Chapter 1: Due Process
What is the "complete diversity" rule?
It holds that there's no diversity jurisdiction if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. EXCEPTIONS: You don't need complete diversity in certain situations, including the following: Statutory interpleader (28 USC §1335); Claims covered by supplemental jurisdiction, such as those brought by third-party defendants; and Class actions (and some other representative actions) in which only the citizenship of the representative(s) need be diverse. NOTE: The easiest way to check for complete diversity is to take a piece of scrap paper, draw a line down the middle, and put all the plaintiffs and their domiciles on one side and all the defendants and their domiciles on the other. If any state appears on both sides, diversity is not complete.
What is a natural person's "domicile"?
It is the term used to define the meaning of "citizenship" of a natural person for the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 USC §1332(a). It has two elements: It's the place at which a person maintains a physical residence (the physical element), With the intent to remain there indefinitely (the mental element). A person retains his domicile until these two elements unite somewhere else.
To be constitutionally adequate, what must notice contain?
It must give the person reasonably adequate information of her rights (e.g., the right to dispute a bill).
In the context of personal jurisdiction, what's the difference between "specific" jurisdiction and "general" jurisdiction?
"Specific" jurisdiction arises when the cause of action is related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. "General" jurisdiction arises when the cause of action isn't related to the defendant's forum state contacts. The significance of this difference is the level of contact the defendant must have with the forum to justify its jurisdiction over her. When "general" jurisdiction is claimed, the defendant must have "systematic and continuous" contact with the forum to justify its jurisdiction over her. "Specific" jurisdiction is much less rigorous. F §2.4.5 pp. 72-73; E Ch.2-III(F); FKM § 3.10 pp. 129-30. Note that the difference becomes more understandable when you take into account that "minimum contacts" exist when it would be reasonable for the defendant to anticipate being haled before forum courts. If the claim in question arises from the defendant's contacts with the forum (specific jurisdiction), it's much more reasonable to expect her to anticipate being haled before its courts. If the specific claim doesn't arise from her contacts with the forum, but she has a continuous and systematic connection with the forum anyway, it's still reasonable for her to anticipate being haled before its courts on any claim (general jurisdiction), whether related to her in-state contacts or not.
What is "constructive service"/"constructive notice"?
Constructive service is a collection of methods of notifying defendants who cannot be located within the state (including temporarily absent domiciliaries, non-resident defendants, and others over whom in-state jurisdiction is exercised). Generally, constructive service is satisfied by certified or registered mail. The use of long-arm statutes has increased the need to recognize the validity of service by mail out of state. Constructive service provides the defendant with constructive notice.
"Judge" Crater is driving his car one night and broadsides a car driven by Misty O'Time. He realizes she's going to sue him and moves out of his house without telling any authority of his forwarding address. The process papers are served on the insurance company that carries Crater's car insurance. Will such service be constitutionally sufficient?
Yes, probably. The key is estoppel—Crater's own acts have made it impossible to serve him with process by any traditional means (e.g., personal service, registered mail, or papers left at dwelling). Thus, service on his insurance company—which would not otherwise suffice—will be valid for notice purposes.
Batman, a resident of New York, is driving through Arkansas in his Batmobile when he runs into a car driven by Alfred Pennyworth, an Arkansas resident. Pennyworth files a tort claim against Batman in Arkansas state court. The non-resident motorist statute calls for registered mail service of papers to the out-of-state defendant and service on the Arkansas State Director of Motor Vehicles. Will this be constitutionally sufficient?
Yes. This is the type of notice most non-resident motorist statutes require. FKM §3.20 p. 184. It's constitutional since it meets the Mullane standard—it's "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to give the defendant actual notice."
Grinch files a tort claim against the Santa Claus Toy Company in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction. Grinch alleges $80,000 in damages. Grinch is a citizen of Oregon. The Santa Claus Toy Company is incorporated in Delaware, has its corporate headquarters in Portland, Oregon, and has its toy factory in Alaska. Santa Claus moves to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. What result?
Case dismissed. As a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hertz Corporation v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010), the parties are not diverse. A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. In Hertz, the Court unanimously adopted the "nerve center" definition of "principal place of business," holding that a corporation's "principal place of business" refers to "the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." It added that this "nerve center" would "typically be found at a corporation's headquarters." Since the corporation's headquarters are in Oregon, under the nerve center test, the corporation will be deemed to have its principal place of business in Oregon. The fact that it also has a factory in Alaska is now irrelevant. Thus, as the plaintiff is also a citizen of Oregon, the parties are non-diverse. Since this is a tort claim, the case arises under state law and so original subject matter jurisdictional is lacking under both §§1331 and 1332. The motion will be granted and the case will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. NOTE: The fact that the corporation also is a citizen of Delaware, its state of incorporation, does not provide diversity of citizenship because the plaintiff must be diverse from all states of which the defendant is a citizen.
What is "diversity jurisdiction"?
Federal court diversity jurisdiction is the authority of the federal courts to hear cases when the parties fall within certain categories and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The dispute must be between the following parties: Citizens of one state v. citizens of another state; Citizens of a state v. foreign state or citizens; Citizens of a state v. citizens of a different state plus foreign states or citizens; Foreign state as plaintiff v. citizens of a state or different states. The most important things to remember about diversity jurisdiction are: "Citizenship" is the same as "domicile," and it's determined when the action is filed in federal court. In multiple-party cases, no plaintiff can be from the same state as any defendant (this is called "complete diversity," but it does have a few exceptions, e.g., statutory interpleader under 28 USC §1335; when at least two people are claiming the same property held by someone else, there's diversity as long as any two of the claimants are from different states and the amount in controversy is $500 or more). The "amount in controversy" must exceed $75,000; $75,000 itself won't suffice.
