Consti 2 cases (ex post facto laws, citizenship)

Calder v Bull

"1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." --- 1. make the act criminal and punish it, 2. aggravate the crime or make it greater than it was when the act was committed, 3. change the punishment and inflict greater punishment than the law required when the act was committed, or 4. alter the legal rules of evidence to receive less or different testimony to convict the offender than the law required at the time of the offense.

Katigbak v SolGen

Assailed law is RA 1379, " "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor" - Alleges that the said law is an ex-post facto law that a. authorizes the confiscation of private property acquired prior to the approval of the law and obliges the public official or employee to explain how he acquired his private property thereby compelling himself to incriminate himself, and to a certain extent authorizes the confiscation of said property without due process of law b. And authorizes the confiscation of property previously mortgaged in good faith to a person. - There were actions that led to the proceedings: 1. Instituted by spouses Katigbak praying: o that the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under RA 1379 o that the above law be declared unconstitutional as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval o that the properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings o NBI officers and Investigating Prosecutor be sentenced to pay damages. 2. RP v Katigbak Sentenced the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally o Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs - Cases were jointly tried - Trial court held that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; that with respect to things acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; that Alejandro Katigbak may not be deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. - Court of appeals certified to the Court the same cases since the question involved is the constitutionality of RA 1379 WON RA 1379 is an ex post facto law and should be declared unconstitutional Yes. The nature of RA 1379 is penal. iting voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants

frivaldo v comelec

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents. ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

poe-llamanzares v comelec

FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father's deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC. On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen (2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement. HELD: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency. (1) there is high probability that Poe's parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe's bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. (2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law. As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

valeroso v people

FACTS: On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered. ISSUE/S: Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid HELD/DECISION: Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be "in his immediate control." Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the "plain view doctrine." However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso's right against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

People v Manayao

FACTS: Pedro Manayao joined the Makapili, a group controlled by the Japanese forces. Manayao participated in the killing of residents of Banaban, Angat, Bulacan on Jan. 29, 1945. The event was part of the reprisal after the guerilla raid two days ago. The People's Court sentenced Manayao to death based on the testimony of two witnesses, who survived the Banaban massacre, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez. Hence, this appeal. Manayao argues that he was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan and was subject to Japanese military law; therefore, the People's Court had no jurisdiction over his case. He also claims that lost his citizenship by swearing an oath of allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan (as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 63) such that the Philippine law on treason is not applicable to him. Finally, he asserts that the he was acting under orders from a superior. ISSUES/HELD: 1. Whether Manayao, in joining the Makapili, was a member of the Japanese armed forces - NO 2. Whether the defense of loss of citizenship by joining the Japanese army makes Manayao not criminally liable for treason under Philippine law - NO RATIO: 1. Manayao was not a member of the Japanese armed forces. Makapili was an organization of Filipino traitors, organized to render military aid to the Japanese armed forces during the war. However, it is not part of the Japanese armed forces. 2. Manayao did not lose his Filipino citizenship by swearing an oath to support the constitution and laws of Japan. Manayao's oath as a member of Makapili cannot be considered an oath to support the constitution and laws of Japan that would have resulted in loss of Filipino citizenship under C.A. No. 63. The Makapili could have sworn to aid the Japanese armed forces without taking an oath to support the constitution and laws of japan. Manayao also failed to prove that he accepted a commission in the armed forces of Japan, which is a ground for loss of citizenship under C.A. No. 63. Indeed, if this defense is sustained, it would effectively shield the perpetrator from the very crime that he committed. Thus, he cannot conveniently divest himself of his Filipino citizenship through his treasonous acts to escape criminal liability under Philippine law on treason.

