ConLaw Final Exam

Daniel v. Paul (commerce- technicality interstate case)

--Application of federal regulations to Lake Nixon club → to avoid desegregation laws, Paul operated it as a private club that needed membership --Served local clients, no evidence of interstate person --Court ruled that operated as interstate commerce because: 1. Advertised for business in publications known to be read by some interstate travelers 2. Leased fifteen paddleboats from Oklahoma company 3. Owned jukebox and records had been manufactured out of state 4. ¾ items from snackbar made out of state

Shreveport Doctrine

--Established congressional power over the nation's rails --Texas Railroad Commission worked at lower rates than Shreveport (part of ICC) and so more people went to the Texas Commission which supported intrastate business rather than Shreveport (interstate) → went to Court and ruled with ICC --Established Shreveport Doctrine - fed govt had power to regulate intrastate commerce when a failure to regulate would cripple or destroy interstate commerce

Buckley v. Valeo (note case)

-Created Federal Election Commision→ enforce election laws of US -Appointments power issue: Article I, Section II -Principal officers: require Senate confirmation Includes: SCOTUS justices, cabinet officials, sub cabinet officials -Inferior officers: can be appointed by president alone, courts of law, or heads of departments -FEC → 6 commissioners -2 appointed by President -2 appointed by speaker of house -2 appointed by pro temp of senate -->Court says these legislative appoints violate the appointments clause because the are principal officers with major enforcement powers; should be subject to Senate confirmation When an official has major enforcement authority = principal officer Where you have principal officer, they are subject to confirmation by the Senate They are not heads of departments so cannot be president pro temp

Train v. City of New York (note case)

-Under statute, the administration was supposed to provide funds to local officials to assist with water control -Nixon impounded (when executive refuses to spend money appropriated by Congress) --> Court says president is required to distribute appropriated funds (Art I, Section 3- Take Care and must implement those laws)

Bowsher v. Synar

facts: President Reagan signed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act into law in 1985. This legislation attempted to control federal budget deficit by imposing automatic budget cuts when members of Congress were unable or unwilling to exercise sufficient fiscal restraint. It also established maximum budget deficit levels for each year beginning in 1986 and the size of deficit was to decrease each year until 1991, when no deficit would be allowed. If the budget exceeded the allowable deficit, across-the-board cuts were required. Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General then evaluated these reports, made his own conclusion, and gave a recommendation to the President, who was then required to issue an order effecting the reductions required by the Comptroller General unless Congress made the required cuts by other ways within a specified amount of time. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three people recommended by the presiding officers of the House and Senate. He is removable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress, which requires majority votes in both houses and is subject to a Presidential veto. Congress can give a number of reasons for this removal, including "inefficiency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance." issue: Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States, under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985, violate the doctrine of separation of powers? holding: -The Congress cannot control how its laws are executed. Since it does not possess this power, it cannot delegate it to its agents. The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress because he can be removed by Congress via a process other than impeachment. The Comptroller General exercises executive power and so the Act is unconstitutional. -The Comptroller General's function under the Act is the "very essence" of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the Comptroller General commands the President to carry out, without variation, his directive regarding the budget resolutions. main points: -Deals with executive power -Interpreting the law enacted by congress is the very essence of law execution -What general was tasked with is a prime example of executive power → tasked an legislative branch official with reducing the deficit instead of the president -Congressional branch of legislature tasked with executing law instead of president (Take Care Clause)

Myers v. US (removal authority)

facts: -An 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers, a postmaster first class, without seeking Senate approval. Meyer's sues Wilson → unlawful and sues for back pay (compensation for lost salary) issue: -Under article II, does the President have the exclusive power of removing postmaster whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate? holding: -After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President's appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. According to Taft, to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed." -Removal authority is incidental to the president's power to appoint officials -Court concerned that it would paralyze/hinder his duty to carry out and execute laws -National interest rationale - if President cannot remove without delay, then nation might suffer

