CivPro MC and Hypos

Pierre (citizen of France) gets into a bar fight in Miami with Hans (citizen of Germany). Pierre sues Hans in the Southern District of Florida for battery seeking $100,000. Both men are lawful permanent residents of the United States. Peter lives in Florida and Hans lives in New York. Is subject-matter jurisdiction appropriate under the 2011 revisions to Section 1332? Is subject-matter jurisdiction appropriate under the former version of Section 1332?

(Beske students - don't worry about former versions) The current version of 1332 does not seem to permit suits between two citizens of foreign states. You need to have a U.S. citizen, domiciled in a state, on one side of the "v."

Archie resides in Miami (Southern District of Florida) and Lucinda resides in Orlando (Middle District of Florida). They drive together on a trip to Wichita (District of Kansas) where their car crashes into Marla's car. Marla resides in Tempe (District of Arizona). Marla sues Archie and Lucinda for negligence, claiming that Archie was intoxicated and that Lucinda shared beer with Archie while Archie was driving. Of the following potential venues, which are appropriate? 1. Middle District of Florida.2. Northern District of Florida.3. Southern District of Florida.4. District of Kansas5. District of Arizona

1, 3, and 4

•Plaintiffs, current and former NFL players, sought class certification to challenge various NFL player rules related to the college draft. They sought injunctive relief and specific rule changes. -[A] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). -[B] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). -[C] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(2). -[D] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(3). -[E] This is not a valid class action under Rule 23.

A

Angus and Ernie, both from Texas, bring a breach of contract action against Apex Corp. in federal district court. Apex makes lawnmowers. It is incorporated in Delaware. It assembles its mowers in TX, where it employs 450 employees. It has another factory in TN, which employs 24 employees. Its corporate HQ occupies a small suite of offices on the 12th floor of an office building in OK, where 14 officers and employees work. Is there diversity jurisdiction consistent with 28 U.S.C. 1332? -[A] There is completely diversity, and the case can proceed. -[B] There is not complete diversity because the case is brought in a TX federal court, and plaintiffs are both TX citizens. -[C] There is not complete diversity because TX is Apex's principal place of business and Apex's presence in OK is much smaller in comparison. -[D] There is diversity between plaintiffs and Apex because Apex is a citizen of Delaware based on its incorporation there.

A not C: bring in a pre Hertz idea

Plaintiff wants to sue Defendant under the Lanburn Act, a federal statute. Which of the following is true? -[A] Plaintiff must file in federal court if the Lanburn Act itself restricts suits under the Act to federal court. -[B] Plaintiff must file suit in federal court because the case arises under federal law. -[C] Plaintiff must file suit in federal court, unless Congress has expressly authorized filing of Lanburn Act suits in state court as well. -[D] Plaintiff must file suit in federal court if there is complete diversity between the parties.

A is correct C and B are wrong because we don't have to expressly authorize, we assume. Congress can only make things exclusive to Fed court

Plaintiff, a KY citizen, files a complaint in TN state court under the Beleaguered 1L Assistance Act ("BLAA"), a federal statute, against Professor Bullikins, a Tennessee citizen. Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in damages for grievous contracts class infractions. Which of the following is true? -[A] Professor Bullikins cannot remove this case because he is an in-state defendant. -[B] Professor Bullikins cannot remove this case because plaintiff has not met the amount-in-controversy requirement. -[C] Professor Bullikins can remove this case to federal court. -[D] Professor Bullikins cannot remove this case unless there is a specific provision in the Beleaguered 1L Protection Act authorizing

A. Amount in controversy doesn't matter, because we have Federal Question

Philip sues Fleur for negligence when he slips on a banana peel on the floor of her coffee shop. Fleur responds by moving to dismiss under 12(b)(3). After the court denies the motion, but before answering, Fleur moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). - [A] The motion is improper because Fleur can't make a second pre-answer motion under Rule 12 to assert a defense that was available when the first motion was made. - [B] The motion is improper because Fleur's failure to assert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion in her first pre-answer motion waives the objection of failure to state a claim. - [C] The motion is proper because the objection is not waived by making a motion on other grounds and may be raised at any time. - [D] The motion is proper because the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is not one of the four "disfavored defenses."

A. Rule 12(g) forces a defendant to file one consolidated pre-answer motion, asserting all available Rule 12 objections, if she files one at all. [A] is the best answer because Fleur has filed two pre-answer motions, and the 12(b)(6) claim was available when she objected to venue. [B] is wrong. 12(b)(6) isn't one of the "disfavored" defenses. She can't raise it in a second pre-answer motion, but she can raise it in her answer, a Rule 12(c) motion, or at trial. [C] is wrong given 12(g)(2). [D] is correct that 12(b)(6) isn't included in 12(h) as a "disfavored defense," and is not waived. But the question doesn't ask whether it was waived; it asks whether Fleur can raise it in a second pre-answer motion. Although a Rule 12(b)(6) objection is not waived if left out of a pre-answer motion, a second pre-answer motion based on it may be barred under Rule 12(g)(2). That he can raise it later - say, in an answer or in a motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial - explains why [B] is wrong.

Stan and Ollie, both from NH, are injured in a 3-car collision involving Stan's car, Mary's car, and Ollie's car. Mary is from VT. Stan sues Mary in federal court, seeking $200,000 in damages for his injuries. Stan loses; the jury concludes that Mary was not negligent. Three months later, Mary sues Stan and Ollie to recover for her own injuries, also in federal court. Can she? - [A] Mary's claim against Stan is barred. She should have asserted this as a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a)(1) in the prior action and waived it by failing to do so. Her claim against Ollie is not barred. - [B] Mary's claims against Stan and Ollie are both barred. She should have asserted her claim against Stan as a compulsory counterclaim and added Ollie as a co-D on the claim, under Rule 13(h). - [C] Mary's claim is not barred. The claim could have been joined in the prior action but didn't have to be under Rule 13(b).

A. [A] is correct. Mary's claim against Stan was a compulsory counterclaim, and she has waived it by not asserting it in Stan's action. Thus, [C] is wrong, too. [B] gets the compulsory counterclaim piece right but joinder of an additional party under Rule 13(h) is governed by Rule 20(a), which permits **but doesn't require** joinder.

•Jose, from WVA, hires Andy, from MD, to build an underground bomb shelter/wine cellar in his backyard. Andy hires Rick, a VA citizen who runs a backhoe business, to dig the necessary holes. They do the work, complete the job, and leave. Two weeks later, the roof of the shelter capsizes, destroying Jose's wine collection. Jose sues Andy and Rick in federal court, based on diversity, for $100,000 in damages caused by the faulty work. After the suit is filed, Andy asserts a crossclaim against Rick for contribution, claiming he is responsible for 50% of the damages. Andy also asserts a claim against Rick for $5000 in damages that resulted when Rick hit his riding mower while working on another job. -[A] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Andy's contribution claim against Rick but not his mower claim against him. -[B] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over both of Andy's claims against Rick under the Kroger case. -[C] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over both of Andy's claims against Rick under § 1367(a). -[D] The court lacks jurisdiction over either of Andy's claims against Rick. Even adding together the $5000 and $50,000 (1/2 of claimed damages), Andy does not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, so there is no "original jurisdiction" of his claim against Rick. -[E] The court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction under §1367(a) because the main claim is based on diversity, not federal question jurisdiction.

A. [B] is wrong - in determining whether supplemental jurisdiction exists, we look to § 1367, not to Kroger. [E] is wrong because supplemental jurisdiction does apply in diversity cases, even though it is qualified by § 1367(b). [D] is distracting but wrong. True, Andy's claim against Rick wouldn't otherwise belong in federal court. But the question isn't whether the court would have original jurisdiction over this claim, it's whether the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction. That leaves [A] and [C]. The test for supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) is whether the added claim arises out of the same underlying events as the main, jurisdictionally proper claim. That allows the contribution claim but would exclude the mower claim. [A] is best answer.

