgment of dissolution provided that appellant would pay child support and 100 percent of medical expenses not covered by insurance. Appellant petitioned for modification of child support alleging that there had been a substantial change in his financial circumstances warranting a downward modification of his obligation. Appellant also contended that Fla. Stat. ch. 61.30(12) was unconstitutional. The trial court found that there was no substantial change in circumstances which would justify a reduction in the former husband's child support obligations and that the statute was constitutional. On appeal, the court agreed that the statute was constitutional as it furthered a legitimate state interest, assuring that noncustodial parents continued to support children from their first marriage notwithstanding their obligation to support subsequently born children. The court agreed there was no substantial change warranting a reduction in child support but remanded the matter for the trial court to consider a reduction in child support for the extended visitation granted to appellant. Outcome: The order denying appellant former husband modification of his child support obligation was affirmed in part as there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting reduction and was reversed regarding reduction in medical expense reimbursement paid by appellant. Further the matter was remanded for the lower court to consider a reduction in support for the extended visitation granted appellant.

Mani v. Mani (N.J. 2005) - pp. 582-93

Procedural Posture: Appellant former husband challenged the judgment of the Appellate Division (New Jersey), which affirmed a trial court's award of alimony to the husband in a lesser sum than that sought by him and its refusal to award counsel fees. The husband alleged that the appellate court improperly considered marital fault in reducing the award of alimony payable by respondent former wife under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23(b) and in denying him counsel fees. Overview: The wife filed suit for divorce, alleging adultery and extreme cruelty, after she learned that the husband was having an affair. Since the wife's assets were substantially greater than the husband's, the husband, at trial, sought permanent alimony of over $ 68,000 per year. The trial court awarded alimony in the amount of $ 610 weekly, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the reduction in the husband's standard of living was justified by the finding that the husband was adulterous. On appeal, the court held that marital fault was irrelevant to alimony under § 2A:34-23(b) unless the fault negatively affected the economic status of the parties or the fault so violated societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would be unjust. Thus, the court held that since there was no allegation that the husband's fault had any economic consequences or that it was egregious, the appellate court improperly considered fault to justify the alimony award. Further, the court held that the appellate court also improperly considered fault to justify the denial of counsel fees because marital fault was irrelevant to the question of whether such an award was proper. Outcome: The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the issues of alimony and counsel fees without regard to fault, giving due deference to the trial court's findings and conclusions.

Bell v. Bell (Alaska 1990) - pp. 725-30

Procedural Posture: Appellant former husband challenged the order of the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial Circuit, Anchorage, which awarded legal and physical custody of the parties' child to appellee former wife, awarded child support based on a finding that the former husband had a net income of $ 2,500 per month, and made a determination as to the division of marital property. Overview: On appeal, the former husband challenged the trial court's award of legal and physical custody of the parties' child to the former wife, the court's basis for determining child support, and the court's determination and division of marital property. The court found that the trial court's finding that the parties were incapable of meaningful communication regarding matters relating to the best interests of their child was clearly erroneous, and thus the trial court's failure to award joint legal custody was improper. The court also remanded for a redetermination of physical custody and the visitation determination. Further, the court found that the trial court's award of child support was clearly erroneous in that it was based on an incorrect determination that the former husband's net monthly income was $ 2,500 and that the trial court failed to make the necessary deductions. Finally, the court found that the trial court improperly determined the division of marital property by using a method in the nature of rescission, because the parties commingled investments and one of the investments greatly depreciated in value. Outcome: The court reversed the trial court's determination of child custody, award of child support, and determination as to the division of marital property. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Turner v. Turner (Ga. 2009) - pp. 632-38

Procedural Posture: Appellant former husband sought review of a decision of a trial court (Georgia), which entered a final judgment a divorce decree, which incorporated the parties' partial settlement agreement, ordered the husband to pay monthly child support, and apportioned the expenses for the children's extracurricular activities two-thirds to the husband and one-third to appellee former wife. Overview: On appeal, the husband did not challenge the trial court's deviation from the presumptive child support obligation, but contended that the trial court erred by failing to explain how it calculated the deviation and by failing to include express findings that the deviation was in the best interests of the children and would not seriously impair his ability to provide for the children. The court agreed, finding that because the trial court applied a discretionary parenting time deviation from the presumptive amount of child support, but failed to make all of the findings required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E) and (i)(1)(B), reversal and remand were required. The court further found that the trial court erred in making a separate child support award outside the parameters of the child support worksheet based on the cost of the children's extracurricular activities. Outcome: The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case.

In re Marriage of Shanks (Iowa 2008) - pp. 123

Procedural Posture: Appellant husband challenged a judgment of the Court of Appeals (Iowa) affirming a decision of the District Court for Pottawattamie County that denied a request for specific performance of a premarital agreement in a dissolution of marriage proceeding against appellee wife. The wife cross-appealed, seeking a more favorable property division, spousal support, and an additional award for attorney fees. Overview: This was a second marriage for both parties. While contemplating marriage, they discussed the goal of preserving the husband's assets for his children. The wife agreed to enter a premarital agreement, stating that she was not marring the husband for his money. The premarital agreement was presented to the wife ten days before their wedding, and she consulted an attorney for the first draft upon the husband's advice. The court concluded on a de novo review that the agreement was voluntarily executed, conscionable, and enforceable, which were required by the Iowa Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (IUPAA), Iowa Code § 596.12. The wife failed to establish duress or undue influence to prove that the agreement was involuntarily executed. The husband's position as a lawyer did not put him in a vastly superior bargaining position because he insisted that the wife seek the advice of independent counsel. The agreement was also not substantively or procedurally unconscionable because all of the provisions were mutual in scope, the wife assented and voluntarily declined to seek Iowa legal counsel on the second draft. Financial disclosures were fair and reasonable under Iowa Code § 596.8(3). Outcome: The court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the district court's judgment in part. The case was remanded with instructions.

Moore v. E. Cleveland 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) - p379

RULE: Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society. Decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition. FACTS: A housing ordinance of appellee East Cleveland, Ohio with the intention of limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, defined a "family" as only a few categories of related individuals, essentially parents and their children. Appellant Moore, who lived in her home with her son and two grandsons, was convicted in state court of violating the ordinance because the grandsons were first cousins rather than brothers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, affirmed, rejecting the Moore's claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional. ISSUE: Was the housing ordinance valid? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the ordinance violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by intruding upon family sanctity and because the ordinance had only a tenuous relationship to the alleviation of legitimate city goals. It held that such intrusion into family life was not constitutionally protected. Rejecting arguments that the ordinance served to prevent overcrowding, minimize traffic, and avoid burdening the public school system, the Court held that the provision had but a tenuous relation to the alleviation of those objectives. Nor was the constitutional right to live together as a family limited to the nuclear family, the Court ruled, as the extended family traditionally played a role in providing sustenance and security. Cutting off protection of family rights at the first convenient boundary, the nuclear family, was arbitrary and could not be justified.

Reid v. Reid (Va. Ct. App. 1989) - pp. 493-97

Procedural Posture: Appellant husband challenged an order of the Circuit Court of Albermarle County (Virginia), which adopted the recommendations of the commissioner that the husband and appellee wife be denied a divorce on fault grounds, that a no fault divorce decree be entered, and that the husband be required to pay child and spousal support, a monetary award, and the wife's costs and attorney's fees. Overview: The parties were married for 19 years and had four children. They experienced marital difficulties, underwent unsuccessful counseling, and the wife moved from the marital home. Two months later, the wife filed for divorce, claiming constructive desertion. The wife identified four marital problems that she alleged endangered her mental health and justified her leaving: (1) sexual inactivity, (2) the husband's excessive work habits, (3) the husband's failure to assist in the disciplining and rearing of their children, and (4) a lack of "intimacy within the marriage." The lower court granted the parties a no fault divorce and awarded the wife spousal support. On appeal, the court found that the wife was not justified in leaving the marriage. The court found that the husband's periodic impotency was not within his sole control, that his time away from the family while working to provide for them did not justify the wife's leaving, and that lack of intimacy was a risk in all marriages. The court held that because her response to these problems was to terminate marital cohabitation and to file for divorce, the wife legally deserted the marriage and forfeited her right to spousal support. Outcome: The court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the husband a divorce on the ground of the wife's desertion and in granting her spousal support. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and costs.

Brown v. Brown (S.C. Ct. Ap. 2008) pp. 484-89

Procedural Posture: Appellant husband filed for divorce from respondent wife in the Greenville County Family Court (South Carolina). The court found that the wife did not commit adultery and awarded her alimony. The parties agreed that the wife would retain custody of the children. The court awarded the wife child support, equally divided the marital property, and ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees and expert witness fee. The husband appealed. Overview: The husband challenged the family court's failure to find that the wife committed adultery, the family court's inclusion of certain items as marital property under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp. 2007), and the assessment of attorney's fees. On appeal, the court found that the family court erred in failing to find that the wife committed adultery because the husband met his burden of proving that the wife had both the inclination and the opportunity to commit adultery such that an award of alimony to the wife was improper under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(A) (Supp. 2007). Additionally, the family court erred in assessing the value of a timeshare solely against the husband as both parties were equally at fault in allowing it to enter into default. The family court also erred in classifying the husband's gun collection as marital property because the wife did not meet her burden in proving the guns were marital property. However, the family court did not err in determining that a backhoe was marital property because the husband failed to prove it belonged to the husband's employer. In light of these decisions, the award of attorney's fees against the husband had to be reconsidered. Outcome: The order of the family court was affirmed in part as to the finding that a backhoe was marital property, reversed in part as to the award of alimony and the finding that a timeshare and a gun collection were marital property, and remanded for reconsideration of the award of attorney's fees against the husband.

Ferguson v. Ferguson (Miss. 1994) - pp. 573-81

Procedural Posture: Appellant husband sought review of a final judgment of divorce entered by the Newton County Chancery Court (Mississippi), awarding a divorce to appellee wife, together with custody and support of the minor child, and denying the husband's counterclaim for divorce and custody of the child. Overview: The wife filed for divorce on the grounds of adultery and requested permanent custody of the minor child. The husband denied the adultery charge, counterclaimed for divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and also sought custody of the child. The chancellor denied the husband's requests and awarded the wife a divorce, custody, child support, and alimony. The chancellor's judgment also included a division of marital property and future interests in the husband's retirement and pension plans. The court, en banc, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court adopted guidelines for the equitable division of marital property and remanded for a re-evaluation of the marital division, which included the wife's interests in the retirement and pension plans. The court affirmed the awards for divorce and custody. The court held that the charge of adultery was established by clear and convincing evidence and that the chancellor's finding that the husband was morally unfit to be a parent was not an abuse of discretion. Outcome: The court affirmed the granting of a divorce to the wife, together with custody and support of the minor child. The court adopted guidelines to aid chancellors in the division of marital property under the equitable property division method, reversed the award of marital assets, and remanded to the chancery court to re-evaluate the property division in light of the guidelines.

Hanke v. Hanke (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) - pp. 732-37

Procedural Posture: Appellant mother challenged an order from the Circuit Court for Harford County (Maryland) that granted appellee ex-husband overnight visitation with their young child. The trial court held that the mother's concerns of sexual abuse by the husband were unfounded. Overview: The mother's concern for the safety of the parties' young child stemmed from the ex-husband's pleading guilty to having sexually abused his stepdaughter. After the trial court entered its order that granted the ex-husband unsupervised, overnight visitation, the mother moved the children from the state to Kentucky. The trial court then changed the child's custody to the ex-husband and terminated any child supported the mother was receiving. The court reversed the order of custody and visitation based upon the substantial evidence that supported the mother's concerns that the ex-husband posed a threat for sexually abusing the child. That evidence included the husband's testimony related to the prior sexual abuse of the stepdaughter, plus psychological examinations, and the child's reporting of the husband molesting her. The court further found that the trial court was clearly wrong in concluding that the mother's concerns were mere overreacting because there was a basis for her belief based upon past behavior, and in any event it was clear that the trial court failed to act with the best interests of the child in mind. Outcome: The court reversed the order that granted the ex-husband unsupervised, overnight visitation with the young child because the trial court was clearly wrong in granting such visitation when the trial court failed to consider the best interests of the child. The court further directed that Maryland courts no longer had jurisdiction as such appeared to have been assumed by Kentucky courts.

M.A.T. v. G.S.T. (Pa. Super. 2010) TWEN

Procedural Posture: Appellant mother filed a petition under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5310 for modification of child custody against appellee father, who had been awarded primary custody. The mother sought shared custody under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5304. The Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, Civil Division (Pennsylvania) denied the petition. The mother appealed. Overview: The court first overruled Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1985) and its progeny. The evidentiary presumption against the parent involved in a same-sex relationship was contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's admonition that presumptions should not be relied upon when deciding chid custody cases between the parents. Thus, the trial court erred in relying upon Constant. Next, there was no evidence supporting the trial court's failure to consider an expert's testimony regarding the benefits to the child of a "3-2-2-3" custody arrangement. Instead, the trial court made clear that its refusal to follow the expert's recommendation was based upon its personal view that shared custody was seldom in the best interests of a school-age child. The court stated that remand was not necessary because the evidence supported an award of shared legal custody under a "3-2-2-3" custody schedule. The parties had shared custody on this schedule for 15 months, and the uncontroverted testimony showed that the child had done well on it. The expert had testified that the schedule should be retained and that reducing the mother's time with the child would be harmful to the child. Outcome: The court vacated the trial court's order. It remanded the case for entry of a shared custody order.