Gonzalez v. Raich (commerce clause)

facts: -Deals with CA Compassionate Use Act → if someone uses marijuana in compliance with state law, is grown locally and for non-commercial purposes, and used in accordance with prescription -Under Controlled Substances Act (federal law), marijuana is classified as Schedule I drug -Defendants in case, meets all of standards for CA law -DEA receives tip about marijuana grown on their land, don't arrest them but confiscates marijuana and destroys it -defendants argued it is "As applied constitutional" --> applying CSA to the use of local, non-commercial weed that is in compliance with state law is not commerce under the Commerce Clause, and cannot be regulated issue: Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use? holding: -main concern with:"slippery slope" -Wickard → Congress can regulate the activity surrounding that good, if failure to regulate would undercut effective market controls -Market around wheat in Wickard, same in this case (market around weed) Rationale: -Court believes that home consumed marijuana could affect market conditions -Not regulating marijuana could lead to gaping hole in regulatory regime --> ***If you have a good for which there is a large market, under Commerce and N+P Clause, Congress can regulate the activity related to that good*** -If production and consumption of good that is around interstate, can be regulated by Commerce Dissent held that: -Judgment should have been deferred to the state because, under federalism, because states have police power to do so -Under majority perception of CC, any activity eventually could have been regulated

Bush v. Gore (intent of voter standard + EPC/14th)

facts: -Deals with the presidential election of November 7, 2000. It became clear that the the battle between Bush and Vice President Gore for the 270 electoral votes needed to win presidency would be decided by Florida. Initial vote counts gave Bush a lead, however the narrow margin triggered an automatic machine recount held on November 10. -The results gave Bush victory, but the margin slipped to only 250 votes, with absentee ballots still needing to be counted. Various issues arose but the main one was that there were large numbers of undercounted ballots (ballots that did not register presidential preference) in traditionally Democratic counties. Gore supporters demanded a hand recount of the undercounted ballots. -Three statutory deadlines imposed obstacles for the manual recounts: 1. FL law directed the secretary of state to certify election results by Nov 18 2. Federal law provided that if all controversies and contests over a state's electors were resolved by December 12, the state's slate would be considered conclusive and beyond challenged (safe harbor provision) 3. Federal law set December 18 as the date the electors would cast their ballots. And so, the manual recounts proceeded but it became clear that they would not be finished before Nov. 18, + the secretary of state announced her intention to certify the vote on Nov 18 regardless of the ongoing recounts → Gore went to Court blocking her from doing so and the FL Supreme Court ruled that the recounts should continue and extended the deadline to Nov. 26 → So, believing that the FL court exceeded its authority, Bush appealed decision to SCOTUS. SCOTUS vacated the FL Supreme Court ruling, aka Bush prevails. In the meantime, Secretary Harris certified Bush as winning the state by 537 votes on Nov 26. -4 days after the US Supreme Court's decision, the FL high court ordered a new statewide manual recount of all votes to begin immediately (votes counted by local officials guided only by the instruction to determine voter intent on each ballot) → "intent of the voter standard" implemented across FL. Bush appealed this decision to the SCOTUS to stop the recount → says that it violates the EPC of 14th amendment: there was no uniform criteria underlying the intent of the voter standard, therefore every vote will be treated differently issue: -Did the FL Supreme Court violate federal law by altering the election procedures in place prior to the election? -Did the FL Supreme Court violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment when it ordered a recount to take place without setting a single uniform standard for determining voter intent? holding (per curium opinion - quick brief and so not an official precedent): -The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions for the FL Supreme court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. It is necessary for the formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these circumstances. When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied. -The intent of the voter standard will lead to the disparate/unequal treatment that will violate the EPC -Any recount now will extend past the safe harbor provision -FL failure to come up with uniform standard, is inconsistent with the state's regime for seating electors → intent of voter standard is inconsistent with the way FL has decided to apportion its electors main points + concurring/dissenting opinions: 1. Court's EPC decision was 7-2, 7 justices thought recount was unconstitutional 2. 5-4 on the remedy point → no remedy that can satisfy this equal protection issue 3. Steven and Ginsburg→ we need to defer to state law; case is fundamentally about state election law and should defer to the FL SC interpretation of its own election law -Stevens: "we may never know the identity of the winner of this years presidential election..." 4. Article II, Section 1 problem: Rehnquist says that bc of FL SC failure to explain intent of voter standard → federal constitutional question has arisen: whether or not the FL SC standard complies with Art. II, Section I? Rehnquist says that FL SC is rewriting election law after the election 5. Breyers asks if this is this a political question? We have a system that allows different states to use different systems 6. Souter and Breyer: EPC problem but there is still time for the FL SC to fashion an acceptable standard