•A twist. Smith, from MN, sues Z Corp., a WI corporation with its principal place of business in SD, for damages for defamation. He sues in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and claims damages of $100,000. Z Corp. impleads Jenny, a former supervisory who allegedly gave Z Corp. inaccurate information that led to publication of the defamatory statements. It seeks contribution, which is permitted by state law, from Jenny, a MN citizen. After Z Corp. impleads Jenny, Smith asserts a claim directly against her, seeking $100,000 in compensatory damages for the defamation. Jenny moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. -[A] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Smith's claim against Jenny under § 1367(a), but jurisdiction is barred by § 1367(b). Congress could have granted jurisdiction over this claim but did not. -[B] Jurisdiction over this claim is not authorized by the supplemental jurisdiction statute. If it were, that would exceed the permissible constitutional scope of jurisdiction under Article III. -[C] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(a), and § 1367(b) doesn't bar the court from hearing the claim. -[D] The claim is barred by the Kroger case because, as in Kroger, the plaintiff here seeks relief from a non-diverse party defendant.

A. [D] is wrong because Kroger is no longer the governing law; § 1367 is. The question isn't whether this is approved by Kroger. [C] is clearly not right because this claim is excepted from supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(b). That leaves [A] and [B]. Gibbs lays out the constitutional standard - the common nucleus of operative fact test. Because Smith's claim against Jenny arises out of the same transaction, it would be constitutional had Congress opted to permit it. (Remember, the Constitution only requires minimal diversity, and Congress can always say that minimal diversity is okay, as it has in CAFA and with statutory interpleader). So the correct answer is [A].

•Quick twist. Jose, from WVA, hires Andy, from MD, to build an underground bomb shelter/wine cellar in his backyard. Andy hires Rick, a VA citizen who runs a backhoe business, to dig the necessary holes. They do the work, complete the job, and leave. Two weeks later, the roof of the shelter capsizes, destroying Jose's wine collection. Jose sues Andy and Rick in federal court, based on diversity, for $100,000 in damages caused by the faulty work. After the suit is filed, Andy asserts a crossclaim against Rick for contribution, claiming he is responsible for 50% of the damages. Andy also asserts a claim against Rick for $5000 in damages that resulted when Rick backed into his dump truck while doing Jose's excavation. -[A] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over both of Andy's claims under § 1367(a). -[B] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Andy's contribution claim but not his truck damage claim. -[C] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Andy's truck damage claim, but it is not properly joined under federal joinder rules. -[D] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Andy's truck claim because it is compulsory under joinder rules.

A. [D] is wrong because truck damage claim isn't compulsory under Rule 18(a). Of course, if he doesn't assert it along with his Rule 14(a) impleader claim, he may lose it, inasmuch as it arises out of the same underlying "transaction," but Rule 18(a) doesn't make its assertion mandatory. More importantly, the test for supplemental jurisdiction isn't whether the added claim is compulsory. [C] is wrong because Rule 18(a) authorizes joinder of this claim. Here, in contrast to prior hypo, Andy added a related claim, and the court probably has supplemental jurisdiction over it since it arose out of the same work on Jose's yard. So [A] is the strongest answer.

Fredo (resident of Las Vegas) and Johnny (resident of Miami) are sued by Michael (resident of New York) for breach of contract. The contract was negotiated and was to be performed in New Jersey. Fredo and Johnny never showed up to do the work they were hired to do. Venue against Fredo and Johnny would be appropriate in which federal district? A. In the District of New Jersey only. B. In the District of New Jersey, the Southern District of Florida, or the District of Nevada.C. In the Southern District of Florida or the District of Nevada.D. No venue exists for a suit over both Johnny and Fredo. Michael will have to file two suits.

A. The correct answer is A. Under old section 1391 (i.e., before the 2011 amendments), you'd have to choose between 1391(a) (for diversity suits) and 1391(b) (for federal questions). Under new 1391, just apply 1391(b). Subsection (b)(1) doesn't apply because all Ds do not reside in the same state. But subsection (b)(2) applies because the contract was negotiated and to be performed (and arguably was breached) in New Jersey. Subsection (b)(3) is a fallback that kicks in only if (b)(1) and (b)(2) don't apply. Here, (b)(2) applies so we can't use (b)(3)!

In which of the following cases would the federal court lack diversity jurisdiction under § 1332? (Assume amount in controversy is satisfied). -[A] Steve from VA, Sam from VA, and Sally from MA sue Joe from NY and John from PA. -[B] Steve from VA, Mary from MD, and Sally from MA sue Rick from MD and Stuart from CT. -[C] Steve from VA, Mary from MD, and Sally from MA sue Joe from NY and John from PA. -[D] Steve from VA and Sven from Denmark sue Sally from MA and Clara from Denmark.

B

Madison (VA) sues Lafayette (MD) and Washington Corp., which is incorporated in DE, has a small headquarters in MD, and a huge office complex in VA. Which of the following is true? - [A] There is not complete diversity because Lafayette and Washington Corp. are both citizens of Maryland. - [B] There is complete diversity, and the suit can proceed in federal court (assuming the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied). - [C] There is not complete diversity because Washington Corp. maintains a significant presence in Virginia, the state where Madison is domiciled.

B

Paul sues Danielle in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California for an accident that happened in Miami. Danielle files an answer that fails to object to venue or personal jurisdiction, thus waiving both of those defenses. Later, Danielle argues that federal court in Miami is a far more convenient forum for litigation of the case, and moves that the court dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court agrees with Danielle that Florida is the more just and convenient forum. May the court dismiss the action? A. No, because once Danielle waived her venue objection it becomes too late to argue that another forum is more convenient. B. No, because dismissal would be inappropriate. C. Yes, because Florida court would be more convenient. D. Yes, because the remedy for forum non conveniens is dismissal.

B

Wanda brings a diversity action against Steve in federal court for injuries suffered in a construction accident. As a result of the accident, Wanda suffered a badly sprained ankle. She alleges that Steve's negligence caused the accident. However, Steve denies that his conduct was negligent. Wanda seeks $100,000 in damages. Which of these is correct? - [A] To determine whether the AIC requirement is met, the court will consider whether Wanda is likely to prevail. - [B] To determine whether the AIC requirement is met, the court will have to figure out whether a reasonable jury could award more than $75,000 for Wanda's injuries. - [C] The AIC requirement is met if it is clear, to a legal certainty, that Wanda's damages exceed $75,000. - [D] The AIC requirement is met because Wanda seeks $100,000 in damages.

B A is wrong because who cares about strength of case, just that its plausible C is wrong because we don't need legal certainty, just reasonable D we can't just say what we want, we need a reason

Congress decides to raise the amount-in-controversy requirement to $40 million. Can it do so? - [A] Sure. Congress can do whatever it wants to the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. - [B] Sure. Congress can limit the federal district courts' exercise of jurisdiction over cases authorized in Article III, Section 2. - [C] No. A $40 million requirement is unfair and would leave too many people subject to the risk of local state court bias. - [D] No. Article III authorizes jurisdiction without an amount-in-controversy requirement.

B A is wrong, because it can't do whatever it wants, it only has so many cards

Reagan grew up in PA. In August 2017, she left for college in ID. She registered her car there and established a bank account there. She has a 1-year lease. She has a part-time job in ID and pays ID state taxes. She listed her ID address on her job application. Her plan is to complete a 2-year degree and then return to PA, where her fiancé lives and just opened a cheese shop. However, she may need a little more than 2 years to finish her degree. Where is Reagan domiciled? - [A] PA, since she is only in ID as a student. - [B] PA, since she intends to return to PA when she finishes her degree and thus isn't in ID indefinitely. - [C] ID, since she has an apartment and goes to school there, has a job there, pays state taxes, and has health coverage there. - [D] ID, since she doesn't know when she will finish the college program.

B Not A because did doesnt matter is your there a a student not C because it doesn't have any matter of what your doing, it matters your intent

Lani, a police officer from HI on loan to a Phoenix, AZ department, sues Alex, from CA, and Dan, from AZ, in state court in Arizona. She claims that defendants battered her while she was trying to arrest them. (Battery is a state tort claim). She credibly alleges $150,000 in damages. Alex answers the complaint denying battery and asserts a counterclaim seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights statute. Within 30 days of filing, Alex removes to federal district court with Dan's agreement. - [A] The federal court has jurisdiction over this case because it could have been filed in federal court originally. - [B] The federal court lacks jurisdiction over this case under § 1441(b)(2). - [C] The federal court has jurisdiction over this case based on the federal counterclaim. - [D] The federal court has jurisdiction because Alex is an out-of-state defendant.