What is the test for determining a corporation's "principal place of business"?
For decades, the circuit courts could not agree on a uniform interpretation of "principal place of business." Some circuits focused on a corporation's "nerve center," i.e., the location of its corporate headquarters where its business was directed and controlled. Others focused on the state in which the largest portion of the company's business activities was conducted. The Supreme Court resolved this circuit conflict in Hertz Corporation v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010). There, the Court unanimously adopted the "nerve center" test, holding that a corporation's "principal place of business" refers to "the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." It added that this "nerve center" would "typically be found at a corporation's headquarters." While acknowledging that the "nerve center" test might not be a "perfect test that satisfies all administrative and purposive criteria" and that it would, on occasion, generate hard cases, the Court determined that this standard would better promote the substantial interests in avoiding the diversion of scarce judicial and other litigative resources into jurisdictional challenges and promoting predictability for plaintiffs and corporate defendants. CAUTION: The Hertz Court noted that if the record revealed an attempt to manipulate the existence or absence of diversity, such as by relying on a "nerve center" that was only a mailbox drop or location of an annual meeting of the board of directors, the lower courts should look to the actual place of control and coordination in determining the corporation's true nerve center. NOTE: Don't forget that a corporation is considered a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 USC §1332(c)(1). So if any opposing party is a citizen of either the corporation's state of incorporation or state of its principal place of business, there will be no diversity jurisdiction.
Under what circumstances will "notice by publication" be sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements?
In general, it's not. Notice by publication (e.g., in a newspaper) is presumptively invalid. The only time it may be permissible is if a person cannot be found after "reasonable diligence" is employed to find her. Then publication becomes the only reasonable means for notice and, as a result, permissible. Before notice by publication is constitutionally sufficient, however, it must be shown that the defendant's name and address are not known.
What does in personam jurisdiction do?
In personam (or "personal") jurisdiction gives the court the authority to bind or affect the parties personally (e.g., to award money damages or injunctive relief). PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF: By filing a complaint in the forum state, a plaintiff submits herself (consents) to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her, both as to her claim and any counterclaims the defendant may assert. The defendant can't challenge the state's jurisdiction over the plaintiff. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT: If a natural-person defendant (i.e., not a corporation or other entity) is served with process in state, the state has personal jurisdiction over her—that's all there is to it. (The Supreme Court never has held that in-state service on an agent is per se constitutionally sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant.) For the defendant who is served with process out of state, however, certain due process requirements must be satisfied before the state can exercise personal jurisdiction over her—that is, she must have sufficient contact with the state to support jurisdiction.
There is one case, one supremely important case, the Queen Mother of all modern jurisdiction cases, you might call it, that concerns the jurisdiction of forum state courts over non-present defendants. What is it?
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), more affectionately known as "International Shoe." This 1945 case established the "minimum contacts" test as a constitutional requirement for valid jurisdiction over non-present defendants as part of the due process guarantee. "Minimum contacts" are found when the non-present defendant can reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state, so that it's fair to subject him to forum state jurisdiction—and that's the thread connecting International Shoe and its progeny. Note that both domicile and consent, in and of themselves, constitute "minimum contacts" with the forum state. HOW TO REMEMBER: Picture Goliath in a giant shoe—the more ridiculous the better—walking over a field of tiny ("mini") contact lenses, crushing them. Shoe = International Shoe; "mini" contact = minimum contacts.
Alexandra, a resident of Rhode Island, files a civil fraud suit against Rasputin in federal district court, alleging diversity jurisdiction. Rasputin lives in Massachusetts. She alleges $80,000 in damages. During the trial, Rasputin moves to Rhode Island, intending to remain there permanently. He immediately moves to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since there is no longer diversity. What result?
Motion denied. Domicile is determined when the action is filed. Since diversity existed then (and the amount in controversy requirement was met), it will continue through the conclusion of the case.
Norman Bates has lived his entire live in Ohio. He's at the local Crane Diner one day when the chef/owner, Marion Crane (who also is a life-long Ohioan), accidentally spills scalding coffee on him, disfiguring him. The following week, Bates moves permanently to Kentucky to run his mother's motel, the Bates Motel, when she suddenly becomes permanently incapacitated. Once in Kentucky, Bates files a negligence claim against Crane in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction and $80,000 in damages. Crane moves to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. What result?
Motion denied. The time for determining citizenship for purposes of diversity is the day the action is filed. WK §28 p. 173; E Ch.3-III(E). Since Bates has shifted his domicile to Kentucky by that time and Crane is a citizen of Ohio and the claim exceeds $75,000, diversity jurisdiction exists. NOTE: The change of domicile must be genuine. It doesn't matter if one's motive in moving is to create or destroy diversity jurisdiction, as long as he truly intends to remain (i.e., with an indefinite intent to remain, not just to move back when the suit is over).
