Comps Article Flashcards (500)

Walzer: "Ch. 17: Nuclear Deterrence" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

"Against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of immoral defense." Essentially, the reason we are ok with this is because citizens are free-living hostages, who don't mind because we feel no pain. If deterrence were more painful, we'd find a different way to avoid nuclear war. However, Walzer says nuclear deterrence is immoral, since we have the intention of carrying out an extremely immoral act, even if we aren't carrying it out now. However, Walzer admits that while disarmament is preferable, that is unlikely, and there may be no other way to maintain nuclear peace...but we must try to think of an alternative. We could strive for a limited war (targeting military only), but as soon as we accidentally hit a civilian population, the other state would seek to react the same way- essentially, the risk for escalation from a "limited-war" is very high and makes nuclear war un-undo-able.

Walzer: "Ch. 8: War's Means and the Importance of Fighting Well" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

"The moral equality of the battlefield distinguishes combat from domestic crime." Essentially, since both sides are fighting, killing is permissible during war, so long as it stays within the limits of the War Convention--only killing where necessary and avoiding excess "trouble" like the rape of women in towns nearby. Human rights fill in the gaps of the utilitarian War Convention by making legitimate acts of war only apply if they do not violate the human rights of the non-combatants being attacked. These rules apply to both the aggressor state and its adversary equally.

Avey & Desch: "What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers"

- Avey and Desch acknowledge that there is a gap between the research being put out by IR scholars and its use by senior national security policy makers. - Authors' recommendations for how scholars can make research useful to DMs: 1) put in context of mid-range theory, 2) keep it brief, and 3) write in plain English - Findings that are useful for SSP students: a) DMs do want scholarly expertise, preferring middle-range theories that "help them make sense of the world and their presentation in brief and jargon-free formats." (243) b) The fields DMs find most useful in order: 1) history, 2) area studies, 3) economics, 4) international affairs, 5) public policy, and 6) political science c) "Very useful" qualitative methods cited were area studies, contemporary case studies, historical case studies, and policy analysis; an exception to the aversion to quantitative methods is public opinion analysis. d) The primary constraint for DMs to digest scholarship is a lack of time, since decisions need to be made quickly - Other interesting/random findings: a) A scholar's visibility in government and among the public—as opposed to their academic standing—makes them more influential to DMs b) Unclassified newspaper articles are just as influential to DMs as classified information c) Despite this article being written in 2014, the internet is not yet an important source of information for DMs

Van Evera: "Chapter 1: Hypotheses, Laws, and Theories: A User's Guide"

- Defensive realist (wikipedia) - This chapter is useful for students in their attempts to evaluate scholars' theories. - Specifically, Van Evera defines what a theory is: a general statement that explains or describes the causes or effects of classes of phenomena. Importantly, a theory must be arrow-diagrammable. - He identifies seven attributes that make a good one (large explanatory power, parsimony, satisfaction, clearly-framed, falsifiability, explains important phenomena, and is prescriptively rich). - He also explains how to test theories through experimentation and observation (the latter is most common in social science fields); strong tests evaluate the certitude (C: an unequivocal forecast) and uniqueness (U: a forecast not made by other known theories) of a prediction. There are four tests: Hoop Test (high C/no U); Smoking Gun Tests (high U/no C); Double Decisive Tests (Rare; high C/high U); Straw-in-the-wind Tests (most common in political science; no C/no U)

Levy: "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace"

- Jack Levy belongs to the __________ school of IR theory. - In this article, Levy discusses how various theories address the causes of war (what causes war? how to explain variations of war and peace? how to explain a particular war's origins?), and organizes them according to a levels-of-analysis framework (systemic, societal, and individual levels). - Systems level theories: a) Realism: * Wars occur because some states prefer war to peace (offensive realism), as well as because defensive actions taken by states simply to protect themselves and not attack others can have unintended consequences (defensive realism). * Key division on realist perspective on war is not between classical realism and neorealism but between: +) Balance of Power (BoP): Hegemony never occurs because states' balancing mechanisms (i.e. blocking coalitions and military buildups) either successfully deter potential hegemons or defeat them in a hegemonic war. +) Hegemonic Transition Theory (HTT), and its subset Power Transition Theory (PTT): Hegemony does occur and concentrations of power are stabilizing; the probability of war is greatest at the point when the rising challenger is overtaking the declining leader. Hegemons frequently arise and create political and economic structures that in addition to enhancing their own positions, also enhances the security of the system b) Liberalism/liberal economic theory: capitalism and free flow of goods in the international system are best for keeping peace, mostly because of the assumption that trade generates wealth for the involved parties, and any disruption to that trade, such as from war, deters partners from going to war with each other. —> Does the fact that war does not always disrupt trade undermine or support this theory? c) Systems-level theories are "theoretically incomplete and empirically inadequate, in that they leave too much of the variation in the outbreak and expansion of war unexplained." (151) - Societal level theories: a) Diversionary theories of war, such as the "scapegoat hypothesis": public opinion influences state leaders' decisions to go to war. War can create a "rally round the flag" effect that can enhance a leader's domestic position; leaders thus anticipate this and can be tempted to behave aggressively internationally in order to shore up domestic support b) Theories of logrolling and coalition forming: to meet the high costs of aggressive foreign policies, internal groups/elites will come together to secure and share power (put forward by Snyder in 1991) (157) - Individual level theories: a) Prospect theory: people (state leaders) make decisions and evaluate outcomes on the basis of deviation from a reference point. So what? Complexity and involving both the system and domestic elements (accounting for individuals as well) more closely matches how policy decisions are generally made.

Goddard: "When Right Makes Right: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power" (2009)

- Legitimation strategies use rhetoric to appeal to public, recognized rules and norms to justify foreign policy - They are effective when they signal constrain, set "rhetorical traps" so that potential opponents would be hypocritical if they protested, and appeal to the "ontological security" of a state's need to secure identity in IR - Prussia was left unchecked in the in the The Schleswig-Hollstein wars because it signaled constraints to Austria, set rhetorical traps about self-determination for Britain and France, and persuaded Russia that Denmark threatened their ontological security So what?

Snyder: "One World, Rival Theories"

-Neoclassical Realism (wikipedia). Though not specified in this op-ed, Snyder is notable for introducing the distinction of offensive and defensive realism to the field. -This article provides an overview of the three main IR theories (Realism, Liberalism, and Idealism/Constructivism), and argues that despite their shortcomings, these classical theories still have a lot to say about the contemporary world. Importantly, Snyder asserts that the variety of theories means that "they act as a powerful check on each other." (55) - Snyder usefully lays out the key strengths and weaknesses of each theory. One of Snyder's major critiques of each of the 3 theories is that none of them explain change—as it pertains to the international system—well: a) Realism failed to predict the end of the Cold War and incorrectly assumed that a shift to multipolarity would occur in the aftermath (which has not happened); b) The tenets of Liberalism's democratic peace seem only to apply to mature democracies and not those in transition; and c) Despite Constructivists' ability to describe how ideas and norms change, they cannot prescribe how to reach consensus on those changes.

Van Evera: Chapter 5 (excerpt): "The Dissertation Proposal"

A dissertation proposal should answer 5 questions: 1) What question or questions do you address? 2) Why does this question arise and why does it matter? 3) What previous literature has been written about this question? 4) What working hypotheses will you explore? 5) How will you reach your answers (methodology)?

Walzer: "Prologue" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

Argues for a more indirect approach to regime change that he labels "politics-short-of-war." This may rely on "force-short-of-war" to be legitimate and sustainable. This action is recommended because just war theory works on the premise that regime change is necessary when a regime is actively killing its citizens, not just capable of it. To be successful, he claims collective security must come from a collective commitment of a coalition of states, protect civilians, and encourage local actors to build civil society as the foundation of democracy, rather than permitting direct and forcible democratization.

Viotti & Kauppi: (Optional) "Chapter 6: Constructivist Understandings"

Constructivism Contribution: Gives an overview of constructivist theory, which is a middle ground between realist/liberal materialism and abstract postmodernism, poststructuralism, etc. - Influenced by: Kant, Locke, Durkheim, Weber - Main ideas: a) Problematizes states' interests and identities, in contrast to R/L which takes them as givens b) Considers the international structure and politics to be intersubjective—a socially-constructed structure with shared norms, rules, and law that has constitutive and regulative effects on agents c) Unlike R/L who consider the agent—or unit-of-analysis—to be a state, for constructivists the agent can be anything (a state, non-state actors, groups of individuals, social movements, corporations, IOs, NGOs, classes of people, etc.); identities of agents can have endogenous or exogenous sources Logic of Appropriateness: agents' actions are associated with their identities, which are informed by rules and norms and not narrowly understood self-interests e) View of the world is not set in stone but rather is "a case of becoming as opposed to being." (279) - Two ways to categorize constructivism: a) By schools of thought: * Neoclassical Constructivism (Finnemore): Incorporates values, norms, and rules into the theory without rejecting standards, science, or methodology) * "Naturalistic" Constructivism * Postmodern Constructivism (very abstract) b) By Levels of Analysis: * Systemic-level: a la Waltz's Third Image, ignores domestic politics to focus on states' interactions within the system * Unit-level: focus on relationship between domestic social and legal norms and states' interests and identities * Holistic: International and domestic factors are "two faces of a single social and political order." (293) - Criticism a) Neoliberal institutionalism—C better at pointing out limitations of other theories than developing its own b) Neorealism—C 1) says little about the feasibility of the international system to become more peaceful and 2) how such change might occur, 3) lacks empirical support, and d) can't explain why discourses come and go So what?

Schelling: Arms and Influence (1996)

Contribution 1: Coercing an adversary depends on the initiator's capacity to hurt or cause damage, which increased in recent history with the advent of advanced weaponry and specifically nuclear weapons. —> Coercion divided into deterrence and compellence; the distinction lies in the timing and initiative (who is acting). —> Nuclear weapons greatly increased the state's capacity to cause harm to populations, which thus increased the utility of the threat of harm towards populations. Nuclear weapons enhanced the strategic importance of the power to hurt, which alters war from the threat to take and hold to a matter of coercion and deterrence. Contribution 2: The process of successfully coercing (compelling, deterring) an adversary is complex, owing to the size of the states involved, which makes the process unpredictable. —> States are able to choose how they exercise coercive power towards adversaries, but the decision depends on internal politics, bureaucracies, chain of command and lines of communication, party structures and pressure groups, and individual values and careers. Because of this, it is difficult for a government to appear irrational and also difficult to guarantee moderation or a particular response. —> Misperception by adversary is a real threat to the utility of coercive actions; proper signalling is difficult and vital to the application of state intent. Effectiveness of coercion dependent on expectations, which must be built over time through repeated interaction. Creating our identity is to get an adversary to identify us with a certain policy position. It is the unpredictability of the diplomatic process of commitment that creates the risk of major war, as opposed to military "accidents." So what? The complex nature of decision-making processes creates uncertainty that blurs lines between cause and effect, and removes a sense of fully controlling a state's actions. Schelling's comments on technology affecting war has applicability in thinking about how cyber and AI will affect how state's compete with each other.