B is correct Not A: because we have an instate dependent. 1441b precludes removal where one defendant is instate when the only foundation of removal is diversity under 1331 we look at motley: look at plaintiffs case not counterclaims. We only look at counters where there is exclusive rights in federal court.

•Smith Corp. terminates Gloria's employment. She sues in federal court, claiming sex discrimination. She claims she has not been able to find an equivalent position and has lost income. Smith Corp.'s answer denies discrimination and claims that Gloria simply was bad at client contact. It also denies that she has lost income as a result of the dismissal. Which of the following is least likely to be subject to discovery under Rule 26(b)(1)? -[A] Smith Corp. requests Gloria's tax returns for the 3 years before and 3 years since her termination. -[B] Smith Corp. requests a copy of a letter Gloria sent to other employees complaining about their salaries and suggesting some collective action to force improvements. -[C] Gloria requests detailed information on the computer operating system of Smith Corp. and its client files. -[D] Gloria seeks the names and addresses of all employees who have been disciplined or terminated by Smith Corp. over the past 7 years.

B. Least likely to be discoverable. Focus in on call of the question. [A] should be discoverable, as Gloria has placed her income at issue. [C] is arguably relevant (though possibly quite broad) - Smith Corp. has put her client skills at issue, and knowing about its computer system will help her assess how the records are kept. [D] is likely discoverable, as it may give Gloria information about a pattern of sex discrimination. [B] is the most questionable. Smith Corp. did not claim it fired Gloria because she was fomenting discontent among her fellow employees; it claimed she was bad at client contact. **Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the material sought be relevant to the claim or defense as pleaded.**

Louise and her passenger, Paul, both from Kentucky, are injured in a 3-car collision between Louise, Steve (TN), and Bailey (TN). Louise and Paul sue Steve together in federal court, each seeking $100,000 in damages. The jury finds Steve liable and awards Louise $100,000 and Paul $46,000. Steve declares bankruptcy and doesn't pay. Louise now sues Bailey for the same injuries. Is this okay? - [A] Louise's new claim is not barred because this claim could not have been joined in the first suit. There are not likely to be common questions of law or fact in her suits against Steve and Bailey. - [B] Louise's new claim is not barred. Although she could have joined Bailey in the first suit, she was not required to. - [C] Louise's new claim is not barred. A party can join with other Ps or sue multiple Ds under Rule 20(a), but not both. - [D] Louise's claim is barred because she failed to join Bailey as a co-D in her original suit against Steve. Both requirements were met, so she had to join Bailey.

B. [B] is correct. [A] is wrong because obviously the suits would raise common questions of fact, so Louise certainly could have joined Bailey in the first action. [C] is goofy. [D] is wrong because joinder is not required if two requirements of Rule 20(a) are met.

Priyanka, from MD, sues Dr. Kay, from VA, and Dr. Ivens, from DE, in state court in MD. She seeks $120,000 (a plausible amount) in damages claiming that either Kay or Ivens caused her injuries. Ivens answers the complaint 10 days later. Kay files a notice of removal to federal court 10 days after Ivens answers. Two months later, Ivens moves to remand to state court because he never agreed to removal. The motion should be - [A] granted, because the amount-in-controversy is not met. Priyanka seeks $120,000, which works out to only $60,000 each. This objection is timely, because objections to SMJ can be made at any time. - [B] granted, because Ivens did not join in the notice of removal, and removal requires approval of all of the defendants. - [C] denied, because the court has original jurisdiction over the case and Ivens's objection has been waived. - [D] denied, because removal was proper, since the case is within federal diversity jurisdiction.

C Class 5

Acme Corp. sues Sarah Eaglet for breach of contract, claiming $300,000 in damages. Acme is incorporated in Delaware. It has a small headquarters in Illinois but conducts a lot of business from its huge office complex in NY. Acme brings the action in NY state court. Eaglet, a NY citizen, answers the complaint, denying any liability. Four months later, Acme moves to amend the complaint to add a claim against Eaglet under a federal fraud statute. The judge grants the motion. Within 10 days, Eaglet removes. Acme makes a timely motion for remand. The motion for remand should be - [A] granted, because the federal court lacks jurisdiction, since both parties are citizens of NY. - [B] granted, because Eaglet did not remove the action within 30 days after the action was filed. - [C] denied, because Eaglet had the right, under § 1446(b), to remove within 30 days of receiving notice of the amendment. - [D] denied, because Eaglet had the right, under § 1446(b), to remove within 30 days after the amendment was granted.

C The test is when does the 30 day clock start B is incorrect because it presupposes that the 30 day clock has expired Class 5

•Smith, from MN, sues Z Corp., a WI corporation with its principal place of business in SD, for damages for defamation. He sues in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and claims damages of $100,000. Z Corp. impleads Jay, a former supervisor who allegedly made the statements on which Smith's suit is based. Z Corp. seeks indemnification (as permitted under state law) from Jay, a WI citizen, for damages owed to Smith. Jay moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. -[A] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim against Jay under § 1367(a), but jurisdiction over it is barred by § 1367(b). -[B] The court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(a). -[C] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(a), and § 1367(b) does not bar the court from hearing the claim. [D] The court does not have supplemental jurisdiction because Z Corp. and Jay are both from WI.

C [D] is clearly wrong. That's what supplemental jurisdiction is all about - allowing jurisdiction where original jurisdiction would not lie. [B] is also wrong, as the indemnification claim clearly arises out of a common nucleus of operative fact. § 1367(b) doesn't bar the suit because this is not a claim advanced by one standing in the shoes (same side of the line) as the original plaintiff, Smith. [C] is correct.

Steve, who lives in Maryland, drives to the beach in Delaware, where he rents a house for a week. He has a little too much fun at the beach and destroys some of the patio furniture. Gus, the owner of the property, files suit against Steve in Delaware state court, serving him with process as he is packing up the minivan in the Delaware rental driveway. Which of the following is true? A. Steve has enough contacts to justify the Delaware court's exercise of jurisdiction here. B. Steve does not have enough contacts to justify the Delaware court's exercise of jurisdiction here. C. Minimum contacts analysis is irrelevant in this action.

C he was tagged on the forum state Class 7

•Sam sues Acme Lawn Mower Company for injuries sustained when the mower ran over his foot. He brings his suit after the statute of limitations lapses for strict product liability actions, so his complaint proceeds on a negligence theory. His counsel seeks discovery from Acme about whether it added any safety guards to the mowers after his accident. This evidence is inadmissible "subsequent remedial measure" evidence in a negligence action. The requested information -[A] is not within the scope of discovery, since it will be inadmissible at trial. -[B] is not within the scope of discovery because it relates to events after the date of Sam's injury and thus requests irrelevant material. [C] is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1).C.

C. [A] is clearly wrong; per the Rule, matter is discoverable even if inadmissible. [B] is too cramped a view of relevance. Evidence like this can frequently lead to admissible evidence relevant to P's claim. [C] is the right answer. This information could lead to evidence suggesting Acme was aware of a defect but delayed introducing a fix.

Utah has a statute barring introduction of evidence that a party in a motor vehicle case was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of an accident. The statute prevents use of such evidence to show that plaintiff was negligent, which under Utah law would reduce plaintiff's recovery. In federal court, assume no Federal Rule applies. Judges generally admit seatbelt evidence where it is relevant. Marsha sues Greg for injuries in an accident (diversity). At trial, Greg offers evidence that Marsha was not wearing her seatbelt. The federal judge should - [A] admit the evidence, since admission of evidence is a matter of trial procedure. - [B] admit the evidence, because the question of admissibility of evidence is arguably procedural. - [C] exclude the evidence because admitting it when the state court would not leads to forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. - [D] admit the evidence, because doing so would not lead to forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws.

C. [A] is wrong because it uses labels. Even York ditched the labels. That is not how the Court analyzes these questions. [B] articulates the standard for Rules, not federal judicial practice (Hanna track 1). As between [C] and [D], [C] is probably the better answer. Seatbelt evidence could make a big difference in Greg's ability to lessen his liability. Thus, Marsha would definitely choose a forum to avoid application of the federal rule.

A judicial district: A. Is the same thing as a state. B. Can extend beyond the borders of a state. C. Might be contained within part of a state. D. Is always smaller than a state.