Yu v Defensor-Santiago

FACTS: Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship HELD: Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

kilosbayan v ermita

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ong's citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition. HELD: First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the Supreme Court. Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong's petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete the appointment. The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesn't end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesn't pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesn't provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an appointment.

dabid v agbay

FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO rejected petitioner's MLA, ruling that petitioner's subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225. RULING: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law's effectivity. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

calilung v datumanung

FACTS: Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." ISSUE/S: 1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional 2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance RULING: No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

nicolas-lewis v comelec

FACTS: Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter's registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled. HELD: RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.

republic v ong

FACTS: The respondent, Kerry Lao Ong, filed for a petition for naturalization in 1996. Ong was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents. He was raised and educated in the Philippines, having studied in the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu, and the Ateneo de Manila University. In 1981, he married Grezilda Yap, also a Chinese citizen, and fathered four children, which upon filing of petition were all of school age, and were enrolled in exclusive schools in Cebu. In his petition, he alleged that he is a "businessman/business manager," and has been since 1989. However, when he testified, he alleged that he has been a businessman since after he graduated from college in 1978. He made no mention of the nature of his "business." He also alleged that he earns an average annual income of P150,000.00, and presented four tax returns as "proof" of said income (amounting to P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00 and P128,000.00). In 2001, the trial court granted his petition, and was admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. In 2003, The Republic, through the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the CA, which was then denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. RULING: The Court held that Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or a public charge. It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse's income should not be included in the assessment. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of "some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation." Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization. Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

republic v karbasi

FACTS: On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC where he alleged the following: 1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi; 2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR; 3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year; 4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte; 5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card which also serves as his birth certificate; 6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child; 7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of marriage; 8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City; 9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name; 10.Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten year requirement of continuous residence; 11.He speaks and writes English and Visayan; 12.His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less; 13.He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473; 14.He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001; 15.It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship; 16.Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and testify as witnesses at the hearing thereof. After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner submitted his witnesses, and thereafter, took the witness stand himself. He narrated that he is an Iranian national. He and his brother left Iran in 1986 beacause of the war between Iran and Iraq at that time. Their government confiscated their passport so they travelled by camel to Pakistan where they stayed for 3 years, but was not granted a refugee status there. They decided to come to the Philippines since one of his brothers was already studying in the country. They procured Pakistani passports under assumed names. Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted himself to the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and protection to some extent. On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition for naturalization. Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization. The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer needed to include the income he received as payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian laws. ISSUE: WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees? HELD: NO Although it isTrue that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under its various international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit: Article 6 of the 1951 Convention: For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling. Article 34 of the 1951 Convention: The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings. In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.

aznar v comelec

FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines. COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes. ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed. HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are : 1. By naturalization in foreign country; 2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and 3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country. The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship. The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states "Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" has no retroactive effect. The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

burca v republic

FACTS: Petitioner Zita Ngo Burca was born in Gigaquit, Surigao on March 30, 1933. Her father was NgoTay Suy and her mother was Dee See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of NationalistRepublic of China. She holds Native Born Certificate and Alien Certificate. Petitioner claims that she isof legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; thatbefore her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China. She also asserts that she hasall the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications required under Section 4of Commonwealth Act No. 473. This is a petition to declare Zita Ngo Burca as possessing allqualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for thepurpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration. The solicitor General opposedthe petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to mention what is required under Section 7naturalization law. ISSUE:Whether or not Zita Burca can be declared as a citizen of the Philippines. RULING:No. In the petition filed by the petitioner there are two flaws. First the petitioner failed to allegeher former residence thus violating Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law and second, the petitionwas submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner without any witnesses which violates the legalrequirement of two witnesses. For these reasons the petitioner failed to acquire Filipino citizenship andher petition to cancel her Alien Registry was denied.

Re Application the The Philippine Bar

FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of the petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino. ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority. HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement "upon reaching the age of majority." In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.

chan tek lao v republic

FACTS: The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court on June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision. More than 10 years later, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization, raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling 1960's (an applicant must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was published was indeed of general circulation in the province where the proceeding was had) that there was no showing or proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of Solicitor General is correct in canceling the naturalization of Chan Teck Lao on the ground that he failed to follow the publication requirement. HOLDING: No. The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic with former Chief Justice Concepcion as spokesman for the Court, indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao from a lower court decision promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization that dates back to 1952 as a result of 1950 decision of this Tribunal sustaining his plea to become a Filipino. Gan Tsitung, in language plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given a judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There would be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had subsequently become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship. The decision of the lower court of January 20, 1965 ordering the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen is SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Citizenship Political Law

bengson v hret

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election. ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. HELD: petition dismissed YES Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. ** Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

petition for leave to resume practice of law

Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. Issue: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship Ruling: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Bocea v Teves

Facts: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Issue: Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Held: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. (BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)

People v Jabinal

Facts: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court's ruling in People vs. Mapa. As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa. Issue: Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? Ruling: The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted. Reason: The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Salvador v Mapa Jr.