McLeod v. Starnes (S.C. 2012) - pp. 639-44

Procedural Posture: Appellant mother sued respondent father in the Lexington County Family Court (South Carolina) for one child's college expenses, an increase in support for another child, and attorney's fees and costs. The trial court (1) dismissed the claim for college expenses, (2) reduced support for the second child, (3) reduced support payable from the father's bonus, (4) reduced his obligation, and (5) denied attorney's fees and costs. The mother appealed. Overview: The mother said it was error to find making the father pay college expenses violated equal protection. The supreme court agreed because (1) its prior decision finding an equal protection violation wrongly applied strict scrutiny, (2) permitting such an order did not improperly treat divorced parents differently than non-divorced parents, and (3) requiring the payment under limited circumstances was rationally related to a legitimate state interest in ensuring its youth's education. Awarding the father a credit for alleged child support overpayment was error because it was based on an erroneous calculation of the parties' incomes. It was error to reduce the percentage of his bonus payable as child support because the reduction was not explained. It was error to deny the mother's request for attorney's fees and costs because (1) these expenses were at least half her income, while the father's were less than one-third his income, and (2) his conduct caused the litigation, as he did not pay the full amount of his bonus that was due, and his claim that a child did not need support after the age of majority prompted the mother's suit, from which she received significant benefit. Outcome: The trial court's judgment was reversed, and the matter was remanded to determine whether and in what amount the father had to contribute to a child's college education.

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. (N.Y. 1989) - pp. 425

Procedural Posture: Appellant tenant sought review of the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (New York) reversing a lower court order granting a motion by the tenant for a preliminary injunction and enjoining respondent landlord from evicting the tenant from the apartment at which he resided, and denying the tenant's motion. Overview: The issue was whether, on his motion for a preliminary injunction, the tenant failed to establish, as a matter of law, the requisite clear likelihood of success on the merits of his claim to the protection from eviction provided by § 2204.6(d) of the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, codified at New York City, N.Y., Rules of the City of New York, tit. 9, § 2204.6(d). The landlord argued that the term "family member" should have been construed, consistent with New York's intestacy laws, to mean relationships of blood, consanguinity, and adoption in order to effectuate the over-all goal of orderly succession to real property. The court held that the term family, as used in § 2204.6(d), was not to be rigidly restricted to those people who had formalized their relationship. The intended protection against sudden eviction was not to rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should have had its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic view of a family included two adult lifetime partners whose relationship was long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. Outcome: The court reversed the order of the appellate division and remitted the case for consideration of undetermined questions, in accordance with its determination that the tenant had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, in that he was not excluded, as a matter of law, from seeking noneviction protection.

In re Marriage of Roberts (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) - pp. 617-24

Procedural Posture: Appellant wife appealed from the order of the St. Joseph Circuit Court (Indiana), which ruled that appellee husband's law degree was not property subject to distribution pursuant to their divorce. The husband appealed from the trial court's grant of attorney's fees to the wife and its denial of his motion for attorney's fees on the grounds that the wife's appeal was frivolous. Overview: The court held that the party challenging a property division was required to overcome a strong presumption that the trial court complied with the applicable statute, and that the trial court's judgment would not be reversed unless clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The court agreed with the trial court that the husband's law degree did not constitute marital property. Despite the legislature's intent that property be interpreted as broadly inclusive, a degree, intangible and personal to the holder, did not possess the common characteristics of property. The potential worth of a degree was dependent upon the choice and availability of work, the talents and abilities of the holder, and myriad other factors. The trial court properly did not compensate the wife for dissipation of the marital estate in the amount she contributed to his education, as dissipation meant money spent foolishly or aimlessly. Any award greater than the marital assets was maintenance and was required to be authorized by statute. The wife's appeal was not frivolous, and the trial court's award to her of attorney's fees was within its discretion. Outcome: The court affirmed the property distribution awarded by the trial court.

Bennington v. Bennington (Ohio. Ct. App. 1978) - pp. 511-14

Procedural Posture: Appellant wife sought review of an order from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County (Ohio), which granted appellee husband a divorce on the ground that the parties lived separate and apart for at least two years without cohabitation, and ordered the sale of the parties' house and automobile. Overview: The wife suffered a stroke and was disabled. The husband moved out of the house and into a van located adjacent to the house. His primary reason for moving into the van was that the wife kept the house at about 85-90 degrees. The wife later filed an action for alimony, claiming gross neglect of duty and abandonment. The husband filed a counterclaim for divorce, alleging gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. He asserted as grounds for divorce the fact that the parties lived separate and apart for at least two years without cohabitation. The trial court granted the husband a divorce. On appeal, the court found that the trial court erroneously included the time that the husband lived in the van adjacent to the house as part of the two-year period, as the parties were not living "separate and apart" during that time. During that time, there was no cessation of marital duties and relations between the wife and husband. While there was a lack of cohabitation, there was no living "separate and apart" as contemplated by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01(K). The court further found that the trial court did not err in ordering the parties' real estate and automobile sold. Outcome: The court reversed the order granting the husband a divorce. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Gaboury v. Gaboury (Pa. Super. 2009) - TWEN

Procedural Posture: Appellant wife sought review of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County (Pennsylvania) which granted her divorce from appellee husband. The trial court dismissed all economic claims against the husband, determining that it had jurisdiction to dissolve the parties' marriage but lacked the necessary personal jurisdiction over the husband to adjudicate related economic claims. Overview: The wife filed a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania. She set forth economic claims for equitable distribution, counsel fees, expenses, spousal support, alimony pendente lite, alimony, and permanent alimony. The trial court granted the husband's preliminary objections, in part, and dismissed the economic claims. The appellate court held that since the wife moved to Pennsylvania seven months before initiating divorce proceedings, she satisfied the residency requirement. In order to resolve the ancillary economic claims, however, the trial court required personal jurisdiction over the husband. The husband did not reside in Pennsylvania, he did not work in Pennsylvania, and the last marital domicile was Wisconsin. As to the wife's contention that the record revealed the requisite minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over the husband, the appellate court did not agree. The husband was not served in Pennsylvania, he had not consented to the jurisdiction of the court, and the requisite minimum contacts under the long-arm statute did not exist. Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would have violated both the Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute and due process. Outcome: The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

McMillen v. McMillen (Pa. 1992) - pp. 755-58

Procedural Posture: Appellant, a divorced father, sought review of the judgment of the superior court (Pennsylvania), which vacated a trial court's award to him of the general custody of his son. By vacating the trial court's judgment, the general custody of appellant's son remained with appellee mother. Overview: Appellant father and appellee mother were divorced. Appellee was originally given primary custody of the couple's child. The child repeatedly and steadfastly expressed his preference to live with appellant. Six years later, a trial court awarded general custody of the child to appellant. The trial court found that the child's best interests would be served most appropriately by placing the child in the custody of appellant because of the child's desire to live with appellant as well as the fact that each home was a suitable environment. The custody order was vacated by the court below. The judgment of the court below was reversed on appeal and the trial court's order was reinstated. First, the court found no abuse of discretion in the amount of weight afforded the child's preference. The record showed that the child's preference to live with his father was supported by more than sufficient good reasons. Moreover, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the child's best interests would be served more appropriately by placing him in his father's custody because the child's preference tipped the evidentiary scale in favor of appellant. Outcome: The judgment of the court below, which vacated a trial court's award of child custody to appellant father, was reversed and the trial court's order was reinstated. The trial court's finding that the best interests of a child would be served most appropriately by placing the child in the custody of appellant was not an abuse of discretion because both parent's homes were suitable and because child preferred to live with father.

Anderson v. Anderson (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) - pp. 489-92

Procedural Posture: Appellant, a wife, challenged a decision from the Alcorn County Chancery Court (Mississippi) entering a final judgment of divorce in favor of appellee, a husband, based on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment under Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (2004). Overview: The court considered whether the husband proved he was entitled to a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment under Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (2004). More was required than mere unkindness, rudeness, or incompatibility. There must be corroboration of the complaining party's testimony. The chancellor appointed a guardian ad litem, who did not conclude that there was sufficient evidence of physical abuse of the children. The chancellor agreed. Without such a finding, this evidence could not be used to prove the husband's ground for divorce. False accusations of infidelity, made habitually over a long period of time without reasonable cause also constituted cruel and inhuman treatment. However, honestly made claims did not constitute habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. There was sufficient evidence to give the wife reason to believe that the husband was in an adulterous relationship. The wife's conduct did not meet the standard of cruel and inhuman treatment. Divorce was a statutory act and the statutes must be strictly followed as they were in derogation of the common law. Outcome: The court reversed and rendered in favor of the wife.

Zablocki v. Redhail (U.S. 1978) - pp. 137-44

Procedural Posture: Appellants, a class of county clerks, challenged a ruling by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which found in favor of appellees, a class of Wisconsin residents, in holding that the marriage prohibition in Wis. Stat. § 245.10 (1973) violated the equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Overview: Wisconsin residents were prevented under Wis. Stat. § 245.10 (1973) from marrying if they were behind in their child support obligations or if the children to whom they were obligated were likely to become public charges. In a class action brought by the residents under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, the county clerks contended that the statute assisted the state to counsel residents on their financial obligations and protected the children to whom support was owed. The Court, however, found that the statute violated equal protection in that it directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry without being closely tailored to effectuate the state's interests. The Court noted that other future financial obligations were not curtailed, only those that might be associated with marriage, and further found that the effect of the statute was that more illegitimate children would be born. Outcome: The Court affirmed the judgment below, holding that the Wisconsin limitations on obtaining a marriage license were unconstitutional.

Loving v. Virginia (U.S. 1967) - pp. 133

Procedural Posture: Appellants, a husband and his wife, sought review of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia which held that Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58 and 20-59, which were adopted by to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications, did not violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Overview: Appellants were indicted on charges of violating the state's ban on interracial marriages. After their conviction, appellants took up residence out-of-state and instituted a class action requesting that Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58 and 20-59, the state antimiscegenation statutes, be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which had affirmed appellants' convictions and had upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. The Court rejected the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to remove the classification from the U.S. Const. amend. XIV's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations and held there was no legitimate overriding purpose which justified the classification. The Court found that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and deprived appellants of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Outcome: The Court reversed the judgment.

Palmore v. Sidoti (U.S. 1984) - pp. 697-700

Procedural Posture: Certiorari was granted to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, which affirmed without opinion an order of a trial court divesting petitioner mother of the custody of her child and awarding custody of the child to respondent father because of the mother's remarriage to a member of a minority. The mother appealed. Overview: A mother challenging a state court order divesting her of custody of her child contended that, contrary to the trial court's findings, it was not in her pre-school child's best interests to be removed from her custody, while the father alleged that the child would be damaged by being raised in a racially mixed household. The mother was remarried to a man of a different race. The trial court determined that there was no question as to the parental qualifications of the mother or her new husband and was entirely forthcoming as to race being the rationale for its holding. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment would not brook such governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. While the Court found that the State of Florida had a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause in protecting the interests of children, such an interest could not support the State's toleration of prejudices based on race. The reality of private biases and the possible injury such biases could inflict on a child were determined by the Court not to be permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from its mother. Outcome: The Court reversed the judgment upholding an order divesting the mother of custody of her child.

Marvin v. Marvin (Cal. 1976) - pp. 400-04

Procedural Posture: Defendant, live-in ex-boyfriend, appealed from a judgment by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which ordered Defendant to pay to plaintiff, live-in ex-girlfriend, economic rehabilitation on grounds that the challenged award was outside the issues of the case as framed by the pleadings of the parties under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 588 and that the award lacked any basis in equity or in law. Overview: Plaintiff, live-in ex-girlfriend, sued defendant, live-in ex-boyfriend, for a reasonable amount of support and maintenance. The trial court granted plaintiff an economic rehabilitation award in equity because plaintiff had no means of support, could not return to her career, defendant terminated the relations, and defendant had the ability to pay plaintiff. The court reversed the award because the pleadings did not request an economic rehabilitation award and there was no basis in law for an economic rehabilitation award. The court accepted the trial court's findings that defendant had no obligation to support plaintiff, plaintiff did not suffer any damage as a result of the relationship with plaintiff, and plaintiff benefitted socially and economically from the relationship. Therefore, defendant was not unjustly enriched at the expense of plaintiff and defendant did not perform any wrongful act against plaintiff, and as a result, there was no basis in the law for plaintiff to receive an economic rehabilitation award. Outcome: The court reversed the economic rehabilitation award to plaintiff live-in ex-girlfriend to be paid by defendant live-in ex-boyfriend because plaintiff's pleadings did not include a request for the award and there was no basis in law for the award because defendant committed no wrongful act against plaintiff, plaintiff benefitted economically and socially from the relationship with defendant, and there was no unjust enrichment.