C. The correct answer is C, "Might be contained within part of a state." Some states contain only one judicial district embodying the entire state (such as Nevada). Other states (such as Florida) contain two or more judicial districts. Florida contains three: the Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts. California and Texas each have four. Note: answer B — "Can extend beyond the borders of a state" — is deceptive. Recall that "bulge" jurisdiction extends personal jurisdiction beyond the borders of a judicial district and outside the state containing the district. However, bulge jurisdiction does not extend the borders of the district itself!

Granger brings an action against Malfoy in federal court (diversity) for damages under the Wisconsin House Elf Act. The Act provides that service of process in actions under it must be made in hand on the defendant before passage of the statute of limitations. Federal Rule 4, however, allows the summons and complaint to be left at the defendant's home with a resident of suitable age and discretion. Granger's counsel used the federal approach on the day before the statute of limitations expired. If the case arose immediately after York (pre-Byrd), the court would - [A] apply state law, since the case would otherwise come out differently in federal court. - [B] apply federal law, since the method of service is clearly a matter of procedure, not substance. - [C] apply federal law, since the federal approach is established in a Federal Rule. - [D] apply state law, since the state rule is found in a statute.

Class 12

Zoe, from TX, sues Beta Corp. (a Texas corp.) in federal court. She alleges that Beta Corp. violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act by firing her due to her age. Assume that, under the law of Texas, where Zoe was hired, worked, and was fired, the employer can fire a worker at any time without cause. - [A] The federal court will apply Texas law. - [B] The federal court will create "general common law" to govern the claim. - [C] The federal court will apply federal law to this claim, looking to federal statutory law and any case law interpreting it.

Class 12

Sally, from Wisconsin, sues Bo, her Wisconsin landlord, in federal court for damages sustained when her rental house collapsed. Sally alleges Bo was negligent in failing to comply with federal building standards applicable to buildings subsidized under the Fair Housing Act. Bo answers the complaint denying liability, and the case proceeds to discovery. Ten months later, Sally decides she doesn't like the federal judge assigned to her case. She moves to dismiss the suit for lack of SMJ, claiming the case does not arise under federal law. The motion should be - [A] denied if the case "arises under" federal law within the meaning of Article III, even if it doesn't "arise under" federal law within the meaning of § 1331. - [B] granted, if the court concludes that the case does not satisfy the standard for a case "arising under" federal law. - [C] denied because Sally, the plaintiff, chose this court and thereby waived any objection to the court's jurisdiction. - [D] denied because Sally waived any objection to SMJ by litigating the case for 10 months without raising the jurisdictional issue.

Class 4?

Sam, from MN, sues Joe from TN, claiming $46,000 in damages after Joe allegedly breached a contract. Which of the following is correct? - [A] The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in this instance would be unconstitutional. - [B] The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in this instance would be constitutional and consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332. - [C] The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in this instance would be both unconstitutional and inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332. - [D] The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in this instance would be constitutional but inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

D

Marla grew up in Montana. She moved to Colorado after high school to attend a 2-year program for hair stylists at the Denver Beauty School. She was anxious to get away from home, so off she went. She figured she'd stay if she liked it and get a job as a stylist afterwards, in Colorado or elsewhere in the West (possibly even Montana). She took an apartment on a 6-month lease. Where is Marla domiciled? - [A] She remains domiciled in Montana because the program is only for 2 years. - [B] She remains domiciled in Montana because she may return there to work as a stylist. - [C] She remains domiciled in Montana because she was domiciled there before she left for Colorado. - [D] She is domiciled in Colorado because she resides there with an intent to remain indefinitely.

D -Beske says it could be more precise: "she has no concrete plans to leave and could remain indefinitely"

Castor Chemical Co., a CA company, sues Pollux, also from CA, in state court for breach of contract, claiming Pollux agreed to manufacture a drug for Castor and then failed to do so. Pollux answers, admitting he refused to deliver the drug and offering as an affirmative defense that, after making the contract, he learned that manufacture of the drug was barred by the Federal Generic Drug Licensing Act. After answering, Pollux removes the action to federal court. - [A] The action is properly removed. At the time he removed, Pollux had raised a federal issue in his answer. - [B] The action is not properly removed because the case does not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of Article III. - [C] The action is not properly removed because it is a federal question case, not a diversity case. - [D] The action is not properly removed because the case does not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of § 1331.

D Class 5

Which of the following acts might subject a litigant to sanctions under Rule 11? - [A] A lawyer makes a legal argument in a phone conversation with opposing counsel for which she has not supporting legal authority. - [B] A lawyer fails to answer a set of interrogatories given to her client by the opposing party. - [C] A lawyer sends a letter to opposing counsel demanding damages for medical expenses which his client alleges she incurred, even though she did not. - [D] A lawyer files a complaint seeking damages for medical expenses her client claims to have suffered without seeking any confirmation from the client that she in fact incurred such expenses.

D Rule 11 only applies to pleadings and specifically does not apply to discovery. Thus, only [D] involves a filing that could possibly subject an attorney to sanctions.

•Sam, a New Jersey shop owner, sues Eli, a local NJ official, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his First Amendment rights for refusing to let Sam speak at a town meeting on vendor licenses. He adds a second claim against Eli for state law defamation, based on statements Eli made to the local newspaper three days later about the quality of products sold at Sam's shop. Can the federal court hear the state law defamation claim? -[A] has constitutional authority to hear Sam's defamation claim under Gibbs but does not have statutory authority to do so under § 1367(a). -[B] has statutory authority to hear Sam's defamation claim under § 1367(a), but it would be unconstitutional, under Gibbs, for the court to do so. -[C] has both constitutional and statutory authority to hear Sam's defamation claim. [D] has neither constitutional nor statutory authority to hear Sam's defamation claim.

D The § 1983 claim arises under federal law, so we don't have to concern ourselves with § 1367(b). Under Gibbs, it is constitutionally permissible to hear the defamation claim if it arises from a common nucleus of operative fact. This is essentially the same standard as under § 1367(a), so it's either going to be [C] or [D]. Here, it's pretty clear that these are not the same operative facts. His federal claim relates to Eli refusing to let him speak at a meeting. Eli's statements to a newspaper regarding Sam's products seem to be transactionally unrelated to the meeting incident. [D] is the best choice.

•Plaintiffs sought to certify class action alleging that 2016 Sonata Hybrid vehicles have defective sunroofs. Plaintiffs sought compensation, reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs and extended warranty. -[A] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). -[B] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). -[C] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(2). -[D] This might be a valid class action under Rule 23(b)(3). -[E] This is not a valid class action under Rule 23.

D [D]. Here, plaintiffs are alleging a single, quantifiable defect. If they own a 2016 Sonata Hybrid, they should be able to establish this. Common questions of law and fact are going to predominate. [A] is wrong because plaintiffs are seeking damages - not the imposition of a standard of conduct. There is thus no risk that manufacturer will be subject to inconsistent obligations. Most courts hold that 23(b)(1)(A) does not apply where plaintiffs seek damages. [B] is wrong because there's no suggestion of a limited fund. [C] is wrong because again, plaintiffs are seeking damages. This is not a case in which plaintiffs are seeking any declaratory or injunctive relief. [E] is wrong because, though precise questions of damage may vary individually, [D] is correct.

Skelly sues Donald, Daisy, and Sal, a comedy trio, on a claim for unfair competition in federal court in VA. West, from CA, is also named as a defendant. Skelly's lawyer has a private eye from her office serve Donald by delivering the summons and complaint to his home in VA, where the server hands them to Fields, the NY booking agent for the trio, who had flown down on business for the weekend. She serves Daisy several weeks later by having a server deliver the summons and complaint to Fields at his office in NY. She serves Sal by mailing the summons and complaint to his home in Michigan by first class mail. She serves West by having a constable in LA deliver the summons and complaint to West at her office. When West says she does not want the papers, the constable places them in front of her on the desk. Assume Michigan permits service by certified mail. - [A] Service is proper on all four defendants. - [B] Service is proper on Donald and Daisy, but not on Sal or West. - [C] Service is only proper on West and Sal. - [D] Service is only proper on West. - [E] Service is not proper on any of the defendants.