Hans Zell brought an ejectment action in federal court against his former wife, Greta Zell, alleging that she continued to reside on his property after transferring title to him as part of the divorce agreement. In his complaint, Zell asserted that any claim asserted by Greta that he had forfeited title to the land by building a structure on it that was not in compliance with local zoning ordinances was insufficient as a matter of law because those state laws were unconstitutional under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Greta filed a timely motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Both parties are citizens of New Jersey. What result?
Motion granted and case dismissed. To satisfy the "arising under" requirement of the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 USC §1331, an issue of federal law must arise under the plaintiff's prima facie case. It is not enough if the complaint asserts the existence of a federal issue in either the defendant's answer or as a reply to an anticipated defense. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); E Ch. 3-IV (A)(3); F §4.6 p. 200. Here, the complaint alleges a purely state law-created claim based in either contract or property law. The federal constitutional issue arises only in reply to what the plaintiff anticipates will be a state law-based defense. Therefore, the issue does not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of §1331. Accordingly, the defense motion will be granted and the case will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
There's one supremely important case on the issue of constitutionally valid notice. What is it?
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). It established the principle that to satisfy constitutional due process considerations, notice must be "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to give the person actual notice."
Is there an amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases?
No (with very few exceptions), not in federal question cases. But diversity actions do require that the claim exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 USC §1332(a); E Ch.3-V(A)(2).
Billy Shakespeare owns the U.S. copyright to the X-rated flick, "A Midsummer Night's Erotic Dream." He licenses the film to the Triple-Ecks Theater chain in return for 10% of the box-office sales. Triple-Ecks runs the film in its chain and refuses to pay. As a result of this refusal, Shakespeare brings a suit in federal district court to enforce payment, relying on federal question jurisdiction. Is this a federal question?
No, because Shakespeare isn't suing for copyright infringement under federal law; he's suing for breach of contract, which does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 USC §1331. There's no copyright infringement claim here because Billy licensed the film. The contract may refer to a copyright, but it's just a contract with a contract breach. The court's responsibility is only to interpret the contract. Thus, no federal question jurisdiction exists.
Suppose that Coffee Anon decided to file a copyright infringement claim in state court because he and the defendant were citizens of the same state and his claim sought damages of $50,000. Does the state court have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim?
No. Claims under the federal copyright statute fall within the federal courts' exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. 28 USC §1338(a). This means that such claims cannot be adjudicated by a state court. Since this is a claim arising under federal law, the facts that the parties are non-diverse and that the claim does not meet the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement for diversity claims are completely irrelevant. Remember that the overwhelming percentage of federal statutory claims fall within the state and federal courts' concurrent jurisdiction, i.e., these claims can be filed in either federal or state court.
Ma and Pa Kettle have never flown before, and they finally decide to take a plane ride. They board the plane, owned by Air Nauseam Airlines, and watch carefully as the flight attendants describe the safety features of the plane. They fasten their safety belts as instructed, but the belts malfunction, cutting off circulation to their legs and seriously injuring them. To settle a tort claim filed by the Kettles, Air Nauseam gives them free lifetime passes on the airline. Shortly thereafter, Congress outlaws certain types of lifetime tickets, and Air Nauseam cancels the passes. The Kettles file suit in federal court, claiming breach of contract and alleging that Air Nauseam will assert as a defense the federal law outlawing the passes. Is there valid federal question subject matter jurisdiction?
No. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the essential elements of the plaintiff's complaint arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 USC §1331. A plaintiff cannot get into federal court by anticipating a federal defense. The federal question must appear as part of the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Here, the Kettles' complaint is straight breach of contract. As such, there will be no federal question jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); E. Ch.3-IV(A)(3).
Coffee Anon retires from politics, moves to the United States, and obtains U.S. citizenship. He goes into the movie business and produces a film, "Five Easy Peaces," to which he owns the U.S. copyright. He licenses the film to the Morbucks Cinema chain in return for 10% of the box-office take. Morbucks shows the film and refuses to pay. Anon brings suit in federal court, based on federal question jurisdiction. He alleges non-payment of royalties. Instead of moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Morbucks defends by arguing that the copyright is invalid and, therefore, not entitled to protection under Title 17 of the U.S. Code. Can the court hear the case based on federal question jurisdiction?
No. In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction to exist, the plaintiff's complaint must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 USC §1331. Here, the complaint alleges a breach of contract claim; it's the defense that arises under federal law. There is no federal subject matter jurisdiction, so the case must be dismissed, unless there is some other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction (like diversity). FRCP 12(h)(3).
Is the "well-pleaded complaint" rule a constitutionally mandated limitation on federal court subject matter jurisdiction?
No; the well-pleaded complaint rule is a product of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "arising under" language found in 28 USC §1331. Although Article III, §2 of the U.S. Constitution also contains the identical "arising under" language to describe one component of the federal judicial power, the Supreme Court has given a broader interpretation to the constitutional "arising under" language than it has to its statutory counterpart. The Court has ruled that Article III authorizes the exercise of the federal judicial power to any case in which a federal question is "an ingredient." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). In explaining its ruling that the "arising under" language of §1331 is limited to cases in which the federal question falls within a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that in enacting §1331, Congress chose not to confer federal question jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by Article III, §2.
Baron von Frankenstein owns the U.S. patent for a method of revivifying the dead. He files a patent infringement suit against Fu Manchu. He files the claim in federal court, claiming subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question and alleging $2,000 in damages. Fu Manchu moves for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that Frankenstein's claim does not ask for more than $75,000, the amount in controversy requirement. Will the motion be granted?