Sosna v. Iowa (US 1975) pg 559 - SP of US

Procedural Posture: In a class action, appellant ex-husband sought to litigate the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in a representative capacity. Appellant sought review from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, which held that Iowa's one-year residency requirement for invoking its divorce jurisdiction did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overview: Appellant filed a complaint in federal district court, asserting that Iowa's one-year residency requirement for invoking its divorce jurisdiction violated the United States Constitution. A three-judge court held that the requirement was constitutional, and appellant sought review. The court affirmed. The court held that the class action was not rendered moot by the fact that the individual appellant's claim had become moot. The requirement was unlike those struck down in other counties because they infringed the constitutional right to travel. According to the court, the requirements at issue in the earlier county cases were justified solely on the basis of budgetary or recordkeeping considerations, but Iowa's requirement was based on the State's interest in requiring that those who sought a divorce from its courts were genuinely attached to the State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack. The statute's failure to provide an individualized determination of residency did not violate due process, because a litigant's rights were merely being delayed, not denied. Outcome: The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

McGuire v. McGuire (Neb. 1953) - pp. 233-38

Procedural Posture: In dissolution proceedings, defendant former husband appealed an order by the District Court for Wayne County (Nebraska), which entered an order allowing plaintiff former wife to recover maintenance, support money, and attorneys' fees. The trial court denied the husband's motion for a new trial. Overview: The wife brought an action against the husband for maintenance and support and the trial court entered an order in favor of the wife. The trial court then denied the husband's motion for a new trial, and the husband sought further review. On appeal, the court reversed the decision to award the wife maintenance and support and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss the wife's suit. The court held that a requirement for receiving maintenance was that the wife have lived separate and apart from the husband. The court found that the award of attorney's fees was erroneous because there was no legal basis for the wife's action against the husband. Outcome: The court reversed the decision to award the wife support and maintenance from the husband and remanded the matter with directions to dismiss the wife's action for maintenance payments.

Troxel v. Granville (U.S. 2000) - pp. 743-47

Procedural Posture: On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington; petitioners appealed the judgment of the state supreme court, reversing an order which granted their petition for visitation of the grandchildren, and holding that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interfered with the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children. Overview: Petitioner grandparents petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren. Respondent mother opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed the order of visitation entered by the superior court. The court granted certiorari. The court found that the visitation order was an unconstitutional infringement on respondent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. The state superior court failed to accord the determination of respondent, a fit custodial parent, any material weight; announced a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation; and failed to accord significant weight to respondent's already having offered meaningful visitation to petitioners. The court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution did not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions. Accordingly, the court held that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, was unconstitutional. Outcome: Judgment affirmed; the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on respondent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters.

Ankenbrandt v. Richards - SC of US 1992 pg 564

Procedural Posture: Petitioner brought a lawsuit on behalf of her daughters based on diversity jurisdiction, seeking monetary damages for alleged sexual and physical abuse of the children committed by respondents, the divorced father of the children and his female companion. The district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the lawsuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner sought further review. Overview: The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because of the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. The district court also invoked the Younger abstention doctrine to justify its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court granted certiorari to decide whether a domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction existed. The Court concluded that such a domestic relations exception existed, but that it only divested the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. The domestic relations exception did not divest the federal courts of jurisdiction in cases like the present one which did not involve the issuance of divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees. Here, petitioner did not seek such a decree; rather, the lawsuit alleged that respondents committed torts against the children. Thus, the Court held that it was error to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. Further, it was improper to invoke Younger abstention when no state proceeding was pending and no assertions of important state interests were made. Outcome: The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct. (Nev. 2003)- pp. 192-97

Procedural Posture: Petitioner father petitioned for a writ of mandamus to respondents, judge and Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, seeking to compel the district court to vacate an order issuing a marriage license allowing the father's 15-year-old daughter to marry and seeking to annul the marriage. Overview: Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 122.025, a minor under the age of 16 was allowed to marry with the consent of 1 parent and district court authorization. This allowed the father's 15-year-old daughter to marry a 48-year-old man with the consent of her mother. The father argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The appellate court found that the right to marry was a fundamental right. The statute provided a safeguard against an erroneous marriage decision by the minor and the consenting parent, by giving the district court the discretion to withhold authorization if it found that there were no extraordinary circumstances and/or the proposed marriage was not in the minor's best interest. The father lost his right to exercise legal control over his daughter during her minority. He still had the other legal and social attributes of parenthood. The state had an interest in fostering appropriate marriages and tailoring its statutes in such a way as to take into account the individual variations in maturity, rather than just setting an arbitrary rule of age. The father had no standing to annul his daughter's marriage. Outcome: The petition for mandamus was denied.

McLaughlin v. Super. Ct. (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) - pp. 787-94

Procedural Posture: Petitioner father sought a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent Superior Court of San Mateo County (California), which directed petitioner and real party in interest mother to submit their temporary custody dispute to mediation, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 4607(a), and denied his motion for a protective order to prevent the mediator from making a recommendation to the court unless he was permitted to cross-examine the mediator. Overview: As part of dissolution proceedings, petitioner father and real party in interest mother has a custody dispute, so respondent superior court directed the parties to submit their temporary custody dispute to mediation, pursuant to the Cal. Civil Code § 4607, and denied petitioner's motion for a protective order. When petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to retrain respondent, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, permitting the mediation proceedings, but directing respondent not to receive a recommendation from the mediator on any contested issued unless it first issued a protective order to guarantee the parties the right to have the mediator testify and to cross-examine on the recommendations, unless the parties waived this right. The court held that the policy of not allowing cross-examination was constitutionally invalid, because it permitted respondent to receive a significant recommendation on contested issues but denied the parties the right to cross-examine its source. Further, the court concluded that § 4607(a), which provided that contested issues of child custody and visitation be referred to prehearing mediation proceedings, was mandatory. Outcome: The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, permitting the custody mediation proceedings, but directing respondent superior court not to receive a recommendation from the mediator on any issue contested by petitioner father or real party in interest mother, unless a protective order had been made to guarantee the parties the right to have the mediator testify and to cross-examine on the recommendation, or the rights had been waived.

Sosna v. Iowa (US 1975)

RULE: A named plaintiff in a class action must show that the threat of injury in a case where his or her own claim has been resolved, but claims of other class members remain unresolved is "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." A litigant must be a member of the class that he or she seeks to represent at the time the class action is certified by the district court. FACTS: Appellant Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on Sept. 5, 1964 in Michigan. They lived together in New York between Oct. 1967 and Aug. 1971, after which they separated but continued to live in New York. In Aug. 1972, Carol moved to Iowa with her three children. A few months after, she filed a petition in an Iowa state court for a dissolution of her marriage. Michael, who had been personally served with notice of the action when he came to Iowa to visit his children, made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the Iowa court. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Michael was not a resident of Iowa and Carol had not been a resident of the State of Iowa for one year preceding the filing of her petition. The Iowa court applied the provisions of Iowa Code § 598.6 requiring that the petitioner in such an action be "for the last year a resident of the state." Carol filed a complaint in federal district court, asserting that Iowa's one-year residency requirement for invoking its divorce jurisdiction violated the United States Constitution. A three-judge court held that the requirement was constitutional. Carol sought review. ISSUE: Did Iowa's one-year residency requirement for invoking its divorce jurisdiction violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court of the United States held that the one-year residency requirement was valid. Iowa's requirement was based on the State's interest in requiring that those who sought a divorce from its courts were genuinely attached to the State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack. The statute's failure to provide an individualized determination of residency did not violate due process because a litigant's rights were merely being delayed, not denied.

Turner v. Rogers (U.S. 2011) - pp. 660-66

Procedural Posture: Petitioner father was subjected to State civil contempt proceedings for failing to pay child support to respondent mother, and the father was ordered incarcerated for a period of 12 months which the father served without paying the past due support. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the father appealed the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina which held that the father was not entitled to appointed counsel in the proceedings. Overview: Both the father and the mother were unrepresented by counsel in the contempt proceeding, and the father was found in willful contempt for failure to pay the child support with no finding concerning the father's ability to pay. The U.S. Supreme Court first held that the case not moot, even though the father served the period of incarceration, since the relatively brief incarceration did not permit full litigation of the father's claim and the likelihood of recurrence of the same action was indicated by the father's contempt proceedings both before and after the current proceeding. The Court further held that the father was denied due process, although due process did not automatically require the State to provide counsel in civil contempt proceedings to an indigent parent subject to a support order who faces incarceration. The right to counsel was limited based upon the parent's ability to pay, the equality of representation between the parties, and State procedural safeguards. In the father's case, counsel was warranted since the State did not provide clear notice that the father's ability to pay was the critical question and made no findings concerning his ability to pay. Outcome: The judgment that the father was not entitled to counsel was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 5-4 Decision; 1 Dissent.

Paul v. Paul (Del. 2012) - pp. 602-05

Procedural Posture: Petitioner husband appealed a judgment by the Family Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County, that denied his petition to terminate alimony; the husband claimed that the Family Court applied the incorrect legal standard in deciding whether the wife and her companion were cohabiting. Overview:The parties' divorce agreement provided that alimony would terminate upon the wife's cohabitation, as defined in Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(g). After the wife became romantically involved with the companion, the husband hired an investigator to conduct surveillance for the purpose of determining whether they were cohabiting. Based on the investigator's report, the husband filed a petition to terminate alimony. The Family Court denied the motion, focusing on the fact that the wife and her companion maintained separate homes, and the absence of evidence as to whether they spent the majority of their free time together. The state supreme court found, inter alia, that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the evidence. First, the term "regularly residing" meant living together with some degree of continuity. Second, the fact that the wife and her companion were retirees did not change the analysis of whether they were regularly residing together. Third, two people might be regularly residing together even though they maintained separate homes. The wife conceded that she and her companion had an exclusive relationship and held themselves out as a couple. Outcome:The judgment was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers Comp. Appeal Board (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) - TWEN

Procedural Posture: Petitioner, a decedent's employer, appealed a decision of respondent Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania), which affirmed a workers' compensation judge's (WCJ) conclusion that the decedent was married via common law marriage to respondent workers' compensation dependent claimant and was therefore entitled to surviving spouse's benefits. Overview: The claimant filed a fatal claim petition and alleged that he was the common law spouse of the decedent, who died in an airplane crash while working for the employer. In order to establish the requisite verba de praesenti, the claimant submitted an affidavit in which he and the decedent had stated that they had united themselves in marriage through the mutual exchange of words. The claimant was found to be the decedent's common law spouse; on appeal, the employer asked the court to abolish the doctrine of common law marriage as antiquated and lacking any valid purpose in today's society. The court, after examining the history and judicial criticism of the doctrine and determining that the instant case was one that called for "anticipatory overruling," held that it would recognize as valid only those Pennsylvania marriages entered into pursuant to the procedures under the 1990 Marriage Law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101-1905. The decision was given purely prospective effect. As to the claimant's petition, which was unaffected by the court's abolition of the doctrine, he met his burden of proof where a common law marriage based upon the exchange of verba in praesenti was found. Outcome: The court affirmed the order of the Board.

Michael H. v. Gerald D. (U.S. 1989) - pp. 457-68

Procedural Posture: Petitioners appealed from an order of the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, granting summary judgment in favor of respondent in petitioner father's filiation action and petitioner child's cross-complaint seeking to maintain her filial relationship with respondent and petitioner father. Overview: Mother and respondent were married. Mother had an adulterous relationship with petitioner father. As a result petitioner child was born. Respondent was listed as father on child's birth certificate and held child out to the world as his daughter. Blood tests showed a 98.07 percent probability that petitioner was child's father. For a time, mother resided with petitioner, who held child out as his daughter. Mother subsequently moved and rebuffed father's attempts to visit child. Petitioner filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Child filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. Mother and respondent reconciled. Respondent intervened, and the superior court granted his motion for summary judgment against petitioner and child. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The Supreme Court affirmed. Outcome: Summary judgment affirmed; petitioner father did not have a liberty interest traditionally protected by society that would give rise to substantive due process rights, and petitioner child's due process claim failed for the same reason; in addition, petitioner child's equal protection challenge did not survive rational relationship scrutiny.

Jennings v. Hurt (Super. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1989), aff'd (App. Div. 1990) - pp. 210-15

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff common-law wife appealed an order from the Supreme Court, New York County (New York), which denied her motion for leave to amend her complaint and found that she was not the common-law wife of defendant common-law husband. Overview: The common-law wife commenced an action against the common-law husband, arguing that they had entered into a common-law marriage by holding themselves out as husband and wife in South Carolina. The trial court denied the common-law wife's motion for leave to amend her complaint and found, after a non-jury trial, that she was not the common-law wife of the common-law husband. The trial court's order was affirmed. The court held that the evidence demonstrated that the parties never held themselves out as being married nor were they perceived as husband and wife. Further, there was not a mutual intent nor an agreement to enter into a marriage contract. Thus, the record failed to support the common-law wife's claim that she was the common-law husband's common-law wife. The trial court also properly denied her motion for leave to amend her complaint to allege new causes of action as those causes of action were insufficient as a matter of law. The court also found that she failed to establish the necessary elements for a constructive trust and the law did not recognize a cause of action for sacrificing career opportunities in order to act as a wife. Outcome: The court affirmed the trial court's order, which denied the common-law wife's motion for leave to amend her complaint, and order of the same court, which, after a non-jury trial, found that she was not the common-law wife of the common-law husband.