Art & Greenhill: "The Power and Limits of Competence: A Research Note" (2018)

Contribution: Coercion can be a powerful tool to manipulate other actors' behavior, but it has a mixed success rate. This article lays out the complexities of different types of coercive behavior (see "compellence and deterrence" flashcard) and explains why they rarely work. Coercion in a nutshell: the ability to get an actor to do something they don't want to do. Two types: —> Deterrence: "Don't change your behavior because if you do, terrible stuff will happen to you" —> Compellence (in war: wartime compellence; in peace: coercive diplomacy): "Better change your behavior, because if you don't, terrible stuff will happen to you." Considerations when thinking about using compellence to achieve foreign policy objectives: 1. Coercive diplomacy is difficult because threats to use force are not as credible as actual force 2. No measurable difference between success of wartime compellence and coercive diplomacy 3. Whether denial or punishment works depends on the context 4. Compellence works better when combined with reassurances or inducements, though more research is warranted 5. No correlation between what compeller demands and whether target complies when undertaken between state actors 6. Coercer's superiority of capabilities isn't a guarantee of success 7. Capabilities of targets and coercers aren't indicative because they don't take into account the level of resolve of the target nor the magnitude of demand from the coercer 8. Weak actors often successfully resist strong ones and can even compel their coercers 9. "The greater the power disparity between compeller and target, the less likely a more powerful compeller is to get its way vis-a-vis a weaker target, if only coercive diplomacy is employed." 10. Nuclear compellence rarely works 11. Non-state coercion via terrorism and insurgency is a mixed bag. Magnitude of demand and nature of violence can explain some outcomes, but more research is needed. So what? This article is important because it explains the difference between coercion and deterrence, and explains the powers targets may have in resisting, even if it seems they have inferior capabilities.

Porter: "Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment" (2018)

Contribution: Describes how the US has pursued a grand strategy of primacy for decades, which hinges on four main principles: 1) military superiority, 2) reassuring and containing allies, 3) integrating other states into US-led institutions and markets, and 4) inhibiting nuclear proliferation. Its key tenet is that US success depends on a "hospitable international environment," which requires the US to check any competitive threat or prevent multipolarity. An interaction between power and habit has stabilized this strategy--power in economic size and military might, and habit referring to choices and assumptions we have adapted throughout the years, perpetuated by the foreign policy establishment, "The Blob." The author argues that primacy is too expensive, pulls the US into issues around the world even when vital American interests are not necessarily at stake, and makes the US prone to frequent uses of force—all while making primacy seem natural and uncontestable. Despite the issues he raises, he predicts that primacy will continue to be the grand strategy of the United States, citing Clinton and Trump administrations' decision to revert to tradition rather than change the strategy when opportunities arose. So what? The article provides a critical examination of flaws into America's grand strategy of primacy and how it has maintained relevance through the past several decades. It speaks to the hubris and hold of elites on foreign policy decisions, regardless of the administration. Criticism: The article largely reads like a deep state conspiracy. Porter raises good points, but does not delve deeply enough into the counterarguments about implications for a world order with a less-committed United States.

Byman: "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice" (2013)

Contribution: Despite the drawbacks of using drones, they are crucial to counterterrorism. Some of the positive factors include: —> Drone strikes have devastated terrorist groups by taking out leadership, undercutting terrorists' ability to communicate, and killing terrorists with crucial specialized skills —> They are many times more realistic/less risky than alternatives —> They violate sovereignty less than boots on the ground would —> They are backed (albeit secretly) by Pakistan and Yemen So what? The author disagrees or downplays much of the criticism, but does agree that the US has to be careful with setting norms of use, since these will become the international standards. Washington has to create and stick to a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, and remove the murkiness that threatens to undermine our ability to denounce other countries' behaviors if they misuse drones. Additionally, the author worries that the ease of using drones will make US intervention abroad too common.

Roland: "The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention" (2014)

Contribution: R2P assumes a link between external military intervention and the desired outcome of preventing mass atrocities. The author questions that assumption, and identifies five tensions in the logic underpinning R2P that cast doubt on its feasibility and long-term viability. The issue: R2P suffers from an unwinnable dilemma: 1) If there is no intervention, R2P will be criticized for being phony, but 2) If there is intervention, it will be judged harshly. Critics can always point out problems. There are 5 structural problems leading to this dilemma: —> Mixed motives problem: Intervention is never solely altruistic >> prone to delegitimization —> Counterfactual problem: Proving its success, measured in something not happening, is not possible >> Hard to convince skeptics —> Conspicuous harm problem: Always collateral damage and accidental deaths >> Bad PR, hurts legitimacy of the operation —> End-state problem: How to disengage without letting the problem restart? >> Pushes interveners toward a more ambitious military undertaking, and may bring 2nd/3rd order destabilizing effects to the country or surrounding region —> Inconsistency problem: Inconsistency in the international response to mass atrocity emergencies >> double standards weaken R2P credibility, inevitable when the doctrine itself warns not to intervene in certain circumstances So what? Calls into question the strategic feasibility of military humanitarian intervention; R2P often invokes the adage: "damned if you do, damned if you don't."

Mearsheimer & Walt: "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy" (2016)

Contribution: The US should shift from the post-Cold War strategy of liberal hegemony to one of offshore balancing, which is a more realistic approach to asserting and maintaining US primacy in the world. This strategy calls for the US to encourage other states to check rising powers in their regions, largely on their own, and advocates for US intervention only when necessary to prevent another regional power from coming onto the world stage. The authors point out the adverse side-effects of the US being the world's policeman: —> stationing military forces overseas tends to foster nationalist resentments that lead to terrorism —> constant interference in other states' affairs generates local antipathy and fosters corruption, making transnational dangers worse —> US attempts at regime change in countries like North Korea and Iran drives them to seek nuclear capabilities out of fear —> spreading democracy at the point of a gun rarely works as new and transitioning democracies are especially conflict-prone —> force-feeding liberal values abroad can compromise them at home, such as torture, targeting killings, electronic surveillance of US citizens. The best way of promoting democracy is not by compellance, but through persuasion—showing others that democracy is the best form of government through our own strength at home. Thinks we should let Russia take the lead in Syria.

Slaughter: "How to Succeed in the Networked World: A Grand Strategy for the Digital Age" (2016)

Contribution: The author conceptualizes international relations not as a chessboard with states as the playing pieces, but as a highly-interconnected/networked web, to acknowledge and leverage the broad diffusion of power from states to smaller groups, including local governments, NGOs, multinational corporations, etc. In this world, "threats arise because people are too connected, not connected enough, or connected in the wrong ways" (76). The fault lines lie no longer between capitalism/communism or democracy/autocracy but rather between open/closed. Argument: The US should promote an open order in this world, something akin to liberal internationalism, but that takes into account the diffusion of power away from states due to globalization, as the accompanying speed of change and spread of information limits the ability of states to assert power in some domains. Embracing openness requires resilience and self-reliance; states should find a way to forge new social contracts marrying new technology with principles of limited power. This involves a shift from traditional vertical state power structures to a more horizontal structure, and adaptation to a more power diffuse world. Three tenets of open government partnership: transparency, civic participation, accountability. States moreover would remain the principal actors in many respects, while involving other sub-state actors in more of the processes. The people must come first, otherwise they will overthrow governments.

Walter: "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement" (1997)

Contribution: The author's credible-commitment theory of civil war resolution contends that civil wars that end in settlements only work when enforced by a credible guarantee of an outside power. This is because the combatants are hindered by the security dilemma and can never truly trust the other side won't back away from the agreement, especially since in a civil war, only one side can rule--requiring each side to disarm and leave themselves completely vulnerable to attack for the settlement to work. Third parties act as insurance, increasing the costs of defection from the agreement. Their credibility relies on: 1) a vested interest (they can be biased in favor of the minority); 2) they must be willing and able to use force, and 3) they must be able to signal resolve (usually by sticking around with enough forces to credibly act in strategic areas). In sum, the good news is that outside intervention can end civil wars, but the bad news is that non-military intervention isn't likely to accomplish anything. But, there are many other caveats: —> Stalemates can be a good place to start negotiating, since it indicates that parties are evenly militarily matched and means there's a defensive military advantage (not offensive)-->equal bargaining power, but still needs outside guarantee —> Strong institutions are necessary to work with the external guarantees and ensure durable settlements —> If working through a multilateral organization, all the players have to be on board--a guarantee is only as good as the political will of its backers (looking at you, UN) —> Allowing each side to retain some arms can make them feel more safe and more likely to stick to agreement —> Outside guarantees can avoid using force IF the agreement calls for extensive internal power sharing arrangements between the parties and IF it works So what? This theory shows one of the best ways to help civil war combatants stick to a negotiated settlement, and therefore end bloody civil wars. Unfortunately, its conditions of using military force and sustained involvement during implementation are the usual political stumbling blocks to intervention. Method: —> Coded 41 civil wars between 1940-1990: had to have at least 1000 battle deaths per year, occur within a recognizable boundary, involve the national government as an agent, experience resistance from both sides, negotiations during the war, negotiations that ended through a successful settlement or after one side achieved a military victory (discarded); settlements had to be jointly drafted, keep the opposition intact, and end the war for at least 5 years —> Findings confirmed theory: once a credibly committed third party insured the settlement, the treaty was successful. Those wars without a credible third party walked away from the negotiating table or wouldn't sign even a good agreement without this guarantee.

Cronin: "Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drives Strategy" (2013)

Contribution: The low risk, low cost option of utilizing drone strikes to target and kill terrorist leaders and fighters abroad is strategically bereft in that utilizing the tactic ignores the conditions to which it is applied, resulting in unintended consequences that will lead to strategic failure in the long run. Goals of U.S. CT strategy: strategically defeat Al Qaeda and Affiliates (AQAA), contain local conflicts to avoid breeding new enemies, and preserve the security of the American people. Al Qaeda, with its diffuse, decentralized organization, is a resilient organization that has proven that targeting of leaders does not necessarily lead to achieving our goals, instead driving adaptation that reduces the already suspicious efficacy of drone strikes in achieving strategic ends. So what? The intended consequences of drone strikes, namely the embittering of locals and cultivation of a desire for vengeance, will ultimately lead to an increased risk of attack against the U.S. homeland in the long term.

Luban: "What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory" (2012)

Contribution: This article focuses on Obama-era drone policy, specifically on the process that Obama personally had to approve every drone strike. Obama was a student of Catholic Augustine and Christian just war theory, which the author believes influenced why and how Obama oversees drone strikes. The article offers a critique of the ways in which Obama's prosecuting of America's wars in the Middle East does and does not align with Augustine's teachings and Just War theory. The author argues that there are places where Obama clearly is in line with just war (9/11 has provided just cause, Obama is willing to take rightful authority as the legitimate ruler of the US,) and places where he is not: —> War should be used as the last option while Obama seems comfortable using force —> Has Obama taken on the CIA's dishonest way of counting non-combatant casualties? —> While Augustine and, seemingly, Obama agree with wars of punishment (bringing bin Laden "to justice"), the author and current just war theory does not —> Even Augustine would say that while it's good for Obama to take responsibility, that doesn't mean he alone should make the decision —> The author also takes issue with the "fog" over Obama's drone program and mentions some anti-drone arguments, such as sovereignty, legal issues, and civilian casualties

Posen: (Optional) "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" (1993)

Contribution: Use the security dilemma as a lens through which to view the special conditions that make ethnic conflict after imperial breakup/state collapse more or less likely. A regime's collapse means introduces a power vacuum (much like anarchy), wherein it's harder to tell the difference between offensive and defensive capabilities. Uneven state structures (technology & geography) can provide distinct advantages/windows of opportunity to certain groups over others. These factors combine with the forces of nationalism to make ethnic conflict nearly inevitable after state breakdown. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, Posen's theory holds that Croatia and Serbia were more likely to go to war because of ancient hatreds in their history, arms, geography, power balance, expected allies, and fanatics. In the case of relations between Russia and Ukraine, the theory holds that conflict is less likely because of the dispersion of nuclear forces throughout Ukraine from the former USSR, shared identity, settlement patterns, and international considerations. So what? Understand the factors can mitigate these high risks: —> Threats to intervene by international institutions will hold more credibility (vulnerable groups will feel more safe, and aggressors will more likely be deterred) in conflicts in which great powers' interests are at stake, because the latter can back up the former's threat. —> The sides involved should discuss their differences and take steps to reconcile them, ideally with an NGO facilitating. Because this is inexpensive it should definitely be tried. (*This sounds a little idealistic to me and more like a superficial measure aimed at getting outsiders on the various parties' sides) —> By threatening NOT to act, allies might help discourage aggressive behavior between the two sides —> Conversely, by pledging assistance to a party (especially to the underdog), could deter aggression by the other side. (However, this is difficult for liberal democratic governments to do) —> Nuclear weapons can serve as deterrents. For example, by leaving a few nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Russia might be deterred from acting aggressively.