Clinton v. Jones

facts: -Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity. issue: Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office? holding: -No, cannot claim absolute immunity for acts that occurred in unofficial capacity prior to presidency. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive. -Examples throughout US history of presidents testifying to acts outside of presidency -Court concerned about Jones' claims about being harder to prove if case dismissed until later

Humphrey's Executor vs. United States (limit to president's removal authority)

facts: -President Hoover appointed, and the Senate confirmed, Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC- independent agency officials engaged in quasi legislative and judicial functions). In 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation since the latter was a conservative and had jurisdiction over many of Roosevelt's New Deal policies. When Humphrey refused to resign, Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. However, the FTC Act only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed, his executor sued to recover Humphrey's lost salary. issue: -Under article II, does the president have the authority to remove an FTC commissioner who performs quasi judicial and legislative functions? holding: -No he does not have the authority to independently remove -The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily on the Court's decision in Myers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executive department." The FTC was different, argued Sutherland, because it was a body created by Congress to perform quasi-legislative and judicial functions. The Myers precedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (ACA)

facts: -The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. -The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. -Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. issues: 1. Does Congress have power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, specifically under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause, to require most Americans to purchase health insurance? 2. Is the individual mandate severable from the ACA? 3. Did Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate principles of federalism when it pressured States into accepting conditions that Congress could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding under Medicaid, the single largest grant-in-aid program? holdings: 1. that the Individual Mandate penalty is a tax for the purposes of the Constitution's Taxing and Spending Clause and is a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The payment is not so severe as to be coercive, is not limited to willful violations like fines for unlawful acts, and is collected by the Internal Revenue Service by normal means. 2. the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate existing commercial activity, but not to compel individuals to participate in commerce. This would open a new realm of Congressional authority. 3. the Medicaid expansion provisions was unconstitutionally coercive as written. Congress does not have authority under the Spending Clause to threaten the states with complete loss of Federal funding of Medicaid, if the states refuse to comply with the expansion. → Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the remainder of the Medicaid expansion provision, without the unconstitutional threat to completely withdraw Medicaid funding, could stand as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause.

Hamdi v. Rumsfield

facts: -deals with:Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution, which gave the president authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such persons or organizations in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the US". during this military effort, the US captured Hamdi and delivered him to US forces. -military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system. issue: -Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? -Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"? holding: 1. although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention (through Act), Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker. 2. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. main points: -US citizens may be held as unlawful combatants -President, under due process clause, must provide combatant to be given notice and opportunity to be heard → must inform of basis of why he is being held as enemy combatant and give him the opportunity to rebut that basis before a neutral decision maker -->War is not a blank check for executive when it pertains to rights of citizens

US v. Nixon (executive privilege)

facts: A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena (duces tecum-bring documents or yourself) claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States. issue: 1. Can the president claim absolute executive privilege, under Article II? 2. Under Article II, does executive privilege overpower a subpoena in a federal trial? holding: #1: Up to judiciary to decide what law is (as established in Marbury). 1)Power is not in article II and 2) if there was an absolute privilege, Congress and judiciary would not be able to do their jobs #2: No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes. -Nothing that specifically provides for executive privilege in Article II -Balancing Act: There is the President's need for a privilege (generalized need for the privilege) vs. need for info in federal criminal trial -General need for confidentiality by President cannot trump the specific need of the Courts -Courts also argued that listening of tapes would be in camera (in chambers) and, if something confidential disclosed, then judge would decide if it will be disclosed -Ultimately, Court recognizes some executive privilege but president must show that there is significant interest in the function of his office to avoid production of evidence -Will not permit the president to aggrandize or take power at its expense -Generally, court will employ balancing test when dispute between branches