Wang v. Feng (Pa. Super. 2005) - TWEN

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff husband appealed and defendant wife cross-appealed an order of equitable distribution and reimbursement entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Family Court Division (Pennsylvania), in connection with their divorce. The husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding all marital property to the wife and further ordering him to make periodic reimbursement payments. Overview: The family's economic and other horizons were limited in China, despite the husband's medical degree, so the couple and their daughter came to the United States. Over a period of nearly 20 years, the wife cared for the family but was also the primary earner of income, even though moves undertaken to enable the husband to pursue further training meant that she was unable to take advantage of the advanced education that she, too, had obtained. Just as the husband finally qualified as an oncology specialist and obtained employment with a large salary, he left the wife without warning. The only marital property was equity in a modest home. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of all marital property to the wife, together with a prospective award of equitable reimbursement for her contributions during the years when she was the primary breadwinner. The trial court had properly considered all the 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a) factors and reasonably determined that the couple's marital estate was simply inadequate to compensate the wife for the sacrifices she had made that enabled the husband to enjoy his current high standard of living. Outcome: The court affirmed the order and judgment, but quashed the wife's cross-appeal for failure to submit a brief.

Bender v. Bender (Conn. 2001) - pp. 610-16

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff wife brought an action for dissolution of a marriage. The superior court entered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain relief, including an award to the wife of one half the pension benefits earned by defendant husband. The husband appealed. The appellate court affirmed the superior court's judgment. The husband appealed. Overview: The husband argued that the trial court improperly awarded the unvested pension benefits to the wife instead of utilizing the known present value of the contributions into the pension. The supreme court concluded that the unvested pension benefits were property subject to equitable distribution. The court noted that the husband's expectation in his pension plan was sufficiently concrete, reasonable, and justifiable, as to constitute a presently existing property interest for equitable distribution purposes. The supreme court next addressed the methods available to value and distribute such benefits. The court concluded that it was within the trial court's discretion to choose among the present value method, present division method of deferred distribution, or any other valuation method that it deemed appropriate in accordance with Connecticut law. The supreme court expressly rejected the reserved jurisdiction method, as the statutory scheme regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings prohibited the retention of jurisdiction over orders regarding lump sum alimony or the division of the marital estate. Outcome: The judgment was affirmed.

Draper v. Burke (Mass. 2008) - pp. 673-79

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff wife filed complaints to revise and alter a foreign child support order in the Bristol Division of the Probate and Family Court Department (Massachusetts). After consolidation, the trial court denied defendant husband's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Overview: An Oregon court ordered the husband to pay child support but did not address college expenses. The wife, a Massachusetts resident, sought to have him, an Idaho resident, ordered to contribute to them. The supreme judicial court held she could not satisfy Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209D, § 6-611(a)(1)(ii)'s limitation that only nonresidents could seek a foreign support order's modification. She had no Idaho contacts, so an Idaho court had no personal jurisdiction over her. Massachusetts had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B(e) and (i) because Oregon had no jurisdiction, as no one lived there; no other state had modified the Oregon judgment; the parties did not consent to jurisdiction elsewhere; and Massachusetts had personal jurisdiction over the husband. There was no conflict with the Oregon court, since it lacked jurisdiction and its judgment was silent on college expenses. Making the wife litigate in Idaho would unreasonably burden her. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B intended to protect the children from the husband's insistence on jurisdictional convenience. Preemption was required by an actual conflict between state and federal law and to implement federal objectives. Outcome: The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Sagar v. Sagar (Mass. App. 2003) - pp. 700-04

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff, a wife, sought a divorce from defendant, her husband, in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department (Massachusetts). The trial judge ruled that a religious ceremony could not be performed on the parties' child until she was of sufficient age to determine whether to undergo the ritual, absent a written agreement between the parties, and granted the wife physical custody. The father appealed the judgment. Overview: The father argued that the order concerning the religious ritual violated his right to free exercise of religion and that the trial judge erred in granting the wife physical custody over the recommendation of a guardian ad litem that no designation of a primary physical custodian should be made. The appellate court held that, because neither parent demonstrated a compelling State interest justifying intervention, the trial judge's order concerning the religious ritual would be affirmed, as it intruded least upon both parents' fundamental rights while remaining compatible with the child's health. The husband failed to demonstrate a compelling State interest for performing the ceremony on the child, as evidence was lacking that failure to perform the ceremony would cause the child significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety, or welfare. The wife did not establish that performing the ceremony would subject the child to physical or psychological harm. The appellate court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding joint legal custody to the parents and designating the wife's residence as the child's primary residence. Outcome: The judgment was affirmed.

Stanley v. Illinois (U.S. 1972) - pp. 454-56

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff, an unwed father, petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois challenging its holding that plaintiff could be separated from his children in a dependency proceeding on the single fact that he had not been married to the children's dead mother. He claimed that his equal protection rights under U.S. Const. amend. XIV were violated by respondent State of Illinois when he was denied a hearing on his parental fitness. Overview: In a dependency proceeding by the State, the children of plaintiff unwed father were declared wards of the State. Plaintiff appealed from the order, claiming that he had never been shown to have been an unfit parent and that he had been deprived of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The state supreme court held that plaintiff could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the children's mother, who was deceased, had not been married. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the State's interest in caring for plaintiff's children was de minimis if plaintiff was shown to be a fit father. The Court held that plaintiff was denied equal protection of the law because all parents were constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children were removed from their custody. Thus, plaintiff, as an unwed father, was also entitled to a hearing. Outcome: The Court granted plaintiff's petition for certiorari. The Court reversed the state supreme court's holding and remanded the case to the state supreme court for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.

United States v. Windsor (U.S. 2013) - pp. 151-58

Procedural Posture: Respondent estate of a decedent brought an action against petitioner United States seeking a tax refund after the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses was disallowed under the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 7, which denied recognition of same-sex marriages. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the government appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which held that the statute was unconstitutional. Overview: The state in which the decedent and the spouse resided recognized their same-sex marriage, and the estate contended that the refusal of the federal government to recognize the marriage for purposes of the estate tax exemption constituted a denial of constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court held that § 7 was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that was protected by the Fifth Amendment. The statute was applicable to a wide variety of over 1,000 federal statutes and regulations in addition to the tax exemption, and was directed to a class of persons the state sought to protect by recognizing same-sex marriages, in furtherance of no specific federal policy. The state's decision to give same-sex couples the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import, but the government used the state-defined class for the opposite and improper purpose of imposing restrictions and disabilities, and § 7 which sought to injure the very same-sex class the state sought to protect violated basic due process and equal protection principles by identifying and making unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages. Outcome: The judgment holding the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 7, unconstitutional was affirmed. 5-4 Decision; 3 Dissents.

Turner v. Safley (U.S. 1987) - pp. 145-49

Procedural Posture: The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's opinion and order finding unconstitutional regulations governing inmate-to-inmate correspondence and inmate marriages promulgated by petitioner prison system. The prison system sought certiorari review. Overview: The district court certified respondents as a class that included inmates at one particular prison who desired to correspond with inmates at other state prisons, and persons who desired to marry inmates of the prison system. The correspondence regulation restricted correspondence between inmates in different prisons. The marriage regulation permitted inmates to marry only with permission of the prison superintendent, whose approval would be given only for compelling reasons. The district court applied a strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the regulations. On certiorari review, the Court held that a lesser standard of scrutiny, the reasonable relationship standard, applied to the regulations. Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the correspondence regulation was reasonably related to legitimate security interests, while the marriage regulation did not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard because it was an exaggerated response to rehabilitation and security concerns and there were obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation. Hence, the Court upheld the validity of the correspondence regulation, but held that the marriage regulation could not be sustained. Outcome: The Court affirmed the lower appellate court's holding striking down the marriage regulation, reversed its holding that the correspondence regulation was unconstitutional, and remanded for consideration of whether the correspondence regulation had been applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

Santosky v. Kramer (1982) - pp. 866-74

Procedural Posture: The court granted certiorari on a decision from the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Third Judicial Department, which affirmed the permanent termination of petitioners' parental rights and rejected petitioners' assertion that the preponderance of the evidence standard in N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 622 was unconstitutional. Overview: After incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent removed petitioners' biological children from petitioners' home. Petitioners' parental rights were later terminated. The court of appeals rejected petitioners' argument that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard in N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 622 was unconstitutional. The court held that before a state could sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process required that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard was inconsistent with due process because the private interest in parental rights affected was substantial and the countervailing governmental interest favoring the preponderance standard was comparatively slight. The court held that a clear and convincing evidence standard adequately conveyed to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process, and that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard was a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts. Outcome: The court found that a clear and convincing standard was necessary to protect petitioners' due process rights, and vacated and remanded so that a hearing could be conducted under a constitutionally proper standard.

Bethany v. Jones (Ark. 2011)

RULE: "In loco parentis" is defined as in place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged factitiously with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. Grandparents who stood in loco parentis have been treated differently from grandparents who did not. Grandparents have standing to intervene in adoption proceedings involving their grandchildren when they stand in loco parentis to their grandchildren. A court may award visitation to a stepparent who stands in loco parentis to a minor child when it determines that it is in the best interest of the child. The doctrine of in loco parentis focuses on the relationship between the child and the person asserting that they stood in loco parentis. The focus should be on what, if any, bond has formed between the child and the nonparent. FACTS: Bethany and Jones were same-sex partners from 2000 until 2008. In 2004, the parties began to take steps toward having a family. A male friend of Jones agreed to donate sperm. Bethany agreed to carry the child because Jones was experiencing some health issues, including reproductive problems. Through the process of artificial insemination, Bethany became pregnant and the minor child was born in 2005. The couple chose to give the child Jones' last name and Jones' grandmother's name as the child's middle name. Bethany and Jones intended to co-parent the child. After E.B.'s birth, the parties agreed that Jones would remain at home as the child's primary caregiver with Bethany returning to work on a full-time basis. E.B. formed close relationships with members of Jones' family. On the other hand, Bethany was not close to either of her parents, and E.B. had little or no relationship with either of them. In 2008, the parties ended their romantic relationship, but at that time agreed to continue co-parenting E.B. However, the situation between Bethany and Jones began to deteriorate. They had a disagreement over Jones keeping E.B. for a 24-hour period, against Bethany's wishes. Bethany, who had entered into a relationship with another woman, decided that it was no longer in E.B.'s best interest to have contact with Jones because she questioned Jones' ability to parent. After Bethany denied Jones visitation with E.B., Jones filed the instant action for custody alleging breach of contract based upon equitable estoppel. Bethany sought to have the complaint dismissed, arguing that Jones lacked standing to bring the suit, as there was nothing in Arkansas law that allowed her to seek visitation with E.B. However, at trial, Bethany testified that at the time of conception, she considered Jones to be E.B.'s parent. Upon trial, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Jones. The state supreme court affirmed the circuit court's order that granted the partner visitation under a theory of in loco parentis or equitable estoppel. ISSUE: Did the lower court err in its decision to rule in favor of Jones and grant her visitation rights under the theory of equitable estoppel? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The Court held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that she stood in loco parentis to the child. Considering the ample evidence about the relationship between Jones and E.B., the Court noted that it was undisputed that she was the stay-at-home parent for over three years who took care of the child and the child called her "mommy." The child thought of the partner's parents as her grandparents and spent holidays with the partner's family. The parties' intentions were always to co-parent, until the biological mother unilaterally determined that she no longer wanted the partner to have visitation. Taking all of that into consideration, the Court held that the circuit court correctly determined that Jones was a parent figure to the child.

Palmore v. Sidoti (U.S. 1984)

RULE: A core purpose of U.S. Const. amend. XIV is to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race. Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category. Such classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be necessary to the accomplishment of their legitimate purpose. FACTS: A Caucasian couple were divorced in Florida and custody of their 3-year-old daughter was awarded to the mother, Linda Sidoti Palmore. Subsequently, the father, Anthony J. Sidoti, sought modification of the custody award on the grounds that Linda was then cohabitating with a man who was black, whom she later married. The Florida trial court awarded custody to Anthony, holding that the best interests of the child would be served there and that there would be a damaging impact on the child if she remained in a racially mixed household. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed without opinion. ISSUE: Did the lower court err in awarding custody to Anthony based on Linda's remarriage to a member of a minority? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment would not allow such governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. While the Court found that the State of Florida had a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause in protecting the interests of children, such an interest could not support the State's toleration of prejudices based on race. The reality of private biases and the possible injury such biases could inflict on a child were determined by the Court not to be permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from its mother.