Sagan: "The Origins of the Pacific War" (1988)

Contribution: author asserts that it was а series of unfortunate events and assumptions that led Japan to initiate war with the US. Underlying assumptions about foreign policy and the nature of the adversary, in both countries, led them to engage the security dilemma, inciting war. Japan concluded war was inevitable, and chose to initiate sooner rather than later against an assessed superior adversary. The culmination of events was a failure of deterrence theory/mutual deterrence. 1940 US policy (unknown to Japan) was to avoid war with J but Roosevelt still wanted to prevent them from expanding; used 2 diplomatic tools: —>Threat of an oil embargo—in 1940 July, the US decided not to do this because they were worried it might provoke Japan to attack the Dutch East Indies oil fields of the Dutch East Indies—exactly what the US was hoping to deter (see also readings from HIST 681 Class 3/4) —>Threat of military intervention - US wanted to let Japan think they were ready to strike in the event they tried to move south Japan started secret negotiations with Germany to form a tripartite alliance with the Nazi and Italian regimes, hoping to reduce likelihood of US intervening American public opinion didn't support actions that would lead to war in the Pacific. FDR, facing an upcoming election, feared that actions taken to deter further Japanese expansion might backfire and provoke rather than prevent aggression Embargo put new time pressures on Japan, whose military position would become increasingly disadvantageous. Highly doubtful they'd win. But even the slenderest hope of victory would dissipate if they didn't act soon J leadership accepted that complete victory against the US would impossible. Hoped that a series of quick victories in the Pacific would persuade the US that a painful war of attrition was not worth fighting The full plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was never revealed to the Liaison Conference; limited to the inner circles of the Japanese navy; no discussion as to whether or not it was strategically wise (*also see HIST 681 readings about the goal of PH being to create a defense perimeter for J's successes in the southern zone) So what? Deterrence theory is imperfect. In this case, even the presence of robust capabilities and credible threats did not succeed in deterring the two adversaries. This has important modern-day implications, where the desire to prevent great power conflict runs up against relative US decline/China rise/Russia intransigence, ultimately threatening to erode the international order.

Overy: "Ch. 4: Armaments and Domestic Politics"

Economic and imperial advantage required commensurate military strength, the level of which determined the powers' willingness to go to war and then the war's timing. Argument: Rearmament taken up by both sides, though was itself not a cause of the war. More at play were the financial, industrial, and labor (FIL) pressures, as the scale and speed of rearmament efforts—and thus a state's willingness and capacity to wage war—hinged on these factors. B, F and G all expected that to win any future war would require the most economic mobilization. - FIL challenges felt more acutely by the western democracies than by G. B and F caught in a cycle wherein they can't cut back on rearmament for fear of Germany, but are also unable to sustain any war effort or preserve their internal economic stability. - High levels of rearmament were thus sustainable for B and F only for a short time, leading them to believe decisive action would be better to take sooner rather than later. So what?

Walzer: "Ch. 6: Interventions" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

Intervention can be justified for two reasons: to assist in the balance of power or to stop a massacre. The burden of proof to make this argument always falls upon that of the intervening power. We can ignore the sovereignty of another state to intervene, so long as the case is urgent, if boundaries have already been crossed by a foreign power, or if within boundaries two or more communities are contained and at least one is fighting for independence. Assistance should always go to the government, unless the resistance has established territory and therefore credibly represents a certain segment of the population. With these instances of secession, we can assist with self-determination efforts but not force it (freedom isn't true unless you earn it yourself), and we can only intervene if risks to third parties are less than if we had stayed out. In civil wars, Walzer's comments on counter-intervention require that the government pass the self-help test: if its local population doesn't deem it as legitimate, then we are not assisting them to win the war, we're winning the war for them in our own war (i.e. Vietnam). Humanitarian intervention is only just when it is a rescue of people, not a power balancing maneuver. Any state capable of stopping a massacre has a right to do so.

Jervis: "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"

Jervis is a defensive (neo)realist (aka defensive structural realist) Jervis is looking to understand why/under what conditions states would cooperate (or adopt compatible security policies) in the midst of anarchy and the security dilemma, which together seem to preclude cooperation. - Two variables matter: a) the offense-defense balance (one or the other has the advantage) and b) the ability to distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons. So what? - Makes a 2x2 matrix with these variables showing 4 strategic environments (see "Four Worlds" chart). The safest, and most amenable to cooperation, is both when defense has the advantage and defensive/offensive weapons are distinguishable. a) When the defensive has the advantage, "a large increase in one state's security only slightly decreases the security of the others," and the state of nature can be escaped from! (351) b) If the weapons/policy that protect a state do not also provide attack capability, they are non-threatening to others, and the state can increase its own security in this way without decreasing the security of others - Jervis outline factors that increase/decrease the values of these variables, which is useful for policymakers to consider: - If costs of being exploited are lower, less likely to defect - Increased gains of mutual cooperation - Decreased gains in taking advantage of the others/increase costs of mutual noncooperation - Increase expectations that the other will cooperate - "Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which can differ from the actual situation; we must therefore examine the decision makers' subjective security requirements" such as how much security they desire and the perception of threat. - The most common environment, historically, is when defense has the advantage, but offensive/defensive weapons are indistinguishable.

Brooks, Ikenberry, & Wohlforth: "Don't Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment" (2012)

Key FP question of the day: Is it time for the US to switch to a strategy of retrenchment, instead of the current strategy of deep engagement? This would entail curtailing overseas military presence, reducing global security commitments, and minimizing the US role in leading the liberal institutional order. The authors assess the pros and cons of both deep engagement and retrenchment to determine if the latter is—on its own terms—indeed in the national interest. Proponents of retrenchment argue that the current strategy no longer serves our national interests. It is too expensive relative to the expected benefits and the rising of potential rivals. Moreover, our allies' security should no longer be subsidized because they can now afford to provide for that themselves. Lastly, this level of engagement has bred global anti-American sentiment. The authors argue against retrenchment: —> Retrenchment proponents overestimate the costs of deep engagement and underestimate its benefits, ignoring the wider security and non-security benefits —> Current strategy of "deep engagement" is either not more expensive than the alternatives or it is unknown what the costs of the alternatives would be —> It would be hard to keep our hegemonic rule/institutional benefits without being very engaged internationally —> Deep engagement—despite its risks and costs—is the "devil we know," whereas retrenchment would only introduce us to the "devil we don't know." (10) The benefits of deep engagement are numerous: —> Managing our external environment helps reduce near- and long-term threats to US national security; promoting a liberal economic order helps expand the global economy and maximize domestic prosperity; and creating, sustaining, and revising the global institutional order is necessary to secure interstate cooperation on terms favorable to US interests. —> Since we are unipolar, counterbalancing does not apply to US and so we don't have to fear overstretch —> Lower allied military expenditures don't necessarily constitute free riding —> Even in retrenchment the US is just as likely to be dragged into an unnecessary war, since it will still have the means to do something —> Embedding US leadership in institutions has functional, political, and legitimacy benefits. This gives it leverage to restrain partners from acting provocatively—its alliance commitments deter expansionist states aspiring to regional hegemony, increasing its partners' security and thereby reducing their incentive to pursue solutions to their security problems that threaten others and perpetuate security dilemmas. Who argues for retrenchment? Mostly realists. The arguments: Defensive realism (and others discounting anarchy's conflict-generating potential): US security guarantees are unnecessary for preventing conflict in Eurasia, because there are myriad ways for the region's major states to signal benign intent and thus peacefully manage regional multipolarity on their own. Basically, retrenchment makes a bet that defensive realism is right that security is the only thing that matters to states. —> 3 bodies of scholarship give pause to this: regional expertise, research undermining defensive realism's conception of state preferences, and offensive realism Given this, retrenchment advocates then contend: preventing rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a core security interest for the US. —> But again, an overall increase in violence anywhere would make the world a more dangerous place, including for the US, and buckpassing won't work the same as it has in the past because of China—no one in the neighborhood is strong enough to counter China so the US would have to do it So what? We should not change our strategy and become isolationist- it is in our interest to keep up being a world leader.

Brooks: (Optional) "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest"

Liberalism - Brooks looks at the conditions under which conquest will bring economic rewards, and concludes that, for the most economically-advanced countries, the benefits of conquest have declined due to changes in the globalization of production since WWII. - Four transformations in the structure of global production that reduce the benefits of conquest: 1) Rise of knowledge-based economies, wherein economic wealth is generated by the population (their minds): a) A conquering state might face resistance in extracting knowledge from the population, and consequent police suppression of access to information will hamper the flow of wealth-generating information and ideas will be hampered. b) Moreover, economic surplus is mobile (people—and the information they possess—unlike land, can flee) and c) bringing them back would be counterproductive. d) Financing for innovation will be stifled, due to outside mistrust of a conquerer, and 5) the need for conquerers to constantly watch over the conquered will stifle wealth-generated innovation. 2) Increased geographic dispersion of production means that a conquerer would only secure one piece of the value-added chain. 3) Increased significance of interfirm alliances, the purpose of which is to divide up various parts of the production process to minimize individual costs and maximize innovation. Before, a conquerer could take over an entire technology in a certain country. Now, they will only secure one portion of the technology, which is less valuable. 4) Increased ease of FDI, which reduces the willingness to pursue conflict; advanced states can get what they need from MNCs, achieving most of the same ends of conquest without the associated cost. So what? - Brook acknowledges that a dearth of cases precludes testing for his conclusions - Conclusions impact expected utility theory, which looks at how rational actors make choices about war by looking at the costs/benefits. - Conclusions also impact offense/defense theory, hegemonic transition theory, and various liberal/realist strands about the gains of capturing and holding territory

Mansfield & Snyder: (Optional) "Democratization and War"

Liberalism Contribution: - The proposition of DPT—that democratic states do not go to war with each other—is near to empirical law; and because of this democratic states have encouraged democratization in other states so as to increase the number of democracies in the system in the hope of reducing conflict. - M & S pull together two centuries of statistical evidence to show that transition to democracy is rocky and ripe for conflict, with democratizing countries actually becoming more war-prone (including against democratic states). *Note, M&S do not look at civil wars* - Characteristics of democratizing states that make them more war-prone: a) Democratization creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions and high energy mass politics b) Public opinion starts off averse to costs and risks of war c) Emergence of new social groups and classes with incompatible interests; domestic pressures create incentives for elites to foment nationalism (which stokes violence, a la French Revolution) - Important statistics: a) States transitioning from total autocracy to mass democracy are twice as likely to fight wars in next the decade So what? This assessment has important implications for policy aiming to promote peace by promoting democratization. Policies need to focus less on encouraging or discouraging democratization, and more on finding ways to help smooth the transition to minimize the risk of conflict.

Walt: "On Writing Well"

Main Argument: Author lays out fairly clear points that may be helpful in developing clear, concise writing skills to avoid the usual pitfalls of academic writing and hopefully reach a larger audience. Key Points: - Requires planning - need to determine how best to package your argument, what needs to be said earlier and what can be said later. - In dealing with complicated subjects difficult to explain with ordinary language, the challenge of clear, concise writing becomes much more difficult. - Good writing requires empathy - need to step outside own understanding of the topic to ensure that your writing is clear and could be understood by someone with little experience with the topic - Avoid jargon and long, erudite sentences. So what? We have to write papers for grades to succeed in school to get cool jobs and save America.