D Who cares that you didnt pick it up you need to be persnickity with all the others Class 6

Yee gets into a 3-car accident with cars driven by Devon and Shirley in Colorado. Yee sues Devon for his injuries in federal court in Maryland, claiming $100,000 in injuries and diversity of citizenship. Shirley has never been to Maryland. Devon brings a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), claiming Shirley as a necessary party. Should the court grant it? - [A] The court should grant the motion, as Shirley is a required party under Rule 19 but joinder is not feasible due to the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Shirley. - [B] Shirley is a required party under Rule 19 and joinder is infeasible, but the court should not dismiss because it can employ protective measures to minimize prejudice to the parties. - [C] Devon's motion should be denied because he could use Rule 14 to implead Shirley, thus bringing her into the case. - [D] Devon's motion should be denied because Shirley

D. D] is correct. Rule 19(a)(1)(A) does not apply; Yee can get complete relief by suing Devon without Shirley's presence in the action. Rule 19(a)(1)(A) doesn't require any party who might be liable to the plaintiff instead of defendant to be made a party. [A] and [B] are thus wrong (although [A] correctly notes that Shirley would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland). [C] is wrong because, even though Rule 14 permits impleader for contribution, personal jurisdiction defects would prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over Shirley. Also; call of question is "should court grant 12(b)(7) motion, making D a far better answer.

Sandy sues Danny for slander. Danny answers on the merits, denying that he made the offending statement. Six weeks later, he realizes that Sandy has filed suit in an improper venue. - [A] Danny should move to amend his answer to raise the defense of improper venue. Under Rule 15(a), the judge may grant the motion in her discretion. - [B] Danny may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that venue is improper since he did not raise any of the four disfavored defenses in either a pre-answer motion or his answer. - [C] Danny may file a motion to dismiss for improper venue, since he did not make a pre-answer motion. - [D] Danny has waived the defense of improper venue.

D. Venue is one of the disfavored 4, and Danny waives it if he answers the complaint without raising it. [D] is the right answer, and for these reasons, [B] and [C] are wrong. [A] is the hard one. We know that amendments are liberally granted. Why not permit cure here? If anyone who commits a Rule 12 foul can do an end-run-around with Rule 15(a), the purposes of Rule 12 would be thwarted. See Rule 12(h)(1)(B) - Rule 15(a)(1) permits amendments as a matter of course only within 21 days after serving. Danny's motion is too late for that, and judge would be unlikely to grant leave.

Samson files a complaint against Delilah for breach of an implied contract to give him haircuts. Delilah moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court denies the motion. Delilah then files an answer to the complaint, including in her answer the defense that venue is improper and the defense that Samson gave her a written release of the claim as part of a previous settlement. - [A] Delilah has waived both defenses by failing to include them in her pre-answer motion. - [B] Delilah may include these defenses in her answer or an amendment allowed as of right under Rule 15(a). - [C] Delilah may assert the release defense in her answer and may include the venue defense in her answer because the Rule 12(b)(6) objection is not one of the "disfavored defenses." - [D] Delilah may include the release defense in her answer but has waived her objection to venue.

D. [A] is wrong because she hasn't waived her affirmative defense by failing to include it in her pre-answer motion. This isn't one of the objections that can be raised by a pre-answer motion under Rule 12. [B] and [C] are wrong because she made a pre-answer motion and could have included the venue objection but did not. Rule 12(h)(1)(A) says it is lost.

•Sal, from NH, sues Pete Corp., a VT corporation with its principal place of business in VT, for damages under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He sues in federal court, claiming that Pete Corp. fired him based on his age, and seeks $50,000 in damages. Pete Corp. impleads Newcomb, a former supervisor who made the actual decision to fire Sal. It seeks indemnification from Newcomb, a VT citizen, for her illegal act. After Newcomb is brought in under Rule 14(a), Sal asserts a claim directly against Newcomb, alleging tortious interference with the employment contract, a state claim, and seeking the same damages. Newcomb moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. -[A] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim against Newcomb under § 1367(a), but jurisdiction over it is barred by § 1367(b). -[B] The court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the claim but may hear it because Sal and Newcomb are diverse. -[C] The court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the claim but may hear it since it satisfies the Gibbs test for a single constitutional case. -[D] The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(a), and § 1367(b) does not bar the court from hearing it.

D. [C] is wrong and is based on the misguided idea that if it's constitutional, the court can hear it whether or not there's a statute. [B] is wrong because, while the parties are diverse, the AIC requirement is not met. Thus, original jurisdiction wouldn't lie under § 1332. That leaves [A] or [D]. Of these, [D] is the clear winner. This is not an action based "solely" on diversity.

Stacey, who works in a gelato shop, sues Rick, who owns the shop, in federal court alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (a federal statute). She claims she was fired for her age and seeks $100,000 in damages. She also asserts, in the same complaint, a claim that Rick breached a side contract they had for an unrelated real estate deal and seeks specific performance. Finally, she asserts a third claim, seeking damages, alleging tortious interference with the real estate deal. Is joinder of these claims proper under Rule 18? - [A] Joinder of two money damages claims is proper, but the claim for specific performance is equitable and should be brought in a separate action. - [B] Joinder of the real estate deal claims is improper because they do not meet the same transaction or occurrence test. - [C] Joinder of the three claims is improper because no efficiency will be achieved by litigating unrelated claims. - [D] Joinder of the three claims is proper.

D. [D] is correct. Rule 18(a) is very liberal and does not require that joined claims arise out of the same transaction/occurrence or seek the same kind of relief. [C] is incorrect because the rule doesn't require that they be related. That said, judge has authority under Rule 42(b) to separate unrelated claims for trial. **Again, note: That it's permitted under Rule 18 doesn't mean the court will have SMJ.*

Danny resides in Miami and Debbie resides in Tallahassee. They decide to travel north to Toronto for spring break, driving in separate cars. On the way, they take a drive in Pittsburgh, going down Murray Avenue in the Squirrel Hill neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Still in separate cars, they are temporarily distracted by the wonderful smells coming from Mineo's Pizza Parlor on Murray Avenue. They both run into Paul, who was trying to pull out of a parking spot in front of Mineo's. If Paul sues Danny and Debbie for negligence, what venue or venues are appropriate? A. Southern District of Florida. B. Northern District of Florida. C. Western District of Pennsylvania. D. All of the above.

D. The correct answer is D. All of the Ds live in the same state, so venue is ok in any district where one of them resides. (1391(b)(1)). Plus, the car wreck was in Pittsburgh, the place where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. (1391(b)(2)).

P (citizen of Florida), sues D1 (citizen of Georgia) and D2 (citizen of Florida) for negligence for $500. Defendants argue that the Constitution and the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), both bar subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit. Are they correct?

Defendants are definitely correct that the statute bars their action. There isn't complete diversity, and the amount in controversy is far less than $75,000.00. That said, defendants are not correct in their statement that there's a constitutional problem. Under the Constitution, minimal diversity (satisfied here) is okay, and there is no amount-in-controversy requirement.

In Mullane, the Court held: - [A] every person with a current right to income from the trust is entitled to at least mail notice of the proceeding. - [B] every person whose name and address could be ascertained through investigation must be given individual notice of the proceeding. - [C] any person whose interests might be affected by the proceeding must be given notice by in-hand service of process. - [D] due to the large number of persons whose interests might be affected by the proceedings, notice by publication was sufficient on the facts of the case. - [E] None of the above is true.

E: A: no the unknown unknowns B: investigation is not required C: no one has to have notice through in hand service D: no, because the known people needed a letter CLass 5

Moana Mall is a large national corporation headquartered in Arlington (Eastern District of Virginia) and incorporated in Delaware (District of Delaware). Moana Mall has thousands of department stores all over the United States. Melissa, a resident of Ft. Lauderdale (Southern District of Florida), goes to a Moana Mall store in Coral Gables and slips on a wet floor, injuring herself. She wants to file suit for negligence against Moana Mall. Venue is arguably proper

In the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of Florida, and the District of Delaware

Husqvarna makes chainsaws in Sweden. It sells them to Kole Imports, a New York wholesaler, which in turn sells them to retail home stores. Tex Sawyer, a chainsaw enthusiast, purchases one at a Home Depot in Lubbock, Texas. The chainsaw malfunctions, causing very grisly injuries. Tex sues Husqvarna in Texas state court. Does the Texas court have personal jurisdiction over Husqvarna?