No; there is no federal question amount in controversy requirement (with very few, rather obscure exceptions). 28 USC §1331. The amount in controversy requirement is applied only to diversity cases. 28 USC §1332(a); E Ch.3-V(A)(2).
Cinderella files a tort claim in state court against Wicked Stepmother for intentional infliction of emotional distress. What would be the surest possible means of serving process on Wicked Stepmother so as to satisfy constitutional due process requirements?
Personal delivery of process. Although substituted process (e.g., to the person's dwelling or by mail) or other means are acceptable, depending on the state, personal delivery always satisfies constitutional notice requirements.
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases that involve a federal question. What's a "federal question"?
Pursuant to authorization under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has enacted legislation that provides the federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over, inter alia, a claim that arises under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. (Note that this includes not only federal statutes but federal common law—i.e., case law interpreting federal statutes.) 28 USC §1331. (Federal statutes have been enacted covering civil rights, interstate commerce, patents and copyrights, antitrust, securities, and bankruptcy.) If a case contains a federal question, diversity requirements such as citizenship of the parties and the size of the claim become irrelevant on the issue of jurisdiction. E Ch.3-IV(A). The key here is to analyze "arises under." It has been construed by the Supreme Court to mean that either federal law creates the cause of action or the plaintiff's complaint requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Pursuant to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, the court will look exclusively at the issues raised in the plaintiff's prima facie case. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). If the prima facie case doesn't raise a federal question, the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (unless diversity, or some other ground for federal court jurisdiction, exists). WK §17 pp. 102-10; FRCP 12(h)(3). It is the plaintiff's complaint that must contain a substantial federal question; it doesn't matter that the defendant may (or will) raise federal defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. E Ch.3-IV(A)(3). Since the federal question must be part of the plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint," i.e., it must be part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, it is not sufficient for the federal question to be included in the complaint as a reply to an anticipated defense.
What is "venue"?
Venue is the place, considering only those courts that have jurisdiction, where a given action will be heard. F §5.1 pp. 235-37; WK §42 pp. 258-59. Thus, jurisdiction must be established before venue can become an issue. In other words, venue is an issue only after jurisdiction over the parties exists. WK §42 p. 259; E Ch. 2-VIII(A)(1). (NOTE: In federal cases, the issue is what federal district will hear the trial; in state courts, the issue is generally what county or district is the appropriate place for a trial.) WHEN DETERMINED: Venue is determined as of the time the action is filed (not the time when the claim arose). TIMING: Objections to venue must be made in the defendant's first appearance in most states and in federal courts—either by FRCP 12(b) motion or in the defendant's answer. REMEDY: If venue is improper and the defendant objects, the remedy generally is to transfer the case to a court with proper venue, not to dismiss the case. 28 USC §1406. (Note that state courts can transfer only in state; federal courts are not limited by state boundaries. A state court can, however, dismiss a case on the condition that the defendant agrees to jurisdiction in a proper venue elsewhere.)
Is the "notice and opportunity to be heard" requirement for valid jurisdiction a constitutional issue?
Yes; notice and opportunity to be heard concerns a defendant's constitutional right to due process.
In 2012, the Mottleys are denied renewal of their free passes on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. They sue the Railroad for breach of contract, claiming that it had agreed to renew their passes for life, in return for a release of liability for injuries in an accident on the Railroad. They allege that the Railroad refused to renew their passes because of a new federal statute barring free passes, but also allege that the statute only applies to passes granted after its enactment. Both parties are from Kentucky. The Railroad moves to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After the Supreme Court's decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing Co., the court will a. grant the motion, applying the well pleaded complaint rule. b. deny the motion if it determines that there is a substantial question as to whether the federal statute applies to the Mottleys' passes, issued prior to its passage. c. deny the motion, because the Mottleys, in order to prove their state law claim, must establish a proposition of federal law. d. grant the motion only if it concludes that the federal statute does not bar renewal of the Mottleys' passes.
a. grant the motion, applying the well pleaded complaint rule.
Consolidated Corporation sues Garces, a former employee, for business libel, a tort claim. The suit is brought in federal court, and alleges that Garces falsely reported to a federal agency that Consolidated was using watered-down concrete on a federal construction project. Garces answers, admitting that he had made a report to the agency, but alleging that his report was protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right of free speech. He also files a counterclaim against Consolidated, based on the Federal Whistleblower Act, which authorizes damages for anyone who is dismissed or disciplined for reporting fraud on the federal government. After answering the complaint, Garces moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Assume that there is no jurisdiction based on diversity.) The motion should be a. granted, because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. b. denied, because the complaint alleges that Garces reported the violations to a federal agency. c. denied, because the case involves a question arising under the Constitution of the United States. d. denied, because Garces's counterclaim arises under federal law. e. denied, because Garces waived his objection to jurisdiction by answering the complaint and asserting a counterclaim against Consolidated.
a. granted, because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Atlanta Precision Drill Corporation makes drill presses in Georgia. It sells them to several wholesale distributors, including Emporia Distributors in Pennsylvania. It sells five hundred drill presses to Emporia and agrees to give them a price rebate on any presses resold into Maryland, a state in which it has no distributor. Emporia resells five presses to Modern Tool and Die Co. in Annapolis, Maryland. A local machine shop buys one from Modern, and Edwards, an employee, is injured using it in Maryland. He sues Atlanta Precision in state court in Maryland for his injuries. Atlanta Precision has no other contacts in Maryland. After the J. McIntyre decision the Maryland court will probably conclude that it a. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it has purposely engaged in conduct calculated to serve the market for its products in Maryland. b. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because five of its presses were resold in Maryland. c. lacks jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because only five of its presses were resold in Maryland. d. lacks jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it has not reached into Maryland to promote its products.
a. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it has purposely engaged in conduct calculated to serve the market for its products in Maryland.