Overy: "Ch. 5: War Over Poland" (The Origins of the Second World War, 2017)

Main Argument: Essentially, the pressure on Poland and the threat of war there was Hitler's doing. The Allies presented Hitler with many options for settlement, but he rejected them because he wanted to be an independent great power, not a great power under Britain and France. Britain and France felt that the time was right to attack after the Poland Crisis (as opposed to over Czechoslovakia) because their domestic political pressures and economic state assisted their cause, whereas waiting to intervene would limit their options. Each side underestimated the other's ability and will to fight. Poland refused to capitulate to German demands, and western agreement that Poland would be the "frontier" to contain Hitler and his vision for Mitteleuropa made the war inevitable. So what? This analysis disproves the common argument that Hitler was the driving force behind WWII. While his Mitteleuropa strategy definitely set events into motion that drove the war, this chapter shows the multifaceted security concerns present in the run-up to WWII and how the western powers' desire to maintain their empires factored into their respective strategies.

Overy: "Ch. 6: From European to World War" (The Origins of the Second World War, 2017)

Main Argument: Misplaced assumptions and desire to revise the world order led to fatal miscalculations on both the sides of the Allies and Axis powers. The drive for empire brought Italy into the conflict, and when it failed, distracted Germany. This delayed their invasion of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Japanese imperialism threatened the US and the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war on the US brought the US into the conflict. Ironically, Hitler declared war on the US thinking the Soviet Union was nearly defeated--but when the war ended, the US and SU were the major powers. So what? Ultimately, conflicting desires between the great powers to either revise the world order (Germany, Japan, Italy) or maintain the status quo (Britain and France) precipitated WWII. Conflicting assumptions and arrogance led to fatal strategic errors.

Mearsheimer: "Ch. 1: Introduction" (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)

Mearsheimer is an offensive structural realist/neorealist Contribution to literature: offers own theory of offensive structural realism and how it compares with realist/non-realist thinking - Summarizes 3 main liberal theories (commercial liberalism, Democratic Peace Theory, and liberal institutionalism) - Summarizes and differentiates between 3 key realist theories: a) Classical realism/"human nature" realism: mankind's innate lust for power drives a state to seek power as an end in and of itself. b) Defensive (structural) realism: power is not an end but rather a means for states to provide for their own security, which is the end. States want just enough—not too much—power to be secure; anarchy makes states behave defensively to maintain the balance of power ("status quo bias") c) Offensive (structural) realism: in contrast to defensive, states need the most/maximum power to be secure. It is safest to be the hegemon. So what? - Offensive structural realism considers that the nature of the international system incentivizes states to not behave defensively (per Waltz, Jervis, Van Evera), but instead to consistently try to tilt the balance of power in their own favor. We can expect to see war in the system, and often. - There is a mismatch between rhetoric and practice in the U.S., often realist logic conflicts with American values (it is ok to fight wars to spread democracy, etc., but less so to maintain or disrupt the balance of power). Thus leaders often say one thing to the public and behind close doors speak the "language of power."

Overy: "Ch. 3: Economic and Imperial Rivalry" (The Origins of the Second World War, 2017)

Overy asserts that the world economic crisis best explanation for the diplomatic system's breakdown in the 1930s - Protectionism takes root everywhere, especially among the strong powers (i.e. Britain's "Imperial Preference" policy), autarky spreads, along with the popular idea of the distinction between "have" and "have-not" states. - Perception of B/F empires as in decline prompts the have-nots to think it's time to overthrow them; G, J and I pursue expansion - Economic appeasement fails to accommodate G and J within the western system; economic rivalry persists Overy argues that economic competition in the 1930s did not in and of itself cause the war; the ideology driving the aggressor powers—that politicized economic rivalry as necessary for realizing their imperial ambitions—compelled them to reject economic appeasement. The real contest lied in the struggle for political power. So what?

Walzer: "Ch. 5: Anticipations" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

Preventive war is understandable when nations are threatened legitimately (risk to territorial integrity or political independence). Augmentation of power, hostile acts, and provocations do not meet the bar for legitimate threats. The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is drawn with three criteria: manifest intent to injure, a degree of preparation that implies imminent attack, and a general situation where waiting magnifies the risk.

Overy: "Ch. 7: Hitler's War?" (The Origins of the Second World War, 2017)

Reasons for the war: nationalism; imperial ambitions; industrial might; tensions from and lack of resolution on WWI; pressures on the world order (which B/F alone wanted to keep as is; even the US wanted to end colonialism and reorganize the system around free trade); decline of Europe's influence; communism vs. capitalism rivalry; B/F believing they could contain Hitler on their own with deterrence and, when that failed, bombing/blockades Could WWII have been prevented? - B/F reluctant to ask for help from the US/SU, which would have undermined their status as great powers - Only active US/SU intervention could have prevented war in 1939, but instead both stood back initially. - In all theaters of the war (eastern Europe, China, Middle East), it became clear that they key aims of maintaining (B/F) or creating a new world order (G/J/I) would necessarily involve US/SU interests; the latter would inevitably need to be brought in or defeated. It was a world war that would need to be won. So what? WWII demonstrates the violence that can accompany transitions in the international world order, and the illuminates the pressures politics, economics, and nationalism that can accompany this fight. It represents an important warning for aspiring hegemons and states seeking to shift the balance of power.

Overy: "Ch. 2: The International Crisis" (The Origins of the Second World War, 2017)

Relative international stability in the 1920s-early 1930s; then the system cracks: - World economy collapses in 1929, cooperation and mutual aid diminish sharply as the powers scrambled to protect their interests at the expense of smaller and less powerful states. Radical nationalism takes hold in Germany and Japan, both hit hard by the depression, pushing for active foreign policy to overcome their economic difficulties. - The West fails to respond to repeated challenges to the League of Nations, prompting its collapse: Japan invades Manchuria in September 1931, withdraws from the League in 1933, and closes the "Open Door" policy in China in 1934. Hitler's Germany repudiates the League and withdraws in October 1933; Britain does not see Germany's rearmament and desire to revise the territorial settlements of Versailles as a problem—yet, and so long as it's on British terms. Final blow is Italy's invasion of Ethiopia - B and F come together, but loosely, and adopt policy of appeasement (separate flashcard), which, as it was conducted from a position of weakness, often looked more like offering concessions to aggressors. - America and Soviet Union out of the picture, both want to avoid war. US/USSR isolationism and B/F appeasement especially encourage their adversaries' aggressive foreign policies: Germany takes over the Rhineland and occupies Vienna, Italy supports Spain's dictator during the Spanish Civil War, Japan encroaches further on China. - Only when Hitler turns his gaze to Czechoslovakia in 1939 does the West respond, ordering mobilization preparations to defend Czech sovereignty if necessary. Hitler backs down. War is averted because no one is ready to risk it. So what?

Walzer: "Ch. 16: Supreme Emergency" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

The concept of necessity for military action/war divided into two parts: imminence of the danger, and the nature of the danger. Utilitarian calculation can force the breaking of moral standards only when people are faced with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community, creating a necessity to break moral rules, and necessity knows no rules. When faced with an imminent danger that is perceived as a survival threat to a state, society, organization, etc., the question becomes: should you wager a moral crime against an immeasurable evil?

Russett: "The Fact of Democratic Peace"

Theoretical Perspective: Liberalism (what strain?) Contribution: - Evolution of DPT: a) Pre-WWI: shared liberal and democratic values moderating conflicts between US-Britain and Britain-France, but general recognition that democratic states don't go to war with each other minimal b) Pre-WWII: the empirical fact of little or no war between democracies up to this time obscured by the predominance of authoritarian states in the international system and the wars involving them. Also, at this time, the few democratic states in the system did not border each other, so it was thought that the lack of war between them could be attributed to geographical distance c) By the 1970s, there were more democracies in the system and the fact that they weren't warring with each other being more apparent d) By the 1980s, this became widely accepted, but not easily explained - Disputes various conflicts offered up by others seeking to show instances where DPT does not hold true (see Table 1.1) - Examines militarized diplomatic disputes between 1946-1986, and finds that beginning in the 20th century, war between democracies becomes almost impossible to find (Table 1.2). And, even when crises do emerge, they do not escalate to the point of war. So what? - Russett findings support DPT, and moreover show that the statistical likelihood of war between democracies is related to the number of pairs—or dyads—of democracies in the system. The more pairs there are, the less likely war will occur. Critique: Meeting the definition of what it means to be a democracy is a very high standard, so the theory does not contextualize illiberal democracies in this paradigm very well.

Russett: "Why Democratic Peace?"

Theoretical Perspective: Liberalism (what strain?) Contribution: - Assesses various hypotheses (below) given to explain the phenomenon of DPT, but determines that even with these controls, there remains an independent explanatory role for democracy: a) International and transnational institutions promote peace b) Distance prevents war c) Alliances promote peace (Joll/Martel address the explanation that the alliance system in Europe was a factor in the outbreak of WWII) d) Wealth promotes peace e) Political stability promotes peace - Russett argues that certain features of democracy, rather than simply correlated characteristics like economics or geopolitics (above mentioned), are the cause of relative peace between democracies. He then evaluates two theories regarding the empirical relationship that help explain what it is about democracy itself that makes conflict between two such states unlikely: a) The cultural/normative (C/N) model points to pervasive normative restraints like "live-and-let live" and peaceful conflict resolution (Russett says this model is more powerful) b) Structural/institutional (S/I) model points to restraints like checks and balances, divisions of power, and need for public support that moderate inclination toward conflict - Finds that: a) The restraints posed by democracies' political systems—C/N and S/I—make them more peaceful toward other democracies, but this does not mean that democracies are necessarily also more peaceful toward other non-democratic states (there is little evidence to support such a claim, and in fact evidence to oppose it, i.e. Vietnam War) b) Democracies are less likely to use lethal force toward each other than toward other non-democratic states, and are generally less likely than non-democratic states to use lethal force So what: - Replacing authoritarian states with democratic states in the system may help to "supersede" the realist principles of anarchy and the security dilemma. - Recognizing DPT and understanding why democracies rarely go to war with each other has bearing on policy, particularly military policies and the costs democracies are willing to pay in support of them, as well as encouraging democratization throughout the system. a) A misunderstanding of DPT however could make democracies more prone to starting wars, including preventative or hegemonic wars, with non-democracies in order to overturn them and spread democracy.

Finnemore: "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention"

Theoretical Perspective: Neoclassical constructivism Contribution: Argues that states' decisions to undertake humanitarian interventions (HI) can't be explained by realism/liberalism—these theories leave open the question of what interests intervening states are pursuing in these endeavors (i.e. if it's not power, a la realism, or economic benefit, a la liberalism, what is it?). Suggests that norms help explain this behavior. Compares humanitarian interventions in the 19th and 20th centuries and finds that: a) Humanitarian justifications for intervention are not new; b) State's perceptions of which human beings are worthy of intervention have changed; c) Norms are inherently consensual but evolve from challenges to consensus; d) HI is part of a broader set of mutually reinforcing and consistent humanitarian norms that seem to strengthen each other; e) Norm institutionalization is critical to norm evolution So what? These findings shed light on the current state of HI (since 1945), and explains why states engage in humanitarian action even when it might not actually be advantageous. Expansion of "humanity" introduces "self-determination" and "sovereignty" as important rights, now enshrined as an organizing feature of the international system, which sometimes comes to a head when HR violations are concerned (states disinclined to intervene for fear of violating others' sovereignty) States are now normatively and institutionally constrained from intervening unilaterally in humanitarian crises; for HI to be legitimate, it must be multilateral, so as to not give the appearance that a state's sovereignty is being violated Criticism: None of the examples Finnemore used were done solely on the basis of humanitarian reasons.