The Prize Cases

facts: Before Lincoln's inauguration, seven states seceded. Then, mid-April Lincoln imposed a naval blockade unilaterally without seeking the prior declaration of hostilities until July 13th and did not ratify Lincoln's blockade until August 6. Prior to July 13, Union war vessels seized 4 ships trading with the Confederacy and the owners of the captured ships brought suit to recover their property. They claimed that Lincoln had no authority to institute a blockade in the absence of a congressional declaration of war and that illegal seizures were illegal In rem jurisdiction: a legal term describing the power a court may exercise over property (either real or personal) or a "status" against a person over whom the court does not have in personam jurisdiction. issue: Under Commander in Chief clause, did the president have the right to institute a blockade of ports under the control of persons in armed rebellion against the government before Congress acted? holding: Yes, it is constitutional. Justice Robert Grier wrote the 5-4 majority opinion stating, "...it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States." While the court acknowledged that the United States Congress had, in July 1861, adopted a law ratifying and approving the President's proclamation after the fact, as well as other actions taken since then to prosecute the war, that was not the point. Grier further wrote, "...The President was bound to meet it [the war] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name." By this decision, the Supreme Court upheld the President's executive powers to act in accordance with the Presidential oath of office, "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" and to act expediently as the Commander-in-Chief in time of war—a de facto war existing since April 12, 1861. main point: -President has power to repel sudden attacks under Commander in chief clause, without congressional authorization -No limiting principle on this case → could be used to cite for the executive when wanting to take aggressive military force

Ex parte Quirin

facts: Burger, Dasch, Heinck and Quirin traveled from occupied France by German submarine U-202 to Amagansett Beach, Long Island, New York, landing in the hours of darkness, on June 13, 1942. The remaining four boarded German submarine U-584 which carried them from France to Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. They were wearing civilian clothing and planned to cause harm to the respective cities. Dasch turned himself into the FBI and all eight conspirators were subsequently arrested and, on the orders of President Franklin Roosevelt, tried by military commission. The commission found all eight men guilty and sentenced them to death. Arguing that the President exceeded his power in ordering the commission and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution protect their rights to a regular trial, seven of the eight conspirators, not including Dasch, filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. issue: Did the President exceed his authority in ordering a trial by military commission for the German saboteurs, thereby violating their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments? holding: -The Court ruled that the German saboteurs had no right to be given access to civilian courts because they were "plainly within the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform — an offense against the law of war. Those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission." -It held that while lawful combatants may be captured and held as prisoners of war, unlawful combatants face harsher circumstances such as being sentenced to prison terms or put to death main points: -Unlawful combatants -FDR, under Articles of War, creates the military commission → -only need ⅔ majority of military officers presiding for conviction (instead of unanimous) -More like civil court → more likely than not that the saboteurs did something wrong -Evidentiary standards are lower -***Situation where enemy soldiers who secretly entered the US without uniform to kill civilians and destroy property such combatants can be tried before a military commission = unlawful combatants*** -Under Articles of Wars, has power to order trial of said unlawful combatants -This can apply to citizens and noncitizens

Clinton v. New York (presentment clause)

facts: Deals with Line Item Veto Act stating that : President may cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary authority i.e. any item of direct spending, any limited tax benefit, if he determines such cancellation will reduce the deficit, not impair essential government, function, or not harm the national interest. Further, although it gave the president the power to rescind various expenditures, it established a check on his ability to do so through Congress. The vetoed sections could be passed again through both houses but the President could also veto it again. Second, any member of congress or individual adversely affected by this act may bring action in the Court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of the part violates the Constitution. One day after the bill passed, 6 members of Congress brought it to Court claiming that it violated Article I of the Constitution: "unconstitutionally expands presidential power" and violates the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment by granting to the President, acting alone, the authority to cancel and thus repeal provisions of federal law. They also alleged that the act concretely injured them, divested constitutional role in repeal of legislation, and altered constitutional balance of powers between legis. And exec. Branches. Lower court agreed with Congress and Executive appealed to US Supreme Court → Court dismissed the case because no real case or controversy, members of Congress were "not the right" litigants. After Court's decision, President Clinton invoked line item veto to cancel more than 80 items included in Balanced Budget Act of 1997 → the affected parties immediately challenged these steps. The federal court consolidated the cases and ruled that LIVA violated presentment clause and unconstitutional delegation of powers. issue: Does the Line Item Veto Act violate the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7? holding: -Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers. -President does not have constitutional authority to enact, amend, or repeal laws→ president has amended law through changing a portion of it -The president must accept or reject all of the bill → under Presentment Clause -Scalia's dissent: all the law really is doing is enabling the president to not spend money as appropriated by Congress