Neff hired Mitchell, a lawyer, in Oregon to sue Jones for breach of contract. Neff agreed to pay Mitchell $300 for his services. Mitchell did the work, but Neff left the state for California and didn't pay Mitchell's fee. Mitchell sues Neff for his fee in an Oregon state court, and has Neff served with process in Oregon while Neff was visiting there on unrelated business. Neff promptly departed once more for California and has not returned to the state since. Under personal jurisdiction theory as expounded in Pennoyer, the Oregon court a. has personal jurisdiction over Neff. b. does not have personal jurisdiction over Neff, because he was served while he was there for a purpose unrelated to the fees claim. c. does not have jurisdiction over Neff, because he is no longer physically present in Oregon. d. has jurisdiction over Neff for the fees claim, but would not have jurisdiction over him if Mitchell had sued him for a claim that arose in another state.
a. has personal jurisdiction over Neff.
Angus and Phillips, from Texas, bring a breach of contract action against Apex Corporation in the federal district court for the Western District of Texas. Apex is a corporation that manufactures lawnmowers. It is incorporated in Delaware. It assembles the mowers at its plant in El Paso, Texas, which employs five hundred employees. It has another factory in Tennessee, which manufactures handles for the mowers and employs twenty-five employees. Its corporate headquarters occupy a small suite of offices on the twelfth floor of an office building in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Fifteen officers and employees work out of the headquarters office. The court will find that there a. is complete diversity and proceed with the case. b. is not complete diversity because the case is brought in a Texas court, and the plaintiffs are both Texas citizens. c. is not complete diversity because both plaintiffs are from Texas. d. is not complete diversity between the plaintiffs and Apex. Under 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1) Texas is Apex's principal place of business, because Texas citizens in El Paso will think of Apex as "local," while hardly anyone in Oklahoma will know anything about Apex Corporation, which has very low visibility in Oklahoma. e. is diversity between the plaintiffs and Apex, because Apex is a citizen of Delaware based on its incorporation there.
a. is complete diversity and proceed with the case.
Boyarin is the vice-president of an Illinois company, Compu-Drive, that does software design for medical applications. She learns that Mercy Hospital, a major research facility in Virginia, is planning to contract with MediSoft, Compu-Drive's main competitor, a Virginia company with its offices in Virginia, to design software to support its genetic research facility. Boyarin calls Mercy's vice president for operations and explains in livid detail the shortcomings of MediSoft's products. Mercy backs out of the MediSoft agreement, and MediSoft, when it learns why, sues Boyarin for interference with advantageous business relations. It sues in Virginia. Boyarin moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. a. The motion will likely be denied, if Compu-Drive has extensive contacts in Virginia. b. The motion will likely be denied, because Boyarin's contacts suffice to support jurisdiction over her for this claim. c. The motion will likely be granted. Boyarin has not acted in Virginia and has no physical presence in the state. d. The motion will likely be granted. Although MediSoft has extensive contacts in Virginia, the plaintiff's contacts in the state do not suffice to support personal jurisdiction.
b. The motion will likely be denied, because Boyarin's contacts suffice to support jurisdiction over her for this claim.
Crandall, a citizen of Missouri, and Rizzouti, a citizen of Iowa, sue Janssen, a citizen of Vermont; Gompers, an American citizen who lived all his life in Florida but recently moved to Great Britain and plans to remain indefinitely; and Toussaint, a Frenchwoman who has moved to Iowa to take a one-year visiting professorship at the University of Iowa, hoping to get tenure there and stay. The suit is brought in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Assume that Toussaint has not been admitted to the United States for "permanent residence.") a. There is no jurisdiction over the action because Toussaint is a citizen of Iowa. b. There is no jurisdiction if Gompers remains in the case, but the action could proceed between the plaintiffs Crandall and Rizzouti and defendants Toussaint and Janssen. c. There is no jurisdiction over the claims against Toussaint, because she is an alien domiciled in Iowa. d. There is jurisdiction over the entire action.
b. There is no jurisdiction if Gompers remains in the case, but the action could proceed between the plaintiffs Crandall and Rizzouti and defendants
Cartwright is a carpenter who lives in Vermont and works out of his home there. In addition to his Vermont customers, he has some customers across the border in New York, and some in Massachusetts. Last year, he built a garage for a New York customer and put an addition on another New Yorker's house. This was about 5 percent of his construction business for the year, which is about the average for his New York business each year. While driving to a job in Massachusetts, Cartwright has an accident, in Massachusetts, with Morales, from New York. Morales brings suit against Cartwright for his injuries in a New York state court. a. Cartwright is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York for this claim because he has minimum contacts in New York. b. Cartwright is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York based on minimum contacts if New York has a long-arm statute that authorizes jurisdiction in tort cases. c. Cartwright is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, because the claim does not arise out of Cartwright's New York contacts. d. Cartwright is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because his work in New York is a small percentage of his yearly construction business.
c. Cartwright is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, because the claim does not arise out of Cartwright's New York contacts.