Gilpin: (Optional) "The Theory of Hegemonic War"

Theoretical Perspective: Neoclassical realism Contribution to literature: Assesses Thucydides' Theory of Hegemonic War and examines whether it's relevant today given the present nuclear age. Theory of Hegemonic War: IR is driven by the uneven growth of power among states; wars arise due to the structure of the system, which is afterwards changed by the war (see separate flashcard) —> what is it about the system's structure that makes wars arise? (draw from Neoclassical realism flashcard) Gilpin's criticisms of the theory: - Limited and incomplete - Doesn't look at how perceptions affect state behavior, which in turns pertains to how hegemonic wars are started - Can't predict when war will happen, or what the consequences will be - Best as a complement to other theories like cognitive psychology or expected utility So what? - Relevance in nuclear age: Gilpin says possibility of hegemonic war can't be ruled out. That the fundamental nature of war has changed does not mean the nature of IR has also changed; if anything, the latter has only been intensified. - Mutual deterrence has structured the order of the international system, but the proliferation of nukes to more and more states, as well as other rogue actors, will continue to affect that hierarchical ordering.

Waltz: "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" (1988)

Theoretical Perspective: defensive neorealism (introduced neorealism in 1979) Contribution to literature a) Neorealism asks: how do changes in the international system affect the expected frequency of war? Answer: Destabilizing developments are best dealt with in bipolar systems, and multipolar systems are more dangerous. b) Writing during the Cold War, Waltz says that bipolarity alone can't account for the peace in the international system—nukes are another "great force for peace" (624), because they make the costs of even thinking about going to war too high. Thus deterrence in a nuclear world is relatively easy to achieve (because a state cannot attack unless it believes success is all but assured; in a conventional world, by contrast, a state can attack if it believes success is merely probable.) So what? I don't agree with Waltz. He is too focused on great power war, and seems to forget that although the US/USSR didn't directly fight each other during the Cold War—thanks to the bipolar system and presence of nukes—numerable small and conventional wars still happened. Additionally, Waltz's conclusions can't explain the lack of a great power war since the end of the Cold War (no more bipolarity, and now numerous nuclear states in the system—still have small wars, yes, but still no great power wars). Criticism: Neorealism does not explain why particular wars are fought- it explains "war's dismal recurrence through the millennia." It also has a distinct status quo bias- if states knew better, they would not start wars.

Mearsheimer: "Ch. 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power" (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)

Theoretical Perspective: offensive structural realism Contribution: Offers theory of offensive structural realism in response to Waltz's defensive structural realism. Discusses what power means and how states (actively/offensively) pursue it, since power is the most necessary means for states to achieve the end of security. Mutual fear, self-help, and power maximization are features of the anarchic international system and drive states to behave aggressively, which leads to constant security competition. Power affects the intensity of fear among states about each other in 3 ways: a) Nukes = deterrence = less fear b) Large bodies of water separating states = less fear c) Distribution of power in the system: even distribution of power among great powers -> less fear; power asymmetries -> more fear * [MORE FEAR] "Unbalanced" multipolarity (multipolarity with a potential hegemon) > balanced multipolarity > bipolarity [LESS FEAR] So what? There seems to be less room for cooperation in an offensive realist world. When cooperating, a state cares more about maximizing its relative gains compared to its competitors, and when making agreements is constantly concerned that the other party will take advantage of them. By this logic, not even a liberal world order can render moot anarchy and the aggressive state behaviors it engenders (vs. defensive realism wherein such an order can help send the message that weapons are defensive and not offensive in nature and tilt the offense-defense balance to the latter). Criticism While the author says offensive realism is also a prescriptive theory, he admits it is mainly a descriptive theory and cannot possibly account for every situation- as with any theory, there are anomalies.

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 4: The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Second Cut" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: *Assigned to skim Model II explains the Cuban Missile Crisis thus (per wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence_of_Decision): 1) Because the Soviets never established nuclear missile bases outside of their country at the time, they assigned the tasks to established departments, which in turn followed their own set procedures. However, their procedures were not adapted to Cuban conditions, and as a result, mistakes were made that allowed the U.S. to quite easily learn of the program's existence. Such mistakes included gaffes like undercover Soviet troops decorating their barracks with Red Army Stars viewable from above. 2) Kennedy and his advisors never really considered any other options besides a blockade or air strikes, and initially, were almost unanimously in favor of the air strikes. However, such attacks created massive uncertainty because the U.S. Air Force couldn't guarantee it would disable all the nuclear missiles. Additionally, although Kennedy wanted a "surgical" air strike that would destroy the missiles without inflicting extensive damage, the existing Air Force plan required extensive bombing that would have created more collateral damage than Kennedy desired. Because the U.S. Navy already had considerable strength in the field, because there was a pre-existing plan in place for a blockade, and because Kennedy was able to communicate directly with the fleet's captains, members fell back on the blockade as the only safe option. 3) The Soviets simply did not have a plan to follow if the U.S. took decisive action against their missiles. Khrushchev's communications indicated a high degree of desperation. Without any back-up plan, the Soviets had to withdraw.

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 2: The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: *Assigned to skim Per wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence_of_Decision: 1) John F. Kennedy, in 1961, revealed that the Soviet Union had far fewer ICBMs than it claimed. In response, Nikita Khrushchev ordered nuclear missiles with shorter ranges installed in Cuba. In one move, the Soviets bridged the "missile gap" while scoring points in the Cold War. Based on Kennedy's failure to back up the Bay of Pigs Invasion, they believed the U.S. wouldn't respond harshly. 2) Kennedy and his advisors (EXCOMM) evaluated a number of options, ranging from doing nothing to a full invasion of Cuba. A blockade of Cuba was chosen because it wouldn't necessarily escalate into war, and because it forced the Soviets to make the next move. 3) Because of mutually assured destruction by a nuclear war, the Soviets had no choice but to bow to U.S. demands and remove the weapons.

Overy: "Ch. 1: Explaining the Second World War" (The Origins of the Second World War)

Theoretical perspective: - 1939: War declared by Britain and France, not Germany—contradicting the image of western democracies as honest brokers in international affairs striving to uphold collective security and the League of Nations. Context for WWII: - Tensions between the existing international system and new power realities: a) Both were global empires, and along with the other powers were held together loosely by the international economy. Pre-1914 imperial and economic interests and values remained in the 1920s and impinged on diplomacy during the interwar years. b) Post WWI, the international system remained fragile, with only B and F playing an active role in world politics. However, the US and Soviet Union—both of whom had retreated after the war—along with rising Germany, Japan, and Italy—would need to be incorporated into the great power system. - Systemic problems exacerbated by domestic and ideological factors So what? - As in 1914, international and domestic issues combined to create an unstable context for conducting international affairs, which made war more probable.

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 7: Conclusion" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: - All three models needed for establishing the causal bottom line - Information demanded by Model II and III exceeds that needed by Model I; information costs account for some differences among explanations - So what? (about the three models and explanations) Model I: Objective, and perceived, context creates incentives and pressures for a government to choose a particular course of action - USSR sent nukes to Cuba to defend Cuba, rectify the strategic nuclear balance, or provide an advantage in confrontation over Berlin - Blockade reflects Kennedy's reasoning- a logical middle ground between nuclear risk over Cuba or risk over Berlin - USSR decision to yield follows logically from US combination of strategic and theater military superiority - Why blockade? Analysts look at this as a solution to the strategic problem posed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba Model II: Helps managers take account of administrative feasibility in making decisions - USSR sent nukes bc of components of USSR military and inadequate camo caused by not having established routines for this setting - Blockade foreshadowed by existing capacities of large orgs (Air Force inability to do strategic bombing and Navy ability to act) - Why blockade? Analysts try to identify outputs of key orgs without which there would be no blockade Model III: Helps managers take account of varying perspectives bearing on the decision making process - Khrushchev's appreciation of situation cloudy at best and advisors are sullen and sporadic - Blockade came about only after it is formulated in a way that attracts Kennedy's support - Resolution of crisis caused by differences in leaders' perspectives and their advisors' - Kennedy and Khrushchev key players who are informed, misled, persuaded, or ignored by the officials around them, for better or worse - Why blockade? The question is about the political bargaining among players with distinctive interests, quite disparate conceptions of what was to be done, and different views of the process by which competing preferences blended and blurred in the selected action

Saunders: (Optional) "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy"

Theoretical perspective: - Argues that interventions can't be fully understood without examining the role of individual leaders; proposes a middle ground between studying "great men" and totally excluding the individual in favor of a structural approach. - Case study: Kennedy's and Johnson's different strategies in Vietnam; good situation to look at because the structural conditions were constant (bipolar system, Cold War ongoing, US democratic institutions, political situation), allowing for a comparison despite the changing system in Vietnam. a) Transformative approach (Kennedy): interfere or determine target state's domestic institutions or change local-level institutions (i.e. nation-building, post-conflict reconstruction); taken by internal-type leaders who prefer favorable outcomes in the target state b) Non-transformative approach (Johnson): resolve an int'l/civil conflict/crisis or restrain/rollback a foreign policy decision without changing target state's institutions at any level (though that might occur as a by-product); taken by external-type leaders who prefer to extract favorable foreign policy/security decisions from the target state rather than getting the "right" domestic institutions. - To explain intervention strategy, Saunders suggests looking at how the causal beliefs of individuals influences how they perceive threats (Jervis and Khong) and determine their interests (i.e. re-election efforts) So what? A typology of leaders can help explain the use of military intervention; individual-level explanations matter!

Khong: (Optional) "Chapter 1: Analogical Reasoning un Foreign Affairs: Two Views"

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: - Previous scholarship asks: how well are historical analogies used by leaders? The usual answer—"not very well," with leaders often choosing inappropriate analogies, or misapplying appropriate or inappropriate analogies to the situation at hand. Khong instead asks: how do analogies influence the selection of policy options? This should precede the "how well?" question. - Khong devised the Analogical Explanation (AE) Frameworks to show how analogies are cognitive advices used to help guide decisionmaking: a) Analogies frame a situation b) Help "assess the stakes" c) Provide options for solving a problem d) Predict chances for an option's success e) Evaluate the moral aspects of an option f) Identify possible negative consequences - Then he draws on findings from field of social cognitive psychological research to explain why policymakers use analogies "recurrently and suboptimally" (14) a) Humans have limited cognitive abilities; in order to cope with the massive amounts of incoming information, they rely on "knowledge structures" (13) like analogies to make sense of it all b) Analogies are picked based on surface similarities c) Once analogy is chosen, the perceiver can go beyond the info given, process it top-down, and this leads to a phenomena of perseverance So what? Leaders' poor analogical reasoning can be a result of psychological processes rather than simply a failure of intellect; as a result, attempts to teach leaders how to use analogies better faces a steeper uphill climb than previously acknowledged (if only being smarter would make one better at using analogies!)

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 8: The Mood of 1914" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: - That the "mood of 1914" contributed to the outbreak of WWI is an "impressionistic" explanation. Although governments were largely successful in justifying their political decisions so as to garner popular support for war, public opinion was already primed for this—as result of decades of accumulated national traditions and attitudes about the state, its authority, and IR fostered via the educational curriculum and embedded further by the rhetoric of politicians and journalists (often framed in neo-Darwinian language), and influenced by pressure groups and ideological movements. - Recent experiences with very different kinds of wars—the South African War, the R-J War, Balkan Wars—also left the publics and their leaders with an unclear image of future war, and what the war started in 1914 would become. - Growing awareness of the importance of sea power, as written about by Mahan, fostered fears among the British and Germans of sudden naval invasions and attacks from the other. This helped get an arms race going and foment international tension, and also led to fantastical and fictional works of future warfare, invasions, and espionage that reflected public anxieties and expectations. So what?