Morrison v. Olson (appointments clause)

facts: Deals with provision (Title IV) in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (dealing with position of independent counsel/special prosecutor) passed in wake of Watergate. Law provided for an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high-ranking officials for violations of federal criminal laws. Thus, it created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws. Independent counsel could only be removed by Attorney General. Olson argued that independent counsel was not inferior officer and could not be appointed by Courts of law and said that they were principal officers that must be confirmed by the Senate. issue: 1. Under Appointments Clause within the Constitution, is the independent counsel an inferior or principal officer? 2. Under appointments clause, may congress vest the appointment of independent counsel in courts of law? 3. Does article 3 permit federal judges to appoint an independent counsel? holding: #1: is an inferior officer because: Independent counsel has certain limited duties: limited in jurisdiction, tenure, and authority → can only prosecute certain officials or federal crimes -Once completed, the independent counsel goes away -The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous -Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch. Scalia's dissent: -Says it's unconstitutional because power should be vested solely in the executive (unitary executive) → all executive power within president -Through independent counsel statute Congress has deprived president of criminal prosecution (power belonging to president) -->Creates powerful "4th" executive branch

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

facts: In 1951 a labor dispute began in the American steel industry. In december, the United Steelworkers Union announced that it would call a strike at the end of the month, when its contract expired. For the next several months, the Federal mediation and conciliation service and Federal wage stabilization board tried to work out a settlement, but without success. President Truman issued an executive order commanding Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the nation's steel mills and keep them in operation. Truman's order cited no statutory authority because there was none but he argued that the inherent powers of the chief executive were enough to authorize the action. The mill owners complied with the seizure orders under protest and filed suit in federal court to have Truman's action declared unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the steel industry, enjoining the secretary from seizing the plants, but the same day the court of appeals stayed the injunction. -->Deals with Taft-Hartley Act → did not give the president the power to settle labor dispute by seizing the property issue: -Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the private steel mills? holding: -The Court held that the President did NOT have the authority to issue such an order. -The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. -The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Tiers of presidential power: 1. Teir 1 → "Zenith": Congressional power + presidential power - president acts in accordance with express or implied Congressional power/statute/law 2. Zone of Twilight → silence - power of distribution is uncertain; invite independent presidential decision making 3. President is acting contrary to statute or law → pres power - congressional power -Steel seizure falls under this tier → pure separation of powers dispute -Doesn't comply with law and so doesn't have constitutional power to seize private property, therefore Congress prevails

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

facts: In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust (fired bc of testimony not because of what they claimed). issue: Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit? holding: -Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history." -Believes it will inhibit the President from carrying out his actions because then may not execute powers in the way that he wants to due to fear of lawsuit or target of multiple law suits → take away from ability to do his job (Take care clause) -If president continually unlawful, Congress empowered with ability to impeach president (checks and balances)

South Dakota v. Dole(spending clause)

facts: In 1984, the United States Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which withheld 5%[1] of federal highway funding from states that did not maintain a minimum legal drinking age of 21. South Dakota, which allowed 19-year-olds to purchase (raised from 18 years old as result of NMDAA) beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol and challenged the law. issue: Did Congress exceed the spending clause by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age? holding: The Supreme Court held 7-2 that the statute represented a valid use of Congressional authority under the Spending Clause and that the statute did not infringe upon the rights of the states. The Court established a five-point rule for considering the constitutionality of expenditure cuts of this type: 1.The spending must promote "the general welfare." 2. The condition must be unambiguous. 3. The condition should relate "to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs." 4. The condition imposed on the states must not, in itself, be unconstitutional. 5.The condition must not be coercive. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that the National Minimum Drinking Age Act clearly met the first three restrictions, leaving only the latter two restrictions worthy of consideration. Rehnquist wrote that the Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it merely exercised its right to control its spending. Rehnquist wrote that the Congress did not coerce the states because it cut only a small percentage of federal funding. It thus applied pressure but not irresistible pressure.