Brown v. Buhman (Utah 2013)

RULE: A plaintiff's standing at the time of filing does not ensure the court will ultimately be able to decide the case on the merits. An actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot. Mootness deprives federal courts of jurisdiction. If a case is moot, courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction. Constitutional mootness is jurisdictional; prudential mootness is discretionary. FACTS: Kody Brown, Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan ("the Browns") form a "plural family." Kody Brown is legally married to Meri Brown and "spiritually married" to the other three women, whom he calls "sister wives." When the family became the subject of a TLC reality television show in 2010, the Lehi Police Department opened an investigation of the Browns for violating Utah's bigamy statute. Under the aforementioned statute, a person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person. The Browns then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Utah and the Utah County Attorney. Claiming the Statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Browns sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Statute against them. The district court dismissed the Governor and Attorney General. The Utah County Attorney's Office subsequently closed its file on the Browns and adopted a policy under which the Utah County Attorney will bring bigamy prosecutions only against those who induce a partner to marry through misrepresentation or are suspected of committing a collateral crime such as fraud or abuse. The Browns fall into neither category. Nonetheless, the district court denied the Utah County Attorney's motion to dismiss the case as moot and instead granted summary judgment to the Browns. ISSUE: Did the district court err in denying the Utah County Attorney's motion to dismiss the case in light of a new policy adopted by the Utah County Attorney's Office? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Court held that the district court erred by proceeding to the merits. According to the Court, Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They lack power to decide issues—however important or fiercely contested—that are detached from a live dispute between the parties. Following adoption of the UCAO Policy, the Court posited that the Browns' suit ceased to qualify as an Article III case or controversy. Their suit was moot before the district court awarded them relief, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide the Browns' claims

Rivkin v. Postal (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)

RULE: A suit for breach of promise or contract to marry follows the procedures generally associated with other actions for breach of contract. Thus, a plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of a contract, that is an offer of marriage and an acceptance, along with consideration, which need only be a return promise to marry. FACTS: A married man began a relationship with his girlfriend. She knew that he was married with children. The parties began living together and the girlfriend became pregnant with the man's child. The man was the parties' sole source of support and he provided an exceptionally affluent lifestyle for the girlfriend and their child. The parties never discussed wedding plans. Though the man finally divorced his wife, he ended his relationship with the girlfriend. The man filed suit seeking a partition of property he jointly owned with the girlfriend and the return of his personal property that was still in her possession. The girlfriend responded with a counterclaim seeking damages for breach of promise to marry. The trial court awarded the girlfriend damages on her claim and divided the jointly-owned property. Both parties appealed. ISSUE: Did the girlfriend present sufficient evidence of a promise to marry?ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The court reversed in part and held that the trial court erred by awarding the girlfriend damages on her breach of promise claim and by awarding her the cedar chest that had belonged to the man's grandmother. Accordingly, the court reversed those portions of the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of orders consistent with the opinion.

Kulko v. Super. Ct. (U.S. 1978)

RULE: A valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum. FACTS: The parties married in California, but resided in New York during their married life. After they separated, and with the father's agreement, the mother moved to California with the children, while the father remained in New York. The mother filed an action in California to modify a child support award entered in New York. The father was served with a summons, and filed a motion to quash, arguing that the California court did not have personal jurisdiction. The California trial and appellate courts refused to quash the summons. The father sought review in the United States Supreme Court. ISSUE: Did the California court err in refusing to quash the summons? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Court determined that California state courts were constitutionally unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over the father as a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within California because he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. By merely consenting to his children's living with the mother in contradiction of the parties' separation agreement, the father did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California law. Particularly, because the action was domestic in nature, the father did not derive any commercial or financial benefit from his children's presence in California. Therefore, his actions were not such that it was fair, just, or reasonable to require him to conduct his defense to the child support modification in California.

Kirkpatrick v. Dist. Ct. (Nev. 2003)

RULE: A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. But the appellate court will not issue a writ of mandamus to control a trial court's discretionary action unless the court has manifestly abused its discretion. Additionally, a writ of mandamus is not available if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of the court to determine if a petition will be considered. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 122.025 provides that a minor must obtain the consent of one parent or a guardian; then, in extraordinary circumstances, the district court may authorize the marriage if the court finds that it will serve the minor's best interests. The marriage consent statute, as applied to minors under sixteen, is not intended to infringe upon the non-consenting parent's liberty interest in his or her relationship with the minor. FACTS: SierraDawn Kirkpatrick Crow was the daughter of divorced couple Karen Karay and petitioner Bruce Kirkpatrick. After the divorce, Kirkpatrick maintained a relationship with his daughter through telephone conversations and visited her in New Mexico and California. In late December 2000, shortly after Sierra turned fifteen years old, she informed her mother that she desired to marry her guitar teacher, forty-eight-year-old Sauren Crow. A Nevada statute permitted a minor under the age of 16 to marry, with the consent of one parent, and the district court's authorization. Pursuant to the law, SierraDawn was able to get married with only the consent of her mother, Karen Karay, and without the knowledge of her father, Kirkpatrick. When Kirkpatrick first learned of Sierra's marriage, he sought an ex parte temporary restraining order in the New Mexico district court. That court granted the temporary restraining order, and awarded Kirkpatrick immediate legal and physical custody of Sierra. Four days later, however, the court rescinded its order because it found that Sierra's marriage was valid under Nevada law and that Sierra was emancipated as a result of the marriage. Kirkpatrick then moved the Clark County district court to vacate its earlier order authorizing Sierra's marriage. Kirkpatrick also sought to have the marriage annulled. Following a hearing, during which Kirkpatrick was present and Sierra and Crow were physically absent, but were represented by counsel, the district court entered an order denying Kirkpatrick's motion, concluding that the marriage complied with Nevada law and determining that Kirkpatrick lacked standing to challenge the marriage's validity. Thereafter, Kirkpatrick filed the current petition seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its order authorizing Sierra's marriage, and to annul the marriage. ISSUE: Should the writ of mandamus be granted? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 122.025 violated Kirkpatrick's due process rights because his protected liberty interest in the parent-child relationship was infringed upon without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it authorized Sierra's marriage without expressly finding that extraordinary circumstances existed and that the marriage was in Sierra's best interests. Because the consent to marry was not properly obtained from the district court, the marriage of Sierra and Crow is void. Thus, the court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus compelling the district court to vacate its order authorizing a marriage license and to annul the marriage.

Bell v. Bell (Alaska 1990)

RULE: An award of child custody must be in the best interests of the child and more than an incapability of meaningful communications between the parties is required to award custody to one parent and not to award joint custody. Also, child support must be awarded based on more than cross-examination of a parent, and property subject to division should be divided equally where possible. FACTS: Appellant ex-husband challenged the award of custody, child support, and the division of marital property. During the time that the ex-husband and appellee ex-wife were going through their divorce, they cooperated and shared custody of their child by alternating custody each week. A Custody Investigator had recommended shared legal custody, and the facts showed that the couple had cooperated when the child was hospitalized. The trial court had found that the parties' inability to communicate made joint custody not in the best interest of the child. The court rejected this conclusion on appeal. As to child support, the trial court based its finding on the cross examination of the ex-husband, which the court found to be inaccurate and reversed on appeal. As for distribution of property, the ex-husband sought a division in the nature of rescission and the court required remand for the trial court to identify all property subject to distribution, determine the value of the property, determine the most equitable division, with a presumption that equal distribution would be desirable. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in its findings? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The custody decision of the trial court was reversed as the controlling underlying factual finding was clearly erroneous, and the award of support and property division were not supported by substantial evidence.

Stanley v. Illinois (U.S. 1972)

RULE: As a matter of due process of law, an unwed father is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children are taken from him; by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denies the father the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. FACTS: In a dependency proceeding by respondent State, the children of plaintiff, an unwed father, were declared wards of the State. Plaintiff appealed from the order, claiming that he had never been shown to have been an unfit parent and that he had been deprived of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The state supreme court held that plaintiff could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the children's mother, who was deceased, had not been married. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted plaintiff's petition for certiorari, reversed the state supreme court's holding and remanded the case to the state supreme court for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion. ISSUE: Were the equal protection rights of plaintiff, an unwed father, violated by respondent State when he was denied hearing on his parental fitness? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION:The State's interest in caring for plaintiff's children was de minimis if plaintiff was shown to be a fit father. Plaintiff was denied equal protection of the law because all parents were constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children were removed from their custody. Thus, plaintiff, as an unwed father, was also entitled to a hearing.

Campbell v. Robinson (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) -

RULE: Breach of promise to marry claims require a promise to marry, defendant breaking that promise, and damages to the plaintiff, but do not necessarily decide who can keep the ring. FACTS: The parties' engagement was broken and plaintiff sued defendant over ownership of the ring that he had given her. A jury trial was held and the jury determined that he was responsible for the termination, but that she was not entitled to damages. Although there was evidence that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage, there was also evidence that the ring was converted into an absolute gift. Defendant contended that plaintiff had ended their engagement, that she had asked plaintiff about keeping the ring and he said that she could keep it. Plaintiff denied this and contended that the breakup was mutual. ISSUE: Did the trial court properly find that plaintiff was not entitled to damages but was entitled to the return of the ring? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: On appeal, the court held that fault did not determine who could keep the ring, but the conduct of the parties controlled. Plaintiff had given defendant the ring when he proposed marriage and it was therefore given in contemplation of the marriage, conditioned upon the marriage occurring. Defendant's act of storing the ring in a safe deposit box did not amount to facts sufficient to sustain a claim that the ring was a gift and plaintiff was entitled to the ring.

Simeone v. Simeone (Pa. 1990)

RULE: Contracting parties are normally bound by their agreements, without regard to whether the terms thereof were read and fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied reasonable or good bargains. FACTS:On the eve of the parties' wedding, appellant wife, without the benefit of counsel, signed a prenuptial agreement. During the parties' divorce proceedings, appellant filed a claim for alimony pendente lite from appellee husband. A master's report upheld the validity of the prenuptial agreement, under which appellant gave up the right to alimony pendente lite, and denied appellant's claim. The lower court dismissed appellant's exceptions to the master's report, and the superior court affirmed the lower court's order. The wife appealed, asserting that the agreement was not reasonable and that she had not understood the nature of alimony pendente lite when she relinquished it in the agreement. The court affirmed the superior court's order. ISSUE: Should the parties' prenuptial agreement be declared void on the ground that appellant wife signed it without consulting with an independent legal counsel? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The terms of the prenuptial agreement should be regarded as binding, without regard to whether the terms were fully understood by appellant wife. To impose a requirement that parties entering a prenuptial agreement should obtain independent legal counsel would be contrary to traditional principles of contract law, and would constitute a paternalistic and unwarranted interference with the parties' freedom to enter contracts.

Pohlmann v. Pohlmann (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

RULE: Court modification of a support agreement requires a party to show a permanent, involuntary, and substantial change in circumstances. Moreover, a noncustodial parent who agrees to the amount of child support will face a heavier burden of proof to reduce such amount in a later modification proceeding. FACTS: Henry F. Pohlmann, III and Carol Greenwell divorced, and upon obtaining a final judgment of dissolution for their marriage, the court provided that Henry would pay child support and 100 percent of medical expenses not covered by insurance. Subsequently, Henry petitioned for modification of child support alleging that there had been a substantial change in his financial circumstances warranting a downward modification of his obligation. He also contended that Fla. Stat. ch. 61.30(12), which presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact shall order as child support in an initial proceeding for such support or in a proceeding for modification of an existing order for such support, was unconstitutional. The trial court found that there was no substantial change in circumstances which would justify a reduction in the former husband's child support obligations and that the statute was constitutional. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in its decision to deny Henry's petition for modification of child support, and in finding Fla. Stat. ch. 61.30(12) constitutional? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The court agreed there was no substantial change warranting a reduction in child support but remanded the matter for the trial court to consider a reduction in child support for the extended visitation granted to Henry. Furthermore, the court agreed that the statute in question was constitutional as it furthered a legitimate state interest, assuring that noncustodial parents continued to support children from their first marriage notwithstanding their obligation to support subsequently born children.

Mani v. Mani (N.J. 2005)

RULE: In awarding counsel fees in a divorce case, the court must consider whether the party requesting the fees is in financial need; whether the party against whom the fees are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action; the nature and extent of the services rendered; and the reasonableness of the fees. FACTS: Respondent Brenda Mani filed for a divorce, alleging adultery and extreme cruelty, after she learned that her husband, James Mani, was having an affair. Since Brenda's assets were substantially greater than that of James', James sought permanent alimony of over $68,000 per year. The trial court awarded alimony in the amount of $610 weekly, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the reduction in James' standard of living was justified by the finding that he was adulterous. James appealed, alleging that the appellate court improperly considered marital fault in reducing the award of alimony payable by Brenda under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23(b) and in denying him counsel fees. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in considering marital fault when it decided alimony? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court held that marital fault was irrelevant to alimony under § 2A:34-23(b) unless the fault negatively affected the economic status of the parties or the fault so violated societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would be unjust. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that because there was no allegation that James' fault had any economic consequences or that it was egregious, the appellate court improperly considered fault to justify the alimony award. Further, the Court held that the appellate court also improperly considered fault to justify the denial of counsel fees because marital fault was irrelevant to the question of whether such an award was proper. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the issues of alimony and counsel fees without regard to fault, giving due deference to the trial court's findings and conclusions.