In which of the following cases would the federal court lack diversity jurisdiction? (Assume in each case that the suit is for more than $75,000.) a. Madison, from Virginia, Jefferson, from Virginia, and Gerry, from Massachusetts, sue Hamilton, from New York and Franklin, from Pennsylvania. b. Madison, from Virginia, sues Lafayette, from Maryland, and Washington Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Maryland, and a large office in Virginia. c. Madison, from Virginia, sues Adams Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia. d. The court lacks jurisdiction in choices B and C.
c. Madison, from Virginia, sues Adams Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia.
Arthur wishes to bring a diversity action in federal court against Cleveland Manufacturing Company. Cleveland has its factory and principal place of business in the Northern District of Illinois, but no other contacts with Illinois. The claim is based on alleged negligence in making a toaster at the Illinois factory, which caused a fire in Arthur's home in the Middle District of Georgia. a. The Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue under §1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place in Illinois. b. The Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue under §1391(d) because Cleveland Manufacturing is subject to general in personam jurisdiction in Illinois and therefore "resides" in the Southern District. c. The Southern District of Illinois is not a proper venue under §1391 because no events giving rise to the claim took place there and Cleveland does not reside there under the venue statute. d. The Northern District of Illinois is not a proper venue under §1391(b)(2), because a more substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place in the Southern District of Georgia.
c. The Southern District of Illinois is not a proper venue under §1391 because no events giving rise to the claim took place there and Cleveland does not reside there under the venue statute.
Eleanor sues Franklin for breach of contract, claiming that he agreed to sell her certain high-risk securities on January 1, 2011, but failed to deliver them on the appointed date. Franklin defends on the ground that after he agreed to the sale, but before the delivery date, a federal statute was passed making such sales illegal. a. This case "arises under" federal law as that phrase is construed in 28 U.S.C. §1331, but not as it is construed in Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution. b. This case "arises under" federal law as that phrase is construed in both 28 U.S.C. §1331 and in Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution. c. This case "arises under" federal law as that phrase is construed in Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution, but not as construed in 28 U.S.C. §1331. d. This case "arises under" federal law as that phrase is construed in both 28 U.S.C. §1331 and in Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution, if the case is removed to federal court after the defendant has answered the complaint in state court, asserting his federal defense.
c. This case "arises under" federal law as that phrase is construed in Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution, but not as construed in 28 U.S.C. §1331.
In which of the following cases could the court rely on general in personam jurisdiction as the basis for exercising judicial authority over the defendant? a. Johnston brings an action in New Mexico against Moreno, a Texas citizen, for breach of a contract they entered into in Texas, in which Moreno agreed to sell Johnston a painting. He obtains jurisdiction by attaching a time share Moreno owns at a condominium complex in the New Mexico mountains. b. Truscott sues Mancini Motors, a Texas corporation that sells antique cars at its dealerships in Texas and California. Truscott sues in New Mexico, for injuries he suffered in New Mexico while driving a 1964 Ford Mustang that Mancini had advertised in New Mexico, sold to Truscott, and shipped to him in New Mexico. Truscott serves Mancini with process in the action at the Texas dealership. Mancini has no place of business in New Mexico, but sells three or four cars a year there. c. Truscott sues Mancini Motors, the Texas antique car company, in Texas. He seeks damages for misrepresentations a Mancini salesperson made to him at a Mancini dealership in California, which led him to purchase a car at the California dealership. d. Cartwright sues Skilful Electric Tool Company in Michigan for injuries he suffered there using a Skilful saw he bought in Michigan. Skilful, incorporated in Delaware, manufactures its tools in Tennessee, and sells them to wholesalers around the United States. The wholesalers resell Skilful products in all states. Skilful advertises its saws in Michigan. About thirty Skilful saws are sold there every year.
c. Truscott sues Mancini Motors, the Texas antique car company, in Texas. He seeks damages for misrepresentations a Mancini salesperson made to him at a Mancini dealership in California, which led him to purchase a car at the California dealership.
Chu, a Californian, went skiing at Aspen, in Colorado, which has only one federal judicial district. After he discovered that he was somewhat out of shape, he bought an exercise machine from Jackson, a friend from Kansas with a two-week time share in Aspen, who had brought the machine with him to Aspen from his home in Texas. The machine was made by Sweda-Trak, a Texas company that sells its products only in Texas, and with its only place of business in the Western District of Texas. Chu brought the machine back to Los Angeles, California, where he was injured using it. Chu brings a diversity action against Jackson and Sweda-Trak in federal court, alleging that Jackson was negligent in maintaining the machine, and Sweda-Trak in designing it. Venue in Chu's action would be a. proper in the Southern District of California (which includes Los Angeles) under §1391(b)(2), because property that is the subject of the action is located there. b. proper in the District of Colorado under §1391(b)(1), because both Jackson and Sweda-Trak reside there for venue purposes. c. proper in the Southern District of California under §1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place there. d. improper in the Southern District of California, because, while a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place there, the defendants do not "reside" there under the venue statute.
c. proper in the Southern District of California under §1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place there.