In re Neagle (take care clause + implied art. 2 powers/not explicitly prohibited powers)

facts: In a bitter dispute between Judge Terry and Senator Broderick, Terry resigned from his position and challenged Broderick to a duel and killed him. Stephen Field was a close friend of Broderick. Field was then elevated to the chief justiceship of the state court and later President Lincoln appointed him to the US Supreme Court. Later, David Terry and his wife were unhappy with the outcome of their case. As a result, the pair threatened the life of the judge in their case, Supreme Court Justice Field. In response to the threat, the Attorney General tasked a United States Marshal, David Neagle (defendant), with serving as a bodyguard and providing protection to the justice while he rode circuit in California. During an assault by Terry upon Justice Field, Neagle shot and killed Terry. Neagle was arrested and charged with murder under state law. Neagle then filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the circuit court granted, ordering Neagle's discharge from custody. -Neagle files writ of habeas corpus → lawsuit against the official holding you in prison; claiming that you are holding me illegally, and therefore you must release me issue: Under Article II, does the president, without congressional action, to order (through the US attorney general) to authorize a bodyguard to protect Justice Field? holding: -Yes. The Court held that the Attorney General acted appropriately since assigning Neagle as Field's bodyguard assured that the nation's laws would be faithfully executed. Furthermore, Neagle's actions were consistent with a congressional statute which provided U.S. Marshals with "the same powers, in executing the laws" as state sheriffs and deputies (who would have been allowed to deter an attack on Field's life). -Under art. 2, President does have authority to order protection even without congressional approval → via the "take care and execute" clause President's ability to protect officials can be inferred under article 2; no textual prohibition on the activity Marshals officers of executive branch and the president may be aided in the lawful exercise of authority by Marshals that he appoints → adopted "general grant: perspective of executive power: President has constitutional power to take those actions necessary to enforce the laws of the nation, even if the Constitution does not provide an explicit authorization for doing so

INS v. Chadha

facts: Jagdish Chadha was born in Kenya and the holder of a British passport. He was admitted into the US in 1966 on a 6 year student visa. More than a year after his visa expired, the INS demanded Chadha to attend a hearing and show cause why he should not be deported. After two hearings, the judge ordered a suspension of Chadha's deportation because of "good moral character" and would "suffer extreme hardship" if deported. Acting under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the US attorney general recommended to Congress that Chadha be allowed to stay (in accordance with Judge's ruling). Further, Congress had the authority to veto, by resolution passed in either house, the attorney general's decision. The chair of the House committee introduced a resolution opposing the "granting of permanent residence in the US of aliens" including Chadha. Chadha filed a suit with the immigration court and then federal court of appeals, asking that they declare legislative veto unconstitutional. issue: Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine? Is legislative veto provision constitutional? holding: -The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution (article 1, section 7). Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority -Does not follow art 1, section 7 bc you have a one house legislative action suspending Attorney General authority -Court said it was an attempted exercise of legislative power → one house veto/resolution was trying to affect the rights, duties, and obligations outside of the legislative branch -If congress is attempting to affect this things, then they have to act in accordance with bicameralism and presentment

Ex parte Milligan

facts: Milligan was an attorney residing in Indiana and was sympathetic toward the Confederate cause. On October 5, commander of Union armies arrested Milligan at his home. He was later found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. Milligan's attorneys then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal circuit court claiming that he should NOT have been tried by a military tribunal and that the president should not have suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The circuit judges were unsure of how to respond so they requested that the SCOTUS resolve the issue. issue: -Under commander in chief clause, can the president authorize the trial of a civilian in an area not in active rebellion where courts are open and active? holding: -the majority opinion explaining that Milligan, who was a civilian not in military service and resident of a state in which civilian courts were still functioning, had a right, when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to the law. -he stated that "martial rule can never exist when the courts are open" and confined martial law to areas of "military operations, where war really prevails," and when it became a necessity to provide a substitute for a civil authority that had been overthrown main points: -Laws of war are inapplicable here because Milligan was a civilian accused of an offense when the US court house was open and in operation -->Courts concerned that military authority have claimed authority over states not in active rebellion -***Civilians cannot be tried in a military commission where the civilian courts are open and in operation***