It depends: Use the grab bag Stream of commerce plus: no facts here Numbers people: are they selling a sufficent number? this needs some assumptions RBG: hella satisfied, always satisified

After her flight was canceled and she was unable to book another, Jennifer, a Michigan resident, took an uber to Steve's Used Car Lot in Denver, Colorado and told Steve she desperately needed to buy a car so she could get to her sister's wedding in Michigan. Jennifer bought a used Hyundai. When she got to Michigan, all four tires spontaneously fell off the car. She sues Steve in Michigan. Can the Michigan court exercise personal jurisdiction?

No No Ford Facts, no domicile and its not about foreseeability , its about purposeful contact Class 8

Dodd is an auto mechanic who is a citizen of Maine and works in Maine. Dodd recently did brake work on Doris's car, after which Doris drove to Massachusetts, where her brakes failed and she was in an accident with Paula. Paula sues both Doris and Dodd in Massachusetts. Assuming Dodd has no other connections with Massachusetts and timely moves to dismiss the case on personal jurisdiction grounds, would it be constitutionally proper for the Massachusetts court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Dodd (the mechanic)? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Maybe

No We are lacking purposeful contact in Mass Doris' decision was a unilateral act, like WWV About Purposeful not just forceable Class 7

Pamela (citizen of Florida) gets into a bar fight in Miami with Caroline (citizen or subject of France). Pamela files suit against Caroline in the Southern District of Florida for $100,000. but assume that Caroline has moved to Miami, and although still having French citizenship, has obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States. Is subject-matter jurisdiction appropriate?

No - 1332(a)(2) carves out an exception where that citizen of a foreign state has been admitted for lawful permanent resident status in plaintiff's state. So subject matter jurisdiction would not be appropriate here.

Sam, a New York Citizen, buys an RV from Colorado Adventure Travel while on vacation in Colorado. Several months later, his RV catches fire due to a design defect while he is on the road in upstate New York. He files suit in New York against Colorado Adventure Travel. Does the New York court have personal jurisdiction over Colorado Adventure Travel?

No, no ford facts are facts presented class 8

Pamela (citizen of Florida) enters into a contract with Bisney, Inc. a Delaware corporation with theme parks in Florida and California. The Florida theme park is 20% of the company's business, and the California theme park is 25%. Movies distributed throughout the country constitute 30% of the company's business. The remaining 25% of the company's business is spread around the country. The company's headquarters are located in Orlando, Florida. Can Pamela invoke diversity jurisdiction?

No, she can't. Because its headquarters are in Florida, Bisney is a citizen of Delaware and Florida. Thus, complete diversity required under 1332 is lacking. The percentage of business statistics are totally irrelevant.

Paul, a citizen of Massachusetts, accepts a wonderful new job in Miami, Florida and decides to move to Ft. Lauderdale. While driving down to Florida, he gets into a car accident in Georgia with Debbie, a citizen of Florida. While stuck in the hospital in Georgia, Paul sues Debbie in Florida federal court for $100,000. Debbie moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Paul should be treated as a citizen of Florida. Will Debbie succeed?

No, she won't. Because Paul gets into an accident before he is actually residing in Florida, he remains a domiciliary of Massachusetts. Domicile requires two things - intent to stay indefinitely (satisfied here) and in-state resident (not satisfied here).

Peter (citizen of Arkansas) enters into a contract with Mall-Mart, Inc. a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arkansas. May Peter sue Mall-Mart in federal court for breach of contract?

No. Mall-Mart has its PPB in Arkansas, so there is not complete diversity.

Paul (citizen of Florida) sues Dialco, Inc. (Delaware corporation with principal place of business in California) in Florida court seeking recovery under a state "unsolicited instant messaging" statute that prohibits unsolicited instant messages. The statute limits recovery to $1000 statutory damages per unsolicited instant message, and prohibits any other sort of remedy (including but not limited to injunction, actual or consequential damages, punitive damages, or attorneys fees). Paul alleges that he has received 10 unsolicited instant messages and seeks $100,000 in damages. Is the amount in controversy satisfied?

No. The statute makes clear that he can't possibly recover more than $10,000. So this is a case in which plaintiff can't plausibly get to $75,000.01.

Paul (Florida) wants to sue Dewey, Cheatem, and Howe, a general law partnership operating out of Atlanta, Georgia. Its three partners are citizens of Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida. May Paul invoke diversity jurisdiction?

No. Though we didn't spend much time on this, a partnership is a citizen of every state in which the partners are citizens. So there is Florida on both sides of the "v.," and no complete diversity.

Paul and Penny are hurt in a car accident., Paul (citizen of Florida) sues Debbie (citizen of Georgia) for negligence ($50,000). In the same suit, Penny (citizen of Florida) joins a claim against Debbie for negligence ($50,000). Is the amount in controversy met?

No. Two plaintiffs cannot add their claims against a single defendant to get the lawsuit over the amount-in-controversy threshold.

Patrick (citizen of Florida) gets into a bar fight with Danny (citizen of Georgia). Patrick later dies due to an unrelated medical condition. His brother, Eddie (citizen of Georgia) serves as executor and files suit against Danny on behalf of Patrick's estate. Danny moves to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Will he succeed?

No; as we know from the Upshaw case, the relevant citizenship for our purposes here is the citizenship of the decedent, Patrick. Because Patrick was from Florida, there is no diversity defect here.

Neo, a first-year associate, attempts to initiate a lawsuit on behalf of SmithCo., her client. - [A] Neo drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of contract to design software for plaintiff. She serves the complaint by delivering it herself to Gates at his office. - [B] Neo drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of contract to design software for plaintiff. She prints out the form summons from office files containing the information required by Rule 4 (a)(1)(A)-(E) and serves both documents on Gates by a method authorized by 4(e). - [C] Neo drafts a complaint against Jobs and Gates for breach of contract to design software for plaintiff. She files the complaint, has the clerk sign and seal the summons, and serves the documents on Gates by a method authorized by 4(e). - [D] Neo drafts a complaint against Gates for breach of contract to design software for plaintiff. She delivers two copies of the complaint to be signed and sealed by the clerk and then served by the clerk on Gates. - [E] None of the above are sufficent

None of the above A: lawyer is not a party so thats okay, but she didn't give summons B: not signed sealed or filed C: she needs to serve both defendants D: clear can't serve Class 6

Paul (citizen of Florida) sues Debbie (citizen of Georgia) for negligence, seeking in good faith $80,000 for his medical bills, pain and suffering, and lost wages. At trial, he was only awarded $70,000 because the jury found that Paul's pain and suffering was somewhat less than he argued. As subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, was diversity of citizenship lacking?

Nope. It doesn't matter what he ultimately gets so long as a jury could plausibly have awarded $80,000.

Pierre (citizen of France) gets into a bar fight in Miami but imagine that it was a four-person fight. Now Pierre (France) and Betty (Florida) sue Hans (Germany) and Veronica (New York). Subject-matter jurisdiction?

Now we have U.S. citizens, domiciled in different states, on either side of the "v." Even one of them would be enough. We have complete diversity and foreign citizens are fine both under 1332(a)(2) and 1332(a)(3) as "additional parties."

Paul (Florida) sues Car Dealer (Georgia) because the $50,000 Furrari car he bought from Car Dealer turned out to be a lemon. Paul's complaint alleges three Counts: I) Breach of Warranty for $50,000; II) Negligent Misrepresentation for $50,000; and III) Fraud for $50,000. Is the amount in controversy met?

Paul (Florida) sues Car Dealer (Georgia) because the $50,000 Furrari car he bought from Car Dealer turned out to be a lemon. Paul's complaint alleges three Counts: I) Breach of Warranty for $50,000; II) Negligent Misrepresentation for $50,000; and III) Fraud for $50,000. Is the amount in controversy met?

Dave, a Delaware citizen, lives ten miles from the Pennsylvania border. Just over the border, in Pennsylvania, is a business called Mike's Motorcycles. Mike's Motorcycles advertises throughout the area, including in Delaware, and frequently sells motorcycles to Delaware citizens. Dave goes to the dealership and buys a Harley. As soon as he bikes into Delaware, the front tire falls off, causing Dave significant injury. Dave sues Mike's Motorcycles in Delaware. Does the Delaware court have personal jurisdiction?

Probably Not general because they are a penn company but for Specific, its similar to for Facts, and the situation "arises out of" purposeful contact with the forum state

Melina resides in Palm Beach (Southern District of Florida) and Sara resides in Pensacola (Northern District of Florida). They decided to travel north to Montreal, Canada for spring break, driving in separate cars. On the way, they took a drive through Cleveland (Northern District of Ohio) and stopped at Humphrey's Popcorn to try legendary popcorn balls. Still in separate cars, they both run into Jason in the Humphrey's parking lot. If Jason sues Melina and Sara for negligence, what venue or venues are appropriate?