Marvin v. Marvin (Cal. 1976)

RULE: Courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may, when appropriate, employ principles of constructive trust or resulting trust. Finally, a non-marital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if the non-marital partner can show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward. FACTS: Michelle Marvin brought an action against Lee Marvin, a man with whom she had lived for approximately six years, in which she alleged that she and Lee entered into an oral agreement that during the time they lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and share equally the property accumulated through their individual or combined efforts, and that Michelle would render services to Lee as companion, housemaker, housekeeper and cook, give up her career as an entertainer and singer, and that Lee would provide for all her financial support for the rest of her life. Michelle further alleged that later she was forced to leave Lee's household at his request; he refused to pay any further support to her and refused to recognize that she had any interest in the property accumulated while they were living together. Michelle prayed for declaratory relief, asking the court to determine her contract and property rights, and also to impose a constructive trust upon one-half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. The trial court denied Michelle's motion to amend her complaint to allege that she and Lee affirmed their agreement after Lee's divorce became final, and thereafter granted Lee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in its decision to grant Lee Marvin's motion for judgment on the pleadings? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held the terms of the contract as alleged by Michelle did not rest upon any unlawful consideration, that it furnished a suitable basis upon which the trial court could render declaratory relief, and the trial court therefore erred in granting Lee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court held generally that while the provisions of the Family Law Act did not govern the distribution of property acquired during a non-marital relationship, and such a relationship remained subject solely to judicial decision, the courts should enforce express contracts between non-marital partners except to the extent that the contract was explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. The Court further held that in the absence of an express contract, the court should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrated an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties, and that courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case. Moreover, the court ruled, Michelle's complaint could be amended to state a cause of action founded on theories of implied contract or equitable relief.

In re Marriage of Roberts (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)

RULE: Despite the legislature's intent for "property" to be interpreted as broadly inclusive, an educational degree simply does not possess the common characteristics of property. A degree is an intangible which is personal to the holder. Even if valuation could be made certain, such valuation, whether based on future earning capacity or upon cost of acquisition, would ultimately result in an award beyond the actual physical assets of the marriage. FACTS: The parties married and the husband quit his job in order to attend law school full time. The wife supported them by working throughout the husband's law school attendance. The parties separated shortly before he graduated. The trial court determined that the husband's law degree could not be considered a marital asset subject to distribution. However, the court did include the husband's student loans, totaling in valuing the marital estate, and found repayment to be the sole responsibility of the husband. The trial court determined that, based upon the student loans, the disproportionate earnings history and the earning potential of the parties, the presumption of equal distribution had been rebutted. The wife appealed the determination that the husband's law degree was not marital property. The husband appealed the award of attorney fees. ISSUE: Should the trial court should have included the husband's law degree as a marital asset subject to distribution? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed and agreed with the trial court that the husband's law degree did not constitute marital property. Despite the legislature's intent that property be interpreted as broadly inclusive, a degree, intangible and personal to the holder, did not possess the common characteristics of property. The potential worth of a degree was dependent upon the choice and availability of work, the talents and abilities of the holder, and myriad other factors. Further, the award of attorney fees was withing the discretion of the trial court.

Jennings v. Hurt (Super. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1989), aff'd (App. Div. 1990)

RULE: For a common-law marriage to exist under South Carolina law, mutual understanding or consent must be conveyed with such a demonstration of intent and with such clarity on the part of the parties that marriage does not creep up on either of them and catch them unaware. One cannot be married unwittingly or accidentally. The law of South Carolina clearly states that parties cannot find themselves husband and wife without intending to be married -- no matter how long the parties live together. Rather, there must be an intention on the part of both the parties to enter a marriage agreement or contract. FACTS: Sandra Jennings and William Hurt began living together while Hurt was still married to his former wife. In the spring of 1982, Jennings became pregnant. Between October 31, 1982 and January 10, 1983, the parties lived together and shared a bed in South Carolina. Hurt's divorce from his former wife became final on December 3, 1982. The parties never had a formal marriage ceremony and ceased living together in 1984. Subsequently, Jennings filed an action in a New York court alleging the existence of a common-law marriage under South Carolina law and claiming that while living together in South Carolina, the parties expressly agreed to marry and held themselves out as married. ISSUE: Was Jennings considered as the common-law spouse of Hurt? ANSWER: No CONCLUSION: The New York court ruled that Jennings was not the common-law spouse of Hurt. The Court noted that common-law marriages were recognized under South Carolina law and that New York law gave effect to common-law marriages deemed valid under the law of the state in which the marriage supposedly occurred. The Court found that based on the totality of the evidence, the parties had neither entered into a mutual agreement that they were married while living together in South Carolina nor held themselves out as married.

Turner v. Rogers (U.S. 2011)

RULE: In a civil contempt case for failure to pay child support, counsel was warranted where the State did not provide clear notice that the father's ability to pay was the critical question and made no findings concerning his ability to pay. FACTS: A family court entered an order requiring petitioner father to pay child support to the mother. The father repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt on five occasions. While serving a 12-month sentence, the father appealed because he was not represented by counsel at the contempt hearing. The father appealed the judgment of the state supreme court, which held that the he was not entitled to appointed counsel in the proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the father was entitled to counsel in this particular contempt case? ANSWER: Yes because the State did not provide clear notice that the father's ability to pay was the critical question and made no findings concerning his ability to pay. CONCLUSION: The court vacated the lower court order and held that the father was denied due process, although due process did not automatically require the State to provide counsel in civil contempt proceedings to an indigent parent subject to a support order who faces incarceration. The right to counsel was limited based upon the parent's ability to pay, the equality of representation between the parties, and State procedural safeguards. In the father's case, counsel was warranted since the State did not provide clear notice that the father's ability to pay was the critical question and made no findings concerning his ability to pay.

Paul v. Paul (Del. 2012)

RULE: In a spousal support context, the term "regularly residing" means living together with some degree of continuity; two people may be regularly residing together even though they maintain separate homes. FACTS: The parties' divorce agreement provided that alimony would terminate upon the wife's cohabitation, as defined in Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(g). After the wife became romantically involved with a companion, the husband's private investigator surveilled the wife. Based on the investigator's report, the husband filed a petition to terminate alimony. The Family Court denied the motion, focusing on the fact that the wife and her companion maintained separate homes, and the absence of evidence as to whether they spent the majority of their free time together. The husband appealed. ISSUE: Did the Family Court apply the correct legal standard in deciding whether the wife and her companion were cohabiting? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The court reversed the decision of the Family Court, and remanded, holding that the Family Court used the wrong definition of "regularly residing."

Bender v. Bender (Conn. 2001)

RULE: Invested pension benefits were subject to equitable distribution where they were sufficiently concrete, reasonable, justifiable, and constituted presently existing property. FACTS: Defendant husband contended that the trial court should have awarded the wife the known present value of the contributions into the pension, which contention the trial court rejected. The court concluded that it was within the trial court's discretion to choose among the present value method, present division method of deferred distribution, or any other valuation method that it deemed appropriate in accordance with state law. On appeal, the state supreme court expressly rejected the reserved jurisdiction method of distribution, as the statutory scheme regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings prohibited the retention of jurisdiction regarding lump sum alimony or the division of the marital estate. ISSUE: Did the trial court err by dissolving the marriage and granting pension benefits to the ex-wife? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The unvested pension benefits were property subject to equitable distribution. The trial court properly applied the present division method of deferred distribution, delaying distribution, in accordance with the domestic relations order, until the pension came into pay status.

In re Marriage of Shanks (Iowa 2008)

RULE: Iowa Code § 596.8(1) requires only that a premarital agreement be executed voluntarily. Neither the Iowa Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (IUPAA) nor the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act defines the term "voluntarily." Proof of duress or undue influence is required under Iowa Code § 596.8(1) to establish a premarital agreement was involuntarily executed. Although the voluntariness requirement of Iowa Code § 596.8 does not incorporate the concept of knowing execution, this concept is not irrelevant to the determination of enforceability of a premarital agreement under the IUPAA. Under the IUPAA, a party's knowing and understanding execution of a premarital agreement is a factor in the procedural unconscionability determination. FACTS: While contemplating a second marriage for both parties, the husband and wife discussed the goal of preserving the husband's assets for his children. The wife agreed to enter a premarital agreement, stating that she was not marrying the husband for his money. The premarital agreement was presented to the wife ten days before their wedding, and she consulted an attorney for the first draft upon the husband's advice. She failed to seek counsel before executing the second draft. A few years later, the husband filed for divorce and sought to enforce the agreement. The trial court refused to enforce the agreement, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. The husband filed an appeal. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in refusing to enforce the prenuptial agreement ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court reversed and remanded. It conducted a de novo review and found that the agreement was voluntarily executed, conscionable, and enforceable, which were required by the Iowa Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (IUPAA), Iowa Code § 596.12. The wife failed to establish duress or undue influence to prove that the agreement was involuntarily executed. The husband's position as a lawyer did not put him in a vastly superior bargaining position because he insisted that the wife seek the advice of independent counsel. The agreement also was not substantively or procedurally unconscionable because all of the provisions were mutual in scope, the wife assented, and she voluntarily declined to seek Iowa legal counsel on the second draft. Financial disclosures were fair and reasonable under Iowa Code § 596.8(3).

McGuire v. McGuire (Neb. 1953)

RULE: It is an indispensable requirement of a maintenance statute that the wife should be living separate and apart from her husband without her fault, and that therefore, a wife living in the same house with her husband, occupying a different room and eating at a different time, is not entitled to separate maintenance. FACTS: Plaintiff, Lydia McGuire and defendant Charles W. McGuire married on August 11, 1919. Lydia alleged that when she has requested various things for the home or personal effects, Charles informed her on many occasions that he did not have the money to pay for the same, notwithstanding the fact that the he had properties and bank accounts under his name. Without separating or living apart from each other, Lydia brought an action against Charles for maintenance and support. The trial court entered an order in favor of Lydia and subsequently denied Charles' motion for a new trial. Charles sought review of the district court's judgment, contending that the trial court erred in entering an order allowing Lydia to recover maintenance, support money, and attorneys' fees from Charles. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in entering an order allowing plaintiff Lydia to recover maintenance, support money, and attorneys' fees from defendant Charles? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION:The Court reversed the trial court's decision to award Lydia support and maintenance from Charles, and remanded the matter with directions to dismiss Lydia's action for maintenance payments. The Court held that a requirement for receiving maintenance was that the wife lived separate and apart from the husband, which did not apply to Lydia and Charles as it has been established that they never lived separately. In the case at bar, the Court found that the award of attorney's fees was also erroneous because there was no legal basis for Lydia's action against Charles.

Loving v. Virginia (U.S. 1967)

RULE: Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58, 20-59, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is to deprive all the state's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under the United States Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state. FACTS: In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. In October 1958, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. The Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail. However, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the Virginia state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58 and 20-59, the state anti-miscegenation statutes which they had violated, were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion to vacate the sentences. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and after modifying the sentence affirmed the convictions. ISSUE: Was the Virginia state anti-miscegenation statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment. The Court held that the Virginia statutes violated both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to remove the classification from the U.S. Const. amend. XIV's proscription of all invidious racial discrimination. The Court held there was no legitimate overriding purpose which justified the classification. The Court found that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and deprived appellants of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Bennington v. Bennington (Ohio. Ct. App. 1978)

RULE: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01(K) provides grounds for divorce when a husband and wife have, without interruption for two years, lived separate and apart without cohabitation. FACTS: The wife, Mary Bennington, suffered a stroke and was disabled. The husband, Larry Bennington, moved out of the house and into a van located adjacent to the house. His primary reason for moving into the van was that Mary kept the house at about 85-90 degrees. Mary later filed an action for alimony, claiming gross neglect of duty and abandonment. Larry filed a counterclaim for divorce, alleging gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. He asserted as grounds for divorce the fact that the parties lived separate and apart for at least two years without cohabitation. The trial court granted the husband a divorce. ISSUE: Can the time that Larry lived in the van adjacent to the house be used as a ground for divorce? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The court found that the trial court erroneously included the time that Larry lived in the van adjacent to the house as part of the two-year period, as the parties were not living "separate and apart" during that time. During that time, there was no cessation of marital duties and relations between the wife and husband. While there was a lack of cohabitation, there was no living "separate and apart" as contemplated by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01(K). The court further found that the trial court did not err in ordering the parties' real estate and automobile sold.

United States v. Windsor (U.S. 2013)

RULE: State laws defining and regulating marriage must respect the constitutional rights of persons; but, subject to those guarantees, regulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the states. FACTS: The State of New York recognized the marriage of same-sex couple and New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, who wed in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but was barred from doing so by §3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined "marriage" and "spouse" as excluding same-sex partners. Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a refund, which the Internal Revenue Service denied. Windsor thereafter brought a refund suit, contending that DOMA violated the principles of equal protection incorporated in the Fifth Amendment. While the suit was pending, the Attorney General notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the Department of Justice would no longer defend §3's constitutionality. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives voted to intervene in the litigation to defend §3's constitutionality. The District Court permitted the intervention. On the merits, the court ruled against the United States, finding §3 unconstitutional and ordering the Treasury to refund Windsor's tax with interest. The Second Circuit affirmed. ISSUE: as §3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Court held that §3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that was protected by the Fifth Amendment. The statute was applicable to a wide variety of over 1,000 federal statutes and regulations in addition to the tax exemption, and was directed to a class of persons that New York State sought to protect by recognizing same-sex marriages. The Court held that the state's decision to give same-sex couples the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import, but the government used the state-defined class for the opposite and improper purpose of imposing restrictions and disabilities, and DOMA, which sought to injure the very same-sex class the State sought to protect, violated basic due process and equal protection principles by identifying and making unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages.