U.S. v. Lopez (commerce-intrastate, noneconomic activity)

facts: Congress made it a crime to "knowingly (have means rea -- guilty mind) possess a firearm in a place that an individual has a reason to know is a school zone." Alfonso Lopez Jr. came into Edison High School carrying a concealed weapon. Acting on an anonymous tip, San Antonio officials confronted the student and Lopez admitted to having the weapon. He claimed that he had been given the gun by an individual who instructed him to deliver it to a third person for gang related activities. Lopez was arrested for the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 and served six months in prison, two years of supervised release, and a fifty dollar fine. His attorneys claimed that Congress had no constitutional authority to pass the Act. The government argued that the law was an appropriate exercise of power to regulate interstate commerce. The appeals court held in favor of Lopez, and the government asked SCOTUS for review. issue: Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? holding: Yes. The Act exceeds the authority of Congress to regulate commerce. The act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. The Court defined three broad activities that Congress may regulate. 1. The use of the channels of interstate commerce. 2. Regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities 3. Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce 1. Congress trying to regulate intrastate/noneconomic commerce ; court has never affirmed a noneconomic, intrastate activity under substantial effects test 2. No jurisdictional hook or nexus → no burden upon federal government to show that gun had moved prior to Mr. Lopez showing up to school with it; no hook in the law that said that it is the movement of guns ---Poor congressional drafting which led the statute to be struck down → had there been different wording, law would have been upheld 3. No legislative findings supporting this law as a commerce clause regulation 4. ATTENUATION → there would be no limitation on the power of Congress ; theory of harm and guns is too attenuated → you would have to draw upon inference, upon inference, and so on

Gibbons v. Ogden

facts: In 1798, the New York legislature granted Robert R. Livingston a monopoly to operate steamboats on all waters within the state. Aaron Ogden and Thomas Gibbons entered into a partnership to carry passengers between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Ogden purchased the right to operate from the Livingston-Fulton monopoly and Gibbons had a federal permit issued under the 1793 Coastal Licensing Act to operate steamships along the coast. The New York monopoly pressured Ogden to terminate relationship with Gibbons and, as a result, the partnership dissolved. Gibbons then joined forces with Cornelius Vanderbilt in which they entered New York waters in violation of the monopoly whenever they could. In response, Ogden convinced the New York Courts to enjoin Gibbons from entering New York waters and Gibbons appealed this ruling to the US Supreme Court. issue: can congress regulate navigation? which law prevails (fed or state)? holding #1: yes, Congress can regulate navigation under Commerce Clause 1. Commerce is "among" states→ Congress can regulate it 2.Commerce includes commercial interaction (not limited to buying and selling of goods) 3. Navigation → voyages/activities in more than one state holding #2: yes, Once we know that federal law is constitutional, it preempts/prevails contrary state law. Supremacy law acts as a conflict in law principle.

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (commerce - substantial effects test)

facts: In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) which was made to help workers achieve gains in wages and working conditions through the collective bargaining process (protect rights of employees and organize and join labor unions and to provide a means for the enforcement of those rights). The law authorized the creation of the National Labor Relations Board heard the complaints of unfair labor practices and provided means to correct them.Complaints were filed against Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation due to discrimination against workers who wanted to join labor union. The NLRB ruled against the company and wanted them to reinstate the workers who had been dismissed. The company refused claiming that Wagner Act was unconstitutional on the basis that steel production facilities were engaged in manufacturing activity that had been declared by the SC as intrastate commerce and thus outside of Congress' regulatory authority. Lower courts ruled in favor, NLRB appealed. issue: was Wagner Act consistent with Commerce Clause? holding: yes, "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." therefore there is an intimate relation which a manufacturing industry may have to interstate commerce. → extremely deferential standard : substantial effects test --under Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate later relations --Court does away with categorical approach seen before --Court concerned about Congress protecting actions in advance --Fundamental principle: "power to regulate commerce, is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection and for its advancement"