Facts: On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm. The defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that he was appointed as such. Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is clear. The law provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for secret agents. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

so v republic

Facts: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9 During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family's business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner's family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends. The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds: Issue: W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws - the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant's worthiness. e do not agree with petitioner's argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Tecson v Comelec

Facts: Petitioners sought for respondent Poe's disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe's) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction. Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen. Ruling: 1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding "qualification of a candidate" for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to "contests" relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections. 2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citize

republic v sagun

Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport. After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen. Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Issues: 1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible? 2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship? Held: 1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence. 2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: x x x x (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. For respondent to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit: Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review. It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. (Republic vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012)

labo jr., v comelec

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

PCGG v Carpio-Morales

In 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) and Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to be used by the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide in investigating and studying loans granted by government financing institutions that amount to behest loans. One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC), which was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate. From 1969 to 1977, RHC obtained a number of loans totaling P86.9 million. To secure said loans, RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans. In 1980, 40% of the amount were converted into DBP's common shareholding in RHC, and the balance of P58.4 million was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of P11.97 million. On the basis of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP's total exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. On January 4, 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee then submitted a report to the President where it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. An Affidavit-Complaint was filed on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman issued an Order dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Ombudsman issued another Order dismissing the complaint on the ground ofprescription, effectively denying the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription RULING: The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under saidlaw shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased tofifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, whichtook effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longerprescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. Following the Court's pronouncements in People v. Pacificador, the rule is that "in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted." As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973,1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for the Court's determination is the reckoning point for the 10-year period. Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription shall begin to run. This void, however, is remedied by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides in part: Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. xxx. Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the counting of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the commission of the violationof the law; and 2) if the day when the violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the Court has recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4,1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office ofthe Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground of prescription.

Carmell v Texas

In Carmell v. Texas, the defendant was convicted on 15 counts of sexual offenses against his stepdaughter between 1991 and 1995 when she was between 12 and 16 years old. The Texas sexual offense statute specifies that a victim's testimony about a sexual offense cannot support a conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence or the victim informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence. But the victim's testimony alone can support a verdict if the victim was under a certain age at the time of the offense. In 1993, legislation increased this age limit from 14 to 18. On four counts, the defendant's conviction depended on which version of the law applied because (1) the incidents occurred before the law changed on September 1, 1993 and (2) the only evidence produced was the testimony of the victim who was 14 or 15 years old at the time of the incidents. The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether applying the amended statute to these counts violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. 1, §§ 9, 10). The clause generally prohibits a law passed after an act occurs from retroactively changing the legal consequences of that act. In a five to four decision, the Court ruled that applying the amended Texas statute retroactively violated the ex post facto clause because the statute is a sufficiency of the evidence rule that reduced the amount of evidence required to convict the person (No. 98-7540 (May 1, 2000)). The dissent argued that the statute was a witness competency rule that could apply retroactively based on the Court's precedents and did not conflict with the fundamental purposes of the ex post facto clause of preventing unfairness and vindictive legislation.