U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno (U.S. 1973) - p372

RULE: The "unrelated person" provision of § 3 (e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C.S. § 2012(e), creates an irrational classification in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. FACTS: Appellees consisted of several groups of individuals who alleged that, although they satisfied the income eligibility requirements for federal food assistance, they were nevertheless excluded from the program solely because the persons in each group were not all related to each other. The district court ruled for appellees. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. ISSUE: Did the "unrelated person" provision of the Food Stamp Act create an irrational classification in violation of the equal protection component of the due process caluse of the Fifth Amendment?ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The "unrelated person" provision was irrelevant to the state purpose of the Food Stamp Act and did not operate to rationally further the prevention of fraud. The classification acted to exclude not only those who were likely to abuse the program, but also those who were in need of the aid but could not afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.

Troxel v. Granville (U.S. 2000)

RULE: The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Const. amend. XIV protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. FACTS: Washington Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) permitted any person to petition a state court for child visitation rights at any time, and authorized the court to order visitation rights for any person when visitation might serve the best interest of the child. Pursuant to the statute, petitioners, paternal grandparents, filed a petition to obtain visitation rights with their deceased son's children. After the Washington Superior Court for Skagit County granted the grandparents more visitation time than respondent Granville--the children's mother--desired, Granville appealed. While the appeal was pending, Granville, who had never married the children's father, was married to a father of six, who adopted the two children. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the visitation order and dismissed the petition for visitation. The Washington Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, expressed the view that the statute infringed on the fundamental right, under the Federal Constitution, of parents to rear their children. ISSUE: Does § 26.10.160(3), a Washington statute permitting any person to petition a state court for child visitation rights at any time, infringe on the fundamental right of the parents to rear their children? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Court held that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringed on parents' fundamental right to rear their children. Reasoning that the Federal Constitution permitted a state to interfere with this right only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child, the Court found that § 26.10.160(3) did not require a threshold showing of harm and swept too broadly by permitting any person to petition at any time with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child.

Hanke v. Hanke (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)

RULE: The appellate court reviews the findings and holdings, bearing in mind that the ultimate test for custody and visitation is the best interests of the child. In most instances the decision of the trial judge is accorded great deference, unless it is arbitrary or clearly wrong. FACTS: On August 1, 1990, Mr. and Ms. Hanke were divorced by a judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County. Mary Elizabeth Hanke was granted custody of their child. Dan Wolf Hanke was awarded overnight visitation rights. Ms. Hanke appealed. Ms. Hanke's concern for this child stemed in part from an incident of sexual abuse by Mr. Hanke of his stepchild, one of Ms. Hanke's daughters from a previous marriage. After the trial court entered its order that granted the ex-husband unsupervised, overnight visitation, Ms. Hanke moved the children from the state to Kentucky. As a result, the trial court changed the child's custody in favor of the ex-husband and terminated any child supported Ms. Hanke was receiving. ISSUE: Did the trial court err in granting Mr. Hanke unsupervised, overnight visitation with the young child? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court reversed the order of custody and visitation based upon the substantial evidence that supported Ms. Hanke's concerns that Mr. Hanke posed a threat for sexually abusing the child. That evidence included the husband's testimony related to the prior sexual abuse of the stepdaughter, plus psychological examinations, and the child's reporting of the husband molesting her. The court further found that the trial court was clearly wrong in concluding that the mother's concerns were mere overreacting because there was a basis for her belief based upon past behavior, and in any event it was clear that the trial court failed to act with the best interests of the child in mind.

Anderson v. Anderson (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)

RULE: The construction of a contract should be governed by the intent of the parties as expressed in the entire contract. A contract must be construed so as to reconcile its different provisions and to reject a construction that leads to a contradiction. FACTS: Before wife Tami Flowers Anderson and husband William Harvey Anderson were married, they entered into an "Agreement In Contemplation Of Marriage" wherein the wife expressly acknowledged that "she could be receiving substantially less sums of money by the AGREEMENT should the parties become divorced than she might in any subsequent divorce action" and that its provisions were "fair and equitable and satisfactory to her." The agreement also provided that the wife waived "all future claims to alimony, attorney's fees, or an equitable distribution of property that is not specified within this agreement." With regard to property distribution, Paragraph 6 of the agreement specified that "all assets and income derived from the date of their marriage forward shall be the assets of and shall be subject to equal division (50percent/50percent) between the parties." The wife moved for partial summary judgment on her entitlement under the pre-nuptial agreement to receive one-half of the interest from the certificates of deposit as an equitable division of property. The Court, however, held that the wife was not entitled to one-half of the interest of the certificates of deposit. The wife claimed that the trial court erred in making a final ruling as to the parties' respective rights in the certificates of deposit. ISSUE: In a case involving a pre-nuptial agreement, did the trial court err in holding that the wife was not entitled to one-half of the interest from the certificates of deposit and that she had no claim on the husband's income? ANSWER: No CONCLUSION: On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment. The Court held that the trial court's order regarding the certificates was entered in connection with that motion and did not deal with the request for temporary alimony. The wife herself invoked the ruling on the interpretation of the pre-nuptial agreement, and the trial court did not commit any procedural error. The certificates were not owned by the husband, but by the trust created when he divorced his first wife. The certificates were not acquired after the parties' marriage. The interest paid to the husband was remitted to the trust. Therefore, the wife was not entitled to one-half of the interest. The agreement clearly specified an equitable division of all assets and income derived from the date of the marriage, not all assets and income earned after the marriage. The trial court properly construed the term "income" in Paragraph 6 as meaning "the increase in value of assets subject to that equitable division of property provision of the agreement." The wife could recover her portion of the investment income earned by the marital assets.

Sagar v. Sagar (Mass. App. 2003)

RULE: The due process clause protects certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, including the right of a parent to direct a child's education and upbringing. In divorce proceedings, each parent is presumed to have equal custody, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 31, and the court is only called on to make determinations as to a child's best interests because the parties normally charged with making such decisions cannot themselves agree. FACTS: In the course of contentious divorce proceedings between two devout Hindus, the husband moved the court for permission to perform a Hindu religious ritual, Chudakarana, upon the parties' young daughter. After a hearing, a Probate Court judge ordered that the religious ceremony shall not be performed on the minor child until the child is of sufficient age to make that determination herself, absent a written agreement between the parties. The probate court also awarded physical custody to the wife. The husband appealed. ISSUE: Was the trial judge's order concerning the religious ritual least intrusive upon the father's fundamental rights? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed and held that the evidence as to the impact of performing, or not performing, Chudakarana on the child was insufficient either way to have justified an order restricting either parent's fundamental rights. The appropriate recourse was an accommodation that intruded least upon both parents' religious inclinations and, at the same time, was compatible with the child's health and well being. The challenged order represented such an accommodation. Further, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding joint legal custody to the parents and designating the wife's residence as the child's primary residence with liberal visitation to the husband.

Santosky v. Kramer (1982)

RULE: The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. FACTS: Under New York law, the State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child is "permanently neglected." The New York Family Court Act (§ 622) requires that only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" support that finding. Neglect proceedings were brought in Family Court to terminate the Santoskys' rights as natural parents in their three children. Rejecting the Santoskys' challenge to the constitutionality of § 622's "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard, the Family Court weighed the evidence under that standard and found permanent neglect. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, the Family Court ruled that the best interests of the children required permanent termination of petitioners' custody. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the Santoskys' appeal to that court. The Santoskys sought further review in the federal court. ISSUE: Was the standard of "fair preponderance of evidence" enough to severe the rights of natural parents to their children? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court held that before a state could sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, Due Process under U.S. Const. Amend. XIV required that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. The Court found that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard was inconsistent with Due Process because the private interest in parental rights affected was substantial and the countervailing governmental interest favoring the preponderance standard was comparatively slight. The Court held that a clear and convincing evidence standard adequately conveyed to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about the factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process, and that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard was a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts.

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (U.S. 2005)

RULE: The procedural component of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not protect everything that might be described as a "benefit." To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Such entitlements are, of course, not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. FACTS: Several weeks after a state trial court in Colorado had issued Jessica Gonzales a restraining order against her estranged husband, which required him to remain at least 100 yards from the home in which Gonzales and her three daughters resided. Gonzales claimed that the husband allegedly, without notifying Gonzales, took the daughters while they were playing outside the home and killed the daughters. Gonzales filed a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suit alleging that the Town of Castle Rock had violated the Due Process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment when the town's police officers, acting pursuant to official policy or custom, had failed to respond to Gonzales' repeated reports over several hours that her husband had taken the three children in violation of the restraining order. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, concluding that Gonzales had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, granted the town's motion to dismiss. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had alleged a cognizable procedural due process claim and reversed the dismissal of her complaint. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, reaching the same disposition as had the panel, ruled that Gonzales had possessed a protected property interest in enforcement of her restraining order. ISSUE: Did Gonzales have a protected property interest in the police enforcement of a restraining order? ANSWER: No CONCLUSION: Reversing, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Gonzales did not, for purposes of the due process clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order. Therefore, even under the facts as alleged by Gonzales, the police officers had not violated Gonzales' procedural due process rights by failing to respond to her requests that the police enforce the order. Colorado law did not make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory, as the state had not created a personal entitlement to such enforcement. Prior Supreme Court cases had recognized that a benefit was not a protected entitlement if government officials could grant or deny the benefit in their discretion. Finally, it was not clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement of a restraining order, which has no ascertainable monetary value, could constitute a "property" interest for purposes of the due process clause.

Ferguson v. Ferguson (Miss. 1994)

RULE: The purpose of alimony is neither to punish the wrongdoer nor to reward the victim. FACTS: Lori Ferguson, nee Schaefer, and Lee Ferguson were married on November 25, 1978 in Plainville, Connecticut. The marriage bore four children. Sometime in 1995, the couple separated and the wife filed a marital dissolution action. The parties have disagreements concerning child support, alimony, property distribution, and the payment of fees. ISSUE: Should the marriage between the parties be dissolved, and should claims on child support, alimony, property distribution, and payment of fees be awarded in favor of the wife? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court found that the wife was a dutiful and faithful spouse but that the husband failed his responsibilities as a husband and parent. Because the husband defaulted in his parental role throughout the marriage, the wife had to expend more time and emotional energy in close supervision of the children, thus making her less available for outside employment and wholly unprepared, on the eve of marital dissolution, for financial independence. The court found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably with no prospect for reconciliation and entered a decree dissolving the marriage. Custody of the three minor children was awarded to the wife subject to the conditions and provisions set forth in the parties' agreement concerning custody and shared parenting. The husband was ordered to pay child support, to pay both periodic and lump sum alimony, to convey to the wife all his right, title, and interest in and to the parties' real estate, to pay counsel fees, and to purchase a suitable vehicle for the wife.

McMillen v. McMillen (Pa. 1992)

RULE: The scope of review of an appellate court reviewing a child custody order is of the broadest type; the appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence to support it. However, this broad scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own independent determination. Thus, an appellate court is empowered to determine whether the trial court's incontrovertible factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in view of the trial court's factual findings; and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion. FACTS: Appellant Vaughn S. McMillen and Carolyn F. Shemo, formerly Carolyn F. McMillen, were married on May 2, 1975. Their son Emmett was born on September 30, 1977. The parties were subsequently divorced in the state of Wyoming on September 25, 1981. At the time of the divorce, the Wyoming court awarded primary custody of Emmett to Carolyn, subject only to the reasonable visitation of Vaughn. The child repeatedly and steadfastly expressed his preference to live with Vaughn. Six years later, a trial court awarded general custody of the child to Vaughn. The trial court found that the child's best interests would be served most appropriately by placing the child in the custody of Vaughn because of the child's desire to live with Vaughn as well as the fact that each home was a suitable environment. On appeal, however, the superior court vacated the custody order. The superior court determined that the record failed to present any circumstances warranting a change in custody and the child's best interests would not be served by changing custody merely because the child wished it. ISSUE: Did the superior court err in vacating a trial court's award of child custody to Vaughn? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The judgment of the court below was reversed on appeal and the trial court's order was reinstated. The intermediate appellate court was empowered to determine whether the trial court's incontrovertible factual findings supported its factual conclusions, but it could not interfere with those conclusions unless they were unreasonable in view of the trial court's factual findings; and thus, represented a gross abuse of discretion. First, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found no abuse of discretion in the amount of weight afforded the child's preference. The record showed that the child's preference to live with his father was supported by more than sufficient good reasons. Moreover, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the child's best interests would be served more appropriately by placing him in his father's custody because the child's preference tipped the evidentiary scale in favor of appellant.