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 6: The International Economy" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Marxists blame capitalism for the outbreak of war generally, and in the case of WWI point to the imperialism undergirding capitalism specifically. The authors find little evidence of this in the case of WWI, noting that imperialism was but one feature of the economic system that impacted war. Other features include: a) the effect of industrialists who might have stood to gain or lose from war; b) banks, and their forging of bilateral economic ties (especially between France and Russia) and personal relationships that sometimes played a role in diplomacy; and c) protective tariffs. Conclusion: just as the outbreak of war temporarily ameliorated certain domestic problems plaguing the belligerents, so too did it enable them to solve some of their financial difficulties caused by having to constantly pay for their rearmament efforts, as patriotism could help make amenable increased taxation. So what? In addition to throwing water on the Marxist explanation, these findings also weaken the economic liberalist argument that the growth of international trade/econ ties make war less likely on the grounds that so many stand to lose by war. In WWI, there were economic actors who, facing stiffer competition (a feature of increased econ connections) and falling profits, pushed for their governments to take protective, nationalist steps to safeguard their interests (i.e tariffs, stronger diplomatic/military support). Bilateral economic ties—forged by banks and governments—also served to tighten up alliances, thus solidifying divisions in the system.

Herman: (Optional) "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War" (1996)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Changing conditions in the SU in the 1970s and 1980s provided the opportunity for reformists to alter the Soviet approach to foreign policy and the West, putting forth initiatives of inclusion in the Western system. This eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This argument goes beyond Brooks and Wohlforth's focus on economic conditions and seeks a broader explanation for why events occured in the way they did. Reformist movement was split in two general movements: —> Conciliatory realpolitik: In the face of a deteriorating domestic situation, supported the paring down of international involvement, military commitments, arms reduction to signal reduced aggressiveness to the West in order to foster expanded trade and technological cooperation. —> New Thinking: extreme conciliatory realpolitik, heavily influenced Gorbachev Reformists essentially conducted an information insurgency in the SU government: —> Exposure of Soviet officials to the West purged myths and stereotypes about capitalism, allowing them to see the advantages of the Western system in comparison to the Soviet system (identity and therefore interests are socially constructed through interaction with others, which are influenced by perceptions and biases of individuals (worldview)). —> Reformers drew roots from the detente movement in the 1970s, which fell apart. Reformers acknowledged Soviet complicity in the breakdown of detente. So what? The momentous turn in international policy (New Thinking) was the product of cognitive evolution and policy entrepreneurship by networks of Western-oriented in-system reformers (expert analysts, liberal international affairs specialists) coincided with the coming to power of a leadership committed to change and receptive to new ideas for solving the country's problems (Gorbachev's rule). A profound reconceptualization of state interests led to the end of the Cold War. Ideas and identities matter!

Brooks & Wohlforth: "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War" (2000/2001)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Cold War scholarship, especially about the change in USSR policy that led the SU's collapse, tends to focus on the ideological side of things. But in order to understand how ideas shape behavior, you need to also look at how material incentives factored into the equation. The SU was in decline, especially by demographic and public health indicators. Soviet growth performance was the worst in the world, and was especially bad relative to the US. Findings: material conditions undermined old Soviet ways of doing things much more than previously recognized. The questions asked: Why did the Soviets choose grand strategy of retrenchment instead of continuing with the foreign policy status quo? Answer: Moscow was more sensitive to its relative decline than other powers who have experienced decline because of the bipolar system: a) the SU always had to compare its position relative to the US, and was a declining challenger to US primacy that never came close to rivaling it in economic size; b) the SU felt more imperially overstretched than the US; and c) it was lagging in technology and innovation. Material costs of the old foreign policy thus pressured a move toward retrenchment. Why did the Soviets engage in retrenchment and at the same time seek to pursue engagement, in particular by opening up to the global economy? Answer: in order to affect policy, material change must be perceived, but there is a lag time in that perception setting in. As resource constraints grew, Soviet leaders shifted to a strategy of opening up in hopes of reciprocation, but because of the lag in perception, both policies were pursued. So what? Constructivism is very prevalent in discussions on the Cold War, and so a lot of what is being focused on is the ideological/societal aspects of the Cold War. This piece adds depth and context to the economic side of the USSR during this time, and why certain things (such as technology) were more important than they would've been otherwise. Moving forward, scholars should keep in mind the issue of endogeneity and that changes in the material environment can help explain how changes in states' fundamental goals or identities occur. Criticism: The authors themselves state that this is only supposed to be a basis for a "more productive dialogue concerning how ideas and material incentives interacted in more finely grained decision problems," and not an answer to the question of why the USSR collapsed. Also according to the authors, it does not take into account every aspect of what happened, focusing only on the material/economic/military part with some first image as well. It is also very narrowly focused on only economic material incentives.

Levy: "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implication of Prospect Theory for International Conflict"

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Levy offers Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative to Expected Utility (EU) Theory. - PT explanations of how people respond to losses vs gains: a) Loss aversion: people value a gain less than they fear a loss of equal size b) Endowment effect: overweighting of current possessions; Instant endowment effect: after a gain is made, future gains and losses will be evaluated based on this new reference point, and even after a subsequent loss G&L will be evaluated based on the former reference point c) Status quo bias (prefer things how they are) and risk aversion (not wanting to do anything to change status quo) d) Diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses - Framing effect: preferences change based on framing; transparency of the choice problem affects magnitude of framing (obvious similarities between two choice leads to EU-type behavior; unclear similarities=deviation form EU) - Certainty effect: tendency to overvalue certain outcomes compared to probabilities So what? The implications of PT - Status quo bias and risk aversion should lead to international stability, but not all leaders are satisfied with the status quo. - When a state perceives itself to be in decline, it considers the status quo to be a certain loss, and because of loss aversion will be more likely to pursue risky behavior - Affect on compellence and deterrence: the lesson is that we should avoid fait accompli strategies that corner actors; influence attempts based on coercion are more likely to be successful if the target views gains as possible and thinks itself able to improve its position. - Caveat: As a theory about individuals, PT is incomplete as a theory for IR; —> Levy also says systems-level theories are "theoretically incomplete and empirically inadequate, in that they leave too much of the variation in the outbreak and expansion of war unexplained." (In: "Causes of War and Peace," 151). What does Levy require in order to be able to say individual- and systems-level theories are complete? Does he think societal-level theories are where it's at?

Saunders: "No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisors, and Information in Group Decision Making" (2017)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Looks at how the traits, biases, and experience levels of individuals play out in group settings where decisions about war are made. Case studies: the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars. Findings: Using a principle-agent framework (in which all leaders must rely on the expertise and information-gathering resources of others to help them make decisions, but their agents- who include bureaucratic officials and military leaders- may have different preferences or incentives), the author finds that the spectrum of experience affects a leader's decision making and the risks associated with conflict by: 1) influencing a leader's ability to monitor advisers (inexperience=less effective explicit and implicit monitoring, Hyp. #1) 2) affecting the credibility of delegating to experienced advisers and the nature (An inexperienced principal is likely to make delegation more credible, increasing perceived and actual levels of power and overconfidence among advisers, Hyp. #2) and extent of information gathering (An inexperienced principal may decrease incentives for advisers to invest in information, or lead to information gathering on agent-defined alternatives, Hyp. #3) 3) affecting whether leaders are able to diversify advice (An inexperienced principal is more likely to marginalize potentially divergent viewpoints, Hyp. #4) and their preference for policies that seem certain (Advisers are more likely to present inexperienced principals with proposals that are framed with high degrees of precision, Hyp. #5) So what? - Since foreign policy decision making usually happens in groups we need to study how biases aggregate (aggregation problem) and why they matter in certain cases and not others. - This is a very strong argument for the first image making a real effect on international relations and the decisions countries make. Something as relatively simple as experience can change the way entire countries act, putting doubt on realist theories of a black box nation (the insides of a nation don't matter). - An experienced team can't compensate for lack of experience at the top.

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 5: The Primacy of Domestic Politics" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: The authors evaluate the claim that domestic politics and social pressures determined the nature of foreign policy in 1914 and influenced the belligerents' decisions for war, and determine that it is hard to prove a link between domestic policy and the decisions that precipitated the war. Internal and external policies were formed not out of rational calculation of profit and loss but rather out of hopes, fears, inherited attitudes and prior planning. - The authors do acknowledge, however, that domestic policy considerations did play a small role in the short-term, in that war did appear at first as a solution to some belligerents' internal problems (give an example). So what? - These conclusions raise questions about the possible impact of the structure of the industrial and capitalist society of 1914. (See ch. 6)

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 2: The July Crisis, 1914" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: This chapter looks at the individual-level explanation for the outbreak of WWI, which holds that individual actors played a major role in escalating the crisis in July 1914: - "Each of these [decisions]—the Austrian decision to take vigorous action against Serbia, the German decision to support Austria-Hungary, the Serbian decision to reject part of the Austrian terms, the Russian decision to back Serbia, the British decision to intervene and, perhaps the most important of all, the decisions to mobilize by Russia and Germany—depended on a whole series of previous decisions, plans, inherited attitudes and assumptions..." (42) So what? - The individual actors are portrayed as being swept away by the tide of rapidly-developing events, with few of them anticipating what the war would end up being. - Tie to readings about analogical reasoning, role of individuals, etc.

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 4: Militarism, Armaments, and Strategy" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: To what extent can the outbreak of the war be attributed to the arms race in Europe or to prioritizing strategic planning over political considerations? - All countries were increasing/preparing their militaries; and especially in the case of the G and B naval race, a step taken by one precipitated a step by the other (security dilemma). Result: as armaments programs got on a roll they were hard to stop, for any reversal would bring economic and social consequences (see Ch. 5: "The Primacy of Domestic Politics"). - Influence of strategic planning was contingent on the army's role in society and the civil-military balance, both of which varied widely by country (see separate WWI country cards). Because all governments saw war as inevitable, they had general staffs—and relinquished to them varying degrees of control—and built up armaments. Despite this, none expected the war they would end up getting—and certainly didn't count on it lasting as long as it did. None made adequate economic plans and all were running out of munitions within weeks. So what? War started because military strategists, civilian politicians, and public pressure groups all possessed a "short-war illusion," and the ideology of the offensive permeated military planning, bolstered by prevailing wisdom about offense and defense which exaggerated the advantages of the former (see also Snyder's "Cult of the Offensive"). Tie into Jervis, offensive and defensive realism

Jervis: "Hypothesis on Misperception"

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: the author offers 14 hypotheses regarding the ways states misperceive each others' behaviors (misperception = inaccurate idea of others and their intentions) Broad themes: a) leaders perceive what they expect (#1-2); b) how contradictory information is absorbed and the resulting misperception corrected when it is (#3-4); c) what is on a leader's mind at the time of receiving information will affect how they perceive it (#5-7); d) actors assume things about others (#8-10); e) actors misperceive how others will perceive the information they put out (#11-13); and f) actors ignore how the evidence might fit with more than one theory or image So what? Perceptions and misperceptions influence individual decision makers' decisions. Accurate perception is critical for making the best decisions.

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 6: The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Third Cut" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: Lack of Soviet transparency on government affairs limited the data available for the authors' analysis. Their attempt to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis is thus (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence_of_Decision): 1) Khrushchev came under increasing fire from the Presidium because of Kennedy's revelation of the Soviet lack of ICBMs, as well as American successes in the Berlin Airlift. Also, the Soviet economy was being stretched, and military leaders were unhappy with Khrushchev's decision to cut the size of the Red Army. Placing missiles in Cuba was a cheap and quick way for him to secure his political base. 2) Because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Republicans in the Congressmade Cuban policy into a major issue for the upcoming congressional elections later in 1962. Therefore, Kennedy immediately decided on a strong response rather than a diplomatic one. Although a majority of EXCOMM initially favored air strikes, those closest to the president - such as his brother and Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, and special counsel Theodore Sorensen - favored the blockade. At the same time, Kennedy got into arguments with proponents of the air strikes, such as Air Force General Curtis LeMay. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco, Kennedy also distrusted the CIA and its advice. In order to avoid appearing weak to the hawkish members of EXCOMM, Kennedy and his brother attacked the purely diplomatic proposals of United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson. This combination of push and pull led to a consensus for the implication of a blockade. 3) With his plans thwarted, Khrushchev tried to save face by pointing to American missiles in Turkey, a position similar to the Cuban missiles. While Kennedy refused to move these missiles "under duress," he allowed Robert Kennedy to reach a deal with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, in which the Turkish missiles would be quietly removed several months later. Publicly, Kennedy also agreed never to invade Cuba.

Overy: "Ch. 2: The International Crisis" (The Origins of the Second World War)

Theoretical perspective: Relative international stability in the 1920s-early 1930s; then the system cracks: - World economy collapses in 1929, cooperation and mutual aid diminish sharply as the powers scrambled to protect their interests at the expense of smaller and less powerful states. Radical nationalism takes hold in Germany and Japan, both hit hard by the depression, pushing for active foreign policy to overcome their economic difficulties. - The West fails to respond to repeated challenges to the League of Nations, prompting its collapse: a) Japan invades Manchuria in September 1931, withdraws from the League in 1933, and closes the "Open Door" policy in China in 1934. b) Hitler's Germany repudiates the League and withdraws in October 1933; Britain does not see Germany's rearmament and desire to revise the territorial settlements of Versailles as a problem—yet, and so long as it's on British terms. c) Final blow is Italy's invasion of Ethiopia - B and F come together, but loosely, and adopt policy of appeasement (separate flashcard), which, as it was conducted from a position of weakness, often looked more like offering concessions to aggressors. - America and Soviet Union out of the picture, both want to avoid war. US/USSR isolationism and B/F appeasement especially encourage their adversaries' aggressive foreign policies: Germany takes over the Rhineland and occupies Vienna, Italy supports Spain's dictator during the Spanish Civil War, Japan encroaches further on China. - Only when Hitler turns his gaze to Czechoslovakia in 1939 does the West respond, ordering mobilization preparations to defend Czech sovereignty if necessary. Hitler backs down. War is averted because no one is ready to risk it. So what?

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 3: The Alliance System and the Old Diplomacy" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: This chapter analyzes why and to what extent the alliances in place in 1914—conducted in the 'old diplomacy' framework characterized by such distrust on all sides—contributed to causing the outbreak of WWI. Existing alliances: - German-Austrian Alliance: to have each other's back in case of an attack by Russia - Franco-Russian Alliance: diplomatic, financial, and military linkages; Russia will support France if the latter is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, and France will support Russia if the latter is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany - By now B's imperial commitments are straining the Empire, leading to informal ententes with France and Russia Conclusions: By 1914, the European alliance system was in disarray. But, the system of alliances and informal ententes provided the framework in which diplomacy was conducted before the war, consequently shaping leaders' expectations about how other governments would behave that shaped how they conducted foreign policy and made military plans. - When alliance partners waffled, it had the effect of making them more committed to the alliance next time (i.e. Russia and Serbia) - Moreover, by 1914 the larger powers were working to bring smaller states onto their respective sides, and the effect of this is that the larger powers to some extent had to support the smaller states' ambitions, which in some respects constrained the foreign policies of the larger states (i.e. Russia's support for Serbia)

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 1: Model I: The Rational Actor" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: *Assigned to skim - Model I (Rational Actor Model): Describes a state's behavior as "choices" of a perfectly rational individual, who is normally assumed to have perfect situational knowledge, and who attempts to optimize whatever values/goals are sought in a given situation. (This is the dominant conceptual framework used in foreign affairs analysis, and the starting point for the authors' analysis). - In their actions, states (governments=primary actor) consider all of their options, evaluate them according to their utility, and rationally pick the one with the highest expected payoff (maximizing utility) —> Is it the individual or the state doing the "acting?" If the former, can we tie this into individual-level theories?

Snyder: "The Cult of the Offensive in 1914"

Theoretical perspective: - Each of the main belligerents entered the war with an offensive campaign. History shows that not only did each campaign fail to achieve its goals, but created serious disadvantages for the state; for each, a defensive or more limited offensive campaign would have been strategically favorable. Snyder asks why the belligerents adopted these strategies, and concludes that in each case, the civil-military relationship enabled the military to use operational plans in the attempt to solve its institutional problems. - Because offense typically serves military organizations better than defense (see separate flashcard for why), there tends to be a preference for offensive military planning (see separate flashcard for offensive bias). Despite the fact that, in 1914, advancements in weapons technology favored the defense, C-M was such that it exacerbated the normal offensive bias. The factors were: weak civilian control, operational doctrine being used as a weapon in C-M disputes about domestic politics; offensive bias thus self-replicates and spreads, and is ignored when it comprises the organization's essence. So what? As in 1914, military technology of today—particularly survival nuclear weapons—favors the defender; "the danger today is that war will occur because of an erroneous belief that a disarming, offensive blow is feasible and necessary to ensure the attackers security." (123) Criticism: the author doesn't capture the entire picture of what caused the war, and should instead be read as an analysis of why the conflict escalated into a world war.

Byman & Pollack: "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In"

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: - The authors argue that an individual's goals, abilities, and mistakes are crucial in understanding state strategies, intentions, and capabilities, and seek to answer: How do individuals affect IR and state behavior, and under what conditions are they influential? - The authors examine the individual roles of Hitler, Bismarck, Wilhem II, and Napoleon, and devise 13 testable hypotheses: Foundational ways individuals shape IR (4): 1) Individuals set the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state 2) Individuals can be an important component of a state's diplomatic influence and military power 3) Individual leaders shape their state's strategies 4) Individual leaders affect the behavior of opposing states that must react to leaders' idiosyncratic intentions and capabilities HOW individuals shape IR (4) 1) Risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause wars 2) Delusional leaders start wars and prolong them unnecessarily 3) Leaders with grandiose visions are more likely to destabilize the system 4) Predictable leaders will have stronger and more enduring alliances Conditions under which individual leaders have the most influence (WHEN/enabling factors) (3) 1) The more power is concentrated the individual leader, the greater the influence of that leader's personality and preferences 2) When systemic, domestic and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous 3) When circumstances are fluid How the first image interacts with the second/third images (2) 1) Individuals can shape the second image 2) Individuals can shape the third image So what? - The authors rebut arguments that individuals aren't important (as follows): a) Many IR theories take human nature as a constant, whereas IR varies. By instead presenting human nature as a variable that bears on IR, the authors have highlighted a short-coming of systemic-level theories. b) Individual-focused theories of IR can't be parsimonious. The authors dismiss that parsimony is more important than accuracy. c) Although some scholars acknowledge individuals can influence state intentions, they nonetheless maintain that those intentions aren't germane to theories of IR, but the authors assert this is empirically weak and analytically misleading.

Joll & Martel: "Ch. 7: Imperial Rivalries" (The Origins of the First World War)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: - The authors conclude that Immediate imperial rivalries did not cause the outbreak of war in 1914. Rather, the constant temptations posed to imperialist or would-be imperialist powers—for example, in the form of Morocco or Tripoli—sometimes produced crises that added to the instability in the international system preceding 1914. Older rivalries, moreover, were pushed to the back burner by the new alignment as a result of Germany's imperial ambitions and desire to make room for itself among the Great Powers. Imperialist policies and mindsets—"German ambitions, French grievances, Russian expansionism, British anxieties and Austrian fears" (248)—also influenced the decisions that were taken in 1914. So what? - Germany's imperial ambitions in particular helped played a role in shifting and adding pressure to old imperial lines. This bears on balance of power, power transition, and theories of hegemony explanations for war.

Weeks: "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict" (2012)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: Asks how domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders' decisions to start wars, and finds that in some dictatorships, institutions allow insiders to hold their leaders accountable for their foreign policy choices. Personalist leaders have eliminated potential rivals and the domestic audience does not have much sway over the cult of the leader (i.e. Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Un). More willing to take risks and be insulated from having to take accountability for their failures. —>Personalist civilian regimes=bosses —>Personalist military regimes=strongmen Nonpersonalist leaders operate within autocratic governments where regime elites are powerful and can influence the power of the leader —>Nonpersonalist civilian regimes=machines —>Nonpersonalist military regimes=juntas Constraint options: —>Ex ante constraints: implementing policy decisions up front so that the leader cannot always do what they please —>Ex post accountability: the leader can implement decisions, but are held accountable by the elites/audience who want a favorable result or do not want risky strategies (accountability for dictators can spell exile or execution, hence when it is applied, accountability can be more dangerous than for democratic leaders) Machines don't initiate conflict more than democracies; juntas, bosses, and strongmen are more likely to do this A domestic audience with a military background is more likely than a civilian audience to initiate force, because the audience is primed to believe that the status quo is a threat, and force is the best way to change it So what? Rather than viewing the decision for conflict as a by-product of regime type (democratic or autocratic), it should be viewed through the lens of the type of autocratic government and their unique costs of fighting and defeat. Opening the "black box" of authoritarian regimes can open policy options for other leaders to consider when crafting foreign policy. Assuming all dictatorships are alike and not understanding each individual context can lead to poor outcomes.

Talmadge: "Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States" (2017)

Theoretical perspective: Contribution: The article first analyzes the extent to which American conventional capabilities could plausibly threaten China's nuclear capabilities. Second, the article incorporates perceptual variables to illuminate a) how China would view threats to its nuclear arsenal after the failure of conventional deterrence and b) what value China might see in nuclear escalation under those conditions. Conclusions: - US conventional campaign would pose a large but not total threat to China's nuclear arsenal; it's more important to consider what China would think about US intentions during a situation in which conventional deterrence has failed - Despite its professed no-first-use policy, China might be pressed to engage in limited nuclear action—to gain military advantage or coercive leverage—out of fear that US actions were an attempt at conventional counterforce or a preparation for nuclear counterforce. So what? - Need to consider the additional escalation dynamics of a US response to China's initial response: Would China's efforts to alert its nuclear forces to improve their survivability during a crisis appear to the US like preparation for escalation, which could prompt the latter to launch a damage-limitation strike? - Some expansion of China's nuclear capabilities could be considered stabilizing if it raises the threshold at which US conventional operations could seriously erode China's nuclear arsenal, reassuring the latter during a conflict - Consider why the US would adopt conventional military strategies that increase the risk of its adversary's nuclear escalation in the first place. Some leader simply consider these risks regrettable but unavoidable; others view escalatory pressures as useful in that they improve deterrence and make conventional and nuclear escalation less likely - So, should the US sacrifice some of its conventional capabilities to reduce nuclear escalatory risks, or increase/leverage these risks to reduce the risk of war breaking out at all? Is "optimal stability," a compromise, possible?

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 5: Model III: Governmental Politics" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: Government action is the result of politicking and negotiation by the top leaders within; even if leaders share a goal, their personal interests and background will dictate how they think it best to achieve said goal. A variety of viewpoints will allow for a more comprehensive analysis of problems and options, but that benefit can be nullified by the complexity of joint action and groupthink. - Decisionmakers, even if their authority is absolute, a) require consensus among their subordinates to ensure the decision is not misunderstood or ignored and b) will be influenced by the composition of their entourage. - Decisionmakers, if certain enough, will seek approval rather than input from their advisors. Likewise, advisors seeking influence in the process will have to work within the framework of the decision already made. So what? Allison and Zelikow's Model III shows how bureaucracies can be effective at sharing power and making higher quality decisions, in spite of their common criticisms. It also analyzes the qualities of power and the oft-ignored balance of power between the decision-makers and the implementers. Criticism: Their argument is fairly constructivist, relying on identities to shape interests. While this can definitely be argued to be the case for bureaucratic organizations, it fails to take into account the sway of ambitious leaders and their powerful hold on the bully pulpit to drive an agenda and accomplish objectives without group buy-in.

Allison & Zelikow: "Ch. 3: Model II: Organizational Behavior" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis)

Theoretical perspective: Unlike Model I, which considers state behavior/government action to be based on a deliberate choice, Model II considers behavior to be the result of an organization's procedural output. - Governments are made of many parts, and complex tasks are broken down into smaller pieces and assigned according to pre-established organizational lines. - As large, hierarchical, and relatively independent, government action requires massive coordination and follows procedures (SOPs). - Existing organizational capacities influence government decisions, and organizational priorities direct implementation. - Leaders' choices are constrained by the organizations' time and resource limitations; the first adequate option is usually taken, at the expense of evaluating all other options (which might not be possible given limitations) Examples given by Kronvall: military transformation and COIN implementation under George W. Bush administration; Trump's challenges—can't run the government like a business So what? Model 2 provides a lens to look at not just the Cuban Missile Crisis but the way governments will respond to any crisis and highlights the importance of how internal organizations interact with each other and make their cases. Critique: Allison and Zelikow describe the aspects of organizations in detail and how they influence decisions, but this does not take into account individuals or situations where there is no precedent.

Tannenwald: "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo"

Theoretical perspective: Constructivism Contribution: Argues that the reason nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 is that a "nuclear taboo" has developed since then that constrains the resort to use these weapons by a) reinforcing deterrence (explain how) and b) inducing restraint when deterrence doesn't work (explain how). So what? Nuclear taboo most helpful for nonnuclear powers, because the restraint induced by the norm is their only recourse against nuclear attack; nuclear states, by contrast, can rely on mutual deterrence for security Taboo won't necessarily constrain terrorists, who might enjoy violating it for dramatic political effect Taboo could unravel or erode if: a) Proliferation of nukes by new states could weaken the NPT, b) Nuclear states' continued emphasis of nukes in their nuclear doctrines, c) If nuclear states rely on their nukes to make policy (i.e make threats), or d) Any use of nukes would damage the taboo (but not necessarily disrupt it because norms are more resilient than traditions, i.e. of nonuse) Criticism: in taking a more holistic view of the issue, the author seems to seriously down-play the role of the precedent or tradition of non-use, which can be a very powerful factor in decision-making.

Ikenberry: "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order" (1998/1999)

Theoretical perspective: Liberal institutionalism Debate about order: Neorealism says that order among states is established via BoP or Hegemony, and because of this the problems of anarchy can't be fended off for long. But why then has the current order persisted for so long? Liberal theories say that western institutions undergird the current stable world order, as they reduce incentives for cheating. Liberalism can explain why these institutions are enduring, but since it doesn't say how the institutions mitigate anarchy problems, doesn't offer a fix to neorealism's assertion that the problems will return. Contribution: a liberal, "sticky" institutional theory to explain the formation and longevity of the modern, US-dominated Western order, and why there have been no major wars since WWII. 4 steps: 1. Current order established after WWII; it was agreed-upon by all/most states despite sharp power asymmetries among them because the US undertook strategic restraint. 2. "Sticky" institutions enabled strategic restraint because their binding effects constrained states in a way that reduced the returns to power. 3. This institutionalized, postwar Western order was amenable to Europe and Japan because American hegemony is liberal and therefore more benign and acceptable. 4. An increasing return to institutions makes this order more durable. The order is only legitimate if other states buy into it; values like multilateralism, openness, and reciprocity foster legitimacy. So what? Ikenberry's argument as one of the foundational liberal scholars both answers a gap left by neorealism (why hasn't the security dilemma been overcome since WWII?) and asserts why international institutions are so important. Criticism: His caveat, that the order is only legitimate if others buy into it, could be more important in the present state of affairs with Brexit and as China seeks to break away.

Wendt: "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" (1992)

Theoretical perspective: constructivism Main Argument: While the international system may be anarchic, it depends on what you make of the situation. Realism and liberalism assume that self-help and power/interests are set in stone; constructivists see identities as informing interests, which in turn inform states' actions and interactions with other states within the system. Key Points: - Some identities can be more salient to states than others depending on the situation. Multiple identities exist within states which evolve in importance (in terms of state decision-making) over time through interaction domestically and with other states. - International institutions can change states' identities and interests. - Self-help, sovereignty, and power politics are institutions in and of themselves, not merely features of anarchy. - Social threats are constructed, not inherent in the international system. They arise from patterns of states' behavior leading to a security dilemma, not simply that the anarchic international system mandates it that way. So what? Wendt argues that "realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy;" basically if we assume the worst about others, then that's what we have to contend with. But if we search for ways to interact that avoid the security dilemma and reinforce positive patterns, you can change the game. Critique: Wendt admits that it's nearly impossible to unlearn traits about others. Therefore this system may have worked to begin with, but once the world became suspicious of other powers and created a security dilemma, it's hard to change it. Even repetitive positive interactions can still hide deep-seated fears about other states.

Walt: "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations"

Theoretical perspective: defensive neorealism Main Argument: Theory is designed to 1) aid policymakers in identifying conditions that allow for linkage of cause and effect, and 2) aid policymakers in deciding what to do in situations given a set of assessed conditions. However, the gulf between theory and practice is widening, given its inaccessibility and academic tendency for theorists to write for their peers and not distill concepts down to be feasible for a policymaker to consume and utilize, in the often tight time frame in which policy decisions must be made. Bad theory, e.g. domino theory, Marxism, can lead policymakers astray. Theory is broad and sometimes not useful for the day-to-day policymaker. Often it does little to aid in implementation. So what? The author identifies reasons why theory sometimes fails to achieve intended effects, implying a need to alter the relationship between theory and policy to make the former more relevant, accessible and practicable to the latter.

Rosato: "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory" (2003)

Theoretical perspective: liberalism? Contribution: finds that the causal logics underpinning DPT do not provide sufficient explanation for the phenomenon that democracies do not go to war with each other. Argues that the fact of DPT may not be due to the nature/character of democratic systems, but rather to "an imperial peace based on American power." (599) Reasons for democratic peace given by the theory: - Democracies are able to externalize their norms of conflict resolution, and mutual respect for each other prevails when interests clash. NOPE! —>Norms of conflict resolution: 1) war may be rationalized as liberating peoples under non-democratic regimes, and 2) non-democratic regimes, perhaps believing that democratic regimes won't wage war, may be inclined to start one first —>Mutual respect/trust: 1) not all leaders view other regimes as sufficiently democratic, basing their perceptions on who we like and who we don't want to be like and 2) trust and respect can be superseded by national security interests (i.e. Domino Theory) - Elected leaders, because of their accountability to their pacifist publics, refrain from engaging in conflict with other democracies. NOPE! There is often broad public support for war if nationalism, self-defense, and nation-building justifications are given - Democracies, by virtue of their bureaucratic political systems, are slow to mobilize or launch surprise attacks, particularly against each other. NOPE! —>Slow mobilization: At least in the US, the War Powers Act of 1972 allows presidents to unilaterally declare war or spin the intentions to make war more acceptable —>Surprise attack: Democracies (especially the US) still resort to covert action programs, indicating a lack of liberal action or lack of openness - Transparency of democratic systems makes democracies' resolve and intentions public, thereby preventing conflict. NOPE! information can still be spun or not shared with the public if it is believed it is not in the public interest/requires executive privilege, etc. So what? If the fact of DPT was the result of democracies' character, we should continue to pursue policies aimed at democratization. If, however, the fact of DPT hinges on continued American preponderance, than that needs to be the US's main direction.

Mearsheimer: "Can China Rise Peacefully?" (2014)

Theoretical perspective: offensive structural realism Contribution: Offensive neorealism's take on whether China can rise peacefully. Conclusions: - As China grows it will strive to become the regional hegemon in Asia, like the US has done in the Western Hemisphere. First, China will attempt to dominate Asia by maximizing the power gap with other Asian states. Second, China will attempt to push the US out, maybe even devising its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. - The US will strive to prevent China's regional hegemony in Asia (*per the tenets of offensive neorealism, which says it's best to be the only regional hegemon in the world—see Mear's Tragedy of Great Power Politics) - China's neighbors in Asia will join the US to try to contain China (it is safer for them to do this rather than bandwagon with China) - An intense security competition will ensue (see author's 12 indicators to watch out for), with more potential for conflict than during the Cold War, as 1) unlike Europe then, "there is no equivalent of the Central Front in Asia to anchor stability." (40), and 2) the situation in Asia will not be bipolar (safe), but unbalanced multipolarity (most dangerous). So what? If the US was successful in making and keeping itself the world's sole regional hegemon, can it do the same with China?

Kalyvas: "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars" (2003)

There are two prevailing perspectives on civil war: —> Hobbesian view of civil war: civil wars are characterized by the breakdown of authority and subsequent anarchy. Civil wars encourage privatization of violence, bringing to the fore all sorts of motivations in what is a "war of all against all" (greed) —> Schmittian view: civil wars are characterized by abstract group loyalties and beliefs, whereby the political enemy becomes a private adversary (grievance) Contribution: But civil wars are not binary, and instead involve the complex and ambiguous processes that foster action of local and supralocal actors, civilians, and armies. Analysis of the character of civil wars requires breaking from binary perceptions and bringing macro and micro-level theory together to understand how both levels manipulate each other for their own ends and to better interpret onset, duration, and termination of civil war. So what? Open the black box and you tend to find a mess of individuals and fluid groups with competing interests that invariably end up colliding with one another. Actions on the ground are often more related to local or private conflicts than to the war's driving aims. Civil war can be seen as a joint process of collective actors' quest for power and local actors' quest for local advantage based upon a wide range of motives, from the most ideological to most opportunistic.

Walzer: "Ch. 14: Winning and Fighting Well" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

This chapter characterizes the tension between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, defining codes and where lines are drawn in the conduct of war. This ranges from the Duke of Sung example of feudal codes, which dictates that war occurs between peers to display aristocratic virtue. On the other end is the General Sherman "war is hell" doctrine, which provides that jus ad bellum is the only justice necessary in war. Walzer argues for a line to be drawn that morally allows for the convention to be overridden only in the face of imminent catastrophe.

Walzer: "Ch. 9: Noncombatant Immunity and Military Necessity" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

This chapter seeks to find a balance between military necessity and the risk to civilians, summed up in the argument that justifying an act that will likely carry evil consequences if: it is a legitimate act of war, the direct effect intended is morally acceptable, the intention is good (insofar as the intent is for the direct effect and not the evil consequences), and the good effect outweighs the evil. In this chapter Walzer also addresses the effect of introducing humanity, or characteristics that are decidedly human, non-threatening, or silly, to enemy soldiers may decrease the desire of some to kill the enemy, while it has little effect on others. This has interesting implications for the psychological need to "other" the enemy in order to create a necessity to kill the enemy, which takes hold differently in different people.

Van Evera: Appendix (excerpt): "How to Write a Paperl"

Van Evera outlines what a good political science paper should look like. - Introduction summary a) What question/questions do you address? b) Put your questions in context and answer how they arise (i.e. from literature or world events)? c) Summarize your answer(s) in a "bottom line" in 1-3 sentences d) Explain your methodology used to reach your answers e) Provide a roadmap to the rest of the paper (i.e. "in Section II I explain___, etc.) - For your argumentation: a) Use empirical evidence b) Clearly frame the points your evidence supports c) Argue against yourself by addressing possible objections or alternative interpretations d) Always use footnotes - Paragraphs and sections should follow a similar structure: a) First, a topic sentence(s) distilling the point of the paragraph/section b) Second, supporting material to explain or elaborate the topic sentence c) Third, qualifications or refutations to counterarguments

Walzer: "Ch. 3: The Rules of War" (Just and Unjust Wars, 2015)

War is hell, but the moral reality of war ensures that soldiers have relative moral equality in killing each other, so long as they are fighting freely rather than out of servitude, and abide by the War Convention. This is the set of norms we subscribe to about how war should be conducted: not killing civilians or the wounded, allowing prisoners to surrender, etc. It separates soldiers' "work" from "mere butchery." The one problem here is that if war is hell and the War Convention sets limits on how war is conducted, it can actually drag out the war and delay/weaken lasting peace. So is it worth it to abide by these rules?