Dziezek, who resides in the Southern District of Indiana, sues Torruella and Hopkins. Torruella resides in the Western District of Kentucky. Hopkins resides in the Western District of Tennessee. Dziezek sues them both for damages arising out of a business deal for the financing of a subdivision Dziezek planned to build in the Southern District of Ohio. His claim against Torruella is for fraud, his claim against Hopkins is for fraud and for violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act. The negotiations between the parties for the financing took place in the Western District of Tennessee. Dziezek claimed that, after the defendants had provided the first installment of financing for the project, and he had commenced construction, they refused to provide subsequent payments needed to complete the project. Venue in Dziezek's action would be proper in a. the Western District of Kentucky. b. the Southern District of Indiana. c. the Southern District of Ohio. d. Both A and C are true.
c. the Southern District of Ohio.
LeCompte brings suit against Wilkins for battery in state court. His counsel looks up the service of process rules and finds that the rule authorizes service of process by first class mail. He serves the complaint and summons on Wilkins by mailing them, first class, to Wilkins at his home address. If Wilkins raises the objection that service of process was improper, the court will likely a. reject the argument, because LeCompte used a form of service that was authorized by the state's service of process rules. b. uphold his objection, because service by first class mail is not constitutionally proper. c. uphold his objection if LeCompte could have arranged for in-hand service on Wilkins. d. reject the argument, because service of process by first class mail is constitutionally sufficient.
d reject the argument, because service of process by first class mail is constitutionally sufficient.
In which of the following cases could the court properly assert jurisdiction, after the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner? a. Ohora is injured when she falls in a hole while crossing the lawn in front of Roux's summer house in Nebraska. She sues Roux in Nebraska for her injuries and asserts jurisdiction by obtaining a writ of attachment on the property on which she was injured. b. Ohora brings an action to quiet title to her Nebraska farm in a Nebraska court. She gives notice of the action by mail to Roux, who lives in New York but claims a one-third interest in the farm inherited from a great aunt. She also gives notice by publication to unknown claimants to the property. c. Consolidated Equipment Company sells Roux a construction crane in Iowa, on an installment contract, subject to a right of repossession for nonpayment. Roux fails to pay. Consolidated brings an action in Nebraska to obtain clear title to the crane, and obtains a writ from the court attaching the crane while present on a job in Nebraska. d. All of the above. e. None of the above.
d. All of the above.
Onofrio lives in Oregon, with no plans to leave. He works in Idaho. He brings an action in federal court in California against Corcoran, an Idaho citizen, and Brainard Corporation, which is incorporated in California, with its principal place of business in Idaho. He seeks $200,000 in damages against each defendant. Brainard has a large sales office employing 125 people in Oregon. Rivera, the president of Brainard Corporation, lives in Oregon. a. The court lacks jurisdiction over the action, because Brainard's president is domiciled in the same state as Onofrio. b. The court lacks jurisdiction, because a substantial part of Brainard's daily activities take place in Oregon, where Onofrio is domiciled. c. The court lacks jurisdiction, because Onofrio's place of business is in Idaho, and Corcoran is a citizen of Idaho. d. Jurisdiction is proper.
d. Jurisdiction is proper.
Neff went to Oregon and met with Mitchell, a lawyer, about a claim Neff had against Jones. Mitchell did some work on the problem and sent Neff, a Californian, a bill for $3,000. After consulting Mitchell, Neff left Oregon, has not been back since, and has never paid Mitchell's bill. Mitchell sues Neff in an Oregon state court for his fee. He has the papers initiating the suit served on Neff in California. a. Jurisdiction based on in-state service was reaffirmed in Burnham v. Superior Court. Consequently, Neff is not subject to jurisdiction in the Oregon suit, since he was not served with process in Oregon. b. Under International Shoe, Neff's contacts in Oregon suffice to support personal jurisdiction over Neff for Mitchell's fees claim. If Neff returns to Oregon, Mitchell may serve him there with the papers in the action and then proceed with the suit. c. Under International Shoe, Neff's contacts in Oregon suffice to support personal jurisdiction over him in any state for Mitchell's fees claim. d. Under International Shoe, Neff's contacts in Oregon suffice to support personal jurisdiction over Neff in the Oregon action for Mitcheli's fees claim, even if he is not served in Oregon.
d. Under International Shoe, Neff's contacts in Oregon suffice to support personal jurisdiction over Neff in the Oregon action for Mitcheli's fees claim, even if he is not served in Oregon.
Atlanta Precision Drill Corporation makes drill presses in Georgia. It sells them to several wholesale distributors, including Emporia Distributors in Pennsylvania. It sells five hundred drill presses to Emporia in 2011. Emporia resells three of them to Modern Tool and Die Company in Maryland. A local machine shop buys one from Modern, and Edwards, an employee, is injured using it in Maryland. He sues Atlanta Precision in state court in Maryland for his injuries. Atlanta Precision has no other contacts in Maryland. After the Nicastro decision the Maryland court will probably conclude that it a. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it is an American company, unlike Asahi and J. McIntyre. b. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it could foresee that Emporia, which is based in Pennsylvania, would resell Atlanta Precision's machines into nearby Maryland. c. has jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because it sold its machines in large quantities to a distributor which it expected to resell in other states. d. cannot exercise jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because its contacts with Maryland are insufficient under the minimum contacts test.
d. cannot exercise jurisdiction over Atlanta Precision, because its contacts with Maryland are insufficient under the minimum contacts test.
Marla, who grew up in Montana, moved to Colorado after high school to enter a two-year program for hair stylists at the Denver Beauty School. She wasn't sure if she really wanted to be a stylist, but she was anxious to get away from home, and her parents agreed to foot the bill, so off she went. She figured she'd stay if she liked it, and get a job as a stylist afterwards, in Denver or elsewhere in the West (including Montana). Or she would leave the program if she didn't like it and look for work, hopefully in Denver. She took an apartment on a six-month lease. After moving to Denver, Marla a. remains domiciled in Montana, because the program is only for two years. b. remains domiciled in Montana, because she may return there to work as a stylist. c. remains domiciled in Montana, because she was domiciled there before she left for Denver. d. is domiciled in Colorado, because she resides there with the intent to remain indefinitely.
d. is domiciled in Colorado, because she resides there with the intent to remain indefinitely.
Ace Truck Bodies builds gasoline tanks in Minnesota for installation on trucks that deliver gas to gas stations. It sells a replacement tank to Deuce Petroleum Company in Kansas, which has it mounted on the bed of its delivery truck and places it in service. As Ace was aware, Deuce delivers petroleum products to customers throughout the midwest. While making a delivery in Illinois, the tank explodes, injuring Jack. Jack sues Ace Truck Bodies in Illinois for his injuries. Ace Truck has no contacts with Illinois other than those described in this question. The Illinois long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who "commits a tortious act in Illinois." The Illinois Supreme Court has held, in Gray v. American Standard Radiator, that this language is met if the defendant's product causes injury to a person within the state. Ace is probably a. subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois because it was aware that the tank it sold to Deuce would be used in Illinois. b. subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, because it could foresee that its tank, if it was defective, would cause injury in Illinois. c. subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, because it committed a tortious act in Illinois under the long-arm statute. d. not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, because its contacts with Illinois are insufficient to support jurisdiction over it under the minimum contacts test.
d. not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, because its contacts with Illinois are insufficient to support jurisdiction over it under the minimum contacts test.
Mary Smith, a divorced, working-class woman of fifty-five, lives in Massachusetts. She doesn't have enough money to travel ordinarily but saved her pennies to attend her daughter's wedding in California. While there, she rented a car to get to the ceremony and had an accident with an Exxon Mobil oil truck. Exxon Mobil, a huge multinational corporation, does business in all states and has a large corporate office in Massachusetts. After Mary returns to Massachusetts, Exxon Mobil sues her in a California state court for the damage to its truck. Mary a. will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the California action, because she was only in California for a few days. b. will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the California action, because it would greatly inconvenience Mary, a woman of limited means, to defend the case in California. c. has minimum contacts with California that gave rise to the claim, but it would not be reasonable to force her to defend the action in California, given Exxon Mobil's ample resources to bring suit in Massachusetts. d. will be subject to personal jurisdiction in California in this action, even though it will be inconvenient for her to defend the case there.
d. will be subject to personal jurisdiction in California in this action, even though it will be inconvenient for her to defend the case there.
In which of the following service of process situations is the boss likely to roll her eyes and say, "What did we hire this kid for?" a. Neophyte drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of a contract to design software for the plaintiff. She serves the complaint by delivering it herself to Gates at his office. b. Neophyte drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of a contract to design software for the plaintiff. She prints out a form summons from the office files containing the information called for in Rule 4(a)(1)(A) to (E) and serves both documents on Gates by a method authorized by Rule 4(e). c. Neophyte drafts a complaint against Jobs and Gates for breach of a contract to design software for the plaintiff. She files the complaint, has the clerk sign and seal the summons, and serves the documents on Gates by a method authorized by Rule 4(e). d. Neophyte drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of a contract to design software for the plaintiff. She delivers two copies of the complaint and two summonses to be signed and sealed by the clerk and then served by the clerk on Gates. e. All of these methods are insufficient.
e. All of these methods are insufficient.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court held that a. every person whose interests may be affected by a judicial proceeding is entitled to at least mail notice of the proceeding. b. every person whose name and address could be ascertained through reasonable investigation must be given individual notice of the proceeding. c. any person whose interests might be affected by the proceeding must be given notice by in hand service of process. d. due to the large number of persons whose interests might be affected by the proceedings, notice by publication was sufficient on the facts of the case. e. None of the above
e. None of the above
Marathon Crane Company, a Canadian company, sold small cranes to Partlett Construction Company, a South Dakota corporation. Marathon knew that Partlett did road construction throughout the midwestern states. Marathon also sold cranes occasionally in Minnesota; it had sold fifteen cranes there over the five years before the accident. Partlett took a Marathon crane to Minnesota, where it collapsed, injuring Perez. Perez brought suit in Minnesota against Marathon for his injuries. In the same action, he asserted a claim against Francis, a Partlett supervisor who had advised the crane driver, in South Dakota, that the crane would lift 10,000 pounds, though it was actually rated for 3,000 pounds. Francis is a Minnesota citizen who works in Partlett's central offices in South Dakota. The Minnesota court a. has personal jurisdiction over Marathon based on general jurisdiction. b. has personal jurisdiction over Marathon based on specific jurisdiction, since Marathon knew that Partlett used Marathon cranes in all midwestern states. c. has jurisdiction over Marathon because, unlike Asahi, it would not be unreasonable to require Marathon to come from Canada to nearby Minnesota. d. lacks personal jurisdiction over either defendant. e. has general in personam jurisdiction over Francis, but probably does not have general in personam jurisdiction over Marathon.
e. has general in personam jurisdiction over Francis, but probably does not have general in personam jurisdiction over Marathon.