Wickard v. Filburn (commerce- substantial economic effect + aggregate theory)

facts: The 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act allowed the secretary of agriculture to establish production limits for various grains in order to stop wild swings in grain prices by eliminating surpluses and shortfalls.Roscoe Filburn owned a small farm in Montgomery County, Ohio where he raised various animals and a small portion of winter wheat, some of which he sold and some he kept to feed his cattle, chickens, and make flour for home consumption. Under the Act, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard set the wheat production limits. Filburn was allotted 11.1 acres to be planted in wheat with a yield of 20.1 bushels per acre. He planted on his allotted acres but also had some other land he planted on to produce the wheat for home consumption. For this excess planting, Filburn was fined $117.11 and he refused to pay the fine. He claimed that Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause by regulating the planting by an individual of wheat on his own property for on-farm consumption. Lower court ruled in Filburn's favor to which Secretary Wickard appealed. issue: Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? holding: no, Congress may use its Commerce Power to regulate or prohibit activities provided the economic effects of such activities are substantial. -->if it exerts SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS on interstate commerce, then it can be regulated by Congress → if every farmer acted as filburn did, it would affect demand for wheat, which, in turn, would have a substantial effect on "defeating and obstructing" the congressional regulatory scheme of stabilizing prices → this era of the Commerce Clause: "Congress decides", meaning that no longer would the court decide whether the local activities substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether Congress reasonably thinks it does or has rational basis for so concluding --Deals with AGGREGATE THEORY refers to economy wide sums of individual behavior→ economic effects of individual behavior --Up to congress to determine rational basis and court should review it deferentially --Substantial effects theory with aggregate theory corollary → Filburn and other individuals in aggregate will have an effect on on interstate commerce -->direct vs. indirect theory doesn't apply anymore

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States ("Sick Chicken Case") (commerce-manufacturing- direct + indirect effects)

facts: This case took place in May 1935 when a New York company was charged with a violation of an NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act) poultry code. Brothers were indicted and went to jail due to failure to align with NIRA codes. Brothers of poultry shop said improper delegation and commerce clause problems issue: Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President? Whether the particular provisions of the Live Poultry Code were within the regulating power of Congress? holding #1: The discretion of the PResident in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, improperly delegates Congressional powers to the executive branch which violates the separation of powers. holding #2: The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended; neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. Thus, not interstate commerce because not flowing from one state to another; no stream of commerce → chickens slaughtered in NY and then sold locally in NY. --court defines direct and indirect effect of interstate commerce: **Congress cannot constitutionally legislate local business activity, such as manufacturing, processing, or refining, unless it had a direct effect on interstate commerce.** ex: Court says that the hour and wages requirement, along with other provisions within the code only had a indirect effect on interstate commerce and is invalid

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (commerce as persons)

facts: Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by certain public accommodations that operated in or affected interstate commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a hotel owned by a group of investors led by Moreton Rolleston Jr. located near the center of the city. It had easy access to two interstate highways and two major state roads and advertised for business in national publications and had more than 50 billboards and highway signs around the state. Therefore, the government and the motel agreed that the facility met the act's definition of public accommodation. However, the motel admitted to using racially discriminatory practices and that it would continue to not serve blacks. In order to do this, the motel filed suits to have the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declared unconstitutional. issue: Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers? holding: No, the Act is constitutional because the motel serves interstate travelers and thus is within the power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution --> Under commerce clause, Congress can prohibit the discrimination of people in public accommodation because of the movement of people as interstate commerce. Congress can protect the movement in advance of black people in interstate commerce. Congress can regulate the movement of person in interstate commerce.

United States v. Morrison

facts: Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. issue: Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? holding: No. The Court's reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce --> The act contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, as established in Lopez. Thus, the Rehnquist Court indicated that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress a blank check to regulate all activity in the name of commerce. Further, a federal law may be constitutionally suspicious if it does not regulate an economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. No application of commerce clause to the regulation of intrastate/noneconomic activity, no legislative findings sufficient and attenuation

Swift & Company v. United States (commerce -stream)

→ Sherman Antitrust Act applies to stockyards/commercial sale of meat --Developed the "stream of commerce" doctrine : allows federal regulation of interstate commerce from the point of its origin to the point of its termination; interruptions in the course of that interstate commerce do not suspend the right of Congress to regulate **under Categorical approach to commerce clause (1887-1937)--> Congress can regulate some things, and cannot regulate others