republic v cokeng

The respondent only stated in his application for naturalization his address in Sto. Cristo Manila however he manifested in several public documents that he also resided in Quezon City and when asked about his residence in Quezon City he asserted that it was an address not a residence or it was set down in mistake or he purchased it for his parents. Respondent Francisco Cokeng seeks reconsideration of this Court's decision ordering the revocation of his certificate of naturalization. Bases of the decision were that in the original application for naturalization, said respondent failed to state all his former places of residence; and lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct, rendering the naturalization one that was illegally obtained. ISSUE:Whether or not the revocation of the respondents certificate of naturalization is valid.RULING:Under section 7 of the Naturalization Law expressly requires the applicant to state his "present and past place of residence", and the words used in the statute clearly show that the term residence was not employed in the sense of legal domicile, precisely because a person can only have one domicile.Good faith of the applicant in omitting one or more of his "present and past places of residence" in his application, becomes and is irrelevant for the purposes of the law. Whether the omission be in good or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the irreproachability of applicant's behaviour is thereby prevented, and the law's intent frustrated. Hence, this Court in a long line of decisions has invariably held that such omission is fatal to the application for naturalization It is apparent from the preceding considerations that the act of appellee Cokeng in not disclosing his residence in Quezon City, having deprived the State of opportunity to fully inquire into the applicant's conduct, rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being contrary to the requirements and policy of the law. While the decree had become final, the State is not thereby deprived of corrective action through denaturalization proceedings for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. For under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, "a competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the civil registry whenever it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally. Thus the revocation of respondents certificate of naturalization is valid.

maquiling v comelec

The use of foreign passport and its impact on dual citizenship, effective renunciation, and holding of public office under RA 9225 The use of a foreign passport after taking the oath of allegiance and executing an affidavit of renunciation under Republic Act No. 9225, or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," is a positive act showing the applicant's continued possession of a foreign citizenship. While it does not divest him of his reacquired Filipino citizenship, it negates his qualification to run for an elective post or be appointed to a government position. This, in a nutshell, is the ruling in the 2013 case of Maquiling vs. Comelec, et. al. (G.R. No. 195649), penned by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno. In the Maquiling case, it has been established that private respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. Subsequently, however, he was naturalized as a US citizen, thereby losing his Filipino citizenship. In July 2008, with the intention for repatriation, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. His application was approved. In April 2009, he again took an oath of allegiance and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his US citizenship. In November 2009, he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in a certain town in Mindanao. In April 2010, another mayoralty candidate (and also private respondent), Linog Balua, sought the disqualification and/or the cancellation of Arnado's cerficate of candidacy. Apparently, Arnado used his US passport in entering and leaving the Philippines between the period April 2009 and June 2009, July 2009 and November 2009, January 2010 and March 2010. Balua presented as evidence a computer-generated travel record and a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In so declaring that Arnado is disqualified from holding public office and even from being a candidate during the 2010 elections, C.J. Sereno explained: "Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America." xxx "While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. "When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America." "We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport." With that, C.J. Sereno passionately said: "The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship." xxx "Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other."

David v SET

Whether or not Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development. Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552 stating "It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s).If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned". Similarly Section 8 refers to the applicability of Inter-Country Adoption stating "Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption, in order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted: to the Board: xxx b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate. In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by foreigners. Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization process. thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens. As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship . Also Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural- born citizenship.

schneider v rusk

chneider v. Rusk dealt with the rights of naturalized Americans. Angelika Schneider, a native of Germany, had come to the United States as a child. She and her parents were naturalized, and Schneider lived in America through her college years. Afterward, she went abroad to continue her studies and married a German citizen. Schneider then settled in Germany and began a family. Twice she returned to America for brief visits. In 1959, when Schneider tried to renew her U.S. passport, the State Department refused her request, saying she was no longer an American citizen. The government based its decision on a section of the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. The law said naturalized citizens who lived in their native lands for three years lost their American citizenship. The government believed returning to one's homeland weakened a naturalized citizen's allegiance to the United States, and sometimes put the American government in conflict with foreign nations. In 1962, almost 1,000 people had been expatriated under this law. Schneider sued the State Department to regain her citizenship. A district court found for the government, and Schneider appealed to the Supreme Court. In his decision, Justice Douglas noted that the justices' views on expatriation had varied in the past, but in this case, the Court ruled 5-3 that the pertinent provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was unconstitutional. Douglas wrote, "We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive." He then cited the Court's past disagreements on expatriation, and concluded with the majority's reasoning in the present case: This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do the native born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process" . . . The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their right to live and work abroad in way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship.