U.S. Foreign Policy Midterm

Division of Labor

-1950s division of labor, can produce more if you specialize rather than be self-sufficient. Increases productivity and economic growth. -specialization requires large, free markets. Gains of specialization can be realized through trade.

Bargaining Tariff

-Bargaining tarrif: linked tarfiff to international negotiation, U.S. gets something in return. Reductions of tariffs are linked to the reduction of tariffs in other countries

Schussler WWII Example

-During WWII, U.S. pursued a strategy of offshore balancing in Europe and Asia against potential hegemons in Germany and Japan that could pose a threat to the U.S - after the Fall of France, FDR feared that all of Asia, Europe, the seas and Africa could fall under the sway of imperial Japan and Germany, putting them in position to bring enormous military power against the western hemisphere that threaten the U.S. way of life. --Roosevelt insisted that the U.S was a nonbelligerent even as he waged a proxy war on behalf of the allies and armed them through lend-lease. He also pledged to keep U.S. out of the war numerous times. FDR shrouded his military planning in secret, hiding talks between U.S. and British military leaders on contingency plans if U.S. entered the war. -In March 1941, FDR tried to provoke an incident by taking an increasingly confrontation posture in the Atlantic. He extended the neutrality zones and had U.S. ships patrol the west Atlantic and broadcast the location of German ships to the English, he occupied Iceland and met with Churchill to discuss war aims. U.S. ships escorting convoys were given orders to shoot on sight if they encountered Axis warships. -U.S. imposed oil embargo on Japan, insisting that Japan withdraw from China. Roosevelt talked openly of maneuvering Japan into firing the first shot rather than working for a diplomatic compromise. Japan tried to negotiate some kind of agreement with the U.S. but FDR would not accept anything less than full exit of China, FDR seemed insanely willing to provoke war. -FDR took a hard line with Japan even though his official suggested he appease Japan. One of the few logical explanations is that he took advantage of the East Asian situation to bring the U.S. into the European war.

Freidan battle for influence.

-During the war and the period immediately following it, New York became the world's center for long-term lending. American financial supremacy drew America's internationally oriented business people and politicians into world leadership during the war and in the postwar reconstruction of Europe, a role that was to be severely hampered by the strength of economic nationalists within the United States. --Internationalits tried to convince average Americans, partially through organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations, that there stake in the restauration of normal economic conditions in Europe is direct vital. American International bankers and foreign policy makers also interacted closely, along with State and Fed people. --Protectionists manage to get the upper hand and get Congress to pass two tarrifs in 1921 and 1922, the Emergency tariff act and the Fordney McCumber Tariff. American protectionism was now back. --In June 1934, Congress passed the Hull's Reciprocal Trade Act, which was a move toward free trade. By 1934, the dollar was also fixed, at 35$ an ounce, indicating a renewed commitment to currency stability. -In 1936, the British, French and U.S. moved towards a gentleman's agreement to restore their currency's convertability into gold. This became the Tripartite agreement, which was joined by other countries too and was a step toward rebuilding international economic cooperation. -The Depression and eventually World War II weakened the economic nationalists and allowed the state to reshape both policies and policy networks. By the late 1930s, economic nationalists were isolated or ignored, and most relevant decisions were placed within the purview of relatively internationalist bureaucracies. As economic internationalism was consolidated, the foreign-policy bureaucracy came to reflect this tendency even as, in pre-World War I days, the apparatus had been unshakably nationalist in economic affairs

Hagaard RTAA

-Hagaard: existing literature overlooks institutions we get from RTAA domestically. Also institutionalist. -RTAA had two lasting institutional effects. First, by delegating its authority, the Congress allowed new organizational interests and centers of expertise to develop within the executive. Giving the State Department a central role in trade policy introduced broader international economic and political considerations onto the policy agenda while providing a strong institutional base for free-traders. Second: there is a new instutional setting that industries come to discuss trade policy. Less protectionist pressure, as congress is no longer beholden to protectionist interests. Moving decision-making towards the executive resulted in a relative decline in the influence of protectionist forces. The new structure also created new channels through which export- oriented industries could influence policy, and therefore new incentives for them to organize New relationship between government and business, allowed for by new institutions, which allow exporting industries to influence government/trade. Now the exporters are at the table, partaking in State dept institutions, this sidelines protectionists. -Hagard: you need strong domestic institutions in order to protect trade policy from protectionist interests. -takeaway state did not create trade policy in the interest of the broad public, it's the state elites that create trade policy. State dept elites set agenda for international trade, determine who gets a seat at the table, state dept was free trade so exporters were taken to the table. -Moving trade policy authority towards the executive, establishing new centers of policy expertise, and insulating the policy process from interest group pressures facilitated a gradual move towards a more liberal trade policy. -The debate on the domestic determinants of American foreign economic policy should rotate less around whether state actors, societal actors, or international pressures are more important in particular instances, and more on how institutions differentially process external constraints and structure the access of groups to decision-making. - But congressional tariff-making had obscured the costs of particularism and made protectionist lobbying relatively cost-free. The new institutional structure exposed the trade-off between export expansion and protection, provided new incentives for internationally competitive in- dustries to organize, and thus increased the costs of protectionist lobbying while decreasing the likelihood of success

Hecksher Olin Trade Theory

-Hecksher Olin Trade Theory: a country has a comparative advatange in goods that take advange of the factors of production in which it is well endowed. (land, labor, capital)

Institutional roots of American Trade Policy Bailey

-In this article, the view is that political institutions, by structuring conflict over trade policy, provide an explanation for the divergence between analyses that predict economic closure and the empricial reality of free trade. -negotiated between states, not unilaterally imposed, reciporcal --for much of the 19th century, protectionists successfully pressured congress into maintain high trade barriers. This changed with the Reciprocal Trade agreements Act of 1934 that changed the way trade policy was determined, and set the stage for efforts to expand free trade. -RTAA mandated reciprocal, not uniltateral tariff reductions, and authorized trade agreements based on a simple majority vote instead of the supermajority mandated in the constitution. These changes in trade rules reflected efforts by the democrats to build support for free trade and insulate trade policy against a future republican congress. --The ensuing increases in world trade made members of Congress more willing to trade off the political risk of reducing U.S. tariffs for the political benefits of gaining access to foreign markets. This change in preference enabled presidents to ask for and receive ever broader authority to negotiate tariff reductions. - Thesis: Our answer is simple: the Democratic leadership wanted lower tariffs that would pass an increasingly skeptical Congress and would be able to outlive Democratic control of Congress. The institutions they designed met this goal. In that the Democrats chose to lower tariffs through reciprocal "bundled" agreements with other nations, some delegation to the president to negotiate these agreements was necessary. The significant change, however, was not delegation to the president per se. Rather, the RTAA marks a turning point in American trade history because first, it moved Congress away from legislating unilateral tariffs, and second, it granted these bilateral agreements the status of treaties without a two-thirds supermajority. -Bailey: institutional account, institutions structure conflict. Institutional innovation leads to RTAA. Big point, Congress did not abdicate power in trade to the executive branch, not because congress didn't have enough time, or was forced to do so. Reason was, there was a democratic majority, they like free trade, so they wanted to create an institution that would protect free trade down the line. In congress you needed a 2/3rds majority for trade deals, now president negotiates tariff setting on the global stage on a bilateral basis.

Gaddis Kennan Strongpoint Defense

-Kennan believed that we couldn't allow cetain areas in the world to fall into hands hostile to us. Thus we must maintain political regimes in those areas at least favorable to the continued power and independence of our nation. -Five vital power centers in particular should be protected, U.S., Britain, Germany, Central Europe, USSR and Japan. Obviously one was already taken.

Kennan Counterpressure and Economics

-Kennan looked to restore the balance of power in Asian and Europe by strengthening friendly nations with economic aid. Significantly, his plan for Europe envisaged no formal military commitment to the defense of that region, instead economic aid was the focus . -Kennan worked out three criteria for dispensing aid, whether the local forces of resistance were worth strengthening, if they had strong traditions of representative government. The importance of the challenged areas to our own security. The probable costs of action in relation to the results to be achieved. -to counter the USSR's ability to project influence, the US should encourage and exploit tensions between the Kremlin leadership and the international communist movement. -his goal was to make Western Europe an economically vibrant and successful project, one that the Communist Eastern Europe would look poor and weak in comparison to. This would demoralize and distintigrate the Communist world and the support for Communism. -Kennan believed that by applying counter pressure against the Communists, Soviet leaders would face situations in which it is not in their advantage to emphasize their conflict with the outside world. Also reward them when they do something right, try to shape their behavior with incentives

Gaddis George Kennan and Particularism/Universalism

-Kennan subscribed to the alternative "particularized approach", skeptical of any scheme of compressing international affairs into legalistic concepts. Thirst for power is always dominant and cannot be met with anything but counter force. -Kennan saw the universalist approach as flawed because it assumed that people in other nations shared similar hopes and aspirations and react in the same way as Americans would. This is not the case, and the diffusion of Ameican institutions abroad would exceed national capabilities. univeralism also risked bogging the country down in the meshes of a sterile and cumbersome international parlimentarianism, that might inhibit action necessary in defense of the national interest. -the particularist approach involved not restructuring the international order, but trying to maintain equilibrium within the current system. A careful balance of power, interests and antagonisms was needed. -another part of his argument was that the internal organization of states should not concern U.S. foreign policy, we shouldn't interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. We can actually coexist and even benefit from diversity in regimes. However, what is dangerous is the combination of hostility with the ability to do something about it.

Freidan Sectoral Conflict in

-Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, domestically oriented groups and banks/corporations with international economic interests battled to dominate U.S. foreign policy. Eventually, the crisis of the 1930s and the eventual destruction of most of America's overseas competitors led to an internationalist victory that allowed for the construction of the post WWII international political economy. --After WWI, British and French tried to get America to take a leadership role on the world stage, but America didn't budge. -The world's most powerful nation pursued a contradictory and shifting set of foreign economic policies. The country both asserted and rejected world leadership, simultaneously initiated and blocked efforts at European stabilization, and began such major cooperative ventures as the League of Nations and the Dawes Plan only to limit Americas participation in them. -the contradictory role of the U.S. in the interwar period can be traced to the extremely uneven distribtution of international economic interests in America. Overseas assets were accumulated by a very concentrated set of actors, leaving most of the US economy indifferent to foreign economic affairs. -Thus American foreign policy was torn between the big international companies and the rest of the economy, between insularity and internationalism. The crisis of the 1930s dissolved many of the entrenched interests that had kept policy stalemated and allowed a new group of political leaders to reconstitute a more coherent set of policies -Internationalits had ear of state and fed. Congress and commerce supported protectionists.

Bretton Woods Conference

-US dollar fixed to gold, encouraging epople to have faith in the unchanigng value of the key currency. Other currencies were fixed to the U.S. dollar. this allowed other countries to have their exchange rate adjusted as needed. Bretton woods built IMF, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later became world bank)

Kennan WWI

-WWI and WWII rendered western Europe dangerously vulnerable to Soviet Power. Both wars were fought, really, with a view toward making Germany something it was not -The period prior to 1914 led to events that "significantly narrowed" the choices of the generations from 1920 to 1950. Much of the cause of the decline in our security in the West are outcomes of WWI. --WWI did not bring reasonableness, humility or the spirit of compromise to Europe after it was over. Instead, hatreds congealed, propaganda heightened hostility towards other peoples. The Allies became only interested in total victory over the Germans, a victory of national humiliation. -ideological tinge that Wilson broght to the war made it have to be fought to the in. Democracies like to stay out of wars, but when forced into conflict they fight it with unbridled fury and indignation. -Considerations of the power balance argued against total victory. -Versailles led to a peace which was forced upon the loser, leaving a sting, a resentment in Germany. The former equilibrium in Europe was also destroyed, as Austria-Hungary was gone. Germany, placed in profound social unrest by the breakup of her traditional institutions remained the only great united state in central Europe. Russia was no longer a reliable ally to help France contain German power. -Between Russia and Germany were only the pathetic states of central Europe, lacking in stability and traditions of statesmanship. On the other side of Europe were France and England, still reeling from the costs of the war. -Perhaps if the U.S. had taken a more active diplomatic role in Europe in 1913, war could have been averted. But back then, public opinion would not have allowed for an intervetnionst role. We could have used force, but focused on fighting a war of limited aims rather than for the transformation of the world system.

Wisonianism WWI and the quest for a New World Order

-Wilson decided to send an expeditionary force, rather than just embed small units of U.S. troops into Entente armies, because he was convinced that the Entente, left to their own devices, would produce a world order after the peace settlement every bit as corrupt, backward and vindictive as the old one. By sending a large American force Wilson believed he could better influence the peace settlement and push it in a progressive direction. -Wilson emphasized peace without victory, -Wilson also thought the balance of power concept was obsolete and that a new system was needed. Wilson defined the war as an epochal struggle between the past and the future, and wanted a more progressive world order. --Wilson wanted a "community of power" that would operate on the basis of collective security. If aggression took place, all members of the league of nations would embargo the aggressor and maybe declare war on him. Cohision among the states would be enforced by world opnion, the antethesis of power nationally organized -However, the postwar peace treaty was far from liberal as Wilson hoped. It took territory away from Germany in the east, required massive reparations and failed to address the problem of Bolshevism in Russia. It was a Diktat whose spirits bore little resemblance to the nonpunitive fourteen points. -League of nations wasn't ratified by congress, collapsed

Wilsonianism and U.S. Entry into WWI

-Wilson's progressive state of mind emerged out of the widespread sense of crisis that hung over an industrial system run riot. Wilson attempted to repair the fatal international defects of modern industrial civilization. If left to old methods of foreign policy, the world would face ruin. --for the first three years of the war, Wilson was caught between conflicting impulses, affirmation of neutral rights which tended to drag the U.S. into the war (german attacks on commercial vessels), and civilized mediation which suggested that the U.S. aught to remain above the battle. Mediating an end to the war also seemed like a goal with no chance of success. --Along with the submarine warfare issues, the interception of the Zimmermann Telegram trying to get Mexico to ally with Germany and fight America made Wilson's attempt to stay out of the war futile. U.S. declared war on April 6 1917. Wilson justified this by saying that the world must be made safe for democracy.

Ideological Implications of Wilson's work post WWI

-Wilson's vision was at the same time too idealistic and too alarmist, a strained combination of extremes that failed to produce public support. Wilson's historical interpretation ran too far ahead of the store of collective experience upon which the acceptance of his views ultimately depended. People prefer to lead their lives on the basis of experience rather than imagination. -Visions of heaven and hell are indispensable religious motivators, but the secularized Wilsonian equivalents—the League, the collapse of civilization—failed to evoke the same kind of concerned response from people for whom the sense of the matter continued to lie somewhere in between. --instead of Wilsonism, a less disturbing and demanding vision of internationalism emerged in the postwar era. Wilsonianism would survive and eventually flourish, but only by altering its form over time.. During World War II, it became the ideological legitimator for a United Nations project that was very different in conception from the League. -And, after World War II, cleansed of Utopian expectations, it came fully into its own, not in an international organization, but as the dominating conception of American foreign policy in the cold war.

Defining Assumptions of Wilsonianism

-advent of total war makes war no longer a viable means of diplomacy -new profile of international relations produced the danger of the poisoning of the world political environment by powers hostile to liberal democracy (fascism) -new political environment suggested that European balance of power was beyond repair -Fourth, in this new world politics and warfare were global in scope. -Finally, given the interconnectedness of the world and the obsolescence of the balance of power, any conflict anywhere, unless nipped in the bud could escalate into another world war.

Kennan Problems with Containment

-against Kennan's wishes, policy against the Soviet Union was to build "situations of strength", deferring negotations with the USSR until requisite levels of strength had been reached. It left little room for efforts to alter the Soviet concept of international relations through positive, not just negative, reinforcement. -Kennan's key assumptions (which Truman did not accept): (1) that the danger of war was remote; (2) that asymmetry could be tolerated indefinitely; (3) that negotiations, if in the interests of both sides, could be productive; and (4) that diplomacy should be flexible. -problems with Kennan's approach: Russians had little interest in negotiating, shift in perception of power relations caused a sense of weakness in the West which led to an unwillingness to negotiate in Washington. Public would not have supported negotiations, likely seeing it as appeasement. Rigidity of bureaucracy would not have the necessary flexibility to handle Kennan's plan. -In its determined effort to restore Western economic and military strength, America lost sight of the objective that strength was supposed to serve: ending the Cold War. In a pattern that was to become familiar in years to come, process triumphed over policy, with results considerably different from what Kennan, or even the administration itself, would have thought desirable. -Because of this, strength became viewed as a end in itself, not as a means to a larger end; the process of containment became more important than the objective that the process was supposed to attain. Containment didn't fail, it was the intended follow-up that never occurred, according to Kennan.

Kennan WWII

-before the war began, Germany, Russia and Japan contained the overwhelming portion of the world's military might. Western democracy had become militarily outclassed. There was no prospect for victory over Germany without the help of Russia -U.S. should have given greater support to the Weimar Republic, and taken a more stiffer and resolute attitude against Hitler's earlier encroachments. Firmness during the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 would have gone a long way --the Soviets were deeply opposed to the West, probably could not have been brought into the Allies camp prior to the war. But we should have tried to get attitudes of mutual respect between USSR and USA pre-war this is another opportunity we missed. We could have engendered respect through diplomacy. -U.S. attitudes towards the war changed dramatically from 1939 to 1941. Only later was the vital defense of freedom and democracy invoked. U.S. entered the war not based on objective reasons, but emotional concerns --it was a mistake to not pay attention to growing Soviet influence in Europe in the closing stages of the war and to continue to give indiscriminate aid to the USSR even when there was reason to doubt that her purposes in Eastern Europe were favorable to American interests It is essential to recognize that the maiming and killing of men and the destruction of human shelters and other installations, however necessary it may be for other reasons, cannot in itself make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose. -But the actual prospering occurs only when something happens in a man's mind that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real relation to other people—something that makes him aware that, whenever the dignity of another man is offended, his own dignity, as a man among men, is thereby reduced. And this is why the destructive process of war must always be accompanied by, or made subsidiary to, a different sort of undertaking aimed at widening the horizons and changing the motives of men and should never be thought of in itself as a proper vehicle for hopes and enthusiasms and dreams of world improvement.

Kennan Ideological and Containment

-containment was aimed at stopping the psychological malaise in countries bordering Moscow's sphere of influence that made them vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies. Communist coups or electoral success were possible. -The Soviet threat lay not in the area of military potential, but rather "in the terrible truths which the Russians have discovered about the vulnerability of liberal democratic society to organizational and propaganda techniques totally cynical in concept and based on the exploitation of the evil, rather than the good, in human nature -thus the U.S. had to prove itself ideologically as superior to the Soviets -the goal of containment was to produce in the minds of potential adversaries attitudes that would facilitated an international order more favorable to the U.S. -Three steps were needed for this. (1) restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; (2) reduction, by exploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movement, of the Soviet Union's ability to project influence beyond its borders; and (3) modification, over time, of the Soviet concept of international relations, with a view to bringing about a negotiated settlement of outstanding differences.

Freidan Capital Exports Growth

-from 1914-1920, America rapidly shifted from a major capital importer and raw materials exporter to the leading exporter of capital. American overseas investment increased due to a tremendous shove by WWI, which forced European countries to borrow from America. By 1929, overseas investments were 1/5th of the U.S. GDP. -During WWI the New York market was the only fully functioning major capital market in the world. American exports of munitions and supplies increased to Europe. After 1914, the rapid overseas expansion of US business led to a maturation of a more internationalist perspective. -During the war and the period immediately following it, New York became the world's center for long-term lending. American financial supremacy drew America's internationally oriented business people and politicians into world leadership during the war and in the postwar reconstruction of Europe, a role that was to be severely hampered by the strength of economic nationalists within the United States -internationally oriented banks and corporations were more favorable toward free trade, an extension of American diplomatic commitments abroad. Sectors with few international ties supported protectionism because they were not importing from overseas subsidiaries, tended to be less competitive and had few worries about retaliation.

Subjectivity of Democratic Peace Ido Oren

-many scholars are convinced that democracies rarely wage one on one another, provide an important rationale for promotin democratization as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy -the democratic peace claim is not about democracies per se as it is about countries that are America-like, or of our kind. It is ahistorical, it overlooks the fact that these values have changed over time. -The values embodied in the current definition of democracy were historically shaped by the need to distance America from its adversaries. They are products, more than determinants of America's past foreign relations. --The reason we do not fight our kind, is not that likeness has a great effect on war propensity, but rather than we often subtly redefine the definition of our kind to keep our self-image consistent with our friends' adversaries and inconsistent with our enemies. --America's self portrayal as a democracy and the norms by which it defines democracy were shaped in part by the conflict with Imperial Germany. the Prussian constitutional state was preferable to the immature democracy of France; and Prussian local govern- ment was the shining model of "self-government" not despite but partly because of its three-class voting system. If any West European country deviated from Wilson's norms it was France, not Germany. --pre-1914, America actual saw Germany as a pretty democratic state, Wilson thought Prussian administratie model was superior to the French one circa 1890. Political tensions and America's entry into the war led to a radical change in the image of Germany, a portrayal of Germany as autocratic. : if one selects "constitutionalism," "rule of law," or "federalism," Imperial Germany appears "normal" relative to Amer- ica; select "efficient administration," "progressive social legislation," or "aca- demic freedom," and it becomes the norm; set the norm to Prussia and "one-person, one vote," and Germany becomes "abnormal" 2 -Wilson: was an anglophile, did see Bismarck as a most "creative," "insightful," and "energetic" statesman. In his early writings he also critized the French as not ready for self-government. -same things happen with USSR and Japan.

Post-Modernism

-maybe postmodernism is a better approach, offers a more modest conception of what knowledge is, accepts that it is ever incomplete Postmoderism: knowledge is not fixed. Everyone creates reality, not just historians. Different paradigms, ways of viewing the world.

Mancur Olson Collective Organization

-organizations exist to further the common interests of their members -The important point is that this is true because, though all the firms have a common interest in a higher price for the industry's product, it is in the interest of each firm that the other firms pay the cost—in terms of the necessary reduction in output—needed to obtain a higher price. -firms in the same industry have a common interest in higher price for their product, but the firm cannot expect a higher price for itself unless all the other firms in the industry also have the higher price. -Just as it was not rational for a particular producer to restrict his output in order that there might be a higher price for the product of his industry, so it would not be rational for him to sacrifice his time and money to support a lobbying organization to obtain government assistance for the industry. In neither case would it be in the interest of the individual producer to assume any of the costs himself. -states also face colletive action problems with taxation and pubic services. . It would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary. Olson: industries that have common interests form associations. Industries want high priced goods, so they can get more money, thus they want tariifs, protectionism, limit competition. Thus they organize to lobby government. Farmers that don't participate in organization, in lobbying but they benefit anyway, they are freeriding. But for the actors that lobby, the benefits are greater than the costs. Large groups have problems providing common goods for three reasons: 1.each group member has a lower share of the benefits; 2.so it's less likely that anybody's benefits of helping provide the good exceed the costs; 3.and organizational costs rise with group size. Exclusive vs Inclusive: There are two kinds of common goods: exclusive and inclusive. With exclusive common goods, the supply is limited. Think of a cartel; each firm wants to increase output (to increase its profits), but if all firms do this, the profits disappear (as the price falls). The supply of profits is limited, so it is an exclusive good. With inclusive goods, however, supply is not limited. Whether more members are welcome depends on whether the good is exclusive or inclusive. Firms prefer to have few competitors because goods are exclusive; unions prefer to maximize membership because its goods are inclusive, and having more members spreads the costs around more. Privileged groups (members of this group would gain more from a public good than it would cost them to provide it unilaterally); Latent groups (any member of this group could withhold his contribution to the public good without causing a noticeable reduction in its supply); and Intermediate groups (if any member of this group withholds his contribution, it will cause a noticeable decrease in supply of the good, or a noticeable rise in cost to other contributors).

Wilsonian Century Ninkovich Subjectivism vs objectvism

-scholars like Kennan and Williams believe that there are material causes that interests can be reduced to. They treat interests and structures as if they were hard, objective realities. --however, these supposedly objective and neutral realist thinkers often have hidden subjectivity, personal biases. --because historians are focusing on critiquing rather than documenting, we get an imperfect view of policy making. -"god like" view of objective historians that assume that they know the truth, possess more perfect knowledge than the people they write about. It is assumed that "the truth" is out there and discoverable. This leads to a history defined by misperception, Monday morning quarterbacking. -elite level experts as the only people capable of perceiving the national interest, unincumbered by ideology -however, in reality, ideologies are critical tools for making since of foreign policy since there are no objective "truths". Ideologies are prisms for underestanding the world -maybe postmodernism is a better approach, offers a more modest conception of what knowledge is, accepts that it is ever incomplete Postmoderism: knowledge is not fixed. Everyone creates reality, not just historians. Different paradigms, ways of viewing the world.

Kennan problems with conduct of foreign policy

-there is a significant gap between challenge and response in our conduct of foreign policy, this gap still exists and today it puts us in grave peril. -public opinion can easily be led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and inadequate guide for national action. The executive feels itself beholden to short-term trends of public opinion. This has been a problem in recent U.S. foreign policy --Kennan dislikes the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to international problems that has defined U.S. foreign policy for the last 50 years. This approach emphasizes arbitration treaties, exemplified by UN, League of Nations, Hague Conferences. -law is too rigid to react to the demands of unpredictable international affairs. Instead we need old fashioned diplomacy. -legalistic approach assumes the ability of each state to solve its own internal problems in ways not provocative of the international environment, it assumes that the world community will not have to make choices between rival clamants for power within an individual state. The approach forgests the limiations of military coalitions and collective action. --the legalistic approach makes states indignant towards those that break it, as the law-abiding states feel a sense of moral superiority. When laws are broken and war breaks out, the law-abiding state will try to achieve complete and humiliating victory over the lawbreaker. In this way the legalistic regime reinforces the dangerous concept of total war.

The Deception Dividend Schuessler

-this article highlights cases where leaders, for realist reasons, are drawn toward wars where an easy victory is anything but assured. Leaders resort to deception in these cases to preempt what would be a contentious debate over whether the use of force is justified by shifting blame for hostilities onto the adversary --undeclared war in Atlantic and oil embargo of Japan were intended, at least partly, to manufacture an incident that could be used to justify hostilities. An important implication of this argument is that deception may sometimes be in the national interest. -Liberals have argued that democracies are more prudent than non-democracies in foreign affairs because leaders are accountable to a populace that will endorse the use of force only when the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. -realists argue that the central fact of international life is anarchy, and the condition of insecurity that follows from it. Thus states must adopt a "self-help" posture, which entails arming, alliances and when all else fails, war. For realists, the democratic nature of a state is irrelevant, only the balance of power and inherent interests matter. For them, deception is justified in cases where public opinion deviates from the national interest. --public is reluctant to pay the human cost of war when victory is uncertain, especially when that cost promises to be high. The public also judges the importance of international challenges by how immediately and clearly they compromise national security.

Ninkovich Wilsonian Century

-this book argues that 20th century traditional systems collapsed, rendering the old rules of the game out of date. U.S. foreign policy emerged from the need to develop new rules for navigating through an unpredictable modern international environment. Wilsonian intrepretations constituted these new rules. -the Wilsonian century was a product of an imaginative interpretation of history that survived not only because it seemed to make sense of a confusing modern world, but also because it successfully passed the test of experience, explaining politics in the face of numerous crises. --two distinct but related foreign policy ideologies emerged. "normal" internationalism and Wilsoninism

Argument Against Democratic Peace

Argument Against Democratic peace: argument focuses on post WWII world. Peace has been maintained largely because of global Alliance structure maintined by U.S. leadership, military force.

Dawes Plan

1924 Dawes Plan: plan for economic stabilization of Europe. Called for foreign supervision of German public finances, with reparations payments overseen by an American with discreet ties to Morgan's. The German currency was stabilized and investor confidence in Germany restored with a $200 million bond flotation, of which J. P. Morgan and Co. managed $110 million in New York. This settlement satisfied most internationalists and nationalists in the U.S. temporarily. -U.S. involved itself unofficially in European reconstruction, working through private banking intermediaries. Dawes Plan and restructuring of British war debs were led by private sector. Dawes Plan: response to crisis that led to hyperinflation in Germany. Featured scaled repartations (scaled to the health of the German economy) to be paid by Germany. The occupation of the Ruhr industrial area by France and Belgium contributed to the hyperinflation crisis in Germany, partially because of its disabling effect on the German economy.[1] The plan provided for an end to the Allied occupation, and a staggered payment plan for Germany's payment of war reparations.

Comparative Advantage

Comparative Advantage (yes again): the ability oof a country to produce a particular good or service more efficiently than other goods or services, such that its resources are most efficiently employed in this activity. -comparative advange means that trade barriers are harmful to the country as a whole -trade barriers make imports more expensive, allowing domestic producers to sell more, raise prices or both.

Costs of Trade Barriers

Cost to aggregate social welfare incentivizes domestic producers to make more goods they're not particularly good at making leads consumers to consume less leads to inefficient allocation of resources away from the country's comparative advantage.

Democratic Peace Thoery

Democratic Peace Theory: community of democracies would confront aggression and nip it in the bud, banish great power war from the earth. Today democratic peace theory is that "democracies are overall more peaceful". Mostly discredited today. Democracies fight wars as often as autocracies. --Normative Model of Democratic Peace: Democracies externalize norms of compromise and tolerance. Democracies recognize these values in each other and presume they will act according to them. --Institutional model of Democratic Peace: democratic peace is institutionalized through free press, open policy discussions. Treaties locked in through supermajority votes. Predicatablity, knowing whats going on, locking in treaties are benefits of democracies. Politicians face costs if they break promises to electorate (audience costs). Democratic leaders are forced to accept culpability for war losses to a voting public; Publicly accountable statespeople are more inclined to establish diplomatic institutions for resolving international tensions;

Factor Endowments

Factor endowments - the material and human resources a country possesses Land, Labor, Capital, Human capital Counties vary in factor endowment These endowments determine a country's comparative advantage and therefore what countries produce and export Protectionism tends to benefit the scarce factor of production

Kellogg-Briand Pact

Kellogg Briand Pact: The Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris, officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy[1]) is a 1928international agreement in which signatory states promised not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them."[2] Parties failing to abide by this promise "should be denied of the benefits furnished by this treaty." As a practical matter, the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not live up to its aim of ending war, and in this sense it made no immediate contribution to international peace and proved to be ineffective in the years to come. Moreover, the pact erased the legal distinction between war and peace because the signatories, having renounced the use of war, began to wage wars without declaring them as in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Nevertheless, the pact is an important multilateral treaty because, in addition to binding the particular nations that signed it, it has also served as one of the legal bases establishing the international norms that the threat[11] or use of military force in contravention of international law, as well as the territorial acquisitions resulting from it,[12] are unlawful.

Marshall Plan

Marshall Plan: economic rebuilding of postwar Europe, produce a buffer against Communist incursion, serve as economic market for U.S. to trade with.

NSC-68

National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) was a 58-page top secret policy paper by the United States National Security Council presented to President Harry S. Truman on April 14, 1950. It was one of the most important statements of American policy that launched the Cold War. In the words of scholar Ernest R. May, NSC-68 "provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s." NSC-68 and its subsequent amplifications advocated a large expansion in the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military aid to allies of the United States. It made the containment of global Communist expansion a high priority. NSC-68 rejected the alternative policies of friendly détente and rollback against the Soviet Union.[1] Although George F. Kennan's theory of containment articulated a multifaceted approach for U.S. foreign policy in response to the perceived Soviet threat, NSC-68 recommended policies that emphasized military over diplomatic action. Kennan's influential 1947 "X" article advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. NSC-68 thought of containment as "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion

GATT

Negotiated in 1947, took effect 1/1/1948 Successive negotiating "rounds" Tariffs, quotas General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. According to its preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis." It was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and was the outcome of the failure of negotiating governments to create the International Trade Organization (I

Normal Internationalism vs Crisis internationalism

Normal Internationalism: an outgrowth of the commercial and cultural internationalism of the 19th century and became the basic ideology of the country. Wilsonianism: a crisis internationalism that surfaced in bad times only to give way to normal internationalism once the turbulence had passes.

Statutory Tariff

Statutory Tariff: no tied to negotiation, unilateral action.

Realism

That states are the central actors in international politics rather than individuals or international organizations, That the international political system is anarchic as there is no supranational authority that can enforce rules over the states, That the actors in the international political system are rational as their actions maximize their own self-interest, and That all states desire power so that they can ensure their own self-preservation.

ITO

The International Trade Organization, or ITO was the proposed name for an international institution for the regulation of trade. Led by the United States in collaboration with allies, the effort to form the organization from 1945-1948, with the successful passing of the Havana Charter, eventually failed due to lack of approval by the US Congress. Until the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994, international trade was managed through GATT. Havana Charter of 1948 More ambitious (full employment policies, etc.)

Iran Crisis of 1946

The Iran crisis of 1946, also known as the Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis, followed the end of World War II and stemmed from the Soviet Union's refusal to relinquish occupied Iranian territory, despite repeated assurances. In 1941 Iran had been jointly invaded and occupied by the Allied powers of the Soviet Red Army in the north and by the British in the centre and south. Iran was used by the Americans and the British as a transportation route to provide vital supplies to the Soviet Union's war efforts. -Negotiation by Iranian premier Ahmad Qavam and diplomatic pressure on the Soviets by the United States eventually led to Soviet withdrawal. The crisis is seen as one of the early conflicts in the growing Cold War at the time.

Neutrality Acts

The Neutrality Acts were passed by the United States Congress in the 1930s, in response to the growing turmoil in Europe and Asia that eventually led to World War II. They were spurred by the growth in isolationism and non-interventionism in the US following its costly involvement in World War I, and sought to ensure that the US would not become entangled again in foreign conflicts. The 1935 act,[3] signed on August 31, 1935, imposed a general embargo on trading in arms and war materials with all parties in a war. It also declared that American citizens traveling on warring ships traveled at their own risk. The act was set to expire after six months.

RTAA

The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (enacted June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1351) provided for the negotiation of tariff agreements between the United States and separate nations, particularly Latin American countries.[1] The Act served as an institutional reform intended to authorize the president to negotiate with foreign nations to reduce tariffs in return for reciprocal reductions in tariffs in the United States. It resulted in a reduction of duties. -granted authority to President to negotiate trade agreement without further recourse to congress. Tariff rates were reduced after, by up to 50%. Renewed in later years. -Why would congress do this? It insolated congress from producer pressures. Realized that trade policy was beyond the capability of congress to handle. New perceived linkages between open trade and peace, American power. -Lopsided democratic majorities, and democrats favored free trade, there was a democratic president at the time.

Turkish Crisis

The Turkish Straits crisis was a Cold War-era territorial conflict between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Turkey, which had remained officially neutral throughout most of the freshly concluded Second World War, was pressured by the Soviet government to allow Soviet shipping to flow freely through the Turkish Straits, which connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As the Turkish government would not submit to the Soviet Union's requests, tensions arose in the region, leading to a show of naval force on the side of the Soviets. The incident would later serve as a deciding factor in the issuing of the Truman Doctrine.[2] At its climax, the tensions would cause Turkey to turn to the United States and NATO, for protection and membership, respectively. The result of this action contributed to the European post-war status quo that remains to this day.

Zimmermann Telegram

The Zimmermann Telegram (or Zimmermann Note) was an internal diplomatic communication issued from the German Foreign Office in January 1917 that proposed a military alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event of the United States' entering World War I against Germany. -led to WWI

Locarno Treaty

The principal treaty concluded at Locarno was the Rhineland Pact between Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Germany formally recognised its new western borders acted by the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, the first three signatories undertook not to attack each other, with the latter two acting as guarantors. In the event of aggression by any of the first three states against another, all other parties were to assist the country under attack. Germany also agreed to sign arbitration conventions with France and Belgium and arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, undertaking to refer future disputes to an arbitration tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. France signed further treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, pledging mutual assistance in the event of conflict with Germany. These essentially reaffirmed existing treaties of alliance concluded by France with Poland on 19 February 1921 and with Czechoslovakia on 25 January 1924.These treaties also showed that relations between France and Germany had not improved to a large extent. series of agreements whereby Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy mutually guaranteed peace in western Europe.

Kennan U.S. and Communist movements

Truman: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." -U.S. moved to not oppose Communsist governments in Yugoslavia and in China that were not allied with Moscow. Using Titoism (which was not aligned with the Soviets) to roll back Soviet influence in Communist states. -"Broadly speaking, there were two objectives of policy: One might be to oppose the Communists' regime, harass it, needle it, and if an opportunity appeared to attempt to overthrow it. Another objective of policy would be to attempt to detach it from subservience to Moscow and over a period of time encourage those vigorous influences which might modify it." -"Any and all movements within world communism which tend to weaken and disrupt the Kremlin's control within the communist world represent forces which are operating in the interestst of the West and therefore should be encouraged and assisted."

Washington Naval Agreement

Washington Naval Agreement: involved U.S., Britain and Japan. Limited tonnage of battleships, amount of ships that could be constructed. signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. It limited the construction of battleships, battlecruisers and aircraft carriers by the signatories. The numbers of other categories of warships, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were not limited by the treaty, but those ships were limited to 10,000 tons displacement.

Realism vs Idealism (George kennan)

domestic policy don't matter, if you say that our foreign policy failings are the fault of democratic governance in the U.S. then you are critizing democracy. But Kennan likes democracy, thinks we should be able to conduct foreign policy under democratic systems. -instead states act in an anarchic system, each pursuing their own rational self-interest. --Wilsonian idealism cares more about domestic institutions

Liberalism

is a school of thought that holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such asculture, economic system or government type. Liberals believe that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states.[2] With the correct international institutions, and increasing interdependence (including economic and cultural exchanges) states have the opportunity to reduce conflict.

Truman Doctrine

the principle that the US should give support to countries or peoples threatened by Soviet forces or communist insurrection. First expressed in 1947 by US President Truman in a speech to Congress seeking aid for Greece and Turkey, the doctrine was seen by the communists as an open declaration of the Cold War. Historian Eric Foner argues the Truman Doctrine "set a precedent for American assistance to anticommunist regimes throughout the world, no matter how undemocratic, and for the creation of a set of global military alliances directed against the Soviet Union