Michael H. v. Gerald D. (U.S. 1989)

RULE: The term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom from physical restraint. FACTS: In May 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and had always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they had lived since June 1984. In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal. Evid. Code § 621, which provided that a child born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption could be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances. The California Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed, holding that the conclusive presumption statute did not violate the rights of the putative father or the child under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. ISSUE: Did the conclusive presumption statute violate the rights of the putative father or the child under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court agreed that the conclusive presumption statute did not infringe on the due process rights of the putative father or the child, or on the child's equal protection rights. According to the Court, Michael did not have a liberty interest traditionally protected by society that would give rise to substantive due process rights, and Victoria's due process claim failed for the same reason.

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. (N.Y. 1989)

RULE: The term family, as used in New York City, N.Y., Rules of the City of New York, tit. 9 § 2204.6(d), should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society's traditional concept of "family" and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that, in using the term "family," the New York Legislature intended to extend protection to those who reside in households having all of the normal familial characteristics. FACTS: Miguel Braschi lived with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment located at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard's death in September of 1986. Two months later, Stahl Associates Company, the owner of the apartment building, served a notice to Braschi contending that he was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the apartment since only Blanchard had been listed as the tenant of record. In December of 1986 Stahl served Braschi with a notice to terminate informing him that he had one month to vacate the apartment and that, if the apartment was not vacated, Stahl would commence summary proceedings to evict him. Braschi initiated an action seeking a permanent injunction and a declaration of entitlement to occupy the apartment. He alleged that under the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, he was considered Blanchard's family member and entitled to protection against eviction. The regulation provides that upon the death of a rent-control tenant, the landlord may not dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant." Stahl argued that the term "family member" should have been construed, consistent with New York's intestacy laws, to mean relationships of blood, consanguinity, and adoption in order to effectuate the over-all goal of orderly succession to real property. The lower court order granted the motion by the Braschi for a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (New York) reversed. ISSUE: Is Braschi considered a member of Blanchard's family who is entitled to protection from eviction under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 9? ANSWER: Yes CONCLUSION: The Court of Appeals of New York held that the term family, as used in § 2204.6(d), was not to be rigidly restricted to those people who had formalized their relationship. The intended protection against sudden eviction was not to rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should have had its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic view of a family included two adult lifetime partners whose relationship was long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence.

McLeod v. Starnes (S.C. 2012)

RULE: There is no absolute right to a college education, and S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(17), as interpreted by Risinger and its progeny, does not impose a moral obligation on all divorced parents with children. Instead, the factors identified by Risinger and expounded upon in later cases seek to identify those children whose parents would otherwise have paid for their college education, but for a divorce, and provide them with that benefit. FACTS: Appellant mother sued respondent father in the Lexington County Family Court (South Carolina) for one child's college expenses, an increase in support for another child, and attorney's fees and costs. The trial court (1) dismissed the claim for college expenses, (2) reduced support for the second child, (3) reduced support payable from the father's bonus, (4) reduced his obligation, and (5) denied attorney's fees and costs. The mother appealed. ISSUE: Did the trial court err when it found that the father was not obligated to pay for college costs? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The supreme court held that: (1) its prior decision finding an equal protection violation in requiring a parent to pay for college education wrongly applied strict scrutiny, (2) permitting such an order did not improperly treat divorced parents differently than non-divorced parents, and (3) requiring the payment under limited circumstances was rationally related to a legitimate state interest in ensuring its youth's education. Awarding the father a credit for alleged child support overpayment was error because it was based on an erroneous calculation of the parties' incomes. It was error to reduce the percentage of his bonus payable as child support because the reduction was not explained. It was error to deny the mother's request for attorney's fees and costs because (1) these expenses were at least half her income, while the father's were less than one-third his income, and (2) the father's conduct caused the litigation, as he did not pay the full amount of his bonus that was due, and his claim that a child did not need support after the age of majority prompted the mother's suit, from which she received significant benefit.

Olmstead v. Ziegler (Alaska 2002)

RULE: Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to modify child support orders. A trial court's determination of whether to modify child support will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when, based on a review of the whole record, the supreme court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Under Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a), factual findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Voluntarily reducing one's income may not justify a modification of child support. Determining whether or not a parent is voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed is essentially a question of fact. The trial court should consider the nature of the changes and the reasons for the changes, and then determine whether under all the circumstances a modification is warranted. A trial court may find that underemployment is voluntary even if the obligor acted in good faith. FACTS: William E. Olmstead and Elizabeth A. Ziegler were both attorneys. At the time of their divorce, they entered into a settlement agreement whereby neither party would pay child support. However, their settlement agreement contained a stipulation that William would pay for the child's education expenses. Two years later, William was failing in his attempt to be a solo practitioner and was earning just over $ 10,000 a year. He then decided to become a teacher. Thereafter, William filed a motion for an order modifying child support under Civil Rule 90.3. On October 28, 1999, the trial court denied William's motion for modification of child support, noting that William had not provided the necessary income verification documents. William moved for reconsideration, and on November 16, 1999, the trial court issued an order simultaneously granting William's request for reconsideration and denying his motion to modify child support. The trial court found that, although their financial situations may have changed, the parties still possessed equal earning capacities. The trial court also reasoned that, although William was free to change careers, he was not entitled to a modification of child support. ISSUE: Taking into consideration William's change of career, was he entitled to a modification of child support? ANSWER: No. CONCLUSION: The state supreme court agreed with the trial court that the father's career change constituted voluntary underemployment, which did not necessarily justify a modification in child support, even if the career change was taken in good faith. In the case at bar, the trial court established that William took many steps, including closing his office and failing to keep regular business hours, that demonstrated his intent to downsize his practice. While he repeatedly stated that he was simply a failure at law and was not capable of earning the average lawyer's salary, that claim was undermined by the fact that at one time he made over $ 53,000 a year. Thus, according to the state supreme court, the trial court properly determined that William was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed and that he was not working at his full capacity based upon his past earnings.

Turner v. Safley (U.S. 1987)

RULE: When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Such a standard is necessary if prison administrators, and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations. FACTS: Inmates brought a class action challenging two regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Corrections. The first permitted correspondence between immediate family members who were inmates at different institutions within the Division's jurisdiction and between inmates "concerning legal matters," but allowed other inmate correspondence only if each inmate's classification/treatment team deemed it in the best interests of the parties. The second regulation permitted an inmate to marry only with the prison superintendent's permission, which could be given only when there are "compelling reasons" to do so. Testimony indicated that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be considered "compelling." The Federal District Court found both regulations unconstitutional, applying a strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: Were the prison regulations unconstitutional? ANSWER: Yes, as to the marriage regulation. No, as to the correspondence regulation. CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the correspondence regulation, but held that the marriage regulation could not be sustained. Applying a lesser standard of scrutiny, the Court concluded that the correspondence regulation was reasonably related to legitimate security interests. However, the marriage regulation did not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard because it was an exaggerated response to rehabilitation and security concerns. The Court noted that there were obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation.

Zablocki v. Redhail (U.S. 1978)

RULE: When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. FACTS: A Wisconsin statute provided that any resident of Wisconsin having a minor child not in his custody but for whom he is under an obligation to support by any court order or judgment may not marry, within Wisconsin or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court's permission to marry. Permission to marry could not be granted unless the applicant submitted proof of compliance with the support obligation, and demonstrated that the children covered by the support order were not then, and were not likely to become public charges. Redhail, a Wisconsin resident, who was under a court order to support his child born out of wedlock, was denied a marriage license by the County Clerk of Milwaukee County, on the sole ground that he had not obtained a court order granting him permission to marry. He brought a civil rights class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, asserting that the Wisconsin statute violated the United States Constitution. The three-judge District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoined its enforcement. A class of county clerks challenged the District Court's order, asserting that statute assisted the state to counsel residents on their financial obligations and protected the children to whom support was owed. ISSUE: Did Wis. Stat. § 245.10 violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The United States Supreme Court found that Wis. Stat. § 245.10 violated equal protection in that it directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry without being closely tailored to effectuate the state's interests. The Court noted that other future financial obligations were not curtailed, only those that might be associated with marriage, and further found that the effect of the statute was that more children born out of wedlock would be born.

Brown v. Brown (S.C. Ct. Ap. 2008)

RULE: Where an ex-wife had been seen kissing a man not her husband, had admitted a relationship with him, had stated that she was in love with him and had discussed marriage with him, the ex-husband had met his burden of proving that she had committed adultery and was not eligible for alimony. FACTS: The ex-wife had been socializing with a man not her husband, had been seen with him -- even seen by the ex-husband -- had admitted that she loved the other man, and that she had discussed marriage with him. The trial court had found that the ex-husband had failed to show that he had met his burden of showing that she had both the inclination and the opportunity to commit adultery. The trial court thereafter awarded her alimony. There were also challenged marital property distribution decisions common to every divorce proceeding and appeal as well as an award of attorney fees against the husband. ISSUE: Was it error for the trial court to find that the ex-wife had not committed adultery and to award alimony to her? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: Because the ex-husband had met his burden of showing adultery, it had been error to award the ex-wife alimony.

Draper v. Burke (Mass. 2008)

RULE: Where ex-spouses lived in different and distant states, federal preemption in an ex-wife's action to modify child support to require the ex-husband to pay college expenses was required in order to implement federal objectives because no one state had modified the original support order. FACTS: An Oregon court had ordered the ex-husband to pay child support but did not address college expenses. The ex-wife, a Massachusetts resident, sought to have him, an Idaho resident, ordered to contribute. The Massachusetts court held she could not satisfy Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209D, § 6-611(a)(1)(ii), which contained a limitation that only nonresidents could seek a foreign support order's modification. Further, she had no Idaho contacts, so an Idaho court had no personal jurisdiction over her. The trial court held that it was required to rely on federal preemption to implement federal objectives and denied the ex-husband's motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Did the trial court properly invoke federal jurisdiction and deny the ex-husband's motion to dismiss? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: Forcing the ex-wife to litigate in Idaho would unreasonably burden her. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738B was intended to protect the children from the ex-husband's insistence on jurisdictional convenience. Preemption was required by an actual conflict between state and federal law and to implement federal objectives.

Obergefell v. Hodges (U.S. 2015)

RULE:The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) must be and is overruled, and Mich. Const. art. I, § 25, Ky. Const. § 233a, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 (2008), and Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. FACTS: Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Fourteen same-sex couples, and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners' favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed. ISSUE: Did the state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same-sex couples the right to marry? ANSWER: Yes CONCLUSION: The Court held that under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. Laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held invalid to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Because same-sex couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states, it follows that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character. The Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.

Ciesluk v. Ciesluk (Colo. 2005) - pp. 771-79

Summary of Issues::Whether adoption of section 14-10-129, as amended, eliminates the presumptions [*2] and shifting burdens on a custodial parent's motion to relocate as articulated in Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996). Whether the best interests of the child standard creates a test that completely separates the interests of the child from the interests of a custodial parent and, if so, does it pass constitutional review. Petition for Writ of Certiorari GRANTED. EN BANC.

United States Use Of Crane Co. v. Progressive Enters., Inc. 418 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1976)

United States Use Of Crane Co. v. Progressive Enters., Inc. 418 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1976) RULE: In the context of a lengthy, on-going business relationship, seeking modification of a sales price is not uncommon and, given increased costs, is a fair method of doing business in order to preserve the desirability of the relationship for both parties. In such a situation, the parties must be able to rely on objective, unequivocal manifestations of assent. FACTS: On May 3, 1974, Crane Company submitted a written proposal to furnish a cast iron deaerator to Progressive Enterprises, Inc. for $ 5238, the price quoted as firm for acceptance within fifteen days. On July 1, 1974, Progressive accepted the offer to sell by submission of a purchase order. However, Crane, through its authorized selling agent, advised Progressive that because of rapidly escalating material costs, the purchase order could only be accepted subject to current price in effect at time of shipment. The communication included a quote for $7350. The parties agree that the July 1, 1974 purchase order was an effective acceptance of Crane's offer to sell. However, apparently without protest to or discussion with Crane or its agent, Progressive agreed to the higher price and, on August 7, 1974, submitted a second purchase order for the machine, this time at $7350. Thereafter, the machine was delivered and Progressive only paid $5,550 and asserting that the balance was not due because the increased price was not a valid modification of the contract. Crane then instituted this suit to recover $2,218 plus interest from March 2, 1975, representing the difference between the higher agreed price with interest and the amount paid by the defendant. ISSUE: Was there a valid modification of the contract? ANSWER: Yes CONCLUSION: The Court found in favor of Crane in the amount of $2,218 plus interest from March 2, 1975. The Court held that the letters of from Crane's agent support a finding that the seller's costs had increased, justifying a request for modification of the price to Progressive. Although Progressive possessed the contractual right to refuse to modify and to demand performance on the original terms, it failed to do so and gave objective assent to the higher price. It added that in the context of a lengthy, on-going business relationship, seeking modification of a sales price is not uncommon and, given increased costs, is a fair method of doing business in order to preserve the desirability of the relationship for both parties. In such a situation, the parties must be able to rely on objective, unequivocal manifestations of assent. The secret intention of Progressive never to pay the higher price is hardly in keeping with the good faith requirement of the U.C.C. of honesty in fact.