Southern District of Florida, Northern District of Florida, and the Northern District of Ohio.

Steve, a Kentucky citizen, is involved in an accident with Jake, a commercial truck driver working for Atlas Tires. The accident takes place in South Dakota. Atlas is incorporated in Delaware. Its corporate headquarters are in Indiana. It has a branch office and manufactures all component parts in Kentucky. Steve sues Atlas in federal court in Kentucky seeking $100,000. -Does Kentucky court have subject matter jurisdiction in the case? -Does Kentucky court have personal jurisdiction over Atlas?

Subject matter: yes Diversity Personal: No because COA is not kentucky, no Ford facts and no General Jurisdiction

Paul has lived in Massachusetts his entire life and has a home there. In 2005, he bought a vacation home in Miami Beach that he stays in during the summers but otherwise still lives in Massachusetts. Can he sue Debbie (a Florida citizen) in federal court on a state-law negligence claim?

Sure. You can only have one domicile, and Paul is only gone from Massachusetts for a fixed term every year. (Even if that were enough to bring his Massachusetts domicile into question, which I doubt, he certainly hasn't established a new domicile, so he retains the clear-as-can-be domicile he had in Massachusetts prior to 2005).

Under section 1391, where there is more than one district in a state, a corporation's residence for purposes of venue exists only in the district with which the corporation has the most significant contacts.A. TrueB. False

The correct answer is "False." The key is understanding that for purposes of venue under 1391(b)(1), corporate "residence" is defined by reference to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. Read 1391(c)(2) and (d) carefully. It's possible for a corporation to be a "resident" of none, one, or more than one of the districts within a state. If the contacts of a corporation are such that it would be subject to PJ in more than one district in the same or different state (with each district treated as if each were a separate state), then the corporation is treated as a "resident" of each and every such district. See 1391(c)(2). It gets more interesting. What about states that have multiple districts, like Texas? More specifically, what if a corporation has sufficient contacts for PJ with Texas, but lacks sufficient contacts for PJ with any of Texas' judicial districts? Thus, imagine scattered contacts. If so, then the corporation is deemed to be a resident of the district with which it has "the most significant contacts." Interesting. In sum, for purposes of venue, a corporation could be resident of zero, one, or more than one judicial districts.

Mall-Mart is a large national corporation headquartered in Bentonville (in western Arkansas) and incorporated in Delaware. Mall-Mart has thousands of department stores all over the United States. Pam, a resident of Miami, goes to a Mall-Mart store in Coral Gables and slips on a wet floor, injuring herself. She wants to file suit for negligence against Mall-Mart. Venue is arguably proper:\A. In the Western District of Arkansas.B. In the District of Delaware.C. In the Southern District of Florida.D. All of the above.

The correct response is D, "All of the above." Regarding 1391(b)(1), consider what districts Mall-Mart resides in. Section 1391(c)(2) states that "an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business." (Emphasis added.) So Mall-Mart "resides" (for venue purposes) in its district of incorporation (District of Delaware, a state with only one district), and its district of PPOB (Western District of Arkansas, because that is the district where its PPOB is located). These are both districts where Mall-Mart is subject to general in personam jurisdiction! Odd, but corporate residence for venue purposes turns on corporate PJ!!! Additionally, Mall-Mart is subject to specific jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida, where its store was located, the condition of which gave rise to the P's claim. Thus, under 1391(b)(1), Mall-Mart is a resident of W.D. Ark, D. Del., and S.D. Fla. (Note: I rather doubt that the "if all defendants reside in the same state" language bars 1391(b)(1) venue here, since this is a single D with multiple residences and not a case with multiple "defendants.") Additionally, venue is proper in S.D. Fla. under 1391(b)(2) because substantial events occurred there, namely, the slippery floor and the injury.

Western Legal Publishing Co., Inc. (citizen of Florida and Delaware) sues a brand-new law book company, West Legal Publishing Co. (citizen of Nevada and California) in federal court under state law for trademark infringement. Western seeks an injunction. Western hasn't yet suffered any harm (because West Legal hadn't yet started operations), so the value of an injunction at this time to plaintiff is minimal. The cost to West Legal, however, will be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Is the amount in controversy met?

This is a tricky one - plaintiff hasn't asked for any dollar amount. Courts have actually split on how to handle this, and I don't want you to worry about it. Most courts say that you estimate the value of the remedy plaintiff seeks. But again, I did not teach this and will not test it.

Steve also has a barely-driven Ferrari on his lot. While Jennifer is negotiating her purchase of the Hyundai, she sees the car and tells Steve that her Uncle Tony in Pennsylvania may be interested in buying it. Steve calls Tony and tells him about the car, sending him pictures and specs. Steve encourages Tony to come to Denver to see it. Tony does so and buys it. When he gets the car back to Philadelphia, he learns that Steve has swapped out the Ferrari engine for a subpar old Toyota unit. Uncle Tony sues Steve in Pennsylvania. Does the Pennsylvania court have personal jurisdiction over Steve?

Yes Though Steve is not from Pennsylvania (no general juris) he had purposeful contact in Penn through solicitation of the uncle. class 8

Paul (citizen of Florida) sues Debbie (citizen of Georgia) for negligence ($50,000), and an unrelated breach of contract ($50,000). Is the amount in controversy met?

Yes, definitely. A single plaintiff is suing a diverse single defendant. Plaintiff can aggregate any claim against defendant, even if unrelated.

Pamela (citizen of Florida) gets into a bar fight in Miami with Caroline (citizen or subject of France). Pamela files suit against Caroline in the Southern District of Florida for $100,000. Is there subject-matter jurisdiction?

Yes; 1332(a)(2) specifically permits suits by citizens of a state (Pamela) against citizens of a foreign state (Caroline). The amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied.

Paul, a citizen of Massachusetts, accepts a wonderful new job in Miami, Florida and decides to move to Ft. Lauderdale. While driving down to Florida, he gets into a car accident in Georgia with Debbie, a citizen of Florida. While stuck in the hospital in Georgia, Paul sues Debbie in Florida federal court for $100,000. but Paul files suit after he moves to Florida. Debbie moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Will Debbie succeed?

Yes; now, Paul seems to satisfy both requirements for Florida domicile, so he is no longer a domiciliary of Massachusetts.

Shelly the glassblower sues Anne in federal court based on diversity and serves her complaint on January 2. Anne answers on January 22, denying negligence. At the end of her answer, under a separate heading entitled "Counterclaim," Anne claims that Shelly agreed to deliver 40 vases to Anne's shop and failed to do so. Shelly answers the counterclaim on January 29, asserting that she never agreed to deliver the vases and that the contract is unenforceable because it was not in writing. After receiving Shelly's answer, Anne's counsel realizes the second argument is valid given the statute of frauds. On February 16, Anne serves an amended counterclaim changing her theory to misrepresentation, a tort. Can Anne amend without leave of the court? - [A] The amendment is proper without leave of court. - [B] Anne will need leave of court since Shelly has already served responsive pleadings. - [C] The amendment is not proper without leave of court since it was filed more than 21 days after Anne filed her answer to the original complaint. - [D] The counterclaim cannot be amended, since the period for amendments has passed.

[A] is correct. A counterclaim is a pleading that requires a responsive pleading (an answer). Thus, Anne has 21 days after Shelly served her responsive pleading, and February 16 is within that window. [B] is wrong - if we look at the counterclaim as its own complaint, then Shelly's response is just like an answer to that complaint. Under 15(A)(1)(b), Anne has 21 days after Shelly's response. [C] is wrong because the key pleading for purposes of this question is the 1/22 counterclaim. [D] is goofy.

Arthur wishes to bring a diversity action in federal court against Cleveland Manufacturing Corp. Cleveland is incorporated in Delaware and has its factory and principal place of business in the Northern District of IL, but no other contacts with IL. The claim is based on alleged negligence in making a toaster at the IL factory, which caused a fire in Arthur's home in the Middle District of GA. - [A] The Southern District of IL is a proper venue under § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place in IL. - [B] The Southern District of IL is a proper venue under § 1391(d) because Cleveland is subject to general jurisdiction in IL and therefore "resides" in the Southern District. - [C] The Southern District of IL is not a proper district under § 1391 because no events giving rise to the claim took place there and Cleveland does not reside there under the venue statute. - [D] The Northern District of IL is not a proper venue under § 1391(b)(2) because a more substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place in the Middle District of Georgia.

[C] is correct. [A] is wrong because the events did not take place in the Southern District, so (b)(2) does not apply. [B] is wrong because, even though Cleveland is subject to general jurisdiction in IL, § 1391(d) tells us to look at the specific district, not the state, for venue purposes in multi-district states. [D] is wrong because the statute simply says "a substantial part" and doesn't require that it be "the most substantial part."

Shelly, a glassblower, sues Anne for negligence, seeking to recover damages for injuries sustained when she was a passenger in Anne's car. She files suit in federal court based on diversity on January 2 and serves the complaint on Anne on January 4. On January 22, Anne moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. On February 9, Shelly amends the complaint to add a second claim against Anne for damage to six vases that were in the car at the time of the accident. Is Shelly's amendment timely? - [A] It is too late to be filed as of right since it is served more than 21 days after she filed the complaint. - [B] It is too late because it was filed after Anne responded. - [C] It is timely under Rule 15. - [D] It is improper because it adds a claim for different damages not mentioned in the original complaint.

[C] is correct. Shelly gets 21 days after Anne files an Answer or motion under Rule 12. February 9th is only 18 days after Shelly received the answer, just bringing this within Rule 15(A)(1)(b). [A] and [B] both ignore 15(A)(1)(b). [D] is goofy.

Marty brings an action, pro se, against Acme, claiming "outrageous conduct in manufacturing gizmos." Acme, unable to discern the legal basis for the claim, moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). The judge grants the motion, and Marty, with a lawyer, files a clearer complaint alleging that Acme's product infringes on a patent he holds on a similar device. Acme responds to the amended complaint by filing a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(3), arguing that under 28 U.S.C. § 1400, the special venue provision for patent cases, venue is improper. Acme's objection to venue. . . . - [A] is waived under 12(g)(2) because it was omitted from Acme's first pre-answer motion. - [B] is not waived under 12(h)(1)(A), but Acme cannot make a second pre-answer motion based on it. - [C] is not barred by Rule 12(g)(2). Acme can make a second pre-answer motion based on it. - [D] is improper, because it cannot be made by pre-answer motion.

[C] is the best answer. When Acme received the complaint, it couldn't understand the claim. It didn't know it was being sued for patent infringement and so had no idea that special venue provision might apply. Thus, the venue objection wasn't "available" to Acme when it filed its first pre-answer motion. [A] is wrong because 12(g)(2) says nothing about waiver and because 12(g)(2) doesn't bar all repeat pre-answer motions, as explained in response to [C]. [B] is wrong because D can make a second pre-answer motion to raise an objection unavailable when she made the first. And [D] is nonsense. This is obviously a claim on the 12(b)( checklist that may be raised by pre-answer motion.

Steve sues Sam in federal court for negligence arising out of an auto accident. He has the complaint delivered (without a summons) to Sam's house, where the process server slips it under the door. Sam moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process (claiming Steve did not serve properly under Rule 4(e)(2)) and for insufficient process, (claiming that Steve violated Rule 4(c)(1) because he did not serve the summons with the complaint). The judge should - [A] deny the motion, because Sam asserted two separate grounds for the motion. - [B] deny the Rule 12(b)(5) motion, because service was proper under Rule 4(e)(2). - [C] order Steve to serve process again in compliance with the rules. - [D] dismiss the case for lack of compliance with the Rule 4 requirements regarding proper service.

[C] is the best answer. No judge will dismiss outright when Sam clearly has actual notice and is just filing a technical complaint. [A] is clearly wrong - obviously Rule 12(g) permits stacking motions. [B] is wrong because service was improper given that the server just slid it under the door. This isn't specifically permissible under Rule 4 (and is unlikely to be permitted by any state rules). [D] is highly unlikely given a mere technical defect and no showing that parties actually lack knowledge. Why would D move to dismiss for easily remedied defects? Just adds delay and expense? Usually, you'd raise these only when the statute of limitations has run in the interim, and D CAN'T BE RE-SERVED.

Cal (CA), went on vacation in Colorado. While there, he bought an exercise machine from Jackson, who had recently moved from Texas. The machine was made by Sweda-Trak, a Texas company that sells its products only in Texas and has its only place of business in the Western District of Texas. Cal brought the machine back to CA, where it malfunctioned and injured him in Los Angeles. Cal sues Sweda-Trak in federal court, alleging negligent design. Venue in Cal's action would be - [A] proper in the Central District of CA (which includes LA), because property that is subject of the action is located there. - [B] proper in the District of Colorado because both Sweda-Trak resides there for venue purposes. - [C] proper in the Central District of CA because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place there. - [D] improper in the Central District of CA because, while a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place there, Sweda-Trak does not "reside" there under the

[C] is the best answer. The site where Cal suffered the injury is the site where a "substantial part of the events" took place under § 1391(b)(2). [A] is wrong because this case doesn't involve a dispute over an interest in property. [B] is flat wrong. Sweda-Trak has no connections to Colorado (Jackson's actions were the quintessential "unilateral act" of the consumer) and certainly doesn't reside there for venue purposes. [D] seems to require satisfaction of both (b)(1) and (b)(2), when in fact they are disjunctive. (Note - it's hard to imagine that Sweda-Trak would be subject to suit in CA under personal jurisdiction/minimum contacts analysis, but venue is proper. These are different inquiries.). Where else would venue be appropriate? Almost certainly in the Western District of Texas (PPB). Assuming it's incorporated in Texas, it is also possibly a resident of other Texas districts, though that issue isn't 100% settled.

The Red Cab Co. contracts with Southern RR to obtain exclusive access to its passengers and station. After Erie, the Blue Cab Co. starts picking up passengers at the station. Red Cab brings a diversity action in federal court seeking to enjoin Blue Cab from accessing the station.• The federal judge must apply TN law, and TN has not decided the issue. After reviewing related TN cases, the court determines that TN would enforce such contracts. The court of appeals affirms. Subsequently, in an unrelated case, P sues D in TN state court to enjoin him from interfering with a similar contract. In analyzing the case, - [A] The TN judge would follow the ruling in Red Cab, since the federal court of appeals was applying TN law. - [B] The TN judge would follow the ruling in Red Cab, since it is the only available precedent on point and the court of appeals is an appellate court. - [C] The TN judge would not be bound by Red Cab but would consider it for whatever persuasive value its reasoning might have. - [D] None of the above is true.

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Whitney (RI) goes skiing in VT. When she purchases her lift ticket, she signs a release waiving her right to sue should she be injured by operator negligence. While skiing, she is injured. She brings a diversity action in federal court in RI. Assume RI refuses to enforce waivers unless they were individually negotiated, but VT enforces all such waivers. Assume RI's choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the place of injury, while VT's rule involves an assessment of the interests of the parties and states, and it's unclear whether VT would go with VT or RI law. - [A] The judge would apply VT law to Whitney's case because the accident happened in VT. - [B] The judge would apply RI law to Whitney's case because RI has an interest in compensation for a RI plaintiff. - [C] The judge would apply RI law because the suit was brought in RI. - [D] The judge would apply whatever state tort law would have been applied had the case been brought in VT state court.

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Laverne and Shirley are injured in an accident in Maryland when hit by two cars operated by Mindy and Shawn. Laverne sues Mindy in Maryland state court. Shirley sues Mindy in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. In both actions, plaintiffs claim Mindy is jointly and severally liable for all damages, even if Shawn was partially at fault. In both actions, Mindy argues that she is only liable for her percentage of fault. In 1911, the Maryland high court held in Powers that tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable. In 2009, the court affirmed this rule but did so over vigorous dissent of three (of seven) justices. Since then, one justice in the majority has retired and been replaced. The clear modern trend is the rule advanced by Mindy. - [A] Both the federal and state judges will probably apply the Powers rule. - [B] The state judge will probably apply Powers, but the federal judge will probably adopt Mindy's percentage fault rule. - [C] The state judge will probably adopt Mindy's rule, but the federal judge will probably apply Powers. - [D] Both judges will probably adopt Mindy's rule.

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